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*To suffer woes which Hope thinks infinite;
To forgive wrongs darker than death or night;
To defy Power, which seems omnipotent;
To love, and bear; to hope till Hope creates
From its own wreck the thing it contemplates;
Neither to change, nor falter, nor repent;
This, like thy glory, Titan, is to be
Good, great and joyous, beautiful and free;
This is alone Life, Joy, Empire, and Victory!*

—Shelley, "Prometheus Unbound."

PREFACE

This volume has as its excuse for being two objects. It is first of all an attempt to reach a goal hitherto unattained and commonly said to be unattainable: a treatment of modern European history that shall be entertaining as well as informing. Secondly, it is an attempt to present a more satisfactory synthesis along the lines of the New History than has so far been offered.

In an effort to escape from the mere cataloguing of events, so difficult to avoid when much ground must be covered in a small space, minor events and figures have been omitted or subordinated to events and personages of more general importance and interest. And in order that the latter—more especially the development of fundamental ideas, the history of the World War, and the course of postwar developments—may receive fuller treatment, the political history of the earlier years of the nineteenth century and the history of domestic developments have been reduced to a minimum.

It is hoped that the method of organization, a close combination of the chronological and the topical, will facilitate the study of the text. The method of organization is also designed to facilitate the omission of portions of the text, if so desired; and with the history of the early nineteenth century and of domestic affairs reduced, it is possible for the teacher to use a considerable amount of collateral reading. It is also hoped that the appendices will prove of substantial value.

*The last two sections of Chapter II are designed as an overview of the 1815-1870 Epoch—comparable to the overviews on pages 169 and 481—as well as an overview of the entire period since 1815.

The author is of the opinion that students should be encouraged to underline important phrases in the text that convey the main idea of the passage (not necessarily entire sentences, but not merely topics) and that such underlining is of more value than any marginal topics furnished by the writer.

In writing a preface to a volume like the present, the author is almost overwhelmed by his sense of indebtedness and hardly knows where to begin; six friends, however, deserve special mention. First of all, since this is my first volume to appear in print, I wish to take the opportunity to acknowledge my general debt to Father Robert Howard Lord, formerly Professor of History at Harvard, without whose kindness, patience, and encouragement during my years of graduate study my career as a writer of history would have ended before it began.

For the impetus that set me to work on this particular task I am indebted to Professor Walter P. Hall of Princeton, who has given generously of his time to the reading of several of the sections. Professor Sidney B. Fay of Harvard has read the entire work in manuscript. To my classmate, Professor Noel C.

Little, Head of the Physics Department of Bowdoin College, I owe an immeasurable debt for his careful and patient reading of the portions dealing with science; the paragraphs on Relativity are his. Theodora Bates Cogswell and Mr. Harold T. Pulsifer have each read considerable portions for style and have offered invaluable suggestions.

The chart on the government of Soviet Russia was done under the supervision of my friend Professor Philip Mosely of Union College, who read the chapter on Postwar Russia. This chapter was also read by Mr. Maurice Hindus, and the chart was reviewed by Professor Samuel Harper of Chicago University. The section on medieval history was read by the late Professor Dana C. Munro, the sections on medicine by Dr. William R. Williams, the sections on chemistry by Professor Philip W. Meserve, and the section on pre-nineteenth century philosophy by Professor Theodore M. Greene.

Others who have assisted me are Professor Harold H. Bender; Sir Bernard Pares; Louise Roberts Helmreich; Professor E. C. Helmreich; the staff of the Bowdoin College Library, in particular Mr. Wilder and Mr. Boyer; the staff of the Dartmouth College Library, in particular Miss Adams; the staff of Widener Library at Harvard, in particular Mr. Briggs and Mr. Haynes; Mr. G. V. Duffield; Mr. M. O. Young; Jennie Pope Albion; Professor R. G. Albion; Professor W. B. Catlin; Professor T. N. Carver; Mr. Nathan Haskell Dole; Professor Wilmot B. Mitchell; Professor H. W. Babb; Professor T. C. Van Cleve; Dr. Alton F. Pope; Mr. W. H. Farrar; Mr. J. H. Leighton; Professor Roscoe J. Ham; Mr. L. S. Treadwell; M. Jean Tierrot; Miss Dorothea Cogswell; Miss Frances Owen; Dr. H. Martinovitch; Mr. Edwin H. Blanchard; Susan Nichols Pulsifer; Professor Edward Kirkland; Professor William Lockwood; and Professor Stanley P. Chase.

My friend and classmate, Mr. Donald Philbrick, kindly undertook the arduous and thankless task of proofreading. I also wish to express my particular gratitude to Mrs. Edgar O. Achorn. For final decisions as to facts and phraseology I am of course responsible; final decisions as to punctuation (particularly ellipses) were made by the publishers.

For permission to quote from copyright work I am indebted to the following: To Miss Gladys Ewart for permission to quote from the work of her father John S. Ewart, K.C., LL.D., *The Roots and Causes of the Wars*. To the Yale University Press for permission to quote from E. N. Lewis, *The Anatomy of Science*. To the Oxford University Press for permission to quote from Schneider, *Making the Fascist State*. To George Allen and Unwin Ltd. for permission to quote from Bertrand Russell, *A Free Man's Worship*. To Messrs. Curtis Brown, Ltd., for permission to quote from Dillon, *The Inside Story of the Peace Conference*. To Charles Scribner's Sons for permission to quote from Tolstoi, *The Kingdom of God is Within You* and from Kaempffert, *A Popular History of Invention*. To Houghton Mifflin Co. for permission to quote from Henry Adams, *The Education of Henry Adams*. To the Macmillan Co. for permission to quote from Stuart Chase, *Men and Machines*; Frazer, *The Golden Bough*; Vachel Lindsay's *The Eagle That Was Forgotten*; and Dampier-Whetham, *The History of Science*. The selection by Spengler is reprinted from the *Decline of the West* by Oswald Spengler by permission of

PREFACE

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and special arrangement with Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., authorized publishers. The stanza from my poem, "Those Who Sleep in France," is printed with the kind permission of the *Boston Transcript*.

In the interests of economy and clarity, occasional liberties in paragraphing have been taken with long quotations.

R. A.

Brunswick, Maine

Feb. 12, 1934.

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**EUROPEAN CIVILIZATION
AND POLITICS SINCE 1815**

ABBREVIATIONS INDICATIVE OF NATIONALITY

(In many cases it has seemed best to indicate nationality merely by an abbreviation in parentheses.)

A *American* (that is, a native of the United States)

An *Austrian*

Bn *Belgian*

C *Canadian*

Ch *Chinese*

Cz *Czech*

D *Dutch*

Dh *Danish*

E *English*

F *French*

G *German*

H *Hungarian*

I *Italian*

Ih *Irish*

J *Japanese*

Jh *Jewish*

N *Norwegian*

P *Portuguese*

Ph *Polish*

R *Russian*

S *Scotch*

Sp *Spanish*

Sh *Swedish*

Ss *Swiss*

W *Welsh*

The index at the back of the book is a *key to pronunciation* for difficult foreign names.

At the opening of the sixteenth century, Europe knew less about most scientific matters than did Archimedes, who died in 212 B.C. Here and there throughout the fifteenth century we catch glimpses of men like Nicholas of Cusa (G) who were deeply interested in science but of whom we know comparatively little. With another Leonardo, Leonardo da Vinci (I, 1452-1519), we are on surer ground. Famous as a painter, he merits even greater fame as a pioneer of modern technology and invention. The foremost of those encyclopedic figures peculiar to the Renaissance and "perhaps the most astonishing genius born of woman," Leonardo da Vinci was outstanding as sculptor, architect, physicist, biologist, anatomist, physiologist, astronomer, and philosopher, and was "certainly the greatest engineer that ever lived." His utter scorn of authority and his reverence for observation and for experiment coupled with mathematics revealed a truly scientific attitude. His fame and importance as a scientist would have been far greater had he published his findings.

Were we to choose any one individual with whom to begin a history of modern science it would be Copernicus (Ph), whose book *De revolutionibus orbium celestium* (*On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Bodies*), published in 1543, initiated a veritable revolution in thought. Fortified by the discovery of similar opinions among the ancients, Copernicus reached the conclusion that the Ptolemaic or geocentric theory of the universe, consecrated by Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, was incorrect, that the planets do not revolve around the Earth, but that the Earth revolves around the Sun. The Copernican or heliocentric theory was doubly disturbing to the minds of contemporaries in that it contradicted both the teachings of the Church and the dictates of common sense (can we not plainly see the sun "rise and set"?), and it raised a question more fundamental than any propounded by the Protestant reformers. Was not man thereby dethroned from his central position in the universe? For this reason the Copernican theories met with hostility from Church officials. By coincidence, Copernicus died at the moment his book appeared, and so escaped any possibility of persecution. One of his followers, Bruno (I), who used the Copernican postulates to erect a system of pantheism, was burned at the stake.

The conclusion advanced by Copernicus was more a hypothesis (though the most important ever propounded) than a demonstration, and it erred in many respects. It remained for Tycho Brahe (Sh-Dh) to found modern observational astronomy (Tycho persistently denied the truth of the Copernican theories), and for Kepler (G), working from observations left by Tycho, to describe the orbits of the planets with mathematical precision. The spirit in which Tycho worked, however, was more medieval than modern, for it was the harmony of the spheres as evidenced by the mystical doctrine of numbers, inherited from Plato, that motivated his work. Kepler's achievements were the more remarkable in that his mathematical tools were decidedly rudimentary.

The Copernican Revolution made evident the need for a scientific method independent alike of authority and the fallacies of human observation. Leonardo da Vinci and Copernicus had foreshadowed such a method; but the task of formulating the technique—the combination of inductive observation and experiment with mathematical deduction—and of applying it was left to Galileo (I), from whom modern science traces its development in unbroken sequence.

By curious coincidence, Galileo was born the day that Michelangelo, the last great figure of the Renaissance, died. 1543, the same epoch-making year that saw the publication of the Copernican hypothesis, saw also the first appearance *in print* of the work of Archimedes, greatest of ancient scientists; and a copy of Archimedes fell into the hands of Galileo. Like Kepler, he felt the influence of Plato as well. Aristotle had taught that heavy bodies fell faster than light bodies. In 1591 Galileo demonstrated that falling bodies, in this case dropped from the Leaning Tower of Pisa, reach the ground at the same instant, irrespective of size and weight. This famous experiment marked the beginning of modern physics and the definitive introduction of the scientific method of experimental research. Galileo coined the word "acceleration" to describe one phase of the phenomena, and calculated that the speed of falling bodies increases as the square of the time that they take to fall. He further demonstrated that a body set in motion maintains a constant speed unless retarded by friction—a discovery which revealed why the planets continue to revolve without the aid of angels—proved that air has weight, and invented the thermometer. Galileo threw the whole Aristotelean terminology overboard and formulated new concepts of distance, time, and mass which enabled men to think in terms of matter and motion. Most important of all, his fundamental attitude was distinctly modern. He abandoned the search for ultimate causes, acknowledging that he knew nothing of force or the origins of the universe, and contented himself with the empirical knowledge of *how* things work. Even more singular, perhaps, was the fact that Galileo perceived psychological implications which have puzzled psychologists and philosophers from that day to this. He noted, for instance, that, apart from eyes, ears, or noses, there would be no colors, sounds, or smells. So began that impassioned interest in the relation of the human mind and abstract generalization to stubborn and irreducible facts which some consider the chief novelty in our present culture.

Kepler's work, so far as it had substantiated that of Copernicus, was based on mathematical induction rather than on observation; Galileo was one of the first to construct a telescope and was the first to furnish substantial, observational proof of the validity of the heliocentric theory. Thus he was primarily responsible for the acceptance of the Copernican hypothesis, although he was compelled by the Inquisition to deny what he had seen "because it is expressly contrary to the Holy Scripture." Not until 1822, indeed, did the sun receive the consent of the Papacy to become the center of the planetary system.

In intolerance and obscurantism, however, the Church was far from unique. Luther denounced the Copernican hypothesis in no uncertain terms because, according to the Bible, Joshua had caused the sun to stand still! Luther's great colleague, Calvin (F), burned the brilliant physician Servetus (Sp) for questioning the doctrine of the Trinity, and justified himself out of the mouth of his victim because Servetus in his last agony prayed, "Son of the Eternal God, have mercy upon me," instead of, "Eternal Son of God, have mercy upon me!"

A contemporary of Galileo, Francis Bacon (E), was the first to voice the dream of an all-inclusive science which should endow man with infinite power and make him master of both the world and his fate—the Faustian dream of modern man, foreign alike to the ancient and to the medieval mind.

The philosopher Descartes (F) marked the complete transition from faith in authority to faith in reason. Although educated in a Jesuit seminary and although, when he heard of Galileo's experiences with the Inquisition, he prudently burned the manuscript of his book *On the World*, Descartes flatly refused to accept *anything* on authority and on the slender basis of the premise, "*Cogito, ergo sum*" (I think, therefore I exist"), attempted by reason alone to formulate a complete explanation of the universe. His *Discourse on Method* (1637) was also of prime importance as a generalization and popularization of the Galilean method. Descartes endeavored to prove that the entire universe is merely a great perpetual-motion machine, acting in accordance with fixed laws. In so doing, he rendered lip service to the Deity, but only as a First Cause, remote and unaffected by man and his prayers. This was the essence of the Cartesian Revolution, "than which it is doubtful if the world has ever seen a greater."

Descartes was the first to formulate a complete dualism—a system of thought which treats the soul and the body (mind and matter) as each belonging to an irreducible, water-tight category. His contemporaries continued to regard the soul as a material substance. And he fathered the idea that on the physical side man is an integral part of the natural order. His most practical contribution was a novel method of combining algebra and geometry, the beginning of an immeasurably improved system of mathematics, which greatly influenced the youthful Newton; indeed, the invention of analytic geometry has been characterized as "the greatest single step ever made in the progress of the exact sciences."

Hobbes (E) went even further than Descartes, for in his *Leviathan* (1651) he propounded the idea that man is a part of the natural order psychologically as well as physically and that the science of human nature should be as exact as physics itself. From Locke's (E) conception of the newborn mind as a *tabula rasa* or blank (*Essay concerning Human Understanding*, 1690) arose the democratic dogma that "all men are created equal" and the belief in the possibility of progress through education and legislation. Obviously Locke's notions were in exact accord with the ideals of the bourgeoisie.

The year that Galileo died, the centenary of the death of Copernicus, saw the birth of Newton (E), the titanic figure in whom their work reached a culmination. His most important discoveries were made when he was only twenty-three, but were published later. To Newton is due the credit of compassing the mechanistic explanation of the universe attempted by Descartes and of erecting the first great physical synthesis. In 1687 his immortal *Principia* (*Principles*) revealed the law of universal gravitation, a demonstration that the same mathematical formula explains the motions of the planets in their courses and the action of an apple or a blade of grass as it falls to earth. An equally important contribution made by Newton was calculus, the mathematical method by which he achieved his triumphs and which he and Leibnitz (G) perfected, placing in man's grasp "the most potent instrument yet found for bringing the world into subjection."

The discovery of Newtonian gravitation has elicited numberless superlatives—"indisputably and incomparably the greatest scientific discovery ever made,"

"Newton was the greatest genius that ever existed"—but the immediate deductions were of less importance than the ultimate implications. To Newton, above all, is due the belief that every event connected with inorganic matter is governed by immutable natural law, the belief that constitutes the backbone of modern thought in general and scientific thought in particular, frees us from the caprices of Chance, and more than any other characteristic differentiates us from our prehistoric and medieval ancestors. Consider the primitive savage—a slave to his animistic beliefs, bowing before his fetishes, cowering before the medicine man, propitiating the gods with blood sacrifices of his best and dearest—if you will realize how far man had advanced by the end of the seventeenth century.

CHAPTER I

THE EVE OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
(1700-1815)

THE FOREFRONT OF LIBERALISM: VOLTAIRE, ROUSSEAU,
AND BENTHAM

Intellectually, the eighteenth century was a sort of halfway house between medieval times and the present day. The faith of the Middle Ages sank low, yet the eighteenth century was equally naïve in its acceptance of certain dogmas of its own—natural law, the essential goodness of man, human perfectibility, and the omnipotence of reason. During this century opposition to authority and faith in reason spread widely throughout educated society, making that period the Age of Reason *par excellence* or, as it is also called, the Age of Enlightenment. The men of the Middle Ages were ready to accept everything on faith and authority; the intellectuals of the eighteenth century, enlightened by reason, were unwilling to accept anything on authority, but insisted that everything be proved to their satisfaction. Not only did they maintain that all human institutions ought to satisfy the requirements of reason but, what is even more important, they had a firm belief in the power of reason to remake the world nearer to the heart's desire.

In the name of reason, therefore, they attacked most human institutions, particularly the Church and the State, though they rarely stopped to question the social system. Foremost among these destructive critics were two Frenchmen, Voltaire and Rousseau. In his masterpiece, *Candide, or Everything for the Best*, Voltaire, one of the greatest satirists of all time, depicted the life of his age with such penetrating faithfulness as to prove to his own satisfaction and that of many others that most things were very far from being for the best. Back of his mordant wit lay a fierce and fearless hatred of oppression and injustice; consequently he ranks as one of the greatest influences in shaping the new and rising spirit of humanitarianism, so foreign to the Middle Ages. Inspired by a visit to England, which was then under the sway of Newton's influence, Voltaire introduced Newton to the Continent and became the great popularizer of deism. The deists were a group of advanced thinkers, dominated by the postulates of Newtonian science, who pronounced the universe a great machine, analogous to a watch. This machine, they declared, had been fashioned and set in motion by a Creator who had thrown the key away, so to speak, and had left

his creation amenable only to the dictates of natural law. They therefore ridiculed belief in miracles (cf. Hume (S), *Essay on Miracles*, 1748) and the "superstitious" practices of the Church and the sects, and declared their adherence to a universal religion, older than and underlying, they affirmed, all orthodox creeds. The career of Voltaire illustrates the change in public opinion which took place during his lifetime (1694-1778). At the outset he was persecuted and forced to flee the country; but during his last visit to Paris, in the year of his death, he was accorded a veritable triumph. The chief popularizer of deism in English-speaking countries was Thomas Paine, author of *The Age of Reason* (1795).

Like Voltaire, the majority of the ablest men in France were religious skeptics. The deists, though unorthodox, were not openly irreligious. Not a few of the leaders, however, used Newtonian science to erect a system of complete materialistic determinism which included man and his soul. The less extreme of these radicals became agnostics, who declared that they could see no reason for believing in either a Creator or a future life, but that they would suspend judgment. Others, like Holbach (F), took the next logical step, flatly denying the existence of both Creator and future, and became out-and-out atheists. To this group considerable numbers of educated Frenchmen belonged, whether openly or not.

Rousseau, even more than Voltaire, is credited with being the spiritual father of the modern world. An eccentric nobody in 1750, Rousseau published an essay "On the Arts and Sciences" and awoke to find himself famous. (Surely, then if ever, the staid Muse of History was in a satiric mood.) At best a disgruntled misfit, whose inability to cope with his environment was the impulse back of his theories, at worst an inspired madman, he was destined to be the most potent literary influence of his century and perhaps of all modern history. The essay that made his fame was an attempted demonstration that the arts and sciences, or more broadly speaking the forces of civilization in general, tend to corrupt. "Nature made man happy and good, but . . . society depraves him and renders him miserable," asserted Rousseau. This thesis gave rise to the well-known doctrine of the "return to nature."

Although anticipated in many respects by the English, notably by Locke, and although adulating aristocracy in preference to democracy in his *Social Contract* (1762), Rousseau was the inspiration of the democrats of the French Revolution. This is understandable if one remembers his unrestrained attacks on absolute monarchy (which he declared the worst possible form of government, invariably bad in its effects), the opening words of the *Social Contract* ("Mankind was born free"), and also his iconoclastic attitude toward society in general. Rousseau was likewise important because of his firm belief in progress and in the perfectibility of man.

With Voltaire and Rousseau in the vanguard of radical thought stood an Englishman, Bentham, the great theorist of nineteenth-century liberalism and prophet of utilitarianism. Bentham did not originate the doctrine which is inseparably connected with his name, but his indomitable energy erected it into a world-shaking system. His earliest work, a *Fragment on Government* (1776), was a masterly attack on the reactionary English constitution eulogized by

Blackstone in his *Commentaries*. The *Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* (1789) is generally considered Bentham's capital work. In it he defines utility as "that property in any object whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness, or to prevent the happening of mischief, pain, evil, or unhappiness." "Nature," he says, "has placed mankind under the government of two sovereign motives, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do." From these passages it is clear that Bentham uses the word "utility" in a very technical sense. Bentham's catholic interests embraced legal procedure, prison reform, democracy, imperialism (which he fervently condemned), religion (he asserted that Christianity had been debased by St. Paul), education, and poor-relief. On every department of the social sciences he left his impress, but particularly on legal reform. His influence on the political reforms of the nineteenth century is of especial interest to us, for it was his spirit which was back of the Reform Movement and Chartism. In his *Catechism of Parliamentary Reform* (1817) he advocated not only virtually universal suffrage but also annual elections, uniform electoral districts, and the secret ballot. Bentham was acquainted with nearly every great English reformer, and his correspondents included the Tsar Alexander, the Duke of Wellington, O'Connell, Bolivar, and John Quincy Adams. He died in the year of the Great Reform Bill; but his influence continued to be felt in the long series of reforms up to 1867. Above all, the popular expression of his creed, "the greatest happiness of the greatest number," gave a lasting impulse to humanitarianism, and is part of the background of all liberal thinking to this day. To appreciate the importance of his philosophy it is only necessary to recall the asceticism of the Middle Ages.

EXTREMISTS AND COSMOPOLITES

The liberals, led by Voltaire, dominated the following century in so far as it achieved any advance over the past; but, content to patch up the existing system, they took little interest in the economic ills of their day. Even the leaders of the French Revolution were almost without exception stanch supporters of the sanctity of private property; and it was not till the end of the century that the fundamental (economic) organization of society came under fire from any extremists¹ of note.

Godwin (E), so-called Father of Anarchism, began life as a minister and a follower of a certain John Glas, "who, after Calvin had damned ninety-nine in a hundred of mankind . . . contrived a scheme for damning ninety-nine of the followers of Calvin." Later, Godwin left the ministry to become a social reformer, and as such his influence was widespread, for there was hardly a prominent liberal with whom he was not on terms of intimacy. His wife was Mary Wollstonecraft, one of the earliest advocates of women's rights (*Vindication of the Rights of Woman*, 1792), and their daughter became the wife of Shelley, the most radical of English poets.

Godwin's *Inquiry concerning Political Justice* (1793) attacks society from

¹ Those who advocate extreme measures of social reform—socialists, communists, anarchists, and the like.

every angle, political, social, and religious ("God Himself has no right to be a tyrant"). Godwin denounced not only monarchies and aristocracies but even democracies, which tyrannize, to his way of thinking, over the individual by majority rule; for government in any form was "that brute engine which has been the only perennial cause of the vices of mankind." He also opposed private property and anticipated Louis Blanc in advocating the distribution of wealth according to needs. Believing in the perfectibility of man and the omnipotence of reason, Godwin attributed wrong-doing to ignorance, not to malice. He therefore deprecated the use of violence, and relied on persuasion to effect the abolition of the evils he condemned, to rule society subsequently, and to bring about a golden age when "labour should become so light as rather to assume the appearance of agreeable relaxation and exercise. Every man would have a frugal, yet wholesome diet. . . . No man would be an enemy of his neighbour, for they would have no subject of contention."

While Godwin was elaborating a theory of anarchism, Babeuf, a Frenchman who has been credited with being the first to propose a practical scheme of social revolution and the first to publish a communist newspaper (1794-96), was developing his communistic² doctrines. Like Bentham and Godwin, he declared that "the aim of society is the happiness of all" and coupled with this the definition that "happiness consists in equality." To the doctrine of natural rights, so popular during the French Revolution, he added the corollary, "Nature has given to every man an equal right in the enjoyment of all goods." Babeuf therefore advocated that the state nationalize all corporations and that inheritance be abolished. Production and distribution were to be carried on under elective officials, with the franchise restricted to manual laborers (an interesting foreshadowing of the "dictatorship of the proletariat"); children were to be brought up by the state. Babeuf was the only communist of note during the Revolution, and paid for his views under the guillotine.

Many Englishmen beside Godwin—directly or indirectly, intentionally or unintentionally—contributed to the criticism of fundamental institutions. Spence originated the principle of the single tax, Thomas Paine proposed a 10 per cent inheritance tax, and Charles Hall delivered a telling indictment of capitalism. One-fifth of the population, Hall claimed, did nothing, yet received seven-eighths of the wealth. His analysis of the economic causes of war has hardly been surpassed.

There remains still another group, internationalists and pacifists, who, for lack of a better name, may be called cosmopolitans, and who evidenced an attitude of mind at variance with that of either conservatives or liberals³ and distinguishable from, if not hostile to, that of the extremists. Submerged in public opinion beneath the rising tide of nationalism, too unpopular and for the most part too nebulous to constitute the nucleus of any definite movement, their ideals remained the almost exclusive property of a few poets and dreamers who here and there could survey the world from the heights of their Olympian detachment.

² In the correct, primary sense of the word; not its loose, present-day sense (*cf.* p. 340).

³ The free-trade liberals were, in a sense, cosmopolitans and indeed gave the idea its only tangible hold on public opinion; but their principal interest was in its economic aspects—and so they affected politics only incidentally—and even in this restricted sphere was effective mainly in England.

In *Candide* Voltaire aimed a sturdy blow at nationalism, and Goethe (G) was moved to exclaim: "National hatreds are peculiar things. You will always find them strongest and most vigorous among the lowest stages of culture. But there is a stage where they entirely vanish, and where one stands in a certain measure above all nations, and feels the happiness or the woe of a neighboring people as though it were his own." He therefore concluded that man's true fatherland should be "the good, the noble, and the beautiful, which is bound to no particular province and to no particular land!" We find a similar sentiment emanating from Fichte (G): "What is the fatherland of the truly educated Christian European? In general it is Europe, in particular it is in every age that country in Europe which stands at the peak of civilization. . . . In this cosmopolitanism we can rest completely unperturbed by the actions and fates of states, for ourselves and our posterity, to the end of time."

Somewhat less nebulous were the ideas of Saint-Pierre (F) and Kant (G). In connection with the Peace of Utrecht, the Abbé of Saint-Pierre, following the lead of Sully (F), advocated a European confederation with a permanent council of arbitration (*A Plan for Perpetual Peace*, 1713). Kant published an essay *On Perpetual Peace* (1795) which is particularly interesting, since he envisaged a league of self-governing nations, believing that such governments would be more apt to keep the peace than monarchies. As any student of history knows, the cosmopolitans had little or no influence on the politics of the nineteenth century.

KANT, BECCARIA, AND MALTHUS

Rousseau, together with Voltaire, Bentham, and others of similar mind, formed part of the main stream of liberal thought, which constituted the logical background of the French Revolution and modern liberalism in general. As has been seen, most liberals were convinced rationalists. But the "back to nature" cult which Rousseau fathered was distinctly antirationalistic in tendency, since natural or primitive man is obviously a less rational being than his civilized brother. Rousseau, therefore, belonged also to the stream of skeptical⁴ thought which rose in the eighteenth century.

Descartes had not questioned the possibility of formulating a satisfactory explanation of the universe by reason alone. Hardly was Reason enthroned, however, when a counterswing away from this naïve and blind faith began. "What is it possible to accomplish by reason?" inquired some of Descartes's English successors. "Is it possible to be *sure* of anything?" Pondering this all-important question, technically known as epistemology, which was raised by Locke and has never been definitely answered, and taking note of the frailty of the human senses, their tendency to err, and the possibilities of self-deception, Berkeley (Ih) denied the existence of matter, although affirming the existence of God and mind. Hume, who denied the existence of God and mind also, as well as the reality of causation, concluded that all learning is "nothing but sophistry and illusion"—a fine prospect for nineteenth century science if taken seriously!

⁴ In the primary sense of one who doubts the value and utility of knowledge.

The considerations raised by the skeptics did not seriously trouble most men, but they motivated the work of Kant, who is generally considered the greatest of modern philosophers and who initiated the period of current philosophy with his *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781). Kant was confronted with the double task of destroying the remnants of dogmatic rationalism and of constructing a new universe to replace the one demolished by the skepticism of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. Like the skeptics, he began with the problem of epistemology: Is it possible for the human mind to construct a convincing and unassailable explanation of the cosmos? Above all, therefore, the *Critique* was an attempt to reintroduce law, order, causality, and reasonableness into the universe. Following in the footsteps of Galileo, Kant shows by psychological analysis that the properties with which we conceive things to be endowed are only the result of our way of looking at them—our ways of thinking—and are therefore properties of our minds. Space, time, and cause, for instance, are not properties of objective nature, but only of human nature. To illustrate, we may know considerable *about* electricity or a table, but what they *are* is not known and may never be. In other words, our possibilities of knowledge are limited in *range* to what we receive through sense perception. Kant accordingly rejects the concept of matter and concludes that physical objects are *in their essence* unknowable. Yet since our perceptions are subject to the laws of psychology, common to all mankind, he infers that they may be made the basis of a valid system of knowledge.

All attempts to establish *by reason* the existence of objects themselves (as distinct from the sensations we receive from them) Kant pronounces futile. He therefore maintains that it is impossible to *prove* the existence of God. He also maintains, however, that although pure “speculative” or theoretical reason fails, “practical” or moral reason (faith) dictates that we must believe in a God who will reward virtue and will right the balance of this obviously unjust world. This brings up his conception of virtue. Kant denies that acts are either good or bad in themselves and that goodness consists in conformity to a code. Rather it is obedience to the spirit of the moral law which bids us—not for fear or favor, but from a sense of duty (categorical imperative)—“act as if the maxim of thy action were by thy will to become a universal law of nature!” Here, at least, Kant makes a definite contribution to ethics.

Kant is the personification of the religious intellectual, determined to be true to his reason and to his faith alike, and as such he is the stronghold of all similarly-minded men. His work is comparable to that of Thomas Aquinas in that both conclude that reason is valid up to a certain point, but that beyond that point only faith can avail. The net result of the *Critique* was that on the one hand it seemed to demolish rationalism and the possibility of a purely rational religion; on the other, it laid the basis for the reviving beliefs of the intellectual classes, seriously undermined by the agnosticism and skepticism of the eighteenth century, by protecting them from the attacks of reason. Needless to say, Kant satisfied neither extreme pietists nor extreme radicals—nor, it may be added, many modern scientists. One of his admirers declares him “the presiding genius of the spiritual life of the nineteenth century”; but according to Bertrand Russell (E), “Kant deluged the philosophic world with muddle and

mystery, from which it is only now beginning to emerge. . . . To my mind he was a mere misfortune."

Two more eighteenth century theorists deserve mention. Somewhat off the main line of thought, in their chosen fields they were as influential as any of their contemporaries or predecessors. The science of penology was fathered by Beccaria, an Italian nobleman, who in his great work on *Crime and Punishment* (1764) laid down the fundamental principle that "crimes are more effectually prevented by the *certainty*, than by the *severity* of punishment." At that time, hundreds of crimes were punished by death, often on the basis of evidence obtained by torture; and Beccaria was loud in his denunciation of capital punishment and judicial torture. Although his main interest was in criminal procedure, he advanced some of the principal propositions later upheld by Bentham and Adam Smith. For instance, he insisted that "pleasure and pain are the only springs of action in beings endowed with sensibility" and used the phrase "the greatest happiness of the greatest number." *Crime and Punishment* went through six editions in eighteen months and was translated into twenty-two languages.

Most men of the age believed firmly in human perfectibility and in progress. In 1798 Malthus (E) published an *Essay on Population* which was a refutation of perfectibility as expounded by Rousseau and Godwin. Malthus maintained that such hopes are baseless because, he asserted, population tends to increase in geometrical progression and so outstrips the means of subsistence, which, according to him, only tend to increase in arithmetical progression. To Malthus, therefore, poverty was inevitable and belief in progress was a chimera, a pious hope fathered by the wish.

WHAT MAKES THE WORLD GO ROUND?

The Greeks of classical antiquity, who originated so much of our culture, evolved three explanations of the universe. Democritus maintained an atomic theory, which, because of the inability of nascent science to cope with the problems of natural law and thus provide a causal foundation, failed to convince his contemporaries. Aristotle too believed in natural law, but where that proved inadequate as an explanation, as it did in all except the simplest matters, he took refuge in a *deus ex machina*. His theories superseded the materialism of Democritus, fused with the teachings of the Church, and since the barbaric Teutons were even less able to explain physical phenomena than were the Greeks, reigned supreme throughout the Middle Ages. A third great Greek, Plato, is the lineal ancestor of modern idealism and mysticism, for he contended that true reality is not the physical object (subject to constant variation and decay) but the idea of the object in the divine intelligence.

By 1815, four great fundamental concepts were struggling for mastery over men's minds. First, there was the medieval belief in the guidance of a God who could and would perform miracles for the benefit of the faithful and to confound the impious.⁵ This anthropomorphic and homocentric concept, which

⁵ Of pre-Christian survivals it hardly seems necessary to take account.

enjoyed the undivided allegiance of the peasantry, was still widely prevalent. Secondly, there was the Newtonian concept of a universe created and set in motion by God but thereafter subject only to unalterable natural law. This was the generally accepted belief among the educated, but owing to the peculiar ability of the human mind to think in water-tight compartments, many were able to reconcile acceptance of this concept with retention of their belief in the earlier medieval theory. Thirdly, there were the skeptics, materialistic and mechanistic, who eliminated "the spirit" and even the Creator from their scheme of the cosmos. Small at first, this group was steadily increasing. And finally there were the idealists, who went to the other extreme and tended to deny the existence of matter.

ASTRONOMY

Although science as a whole runs back into the shades of prehistory, and although modern science was more than two centuries old in 1815, to our eyes its achievements prior to that date appear almost unbelievably meager.

In considering the history of science, the first point to be noted is the rise of specialization. During the eighteenth century the functions of the philosopher and the scientist were still largely indistinguishable; the study of nature was philosophy, and those who investigated its laws were philosophers. As an illustration take Kant, who was a scientist in his own right as well as a philosopher. Toward the beginning of the nineteenth century, the subject matter of science became so elaborate that no single scientist could hope to cover it all; and philosophers in the old sense were supplanted by mathematicians, physicists, chemists, biologists, and the like. This was unfortunate, for it meant that no one was competent to survey the whole field of scientific achievement, correlate the results, and draw conclusions. Unfortunately, too, the developments ultimately became so technical that today the advances made in a single field, even when translated into nontechnical language, are scarcely comprehensible to the layman.

Oldest of the sciences, its ancestry deriving from the star-gazers of pre-Christian Mesopotamia, astronomy at the opening of the nineteenth century occupied a commanding position. In scope it was macrocosmic; it was based on an all-inclusive law (Newtonian gravitation); thanks to the invention of calculus, it was endowed with a well-developed technique; and a galaxy of geniuses had carried its conclusions to a point of surprising finality. Most important of all, to astronomy in particular was due the widely disseminated belief in the omnipotence of natural law.

The chief advances of the eighteenth century were the work of two complementary stars of the first magnitude, Laplace and Herschel. A peasant by birth, Laplace became the greatest astronomer and one of the greatest scientists ever produced by his native land, and was characterized as the Newton of France because of his triumphs in gravitational (theoretical) astronomy. Newton had worked out the problems involved in the positions of *two* mutually gravitating bodies, but had left unexplained certain irregularities that seemed

to indicate an inexactitude in his general law and that perturbed and exercised his successors. Laplace, nevertheless, had a vision of a mathematical analysis which should ultimately be so refined as to "embrace in the same formula both the movements of the largest bodies in the universe and those of the lightest atom; to it nothing would be uncertain, and the future as the past would be present to its eyes." As his contribution toward this goal he sought a formula that, given the present positions and motions, would determine the positions and motions of three mutually gravitating bodies at any future time—a particular case of the problem involved in determining the mutual positions of the eighteen known bodies of the solar system. By his *Celestial Mechanics* (1799-1825) the last conspicuous obstacle to belief in gravitation and in the stability of the solar system was removed, since the inequalities previously noted were proved to be periodic, not cumulative. When he presented a copy of his work to Napoleon, that god of war remarked, "M. Laplace, they tell me you have written this large book on the system of the universe and have never even mentioned its Creator." To which Laplace replied, "I didn't have need of that hypothesis." Yet he was fundamentally humble in his attitude, as is proved by his last words—"What we know is little, what we do not know is immense."

Laplace was deeply interested in the theory of probability, for, as he said, "The most important questions of life are, for the most part, really only problems of probability." The truth of this assertion is increasingly apparent, for the all-important statistical calculations of present-day business and pure research are many of them based on the theory of probability, which Laplace raised to a science. To Laplace is also given chief credit for the introduction of the nebular hypothesis, incapable of final proof and since then considerably modified, but tending to show that the earth in its present form is the result of an incalculably long development. The importance of this theory was greatly enhanced in the following period by the enunciation of the evolutionary hypothesis, of which it was at once seen to be the complement.

Laplace was the greatest of the geniuses who completed the work of Newton on the solar system. Apparently astronomy had exhausted its possibilities; but Herschel, greatest of observing astronomers, demonstrated that the science was only well started—that its possibilities are limitless. Deserting the Hanoverian army in which he was a regimental musician, he arrived in England with only a crown (a little over a dollar) in his pocket, and for years made a living by playing and teaching music. His real ambition was to penetrate to the limits of space and "to leave no spot of the heavens unexamined"; but as no telescope suited to his needs existed, it was necessary for him to undertake the construction of one himself. After educating himself in mathematics, in addition to giving fourteen or more hours of instruction a day, and after repeated failures, he finally succeeded. Eventually George III, by granting him a stipend, relieved him of the drudgery involved in his teaching; and it may interest Americans to learn that it was this monarch who remarked: "I spend money on war because it is necessary, but to spend it on science, that is pleasant to me. This object costs no tears; it is an honor to humanity."

Herschel's earliest triumph was the discovery of a new planet, Uranus (1781), the first to be identified in historic times—although it was subsequently shown to have been seen twenty times before, a fact which adds immeasurably to his credit. The efficiency of his four-and-a-half-inch telescope marked him out as the foremost instrument-maker of the world, eventually, he constructed one with a seven-foot mirror, and his establishment became a pilgrimage spot for the great of all lands. The labor involved in his scientific achievements may be appreciated by remembering that in order to make *one* complete survey of the visible (northern) firmament, he had to take three hundred thousand separate observations, and that he made four such surveys during his lifetime.

To summarize his work is impossible. Its magnitude may be indicated by saying that as Galileo was the first to map the solar system, so Herschel was the first to map the galactic system (the stars of the Milky Way). His predecessors had studied the (visible) movements of the planets around the Sun, but had regarded the apparently motionless stars as fixed points in a crystalline sphere, uniform in distance from the Earth—just as pre-Copernican astronomers had regarded the planets as fixed points in a crystalline sphere (supposedly) revolving around a stationary Earth. By Herschel the stars were revealed as worlds in themselves, coequal and autonomous members of the universe, many of them suns with systems of their own. His most sweeping conclusion was that the entire solar system is moving, and he traced its path with approximate accuracy. He located 2,500 nebulae, of which only 103 had previously been known, and most important of all, discovered over 800 double stars, which proved that gravitation was universal and enabled his successors to make measurements of stellar distances. At the end of his life Herschel could say with truth: "I have looked further into space than ever human being did before me. I have observed stars of which the light, it can be proved, must take two million years to reach this earth."

THE OTHER NATURAL SCIENCES

Geology, even more than astronomy, was in the nineteenth century destined to further the acceptance of the theory of evolution. The turn of the century (1790-1820) has been characterized as the Heroic Age of Geology, for during that interval geology became a science in the modern sense of the word. Previously the old medieval concept held sway. The Earth was not supposed to have had any history, in the sense of development resulting from the continuous operation of natural laws, but was assumed to have been made by God, six thousand years before, in the finished state necessary to serve as the theater of human history. Such changes as had taken place were explained by the Theory of Catastrophism, according to which they were the result of a series of cataclysms or catastrophes like the biblical Flood.

Hutton (S) has been characterized as the Founder of Modern Geology, in that he rejected (1788) the Theory of Catastrophism and appealed to the operation of such ordinary causes as erosion to explain the formation of the earth's surface—mountains, valleys, plains, deserts, and coasts. "We find no

vestige of a beginning—no prospect of an end” was the conclusion that he reached. The next step in advance was made when William Smith (E) brought forward his conclusion (1799) that fossils can be identified by the strata in which they are found and vice versa.

At first glance, the eighteenth century discoveries in physics do not seem as brilliant as those in other fields of science; nevertheless, there were several of the utmost importance for the future. The earliest scientific investigations of electricity were those of Gilbert (E, 1540-1603), published in 1660, but for a century more, until 1799, electrical science languished. Then came the invention of the voltaic pile by Volta (I), for whom the volt is named. This “pile” was the first battery (a device for the *continuous generation*, as opposed to the mere *storing* or *intermittent* generation of electricity) and it put an invaluable instrument for experimentation into the hands of scientists. Not only was a continuous discharge of electricity made possible but also the current could be intensified by the multiplication of cells and the construction of larger ones. For three-quarters of a century Volta’s battery remained the only important source of electrical energy.

The results of this momentous invention were almost instantaneous. The following year water was decomposed into its constituent gases by the immersion of the terminal wires of a voltaic pile. Similar experiments in decomposition conducted by Davy (E), whose activities covered almost every field of the sciences, resulted in the disintegration of some supposed elements, the discovery of new elements, and the revelation that it is possible to obtain metals electrically. This last discovery eventually led to the electrical production of aluminum and other metals; so that a billion dollars’ worth of copper is now refined by electricity in the United States alone. Davy also demonstrated the principle of the incandescent filament and constructed an arc light—which had, however, no practical result, since there was as yet no current sufficient to run it for any length of time.

Davy was active in the overthrow of the Caloric Theory. Physicists of the eighteenth century ascribed the manifestations of heat to an imponderable fluid, known as caloric, permeating all inflammable materials and subtracted from them when they burned. The validity of this theory had been questioned by Thompson, an American who was knighted by George III and subsequently became Count Rumford of the (Holy Roman) Empire. From observations on the heat generated by friction in boring cannon, Rumford concluded that heat must be a mode of motion, since “anything which any *insulated* body, or system of bodies, can continue to furnish *without limitation*, cannot possibly be a material substance.” Davy performed an experiment which consisted in melting two blocks of ice solely by rubbing them together (1799). As the water thus formed was known to possess a higher specific heat than ice, the Caloric Theory failed to provide an explanation. Nevertheless, in spite of Davy’s experiment and even more conclusive demonstrations by later scientists, the mechanical theory of heat made little headway among physicists in general until the middle of the nineteenth century.

Modern chemistry, even more than the other physical sciences, is a creation of the last century and a half. Its foundations were laid by a Frenchman, an Englishman, and an Italian—Lavoisier, Dalton, and Avogadro. Lavoisier, Father of Modern Chemistry and greatest of all chemists, did more than any other single individual to prepare the way for the experimental science of the nineteenth century. The most famous of his achievements was the destruction of the Phlogiston Theory—similar to the Caloric Theory of the physicists—about which chemical thought then centered. In order to explain combustion, chemists maintained that all combustibles consisted of (1) an invisible “combustible substance, a principle of fire, but not fire itself,” called phlogiston, and (2) some other element. Combustion therefore meant the liberation of phlogiston, the other constituent being left behind. By careful experimentation with a balance of great exactitude, whereby weights could be determined accurately (it was he who formally introduced this instrument into chemistry, and it is by his quantitative analysis that he is chiefly distinguishable from his predecessors), Lavoisier proved that burning substances sometimes *gain* weight. He went on to show that combustion does not involve a substance with unique properties, but is due to the presence of oxygen, rediscovered shortly before by Priestley (E). The most important experiments made by Lavoisier were concerned with determining the significance of this element, to which he gave its name, and he discovered its importance and that of other substances in the life of plants and animals.

Lavoisier was no closet philosopher, but saw clearly the ultimate implications of his theories, as is shown by his plea for the poor. Because they are compelled to work, they consume more carbon than the idle rich but, since poverty prevents them from buying suitable food, they are less able to obtain an adequate supply. Lavoisier called upon society to right this unjust inequality so far as possible.

His most important achievement was his proof of the Indestructibility or Conservation of Matter (technically mass). By careful weighing, he proved that chemical changes are not accompanied by change in mass and that matter can neither be created nor destroyed, but can only be transformed. Thus by measurement (weighing) Lavoisier made possible the science of modern chemistry. As Lord Kelvin said: “Accurate and minute measurement seems to the non-scientific imagination a less lofty and dignified work than looking for something new. Yet nearly all the grandest discoveries of science have been but the rewards of accurate measurement and patient, long-continued labour in the minute sifting of numerical results.” Proof of the indestructibility of matter had a profound effect on thought in general and from that point of view was the most important event since Newton’s day, for since persistence in time is one of the common-sense marks of reality, it reinforced the belief that matter was the ultimate reality and thereby strengthened the prevailing tendency toward materialism.

The ancient Greeks decided that the elements were earth, air, fire, and water; and up to the time of Lavoisier little advance had been made beyond this concept. In addition to explaining the action of fire, Lavoisier decomposed water, discovered that “atmospheric air is composed of two elastic fluids,” made

the first analysis of organic material, and following his discovery of the conservation of weight, was able to formulate a correct concept of an element as a substance which, when changed into another, increases its weight but never gives rise to substances of less weight. He was then able to draw up the first modern table of elements (irreducible or non-decomposable substances), an essential to the subsequent advance in chemical theory and practice. Lavoisier furthermore demonstrated that elements always exist in the same proportions in compounds. Finally, the overthrow of the Phlogiston Theory revealed clearly the three fundamental states of matter—solid, liquid, and gaseous.

Lavoisier's tragic end calls to mind those of Servetus and Bruno: he fell a victim to political bigotry during the French Revolution, his brilliant achievements cut short by the guillotine (1794). "The Republic has no need of scholars" was the comment of his executioners, an error of which no statesman and few politicians would be guilty today. A far truer judgment was that of his colleague Lagrange. "It only took them an instant to fell that head; and a hundred years, perhaps, will not suffice to reproduce its like." Surely Lavoisier is worthy of "the glorious title of benefactor of humanity" to which he aspired:

Dalton is frequently referred to as the originator of the atomic theory. As a matter of fact, the hypothesis is as old as history, but prior to his time it lacked scientific basis. As *seems* true on first consideration, most scientists believed that matter was continuous and infinitely divisible. By a *tour de force* of deductive reasoning, since direct proof was impossible, Dalton reached the conclusion that matter is composed of indivisible particles which he named atoms (from Greek words meaning "not divided")—particles so small as to be invisible by the use of even the most powerful microscope—plus space (1803). This, it is argued, is the only possible explanation of the fact that a cubic foot of air can be compressed into one five-hundredth of a cubic foot or will expand so as to fill a space of a million or more cubic feet. The atomic theory also explained the fact that every substance can exist in all three states, solid, liquid, and gaseous. According to Dalton, each element is composed of its own particular kind of atoms, uniform but varying from those of other elements in size and weight. Using as his unit of measurement the weight of a hydrogen atom, the lightest of all, he attempted to determine the proportions in which atoms combine into molecules (the constituent units in which atoms are normally encountered in compounds). By pointing out that the combining weights of elements give the relative weights of atoms, Dalton "elevated chemistry into a science."

Avogadro made the second important step in the development of the atomic theory when he propounded the hypothesis that equal volumes of all gases at the same temperature and pressure contain equal numbers of molecules (1811). Therefore, as he said: "Setting out from this hypothesis, it is apparent that we have the means of determining very easily . . . the relative number of . . . particles in compounds; for . . . the relative number of particles in a compound is given at once by the ratio of the volumes of the gases that form it. . . . Since we know that the ratio of the volumes of hydrogen and oxygen in the formation of water is 2 to 1, it follows that water results from the union

of each particle of oxygen with two particles of hydrogen." Thus the constitution of water is H_2O , not HO , as Dalton had assumed. Neither Dalton's hypothesis nor Avogadro's law, however, was generally accepted at the time.

At the opening of the nineteenth century nearly everyone, even biologists, still accepted the biblical account of the origins of life as contained in the first chapter of Genesis. The theory of evolution is particularly associated with the mid-nineteenth century; but in the sense of development, it goes back to the Greeks. Buffon (F, d. 1788) suggested a common origin for animals, but withdrew the suggestion at the insistence of the church authorities. Lamarck (F), who was educated for the priesthood, began his active career as a soldier, and did not begin his zoological studies until he was fifty, first brought the evolutionary hypothesis into prominence. To explain the development of new or modified organs he proposed two laws (1801): that the organs are the result of new wants (for example, that the giraffe's neck is the result of attempts to reach higher foliage), and that these acquired characteristics are transmitted to offspring. Whether these hypotheses be accepted in modified form or rejected outright, as they have been by the majority of biologists, the important point is that Lamarck denied the theory of the special *creation* of species and made the first serious attempt to establish the theory of the origin of species by *evolution*.

MEDICINE

Modern medical theory dates from the appearance of Vesalius's masterpiece, *De corporis humani fabrica* (*On the Anatomy of the Human Body*), published in the same epoch-making year (1543) that gave the Copernican hypothesis to the world. In his study of anatomy Vesalius (Bn) rejected the authority of the Greeks and relied on observation. As late as the eighteenth century, nevertheless, medical theory and practice remained almost unbelievably backward. Only in that century were the professions of the surgeon and the barber separated (in 1743 in France, in 1745 in England, and not until 1783 in Austria). The nature of disease was still quite unknown, and bleeding persisted as the principal method of treatment. Human fat, spider webs, moss from human skulls, unicorn horn, and bones from the stag's heart were dropped from the standard lists of drugs (London *Pharmacopoeia* of 1746), but crab's eyes, wood lice, pearls, vipers, and the like were still listed. There were no schools of nursing, and conditions in hospitals were perhaps the worst known to history. Most of the beds contained four to six patients, with no attempt made to segregate contagious cases from noncontagious, and so vile was the air that the attendants went around with sponges dipped in vinegar held to their noses. Even more shocking, if possible, was the treatment of the insane. For the most part, no attempt was made to cure the demented; instead, they were chained or locked up, beaten, and exhibited to the curious like animals in a menagerie. Sanitary conditions had improved little or none since the Middle Ages, and epidemics swept over Europe at frequent intervals. In Moscow alone, fifty-two thousand perished during a single outbreak of the plague (1770-71). Such conditions will occasion less surprise when the type of medical instruction is

recalled. Prior to 1745, except at Leyden, medical students were graduated without having had any hospital experience or having witnessed any application of the theories taught. Haller (Ss), one of the most famous teachers of the day, lectured on surgery without having performed an operation! And in the great medical school in Paris lectures on Hippocrates (d. about 350 B.C.) were solemnly delivered three times a week!

Here and there advances were made, by such outstanding figures as Morgagni (I), Auenbrugger (An), and Jenner (E). In spite of the influence of Vesalius, it remained for Morgagni, who introduced Aristotelian investigation into post-mortem examination, to found systematic *morbid* anatomy (1761). By continuous and systematic observation and recording Morgagni laid the basis for the study of the effects of disease on the victim.

The capital event in the history of eighteenth century medicine was the establishment of inoculation (vaccination) for smallpox. In Russia alone smallpox carried off as many as two millions a year, and from its ravages a majority of humanity suffered not only pain but the far greater anguish of loathsome disfigurement. Preventive medicine based on scientific knowledge is very recent, arising in the latter part of the nineteenth century. Preventive medicine as an empirical art is very old, its history lost somewhere in the East. It began with the observation that patients who recover from smallpox possess an acquired immunity and that this immunity can be conferred on others by variolation (inoculation with material from a diseased person). In these days, when it is commonly forgotten that during the Middle Ages and earlier the East was for centuries the leader in culture, it may come as a surprise to learn that variolation was introduced into England from Turkey. The practice spread rapidly, but was attended with discomforts and dangers.

The credit for man's complete triumph over smallpox is due to an obscure English practitioner. When he was still in his teens, Jenner's attention was called to the belief of farmers that cowpox conferred immunity to smallpox. In 1798, twenty-five years later and two years after he had performed his first inoculation, he published his findings, which were the basis for the acceptance of smallpox vaccination by the medical profession. Even so, progress was astonishingly slow, and as a result we have an interesting example of the value of inoculation demonstrated on a huge scale. During the War of 1870, the French army, which was unvaccinated, lost 20,000 from smallpox; the German army, which was vaccinated, lost only 297. "Of the great events in the eighteenth century none was so laborious in its accomplishment or so grand in total results." "Pronounce meditatively the name of Jenner," exclaimed Coleridge, "and ask what might we not hope, what need we deem unattainable if all the time, the effort, the skill which we waste in making ourselves miserable through vice and error, and vicious through misery, were embodied and marshalled to a systematic war against the existing evils of nature!"

1808 marked the introduction of the first modern method of diagnosis. Previously, examinations, even for internal maladies, had been largely effected through sight, that is, by simply looking at the patient and judging what the matter was. In the mid-eighteenth century (1761), Auenbrugger had suggested the use of percussion diagnosis (tapping the body with the finger or a medical

hammer in order to detect such disorders as tuberculosis), but Auenbrugger lived before his time; and not until it was translated by Corvisart, Napoleon's favorite physician, did his treatise attract general attention.

Toward the beginning of the nineteenth century, thanks to the investigations of Howard (E, 1777-89), some improvement in the condition of hospitals was effected; and Pinel (F, *Medical-Philosophical Treatise on Alienation*, 1801), at the risk of his life and liberty, began the more humane treatment of the insane.

GEOGRAPHICAL DISCOVERY

Maritime exploration inevitably preceded that by land, as hardy navigators by the score from Diaz, Columbus, and Magellan to Tasman and Cook scoured the Seven Seas. The eighteenth century with its commercial bent and its strong intellectual curiosity carried the work well toward completion. Captain Cook (E) contributed more than any other explorer to our knowledge of the Pacific, and was the first to penetrate the Antarctic (1768-79). Cook advanced six hundred miles further south than his predecessors, was the first to cross the Antarctic Circle, and dispelled the immemorial belief in a vast southern continent. By the end of the century, nearly all the major water bodies had been explored—in outline at least—but four-fifths of the land area on the maps was still blank.

The entire interior of Asia, including that of Arabia and the East Indies, was *terra incognita*. Prior to 1800, Marco Polo (I) and his contemporaries of the Proto-Renaissance, curiously enough, were the only Europeans to travel extensively in the interior of the "Yellow Continent." Of Africa, only the coast and the valley of the Nile were known until Park (S) traced the course of the Niger at the turn of the century; of Australia, only part of the coast; and although Bering (Dh) had discovered the northwestern tip of America (1741), Hearne (E) had descended the Coppermine, and Mackenzie (S) had penetrated the heart of the Northwest to the mouth of the great river which bears his name, most of the American West beyond the Mississippi was almost as much of a mystery as darkest Africa. It was not until the opening years of the nineteenth century that Lewis and Clarke (A) ascended the Missouri and reached the Pacific overland. Thanks in part to Humboldt (G), who explored the Orinoco and the Andes (1799-1804), South America was the best-known continent with the exception of Europe.

Reports of these discoveries, with accounts of exotic and alluring types of society, prepared Europeans to receive criticisms of their own institutions. "Poor, nasty, brutish, and short" as we now know the existence of primitive man to be, in the fertile imagination of Rousseau he became a Noble Savage whose supposed paradisiacal state made civilized society seem drab and vicious by comparison.

INVENTION

Geographical discoveries, scientists, social theorists, and philosophers shook the thought-world of the educated to its foundations and exerted a determining influence in bringing about the Revolution of 1789, whose ultimate effects on

the political systems of Europe were so profound; but neither scientists, social theorists, nor philosophers had any great influence on the beliefs of the masses, for without any systems of public education most men were still illiterate. And neither scientists nor the events of the Revolutionary Era itself had any considerable effect on the modes of everyday life. There was some redistribution of wealth and slightly greater economic freedom, but no fundamental readjustment. All the geographical discoveries, all the philosophers, all the scientists, all the social theorists, and all the political revolutions would never have produced by themselves the world of today.

The thing that particularly distinguishes the age in which we live is the astonishing number of inventions constantly being made. The Middle Ages inherited a number of "universal," or prehistoric, culture traits, such as the use of fire, pottery, and cattle, and a number of inventions made within historical times, such as the arch, the alphabet, and the use of iron. During the Middle Ages few inventions appeared in Europe. The chief were the compass, gunpowder, and the clock. Apparently unimpressive, they were nevertheless of revolutionary import. The first and the second led eventually to the Europeanization of the entire globe, the second ended the feudal era by removing the walls of castles and towns, and also foreshadowed the horrors of the World War, while the third was as essential to the development of science as the zero. "Without the time factor, measurable by the clock, we should never have had the science of physics; never any heat engines beyond Hero's toys; never our billion horsepower." In early modern times, also, the number of inventions was decidedly limited. The art of printing from movable type, which made ideas immortal, safe from Church and State alike, was by far the most important. Others which may be mentioned were the thermometer, the telescope, the barometer, the air-pump, the compound microscope, and the manometer for measuring blood pressure—none of immediate practical significance. Until the middle of the eighteenth century, in fact, most of the outstanding inventions that characterize our present civilization and that today are commonplace were unknown and undreamt of by the vast majority of men. For this reason alone, the European of 1750 would have felt far more at home in the Middle Ages than in the twentieth century; and with the possible exception of the English, the same may be said of Europeans of 1815.

"For the ordinary man, the main facts of human toil and enjoyment did not change appreciably from the days of Cheops, the pyramid-builder, to those of Washington." Indeed since the days when Rome was at the height of her glory there had been in many ways a distinct retrogression; and since the Middle Ages, only a slight recovery. The food had changed little—it is hardly an exaggeration to say that the typical peasant lived by bread alone; the clothing less (except in style), for wool remained the staple cloth; and methods of production and distribution least of all. The technique of industry and of agriculture had remained almost stationary. The hand loom had existed for generations without any fundamental improvement. Most plows, a bough tipped with iron, were essentially the same as those used by the pastoral peoples who first began to till the soil. The same may be said of the harrow, hoe, rake, sickle, fork, spade, and flail, and of the principles of cultivation. The only

sources of light were the candle and the open-flame whale-oil lamp, without any chimney. The printing press was the hand-operated device invented during the Renaissance. The only means of locomotion—animal power, the oar, and the sail—had been known to the ancestors of Homer; and news was disseminated by these selfsame slow, uncertain methods. Try to imagine the modern world without the railroad, the steamship, and the telegraph—to say nothing of the airplane, the telephone, and the radio!

Then, a generation before the storm of 1789 disrupted the Old Régime, a burst of inventive attainment in England gave rise to a revolution in culture beside which the transformations wrought by the political revolution in France pale into insignificance—a revolution that ushered in a new world and, coupled with the nineteenth century developments in science, was to affect mankind more profoundly than any previously recorded in history. Not only was the economic and consequently the social structure remade, so that the private, everyday life of every individual was affected, but the repercussions on politics and thought were equally far-reaching.

PRE-NINETEENTH CENTURY SOCIETY

By comparison with China and India, with their already teeming populations, Europe was sparsely inhabited. In 1801 France, with the largest population, had only about 27,000,000, or 131 to the square mile. England in 1760 is estimated to have had only a little over 5,500,000, and shortly before that time an English statistician predicted that the population would not reach 11,000,000 before 2300 A.D.! The total for Europe at the opening of the nineteenth century is estimated at 175,000,000.

The population was overwhelmingly agricultural. England, which throughout the Middle Ages had been a source of raw material, exported grain until after the middle of the eighteenth century and only after 1792 did she become permanently dependent on imports of foodstuffs from abroad. In 1801, only 17 per cent of her inhabitants lived in cities of over 20,000, in France the percentage was less than 7, and in Germany about 4.

Although town life was well established, there were few signs of the gigantic urban agglomerations which dominate our present social organization. France could boast 34 towns of over 20,000 (1801), but only Paris had over 500,000. London still fell short of 1,000,000 and was the sole city in England of over 100,000. Italy was the only other country with a well-developed urban population. Berlin was a stodgy provincial town of some 150,000 to 200,000. In 1750 Birmingham, Manchester, Essen, and Le Creusot were sleepy country villages. And all of the "cities" had the unbelievably dirty, winding streets still to be seen in some out-of-the-way provincial towns of today, so narrow that the passer-by could almost touch the houses on both sides simultaneously. Pavements, sidewalks, municipal water supplies, and drainage were practically unknown.

If there was any deity to whom the skeptic eighteenth century rendered its soul with particular fervor, it was the great god Mercury. This worship of commerce, the apogee of the Commercial Revolution which had taken place

during the preceding three centuries, is clearly proved by the existence of the Mercantile System—a system based on the theory that a country prospered to the extent that it could accumulate bullion and that it must therefore enjoy a favorable balance of trade, that is, the value of its exports must exceed that of its imports. In order to attain this desired goal, all commerce and industry was subject to strict government regulation. A policy of protection was enforced by the erection of tariff walls, often prohibitive, and by the granting of bounties. The inevitable result was a flourishing crop of “tariff wars.” A second method employed was the acquisition of colonies over which the mother country endeavored to exercise a monopoly. These two measures were linked by maritime laws which, in addition to requiring that colonial (all extra-European) goods enter the country in native vessels, restricted imports of European goods to native vessels or vessels of the country from which the goods came. Thus economic nationalism preceded political nationalism; no wonder its roots are so deeply imbedded.

The ships in which this commerce was carried on were small, broad, and very slow. Their meager capacity is explained by the insignificant traffic in articles of bulk (most of the wares were colonial luxuries such as wines, dried fruits, textiles, sugar, coffee, spices, and dyes); two hundred tons was the average, five hundred unusually large, anything over a thousand titanic. In size, therefore, they were smaller than the vessels that supplied the Roman Empire, and in shape they did not greatly differ from those in which Columbus sallied forth to discover America. Obligated to wait weeks or even months for a favorable wind, when under way they made only about fifty miles a day. There were no regular schedules and no special accommodations for passengers. None were needed, for the average individual seldom strayed more than a day's journey from his birthplace. The total tonnage clearing English ports in 1750 was only about ten times the capacity of the *Leviathan* or the *Majestic*.

Wholesale distribution was accomplished through great international fairs, which took place yearly at such favorably located places as Leipzig and Frankfurt-on-the-Main, fairs that had existed since medieval times and which, though now of much less importance, are functioning yet. The itinerant peddler and the annual local fair, going institutions to this very day throughout provincial Europe, still took care of the distribution to the consumer. In all but the largest cities, such stores as existed resembled the “general store” of American country villages, where the customer can obtain all the necessities of life from flour and cloth to soap and stationery. Most buying took place in the local workshops or at the weekly fair, which displayed the products of the neighborhood; so that, notwithstanding the emphasis on foreign commerce, the bulk of exchange was local rather than international or even intranational.

These primitive conditions were fostered by restrictions on internal commerce, such, for instance, as tolls levied on goods entering a town and road and river tolls. A cargo paid toll thirty-six times on the Rhône and the Saône; on the Main, thirty-three times between Mainz and Bamberg!

The poverty of domestic commerce was also explained by the conditions of transportation by land, which were even worse than those by water. France had been developing good roads for a century or more, but most of Europe



resembled England, where until the middle of the eighteenth century the highways were so bad as to be positively dangerous. Carriages sank in mud to their hubs, wheeled vehicles were consequently rare, rapid travel had to be done on horseback, and much of the transportation of goods was done by pack animals. As late as 1763 there was only one stage a month from Edinburgh to London, and it took fourteen days to cover the three hundred and fifty-odd miles. No wonder that, whenever possible, what little transportation in bulk existed was done by water.

Industry was still in its swaddling-clothes, large-scale production unknown. In 1740, English blast furnaces produced 17,000 tons of iron, an average of only 294 tons per furnace; and the consumption was a mere 15 pounds per capita. As late as 1826 the Krupp works at Essen employed only four hands. Although these industries were not particularly representative of the eighteenth century, the figures will at least serve as a basis for gauging the typical developments of the age which followed.

The backwardness of industry was partly explained by its organization. With the revival of town life in the later Middle Ages a system of industrial organization known as the Guild System had arisen. In each town all the independent workers in each craft or trade—known as master craftsmen—were members of a guild whose primary purpose was to establish and maintain a monopoly. Assisted by their families and a few employees, all living and working in the master's dwelling, the master craftsmen did all the manufacturing (*manu*, by hand, + *facere*, to make). Distribution (sale) as well was carried on under the same roof and under supervision by the guild. When this system arose it was adequate to the demands of the town market, the town and immediate countryside, the only market that most goods could reach by existing means of transportation. Unofficial guild regulation was reinforced by government supervision. On the Continent the Guild System continued to dominate town industry throughout most of the eighteenth century, in theory at least; and at the opening of the French Revolution there were eight fat volumes which dictated exactly how every step in production in France should be carried on, from the choice of materials to the size of buttons.

As the market grew, cottagers outside the town took advantage of the increased demand to supplement their returns from farming by doing a little weaving at home, working at one or the other as choice or necessity dictated. Thus alongside the guilds a new type of organization developed, known as the Domestic or Putting-out System and marked by the rise of a capitalistic class of entrepreneurs (middlemen) who took advantage of the difficulties in marketing encountered by the cottage workers. These entrepreneurs of the Putting-out System owned the raw materials and often the instruments of production as well, marketed the product, and reaped the profits. This was the type of developed capitalism, the direct prototype of the modern sweatshop, which preceded that with which we are most familiar today. In any case, since production was for the local market, where conditions of demand and supply were well known, there were no prolonged periods of industrial depression and unemployment.

Prior to the French Revolution, agriculture, the main occupation of the



MEDIEVAL LIFE


A Medieval Town (Carcassonne)

(Courtesy of Keystone Film Company)


A Medieval Ship

(Courtesy of New York Museum of Science and Industry)

Model of NEWCOMEN'S Steam Engine



Model of WATT'S parallel steam engine embodying his invention of the separate condenser



Courtesy of New York Museum of Science and Industry

NEWCOMEN'S ENGINE

ONE OF WATT'S ENGINES

overwhelming majority, was still predominantly medieval in organization, for the manorial system in some form, characterized by the large estates known as manors, was the prevailing type. The peasants, or serfs who lived on these manors did not own land, but in return for services, such as cultivating the lord's fields, they were allowed to use certain plots.

In England serfdom in its personal sense had disappeared, but the manorial organization had left its mark on methods of land tenure and cultivation. At the opening of the eighteenth century, nearly half the total area of the country was uncultivated and nearly half the remainder was in the hands of the yeomanry (freeholders⁶ of small farms); but as the village community was essentially the manorial estate of medieval times, over half the land in use was cultivated under a communal system. The most important classes among the inhabitants of the country village were, first, tenants or leaseholders,⁷ second, copyholders, formerly serfs, who held their land by right of possession and custom, by the will of the lord, and by copy of the manor court-roll, and, third, squatters, with no legal rights whatsoever.

The survival of the Open or Common-Field System meant the persistence of singularly antiquated methods of agriculture. "Common," as applied to this situation, meant three things: the community pasture or common proper (hence the term), the arable land, and the other categories of land, such as the community meadow and woodlot. Each arable field was divided into narrow strips which were allotted for the season to the various members of the community. The strips assigned to a family were widely separated; hence much time was wasted in traveling to and fro. Far worse than that: since the strips were only separated by balks or furrows, so that the success of the individual cultivator was hampered by the carelessness of previous occupants and the negligence of his neighbors, no scientific farming was possible. Because the fields were given over to pasturage after the harvest, no turnips (essential to keeping any considerable number of cattle through the winter), and no artificial grasses, clover, or potatoes could be raised, and drainage was impossible. Moreover, since no means of artificial fertilization was known, the Three-Field System dictated that a third of the arable land should lie fallow each year in order to recuperate. As an added complication, every act was subject to the decision of the community as a whole, which determined when planting was to be done, when the crops were to be harvested, and so on, and so on. Uncultivated land was also used in common. Each took his supply of hay from the village meadow, his fuel from the woodlot; and into the common all the animals were turned loose, so that scientific stock-breeding was impossible.

The whole system was criticized by the progressively-minded, who felt that it precluded any possibility of improvement. Nevertheless, living-conditions were fairly satisfactory, and the farmers frequently supplemented their agricultural returns by a certain amount of home industry. Conservative by nature, they were averse to any change.

In social organization the eighteenth century, like all those which had pre-

⁶ Practically owners, but in England all land belongs in theory to the king (a survival of feudalism).

⁷ Holders of long- or short-term leases or tenants at will, that is, as long as the lord willed it.

ceded, was essentially static rather than dynamic. A man was born into a certain station in life, and the chances were overwhelmingly in favor of his remaining there. He was born in a certain locality, and ten to one he died there. Such was the life of Europe in the "good old days," some four or five generations ago.

THE AGRICULTURAL REVOLUTION: ENGLAND

For several hundred years, as a result of inclosures there had been a tendency in England away from medieval conditions of landholding and toward increasing concentration of ownership. Inclosure was the process of eliminating the communal system of agriculture by the redistribution of land in compact, independent holdings. The Agricultural Revolution in England, which began in the first half of the eighteenth century and had achieved its most important results by the middle of the nineteenth, was characterized by a marked acceleration of this movement and by the introduction of modern methods of farming.

In the early years of the eighteenth century the inclosure movement took a turn so novel as to constitute an almost separate development. Inclosure by Act of Parliament was instituted. At first a great landlord could send in an inclosure petition without the knowledge of his tenants, and even when this was prevented they had little chance of stopping the bill. The large proprietors framed the measure, which frequently named the commissioner, and could bring influence to bear on the actual allocation. The squatters, needless to say, were left out of consideration; tenants could be disposed of at the expiration of their leases, or sooner if they were tenants at will; and copyholders, too, could be evicted if unable to show written evidence of their rights. Costly lawsuits, bribery, chicanery, or actual violence capped the deal.

The process gathered velocity with the passage of time. In a single year (1801) a hundred and nineteen bills were passed, and in two decades (1800-20) there was a yearly average of eighty bills. These special bills were reenforced by General Acts (1801, 1836, and 1845). During the eighteenth century, arable lands were principally affected; then (1801-42) moors and fens; and lastly (1845-69) the commons proper. Out of thirty-seven million acres, including non-arable land, it is estimated that during the period of the Agricultural Revolution alone some eight million were inclosed. A powerful stimulant was the desire of new industrial capitalists to better their social status by acquiring estates and so becoming part of the landed gentry, since participation in trade meant social inferiority, while ownership of land was the hallmark of the old feudal aristocracy.

The results of the inclosure movement were both good and bad, but chiefly the latter. A considerable proportion of the agriculturalists were evicted outright. The extinction of the commons proper and of the woodlots were the features which worked the greatest hardship to those who survived. Obviously an individual was worse off when he had four acres of straight garden plot than when he had only an acre of garden plot and access to fifty acres of pasture, fifty of woodlot, and fifty of meadow. Eventually the majority of small in-

dependent farmers, those previously independent and those created by the inclosures as well, were crowded to the wall by the competition of large-scale farming and also by the ruin of home industry through the Industrial Revolution, and had to sell out. Thus England lost her sturdy yeomanry, and became a country of great landed estates.⁸ Worst of all, much of the land in these estates consisted of private parks, playgrounds for the idle rich. Nevertheless, just as the Industrial Revolution was to bring ultimate benefit, at the cost of incalculable suffering to individuals, so the extinction of the antiquated manorial system and the rise of large-scale farming seem to have been necessary prerequisites to the development of modern agricultural methods, which the small farmer was either too poor, too ignorant, or too unprogressive to undertake.

The rise of modern agriculture began with the introduction into England from the Netherlands of certain important crops, such as turnips and clover, which made it possible to keep larger numbers of stock over the winter, whereas previously most had been slaughtered. Clover also supplied the soil with nitrogen, and the increase in cattle augmented the supply of manure. By this cycle the whole level of farming was raised. Many common garden vegetables—cabbage, cauliflower, carrots, and parsnips—new fruit trees, and better stock also entered England from abroad. It was now England's turn to better these products by improved methods of culture.

Jethro Tull, by reason of his popularity during his lifetime and in the latter part of the century, is ranked as the leader of this phase—not that his ideas were new or that all of them were correct. His most important contribution was his insistence (*Horse Ho[e]ing Husbandry*, 1733) that seed be sown in rows instead of broadcast and that growing plants, instead of being left to struggle unaided against weeds and caked soil, be aided by constant hoeing.

Tull's ideas were adopted and kept alive by certain great landowners such as Lord Townshend, who was prominent in the development of the Norfolk or Four-Course System of culture. Economically, the most important aspect of this system was the elimination of fallow land, as continuous cultivation was made possible by crop rotation. A field was never used for grain twice in succession, but in alternate years a cleaning or recuperative crop such as roots or clover was planted instead. It was called the Four-Course System because of the usual rotation employed—wheat, turnips, barley, and clover. Coke of Norfolk, first Earl of Leicester and Father of the House of Commons, was another of the prominent capitalists who provided money for improvements and stimulated smaller farmers by their example. The most effective propagandist of the new methods, however, was that shrewd observer and effective writer Arthur Young (*Farmer's Letters*, 1767, *Annals of Agriculture*, 1784-1815). Lack of proper implements, disagreement among "experts," and above all the disinclination of the average farmer to adopt new methods retarded the advance of agriculture; by the opening of the nineteenth century, however, the new system

⁸ The latter part of the nineteenth century saw a reversal of policy and an increasing effort to break up the great estates and restore the small independent farmer. The Metropolitan Commons Act of 1866, an effort to save the parks, forbade inclosures in metropolitan areas. The Act of 1876 restricted inclosures in rural districts, and the Act of 1893 forbade any additional inclosures without the consent of the Board of Agriculture.

was generally accepted in England and the production of wheat per acre had doubled or trebled.

For the effective operation of his system Tull had postulated the use of a drill to plant seeds automatically and a horse-drawn hoe, and he had invented such machines; but neither was a complete success or widely adopted. Improvements in the plow had been made by the Dutch, who invented a moldboard which could turn a furrow, and by Small (S, about 1730), who made some parts of his plow of iron. The first efficient seed drill, from which present-day drills trace their ancestry, was patented by Cooke in 1783—though not generally accepted until the mid-nineteenth century. The first threshing-machine, containing the fundamentals of all successful threshers, was invented by Meikle (S, 1786). The invention that produced the most immediate results, however, was the cradle or Scotch reaper (about 1794). This was simply the scythe, which the Scotch had recently revived, improved by the addition of wooden “fingers” to gather the grain and deposit it in windrows, but it enabled a single reaper to accomplish as much as seven equipped only with sickles.

The second great achievement of the pioneers of modern agriculture was the improved breeding of stock. When the Agricultural Revolution began, there were no breeds in the modern sense, and domestic animals were a sorry lot indeed. Inclosures were, if possible, more necessary as a prerequisite to efficient stock-breeding than to efficient farming. The leader in scientific stock-raising was Bakewell, who began the inbreeding of carefully selected stock and thereby accomplished wonders. In less than a century (1710-95) the average weight of cattle was increased from 370 to 800 pounds and that of sheep from 28 to 80.

By driving the farmers off the land and by increasing the means of subsistence, the Agricultural Revolution stimulated the Industrial Revolution and made possible the prodigious growth in population which accompanied it.

THE AGE OF GREAT TEXTILE INVENTIONS

Important as were the advances in British agriculture which took place in the eighteenth century, absorbing as were the political events with which the century closed, beside that world-shaking movement known as the Industrial Revolution they must nevertheless take a secondary place. To define the Industrial Revolution in a phrase is difficult, if not impossible. Without attempting to be too exact about phraseology and at the risk of forgetting other important aspects, it might be said that the Industrial Revolution proper was the change from the Age of Tools to the Age of Machines—using the term “machine” in the sense of a device that automatically performs a complete operation. However, as machines of a sort existed before, this change was quantitative rather than qualitative; the all-important factor was rather the substitution of prime movers for animal (including human) power. We must therefore amend our original definition and say that the Industrial Revolution was the beginning of the Age of Power Machinery or, more simply, the beginning of the Power Age. The importance of the introduction of power lay in the fact that it enabled the worker to do more, and that more quickly and more cheaply. Arising in England about 1776, this phenomenal development, which

gave birth to our unprecedented mechanical and industrial civilization, proceeded with breath-taking rapidity.

Many changes, some of which have been mentioned,⁹ paved the way; but the genesis of the Industrial Revolution proper is to be found in the field of cotton manufacturing. The production of cloth to supply man's basic need of clothing involves two interdependent processes, spinning and weaving. The former converts raw material into thread; the latter converts thread into cloth. (In weaving, one set of parallel threads, the warp, is stretched longitudinally across the loom, and a second, the weft, is interwoven at right angles.) Prior to the Industrial Revolution these processes were carried on by means of the spinning-wheel and the hand loom, and it required ten spinners to keep one weaver supplied with thread—this at a time when, at home and abroad, there was an increasing demand for cotton to replace wool.

With the opening of the Era of Great Inventions, the first step in equalizing these processes was accomplished by means of the spinning-jenny, invented by Hargreaves (E, 1767). This machine, the first radical invention successfully introduced into the textile industry, contained eight spindles making threads simultaneously. A child could turn the crank by which the machine was operated and could therefore produce as much thread as eight adults using spinning-wheels; and within Hargreaves's lifetime the number of spindles per machine was increased to eighty. The spinning-jenny, however, was only fitted to produce weft. In order to obtain thread strong enough for warp, linen had to be used, so that it was not yet possible to produce all-cotton cloth by machinery. Furthermore, man power was still the motive force.

The most interesting figure of the Industrial Revolution was Arkwright (E), son and father of the Age of Capitalism. The thirteenth child of humble parents, without any education worth mentioning, Arkwright began life as a barber. Subsequently he became interested in the textile industry, and his secret experiments caused him to be suspected of witchcraft and sorcery by his superstitious neighbors. Working on a principle already utilized but hitherto financially unsuccessful, he invented the water frame, still in use without substantial modification, for making thread by means of rollers (patented 1769). This machine made cotton thread strong enough to be used as warp, and thus for the first time quantity production of all-cotton cloth was a possibility.

In perfecting the water frame and in the erection of his mills, Arkwright was aided by various capitalists; nevertheless he exhausted his slender resources, so that he was obliged to go in rags. Like other inventors, he encountered the bitter hostility of the working classes—one of his plants was gutted by a mob—and his ideas were stolen. In addition, the courts refused to protect his patent rights; instead, he was accused of plagiarism. Finally, he had to fight the powerful woolen interests, which were protected by law; and it was only after a special act of 1774 had relieved his goods of a double duty (aimed at the competition of cotton goods from India!) that he began to prosper. An expenditure of \$60,000 which went into the development of his ideas before any profit was realized is a partial justification of the capitalist contention that

⁹ Cf pp 14-15, 40.

those who take the risks should enjoy the rewards. Only unusual ability and untiring industry, which, in spite of a distressing asthmatic affection, kept him at work from five in the morning till nine at night, preserved him from failure.

Two facts, above all, stand out in the career of Arkwright. 1. He was the Father of the Factory System. His machines were so heavy as to necessitate special housing and required something more than man power for their operation (Arkwright at first used horse power, but soon turned to water power—hence the name of his machine). 2. As Father of the Factory System, Arkwright was the Father of the New Capitalism, for factories and even the individual machines were so costly as to be available only to capitalists. Eventually Arkwright prospered, was knighted, and was erecting Willersley Castle when he died. His son, who inherited his executive ability, carried on the business, and was probably the wealthiest commoner in England.

Crompton (E), on the other hand, from whose efforts came the final and most important invention connected with spinning, is typical of the inventors who sow that others may reap. The mule (1779), so called because it combined the advantages of the jenny and the water frame, made possible quantity production of finer grades of cloth, capable of competing with the best imported.

By this time the spinners were more than able to hold up their end and it was the weavers who were in need of help. For this reason, the flying shuttle (patented by Kay (E) in 1733) was adopted, enabling the weaver to work faster and to produce cloth of varying width without the aid of an assistant, whereas previously he had been limited to the span of his arm. Some more basic invention, however, was needed.

The first steps toward the invention of the power loom were taken by Cartwright (E, brother of Six-Point Cartwright), though his earliest model was a failure. His second (1786) provided a valuable basis for subsequent improvement, but it remained for Radcliffe and Johnson to introduce dressing-sizing in 1803 and set the power loom on the road to commercial success. By 1815, though not predominant, it was in common use; and although the hand workers kept up the bitter struggle until well along in the nineteenth century, eventually and inevitably they succumbed to the remorseless march of mass production.

THE ADVENT OF THE AGE OF STEAM, COAL, AND IRON

Important as were the textile inventions of the later eighteenth century, without some new and better source of power there would have been no Industrial Revolution such as we know today. The decisive steps were the perfection of the steam engine and its application to industry and transportation.

Watt (S) is commonly spoken of as the inventor of the steam engine. This is both true and untrue, depending in part on what is meant by the term "steam" engine. It is *untrue* because others had already constructed engines employing steam and because Watt's achievements were an extension

of theirs. It *is* true because Watt was the first to employ steam in a piston engine to deliver the working stroke and because he transformed the steam engine from a device of very limited application into a power of world-shaking significance.

Steam engines of a sort were invented in Greco-Roman times, but accomplished no useful work and were totally unlike the present reciprocating engine. Newcomen (E) constructed the first commercially successful piston engine (about 1712) and therefore, more than any other individual, perhaps, is entitled to be called the Father of the Steam Engine. How basic his achievement was may be understood when it is recalled that before this for "1700 years, no new prime mover appeared save the cannon."

Newcomen engines were utilized in pumping water from mines as late as 1830 and did the work of fifty horses at a sixth of the cost; but they were decidedly inefficient (capable at best of a dozen strokes a minute), consumed thirteen tons of coal a day, and delivered only reciprocating (as opposed to rotary) motion. This important drawback was due chiefly to their being single-acting (exerting force only while the piston was moving in one direction). The piston—which worked in a cylinder with the upper end open—and the plunger of the pump were attached by chains to opposite ends of a balance (walking, or horizontal) beam, with the pump end weighted. During the *working stroke*, when the piston was at the top of its rise and the cylinder filled with steam, cold water, injected into the cylinder, condensed the steam, created a vacuum, and thus lowered the pressure. Thereupon, air, pressing through the open end of the cylinder, pushed the piston down, and the piston, in turn, pulling its end of the horizontal beam with it, caused the other end and the pump plunger to rise, and so pumped the water. During the *return stroke*, the counterweighted end of the beam sank, allowing the pump plunger to sink with it, and raised correspondingly the opposite end of the beam and the piston. Meanwhile, steam was admitted to the cylinder, with pressure enough to clear it of water but not sufficient to exert any active force against the piston. As can be seen, it was not the pressure of the steam but that of the atmosphere which delivered the working stroke (the stroke which raised the water). Newcomen's invention was therefore an atmospheric or steam-atmospheric engine rather than a steam engine in the sense in which the term is now used.

The Newcomen engine remained unimproved until Watt, an instrument-maker at the University of Glasgow, was asked to repair one (1763). It is interesting to note, in passing, that Watt, although well educated, owed his position to friends who procured it for him when the guild refused to allow him to practice his trade as not having been properly apprenticed. In no time at all he noted the deficiencies of Newcomen's machine and, profiting by Professor Black's (S) recent discovery of latent heat, soon determined that, as a result of the alternate heating and chilling of the cylinder incident to each stroke, three-quarters of the heat of the steam was lost in warming the cylinder. Watt conceived the idea of adding a separate condenser (1765), which made it possible to keep the cylinder as hot as the steam entering it. More important still, he put a head on the cylinder, forced the piston down

by steam rather than by atmospheric pressure, and thus created a true steam engine (though not a double-acting engine, as the counterweight for returning the piston to its former position was retained). But when a trial was made, the machine proved unsatisfactory, largely owing to faulty workmanship; and shortly afterward Watt's first partner failed.

For a time, Watt gave up in despair. That he was able to carry his work to completion was owing to the encouragement, financial support, and business acumen of Boulton, a manufacturer of Soho (near Birmingham), who was desirous of supplementing the inadequate water-power available there. To invent a machine is one thing; to produce and market it is another. These last two steps were the achievements of Watt's new partner, and thus was created the classic example of the alliance of genius and capital.

In 1776 the Declaration of Independence was signed and Watt's first successful engine began to revolve—fourteen strokes to the minute. Of the two, Watt's invention was to affect more lives, and affect them more intimately. To link Watt's engine with the textile machines, as was done in 1785, was a matter of detail; in essence, the Industrial Revolution was already born, and Watt was its father.

By 1782, Watt had attained rotary motion, the use of steam expansively, and double-action. The first made possible the direct application of steam to manufacturing and transportation. In evolving the second, Watt found that he could cut off the steam after the piston had completed only about a quarter of its stroke and that the expansion of the steam then in the cylinder would carry the piston the rest of the way—a great saving. Finally, he discovered that he could utilize steam on both the in and the out strokes of the piston. This last invention was the crown of Watt's career, for it doubled the effectiveness of his machine and marked the advent of the true all-steam engine. Above all, Watt's engine, compared with Newcomen's, cut coal consumption 65 to 75 per cent. Incidentally, in order to render the amount of power that his machines were prepared to deliver intelligible to his customers, Watt devised the unit of measurement still known as "horse power."

Before the invention of the steam engine, work waited on power or went in search of it, like Mohammed in search of the mountain: when horses died or men went on strike, work stopped until they could be replaced; when the wind failed, the captain stayed in port or hung becalmed at sea for days or even weeks; the factory went in search of the waterfall. After the invention of the steam engine, in place of the meager and unreliable amounts of energy provided by falling water, the wind, and animal power, energy in comparatively unlimited quantities was available when and where needed. For these reasons the steam engine was the greatest "single" invention of all time. As has been said, the Industrial Revolution ushered in the Age of Machines, *par excellence*, but even more emphatically it began the Age of Steam, the Age of Power!

Let it be emphasized here, as strongly as possible, that *even in England* power machinery was introduced only very gradually and achieved predominance only after 1815—elsewhere, later still.

Without improved methods of producing raw material these inventions would never have attained their present importance, for a Negro slave

working an entire day to separate the fiber from the seeds could produce only a pound or two of cotton. The problem was solved through the invention of the cotton gin by Whitney (A, 1793), whose first working model, a small hand machine, could clean as much cotton as fifty slaves. When Whitney invented his gin, the United States was producing only about 140,000 pounds a year, and practically all of this was consumed at home. Within a decade (1801) America was producing nearly 50,000,000 pounds a year, and five years later some 80,000,000. In a twelvemonth (1801-02) the price dropped from 44 to 19 cents a pound. Even these impressive figures fail to indicate the fundamental significance of Whitney's invention. Since American cotton was the first subtropical raw material consumed on a large scale by all industrial nations, its introduction into Europe marked the advent of America as an essential element in the world economic system.

For the foundations of the new era, coal and iron and above all the knowledge of how to use them were *sine qua non*. Steam, coal, and iron—these were the new trinity of the future. Fortunately, the introduction of machinery was accompanied or preceded by rapid advances in metallurgy. Early in the century Darby (E) perfected the process of smelting iron with coke instead of charcoal. The product was not malleable, but this difficulty was overcome when Cort (E) perfected the "puddling" or reverberatory furnace (1784), which was also important because it made iron available at greatly reduced prices. Cort's greatest invention, however, was the rolling mill for the production of sheet iron (1786). Imagine trying to hammer out enough sheets of metal to construct a vessel like the *Leviathan*! Smeaton's (E) steam bellows reduced fuel consumption a third.

One of the most important if least spectacular aspects of cultural development is the progress of technology, without which modern inventions could never have taken form. As has been seen, one of the reasons why Watt temporarily despaired of completing his engine was that he was unable to obtain accurate workmanship. Owing to defects in boring, early engines sometimes had errors in the diameter of a 28-inch cylinder amounting to the thickness of the little finger. Watt's success was at once the result and the cause of an immense advance in the production of machine tools. The first notable improvement, patented in 1774, was a method of boring invented by Wilkinson (E). "Wilkinson's was probably the first metal-working tool capable of doing heavy work with anything like acceptable accuracy." In 1776 Boulton wrote, "Mr. Wilkinson has bored up several cylinders almost without error; that of fifty inches diameter . . . does not err the thickness of an old shilling in any part." Such a standard will cause the modern workman to smile—until he remembers the previously existing conditions. Wilkinson manufactured the best cannon used in the Peninsular War *on both sides* (with an impartiality that would have astonished Major Barbara, he sold his wares to the agents of Napoleon as well as to his countrymen), built the first iron vessels on record, and cast the plates for the first iron bridge erected in England. This last undertaking, which had a hundred-foot span, was constructed across the Severn in 1779 on the site of the present town of Iron Bridge, to which it gave its name. Still in use, this "colossal" feat of engineering, the first considerable

structure built of iron, is the progenitor of the Empire State Building, as well as of the George Washington Bridge.

Prior to the end of the eighteenth century most industrial machinery was made of wood. The substitution of metal and the improvement of machine tools was largely effected by Maudslay (E) at the turn of the century; his outstanding invention was the slide rest. It is surprising and of more than passing interest to note that interchangeable-part manufacture, the *sine qua non* of mass production, was achieved by Whitney in the closing year of the century. By this feat Whitney qualified as one of the godfathers of the new capitalism.

Until quite recently, the Heroic Theory of Invention held sway—the theory that inventions spring full-armed from the brain of a single, supremely endowed individual. A consideration of nearly all inventions shows that this Heroic fallacy has little foundation in fact. Inventions are rather the culmination of a gradual evolution—of what may be called Invention by Accretion—extending over a considerable period of time and resulting from the successive advances made by a long series of collaborators. This process is never-ending, so that the machines that we know today, while retaining the fundamental principles embodied in their predecessors, have been subject to countless modifications and improvements. In the middle of the nineteenth century (1857) spinning machinery was “a compound of about 800 inventions.” Almost the only invention which substantiates the Heroic Theory is the cotton gin, which, curiously enough, was made by a Yankee who until that time “had never seen either cotton or cotton seed.”

EXTRA-INDUSTRIAL INVENTIONS

How were the workmen of the Industrial Revolution to be fed? The Agricultural Revolution, to be sure, was helping to solve this problem; but added help was needed. By 1785 Evans (A) perfected a series of improvements in milling machinery and had constructed elevators, conveyors, hoppers, drills, and descenders, all operating by power, so that every necessary movement of grain or meal from one part of the mill to another or from one machine to another could be effected without manual aid. Another important step toward feeding the millions who swarm the metropolises of Europe and America was taken when (about 1811) for the benefit of the Napoleonic armies, Appert (F) laid the foundations of the canning industry, which makes it possible to utilize perishable foods out of season and far from the spot where produced.

A number of other inventions not directly connected with industry—some astonishingly modern—occurred during this period. Aviation as a whole has a much longer history than many would assume. It is divided into at least two distinct departments, however, and heavier-than-air machines appeared only long after this period had closed. It began in 1783 with the invention of the balloon by the Montgolfier brothers (F). On June 5 a hot-air craft of this type made an ascension which dumbfounded the countryside and stirred up intense excitement all over France. On August 27 a hydrogen balloon designed by Professor Charles, whose principles were later adopted in all balloon construction, likewise made an ascension.

On October 15, Pilâtre de Rozier (F), the first human being to make an ascension, went up in a captive, hot-air balloon; and on November 21, together with the Marquis of Arlandes, he made the first aerial voyage! Arlandes fed the brazier which heated the air, and was therefore referred to as the "chauffeur" (from *chauffer*, to heat). The earliest voyage in a hydrogen balloon was made by Charles and Monsieur Robert on the first of December. In January of the following year a balloon made an ascension with seven passengers; and in January of 1785 Blanchard (F) and Jeffries (A) succeeded in crossing the Channel. It is not on record whether the English lay awake nights for fear of an aerial invasion of the British Isles. In 1804 Gay-Lussac (F), in the course of making scientific observations, reached an altitude of 23,000 feet, but for fifty years thereafter no noteworthy attempt was made to utilize the balloon for such purposes.¹⁰ •

The first important advance made in lighting since the Pyramid Age was accomplished in 1784 when Argand (Ss) improved the whale-oil lamp by inventing his burner, the ancestor of those used today in ordinary kerosene lamps. The Argand burner consisted of two concentric tubes with a tubular wick between, the inner tube left open to provide a draft; and the lamp had a chimney to steady the flame.

A still more radical departure was the introduction of gas lighting. The year following the invention of the Argand burner, Professor Minckelers (Bn) lit his lecture room by means of gas. This is the first instance on record of such a use, but Minckelers made no attempt to exploit his discovery commercially; and the most important point about a discovery or invention is its introduction and adoption, not its conception or invention. In 1792 Murdock (E) lit his house with coal gas and shortly after introduced gas lighting into the Boulton & Watt factory. Encouraged by his success, he fitted another factory for gas, this time with 907 burners, totaling 2,500 c.p. (1805). Shortly before, Winzer or Winsor (G, 1803) had given an exhibition of gas lighting at the Lyceum Theatre in London. Winzer was a typical promoter, of the type which seeks to profit from the work of improvident inventors, and had borrowed the ideas of Lebon (F) on wood-gas lighting. He was the first to light a street (Pall Mall, 1807) and, as promoter of the first gas company, the Father of the Public Utility Corporation. Clegg, who had worked for Murdock, was engineer of Winzer's company and was chiefly responsible for making gas lighting a commercial success. He constructed the first gas tank and was the first to light a whole town by gas. In 1817 over 300,000 cubic feet of gas, enough for 76,500 six c.p. burners, were being manufactured in London daily. In 1830, gas lighting was definitely established in Paris, and thenceforth spread rapidly, though not till the last half of the century was it in common use in homes. Those who have reached middle age can remember the day when candles, oil, and gas were the standard sources of light.

Paper made by hand is so expensive that the popular journal of today would never have come into existence had it not been for the paper-making

¹⁰ In 1797 Garnerin (F) founded the "Caterpillar Club" by making a successful jump with a parachute from a balloon, at a height of over 2,000 feet. Garnerin was the first to use a parachute in any such manner, little dreaming what importance his discovery would attain and how many lives it would save at a later date.

machine, invented by Robert (F, 1798). The invention of the Renaissance printing press paved the way for universal education; the steam press, invented by König (G) and installed by the London *Times* in 1814, paved the way for democratic government. Producing 1,100 impressions at every revolution of the clock, in less than two hours the steam press could print as many copies as the old hand press in an entire day—an increase of well over 300 per cent.

THE COMMUNICATIONS REVOLUTION

Increased production of goods, as brought about by the Industrial Revolution, meant nothing unless they could be marketed. Improved methods of agriculture might result in bumper crops, the cradle and the threshing machine might harvest them, Evans's milling machinery might transform them into flour, yet the workman in the city slums would still starve unless a way were found to transport the finished product to the ultimate consumer.

For this problem four solutions were evolved, which together initiated a veritable revolution in communications. The first was the canal—not a novel solution, for France had been constructing great canals for over a century. In England the golden age of canal-building, during which 3,000 miles were constructed, came between 1760 and 1830; and the Liverpool and Manchester canal reduced the price of coal in the latter city 50 per cent. The second solution was a material improvement in roads, due chiefly to McAdam (S), who invented the process of macadamizing still in use. Thanks to McAdam, the way was paved for the automobile, and during the early nineteenth century, stage coaches were able to run on a regular schedule and cover 107 miles in the startling time of 10 hours. At last, conditions of transportation and communication were catching up with those under the Roman Empire! And even so, it was October 3 before the news of the Battle of the Nile (August 1, 1798) was published in London.

In 1807 the steamboat became a factor in modern civilization. Fulton (A) was the inventor, in the sense that anyone who improves on the inventions of others is an inventor. Fulton had the advantage of having seen or known about the work of such outstanding pioneers as Jouffroy (F), Rumsey (A), Fitch (A), and Symington (S), not to mention his acquaintance with Watt. Fulton made the steamboat pay where others had failed partly because he had the backing of Livingstone, one of the wealthiest men in America and a former associate of the inventor Stevens (A), partly because he secured a virtual monopoly of American river traffic, and partly because he attracted public attention. This he succeeded in doing not by the speed of his craft (less than 5 m.p.h.), but by the distance that it traveled—from New York to Albany. The difficulty of catching the public eye (marketing the product) is one of the basic problems encountered by all inventors and has probably accounted for more failures than any other one factor.

The present-day railway is a combination of two elements: the rail road and the application of steam power to traction. For some two centuries private rail roads for the conveyance of freight had been in operation, using horse

quently it was as low as six, five, or even four! Their hours and conditions of labor were the same as for adults, and their pay 3 shillings in ordinary times, 3 shillings 7½ pence in rush periods. Orphans, farmed out in gangs, were bound to the machines by chains; if they erred or fell asleep from exhaustion, the lash revived their wandering attention. At first these orphans were the form of labor most in demand; but when the authorities began to take an interest in the welfare of their charges, employers preferred children whose parents were living but dared not protest on account of the pressure of economic necessity. In would-be extenuation it has been pointed out that conditions among laborers outside the factories were probably worse, and that conditions in the factories coincided with the general level of the public conscience as evidenced by the penal codes. Such consolation fails to charm.

In the mines, mingling with the men who worked perfectly naked, were employed children of the same ages as those in the factories. "Young females . . . crawling on all fours, with belts round their waists and chains passing between their legs" dragged carts which required the unremitting exertion of their physical powers. The youngest children, who were employed in trapping, descended into the mines before daybreak, worked alone under conditions that amounted to solitary confinement, left after dark, and except on Sundays did not see the light of day for weeks at a time.

If possible, the entire family had to obtain work, for the pitiful wages of any one or two individuals were well below the starvation point for a household; and they lived in tenements, almost never more than one room to a family, amid squalor, filth, and disease. In 1831 Manchester, already a city of 142,000, was still without paving or sewers.

Worst of all were the periods of "panic" or "depression" resulting from "overproduction." In the Middle Ages the serf was sure of shelter from the elements under the roof of his own cottage, and if the crops failed, he was fed by his lord; the capitalist of the Industrial Revolution felt no responsibility beyond the payment of cash wages. In hard times he simply discharged any surplus laborers; they could go whistle for something to eat, and when they were unable to pay their rent, they were turned out on the street by the landlord. From childhood to old age the proletariat faced one never-failing nightmare—unemployment!

The effects of such an existence on the minds, morals, and more particularly the physique of the laboring classes can easily be imagined. Undernourished and exhausted men and women and degenerate children robbed of their childhood—what hope for England if these continued to breed, generation after generation? What price glory and riches? Is it any wonder that those in charge of recruiting during the World War found that they had to allow for 40 per cent of the candidates being physically unfit?

Not that every employer was bad at heart, but the well-intentioned felt forced to meet the competition of the callous; good and bad, employer and employee alike, were helpless in the clutches of the system. One factor in particular contributed to aggravate unemployment and render it chronic: each fresh introduction of labor-saving devices deprived men of work. To

selfish employers this perpetual existence of a large body of unemployed labor, which kept down wages, was not unwelcome.

Such were the conditions which moved Henry George to exclaim: "So long as all the increased wealth which modern progress brings goes but to build up great fortunes, to increase luxury, and make sharper the contrast between the House of Have and the House of Want, progress is not real."

A concomitant of these conditions and their most significant psychological result, the most portentous for the future, was the inevitable cleavage between capital and labor. In the Middle Ages the upper and lower classes were interdependent; to a considerable extent they shared fortune and misfortune. In the Capitalistic Era there were no longer any mutual relations between employer and employee. Less and less did the two have in common—or feel that they had in common. As a result class consciousness awoke and, under conditions of such congestion, spread with ease and rapidity. Wider and wider grew the gap that separated the downtrodden from their masters, till a chasm of economic inequality, social injustice, and hatred yawned between. On one side stood the possessors, parasites in many cases, reaping the profits; on the other, the creators, the dispossessed, who received only enough to exist and beget children to carry on the system. The Industrial Revolution was alienating the bourgeoisie from the proletariat as effectively as the ornate grilles of Versailles had separated the peasants from the aristocracy.

Is it any wonder that when these ignorant, famished creatures beheld machines depriving them and their children of bread they turned to sabotage for revenge? Poor deluded things! They might better have submitted meekly, for all they got was clubs and bullets—sympathy none. "No one compels them to work!" shrieked their employers. "If they don't want the jobs, there are plenty who do." Well said! with thousands more, dispossessed by the Agricultural Revolution or ruined by the competition of machine industry, pouring into the cities to flood the tide of unskilled and unemployed labor. What chance had they, with the Government as well as the bourgeoisie against them?

Ill fares the land, to hastening ills a prey,
Where wealth accumulates, and men decay.

THE CANONIZATION OF CAPITALISM

In the early nineteenth century, even the normal recourse of unionizing to enforce "collective bargaining" was closed to British laborers. For centuries the common law had regarded trade unions as criminal activities, and over thirty acts of Parliament had been passed to strengthen its operation. Now it was enacted that all persons combining to advance wages, decrease the amount of work, or in any way affect manufactures or trade could be convicted before a justice of the peace and sentenced to jail for three months or to hard labor in the house of correction for two (1800). Shortly afterward the Habeas Corpus Act was suspended (1803).

This increasing severity was in part due to the French Revolution, in part to the fact that the new state of affairs had been sanctified by a theory. In

1776, following in the steps of the French Physiocrats, Adam Smith published an attack on Mercantilism entitled *The Wealth of Nations*. As a good son of the eighteenth century, he believed that economic institutions were governed by natural laws, that human interference, whether by law or by combination, was worse than useless, and that supply and demand should accordingly be allowed free play to fix the price of labor and commodities. He maintained that each individual knows his own interests best, that "by pursuing his own interest a man frequently promotes that of society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it," and he therefore demanded "natural liberty" for the individual to attain increased wealth and at the same time to increase the aggregate wealth of the country. A wise government, he insisted, will keep its hands off industry and commerce, and restrict its activities in connection with economic affairs to preserving order—a theory which goes under the name of *laissez-faire* ("Let alone!" or "Hands off!"). In extenuation it should be noted that *The Wealth of Nations* was written before the worst effects of the Industrial Revolution became evident, and that even Adam Smith remarked that "when the regulation . . . is in favour of the workmen, it is always just and equitable; but it is sometimes otherwise when in favour of the masters." In further extenuation of his individualistic views, the conditions against which he was reacting should be remembered.¹⁴

The sanest and most far-sighted reform advocated by Adam Smith was the substitution of coöperation for competition in international relations, and he accordingly urged that economic barriers be reduced to a minimum. Unfortunately, his statesmanlike views on tariffs aroused comparatively little interest, while his advocacy of individualism was loudly acclaimed and *The Wealth of Nations* became the Bible of the so-called Classical Economists. Elaborating the theory of *laissez-faire* and other eighteenth century doctrines, his followers went on to demonstrate that governmental interference with business was not only inadvisable but actually contrary to the "natural rights" with which men were at that time supposedly endowed—though few were interested in inquiring about the natural rights of the proletariat. The right to private property being "inviolable and sacred," it was easy to deduce that the unrestricted right to acquire such property was sacred likewise. Furthermore, all attempts to do away with poverty, because they were contrary to "natural law," were condemned as useless.

The most influential of the Classical Economists were those of the Manchester School, and the chief of that school was Ricardo (Jh-E, *Principles of Political Economy*, 1817). From the premises laid down by Adam Smith and Malthus, Ricardo deduced his "iron law of wages"—"The natural price of labour is that price which is necessary to enable the labourers . . . to subsist and to perpetuate their race, without either increase or diminution." Since according to Ricardo's Wage-Fund Theory there is at a given moment only a fixed fund for wages, if some get more, others will get less; or if the numbers of workers increase, the amount received by each will decrease. Thus in time of prosperity when wages rise and more marriages take place, the supply of labor will increase and cause wages to fall to their previous "natural" level.

¹⁴ Cf. pp. 39-40.

Ricardo agreed with Adam Smith that the existence of such "laws" proved that collective bargaining and "legislative interference must be pernicious." "There is not sufficient wealth for all," declared the economists, "and if equally divided it would be back in the same hands in a few years." And since human laws were "proved" incapable of altering the operation of these natural "laws," the only solution, as advocated by Adam Smith, was to allow each to pursue his "enlightened self-interest." When all else failed, these prophets of gloom fell back on the dictum, "Competition is the life of industry." No wonder the new department of social inquiry known as economics was christened "the dismal science."

Needless to say, the doctrines of the Classical Economists were applauded by the bourgeoisie. Adam Smith was hailed as an apostle of light and became their patron saint. When the workers began to rebel, to organize unions, and to demand a fair share in the profits of the goods they were producing, the capitalists chanted: "You are creating a combination in restraint of trade. You are destroying freedom of competition. You are preventing the individual worker from making a free bargain for his services." To the Government they appealed: "Let us alone, give us a free hand, and we will make you rich. England will be the workshop of the world." Which was all very well from their point of view. And the Government backed them up. Their attitude was made clear by John Bright, "the Great British Commoner," in a speech against proposed legislation for the restriction of factory hours. "*The people* ask for freedom for *their* industry, for the removal of the shackles to *their* trade; you deny it to them, and then forbid them to labour. . . . Give them liberty to work, give *them* the market of the world for *their* produce, give *them* the power to live comfortably."¹⁵ Considering that in that day the workers never owned stock or enjoyed any other opportunity of participating in the profits, this was rather bald sophistry.

Politically and socially, the outstanding phenomena of recent times are the rise of the bourgeoisie and the success of the *haute bourgeoisie* in convincing the "average man"—the lower clergy, the professional class, the *petite bourgeoisie* (lesser capitalists, small shopkeepers, and the like)—and even a portion of the wage-slaves that the prosperity of society as a whole is indissolubly associated with bourgeois ownership and administration of capital.

¹⁵ The italics are mine.—Author.



PART II
EUROPE FROM 1815 TO 1870

II. EUROPE IN 1815

III. THE RESTORATION ERA

IV. IRRESISTIBLE FORCES AND IMMOVABLE OBJECTS

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CHAPTER II

EUROPE IN 1815

THE CLOSE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY EPOCH

One hundred years before the outbreak of the World War, Napoleon abdicated the throne of the First Empire:

1814—the end of the Revolutionary Era,¹
the end of the greatest war Europe
had seen or was to see until our day,
the beginning of a century that cre-
ated the world into which we were
born. . . .

1914—the end of the nineteenth century,
the beginning of the greatest war in
history, the beginning of . . . ?

A quarter of a century before the downfall of Napoleon, France, in defiance of the age-old old-world system of inequality, had unfurled the banner of a new age, an age of "Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity." She had promised aid to all who would rise against their rulers. She had attempted to propagate her ideas at the point of the bayonet. And for a few brief years Western Europe had stirred to the magic of her inspiration. Time-honored thrones were shaken. A new era seemed about to dawn. Such was the French Revolution proper, which terminated in 1799—viewed from one angle.

The French Revolution has been depicted as an uprising of the masses against the classes. In reality it was a struggle of the means against the extremes, of the middle classes against the crown, the clergy, and the aristocracy on the one hand and the proletariat and peasantry on the other. In other words, it was the first attempt of the bourgeoisie to rise politically superior to the Third Estate, to which they theoretically belonged, and to attain to a status equal to that of the privileged classes. Thus it marked the beginning of a series of class conflicts which, widening and deepening, was to spread to every country in Europe and culminate in the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia.

The true nature of the struggle was not apparent at the time, for the bourgeoisie in France were theoretically democrats and equalitarians. As such they were able to maintain control until Napoleon appeared; whereupon he, too, employed the revolutionary slogans to fool the people into acquiescing in a dictatorship more absolute even than that of the Bourbons; and as an excuse

¹ The "Hundred Days" of 1815 were only an interlude which could not conceivably affect the ultimate course of events.

for attempting to dictate to every country in Europe. Swept into the vortex of an insatiable ambition and drunk with conquest, France no longer spent her time crusading for Liberty. At the height of the Empire, after the victories of Austerlitz, Jena-Auerstadt, Friedland, and Wagram, France dominated by annexation or through her vassal states the entire Continent west of a line from Hamburg to Fiume,² plus Saxony, Poland, and Dalmatia.³ In addition, Austria, Prussia, and Denmark were her more or less subservient allies. Most of Europe was therefore divided between two immense empires, that of France and her satellites and that of Russia, which in alliance dominated the Continent, "divided the world between them." England and Turkey alone maintained an independent existence; Sweden, Portugal, Sardinia, and Sicily gravitated in the orbits of the Great Powers; while the principle of the balance of power on which international polity had reposed for centuries was completely overthrown. The territories controlled by France enjoyed civil liberty, that is, feudalism was abolished and "equality before the law" proclaimed; but of political liberty there was hardly a trace. For thorough-going absolutism Napoleon yielded nothing to Louis XIV.

Such a situation was manifestly unstable: the few remaining independent states were jealous and fearful, the subject states discontented, and a considerable portion of the French themselves were not sufficiently intoxicated with military glory to forget their lost liberties. Never had Europe submitted to the dictatorship of a single individual. Charles V and Louis XIV, both possessed of less power, had aroused coalitions that ultimately compassed their defeat. Napoleon could triumph temporarily on the field of battle; but to be enduring, military sway must be unquestioned. With every fresh encounter, the fate of the Empire hung in the balance; though other nations might perforce submit for the moment, they bode their time. Only the force of nationalism, by virtue of which Revolutionary France had staved off the simultaneous attacks of practically all the rest of Europe, could have saved him—and nationalism Napoleon had repudiated. In 1813-14 the vassal and independent states (Turkey excepted) joined in the War of Liberation. With the Battle of the Nations at Leipzig the Empire disintegrated like a string of beads when the cord is cut.

As Napoleon, in order to escape the wrath of his late subjects, was sneaking out of the back door to the eighteen-mile-long "empire" of Elba granted him by the victors, Louis XVIII landed on the shores where his ancestors and his martyred brother had held absolute sway. The First Treaty of Paris (May 30, 1814) gave France substantially her 1792 boundaries; in fact there were some additions of territory.⁴ If it be queried why the Allies were so lenient, the explanation is that they were impressed by the lack of royalist

² Her grasp on Portugal and even on Spain was decidedly shaky, however.

³ This is of course only an approximation, for her control extended more or less to the east of this line and included Mecklenburg, Danzig, and everything southwest of the upper Save.

⁴ Compared with the boundary of 1792, the boundary of 1814 deprived France of no territory worth mentioning. She was allowed to keep her enclaves of 1789 (Venaissin, Avignon, and so on; Montbéliard, Mulhausen, Altwiler, and so on), and over and above what she held in 1792, was granted slight additions along the northeastern frontier (around Dour, Valcourt, Gedinne, Saarbrücken, and Belheim), and northwestern Savoy (Annecy and Chambéry).

sentiment in France, feared that Louis could not retain his throne if he were forced to accept a treaty which hurt the national pride of his subjects, and so preferred a comparatively strong France with a friendly ruler to the possibility of stirring up another revolution.

THE CONGRESS THAT NEVER MET

Napoleon, France, and the Revolution disposed of, the Allies turned toward Vienna, where the final balance was to be struck, where the much-contorted map of Europe, which Pitt had rolled up after the Battle of Austerlitz, was to be redrawn, and where the wrongs of so many lean years were to be righted. The Congress, which assembled in September, was a tribute to the diplomacy of Austria, as conducted by Metternich, and a celebration of the return to the "normal."

To all, the occasion was a *tabula rasa*, a free field for achievement; but the objects to be attained varied widely. To the peoples of Europe, those who had suffered and borne the brunt of the wars, it was an opportunity to create a new order where justice and equity should take the place of greed and violence. To the smaller states it was a feast where they might pick up an occasional crumb beneath the seats of the mighty. To the powers it was a chance to redraw the map of Europe nearer to the heart's desire. "It is a miserable commerce," wrote the Archduke John in his diary, "this trading in lands and human beings. We cursed Napoleon and his system, and justly . . . and the very princes who fought against it are walking in his footsteps." (The tiger had fallen and the jackals were gathered to the feast.)

At the council table of Vienna the Great Powers of a former day had to take a back seat: Portugal, the great imperial state of the fifteenth century; Spain, which, together with Turkey, had dominated the sixteenth; Holland, the foremost commercial nation of the seventeenth; the Sweden of Gustavus Adolphus and Charles XII; and the France of Louis XIV and Napoleon. Turkey, in size still one of the Great Powers but never a member of the European Concert, was not even consulted. With the exception of Austria it was an assemblage of parvenus that dictated the Vienna settlement—England and Prussia, who had won their way to the front in the eighteenth century, and Russia, just emerging from the mists of Eastern barbarism to take her place among the powers of the West.

As the most important settlement between the Peace of Westphalia (1648) and the Peace of 1919, it was fitting that no lack of pomp should mar the occasion. The stage was well set, and the cast brilliant. Handsome and magnanimous, Alexander I, Tsar of All the Russias, headed the brilliant assemblage of guests, with Nesselrode as his chief adviser; Castlereagh, who was to exercise the most active influence, and the "Iron Duke" of Wellington represented England; Frederick William III, Hardenberg, and Humboldt spoke for Prussia. A host of lesser kings, princes, and other delegates from every country in Europe added the weight of their collective presence—including Bernadotte, once a common soldier in the Revolutionary armies, "legitimate" heir to the throne of Sweden by election and adoption, the only member of

the Revolutionary royalty to survive when the Napoleonic creations fell like a house of cards, and ancestor of the present occupant of the Swedish throne. Talleyrand, second to none in diplomacy, represented France. Nor must the host to this hitherto unparalleled aggregation, Francis I of Austria, and his chief adviser, Metternich, be forgotten.

These representatives of the Old Order knew how to do things in the grand manner. A continual round of dinners, balls, and reviews precluded any possibility of boredom. For the benefit of the serious-minded, Beethoven, conducted the *première* of his immortal Seventh Symphony. It is said that the Austrian Government expended \$15,000,000 in entertainment—and in those days a dollar was a dollar.⁵ How much more was spent in financing the secret police—what it cost to examine the contents of the waste-paper baskets, examine the letters, and have everyone of importance shadowed, even in his most private moments—it would be interesting to know.

The procedure of the Congress was so casual and so complicated as to defy accurate description. The Big Four—Russia, England, Austria, and Prussia—were fixed in their determination to decide and dictate the details of the settlement, and with this end in view, Castlereagh, Nesselrode, Hardenberg, and Humboldt, arriving first, constituted themselves a committee of the whole, together with Metternich. They hit upon the happy idea of inviting the two remaining powers of Western Europe, France and Spain, to join them in forming a "dummy" Committee of Six which was to sanction the decisions of the Big Four. When Talleyrand arrived and was presented with this *fait accompli*, he protested vigorously, and posing as the champion of the smaller powers, demanded that the Congress as a whole be convened and consulted. The sole concession he was able to obtain was that the dummy committee should include all eight countries which had signed the Treaty of Paris and so had brought the Congress into existence. Sweden and Portugal were accordingly flattered into conniving with the powers. The concession was purely formal, for the Committee of Eight was consulted only on such nebulous and unimportant matters as the slave trade. The vital work continued to be done by various small committees, often quite informal, to which, as will be seen, Talleyrand was finally admitted—but only after most of the issues had been decided. (The question of the official opening, though repeatedly broached, was never settled; so that *the Congress of Vienna as such never met*, and the delegates of the smaller powers might just as well have stayed at home and saved their traveling expenses.)

✓ In disposing of the vast remains of the Napoleonic Empire, snags were encountered on which the good ship of European statescraft, with too many hands at the helm (or was it too few?), almost foundered. To begin with, the situation was complicated by a number of secret agreements which had been concluded at various times since early in the previous year. Most difficult of all were the problems raised by Saxony and Poland, where the thrones would be left vacant if the King of Saxony, Napoleon's most faithful ally, were deposed. Russia and Prussia, to be sure, had agreed on a solution: to

⁵ In 1811, college tuition (Bowdoin College) could be had for \$16 a year. Rooms were \$5 a year, plus \$3.10 for service.

Russia, Poland; to Prussia, Saxony. What more simple? But Austria and England, fearful for the tenuous balance of power, so rudely shaken by Napoleon, had no desire to see the territory of Russia unduly augmented. Here was Talleyrand's chance. He likewise did not want Russia strengthened. Above all, he did not want the legitimate monarchy of Saxony wiped off the map—and he held the balance of power. A triple alliance (England, Austria, and France against Russia and Prussia) was actually concluded, and for a moment Europe trembled on the brink of fresh disaster. When Alexander realized that if necessary he would be opposed by force of arms, he drew back, and soon the news of the return of Napoleon (March, 1815) arrived to clear the air and speed the settlement.

Only nine days before the Battle of Waterloo, the Final Act, containing 121 articles, was presented to the Committee of Eight for signature (June 9, 1815).⁶ This arbitrary procedure was perhaps justified on the ground of expediency, since to include all the parties involved would have necessitated no less than sixteen hundred ratifications and the mere drafting of the requisite copies of the treaty—in an age which knew not the typewriter—would have involved an incalculable amount of time.⁷ Even the Final Act, huge as it was, did not include all that was done, though it incorporated the most important clauses from seventeen supplementary agreements which were guaranteed *in toto*. A number of other treaties were negotiated by individual powers, and many matters were allowed to stand by tacit consent. With the exception of the Treaties of Paris, however, it will suffice to treat the settlement of 1814-15 as a unit and to make clear how the map of Europe and the world at large had changed since the outbreak of the Revolution of 1789.

The avowed purposes of the Congress were the disposition of the non-French portions of the former Napoleonic empire and the restoration of a "real and permanent balance of power in Europe." Some authorities affirm that the restoration and preservation of the balance of power was the guiding principle, as indeed it was to the extent that the powers were continually on the watch to see that no one country got too much; but the "balance of power" was only a vague generalization. The powers therefore established another and more precise principle, the principle of legitimacy, which dictated that all legitimate (hereditary) rulers should recover their prewar possessions. Evoked by Talleyrand in order to secure the throne of France to the Bourbons, legitimacy was adopted by Metternich for the benefit of other hereditary rulers. Where legitimacy hindered rather than furthered their designs, the powers evoked the principle of compensations. Finally there was the desire to surround France with a *cordon sanitaire*,⁸ a direct foreshadowing of the treatment accorded Russia in 1919.

To the new forces of liberty, nationality, and democracy, which had been the ultimate cause of Napoleon's downfall, the Congress of Vienna paid as little attention as had Napoleon himself.

⁶ Spain, who refused to sign at this time, and practically all of Europe, with the exception of the Pope and the Sultan, subsequently adhered.

⁷ As it was, the formal act of signing was not completed until the twenty-sixth.

⁸ A "safety belt" of border states strong enough to resist aggression.

THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE

In accordance with the principle of legitimacy, the Bourbons were restored: one branch in France, a second in Spain, a third in the Kingdom of Naples.⁹ The House of Savoy was restored in Piedmont and Savoy, and given the Republic of Genoa to strengthen it against France.¹⁰ The House of Orange was restored in Holland, which was increased for the same reason by the addition of Belgium (the Austrian Netherlands) and the Bishopric of Liège. The King of the Netherlands also acquired Luxemburg, increased by part of Bouillon, and recovered Java from England. The King of England recovered Hanover.¹¹ The Marches, the Legations, Benevento, and so on, were restored to the Holy See.¹² Switzerland received full title to Geneva, Neuchâtel, the Valais, and the Bishopric of Basel.

As compensation for her entrance into the war, for her loss of Finland and Pomerania, and in order to punish Denmark for her loyalty to Napoleon, Sweden was given Norway.¹³ Denmark was compensated with a part of Lauenburg.¹⁴ The city of Cracow was erected into a miniature, oligarchical "republic" or free city,¹⁵ something like the present Free City of Danzig.

Though England could present no legitimate claim to additional territory on the Continent, she was amply compensated for having resisted France more than twice as long as any other power and for her services as the banker of six coalitions. Helgoland (Danish) and Malta were handed over to her outright, and she obtained a protectorate over the "United States of the Ionian Islands" (Turkish in 1789).¹⁶ From France she obtained Tobago, St. Lucia, Mauritius, and the Seychelles Islands; from Spain, Trinidad; from the Dutch, the Cape of Good Hope and a part of Guiana. During the Revolutionary Period, also, she had acquired Ceylon from the Dutch (1802), had extended her sway in India,¹⁷ was absorbing British Honduras, was extending her holdings in the Straits Settlements, and had occupied Tasmania. Taking these acquisitions in the aggregate, England made the most considerable gains in square miles—the lion's share, fittingly enough. And just prior to the outbreak of the French Revolution she had begun to occupy Australia. (1788). A new British Empire was rising to replace the one lost in 1783.

To Russia, the largest power of the Continent, went by far the most extensive gains in Europe, as distinct from exchanges. Beside recovering that consider-

⁹ And a fourth in Lucca. The Neapolitan Bourbons had maintained their hold on Sicily, which together with the Kingdom of Naples constituted the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies.

¹⁰ The Dukes of Savoy had continued to rule in Sardinia, which together with Piedmont and Savoy had constituted the Kingdom of Sardinia.

¹¹ Upon the accession of Queen Victoria in 1837, Hanover became a separate state.

¹² Many of these "restorations" were simply acceptances of accomplished facts.

¹³ Iceland should have gone with Norway, but the diplomats of Vienna were poor students of history and declared that Norway and Iceland had no historical connection.

¹⁴ By the Treaty of Kiel (Jan. 14, 1814) the Danish colonies captured by Great Britain during the war were returned, with the exception of Helgoland.

¹⁵ Absorbed by Austria in 1846.

¹⁶ England relinquished the Ionian Islands to Greece in 1863.

¹⁷ Mysore, Orissa, the Doab, Rohilkhand, parts of the Carnatic, and so on.

able portion of Poland which had been in her possession when the Revolutionary Wars broke out and the large share which she obtained in 1795, she received almost all that Austria had obtained by the Third Partition, all that Prussia had obtained by the Third Partition, and most of what Prussia had obtained by the Second Partition. In addition, tacit consent was given to the Russian conquest of Yedisan (Jedisan) from Turkey (1792), Finland from Sweden (1809), and Bessarabia, also from Turkey (1812). During this period, too, Russia began her formal conquest of Transcaucasia.¹⁸

Smallest and therefore least successful of the Big Four, Prussia was forced to content herself with much the same amount that she had held in 1789. Posen and most of what she had lost west of the Elbe in 1807 were recovered; and to compensate for what she had to surrender to Russia, she acquired Swedish Pomerania, nearly half of Saxony, and considerable territory in western Germany, notably the rest of Westphalia and nearly all of the present Rhineland—the last as a further guarantee against French aggression. Curiously enough, although her new possessions were peopled with Germans, who could be assimilated with comparative ease, she was not particularly pleased. Dominant in 1789 in northeastern Germany, in 1815 Prussia obtained a stranglehold on the northwest. It only remained for her to link up her holdings and she would control the north as a whole; the hegemony of Prussia in Germany would be a fact. With an eye to subsequent history, it may be said that she really profited the most. She and England were the only powers which did not subsequently lose most of what they gained in 1815.

Judged by the apparent value of her subsequent holdings—although her net gains were not particularly impressive—Austria achieved what must, to contemporaries, have appeared the outstanding success of the Congress. All her contiguous possessions of 1789 (except a small part of Galicia) were returned,¹⁹ plus all the contiguous possessions—with the exception of West Galicia—that she had held at any time between then and 1815,²⁰ and in addition she received some territory that she had never possessed at any time during that period.²¹ In other words, in exchange for her exclaves of 1789, including Belgium, she received the former Bishopric of Trent, the mainland possessions of the former Republic of Venice—most of the northeastern portion of the Italian peninsula between the Alps and the Po,²² plus Venetian Istria and Dalmatia—and the former Archbishopric of Salzburg, and found herself with a compact aggregation of territories dominating Central Europe and Northern Italy.

In Italy, Austria's hold was further strengthened by the establishment of Hapsburg dynasties in all but one of the duchies and by the complete political

¹⁸ Georgia (1801, a Russian protectorate since 1784), Mingrelia, Baku, Imeritia, and a long strip of the west Caspian coast (Daghestan, Shirvan, and northern Talish). For years to come, her hold on these regions was far from secure.

¹⁹ The Tyrol, Carinthia, Croatia on the right bank of the Save, Milan, part of East Galicia, and so on.

²⁰ Salzburg, Trent, Venice and its possessions east of the Adige (including Venetian Istria and Dalmatia).

²¹ Venice beyond (west of) the Adige, the Republic of Ragusa, and so on.

²² The former Bishopric of Trent and the former Venetian possessions in Italy thenceforth constituted part of what was known as Lombardy-Venetia.

disunion resultant from the existence of ten independent states of the most varied sizes. Once more, in Metternich's happy phrase, Italy had become a "geographical expression."

The solution of the German problem was in the nature of a compromise. No attempt was made to revive the three hundred-odd principalities of pre-Revolutionary Germany, either temporal or ecclesiastical (not to mention the fifteen hundred Imperial Knights, and so on), or the Holy Roman Empire, which, moribund from infirmity and old age, had received its deathblow at the hands of Napoleon and had passed quietly off the scene in 1806. The Revolutionary secularization of ecclesiastical lands was even extended, in compensating the surviving states. Thus the contributions of the French Revolution and Napoleon to German unification were allowed to stand, and to this extent the solution was an advance over the restoration principle. Thanks to the rivalry of Austria and Prussia, however, and out of respect for their wishes, no further steps were taken toward creating a unified national state, and Germany accordingly remained a collection of thirty-eight sovereign and heterogeneous governments, connected only by the impotent diet of the "Germanic Confederation." Provision was indeed made that "there shall be Assemblies of the estates in all the countries belonging to the Confederation"; but what this possible concession to the principle of democracy meant was open to varied interpretation. Thus Germany, like Italy, appeared doomed to remain a geographical expression.

While the subject of the distribution of territory is under consideration, it should be noted that in 1815 not a single state of any size, with the exception of Switzerland, was coextensive with the nation it represented. Lack of space precludes justifying this assertion; but if each state be considered with respect to subject nationalities, unredeemed nationals, and colonial holdings, the facts are self-evident. And even if colonial holdings be omitted from consideration, the Iberian Peninsula is the only further exception.²³ A comparison of Map 20 with Map 7 will help to make the point clear. In general, therefore, it may be said that nationalism, so powerfully stimulated by the French Revolution and Napoleon, was ignored. The few conscious concessions to the principle were almost all without effect. It was decreed that "the Poles, who are respective subjects of Russia, Austria, and Prussia, shall obtain a Representation and National Institutions, regulated according to the degree of political consideration that each of the Governments to which they belong shall judge expedient"; but the proviso contained in the last clause of this injunction rendered it nugatory and effectually precluded any action so far as Austria and Prussia were concerned.

In justice to those who framed the Viennese settlement it should be pointed out that the treaty contained a few far-sighted provisions—among them the neutralization of Switzerland (an additional guarantee against France), the principle of freedom of navigation on international rivers (the Scheldt, the Meuse, and the Rhine, together with its principal tributaries, were specifically mentioned), the abolition of the slave trade (though without provision for

²³ And even Spain had the Catalanian question to deal with.



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confidence. He believed he had a mission: he was a divinely destined crusader against "anarchy" (that is, liberalism). "The Emperor and I will set the world a great example; we will not leave our posts." "I feel the world resting on my shoulders." If I should deceive myself for a moment I am brought to recollection by the arrival of some courier with the declaration 'What will you do?' They say, 'We have confidence only in you. Our fate is in your hands!' " "They expect me as a Messiah." He referred to himself as "the sentry who is never relieved." Although his hold on Western Europe was broken in 1830, in Central Europe he remained dominant until 1848—the outstanding figure on the international stage.

Although he was once known to complain that he had been born either too early or too late (too late to stem the rising tide of liberalism, too early to participate in the building of a new order), Metternich at first found the conditions of the Restoration Era admirably suited to his purpose. To begin with, the psychology of the postwar period played into his hands. By comparison with the almost uninterrupted tumult of the Revolutionary Era, the "good old days" of the Old Régime, stable and relatively peaceful, seemed very desirable. Consequently almost everyone, excepting only the Jacobins or extreme liberals, wanted peace at any price—just as Metternich asserted. The rulers, with the exception of the Tsar, were in hearty sympathy with his aims. France, the only country where trouble might be anticipated, was bound by a five-year occupation. Austria, Russia, Prussia, and England, moreover, had renewed the Quadruple Alliance, originally formed against Napoleon. Assuming the sonorous and euphonious title of the Concert of Europe, the allied powers undertook to regulate international affairs through congresses, to be called whenever necessary.

The only power with which Metternich at first experienced any difficulty was Russia. Alexander I, who had imbibed many advanced ideas from a Swiss tutor, a disciple of the Abbé of Saint-Pierre, was a curious combination of Occidental liberal and Oriental mystic and was bent on playing the rôle of a public benefactor—after the manner of an enlightened despot. Intensely religious and always in a "luminous fog," he evolved the idea of a Holy Alliance. Accordingly, even before the signing of the Quadruple Alliance and the Second Peace of Paris (November 20, 1815), which completed the Restoration settlement, Alexander had asked Austria and Prussia for their adherence to the following singular document:

Their Majesties the Emperor of Austria, the King of Prussia and the Emperor of Russia . . .

Solemnly proclaim that the present act has no object, save to reveal in the presence of the whole World Their fixed determination not to take as Their only rule of conduct, whether in the administration of Their Respective States, or in Their political relations with all other Governments, any but the precepts of that Holy Religion, precepts of justice, of charity, and of peace, which far from being applicable only to private life, ought on the contrary to influence directly the decisions of Princes. . . .

Art. I. In conformity with the words of Holy Scripture which command all men to consider each other as brothers, the three contracting Monarchs will remain united

in the bonds of a true and indissoluble fraternity . . . considering Themselves in Their relations with Their subjects and armies as Fathers of families. . . .

Art. II. Consequently the only principle in force, whether between the said Governments, or between their Subjects, shall be that of doing each other reciprocal service . . . considering themselves all simply as members of one and the same christian nation. . . .

The two rulers first approached by the Tsar signed, though Francis muttered that "if it was a question of politics, he must refer it to his chancellor, if of religion, to his confessor"; and similar cynical remarks were heard on all sides. The Prince Regent of England avoided signing, on the ground that his office did not give him the necessary power. Most of the other countries of Europe adhered later. The Pope, however, the most prominent of all Christians, and the Sultan were not even invited to join.

Alexander was quite sincere, but the agreement, needless to say, had no effect—except to arouse bitter accusations of hypocrisy as time went on; because the Holy Alliance and the reactionary Quadruple Alliance numbered among their chief participants the same powers, the two gradually became identified in the popular mind.

THE CONSERVATIVES IN THE SADDLE

In addition to proposing the Holy Alliance, Alexander did a number of other things which were far more surprising and disconcerting to his conservative colleagues: he confirmed the Finnish constitution, granted the Poles a fairly liberal constitution, and most astonishing of all, instituted a program of liberal reforms in Russia proper. His internal reforms, however, were not an unqualified success; consequently Alexander became discouraged, and the Old Régime remained substantially intact. Thus Alexander fell between two stools: instead of being either an out-and-out Conservative or a thorough reformer, he aroused hopes which remained unsatisfied and threw away a golden opportunity to serve his dynasty. Had he carried through an effective program of moderate reform, the cataclysm which overwhelmed the Romanovs during the World War might never have occurred.

Elsewhere, liberals and liberalism received little quarter. Even England, the proverbial home of liberty, was no exception to the rule, for at this time England was *not* a democracy—merely a constitutional aristocracy or, more properly speaking, a parliamentary plutocracy. The "popular" house, the Commons, was still elected on a highly restricted franchise; and Castlereagh, the leader of the Tories, was as unreservedly opposed to liberalism as Metternich himself.

Louis XVIII, who had returned once more to France, was probably as reactionary at heart as any monarch of the day; but if it be true that "the Bourbons learned nothing and forgot nothing," in this respect at least he was the exception that proves the rule. He realized that to accede to the extreme demands of the reactionary Ultras (Ultra-royalists), who were bent on an integral restoration of the Old Régime, would only provoke a fresh upheaval; and he was determined above all not to resume his travels. His aim,

consequently, was to preserve a balance between the extremes. In order to reassure and conciliate the bourgeoisie, the professional classes, and the peasants who had profited by the Revolutionary land policy, he had promulgated a Charter at the time of the First Restoration. The Charter guaranteed military pensions, the public debt, the Revolutionary land settlement, and the titles of the Napoleonic nobility, in addition to equality before the law, equality of taxation, freedom of worship, and freedom of the press. The government was to comprise a bicameral legislature, modeled on that of England, with a Chamber of Peers and an elective Chamber of Deputies. Four points should be stressed: 1. Louis granted the Charter by "divine right," without consulting the representatives of the people, and it contained a preamble eulogizing the Old Régime and declaring the conservation of the prerogatives of the crown the first duty of the king. 2. It was not made clear whether the ministers were responsible to the king or to the Chamber. 3. By Article 14 the king was empowered to promulgate ordinances "necessary to . . . the surety of the state." 4. The vote was confined to those who paid a direct tax of 300 francs (about \$60), and only those who paid a direct tax of 1,000 francs were eligible for election to the Chamber.¹ As a result, there were only some 90,000 voters out of a population of 29,000,000 (about 1 in 300) and only some 16,000 eligible for election (about 1 in 1,800). The Charter made France a constitutional plutocracy, like England—but with the all important exception that the supremacy of the Chamber over the Crown was not clearly established. Under this illiberal constitution France remained, with slight modifications, until 1848; but at least she enjoyed a more liberal government than any she had experienced under the Old Régime or under Napoleon.

Strangely enough, it was easier for Louis to satisfy the Left than the Right.² The way things were going, the King and the former revolutionists were reaping all the advantages, the Ultras felt. Exasperated by animosities pent up during years of exile, they got out of hand, and for a while the White Terror rivaled the Red. In the midst of this state of affairs the elections were held. Since the Jacobins were intimidated, coerced, or murdered outright in order to keep them from voting, the Ultra majority was so heavy that the Chamber which resulted has gone down in history under the title of the *Chambre Introuvable* (Nonesuch Chamber). Forthwith it proceeded to vote a law prescribing death or deportation as the penalty for seditious writings, speeches, or cries, suspended the guarantees of personal liberty, and established

¹ Money was worth vastly more in those days.

² In England members of the House of Commons sit on benches facing each other, to the right or left of the Speaker according to whether they belong to the party in power or to "His Majesty's Opposition." This arrangement was adopted in the eighteenth century. When a new ministry takes office the two parties exchange sides (cf. Radlich *The Procedure of the House*, Vol. II, pp. 23 *et seq.*). On the Continent, where the representatives sit in a theater-like semicircle, the government supporters were originally placed to the right of the President following the English practice, the opposition to his left. This meant that the reactionaries and conservatives sat on the right, the liberals and republicans on the left. This arrangement persisted—parties—of which there were invariably several—seating themselves in accordance with their opinions, not in accordance with their relationship to the ministry. Today when we speak of the Right, therefore, we mean the more conservative groups (royalists, etc.). The Left, similarly, refers to the extremists (Socialists, Communists, and so on), and the Center, to the moderates. In practice, therefore, the Left may be the government supporters if a Socialist ministry happens to be in power.

special courts with dictatorial authority to try cases of sedition. Even the powers protested against these dangerous proceedings, and Louis gladly dissolved the Chamber. Fresh elections resulted in a Chamber with a moderate royalist majority, and the country entered on a period of peace and progress.

Although Austria gained territorial unity at the Congress of Vienna, her fundamental problem—nationalistic diversity—was actually intensified. For this reason the ruling classes were bound to oppose democracy and nationalism to the last ditch and the Old Régime flourished unshaken. All the evils that had existed in France prior to the Revolution were intensified and magnified. There was the same triple inequality, between classes, within classes, and between different parts of the country. Uniformity there was absolutely none, and the Government bordered on chaos. The population consisted, on the one hand, of a few aristocrats and higher clergy, who controlled everything, and on the other, of the peasantry, who were devoid of even the most elementary rights. The middle class was almost nonexistent.

¶ This situation Metternich sought to maintain by preventing the rise of liberalism, and in pursuance of his objective he evolved a system known to history by his name. The Metternich system had two main aspects. First of all, Austria was hermetically sealed against the outside world: dangerous books were held up at the frontiers, foreign scholars were not allowed to hold positions in Austria, and Austrian students were not allowed to study abroad; in fact no Austrians could travel abroad without permission. Secondly, the Government kept its hand on all forms of intellectual activity within by a police system of extreme activity and efficiency. Newspapers and books were censored, spies were everywhere, the books borrowed by the university professors from the libraries and those used as texts were carefully noted, student societies were forbidden, and since students were compelled to go regularly to confession, the clergy did yeoman service in the cause of conservatism. Yet even the unyielding stagnation of the Metternich system could not prevent Austria from producing the immortal Schubert.

¶ Metternich of course desired to extend this system as widely as possible, particularly in neighboring countries. He had expressed the pious wish that Italy might remain a geographical expression, and a geographical expression she remained. By means of dynastic ties with the Hapsburg princes there, and by treaties with the states under other dynasties, Austria dominated the peninsula.

It would be hard to say in which of the countries of Southern Europe the Restoration assumed the most odious guise: whether in Piedmont (nucleus of the Kingdom of Sardinia), where in order that all signs of the French occupation should be obliterated the French furniture in the royal palaces was destroyed and the French plants in the Botanical Gardens were uprooted;³ in the States of the Church or the Two Sicilies, which vied for the honor of being the most corruptly governed country in Europe; or in Spain, where the Old Régime was revived *in toto*. Everywhere liberals were hunted to the ground, persecuted, imprisoned, or massacred in cold blood.

³ Truth to tell, the French, who in pursuance of Napoleon's policy of making his conquests pay for his wars had systematically despoiled and sacked the peninsula, had done little to endear themselves to the inhabitants.

GERMANY AND THE REBIRTH OF PRUSSIA

If Germany enjoyed a greater semblance of unity than Italy, she was equally far from attaining the substance, as the Germanic Confederation consisted of an even greater number of small states (thirty-eight). The sovereigns of some of these were not even German. The Duke of Schleswig-Holstein and of Lauenburg was the King of Denmark. The Duke of Luxemburg was the King of the Netherlands. The King of Hanover was the King of England. The southern part of the Confederation was made up of the Germanic possessions of the Austrian Emperor, who was perpetual President of the Confederation—and Austria was determined that no strong, unified state should develop in Germany proper. The only organ of centralization was a Diet, hardly differing in authority from the medieval German Diet and made up not of elected representatives, but of delegates appointed by the various princes and voting according to instructions. The efficiency with which the Diet worked is demonstrated by the fact that it took five years to draw up a constitution. As if to guarantee this stagnation in perpetuity, Article 59 of the Treaty of Vienna decreed that a unanimous vote was necessary to effect any "change in the fundamental laws, the organic institutions, individual rights, or religious matters." In short, Germany presented no recognizable resemblance to the powerful state which was later to bear that name. Prussia, the only other large German state beside Austria, had been promised a constitution by Frederick William III—but Frederick William neglected to keep his promise.

Naturally, extreme liberals and many other patriots were dissatisfied with this state of affairs; and especially in the universities discontent was rife. This unrest stimulated the activities of the Burschenschaft, a patriotic society founded at Jena during the Napoleonic wars and subsequently extended to many other universities. In 1817 a festival or convention of the Burschenschaft was held at the Wartburg, a castle associated with Luther, for the purpose of celebrating the three-hundredth anniversary of the posting of his "Ninety-five Theses" and the fourth anniversary of the defeat of Napoleon at Leipzig. Passionate speeches commemorated the great moments of German history, and in imitation of the burning of the Canon Law by Luther, various reactionary books and a corporal's cane were cast into a bonfire. Before the indignation and alarm of the authorities had subsided, a Russian spy, Kotzebue, was assassinated by a student.

Metternich was not slow to take advantage of the feeling aroused by these events. In 1819, in collaboration with Prussia, he railroaded through the diet the Carlsbad Decrees, by which Germany was delivered into his hands. Besides specifying that the assemblies in the German states, for which the Congress of Vienna had made provision, should *not* be parliaments, the Carlsbad Decrees introduced the Metternich system into Germany. It was ordained that every university should have a government supervisor, that intractable teachers could be removed and would remain thereafter ineligible for reappointment elsewhere, that student societies should be abolished, that any student expelled from a university for his opinions should be ineligible to matriculate else-

where, and that the press should be strictly censored. A special commission was created, with power to arrest any German, no matter to what state he belonged. As a result, Germany enjoyed a liberal-hunt scarcely less vigorous than those so popular in Southern Europe. Not even national heroes, like Jahn, Arndt, and Gneisenau, were exempt from supervision and persecution; and a new edition of Fichte's famous *Address to the German People* was suppressed.

Although outwardly the condition of Germany seemed one of almost complete inertia and stagnation, it should not be forgotten that beneath the surface a remarkable development continued to take place in Prussia. The task with which Prussia was confronted in attempting to unify her eight provinces was far from easy. With the exception of their German nationality (and in the case of Posen even this was lacking), the component parts of the kingdom had little or nothing in common. Not only were they without a representative government; they even lacked a centralized government. Unification, therefore, could come only through the efforts of the administration. The success achieved by the Prussian bureaucracy is sufficient proof of the faithfulness and efficiency of their efforts.

A word more on the Prussian system—a system which was to loom large in the future. England, to be sure, pursued a divergent path to glory; but England was England, peculiar by reason of her insularity. Able to dispense with a large standing army, she had developed "representative" national government and local self-government, both at the expense of the Crown. With the Continental nations it was different. Prussia in particular had no geographical boundaries worth mentioning. Surrounded on all sides by larger and more populous countries, she had been forced to depend for her very existence on force of arms. A devoted and efficient dynasty, a devoted and efficient bureaucracy, and last but not least a devoted and efficient army—these were the triple walls which in the past had secured and had assured Prussia a place of respect among the powers, and which in the future were to raise her to the heights of glory. Incidentally, but by no means fortuitously, the army and the bureaucracy were both dominated by the nobility.

Suffice it to say that during the Restoration Era the foundations were being laid for that astounding burst of material prosperity and national achievement which characterized the greatness of Germany in the last half of the century. Silently but surely, hard work, economy, and efficiency were making the Germany of Bismarck, as they had made the Prussia of Frederick the Great. The peculiar feature of the Prussian system was a genuine regard for education—so long as it did not conflict with political stability. In Prussia compulsory education went back to Frederick William I (1717, 1736); whereas elsewhere in nineteenth century Europe education was still largely regarded as something ornamental rather than fundamental. If the foundations of the British Empire were laid on the playing-fields of Eton and Rugby,⁴ even more surely the foundations of the German Empire were laid in the classrooms of Prussia.

So far, however, Prussia had done nothing to further the cause of German nationalism, and there was little visible evidence of what she was achieving

⁴ Cf. the poem by Henry Newbolt, "Play up! play up! and play the game."

at home. Almost the only outward sign of this inward evolution was the Zollverein. This famous tariff union had its inception in the Prussian customs reforms of 1818. Previous to this time, Prussia had no more uniformity in her commercial policy than in her government, but instead 67 different tariffs, some approximating free trade, some prohibitive, with 3,800 categories of goods. To complicate matters still further, Prussia embraced 13 enclaves and her frontiers touched 28 different states, a sufficient indication of her difficulties in collecting duties. In 1818 all internal duties were abolished, raw materials were admitted free, and the duty on manufactures was set at approximately 10 per cent. For the moment, the commercial policy of Prussia was the most liberal in Europe. The following year, the year of the Carlsbad Decrees, the first step was taken toward a true Zollverein when one of the enclaves joined the Prussian customs union. Eventually most of the German states were to follow suit.

France, meanwhile, had recovered so rapidly that by 1818 she was in a position to pay off the indemnity exacted of her by the Second Peace of Paris, and accordingly at a congress convened at Aachen (Aix-la-Chapelle) she was formally readmitted to the society of the Great Powers, as a member of the European Concert in good and regular standing. The prodigal daughter had returned, and the Quadruple Alliance became in effect a Quintuple Alliance. So long as this alignment could hold together, the peace of Europe seemed assured—and incidentally, so did the suppression of liberalism. Internally as well as internationally France was making progress. An electoral law favorable to the bourgeoisie had been passed, and a liberal press law enacted. By 1820 it seemed that she was at last on the way toward the establishment of a permanent liberal régime—when the assassination of the Duke of Berry, the ultimate heir to the throne,⁵ resulted in the downfall of the moderates and a period of renewed reaction which lasted until 1830.

CLOUDS IN A CLOUDLESS SKY

The extreme liberals and a substantial proportion of nationalists remained unreconciled to the Metternich system, and about 1820 a series of events occurred which warned the conservatives that all was not going as well as appeared on the surface. In Spain, every year since the Restoration had seen abortive revolts, followed by increasingly stern repression. In 1820 the King, unable to stem the tide, was forced to restore the Constitution of 1812 and accept a liberal ministry. In Italy, where memories of the Napoleonic Kingdom and of the more enlightened rule of the French would not down, the Neapolitans followed suit; the hated Bourbon ruler, Ferdinand I, was likewise compelled to grant the Spanish Constitution of 1812, and solemnly swore to uphold it. Portugal, and somewhat later Piedmont and Greece, also joined the procession of revolutionary nations.

Here was a state of affairs bound to excite the attention of Metternich,

⁵ Louis XVIII had no immediate heirs; his brother, the Count of Artois, was therefore his heir. The elder son of the Count of Artois had no immediate heirs; a younger son, the Duke of Berry, was therefore *his* heir. (The Duke of Berry had a posthumous heir, the famous so-called Henry V.)

and a congress of the powers met at Troppau to consider the situation in Naples (1820). The events in Germany, France, and Southern Europe had had a cumulative effect on Alexander, who by now was ready to abjure his liberal tendencies. "Tell me what you want and what you wish me to do and I will do it," was his contrite declaration. Metternich thereupon propounded the Doctrine of Intervention, which he held to be implicit in the Viennese settlement: namely, that the powers had the right to intervene in the internal affairs of any country which was a prey to revolution, since if unsuppressed, such a movement might serve as an incentive to similar uprisings elsewhere and so imperil the peace of Europe. To this doctrine Russia and Prussia gave hearty support; but England, breaking the European Concert, declared through Castlereagh that the guarantee of the Congress of Vienna applied only to territory and did not extend to forms of government. At the Congress of Laibach (1821) Ferdinand of Naples, in spite of his solemn promises, pleaded for support against the revolutionists, excusing himself on the ground that he was not obligated to keep faith with rebels. Metternich was commissioned to act, and an Austrian army crushed the insurrectionists with neatness and dispatch. Such remnants of French rule as had been allowed to stand were eradicated, and the bad government of the unfortunate state became even worse. At this moment revolution broke out in Piedmont, but was suppressed with equal ease and celerity. The attention of the powers next turned to Spain. At the behest of the Congress of Verona (1822) and despite renewed protests from England, Louis XVIII sent an expeditionary force to bring the Spanish to their senses, restore his cousin of Spain, prove his loyalty to the conservative cause, and forestall Alexander, who was about to dispatch a force of his own, by way of France. The campaign was highly successful, if not particularly glorious, and the restored reactionaries of Spain indulged in a liberal-hunt that disgusted and alarmed even Metternich. At the same time, the revolution in Portugal was suppressed. Once more the conservatives were in the saddle, more firmly, it seemed, than ever.

During the preceding decade the South American possessions of Spain and Portugal had revolted. Since intervention had achieved such brilliant successes in Europe, in spite of all that England could say or do, the King of Spain proposed a congress to consider the question of coercing his obstreperous subjects overseas (1823). At this point, Canning, Castlereagh's able successor in the British Foreign Office, took a hand. If England was powerless against the other powers where Continental affairs were concerned, in this situation she held the trump card—her navy. Not that she was imbued with a crusading spirit, but the political freedom of South America broke the commercial monopoly of Spain, her age-old rival, and opened new ports to British trade. In 1823 the United States backed up England's stand in a celebrated pronouncement, since known as the Monroe Doctrine:

In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part. . . . With the movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity more immediately connected. . . . We owe it, therefore, to candor, and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers, to

declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety . . . as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States. . . .

Thereupon the Continental Powers, any one of which could probably have defeated England single-handed on land, withdrew with what grace they could muster. To quote his own version of the affair, Canning had "called the New World into existence to redress the balance of the Old." Metternich would have been spared this lesson on "the influence of sea power on history" had he profited by the experience of a far greater, to which he had not long before been a witness, when Napoleon failed in his mighty effort to beat England to her knees.

It was evident that the system of government by congresses, as it has been called, was on its last legs. The question of the Greek revolt, however, remained to be settled, and the Tsar accordingly summoned another congress. Again England refused to attend. The Continental powers met at St. Petersburg (1825), but disagreed so violently among themselves that no action was taken; the congress system passed quietly away, unwept, unhonored, and unsung; the Concert of Europe dissolved into its constituent parts; and the balance of power once more became the sole basis of the European states-system.

THE BALKAN VOLCANO IN ACTION

In 1815 the Turks held an empire which stretched, theoretically at least, from the Persian Gulf to Morocco, and from that arm of the Indian Ocean known as the Gulf of Aden to the lower Danube and beyond—but it was an empire in decay. A century and a half earlier the Ottoman Empire had extended almost to the gates of Vienna and the Black Sea had been a Turkish lake, but in 1815 the hold of the Sublime Porte on its African possessions was decidedly tenuous. Asia Minor and the environs of Constantinople were the only regions of any extent where the Turks were in a majority, and the Ottoman Government had done little or nothing to assimilate or reconcile its subject minorities (which together constituted a majority).

An especially important portion of this vast empire was the Balkan Peninsula, which the Sublime Porte⁶ controlled in its entirety, for the northern frontier in this quarter marched with the Pruth, the eastern Carpathians, the Transylvanian Alps, the middle Danube, the Save, and the Una. The Christians of the Balkans had long been restive under a power alien in language, religion, and customs, a power which rested solely on the right of conquest. One tiny corner of the Balkans, Montenegro, had never submitted but had kept up intermittent warfare from the days of the first Turkish invasion in the fifteenth century, and its independence had been recognized on the eve of the nineteenth (1799). The Serbs, neighbors and close kinsmen of the Montenegrins, had been in almost constant revolt since 1804.

Though remote and backward, the Balkans were not entirely impervious to Western influences, and they had been stirred by the ideals of the French

⁶ The term used by diplomats in referring to the Turkish Government.

Revolution. As a result the Greeks too had been in a ferment. As in the case of most nascent nationalities, the first sign of awakening was a spiritual revival, all the stronger because the Turks allowed their subjects no cultural advantages. Schools and politically-minded literary societies sprang up everywhere, especially when it became evident that the Congress of Vienna did not intend to deal with the Near Eastern Question.

In 1821 a revolt developed in the Morea, the island-like tip of the Balkan Peninsula. The diplomatic situation as it affected the Near East was complicated. It would be natural to assume that Austria, for centuries the champion of Christendom against the Turks, would be the first to extend a helping hand to her fellow Christians. But the Sultan was a legitimate ruler, and Metternich did not hesitate to push his theories to their logical conclusion. The Greeks, he claimed, were rebels acting under orders from Paris, "the center of the greatest conspiracy that the world has ever seen." Moreover, like the majority of Balkan peoples, they were Orthodox Catholics—members of the Greco-Russian Catholic Religion of the Eastern Church, which was rated by the Roman Catholics as unorthodox. For this reason the Christian powers of the West had refrained from aiding the "Greek Empire" of Constantinople when it fell before the Turks in 1453; and for this reason among others the Greeks looked to Russia, the great Orthodox Power, rather than to Catholic Austria, for sympathy and support. Austria, therefore, was beginning to fear Muscovite influence in the Near East, and anticipated no good if the Balkans gained their freedom—a suspicion which the future was to prove amply justified. (Metternich's prognostications proved him a greater prophet than statesman.) Incidentally, Austria viewed the Balkans as a potential field for her own imperialistic activities. The Western powers were interested in the Near East, but were hardly more favorable than Austria toward Greek ambitions; and Metternich was able to dissuade Alexander from aiding the Greeks. But while the powers remained neutral, the cause of Greece was warmly espoused by liberals and by classically educated intellectuals, stirred by the dramatic, if unwarranted, claim of the Greeks to descent from the Periclean immortals and by the presentation of the Greek cause as a struggle of civilization against barbarism. Byron, Lafayette, Chateaubriand, and hundreds of others rallied to the Greeks and gave their support, their money, or their lives to this modern crusade against "the despicable Turk."

The first four years of the revolt were on the whole successful, since the insurgents had control of the sea; but of the character of the warfare, the less said the better. The undisciplined Greeks were little better than brigands, hated each other only less cordially than they hated the Turks, fought among themselves during every lull, and in cold-blooded atrocity matched the Turks point for point. Here too they had the advantage: the Turkish reprisals—the execution of the Patriarch of Constantinople and the massacres of Scio (Chios)—obscured the events which had caused them and aroused still further sentiment in favor of the revolutionists. The turning-point, both against and for the Greeks, came when the Sultan, in despair, called on his subject, the Pasha of Egypt, for aid (1825). The well-trained troops of Mehemet Ali made short work of the Greek bands in the Morea, the Turks recovered most of

THE BALKAN VOLCANO IN ACTION

the mainland, and soon a policy of extermination was well on the way to solving the Greek question.

At this juncture England, Russia, and France decided to intervene. Canning saw another opportunity to checkmate Metternich and feared that Russia, by acting alone, might get all the credit. Russian policy was determined by the new tsar, Nicholas I, who was free from the influence of Metternich and wanted to prevent England from supplanting Russia in the affections of the Greeks. (Selfish motives sometimes work out for the best!) On the Greek question French conservatives were willing to join the liberals in the hope of enhancing French prestige abroad.

The Allies demanded that the Sultan grant his rebellious subjects autonomy. This demand the infatuated monarch evidently considered a bluff, for he refused. Thereupon, with the twofold object of saving the Greeks and their own faces, the Allies sent an expedition to Greece for the purpose of enforcing an armistice, trusting that the mere presence of their forces would effect the desired result. In this expectation they were disappointed by force of circumstances. From the Bay of Navarino, where the Allied fleet found the Turco-Egyptian squadron, the operations of the soldiery ravaging the Greek villages were clearly visible; and as the visiting armament came to anchor, one of the Turkish vessels fired on an English cutter. A general engagement ensued; and when the smoke cleared, the Turkish squadron had disappeared (1827). To the decisive effects of this "untoward" event, as it was styled by Wellington, were added the even more decisive defeats suffered by the Sultan in the Russo-Turkish War of 1828-29. Negotiations over the Greek question lasted until 1830, when Greece finally took shape as an independent power—with the exception of Montenegro, the first small power in Eastern Europe—and Metternich was left to draw such satisfaction as he could from the fact that the new state was a kingdom under a Bavarian prince, rather than the republic for which so many Greeks had longed. In determining the confines of Greece, the powers betrayed their usual shortsightedness. Since her territory stopped at a line from the Gulf of Volo to the Gulf of Arta and Turkey was allowed to keep Crete and the islands of the eastern Aegean, more Greeks remained under Turkish rule than were liberated. Consequently the predominating motive of Greek foreign policy for a hundred years was irredentism, that is, the desire of the Greeks to liberate their "unredeemed" brothers remaining under Turkish misrule.

Incidentally, the Treaty of Adrianople (1829), signed at the conclusion of the Russo-Turkish War, provided for the autonomy of the "Danubian principalities" of Moldavia and Walachia (situated between the Danube and the Carpathians), under the nominal suzerainty of Turkey, and reaffirmed the right of Serbia to autonomy.⁷ These clauses were put in force the following year. In practice, Russia exercised a veiled protectorate over the Danube principalities. By the Treaty of Adrianople, also, Turkey relinquished to Russia her rights over the Caucasus.

⁷ Serbia had been promised autonomy by the Russo-Turkish Treaty of Bucharest (1812) and by the supplementary Treaty of Ackermann (1826), but both times Turkey had failed to act.

THE REVOLUTIONS OF 1830

The reaction in France which resulted from the murder of the Duke of Berry tended to increase in violence throughout the 1820's. A new electoral law, known as the law of the double vote, was passed, giving that quarter of the electorate which paid the highest taxes the exclusive right to choose approximately two-fifths of the Chamber, in addition to exercising their regular vote. The liberal press law was repealed and the censorship reestablished. In addition, the Government practiced every form of chicanery, so that the next election resulted in the choice of only fifteen liberals out of four hundred and thirty deputies.

The last hope of the liberals died with Louis XVIII (1824) and with the accession of his brother, the Count of Artois. Acknowledged leader of the Ultras, who prided themselves on being more royalist than the King, the Count of Artois, now Charles X, forthwith inaugurated a series of almost incredibly stupid acts. Those who had lost their estates during the Revolution were indemnified by government bonds floated through reducing the rate of interest on the national debt from 5 to 3 per cent—a measure which injured and alienated the bourgeoisie. A law was passed making sacrilege a capital offense, and the universities were handed over to the domination of the Church.

By this time, the electorate was roused, and the Government met a decisive defeat at the polls. A moderate ministry held office for about a year, during which the censorship was again abolished and professors who had been dismissed were reinstated. Then the country was stirred by the appointment of the most reactionary ministry since the Restoration; and when the Chamber demanded its dismissal, the King called for a new election. Again the Government met defeat, but Charles did not know when he was beaten. Acting in accordance with his interpretation of Article 14 of the Charter, he replied by issuing the infamous July Ordinances. The first forbade the publication of any periodical without a government permit, revocable at pleasure. The second dissolved the newly elected chamber before it had assembled. The third disenfranchised approximately three-fourths of the electorate, chiefly bourgeois liberals, and left the power in the hands of the landowning nobility. The fourth called for new elections. Charles was warned by his advisers against issuing the ordinances, but declared that his brother (Louis XVI) had lost his head through yielding to popular demands and argued that since the great majority of the people had no vote anyway, they would not trouble to help the comparatively few who were being disenfranchised. Events soon proved that he was wrong, for the implications of his acts were too obvious. If these measures were allowed to stand, France had no constitution worthy of the name. Verbal protests made no impression on Charles, but two days later fighting broke out in the streets. Workmen began to throw up the famous barricades which have so often played a deciding rôle in French history, and the troops were powerless to restore order. A couple of days later Charles withdrew the ill-starred ordinances, but by then it was too late and he was obliged to abdicate; once more Paris had decided the fate of the Bourbon dynasty—this time forever.

The July Revolution was over, but the decision as to the form of government still hung in the balance. The proletariat, who had won the revolution, wanted a republic, but the bourgeoisie was not prepared for such an extreme step. Thanks to Thiers and Lafayette, Louis-Philippe, head of the cadet or Orleanist branch of the Bourbons, was called to the throne by the Chamber of Deputies and was accepted as a compromise by the proletariat. In the course of time, the new dynasty was recognized, if not welcomed, by the powers, who soon found plenty to occupy their attention elsewhere. A permanent breach had been made in the very foundations of the 1815 settlement.

The repercussions of the revolution in France were widespread, and were first experienced in the near-by Netherlands. Although the Belgians and the Dutch possessed the first essential of nationality, territorial contiguity, they lacked all the others. For two centuries prior to the French Revolution they had had no historical connection; the inhabitants of Holland spoke Dutch, the Belgians Walloon or Flemish; Holland was Protestant, Belgium Catholic; Holland was agricultural and commercial and wanted free trade, Belgium was industrial and wanted protection. Most important of all, the Belgians thoroughly disliked their connection with the Dutch; and their discontent was aggravated by the Dutch King who, not content with a personal union, went out of his way to try to assimilate his new subjects by making the Dutch language, law, and officials supreme.

When news of the successful uprising in Paris reached Brussels, the Belgians were inspired to stage a revolution of their own. The royal troops were driven out, and Belgium was proclaimed an independent state. The autocratic powers would have been only too glad to intervene, but the threatening attitude of Palmerston, England's Foreign Secretary, the hostile demeanor of France—Louis-Philippe dared not abandon the Belgians for fear of losing his own throne—and the presence of insurrections elsewhere saved the day. A new nation had arisen in the very midst of Western Europe, and Metternich was left to draw what consolation he could from the fact that at least it was a monarchy.⁸

Although the inhabitants of Congress Poland⁹ enjoyed a greater measure of liberty than they had known since the extinction of their independence—a far greater measure than any of their independent neighbors—owing to their nationalistic aspirations they remained unswervingly hostile to the new régime, and friction with their Russian overlords inevitably developed. When ordered to prepare their troops to coerce Belgium, the Poles answered by throwing the unpopular Russian viceroy out of Warsaw and declaring the rule of the Romanovs at an end. They hoped for foreign aid but, although enthusiasm for their cause was widespread, none came. Certainly the autocratic governments of Austria and Prussia, with Polish minorities of their own, were not favorably disposed. Nor was Louis-Philippe ready to risk his newly acquired

⁸ The status of Belgium was not settled until 1839, when the independence and neutrality of the new state were guaranteed by a six-power treaty, Prussia being one of the signatories. Belgium was given two-thirds of western Luxemburg, and the King of Holland received the Province of Limburg as compensation.

⁹ The Russian-Polish state created by the Congress of Vienna.

throne, and he and Palmerston restricted their activities to writing long-winded and ineffectual notes. In addition, party quarrels sapped Poland's strength. Under the circumstances the result was foreordained; and when the revolt had been crushed, the Polish constitution was abolished. Thousands of Polish patriots ended their days in Siberia; Chopin and thousands more, forced to content themselves with their vicarious successes in Belgium, went into voluntary exile.

Equally unsuccessful were the revolutions which broke out in Italy, this time in the central part—Modena, Parma, and the Papal States. Here too the revolutionists looked for help from France; and here too they were doomed to disappointment. Taking the oratorical gestures of Louis-Philippe at their true value, Metternich dispatched Austrian troops into the disaffected area; and soon all was as before—except that there were a few less liberals with whom to contend. In some of the lesser states of Germany popular demonstrations led to mild constitutions or to further democratic concessions in those already enjoying constitutions; but Austria and Prussia, the two states on which all else ultimately depended, remained undisturbed by the agitation going on around them.

TORY ENGLAND

History is forever emphasizing the importance of geography, and in the case of England this is particularly true. Not without reason has she gloried in her "splendid isolation," for until the invention of the submarine and of aircraft she profited to a very special and very real degree by the aloofness of her island realm, guarded forever by the sounding sea. Occasionally, to be sure, she exercised a direct influence on the Continent; but on the whole, her history and her interests stood somewhat apart from the general run of European affairs. At this point, therefore, it is necessary to turn back and survey the concerns with which, in these same years, she had been mainly preoccupied.

From the present status of British institutions or even from a superficial examination of English institutions in 1815, false deductions may easily be drawn. Throughout the twenty long years of the Revolutionary Wars, England was the only country that never gave up the struggle with France, the only main contestant never invaded; she it was who administered the *coup de grâce* to Napoleon at Waterloo; and in 1815 she emerged with vast gains in territory. Her priority in the Industrial Revolution made her the workshop of the world and a commercial Titan among the nations. At first glance, therefore, her situation appeared enviable indeed; and to Metternich and his colleagues she appeared very liberal, with her opposition to the policy of intervention doubtless serving as adequate proof thereof. Unqualified, however, these impressions were largely false.

In considering the evils of the Industrial Revolution, it would be natural to inquire why the people of England did not pass laws to correct these intolerable abuses. The answer, in a nutshell, is that the common people were powerless. Much has been made of the fact that England was the first country in Europe to curb the power of the Crown and that she did so some time before the French Revolution. In the seventeenth century, far in advance of her neigh-

bors, she achieved "representative" parliamentary government, with the Crown admittedly subordinate to the House of Commons. But though this step was of fundamental importance, one must not leap to the conclusion that the "Glorious Revolution" marked the transfer of power to "the people." Far from it. In 1689, England simply changed from a limited monarchy to a constitutional aristocracy or, more properly speaking, to a parliamentary plutocracy, for the Commons were still elected by a very small minority of the people. Just before the outbreak of the French Revolution there was a demand for reform; but the reaction to the excesses in France played into the hands of the conservatives, and nothing was achieved. As has been noted before, freedom of speech and of the press were abolished, the Habeas Corpus Act, even, was suspended, and all agitation was suppressed with an iron hand.

In short, England was far from enjoying the benefits of an enlightened democracy—or even the benefits of an enlightened despotism. A despotism may not be a bad form of government; a plutocracy invariably is, for plutocrats are inevitably concerned primarily if not solely with their own class interests. To this rule England was no exception. Not one substantial piece of social legislation to offset the evils of the Agricultural and Industrial revolutions stood on her statute books. Whatever attitude Castlereagh¹⁰ and the Tories may have assumed on foreign affairs, in order to protect and further their commercial policy, the cause of liberalism at home was the least of their interests.

A detailed analysis is necessary in order to make clear the exact situation. One authority states that the Commons were chosen by an electorate composed of only one in thirty of the population; but by itself this statement fails to depict adequately the true condition of affairs. The representation, such as it was, was anything but equal; and corruption, illegal or legalized, was the order of the day. To begin with the crux of the matter, the House of Lords, which (save the bishops, who belonged for the most part to the gentry) was composed almost exclusively of hereditary peers,¹¹ shared legislative powers equal in most respects to those of the House of Commons and in addition *controlled the majority of elections to the lower house.*

Even if free from corruption and unhampered by any House of Lords, the representative system as embodied in the House of Commons would have been most unrepresentative. The explanation of this state of affairs hinges on the character of the voting districts, the nature of the suffrage, and the method of voting.

In the counties the suffrage was uniform, for any freeholder¹² possessing land which yielded an income of 40 shillings a year was entitled to vote. Since 40 shillings (about \$10) was a vastly larger sum in those days than it is now, the county franchise was far from democratic; moreover, it was the only uniform feature of the whole system. The counties, from the smallest to the largest, each had two representatives—a situation somewhat analogous to the American method of giving Nevada and New York two Senators apiece. Only 82 of the

¹⁰ Although at no time Prime Minister, Castlereagh (Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 1812-22) was the real ruler of England.

¹¹ With the exception, of course, of new creations.

¹² Cf. p. 41, note 6.

489 English members in the Commons were county members, the overwhelming majority were elected by boroughs (corporate towns). With negligible exceptions they also returned two members, irrespective of size, but the right to vote was a privilege, and in order to possess it a borough had to be specifically enfranchised. Never had there been any general redistribution of seats, and only six English members had been added since the first half of the seventeenth century. As a result, while the new industrial centers, such as Birmingham, Manchester, Leeds, and Sheffield, had no voice in the government, many absurdly small towns continued to send two members to Parliament. Gatton had six houses, Dunwich had almost disappeared beneath the sea, and Old Sarum was an uninhabited hillock. In all, there were 36 enfranchised boroughs with less than 25 inhabitants apiece. Cornwall, with a population of only 300,000, returned 44 representatives, while Lancashire, with 1,330,000 inhabitants, had only 14. In other words, Cornwall had one representative for each 7,500 of the population, while Lancashire had only one for each 100,000! As if these conditions were not bad enough, the franchise in the boroughs was unbelievably chaotic—a typical example of the English tendency to cling to antiquated institutions. In some, strange to relate, the franchise was democratic: any potwalloper (“every inhabitant in the borough who had a family and boiled a pot there”) could vote, provided only that he was not an object of charity. Other boroughs accorded the franchise to every “freeman”; but this term had come to signify a member of a guild, and the qualifications for membership were established by the capricious decisions of the corporation (borough authorities). Clergymen, lawyers, doctors, and bankers, for instance, were excluded. In a third class of boroughs, burgage boroughs, the right to vote belonged to the occupants of certain designated pieces of ground. At Richmond, for example, coal houses, pigeon lofts, and pigsties established the privilege. In a fourth class, known as corporation boroughs, the vote was restricted to members of the corporation. Most of these bodies were close corporations, self-elected, and in many cases the members were nonresidents, present only at election time.

The balloting was public, and the polling frequently occupied ten days or two weeks, during which the opposing forces battled for victory. Corruption prevailed on an almost unparalleled scale. The smaller constituencies were known as pocket, nomination, or rotten boroughs—terms sufficiently indicative of the extent to which they were controlled by the landlord. (In the case of Old Sarum, the landlord, in appointing the representatives, was of course quite within his rights.) Corporation boroughs and boroughs with few inhabitants could be controlled at a minimum of expense. Patronage, such as a snug berth in a government office, often served to swing the vote in corporation boroughs to the “right” side, while householders could be bribed or intimidated and houses filled with docile tenants. In burgage boroughs, since there was no residence qualification, occupants of “vote houses,” if resident overnight, could vote the next day. Title deeds to such property were known as “snatch papers.” In boroughs where the qualification for voting was “freeman” status, the corporations exercised a decisive influence through their right to create voters by conferring the “freedom of the city.” Sometimes they exer-

cised this right so as to restrict the franchise as much as possible, often refusing the right to those manifestly qualified, in order that there might be fewer to bribe; sometimes they went to the other extreme and created hundreds of honorary freemen who had no local connection and only appeared during elections to swamp the residents. Votes had an established market value, just as stocks and bonds have today. One town had a "Christian Club" solely for the purpose of deciding to whom to sell its votes, another advertised openly for a purchaser, and at Liverpool placards summoned the voters to receive their money.

The Duke of Newcastle alone returned 11 members. Of the English members, 218 were returned through the influence of 87 peers; and in all, 487 of the 658 members of the Commons were said by a competent authority to be nominees. Incidentally, since the members received no pay, no one could stand for Parliament unless he had an independent income or was subsidized.

In explanation of this apparently astonishing state of affairs, it should be pointed out that the theory of representation was fundamentally different from that in vogue in democratic countries of today, and resembled more nearly those of Soviet Russia or Fascist Italy. According to this theory, only classes, or "interests"—landowners, the commercial interests, the Established Church, and the universities—not individuals as such, were entitled to representation. It was on these grounds that the English had refused the American colonists this right, or rather had claimed that the colonists already possessed it.

Such were the "normal" conditions under which England chose her "representative" body. In addition, special discrimination was practiced on religious grounds, for the Anglicans (members of the Church of England) constituted a class of politically elect. Others—Dissenters, Roman Catholics, and Jews alike—were the object of prejudicial legislation. To be sure, the more rigorous measures against Catholics, such as that which had prevented them from holding land or worshiping as they saw fit, had been abrogated from 1778 on. But if all the statutes had been enforced, it would have still been impossible for either Catholics or Dissenters to hold any office, civil or military, local or national. Fortunately for the Dissenters (who had been granted religious toleration by an act of 1689), these acts were a dead letter so far as they were concerned, and an annual Indemnity Act dispensed with the penalties incurred by their political activities during the preceding twelvemonth. Catholics, however, were still political outcasts; and both they and Dissenters had to pay taxes known as tithes for the support of the Established (Anglican) Church. They were excluded from Oxford and denied the right to take a degree at Cambridge. They could not be legally married except by a clergyman of the dominant denomination, and their children were therefore illegitimate in the eyes of the law.

Closely examined, the economic situation, too, disclosed distinct drawbacks. Although England prospered in the aggregate as a result of the Napoleonic Wars, the profits, as can be seen from a survey of the Agricultural and Industrial revolutions, went into the pockets of a chosen few. Not only were there chronic evils, inherent in the prevailing system, but these ills were aggravated by a period of keen economic distress which set in after 1815. When the Continental nations returned to peace conditions, England's industrial monopoly

was broken and exports fell off. War industries were ruined, and thousands were thrown out of work, to swell the normally high rate of unemployment; thousands more joined them from the disbanded armies; a series of bad harvests followed; and to cap the climax came a piece of class legislation which rivaled the best efforts of the eighteenth century Mercantilists or the tariff-juggling politicians of twentieth century America. For the benefit of the landlords a new Corn Law, regulating the traffic in breadstuffs, was passed, which prohibited the importation of grain so long as the price in the home market was less than 80 shillings a quarter (about 8 bushels).

Small wonder that unrest, effectually stifled during the long Revolutionary Period, burst forth with renewed vigor. Agitation took two forms, more or less distinct, yet more or less connected. On one side were the inarticulate masses, crying for work and bread and turning more and more to sabotage, known in England as Luddite riots, as their only means of protest; on the other side were the reformers, who desired to effect a change in the political system. The most popular leader of the reform movement was Cobbett, the gifted son of an agricultural laborer, who was the first great newspaper man. By reducing the price of his *Weekly Political Register* from a shilling to "tuppence" (about 4 cents), he was the first to make the press a power with the masses. Cobbett saw clearly that social and economic betterment were dependent on political reform, and his constant demand was for universal suffrage. Bentham, Sir Francis Burdett, Robert Owen, and "Orator" Hunt, among others, added their voices to the cry for reform.

It did not take the Government long to realize the dangers of the situation, but their reactions were characteristic. As constructive remedies were beyond the stretch of their imagination, they simply put on the screws. Rioters were executed, and the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act drove Cobbett to seek temporary asylum in America. The height of the agitation and the reaction was reached about 1819, when the authorities charged a peaceable mass meeting at Manchester with cavalry. Six were killed and many injured. Shortly after the Manchester Massacre, Parliament passed the notorious Six Acts, which further restricted freedom of publication and assemblage.

TORY REFORM

In 1820 a change, coincident with the accession of George IV though in no way connected with it, came over Tory policy. A new generation was rising to power which realized that unmitigated repression was a blind alley. Canning in foreign affairs, Peel and Huskisson in domestic, were the leaders who initiated this turn of events, though the old-line faction continued to exercise nominal control.

England was suffering from a crime wave which had long engaged the attention of Romilly, Mackintosh, and Bentham. So little effect had the writings of Beccaria in England that two hundred offenses were punishable by death, including the destruction of machinery, poaching, cutting down trees, destroying fences, maliciously cutting serge cloth, and personating out-pensioners of Greenwich Hospital! As a result, juries refused to convict, even on the best of

evidence; and less than 10 per cent of those convicted were executed. Also, imprisonment for debt was still in order, as shown by the treatment accorded Lady Hamilton in 1813, after the death of Nelson. Finally Mackintosh succeeded in carrying a bill abolishing the death penalty for stealing 5 shillings' worth of goods from a shop; and by the end of the decade, thanks to Peel, the number of capital offenses had been reduced to about a score. Reform in criminal procedure and in prison administration also began in the '20's. When one remembers that the welfare of the people at large aroused little concern in the minds of the authorities, it is not surprising that up to this time murderers and debtors, men, women, and children, were all herded together in the same jails under conditions that defy description.

Commercial reform likewise began during this period; the first steps toward free trade were taken when Huskisson persuaded the Government to adopt a policy of reciprocity (1823), to abolish bounties, to reduce the duties on a number of raw materials, manufactures, and foodstuffs, and to modify the Navigation Acts. The most astonishing piece of legislation enacted during the period was a bill legalizing trade unions (1825); strikes, however, were still forbidden.

The legal bar to the political equality of Dissenters was removed by the repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts (1828). The Test Act had forbidden anyone who would not take the sacrament according to the rites of the Church of England to hold office under the Crown (national office); the Corporation Act, similarly, had forbidden non-Anglicans to hold municipal office.

Catholics now remained the most considerable body of the population still subject to discrimination. Public attention to this situation was aroused by the election to Parliament of O'Connell, a prominent and popular Irish leader, who was prevented from taking his seat when he refused the oath declaring Catholicism idolatrous. Fear of revolt in Ireland and the advice of Peel, rather than sweet reasonableness, finally decided Parliament to pass the Catholic Emancipation Act of 1829, whereby an inoffensive oath was substituted for the oaths of Allegiance, Supremacy, and Abjuration (the so-called Declaration against Transubstantiation, and the Declaration against Transubstantiation and the Invocation of the Saints and the Sacrifice of the Mass). Thus it became possible for Catholic laymen to vote, to sit in either house of Parliament, and to hold any office except a few of the very highest. The first steps toward equality between religions had been achieved; but equality for those who refused to subscribe to any creed was still in the future.

THE PASSING OF THE GREAT REFORM BILL

Throughout the decade agitation in favor of parliamentary reform had been growing, and a number of circumstances combined to render the moment propitious. The death of George IV and the accession of William IV (1830) necessitated a new election. The Whigs, under Earl Grey and Lord Russell, stood pledged to moderate reform. Needless to say, the Whig aristocracy were fully as class-conscious on the average as the Tories and did not favor any such sweeping measures as were demanded by the radicals or by the masses;

but for over half a century with hardly a break the Whigs had had to be content with warming the Opposition benches. Some were sincerely convinced of the necessity for partial reform, and the rest were ready to grasp at any means which would return them to power. In addition, some of the Tories, disgruntled by the reforms already passed, had joined the opposition. The July Revolution in France quickened the activities of the radicals and showed the capitalists that a change did not necessarily mean anarchy.

Although the Whigs lost the election, the Tory majority was greatly reduced. Nevertheless, when the matter of reform was broached in Parliament, Wellington, the Prime Minister, stood by his guns and declared himself unalterably opposed to changing a system which "answered all the good purposes of legislation," possessed "the full and entire confidence of the country," and was so perfect that, if called on to erect one, he did not claim that he could achieve such a legislature as they already possessed, for "the nature of man was incapable of reaching such excellence at once." The speech was the swan song of the Old Régime in England. The ministry was defeated, and the Whigs took office under Earl Grey, who for forty years had advocated reform.

When Lord Russell, spokesman for the Whigs, laid the Reform Bill before Parliament, it was denounced by the Tories as "destructive of all property, of all right, of all privilege." More telling was their argument that under the then existing system members of the Commons were comparatively independent of the whims of the electorate. From the Whig benches on the other side of the House resounded the ringing phrases of Macaulay.

Now, therefore, while everything at home and abroad forebodes ruin to those who persist in a hopeless struggle against the spirit of the age, now, while the crash of the proudest throne of the Continent is still resounding in our ears, now, while the roof of a British palace affords an ignominious shelter to the exiled heir of forty kings, now, while we see on every side ancient institutions subverted, and great societies dissolved, now, while the heart of England is still sound, now, while old feelings and old associations retain a power and a charm which may too soon pass away, now, in this your accepted time, now, in this your day of salvation, take counsel, not of prejudice, not of party spirit, not of the ignominious pride of fatal consistency, but of history, of reason, of the ages which are past, of the signs of this most portentous time. . . . Save the greatest, the fairest, the most highly civilized community that ever existed, from calamities which may in a few days sweep away all the rich heritage of so many ages of wisdom and glory. The danger is terrible. The time is short. If this bill should be rejected, I pray to God that none of those who concur in rejecting it may ever remember their votes with unavailing remorse, amidst the wreck of laws, the confusion of ranks, the spoliation of property, and the dissolution of social order.

Despite this glowing entreaty, however, the measure was defeated. But when Grey appealed to the country, the answer was unmistakable. A second bill was introduced and passed the Commons, only to be thrown out by the Lords. Finally, a third bill was introduced, which also passed the Commons. This time the Lords gave the proposition a more respectful hearing, but its ultimate defeat was certain. Only one resource remained: to create enough new peers to insure the passage of the measure. This the King refused to do, whereupon Grey resigned, and the King turned to Wellington.

Meanwhile the excitement in the country at large, increasing with each fresh turn of events, swelled to fever heat. The propaganda of the philosophical radicals, of Cobbett, and of Owen was making itself felt, but no single individual, perhaps, deserves greater credit for the ultimate turn of events than Francis Place, better known for his connection with the evolution of trade unionism. This self-educated reformer began life as an ordinary tailor, and his mind and heart were close to the masses from which he sprang. He was equally close to Bentham, whose disciple he was, and to the liberal reformers, for whom his establishment was a rendezvous, and thus he was able to act as a link between the upper and the lower classes. In short, Francis Place was a sort of glorified ward politician, a boss who was able to "deliver the votes," but a boss whose incentive was the welfare of the oppressed rather than self-glorification. By keeping his forces in order and using them to bring pressure on the Government, he aroused a wholesome fear among those in power.

Although the leaders knew that the bill itself was only a step, which would by no means satisfy popular demands, the hopes of the masses had risen. In their ignorance, many of them believed that it provided for universal suffrage. A meeting of Westminsterites¹³ threatened that if the bill should be defeated "tumult, anarchy, and confusion will overspread the land, and will cease only with the utter extinction of the privileged orders," and added, "We will prepare our powder and melt our lead." References were heard to the Great Rebellion, the execution of Charles I, and the deposition of James II. The Queen was insulted in the streets. Nor were the demonstrations merely oratorical; rioting was on the increase, and an especially alarming outbreak at Bristol resulted in a conflagration which destroyed many of the principal buildings. Clearly, there was serious danger of a revolution.

Under the circumstances, not even the victor of Waterloo was able to form a ministry. Grey was recalled, and the King agreed, if necessary, to create sufficient new peers to assure the passage of the bill. The threatened creations proved unnecessary, as about a hundred peers withdrew from the House of Lords during the voting, and the great Reform Bill thereupon became law (1832). In effect, therefore, the passage of the bill was as much a victory of the Commons over the Lords and the Crown as a triumph for the principle of democracy—indeed, as will soon be seen, rather more so.

THE GREAT REFORM BILL

To anyone reading the provisions of the Great Reform Bill today, so much excitement over such an apparently innocuous measure seems almost incredible. 1. Fifty-six of the smallest boroughs were disfranchised outright. Since many of the most eminent commoners in the history of the House, including some of the reformers themselves, had entered Parliament as nominees from these very places, the wisdom of this step was at least open to question—and was, of course, questioned by the Tories. Thirty-one small boroughs lost half their representation. One hundred and forty-three vacant seats were thereby obtained,

¹³ Westminster is geographically, but not administratively, part of London.

which were redistributed—44 to twenty-two large new English cities (two-member boroughs), 21 to single-member boroughs, 65 to English and Welsh counties, 8 to Scotland, and 5 to Ireland. Even this did not effect a really equitable readjustment; since the boroughs retaining one seat were almost without exception less than half as large as those newly enfranchised, 20 members of the Commons might represent either 2,411 voters or 86,072. 2. Voting was limited to two consecutive days, in hope of eliminating some of the preëxisting evils; but where certain abuses were eradicated, others arose to take their place. Under the old system influential individuals had the almost unquestioned disposal of certain seats; now if they wanted seats they were obliged to go out into the "open market," as it were, and buy them. As a result corruption increased rather than diminished. 3. The policy in regard to the franchise was more or less the reverse of that previously in force. In the counties, which had had a uniform 40-shilling franchise, various special classes were admitted to the vote, as a sop to the agrarian interests. In the boroughs, where the franchise had been indescribably chaotic, a uniform requirement of owning or renting a house worth £10 (about \$50) a year was established as the standard.¹⁴

The net results of this far-famed measure are astonishing. The county electorate increased approximately 50 per cent. The borough electorate increased to the same moderate extent, but this was effected by disfranchising nearly half the old electorate (one of the principal objections urged against the bill by the Tories) and then adding to the remainder more than an equal number of new electors. The net increase for the counties and boroughs combined was therefore less than 50 per cent. In other words, even after the act had taken effect there were only about 650,000 voters out of a population of some 24,500,000.¹⁵

Because the English when acting in concert never make a clean break with the past but are addicted to halfway measures, which leave the issue confused, English history is more difficult to study than Continental and therefore requires more detailed consideration. It is easy to see that the Great Reform Bill did not mean that England had become a democracy—far from it, for neither the city nor the country laborers obtained the vote. Indeed it is not even correct to say, as do many, that it ushered in the rule of the middle class. Only the *haute bourgeoisie*, the upper middle class, profited, and England remained a plutocracy—if a slightly less exclusive one. Judged by its *immediate* results, therefore, the "Great" Reform Bill by no means deserved its name. Its chief if not sole effect was that it made a breach in the walls of privilege. In this all-important respect, however, its significance can scarcely be exaggerated.

¹⁴ There were a few unimportant exceptions to the £10 borough franchise. Supplementary reform bills for Scotland and Ireland established slightly different qualifications. The most important feature of the Irish bill was the disfranchisement of the 40-shilling freeholders.

¹⁵	County Electorate	Borough Electorate	Total Electorate	Percentage of Increase
1831	247,000	188,391	435,391	
1833	370,379	282,398 *	652,777	49.9

* 108,000 of whom were previously entitled to vote.

CHAPTER IV

IRRESISTIBLE FORCES AND IMMOVABLE OBJECTS

SOCIAL REFORM IN ENGLAND

For two of the Great Powers, England and Russia, the history of the period following the Restoration Era reveals little in common with the rest of Europe, little in common with each other with one important exception: for both it was an interval marked by no events of outstanding importance in political affairs.

To the overexpectant populace of England the Great Reform Bill was a bitter disappointment, for, as they soon discovered, it merely enabled an oligarchy of wealth to share the power with the agrarian oligarchy. When the first shock of disillusionment was over, however, the masses found consolation in the belief that the progress registered in 1832 was an earnest of further reforms in the near future. In this hope too they were doomed to disappointment. The new electorate, no more democratically-minded than the old, had no inclination to share its hard-won privileges. Whigs as well as Tories regarded the concessions of 1832 as a "finality," and for a generation by presenting a united front they were able to make their views prevail.

Although for the time being the way to political democracy was definitely blocked, the period from 1832 to 1867 was by no means one of stagnation—quite the contrary. In 1833, following the passage of the Whig Reform Bill, appropriately enough, three great nonpolitical reforms were enacted. The Factory Act of 1833, the first to affect the textile industry as a whole, was not, however, the work of the Whigs. If it be remembered that they were in large part the representatives of factory owners, the reason is clear. The Whigs had passed the Reform Bill, in spite of the Tories, to obtain the support of the industrialists; the Tories now enacted social legislation to spite the Whigs. (Of course some individuals in *both* parties were sincere in their advocacy of reform.) The law of 1833 embodied four main provisions: (1) The work of children under the age of eleven was limited to a nine-hour day, or forty-eight hours a week; (2) workers less than eighteen years old could only be employed twelve hours a day, or sixty-nine a week; (3) night work, between the hours of 8:30 P.M. and 5:30 A.M., was prohibited; and (4) most important of all, inspectors were provided to enforce the law. The second of the important reforms of 1833 was the abolition of slavery in the British dominions. To the

members of the English Parliament the Negro slaves of the distant British colonies were vastly more picturesque and appealing than the wage slaves of England itself or the downtrodden peasantry of Ireland. Already the slave trade had been forbidden (1806-11). The abolition of slavery, therefore, was merely an extension of a recognized principle. The third great reform accomplished in 1833 was the first public grant for education made in England. This step in progress did not signify the establishment of a national school system, however, for the administration of the funds was intrusted to church societies.

These three reforms were followed by a succession of others. Since the days when Elizabeth was moved to eliminate "sturdy beggars" by the formulation of an adequate poor law, England has been plagued by the question of what to do with her pauper class. The unemployment crisis which resulted from the Industrial Revolution, and which had been aggravated by the period of distress following 1815, made the issue more than usually acute. The Poor Law of 1834 was hardly more than a reënforcement of the Elizabethan statute, but is important because it remained the basis of action throughout the century. It provided that the administration of poor relief should be under the supervision of a central commission; and the commission, in turn, decreed that the able-bodied should be entitled to support only within the walls of "work-houses" worthy of the name. Only the physically incapacitated were to be entitled to "outdoor relief" (the privilege of being supported at home, outside of the walls of a workhouse). The system was a hardship on many honest folk and explains the origin of such doleful ditties as "Over the Hill to the Poorhouse"; but it enabled several parishes to unite their efforts, prevented loafing, and accomplished considerable economies. The passage of the Municipal Reform Act in 1835 complemented the Reform Bill by a reconstruction of local government. The close corporations were deprived of authority, and a uniform borough franchise, substantially the same as that of the Reform Bill itself, was established.

It is the tendency of the New History to minimize the importance of reigns, a tendency which in general is justified. In England, in particular, recent sovereigns have played a minor rôle; but no account of European affairs would be complete which failed to stress the beginning of the longest and in many ways the most brilliant reign in British history. In 1837, just when the authority of the Crown seemed to be approaching its nadir, Victoria, a slender, pretty girl of scarcely eighteen, ascended the throne. The Victorian Era had begun.

The year after her accession a decade of renewed political agitation opened, with the inauguration of the Chartist movement, so called from the People's Charter. The genesis of this important document is to be found as far back as 1776, when Cartwright, brother of Cartwright of the power loom and a friend of American independence, formulated his Six Points. The Fox Commission of 1780 added the demands for equal electoral districts and for the abolition of the property qualification for members of Parliament. In pre-Reform days Bentham and Sir Francis Burdett renewed and popularized these demands. The Charter itself called for (1) manhood suffrage, (2) the secret ballot, (3) annual Parliaments, (4) abolition of the property qualification for members of Parliament, (5) payment of members of Parliament, and (6) equal electoral dis-

tricts. Moderate as these demands seem at the present time and as strongly urged as they were, they met with such uncompromising hostility that for many decades nothing was accomplished. Eventually, however, they were to become, with few exceptions, the law of the land. In the closing year of the decade the publication of parliamentary speeches, enabling constituents to keep fully informed on the official opinions and actions of their representatives, was at last legalized.

The introduction of penny postage (1840) was the greatest step forward in the improvement of communication between individuals. Previously, postage varied according to the distance a letter was carried. Now the novel though simple expedient was adopted of charging one uniform rate by weight, regardless of the distance letters were to be carried, but sufficiently high so that the losses on longer deliveries were offset by the gains resulting from the shorter and from the increased volume of business.

PEEL AND THE ADOPTION OF FREE TRADE

The decade of the '40's was second to none in constructive reforms, and it is interesting to note that the chief credit was due to the Tory or, as it was now beginning to be called, the Conservative party, and above all to its greatest leader, Peel—all of which goes to show how little there is in party names.

Robert Peel was no new figure in politics. He had entered Parliament (1809) at the age of twenty-one as member for a pocket borough bought for him by his father, an industrial capitalist, and three years later was appointed Chief Secretary for Ireland. As such, in defiance of Castlereagh and Canning, he successfully opposed Catholic Emancipation, and as a reward, was returned for Oxford, a distinction considered the highest within the bestowal of the British electorate. He served as chairman of the committee which brought about the resumption of cash payments (1819), thereby contributing greatly to England's financial stability, and entered the cabinet as Home Secretary. His tenure of this office was characterized by Canning as the most efficient in history. He created the famous London police force, known to this very day as "Bobbies," and was effective in securing the reform of the criminal code, so long and ardently advocated by Romilly and Mackintosh; and during his administration every law imposing extraordinary restrictions on personal liberty was repealed. Converted to the cause of Catholic relief, he tendered his resignation, which was refused, and then introduced and carried Catholic Emancipation. The charge of being a turncoat he effectually rebutted by offering himself for re-election. After the Tory debacle attendant upon the passage of the Reform Bill the task of rejuvenating the party had fallen on his shoulders.

When Peel took office (1841) after more than a decade of almost uninterrupted Whig rule, he was confronted by an economic crisis of catastrophic proportions. Business was bad and crop failures had raised the cost of living, so that the unemployment and distress were appalling. In Manchester alone 116 mills were idle and 12,000 families subsisted on charity. In Leeds 20,000 workers averaged less than a shilling a week in wages. Worst of all from a

governmental standpoint, there was a mounting deficit which was causing a rapid increase in the national debt.

While battling with this situation, the Government found time to pass some important social legislation, which helped to remedy the still shocking working-conditions and, whether so intended or not, assisted in solving the economic problem by reducing the supply of labor. The first Mines Act (1842) excluded boys under eleven, together with girls and women, from underground work. A new factory act (1844) limited working-hours for women to twelve, reduced those of boys and girls to alternate days or half-time, prescribed that children should attend school, stipulated in detail what measures should be taken for safety and health, and provided penal compensation for injuries resulting from unfenced machinery. In 1847, the year following Peel's retirement, the ten-hour day, with a half-holiday on Saturday, was introduced in behalf of women and young persons.

Peel's relation to social reform has been almost forgotten as a result of his fame in connection with the Corn Laws. One of the most important innovations in British history was that which converted England from a stronghold of Mercantilism in 1815 to the stronghold of Free Trade in 1860 (a position which she surrendered only in 1932). As the dates indicate, it was a gradual process. Three separate issues were involved: the repeal of the Navigation Acts (for the protection of English shipping), the repeal of the Corn Laws, and the abandonment of protection in general. In the '20's Huskisson had effected some reduction of duties and a modification of the Navigation Acts. During the '30's, owing to the formation of the Anti-Corn Law League and the leadership of Cobden and Bright, the question of the repeal of the Corn Laws attained considerable prominence; but this agitation had had no direct effect, and it remained for Peel to engineer the deciding steps, although as a scion of the new industrial plutocracy he had been predisposed toward protection. Peel's first budget reintroduced the income tax, previously used as a wartime measure during the Revolutionary Era, and this piece of essentially socialistic legislation thenceforth became the cornerstone of British finance. Thanks to the surplus revenue which resulted, Peel was able to repeal 605 duties and reduce 1,035 others. Business revived, prosperity returned, the budget more than balanced, and a comfortable surplus was available for reducing the national debt. Peel's tenure of office seemed secure beyond peradventure; as Cobden put it, neither the Grand Turk nor a Russian despot had more power.

Then suddenly and without warning, the free-trade question reached its most acute crisis. A failure of the potato crop in Ireland (1845), where half of the already superabundant population were dependent on that temperamental vegetable, forced thousands of Irish to choose between emigration and starvation. The situation was complicated by a simultaneous failure of the English grain crop. Only unrestricted importation of breadstuffs from abroad could save thousands more from a lingering death. All the elements of a great tragedy were present, including a great hero. Peel knew that in order to maintain his control over his party and the control of the party over the country, he must continue his traditional support of the Corn Laws. But Peel, as he had already demonstrated on more than one occasion, was a statesman even before

he was a politician. In 1846, by sheer weight of personal influence and the exercise of that ability whereby "he played upon the House of Commons as upon an old fiddle," this "odd shy man," as his sovereign called him, forced the repeal of the Corn Laws through the Commons against the opposition of many of his cabinet and many of his party leaders, egged on by his ambitious follower, Disraeli. In the Lords, Wellington accomplished the last notable act of an illustrious career by securing a favorable vote. In English politics the real and the ostensible causes of defeat are seldom identical. The same night the ministry went down to defeat on a minor issue, amid a scene eloquently described by Disraeli himself. "The Protectionists passed in defile before the Minister to the hostile lobby . . . the flower of that great party. . . . They had been not only his followers but his friends. . . . They trooped on. . . . The Emperor was without an army." The power of "the greatest member of Parliament that ever lived" was broken. But in the streets, as the fallen champion passed, he met the acclaim of an army far greater than that which he had lost—the legion of the poor, the hungry, and the nameless.

In subsequent years Peel's work was carried to completion. The repeal of the Navigation Acts (1849) opened English ports to the shipping of the world on equal terms, and the free-trade budgets of the '50's which made Gladstone's fame were merely an extension of Peel's principles.

In 1848 England felt a mild repercussion of the revolutionary movement which shook the Continent in that year. Chartism came to a head, in a demonstration heralded before the event as a parade of a half-million Chartists, who were to escort to Parliament a monster petition for the Six Points, containing, it was claimed, 5,700,000 signatures. Conservative England shook in its boots. A hundred and seventy thousand special constables were sworn in, and the aged Duke of Wellington dusted off the sword of Waterloo. In the face of these preparations, the Chartists hesitated, and finally dispatched the petition in a cab. Upon examination, the document was found to contain less than two million signatures—among them "the Queen," "Wellington," "the Prime Minister," "Peel," and the like! Ridicule and returning prosperity accomplished more than armed resistance, and Chartism as a separate movement disappeared.

SHAFTESBURY AND REFORM IN ENGLAND

The outstanding hero of the early struggle for social reform was Anthony Ashley Cooper (Lord Ashley), seventh Earl of Shaftesbury. From the history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries many who held the highest office in their respective countries may well be omitted; but no account of the evolution of humanity would be complete which failed to mention this self-sacrificing champion of the masses who, although hopelessly in debt, time and again refused office in order to be free to devote himself to the welfare of the afflicted. Child of a cold, harsh father and of a mother who was a social butterfly, heir to a peerage of ancient standing, and a member of the Conservative party, Shaftesbury from early youth to old age was a seeming contradiction of the laws of heredity and environment and a notable exponent of the old adage,

Noblesse oblige. (His foremost opponent was John Bright, widely heralded advocate of political reform!)

Shaftesbury fathered the Mines Act of 1842 and the two acts of 1845 known as the Magna Charta of the insane. The Factory Acts of 1833 and 1844 were compromise measures, passed as substitutes for bills which he brought forward and for the purpose of taking the wind out of his sails. He was the spiritual if not the legal father of the Ten Hours Act of 1847 and of the Factory Act of 1850, the most important ever passed.

In his struggles to alleviate the misery of the poor and downtrodden, Shaftesbury found influential, though unofficial, allies in two great writers, Dickens and Carlyle. Through a long series of widely read novels, permeated by keen wit as well as by deep sympathy for his characters, Dickens made the upper and middle classes of Victorian England realize for the first time the suffering experienced by "the other half." Carlyle, in utterances almost incoherent with emotion but all the more moving for that very reason, denounced in no uncertain terms the evils of the Industrial Revolution (*Past and Present*).

The Ten Hours Act had remained a dead letter, for employers evaded it by working their employees in relays. The Act of 1850 put a stop to this practice by forbidding the employment of women and "young people" before 6 A.M. and after 6 P.M. and thereby for the first time established an effective maximum day. In 1853 the benefits of this law were extended to children as well.

In 1851, Shaftesbury obtained the enactment of two Laboring Classes Lodging Houses Acts—the beginning of a long series of measures designed to ameliorate the living-conditions of the poor. One, which authorized local authorities to build lodging-houses, remained a dead letter, but established the principle that the state should provide sanitary dwellings for its needy citizens. The other was the first attempt to render existing lodgings fit for human habitation. The conditions in cheap lodging-houses, as depicted by official reports, were almost unbelievable: for instance, a room 34 feet by 20 where "on particular occasions commonly 50, sometimes 90 to 100" found accommodation; and another, 18 by 10, where 58 were discovered sleeping. "Eight occupants to the bed was not unusual, all over the country," and in many cases there were no beds at all. No distinction was made of age or sex, and most of these "habitations" were filthy with vermin. Small wonder that Dickens called Shaftesbury's second measure "the best Act ever passed by an English Legislature."

Up to this time, very few industries except textile factories and mining had been regulated. In 1864, on the recommendation of a commission moved by Shaftesbury, an act was passed regulating six dangerous trades: the making of pottery, of lucifer matches, of percussion-caps, and of cartridges, paper-staining, and fustian-cutting.

A number of minor reforms remain to be noted. Changes in army regulations (1844) and in public sentiment eliminated dueling from the *mores* of the English nation. From time to time fresh improvements in the criminal code were enacted. Prior to the mid-nineteenth century those who escaped the death penalty were sentenced to transportation to Australia or, worse still, to

Norfolk Island, a Devil's Island so horrible that the wretched victims often sought death instead. In the '50's the practice of transportation was discontinued. Meanwhile a law had been passed allowing prisoners the benefit of counsel (1836) and the whipping-post and the pillory had been abolished. By 1861 the only capital crimes remaining on the statute books were murder, treason, and piracy. Dissenters were finally admitted to degrees at Oxford (1854), and Jews permitted to sit in Parliament (1858).

REACTION IN RUSSIA

The history of Russia during the reign of Nicholas I (1825-55) can be summed up in two words—unmitigated reaction. A typical antediluvian, Nicholas was a tsar of the old school and the outstanding conservative of the period. Not only was he ardently devoted to military matters and to the autocratic régime to which Alexander I had been reconverted but, unlike his immediate predecessors, he was an uncompromising opponent of westernization. Two occurrences served to intensify these tendencies: the first was a revolt of the liberals with which he was confronted immediately upon his accession; the second, the Polish Revolution. As a result, Nicholas created a ministry of secret political police, famous throughout the subsequent history of tsarist Russia as the Third Section or Okhrana. With this redoubtable organization at his back he proceeded to introduce the Metternich system into Russia, improving upon it to such good effect that, incredible as it may seem, the "Nicholas System" may be accurately described as a successful attempt to gild the lily. Russia became a gigantic barracks where none of his subjects dared breathe without orders. Unlike his immediate predecessors again, Nicholas was noted for his religious persecutions and for his attempts to Russify his subject peoples—policies which were later to attain great importance. Until the military machine which was his pride and joy cracked under the strain imposed by the Crimean War (1853-55), Russia in her internal affairs showed little but bovine apathy. In the international affairs of Europe she played the part of a great, fearsome potential force for conservatism and reaction, waiting, with an army twice as large as any other in Europe, to be employed against liberalism—as she was to be in '48 and '51.

The most noteworthy accomplishments of the reign were the extensions of Russian territory. Erivan and Nakhichevan were acquired from Persia (1828), Turkey surrendered to Russia her claims to the Caucasus (1829),¹ and by 1854 the conquest of the vast Kirghiz Steppes had been completed and the frontier pushed south of Lake Balkhash.

THE EUROPEAN TINDER BOX

In addition to settling the fate of the Bourbons for good and all, the July Revolution definitely established the *haute bourgeoisie* in power in France.

¹ According to the Treaty of Adrianople, the Russian boundary in Transcaucasia was to include the fortress of Akhalkalaki and the cities of Akhaltsik and Nikolai. Turkey surrendered her claims to all territory north of this boundary, including the Black Sea littoral as far as the Kuban.

The qualification for voting was lowered to the payment of 200 francs (about \$40) in direct taxes and that for election to the Chamber to 500 francs. The power of the Crown was curtailed by changing Article 14 of the Charter so that the king was forbidden to dispense with laws, and the sovereignty of the people was explicitly proclaimed. The matter of ministerial responsibility, however, was left in abeyance. Louis-Philippe was obliged to accept the Charter, so amended, from the Chamber; the new situation was further consecrated by changing the royal title from "King of France by the grace of God" to "King of the French by the grace of God and the national will"; and the tricolor which had led the armies of the Revolution and Napoleon to victory on a hundred glorious fields once more replaced the white flag of the Bourbons as the symbol of the French nation.²

In other ways the July or Orleanist monarchy maintained the Restoration régime essentially intact. The decisive factor, throughout, was the character of Louis-Philippe. Thiers had proclaimed: "The Duke of Orléans is a prince devoted to the cause of the Revolution. . . . He was at Jemappes. . . . He is a citizen-king"; and in his rôle of citizen-king Louis-Philippe sent his sons to schools patronized by the bourgeoisie and wandered about Paris armed only with his trusty umbrella, drinking to the health of the workmen. At heart, however, he was as absolutist as any of his predecessors—just as the republicans had suspected—and determined to rule, by constitutional means if not by unconstitutional.

From the beginning, Louis-Philippe was opposed by both extremes, republicans as well as legitimists. The legitimists hated him for usurping his cousin's crown and despised his bourgeois pretensions, but a Bourbon revolt in their ancient stronghold, the Vendée, was easily suppressed. The republicans, unfortunately, were divided over the question of whether or not to attempt a social as well as a political revolution. The two factions went their separate ways, and the isolated revolts under the red flag were also crushed without difficulty. Six attempts to assassinate the King and a constant stream of invective and caricature in the opposition papers resulted in gag laws, prescribing a fine of 10,000 francs for press offenses against the King.

Louis-Philippe was left to rely solely on the bourgeoisie, and his situation was further complicated by the fact that even they were divided. The Party of Progress stood for a gradual democratization of the country and a foreign policy of helping revolutionary peoples against their rulers. The Party of Resistance declared the revolution at home complete and was desirous of placating the neighboring monarchies. Louis-Philippe at first gave the Party of Progress the upper hand, in order to discredit it—thereby demonstrating that there are more ways of killing a cat than choking it with butter. When the business world had become sufficiently alarmed because they felt that a financial crisis was imminent, the Party of Resistance took over the government. In ten years France had ten ministries, whose rise and fall depended on foreign affairs and on the discussion of the question, never settled, as to

² The Danish flag is the oldest in Europe (said to have been adopted in 1219); the Union Jack dates from 1801.

whether the King was obligated to choose his ministers from the parliamentary majority.

With the advent of Guizot to power (1840), the Government seemed as firmly established as the Rock of Gibraltar. It never lacked a majority, and the majority grew with every election; but this gratifying result was obtained through systematic corruption—the disposition of governmental favors, largely of an economic nature. Some two hundred deputies held lucrative offices. In the main, Guizot's policy was political stagnation at home and peace at any price abroad.

In Germany after 1830, particularly in the south, the tide of liberalism ran strongly for a moment. At the Castle of Hambach a festival was held during which the red, black, and gold flag of the Burschenschaft, adopted from the volunteers of 1813, was flung to the breeze, and songs and speeches extolled the sovereignty of the people and the unification of Germany. But it was only another Wartburg Festival. At the instigation of Metternich the Federal Diet renewed the Carlsbad Decrees, strengthened by still further repressive legislation. A federal commission was given surveillance over all local chambers, and any constitution that violated the monarchical principle was declared *ipso facto* null and void. Political meetings were forbidden, and the wearing of the Burschenschaft colors, even in a necktie, was made a crime. Never was Austria so omnipotent in Central Europe. With her backing, the reactionary princes plucked up courage to annul their constitutions, and the usual liberal-hunt followed. Thirty-nine Prussian students were condemned to death, reprieved, and incarcerated. A Bavarian journalist was imprisoned for four years for reprinting an article from another paper. From 1833 to 1847 (while her great romantic composer, Schumann, was creating some of the most beautiful music ever written), Germany had no political history.

The only positive development of a semipolitical nature was the continued evolution of the Prussian customs union. In 1834, the crucial year of its development, it absorbed a rival organization of South German States, and with the greater part of Germany included in its membership, blossomed forth as a true Zollverein. Thereafter it continued to grow until after the annexation of another rival union (1854) it embraced the whole country with the exception of Austria and the minor states north of the Elbe. Politically, the Zollverein was highly significant, for it caused the lesser states to look to Prussia rather than to Austria for leadership.

In order to comprehend the fundamentals of the problem that confronted Metternich and his successors at home and understand more clearly his opposition to democracy and above all to nationalism, a further analysis of the Austrian Empire is essential. Built up by the Hapsburgs in the course of many centuries, Austria was as heterogeneous a collection of nationalities, linguistic groups, and religious denominations as ever cluttered up the map of Europe. The Germanic, western portion of the empire, the Austria of today, was the original nucleus. It included Austria proper (the ancient Duchy of Austria, located in the valley of the Danube in the vicinity of Vienna) and the Eastern Alps (the Tyrol, and so on); and the most important element in the empire as a whole was the German nobility. With the exception of the Hungarian

nobility and a few Italian and Polish nobles and bourgeois, they comprised practically all the wealthy and educated and constituted a ruling class, so that in effect Austria was "an East India Company run for the benefit of two hundred families" In the center of the empire, along the Danube below Vienna, lived the Magyars (Hungarians), who enjoyed a measure of local autonomy and were the only other element of official importance throughout the nineteenth century. The Germans and the majority of the Magyars were Roman Catholics, and the Germans in particular were distinguished for their unfaltering devotion to the Church In the east (Transylvania) the majority of the population were Orthodox Catholic Rumanians, that is, members of the Greek (Greco-Russian) but not of the Roman Catholic Church The northern and southern portions of the empire were peopled by Slavs. In the north a band of Slavic peoples extended the breadth of the empire, but even these northern Slavs lacked homogeneity. Those in the west (Bohemia and Moravia) were Czechs At the time of the Reformation the Czechs were Protestants, but by the nineteenth century they had been largely reconverted to Catholicism. East Galicia and Bukowina were peopled mainly by Ruthenians, converted from Orthodoxy to Roman Catholicism but preserving their married clergy. In between were the Slovaks, in northern Hungary, and the Poles in West Galicia—both peoples ardent Roman Catholics. The Yugoslavs (South Slavs), likewise, were heterogeneous: Austrian Slovenes and Hungarian Croats (Roman Catholics) and Serbs (Orthodox) The southwest—the Southern Tyrol and the environs of Trieste, as well as Lombardy-Venetia—was solidly Italian, and there was a sprinkling of Italians in the coastal cities of Dalmatia Of the entire population of the empire, about a fifth were Germans and less than a fifth Magyars; but these two minorities were possessed of a plenitude of power over the Slavic majority and the Italians

Historically the period between 1830 and 1848 is chiefly important for the rise of Hungarian and Slav nationalism and the development of a liberal opposition in Austria proper Since the Government was already in the hands of the Germans, there was no question of German nationalism The Metternich system continued in force and the universities taught almost nothing but law, but the authorities had become lax The customs blockade no longer operated with efficiency, and the bookstores sold forbidden newspapers as covers on cookbooks and prayer books Consequently the bourgeoisie and the students became more and more infected with liberal ideas and began to demand democratic reforms.

Among the Slavs nationalism was the dominant issue, and as in Greece, a cultural renaissance laid the foundations for subsequent political events. Prague, the capital of Bohemia, and Agram, in Croatia, were the centers of this movement Ever since Bohemia had lost her independence and become subject to Austria (1620), the Czechs had been subordinate to the German minority, and the German language had become dominant not only in governmental affairs but in society and in literature. The native tongue had come to be considered fit only for peasants In the early nineteenth century a literary revival took place Native scholars resuscitated the Czech literature, exhorted their compatriots to boycott German, and extolled the glories of Czech history.

Czechs also urged a union of the various Slavic peoples, and were thus the originators of Pan Slavism. Among the Croats, who demanded that their language should be employed in the local diet, a similar development took place.

The movement among the Magyars was both national and liberal and was of more immediate significance. Hungary was already autonomous, and this autonomy rested on a document of 1222, in accordance with which the Emperor exercised power in Hungary not by virtue of his imperial office, but only as King of Hungary. The result was a purely personal union. The Hungarian constitution, if this essentially medieval system may be so called, was therefore of ancient right and in many ways resembled that of England. But although the Magyars had autonomy, there was no vestige of democracy. The Diet was composed of two "Tables": the Table of Magnates or great nobles, sitting by hereditary right, and the Table of Estates, elected by the lesser nobility and infinitely more chaotic in its organization than the English Commons. Incidentally, there was no responsible ministry. The Diet was supposed to be convened every three years, but from 1812 to 1825 had remained in abeyance. Finally passive resistance on the part of the Hungarian tax-collectors forced the Emperor to yield, and in the revived Diet nationalism and liberalism became the chief issues. Nationalism centered about the demand for the use of Magyar (instead of Latin) as the official language. On this matter the Hungarians were united and finally obtained the Emperor's consent; on the question of liberalism, however, the Diet was divided. The liberals, led by Kossuth and Deák, wanted to modernize the country, and accordingly demanded the abolition of feudalism, the enfranchisement of the bourgeoisie, and the introduction of a true parliamentary system. These demands the Table of Magnates was successful in resisting.

Italy, hampered in her struggle for national development by no complications of linguistic or religious diversity, was the most clearly defined geographical unit on the Continent, but thanks to the Congress of Vienna and Metternich, she remained divided into ten states³ (leaving out those Austrian provinces which were partially Italian, geographically and linguistically).⁴ Of these, only four were of primary importance. In the northeast was Lombardy-Venetia, an appanage of the Austrian Hapsburgs, and in the northwest Piedmont, nucleus of the Kingdom of Sardinia and the only country in Italy free from Austrian influence. In the center of the peninsula and extending from coast to coast were the Papal States. The entire south, Naples and the island of Sicily, constituted the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. In 1814 the returning rulers, even the Hapsburgs, had been welcomed as deliverers from the French oppression; but the reactionary character of the restorations had changed all that. In all of the Italian states, with the possible exception of Piedmont, the people hated their rulers as foreigners and, worse still, as newcomers.

³ The Kingdom of Sardinia, the Principality of Monaco, the "Kingdom" of Lombardy-Venetia, the Duchies of Parma, Modena, Lucca, and Tuscany, the Republic of San Marino, the Papal States, and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies.

⁴ The Tyrol and the K \ddot{u} st \ddot{e} nland.

THE RISORGIMENTO IN ITALY AND RESTIVE GERMANY

So far the revolts in Italy had been signally unsuccessful. Engineered by the Carbonari (literally, Charcoal-Burners), a secret organization whose aims were vague and mainly destructive, they had consisted of isolated local uprisings, easily quelled by the Austrian troops. After 1830 a new generation of leaders arose. These patriots were divided into three camps: first, republicans; second, those who advocated a federation under the presidency of the Pope; and third, those who hoped for a united monarchy under the House of Savoy.

The leader of the Italian republicans was Mazzini. As a Genoese, Mazzini was an enemy not only of the Hapsburgs and all other foreign rulers but of his own sovereign as well. In 1830 he was arrested for membership in the Carbonari. Released and exiled the following year, he became disgusted with his former associates and founded Young Italy, a society restricted to those under forty, on whose youthful enthusiasm he relied for the spread of his propaganda. By 1833 Young Italy numbered 60,000. Mazzini's principal aim was a unified Italian republic, and he even dreamed of a world republic. Although most of his subsequent life was passed in Switzerland and England, the idealism and eloquence of his pen made him the most effective of those who aroused the patriotism of his countrymen. Possibly Italy would never have been united without Mazzini; certainly it would never have been united by his efforts alone for he was an impractical dreamer and only succeeded in stirring up a few abortive revolts, less successful for the most part than those of the Carbonari. His fame, therefore, rests solely on his success in imbuing his countrymen (as well as others of liberal views) with his own burning hopes, but because of his supremacy as a propagandist of Italian nationalism he is known as the Soul of Italian Unification.

To Gioberti, equally ardent in his desire for Italian independence but pessimistic over the possibility of unifying a country which had known no real unity since the fall of Rome, the only hope seemed to lie in a federation under the Pope. Balbo hoped for a similar federation, and D'Azeglio was another influential writer who, like Mazzini, wielded his pen in behalf of the freedom and unification of Italy. The significant thing about Gioberti, Balbo, and D'Azeglio is that in their writings all three, as Piedmontese, pointed to their sovereign as the instrument whereby their aims could be accomplished. Whatever may have been the sentiments of Italians at large, in so far as a people so ignorant were capable of forming any reasoned opinion, the majority of well-informed Italians were gradually coming to the conclusion that in Piedmont, as led by the House of Savoy, lay their only hope. In spite of differences of opinion on matters of detail, these three men, as well as Mazzini, contributed to the great national awakening known as the Risorgimento (Resurrection) which now began to stir the peninsula from end to end.

In 1846, when Pius IX, surnamed "the Good," was elected to fill the chair of St. Peter, the world was treated to the unique spectacle of a liberal pope. Pius granted several mild reforms which evoked wild enthusiasm, and his example

was followed by the Duke of Tuscany and Charles Albert of Sardinia. After these moderate advances came a revolution in the Two Sicilies as a result of which the King granted a constitution.

Germany too showed signs of awakening. In Prussia, the people had by tacit consent remained silent during the lifetime of old Frederick William III, who had led the country during the War of Liberation. With his death, however, hopes for a new order ran high. Frederick William IV, who ascended the throne in 1840, was the son of beloved Queen Louise and a man of unusual talents, a patron of the arts and a brilliant conversationalist. His reputation for liberalism was confirmed by the proclamation of an amnesty for political prisoners, and he spoke eloquently of Prussia's destiny; but he did not deign to reply to the demands for a parliament, and when attacked in the press, recently unshackled, he revived the censorship. Needless to say, this reply simply embittered the controversy—all the more because it soon became evident that his ideal was the "Christian" state of the Middle Ages, as conceived by the romantics. Finally (1847), instead of calling a parliament, he decreed the creation of a United Landtag. Since this body was merely a joint session of the Provincial Estates, it was not representative of the people but merely of the classes; moreover, it was to meet only when summoned, and when assembled had no real power. At the opening session Frederick William went out of his way to make clear that he had not the slightest intention of granting a modern, written constitution. The Landtag demanded a parliament; the King demanded loans. As neither would yield, the net result was the dissolution of the Landtag.

At the same time that the Prussian Landtag was engaged in this conflict, a group of moderate constitutionalists at Heppenheim, in South Germany, was demanding that the reactionary Federal Diet be replaced by a true parliament; and a group of radicals in near-by Mannheim was calling for still more liberal reforms. In early February of 1848, a local revolt took place in Bavaria.

Evidently only a spark was needed to set the European states-system in flames.

THE REVOLUTION OF 1848 IN FRANCE

Even before Guizot took office, Lamartine made a remark which should not have been cryptic to anyone, least of all to a French politician: "The French nation is bored." After Guizot had been in office for seven years, a certain deputy achieved fame by exclaiming: "What has been accomplished during the last seven years? Nothing, nothing, nothing!" This was hardly a fair appraisal, for the reign of Louis-Philippe was the period when education in France took the greatest step forward. In this respect, therefore, France was second only to Prussia and was ahead of the rest of Europe. The reign of Louis-Philippe was also the Railroad Age in France; and altogether his internal improvements won him the title of the Napoleon of Peace. The two sayings were, however, a sufficient indication of the state of public opinion in France; indeed, they might well have been taken as an epitome of liberal sentiment throughout Europe—an inevitable reaction to a policy of political stagnation.

But Louis-Philippe and his Prime Minister remained blind, or at least unmoved. "Get rich by work and you will obtain the vote," was Guizot's reply

to every protest. Relying solely on the general increase in prosperity, he failed to take account of the constantly increasing chasm between the masses and the small body of voters who, in the eyes of the law, constituted the country (the *pays légal*). In particular Louis-Philippe alienated the proletariat by crushing unions and strikes and refusing to protect the workers from the capitalists, although now that the Industrial Revolution had reached France, the working-conditions there were as bad as they had formerly been in England.

Possibly Guizot was not to blame for his blindness, since no one in the Chamber imagined a radical change in the existing régime to be possible. The Opposition, known as the Dynastic Left, was composed of Orleanists who only demanded a slightly extended franchise and who were as much opposed to universal (manhood) suffrage as the majority. The Republicans were resigned to regarding their ideal as a chimera, impossible of attainment—all except one, Ledru-Rollin, who formed a party all by himself and continued to demand universal suffrage in the interests of social reform.

Shortly after the deputy referred to made his famous remark, the Dynastic Opposition began a "campaign of banquets" as propaganda in behalf of moderate reform and as a protest against the Guizot ministry—eminently orderly functions, which were marked by nothing more alarming than toasts to Reform, accompanied by toasts to the King. When the Government made the singular error of forbidding one of these banquets, the deputies abandoned the project; but an excited crowd of workmen and students, assembled to escort the participants to the scene of the banquet, paraded according to plan, and rioting of a not very serious nature occurred throughout the day.

The following day the rioting continued and barricades were erected. The National Guards were called out, but shouted, "Hurrah for Reform! Down with Guizot!" Louis-Philippe thereupon dismissed his unpopular minister, and the Opposition was satisfied. The Republicans, however, were by no means satisfied, and a mob continuing to demonstrate in front of Guizot's residence was fired on and a number were killed.

The next day the Government had a life-sized revolution on its hands, in the face of which the National Guards were powerless; and Louis-Philippe abdicated in favor of his grandson, the Count of Paris, who was proclaimed by the Chamber. But after the House had adjourned, the premises were invaded by a mob shouting, "Down with royalty!" and the Republican deputies who had remained behind, headed by the poet Lamartine, appointed a provisional government. To the list of those composing the new Government, a group of radical Republicans added three more names, including that of Louis Blanc, a prominent Socialist. The two factions then met at the City Hall and proclaimed a republic (February 25).

The Government set up in the course of the February Revolution was divided between bourgeois Republicans, who only wanted political reform (universal suffrage) and were devoted to the tricolor, and radical Republicans, who wanted social reform and the red flag. Between the two groups trouble broke out forthwith. Although the moderates had a majority and included the more prominent members, the Socialists, backed by the Parisian workmen, who were organized in clubs similar to those of 1789, were at first able to dominate. The

Government was coerced into decreeing: "The French Republic pledges itself to guarantee . . . work for all citizens" and into ordering "the immediate establishment of national workshops," a favorite scheme of Louis Blanc's. Further manifestations of the workers resulted in the creation of a government labor commission, with Louis Blanc at its head. Finally the moderates plucked up courage, summoned the National Guards to frighten off the next mob of workers, and the power of the Socialists was broken.

The labor committee, with no power to enforce its decisions, advised many admirable measures; but none was put into effect. Consequently the national workshops as organized by Louis Blanc's bitter opponents were not workshops at all but merely a travesty of his ideas, deliberately designed to discredit his theories. No constructive work was attempted. Instead, skilled artisans and street rowdies alike were set to digging excavations for public works. As the number demanding work increased to enormous proportions, the amount of work available decreased, and the hours of labor and the pay likewise decreased. As is usual under a revolutionary régime, many measures adopted by the Government with the best of intentions reacted against it. The repeal of such unpopular taxes as the salt tax, the newspaper tax, and the internal customs necessitated the levy of a surtax on the bourgeoisie and the peasants which gained the republic many enemies.

The new Assembly, though elected by universal suffrage, proved overwhelmingly moderate, and decreed the dissolution of the national workshops. The workers replied by raising barricades and demanding the dissolution of the Assembly. Thoroughly frightened, the deputies voted General Cavaignac dictatorial powers to put down the insurrection—a commission which he proceeded to execute with exemplary thoroughness. All the troops in Paris and the neighborhood were called into action, and three days of the bloodiest street fighting that France had yet witnessed sufficed to wipe out resistance. Ten thousand workmen were killed, prisoners were shot without trial or deported, and thirty-two newspapers were suppressed. The June Days were decisive in more ways than one: they effectually disposed of the Socialists and added to the conviction—which had grown with each succeeding revolution—that between them and the bourgeoisie there was nothing in common.

The Constitution of 1848, as voted by the Assembly, was a document eminently bourgeois in the best sense. Most important of all, it provided for a President with power to appoint the ministers, but to hold office for four years only.

THE FLOOD OF REVOLUTION

No parallel movements accompanied the outbreak of the Revolution of 1789; in 1848, news of the February Revolution, spreading over Europe on the wings of Stephenson's new iron Pegasus, acted as a draft which fanned the smoldering combustibles of Central Europe to flame.

Outside France, the revolutionary movement centered in the Austrian Empire, the stronghold of the Metternich system, and within the Empire, in Budapest, capital of Hungary, and in Vienna. In the former it was above all national; in the latter, liberal. When news of the Revolution in Paris arrived,

Kossuth, the greatest orator in Europe, rose in the Hungarian Diet to proclaim: "From the charnel-house of the Viennese system, a poison-laden atmosphere steals over us, which paralyzes our nerves and bows us when we would soar. . . . Our task is to found a happier future in the brotherhood of all the Austrian races, and to substitute for the union enforced by bayonets and police the enduring bond of a free constitution." These ringing utterances and the accompanying declaration that only by the grant of a responsible ministry could the Hapsburg dynasty hope to survive in Hungary resounded throughout the length and breadth of Europe. From the southern shores of Sicily to the northern shores of Germany her subjects and protégés rose against Austria.

In Vienna a riot broke out, accompanied by cries of "Down with Metternich!" Though the venerable minister was unmoved by the excitement, his colleagues deserted him and the feeble-minded Emperor was convinced that the Old Régime was doomed. With infinite dignity Metternich handed in his resignation and, aided by a faithful secretary, slipped away in disguise to England, where he was welcomed by Wellington and became the lion of Brighton society. Alone among the figures of first rank who had graced the Congress of Vienna and had celebrated the fall of Napoleon, he lived to see the establishment of the Second Empire in France.

Behind him in Vienna, a far different scene was being enacted from that with which the political portion of this tale opens. Institutions, such as feudalism, that had survived the passage of centuries and the shock of countless wars went by the board. A constitution was proclaimed, an Imperial parliament instituted, and a liberal ministry installed. In Hungary, a new government—national, liberal, and completely autonomous—was established, and sanctioned by the helpless Emperor. The movement among the North Slavs centered in Prague, where the Czechs were joined by the German liberals and the unruly nobility. The early requests of the Bohemians were so moderate as to seem almost colorless; but soon they too were demanding autonomy, and in this case, likewise, the Emperor was powerless to refuse. In the south, where the Hungarians were determined not to share their newly acquired freedom and were bent rather on a policy of intense Magyarization, the Croats and Serbs rose against Hungary. Here and in Transylvania, where the Rumanian peasantry were likewise rising against Hungary, the German were in the uncomfortable position of having to choose between the local revolutionists and the rebellious Magyars. It was a three-ring circus, with all its side shows to boot. Yet nowhere was there talk of repudiating the Emperor.

South of the Alps, Austria was confronted with a still more serious situation. Charles Albert of Piedmont had granted his subjects a constitution and had declared against Austria, and from Piedmont to the tip of the peninsula Italians who had settled with their own princes were on the march to throw the Austrians out, bag and baggage. Occupied with affairs at home, the Imperial Government was powerless to act. Radetzky, its representative, abandoned the cities, and the White Coats retired within the fortifications of the Quadrilateral, one of the strongest positions in Europe.

The March Days in Berlin, so far as the King was concerned, were a counterpart of the opening of the first French Revolution. While the middle classes

held aloof, excited and curious crowds from the unorganized lower classes thronged the streets and came into collision with the troops. A bloody fray developed, in which the military were getting the upper hand when the agitated monarch lost his nerve and ordered them out of the city. The dead were brought into the courtyard of the palace and the King stood before them with bared head, proclaimed himself in favor of a "true constitutional system, with responsibility of the ministers," rode through the streets wearing the red, black, and gold tricolor, declared that "Prussia henceforth is swallowed up in Germany," and summoned a national assembly.

In the neighboring states to the south, overcome by similar fear of the revolutionists, the authorities abetted the formation of the Frankfurt Parliament, which had been called by the liberals to prepare a constitution for a united Germany. "Most astonishing of all," in the words of the Duke of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, "was the total absence of any power of resistance on the part of the various government authorities, and the helplessness with which one and all, high and low, allowed themselves to fall a prey, some to the most inept notions, and others to a paralysis of terror." All over Germany, as all over Italy, constitutions began to sprout overnight.

From Cape St. Vincent to the Russian frontier not an autocratic ruler was left. Only behind the impenetrable defenses of the Nicholas System and in an isolated camp on the Adige and the Mincio did the forces of absolutism still prevail.

THE TIDE OF REVOLUTION ON THE EBB

For a moment, in March of '48, the hopes of so many years and so many hearts were actually achieved. But in the same way that the revolution was already on the wane in France, so in Central Europe it subsided almost as rapidly and unexpectedly as it had arisen. If only the revolutionists or even Kossuth himself had abided by the program he had laid down, there might have been no World War. As it was, nationalism clashed with liberalism, jealous leader with jealous leader, and one aspiring nationality with another, till all went down in a common rout.

The movement in Bohemia was the first to run its course. The Czechs withdrew their deputies from the imperial parliament, which, torn by nationalistic dissensions and lacking Hungarian support from the first, grew less and less capable of serving as an instrument of liberal opinion. At home Czechs and Germans fell foul of one another, and the radical element was getting the upper hand. Frech outbreaks led to the bombardment of Prague by Windischgrätz, the Austrian commander, and the aspirations of Bohemia were effectively crushed. For this accomplishment, the first triumph of the counter-revolution, Windischgrätz was made commander in chief of the Austrian forces.

From Naples, from Tuscany, and from the Papal States, meanwhile, local contingents were on the march to join Charles Albert of Piedmont in a final drive on the Austrians in Italy. But jealousy between the various rulers, jealousy of Piedmont, and the old divisions between the revolutionists played havoc. Pius, cured of his liberal tendencies, could not bear to see his troops in action against Catholic Austria and withdrew his forces. A republican uprising in

Naples gave the King an excuse to dissolve the assembly and recall his contingent, and the Tuscan army likewise withdrew. The Austrians, on the contrary, were fortunate. On the advice of Radetzky, they concentrated their effort on this campaign, for against the Italians all factions could sink their differences, the very students who had carried the day in Vienna volunteering for service. Charles Albert, with only a handful of irregulars for assistance against Radetzky, discovered by sad experience that the god of battles is indeed on the side of the biggest battalions. At Custozza and Novara, Italian independence met overwhelming defeat—not merely Italian independence but also Hungarian and Slav nationalism, and liberalism in Austria proper as well, for with the Italians out of the way the imperialists were free to settle affairs at home. In Italy it only remained to clean up the débris. In Tuscany and Rome, where republics had been established by Mazzini, absolutism was restored by Austrian and French arms respectively. The fall of the resuscitated Venetian Republic (August, 1849), after a siege which ranks with the historic defense of Carthage, completed the story so far as Italy was concerned.

The "revolutionary" ministry in Austria, which at heart was imperial rather than liberal, began to pluck up courage, and was further heartened when a force of Croats advanced against the Magyars. The Croats were defeated, however, and it was necessary for the ministers to make up their minds whether to take action themselves. The decision to invade Hungary met with the disapproval of the Viennese liberals, and the Minister of War who ordered the advance was hanged by a mob. The Imperial Government therefore decided to put its own house in order before proceeding to polish off the Magyars. A four-cornered struggle developed: Vienna, defended by the democrats, was besieged by an expeditionary force of Croats and by the victorious troops of Windischgrätz, while the Hungarians advanced to its relief. The Magyars were defeated, Vienna fell, and a new ministry came into power. Schwarzenberg, a brother-in-law of Windischgrätz and a prince of the Metternich school, was the presiding genius. His first act was to depose the hapless Emperor, whose hands were morally tied by his commitments to the revolutionists, and to enthrone in his stead not his heir, but his young nephew, Francis Joseph. Within the span of time represented by the careers of Metternich and Francis Joseph is comprised the entire sweep of European history from the Napoleonic Wars to the World War.

With Vienna, Schwarzenberg dealt as harshly as with a foreign question. He was then free to turn his attention to Hungary, which refused to recognize the new emperor. The task looked simple, and Windischgrätz achieved some minor successes; but the Magyars proved unexpectedly stubborn. The dissolution of the imperial parliament and the promulgation of a unitary constitution disillusioned the Slavs. Discovering that their hopes of reward for their efforts against the Hungarians and the Viennese liberals were without foundation, they withdrew their support. When Kossuth proclaimed the independence of Hungary, Francis Joseph called on the autocrat of the Russias for aid—and the fate of the Magyars was sealed. The struggle ended when the Hungarians surrendered to a Russian expeditionary force. As punishment for her misdemeanors Hungary was deprived of even that measure of autonomy which she

originally possessed and was incorporated in the unitary empire. The Germans took over the government completely; and only the continued absence of serfdom, which even Schwarzenberg dared not revive, testified to the fact that there had ever been a revolution in the Austrian Empire.

In Germany the democrats fared little better. The Frankfurt Parliament, in which the hopes of the liberals and the nationalists were centered, had been elected by universal suffrage from the entire German-speaking territory of Central Europe. The members were able, but in the main men of little practical experience—doctrinaires, professors, writers, and the like; 200 out of 586 were republicans. They began by electing as "Imperial Vicar" the Archduke John, a liberal prince of Hapsburg, whose strictures on the Congress of Vienna have been noted elsewhere. Since the choice displeased the republicans and the lesser princes, as well as the Prussians, who hoped to see their country the nucleus of the projected state, it was not an altogether happy one.

Three fundamental questions came up for solution: the form of the constitution, the boundaries of the new state, and the choice of the executive. The radicals wanted a republic, but an insurrection with that object in view was put down by Prussian and Austrian troops. By October it was decided that the new state should be a liberal monarchy, similar to Belgium, with civil guarantees and a provision for local autonomy.

The question of boundaries centered in the problem of Austria. Germany, exclusive of the Germanic portions of Austria, had a population only a little in excess of 30,000,000; the Austrian Empire, Germanic and non-Germanic, a population of nearly 40,000,000. If the whole empire were to be included, the affairs of Germany would be subject to Austria and to the whims of her non-German majority; if Austria were left out entirely, the objective of an all-inclusive German state would not be achieved. As a solution, it was proposed that only German-speaking territory be included, and that non-German provinces be joined to German states by personal unions only (that they should have a common ruler but not a common government). To this proposal Austria refused to agree; with her, it was all or nothing. The parliament therefore divided into two parties: the Great German party, who, rather than have any Germans remain outside, resigned themselves to admitting other nationalities, and the Little German party, who preferred the complete exclusion of Austria. The former, consequently, was headed by the Austrians, the latter by the Prussians. In the struggle that ensued, the Great Germans finally lost, whereupon the Austrian deputies withdrew from the parliament.

It was then decided to offer the hereditary title, Emperor of the Germans, to Frederick William IV of Prussia. Poor Frederick William was in a pitiable dilemma. He was eager to become the head of a united Germany; but because he had a romantic loyalty to Austria and feared her reaction if he accepted, he decided to reject this "crown from the gutter" and wait to be chosen by the princes.

Disavowed by Prussia, the Frankfurt Parliament was helpless. The republicans tried to bring about the recognition of the new constitution by force, but were crushed by Prussian troops (1849); and the governments of the other states withdrew their deputies. Another and final insurrection of republicans

was similarly crushed, and the hope of a united and liberal Germany went out like a candle in the night. Hundreds of liberals were forced to seek asylum in America and elsewhere—among them Wagner, just entering a career as the greatest operatic composer of all time.

The causes of failure are not far to seek, and the blame does not rest entirely or mainly on the parliamentary doctrinaires. True, they lost valuable time in discussing matters of theory that might better have been left to the future to decide; but when one remembers that the theorists of 1789 were more than two years in drawing up a constitution, the time spent by the Frankfurt Parliament does not seem excessive. With Austria and Prussia both hostile, the chances of success were nil; and it is Frederick William who, in the final analysis, must be held accountable for what happened.

The offer from the princes for which Frederick William was waiting never came, and he finally decided to form a union on his own initiative. A few of the smaller states at first joined, not daring to refuse while Austria had her hands tied by revolutions; but as soon as Austria had finished off the Italians and the Hungarians she revived the Germanic Diet, and one by one the states of the Prussian union deserted. Menaced by Austria and Russia, Prussia formally dissolved her union at the Conference of Olmütz—the famous Humiliation of Olmütz (1850). Frederick William had paid the price of his refusal to support the liberals.

While these events in the history of Germany, considered as a whole, were taking place, a similar drama was being enacted in Prussia. The Prussian National Assembly was at first in the control of the Center. Although liberal, as opposed to the reactionaries on the one hand and to the radicals on the other, the Center was royalist and national in the Prussian sense, desirous of preserving both the king's sovereignty and the independence of Prussia in any future German state. With these objects in view, it voted a constitution modeled on that of Belgium and providing for universal suffrage and a responsible ministry.

The period of apparent harmony between Crown and parliament was of brief duration, however, for in a clash with the soldiery fourteen civilians were killed. The Assembly requested the King to order his officers to avoid conflicts; but Frederick William, who considered any interference with military affairs an unwarranted encroachment on his prerogatives, refused to comply. When the request was repeated, he dismissed his liberal advisers in favor of a "fighting ministry" of reactionaries. Consequently the Assembly adopted the views of the Left and declined to insert "by the grace of God" in the constitution. The King thereupon ordered the deputies to move to the little town of Brandenburg, remote from the influence of the Berlin mob, and when they disobeyed, cleared the meeting-place with soldiers and declared the Assembly dissolved. A second Assembly was summoned to elaborate a constitution, got into similar difficulties with the King, and was in turn dissolved. Finally, in order not to go back on his word, Frederick William promulgated a constitution of his own creation (1850).

A liberal constitution in Piedmont granted by a liberal king, an illiberal constitution in Prussia wrung from an illiberal king under pressure of circumstances, and the abolition of serfdom in Austria—such were the meager results

of the most widespread revolution in history, and all that Europe had to show by way of progress in its long and toilsome advance toward democracy and nationalism.

Returning from England to pass his last days in peace, Metternich could watch with satisfaction the work of his successors, who had neglected to establish even the unitary constitution they had promised and who now ruled despotically. Surely he could feel that he had not lived in vain, that after all he had governed both wisely and well, that he had been correct in despising the first mad outburst which drove him from power, and that Austria, after surviving such a crisis, might yet prove title to her proud motto *Alles Erdreich Ist Oesterreich Untertan*—Austria, Earth's Imperial Overlord Universal.⁵

NAPOLEON THE LUCKY

As candidates for President of the Second Republic three well-known contestants appeared: Cavaignac for the bourgeois, Ledru-Rollin for the Socialists, and Lamartine for the Catholics. There was also a dark horse—Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, nephew of the great Napoleon, grandson of the Empress Josephine, and head of the House of Bonaparte. (Five Bonapartes, including two elder brothers, had died that he might occupy this position.)

Ever since the fall of Napoleon, the Napoleonic Legend had been growing. In the idleness of his captivity at St. Helena, Napoleon had dictated his memoirs, in which, with an eye to posterity and to the future of his dynasty, he sought to convey the impression that all his mistakes and apparent illiberality had been forced on him by a malignant destiny. He claimed that at heart his only desire had been the welfare of his people, that he was really democratic by nature, and that, given another ten years within which he should have imposed peace on his enemies, he would have initiated an era of Liberty and Fraternity. The picture found favor in the eyes of many Frenchmen, not a few of whom aided in spreading this grotesque fantasy.

Strange to relate, Louis-Philippe had also helped to intensify Bonapartism. In an effort to do something popular but not dangerous, he had been instrumental in bringing the ashes of Napoleon to Paris, where they had been deposited with elaborate pomp under the dome of the Invalides, in Napoleon's own words, "on the banks of the Seine among the people whom I have so dearly loved." Earlier still he had completed the Arc de Triomphe, the Triumphal Arch that commemorates the Napoleonic victories and stands at the head of the Champs Élysées looking down over Paris on all sides, a constant reminder of the greatest military genius that France ever produced.⁶

Louis Napoleon had contributed his bit to the family legend by writing *Napoleonic Ideas* and other pamphlets wherein he extolled and elaborated his uncle's views. Louis, however, did not believe in putting all his eggs in one

⁵ Or, more literally, abandoning the A, E, I, O, U initials of the original, "The Whole World is Austria's Vassal." In Latin, *Austria Erit in Orbe Ultima*.

⁶ Two of the three great heroes of France—Charlemagne, Jeanne d'Arc, and Napoleon—were not French! Napoleon was born in Corsica (an island inhabited by Italians) which was ceded to France the year before his birth. His ancestors came from the Italian peninsula.

basket; he corresponded with Louis Blanc and with Proudhon, the anarchist, and strove to link the Napoleonic Legend with the new socialistic doctrines. In *The Extinction of Pauperism* he expounded the thesis: "The triumph of Christianity abolished slavery; the triumph of the French Revolution abolished serfdom; the triumph of democracy will abolish pauperism." And he managed to convey the impression that the maintenance or attainment of these desiderata was somehow inseparably connected with Bonapartism. In one other respect he differed from his uncle. He posed as the champion of nationalism; in fact it was to be the keynote of his foreign policy. Above all, he never forgot the maxim that he had learned from his mother: "All means of ruling are good, legitimate, and sufficient, provided only that material prosperity is insured."

Nor was this all, for Louis Napoleon had striven to identify himself with the forces of his age by deeds as well. He had joined the Carbonari and had engaged in an insurrection against the Pope; he had plotted with French Republicans and with Polish rebels; finally, he had made two attempts (1836 and 1840) to "invade" France and "regain his throne"—but had only succeeded in covering himself with ridicule. All possibility of a career seemed over. How could he ever hope to regain favor in the eyes of the French, a people extremely sensitive to ridicule, after making himself the laughing-stock of Europe—and at the hands of Louis-Philippe, himself a favorite subject for cartoonists? During the June Days, when Cavaignac had been earning an unenviable glory by slaughtering his fellow countrymen, he had been fortunate enough to be doing guard duty against the Chartists in Trafalgar Square, and thereby had given proof of his attachment to the established order without incurring the hatred of the French proletariat. Returning to France, he had been elected to the Assembly, where the impression that he made was one of decided mediocrity.

Hardly an imposing figure at best, Louis Napoleon as candidate for President had, however, two invaluable assets—his name and his insignificance. He was "every man's second choice." The Royalists, having no candidate of their own, would vote for him rather than for a Republican. Bourgeois advocates of "law and order" would vote for him in the hope of a stable government. Antirepublican Catholics would vote for him rather than for a convinced republican. Above all, the peasants, with charming inconsistency, would vote for him. "How could I help voting for this gentleman," cried one veteran, "I whose nose was frozen at Moscow?" Out of 7,188,000 votes, he polled 5,400,000. Once more a Bonaparte swore to "remain faithful to the democratic Republic and to defend the constitution."

The Prince-President began by choosing a ministry of Catholics and liberal Orleanists. Then, in order to curry favor with the clericals, he sent an expedition to restore the Pope. Executed in spite of the opposition of the Assembly, this move openly defied Article 5 of the constitution, which declared: "The French Republic . . . will never employ her forces against the liberty of any people."

The June Days had alienated the bourgeoisie as well as the Socialists from the Republic, and when a new Assembly was elected, the positions of the parties were reversed: the Royalists numbered 500, the Republicans a scant 250, of whom only 70 belonged to the moderate faction that had dominated the pre-

ceding Assembly. Advanced Republicans, with a Socialistic tinge, made up the remainder. With this growth of radicalism as an excuse, the Royalist majority, in collusion with the President, proceeded to enact a series of measures, including a stringent press law and a law forbidding public meetings, designed to crush the Republicans. In the name of educational freedom, a bill was passed abolishing the monopoly of the university over instruction, granting individuals the right to open schools (a privilege of which the Catholics quickly availed themselves) and empowering municipalities to choose Catholic clergy as teachers. At the same time, teachers were made subject to dismissal without appeal and were required to give instruction in the catechism. A fourth measure was a new electoral law which disfranchised members of political clubs and established a three years' residence qualification for voters, whereby migratory laborers were automatically disfranchised and three million of them lost the vote.

As soon as he had silenced the Republicans, Louis Napoleon set about getting rid of the Royalists. He filled the ministry and the civil and military administrations with personal adherents. The *éminence grise* of the administration was the Duke of Morny, who was Louis's illegitimate half-brother and also an illegitimate grandson of our old friend Bishop Talleyrand. The Prince-President toured the country and was received with cries of "Long live Napoleon!" and sometimes "Long live the Emperor!" A historical incident lent color to the accusation that these occurrences were premeditated. At a certain military review, the cavalry shouted, "Long live the Emperor!" The infantry were silent; whereupon their commander was promptly cashiered, and the commander of the National Guard of Paris, who took his part, was also cashiered. As a result, the Assembly passed a vote of no confidence and refused to revise the constitution in such a way as to make the presidency reëlective.

The formation of numerous and apparently allied secret societies, composed of Blanquist and Marxian socialists, furnished Louis Napoleon with an excuse for declaring that "a vast demagogic conspiracy is being organized in France and all over Europe"—this for the benefit of the bourgeoisie and the Royalists. At the same time he executed an about-face and, posing as the champion of universal suffrage, demanded the repeal of the new electoral law—this for the benefit of the Republicans. Again the Assembly refused, and the monarchists, in alarm, proposed to confer on the president of the Assembly the power to requisition the services of the military and civil authorities; but the Republicans, who feared a royalist restoration, combined with the Bonapartists to defeat the proposition.

It was 1851, and with it the Second of December came round, the great day of Napoleonic history, anniversary of the Battle of Austerlitz and of the establishment of the First Empire. Louis Napoleon issued a proclamation in which he declared: "My duty is to maintain the Republic . . . by invoking the judgment of the only sovereign I recognize in France—the people." Then, assisted by the Duke of Morny, he executed a *coup d'état*, arrested the party leaders, filled the Assembly with soldiers, declared that body dissolved, and reëstablished universal suffrage. The dissolution of the Assembly was in plain defiance of the constitution, which provided that such an act would result in

the automatic deposition of the President, and a number of deputies got together and voted his expulsion; but they were arrested and imprisoned. Soldiers marched through the streets firing on the unarmed crowd; the police reported 191 deaths, the *Moniteur* 380. Many more were seized and executed out of hand. In addition, 26,884 were arrested. Of these, 5,032 were transported, 980 exiled, 2,827 imprisoned, and 5,197 put under surveillance. Sixty-five Republican deputies were exiled, and in over a third (32) of the departments martial law was declared. Thus the opposition was left prostrate and breathless.

In order to convey the impression that these illegal and brutal measures were sanctioned by public opinion, Napoleon held a plebiscite on the proposition: "The French people desire the maintenance of the authority of Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, and delegate to him the powers necessary to establish a constitution. . . ." And 7,145,393 voted "Yes," 592,506 "No." Although many of these votes doubtless represented a sincere desire for "strong" government, the plebiscites of Napoleon III, like those of Napoleon I, were essentially illusory, in that they called for a categorical vote on an ambiguous proposition, with no alternatives offered. Besides, it was not "healthy" to be numbered among the opposition. For a second time in the same way, France had allowed herself to be tricked by a Bonaparte.

In erecting his régime Louis Napoleon simply adapted his uncle's constitution of the Year VIII. The President, "responsible to the people," had complete control of the executive. A Council of State worded the laws and alone could censor the actions of officials. The Legislative Body (*Corps Législatif*), elected by universal suffrage, had power to accept or reject the proposals of the Council of State—but only without comment. As if this were not sufficient control, an appointive Senate, although it did not pass on the laws in the ordinary course of procedure, could annul the decisions of the Legislative Body if it judged them "contrary to the constitution, religion, morality," and so on.

The Prince-President was not slow to make clear his true intent. He ordered the imperial eagle restored to the flag, and on the sixth of January the prefects were instructed to do away with the motto "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity." He took up his residence in the Tuileries and surrounded himself with an imperial retinue. Again he went on tour; and this time, thanks to explicit orders issued to the prefects, he was received with shouts of "Long live the Emperor! Long live Napoleon III!" At Bordeaux he pronounced the fateful words: "France seems to wish a return of the Empire. . . . *The Empire means peace.* It means peace, because France wishes it, and when France is satisfied, the world is quiescent." The comedy was drawing to a close, and the prince in disguise was ready to step forward and claim his throne.

December second came round once more, and with it another *coup d'état*, when a second Citizen Bonaparte became emperor in name as well as in fact. This time, it was Louis Napoleon, Napoleon III (with all due respect to the laws of legitimate succession and to the poor little "King of Rome," who never wore a crown), Napoleon the Little, as Hugo, with his magnificent invective, christened him.

Palmerston was so forward in recognizing Napoleon in behalf of England that he was removed from office. The Continental powers were delighted to see

the revolution crushed, though in many quarters enthusiasm was tempered by the thought that it meant another Bonaparte on the French throne. The Tsar would only consent to address his new cousin as "good friend"; but even by Austria recognition was accorded this most recent and most staggering blow to the treaties of 1815. At all events, the Revolutions of '48 were over.

None of the princely houses, however, would consent to furnish the new Napoleon with a consort; and he was left to consummate a love match with the beautiful Eugénie de Montijo, daughter of a Spanish grandee by an American mother.

Napoleon III had proved himself as clever a politician as his uncle, a past master in the art of fooling the people, rendering their power illusory, and making them like it, or appear to like it. Would he prove equally successful as a builder? For obviously, since he had gone out of his way to emphasize that the Empire meant peace, he did not hope to equal his illustrious predecessor in military prowess.

CHAPTER V

THE RESHAPING OF EUROPE

By 1852 the Revolutions of '48 were past history. With the Nicholas system standing stanch and unshaken in Russia, with Liberals and Conservatives united in unflinching support of political stagnation in England, with Napoleon and the Hohenzollerns making a mock of universal suffrage, and with the Metternich system restored and improved in Austria and most of Italy, the recent upheaval seemed to lead to only one possible deduction—that no matter how severe the shock, the power of conservatism to react was greater still. Once more Switzerland was the only republic of importance, the only democracy, in Europe. Well might the most extreme conservative heave a sigh of relief and satisfaction; well might the most hopeful liberal despair of seeing Europe attain either nationalism or democracy—let alone both.

The decade of the '50's, so far as the Great Powers were concerned, offered little of interest in internal politics. By means of the Concordat of 1855, which overthrew "Josephism" (Joseph II had subordinated the Church to the State) and renewed the immemorial alliance between the Throne and the Altar, Austria added a last refinement to her autocratic régime. Since during the late crisis the clergy had distinguished themselves by their unwavering hostility to nationalism and liberalism, the reason for this retrogression is readily apparent. By the terms of the Concordat, Catholicism was recognized as the state religion, the relations of Church and State were to be regulated according to canon law (not according to civil law, as before), and the bishops were made supreme over education, both private and public, and were intrusted with the censorship of printed matter. In Prussia the reaction, if not so patent and thoroughgoing as in Austria, was equally distasteful to the patriotic and the progressively-minded—particularly the renewed tendency to trail along in the wake of Austria.

THE EUROPEAN JACK-IN-THE-BOX

For nearly forty years after the Congress of Vienna—if the expeditions to eradicate revolutionary activity, in accordance with the principle of intervention, be excepted—there had been no wars among the Christian powers. But between the time when Napoleon made his famous declaration of policy and the time when Austria added the capstone to her autocratic régime a conflict

of major proportions developed that was the prelude to a whole series of wars. Occurring at intervals throughout a period of less than twenty years, in an inexorable chain of cause and effect, these fresh conflicts swept the Metternich system and all that it stood for into the dustbin.

As was to happen later at the beginning of the World War, the trouble began in the Near East, that hotbed of agitation whose problems were perpetually on the docket of international affairs. As already noted, the Sultan of Turkey had constant trouble with his subject peoples and with foreign powers; and among his neighbors was the Muscovite, to whom, isolated in the midst of his limitless plains, the sea had acted as an irresistible magnet ever since the days of the early Romanovs. So long as Russia lacked a seaport he was dependent on the bounty of surrounding powers for all that he received and was nearly as remote from the main current of world affairs as the Grand Lama. To ambitious Russians this was an intolerable situation; accordingly they pushed out in every direction and at no very distant dates arrived at the Pacific (1636), wrested a window on the Baltic from the Swedes, and after centuries of conflict, broke into the Black Sea (1787), which had been to all intents and purposes a Turkish lake. Unfortunately for Russia, her ports on the Pacific were remote and frequently ice-bound, her ports on the Baltic, similarly, were not ice-free in winter, and the Turks held the Straits which controlled the outlet to the Black Sea.¹ Still, the Turk had been forced to yield the northern shore of his private lake, he was getting weaker every day, and he was an infidel with poor Christian subjects beseeching to be freed. Incidentally, Russia had a more or less legitimate excuse for intervention, since most of these Christians were Slavs and Orthodox (Greco-Russian) Catholics.

Pursuing this line of reasoning, the Russians had followed up their earlier attacks and had pushed their frontier to the Dnestr (1792) and to the Pruth (1812). Later still they had dictated terms a stone's throw from Constantinople and had obtained a virtual protectorate over the Danube principalities of Moldavia and Walachia (1829). Their ultimate and dearest aim was to obtain control over the Straits or, failing that, the right of passage for their ships of war.

This brings England into the picture. Her supreme desire so far as the Near East was concerned was to keep the Mediterranean a British lake, from the point of view of naval strategy. She was therefore determined that Constantinople should remain in weak hands, and she had concluded a treaty with the Sublime Porte in which the Sultan agreed to keep the Straits closed to all warships. France was likewise mixed up in Turkish affairs. Since the days of Francis I she had been the traditional ally of Turkey, and she was the official, though long inactive, guardian of the Holy Places.² From early times, also, she had had commercial interests in the Ottoman Empire.

Despite these adverse factors, Russia for a moment attained one of her main objectives. Mehmet Ali, the Pasha of Egypt who had assisted the Sultan against the Greeks, revolted in turn and even threatened to conquer Turkey

¹ Owing to their diplomatic importance, the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus are *the* Straits of history.

² The places in Palestine associated with the life of Christ.

proper—thereby revealing the true weakness of the Ottoman Empire. The Sultan called on the Tsar for aid (necessity makes strange bedfellows!), and by the Turco-Russian Treaty of 1833, the high-water mark of Russian influence in Turkish affairs, Russia received her reward, for according to a secret clause the Straits were opened to her warships alone. England and France, suspecting danger to their interests, were more than ever convinced that the status of Turkey was inseparably linked with the balance of power and was therefore a matter of general concern. Their opportunity to assert their views and checkmate Russia came when Mehemet Ali continued his marauding activities. This time, it was England who successfully intervened. (In order to induce him to keep the peace the redoubtable Pasha was made the hereditary and virtually independent ruler of Egypt.) Palmerston, as his reward for saving the remainder of the Ottoman Empire, had the satisfaction of concluding a new convention concerning the Near East whereby it was decided that the Straits should be closed to *all* foreign warships (1841). Needless to say, Russia had no intention of abiding by any such arrangement longer than should prove necessary.

Just as Napoleon III was getting comfortably established on his newly acquired throne, the Near Eastern question came to a fresh crisis as a result of quarrels arising between Roman and Orthodox Catholics over the custody of the Holy Places. Urged on by his coreligionists, Napoleon snatched at this golden opportunity to disrupt the Holy Alliance of the three Eastern powers, and demanded of the Turks a stricter enforcement of the rights of the Latin Church. "In bare terms the question was whether . . . the Latin monks should have the key of the chief door of the Church of Bethlehem, and . . . of the two doors of the sacred Manger, and whether they should . . . place in the sanctuary . . . a silver star adorned with the arms of France." Such were the demands presented by the Emperor of Peace in connection with the birthplace of the Prince of Peace. The Tsar, conversely, championed the Greek Church. The whole argument might have been settled by an impartial umpire in a few hours, but increasing in acrimony in the hands of experienced and astute diplomats striving for national advantage, it dragged on for over a year. In his discomfiture the Sultan compromised himself by promising the same thing to both sides and, when further pressed, gave the Roman Catholics the upper hand. Nicholas took this slight on his coreligionists as a personal offense and, holding out Crete and Egypt as bait, hinted to England that the domains of the Sick Man of Europe should be partitioned forthwith. England, with unctuous righteousness, declined to participate in any such venture; and Nicholas, returning to his original point of attack, demanded a treaty substantiating the rights of his Orthodox brethren in the Holy Places and in addition a guarantee amounting to a general protectorate over all Orthodox Christians in Turkey. The terms were not excessive, as Austria enjoyed a similar protectorate over Roman Catholics, and they were finally reduced to a demand for a note (instead of a treaty) signifying the goodwill of the Sublime Porte on the points at issue; but in the meantime the Sultan had learned that a British fleet was being held at his disposal at Malta and that a French squadron had sailed for the East. When the Porte informed the Tsar, in diplomatic language, that

he could go fly a kite, the Tsar retorted by occupying the Danube principalities. At the same time, he was careful to point out that his action was only by way of obtaining security for the acceptance of his demands. A set of compromise terms was formulated at a conference of the powers and agreed to by Russia; but Turkey, acting on the advice of the British ambassador, refused to accede and instead dispatched an ultimatum to Russia (1853). England and France had decided that the time had come to settle the Eastern question once and for all, and before the Turkish ultimatum expired, the British fleet, at the request of Napoleon, entered the Dardanelles in violation of the Convention of 1841. Not for the first time in history the Continent was to be drenched in blood over a religious issue of infinitesimal importance, and the shades of the sixteenth century divines must have looked on with ill-concealed mirth.

✓ Napoleon had begun the trouble but throughout, England, under the unofficial influence of Palmerston, had stiffened the resistance of the Turks; and together Palmerston and Napoleon had their way. In his decision to precipitate hostilities, the Emperor of Peace was influenced by the remembrance of his not too cordial reception by the Tsar when he made his *début* into the brotherhood of monarchs, by his desire to avenge the campaign of 1812, and above all by his determination to shine in European affairs. Russia, to her intense surprise, was left to fight her battles unaided, for, as Schwarzenberg had predicted, Austria "astonished the world by her ingratitude." Returning to her habitual attitude of suspicion toward Russian activities in the Balkans and ignoring the debt that she had contracted during the Hungarian Revolution, she not only refused to join her late benefactor but even demanded the evacuation of the Danube principalities, which she proceeded to garrison until the end of the war. From that time forward Austro-Russian relations were embittered by this display of almost unparalleled thanklessness, for which, in the end, Austria was to pay in full.

THE CRIMEAN WAR

The Near Eastern conflict that broke out in 1853 resembled the proverbial contest between the elephant and the whale, as the Allies were first at a loss for a point of attack. Finally Palmerston suggested Sevastopol, the great Russian naval base in the Crimea, and thither the combined fleets of the invaders transported the Anglo-French army (1854). Even before their arrival the troops suffered heavily from cholera, dysentery, and malaria; and the campaign as a whole was a classic of mismanagement. Instead of making an immediate assault, which offered excellent chances of success, the ill-equipped Allies settled down to a siege. Consequently, although the operations were marked by such exhibitions of sublime courage as accompany all wars, including the charge of the Light Brigade, immortalized by Tennyson (of which one of the French commanders remarked with truth, "It's magnificent, but it isn't war"), they nevertheless were powerless to make any impression on the fortress. The very elements joined in the defense. A hurricane destroyed many of the Allied transports, leaving the soldiers to face the Russian winter without adequate supplies; and it looked as if the campaign of 1812 were to be repeated. The following months were one long agony almost unequaled in military annals.

Thousands perished of exposure on the battlefield, thousands of sick and wounded died in the hospital at Scutari, where they lacked even the most elementary care until the arrival of Florence Nightingale with the first contingent of nurses ever to participate in a campaign, the vanguard of a noble army which has since done much to relieve the sufferings of the battlefield. Early in 1855, little Sardinia joined the Allies (for reasons best known to herself, which will appear later), and Palmerston returned to office to prosecute the campaign with renewed vigor. Finally the death of Nicholas broke the iron will of the defense, and the fall of Sevastopol in September found both sides ready to abandon the struggle.

✓ The Congress of Paris of 1856, to which Napoleon acted as host, settled the terms of peace. 1. Turkey was invited by the Six Powers to become a member of the Concert of Europe, and her independence and integrity were guaranteed. 2. The Sultan promised to ameliorate the lot of his subjects "without distinction of creed or of race." 3. The Black Sea was neutralized. No ships of the line were to be permitted, and no coastal fortifications. 4. The navigation of the Danube was declared free. 5. Russia ceded to Turkey a strip of territory on the left bank of the Pruth and the Danube, and thereby surrendered control of the latter. 6. The Danube principalities (Moldavia and Walachia) were freed from their unofficial Russian protectorate and assured of autonomy under Turkish suzerainty. 7. The powers (meaning Russia) agreed not to interfere, either collectively or individually, with the relations of the Sultan with his subjects. Supplementary clauses of the Treaty of 1856 abolished privateering and proclaimed the rights of neutrals in time of war. It was provided (1) that in time of war a neutral flag should protect enemy goods, with the exception of contraband, (2) that neutral goods, except contraband, should not be seized when under an enemy flag, and (3) that a blockade, to be legal, must be effective (that is, that there should be no more "paper" blockades). ✓

✓ What were the net gains from this conflict which has been characterized as the most inexcusable war in modern history? Practically none, since the Turks paid no attention to their promises and the more important clauses of the treaty were all relegated to the waste-paper basket within fifteen years.

England and France suffered the fate common to allies. United in war, they were divided by the peace. Although neither gained anything tangible, Napoleon's prestige was greatly enhanced. The powers which had previously treated him with amused tolerance now hastened to pay court to the ruler of a France which was once more the arbiter of European destinies. Queen Victoria paid him a visit—the first time since 1422 that an English sovereign had set foot in Paris—and he was even approached, on neutral ground, by the Tsar, who came to beg aid in furthering his plans for Rumanian unity, a cause in behalf of which Pan Slav mysticism and the mysticism of Napoleonic nationalism could join hands. Not since the days of the great Napoleon had such a sight been seen. Perhaps, after all, Hugo was mistaken.]

PIEDMONT AND CAVOUR

In the states of the Italian peninsula, with a single exception, the reaction following '48 resulted in a worse brand of despotism than ever. In Naples, 40,000 political prisoners languished in the prisons of King "Bomba." Austria, supreme once more in Lombardy-Venetia, no longer confined her attentions to that region but made it her business to take an active part in the affairs of the entire peninsula. In Rome, the French tricolor guarded the slumbers of Pio Nono (Pius IX), who was not likely to indulge in any more liberal impulses.

Only in Piedmont did the picture vary materially. After losing the Battle of Novara, Charles Albert, believing that more advantageous terms might be obtained by a new ruler, had abdicated in favor of his son. Victor Emmanuel, the new king, found his country crushed and exhausted. His first task was to conclude peace and, if possible, to save something from the wreckage. But when Austria offered substantial concessions if he would annul the new constitution, he steadfastly refused; and as a result the little kingdom was saddled with a heavy indemnity which it could ill afford. The essential thing, however, was that by his loyalty to parliamentary institutions Victor Emmanuel won the undying devotion of his subjects—and incidentally the respect of all Italy—for himself and for his dynasty; and that in Piedmont, as nowhere else on the Continent, the Crown and the people advanced hand in hand. Yet who cared what happened in such an insignificant country? Surely the entire Concert of Europe was not out of step just because Piedmont marched to a different tune.

The Kingdom of Sardinia, indeed, was far from a likely place to look for any important development. It was divided into four heterogeneous parts: Sardinia, the Genoese Riviera, Savoy, and Piedmont. The island from which the kingdom took its name was the least desirable in the Mediterranean. Infested with malaria, it has remained to this day poor and backward, essentially medieval in its characteristics. The Genoese littoral, a precipitous strip of coast important mainly for its harbors, had been a republic until its independence was extinguished by the republicans of the French Revolution. Handed over to the House of Savoy in 1815, it remained hostile to its new masters. The Duchy of Savoy, the home of the dynasty but separated from Italy by the Alps, was French, rural, and dominated by the nobility and the clergy. Piedmont, the center of gravity of the kingdom, was also rural. It had no industries worth mentioning, and Turin, the residence of the court, was the only city of any size. The total area of the kingdom was less than half that of present-day Iowa, the population a mere 5,000,000. In Piedmont, class distinctions were sharper than elsewhere in Italy: the nobles despised the middle class and spent their time in the army, the peasants were ignorant, the middle class was small and poor. Furthermore, the Piedmontese spoke a dialect and were considered by the other inhabitants of the peninsula coarse and uncultivated—outside the pale of Italian culture.

The liberals were the only national party, and until 1848 had hated and suspected the dynasty. Even the constitution of 1848 had failed to convince

them of Charles Albert's sincerity. That they became reconciled to the House of Savoy was owing to Victor Emmanuel and above all to his great minister, Cavour; for unlike his fellow monarchs of Italy, Victor Emmanuel refused to abandon the Italian tricolor or liberty of the press and permitted the country to become an asylum for political refugees from all over the peninsula.

The constitution of Piedmont was somewhat less liberal than that of Belgium, considerably more democratic than the French Charter; the vote was restricted to property owners, but the tax qualification was only 20 to 40 lire. (It must be remembered that money was worth a great deal more in those days.) Catholicism was declared the state religion, the sovereignty of the people was not proclaimed, nor civil rights, and the extent of ministerial responsibility was uncertain. The net result was that the whole system depended on the character of the monarch. Fortunately, Piedmont had a king who was a convinced liberal. The first three ministers under the new constitution, Balbo, Gioberti, and D'Azeglio, were prominent among the writers who contributed to the *Risorgimento*. It was under D'Azeglio that Cavour first entered office, and it was D'Azeglio who generously suggested Cavour as his successor.

Cavour was by birth an aristocrat; and in Piedmont in particular, where the nobility had suffered early and often as a result of the French occupation, to be an aristocrat was to be a reactionary or at the very least a conservative. The chief object in life of Cavour's father was to strengthen the family influence at court, and at an early age Cavour became a page to Charles Albert, then heir apparent. "All personal considerations, all probable advantages, both political and material," he later wrote to his brother, "invite me to fight under the banner of absolutism." But Cavour, contrary to the family traditions, had already adopted the principles of bourgeois liberalism. In addition he betrayed an astonishing independence of action. Destined as a younger son for a military career, he was disciplined at the military academy for having illegal books in his possession; and although he graduated at the head of his class, his tactlessness led to a permanent rupture with Charles Albert, who referred to him as a Jacobin. As a matter of fact, he was strongly opposed to radicalism; but in the Piedmont of the '20's, liberalism in any form was regarded in much the same way that Bolshevism is at present regarded in America. Soon afterward, as a result of his strictures on the July Ordinances, he became an object of open suspicion to the authorities. By his family he was considered a traitor to his country and to his class; by the police he was regarded as an anarchist and "a very dangerous man"; and at the suggestion of his own father he was detailed to a solitary Alpine fortress. There he read Adam Smith, Bentham, and Byron and followed the progress of the Reform Bill with breathless interest.

That nature had not destined him for a military career he soon realized fully, and he accordingly resigned his commission; his public career seemed over and he was intrusted by his father with the management of a small estate situated in one of the ugliest portions of the northern Italian plains. Though city-bred, he developed an interest in farming, mastered agriculture in all its details, and contributed no little to the Agricultural Revolution in Piedmont.

PIEDMONT AND CAVOUR

Most important of all, he gained practical insight into the unsolved problems of Piedmontese rural economy.

During the fifteen years that he lived in the country, Cavour made several extended visits to France and England, where he studied the institutions that he hoped to see introduced into his native land. No detail of public or private business was too insignificant to arouse his interest. The Poor Laws engaged his particular attention, and he spent long hours in the visitors' gallery of the House of Commons. In the French salons he was urged to leave the hopeless stagnation of Piedmont and make a literary career abroad; but Cavour recognized his limitations, and besides, the path of duty lay elsewhere. Nevertheless, his magazine articles did much to inform and arouse the reading public. He ardently advocated the building of railways, visioning Rome as the center of an iron network uniting the whole peninsula; and in all of his writings, instead of Piedmont, Tuscany, and so forth, he constantly employed the term *Italy*—a usage more novel to his contemporaries than the reverse would be to us. In 1846, however, he was still the most unpopular man in the kingdom. The conservatives viewed him with disfavor on account of his liberal views; that his father was prefect of police rendered him suspect in the eyes of the liberals. In 1847, when Charles Albert revoked the censorship, he reentered public life as the founder of a newspaper entitled *Il Risorgimento*.

In 1852, Cavour became Prime Minister. This political shift in little Piedmont passed unnoticed by the powers, but from that moment progress toward Italian independence and unity was sure if slow. Throughout, Cavour was scrupulous in his adherence to constitutional procedure, and under his skillful guidance the newly formed parties gained invaluable experience in the essentials of democratic government.

The first obstacle to be surmounted was the temporal power of the Church. More powerful than in any other country, with the exception of the Papal States, in Piedmont the clergy still constituted an *imperium in imperio* (a state within a state) with its own independent tribunals; and Pius, thoroughly cured of his liberal tendencies by his experiences with Mazzini's republicanism, threw the entire weight of his influence into the balance against the progressive tendencies of the day. With the liberals clamoring for action, Cavour endeavored to effect a compromise; but when the Papacy remained obdurate, he deprived the Church of its privileges outright and suppressed the monasteries.

At the same time, working from 5 A.M. till midnight, he prepared for the struggle with Austria. With a boldness that appeared even to his supporters rash if not actually foolhardy, he expended on constructive measures what he gained by economy and increased taxation. Roads and railways were built, agriculture, industry, and commerce stimulated, and the military forces reorganized on the Prussian model. In attacking the problems of economics and finance, Cavour's training in business matters stood him in good stead.

Referring to the hoped-for unification of Italy, Charles Albert had boldly proclaimed: "*Italia farà da sé*" ("Italy will accomplish it by herself," or freely translated, "Italy will work out her own salvation"). Cavour, however, realized that Italy was helpless without foreign aid and that in order to secure this it was imperative to arouse interest in the Italian cause and prove that his coun-

try was a good "risk." In the Crimean War he saw his opportunity to demonstrate to the world that Italians could and would fight, and into this war he therefore plunged to gain the friendship of France and England. To his supporters who lacked his vision this expedition on the part of a small state already staggering under debt seemed as absurd and profitless as an invasion of China; by his enemies the venture was denounced as "economically reckless, militarily a folly, politically a crime." Yet when the peace treaty was drawn up, Sardinia signed along with the Great Powers; and at the Conference of Paris, Cavour was able to arraign Austrian rule in Italy with the Concert of Europe as his audience. At last, he felt, the time had come to act.

THE MAKING OF ITALY

Napoleon III, unlike Napoleon I, had elected to rely on nationalism as his ace of trumps in foreign affairs, and Cavour consequently concluded that France was the one power from which he could hope for active assistance. Moreover, he knew that Napoleon was ambitious of taking the lead in Italian affairs and that he therefore wanted to exclude Austria so as to make way for an Italian confederation, nominally under the leadership of the Pope but in reality under French domination. But Napoleon hesitated to act. At this point, Fate played into Cavour's hands, for in 1858 Napoleon had a narrow escape from assassination at the hands of an Italian revolutionist, Orsini. The motive of the would-be assassin was the nonfulfillment of the oath to further the cause of Italian freedom taken by the Emperor when a member of the Carbonari. Before his execution Orsini wrote a letter, subsequently published, in which he exhorted Napoleon to consummate the liberation of Italy. Later that year, the Emperor asked Cavour to meet him "accidentally" and secretly at Plombières, a watering-place in the Vosges; and there a bargain was struck. In return for the cession of Savoy and Nice and provided that Cavour, without committing any overt act, could induce Austria to declare war, Napoleon agreed to free Italy "from the Alps to the Adriatic" (Lombardy-Venetia, the smaller duchies, the Romagna, and the Legations). The remainder of Central Italy, with the exception of Rome, was to form a new kingdom—which Napoleon secretly intended should go to his cousin—and the whole peninsula was to constitute a confederation under the presidency of the Pope.

The task assigned Cavour was doubly and triply complicated: he had to create an opinion throughout Europe favorable to his cause and so prevent hostile intervention, and at the same time reconcile the divergent elements in Italy that were working for unity. And he could never let his right hand know, what his left was doing. But preparations for war grew daily more apparent, the press more openly insulting to Austria. All Europe sensed the impending conflict, and the powers took sides according to their natural bent toward liberalism or conservatism. Cavour's worst difficulty was the innate indecision fundamental to Napoleon's nature. Remote from the magnetic influence exercised by the little Premier of Piedmont, the Emperor had time to reflect on the dangers of his proposed course of action. French Catholics, through his wife, were imploring him not to aid and abet the activities of a state that had

shown itself so antireligious and whose increasing strength could not fail to imperil the authority and power of the Pope. He therefore clutched eagerly at a Russian proposal that both parties to the quarrel disarm and that Italian affairs be made the subject of a general European congress. Forced to accede, Cavour was contemplating suicide when Austria herself saved him. Refusing to discuss the status of Lombardy-Venetia, she sent a three days' ultimatum calling on Piedmont to disarm (1859).

At Magenta and Solferino, Napoleon proved himself as successful if not so brilliant a general as his uncle. Lombardy was free, and it seemed only a matter of time until the Austrians would be swept into the sea or across the Alps. But the situation was not so simple. In front of the victors loomed the redoubtable defenses of the Quadrilateral, before which even the great Napoleon had been forced to pause; the defending armies, beaten but not broken, were rallying; Austria was far from exhausted; the sight of one of the bloodiest battles in modern times had proved too much for Napoleon's sensitive stomach; the Prussian armies were gathering on the Rhine; and the French Catholics had taken offense. Together, these factors woke all of Napoleon's former hesitations. Was he not foolish to encourage the formation of a large state on his borders? In an interview with Francis Joseph at Villafranca he consented to conclude peace on the basis of the *status quo*. The two monarchs further agreed to work for an Italian confederation, under the honorary presidency of the Pope, and to induce the Pope to grant "indispensable reforms." Assured of Lombardy and powerless to continue the struggle single-handed, Victor Emmanuel likewise assented before Cavour arrived (1859).

Throughout his reign and on this trying occasion above all, Victor Emmanuel displayed those qualities of mind and heart which entitled him to rank among the four great heroes of the Risorgimento. Lacking intellectual gifts of the first order, a soldier rather than a politician, he nevertheless possessed those attributes which were most in demand for the task at hand. His patriotism and his honor were unblemished and his physical bravery was exceeded only by a moral courage which kept him true to his convictions in the face of every obstacle. Once his mind was made up, not even the exalted authority of the Papacy itself could sway him. In addition, his simplicity won him the undying devotion of his people, his loyalty and common sense the admiration of his ministers. And he knew how to pick the right men. For two hours on end after the arrival of Cavour, who completely lost his self-control and finally resigned in disgust and despair, the King bore the unrestrained reproaches heaped upon him by his distracted minister.

But the first step in the unification of Italy had been achieved and a second followed close on its heels. As a result of the opening victory of the Allies at Magenta, Modena, Parma, Tuscany, and the Romagna had risen and were demanding to join Piedmont. Such aspirations neither the Pope nor Napoleon was willing to countenance. The latter tried to avoid responsibility by proposing a European congress, his favorite remedy for any thorny problem. When England vetoed this proposition, he finally gave his consent to the proposed transaction in return for the cession of Savoy and Nice, which he had not had the face to exact before. To the powers he gave the excuse that in view of the forma-

tion of a powerful state on his frontiers boundary rectifications were essential to military security. Cavour thereupon returned to office, assumed responsibility for the act—which was bound to bring its sponsor the odium of all patriotic Italians—and assured its passage through the parliament. In order that the deal might possess a moral sanction, plebiscites were held in all the districts which were to change hands. Those in the duchies and the Romagna were overwhelmingly in favor of union with Piedmont (1860). And in defense of Napoleon, it may be added that the transfer of Savoy and Nice had the backing of geography, and in the case of Savoy of language; but it embittered his relations with England during the remainder of his reign.

The third step, which followed hard on the heels of the second, was the work of Garibaldi, known to history as the Sword of Italian Unification. In early life, as a member of Young Italy, Garibaldi was condemned to death for participation in a revolutionary plot, but he escaped to South America, where his gallantry secured the independence of Uruguay. Although a republican, he had more common sense than Mazzini; he decided that half a loaf was better than no bread, and in '48 he returned to fight under Charles Albert. Subsequently, he commanded the forces of the Roman Republic, and when it fell, took refuge on Staten Island. The campaign of '59 found him once more in the field against Austria.

From this point on, his exploits read more like fiction than sober history. With a mere handful of volunteers he proposed no less than the overthrow of the Bourbon government in the Two Sicilies, defended by 124,000 professional soldiers. Cavour, again playing a double rôle of extreme delicacy—officially Piedmont was on good terms with the Court of Naples—condemned the proposed expedition to the powers at the same time that he was aiding and abetting it in secret. In 1860, after "seizing" transportation, the famous Thousand set sail from Genoa. Fortunately, the British had heard Gladstone's fiery denunciations of Bourbon misrule in the Two Sicilies: "No such extremities of fear, cruelty, and baseness as it has been my irksome duty to describe could be reached by any government but one already unmanned by a bad conscience and driven on by necessity to cover old misdeeds by heaping new ones on them." "I have seen and heard the strong and too true expression used, 'This is the negation of God erected into a system of government.'" Together with the return of Palmerston and the Liberals to power in England, these ringing invectives assured Garibaldi uninterrupted passage to Sicily, where the Red Shirts disembarked under the guns of a British man-of-war. The Sicilian population was sympathetic but, cowed by centuries of foreign domination and discouraged by one fruitless revolt after another, gave little support. Within a month, nevertheless, Palermo was taken and a force of 20,000 Neapolitan regulars, supported by nine frigates and two forts, compelled to capitulate; and in less than three months Garibaldi was dictator of the island and was ready to cross to the peninsula. The King of the Two Sicilies appealed to France and England to stop the advance at the Strait of Messina. Napoleon would have intervened with great pleasure, and it was only when Cavour was able to persuade the English Government not to agree that Garibaldi's second and greatest triumph became possible. After his first victory on the mainland,

won against forces double his own, the opposing garrisons laid down their arms at his approach; and the progress of the great liberator toward Naples became a triumphal march.

The success of the Red Shirts raised another diplomatic situation for Cavour to solve. Under the influence of Mazzini, Garibaldi announced his intention of moving against Rome, an act sure to result in a clash with Napoleon. In order to forestall such a calamity, if possible, Cavour persuaded Victor Emmanuel to head Garibaldi off by invading Umbria and the Marches—that portion of Adriatic Italy retained by the Papacy after the loss of the Romagna—but without molesting Rome and the Mediterranean coast. His calculations proved correct, for Napoleon withdrew his ambassador from Turin but went no further. Overwhelmingly, the inhabitants of Umbria, the Marches, and the Two Sicilies registered their desire to join Piedmont (1860); and the fourth step in the unification of Italy had been accomplished. The vote of confidence that Cavour obtained from the parliament on this occasion and the steadfast support that he received from his sovereign are the best evidence of the characters of these two great patriots. Thereupon Italy's great soldier of fortune, who in less than five months had conquered a kingdom of 11,000,000, resigned his command and, refusing all honors, went into retirement.

In 1861 the first Italian parliament convened, representing a country of 22,000,000 inhabitants; and a month later Victor Emmanuel assumed the title of King of Italy. The fundamental statute adopted was the Piedmontese constitution of 1848, slightly modified, which remained the Italian constitution until after the World War. Although the unification of Italy was not yet complete, another new state had arisen—the earliest of major importance to develop since 1815.

In less than three months more, exhausted by the vindictive attacks of his shortsighted critics, Cavour laid down his burden forever. Without doubt he was the brains of Italian unification; and had he served one of the powers, he might well have proved the greatest figure of the century in the history of Europe at large. Bismarck played to a larger audience and for that reason achieved greater fame; yet Bismarck rendered the tribute of genius to genius: "There is only one statesman in Europe, M. de Cavour." "A free Church in a free State"—Cavour's solution for the greatest of Italy's remaining problems were among the last words that he uttered. By contrast with the other leaders of nineteenth century Europe, he was unique in his combination of idealism and practical common sense.

THE SECOND EMPIRE

Thrice the Emperor of Peace had staked his fortunes on the iron dice of war, and thrice Fate had smiled on him: at his imperial command the Roman Republic had disappeared as though it had never been; the Tsar of All the Russias, who single-handed had vanquished the first Napoleon, had groveled at his feet; and in defiance of the proudest dynasty in Europe and of the settlement of 1815 a new state had sprung into being. Disregard of nationalism had been the fundamental cause for the downfall of Napoleon I, but Napoleon III

posed as the champion of nationalism. With that tremendous force at his back, there seemed no limit to what he might accomplish; and in 1859 he loomed on the European horizon like a colossus. Did the colossus have feet of clay?

This much at least was clear: Napoleon was fast changing his coat. But it was yet to be seen whether, in the long run, the new one would become him any better. In any case, the soldiers whose bones lay moldering outside the walls of Rome, around the Grand Redoubt at Sevastopol, and on the plains of Lombardy, could they have spoken, would doubtless have suggested that he had better change his title along with it. The Emperor of Peace was beginning to look more like the God of War—but even the great Napoleon had his Moscow, his Leipzig, and his Waterloo. Would Napoleon the Little succeed where his illustrious predecessor had failed?

For the moment he appeared supreme in international affairs, and at home he had perfected his autocratic régime. During the early years of the Second Empire political life was suspended; but Napoleon III proved even more astute than his uncle in concealing that fact from the public, and universal and direct suffrage was maintained. This did not mean that the Government's control over elections was any less sure. An official candidate was proposed in each precinct, and public officials were of course required to support him; all electoral meetings were forbidden—as tending to violate the "freedom" of the electors; gerrymandering was common; and if necessary the officials doctored the returns. In principle, the press remained free, but papers were suppressed for "endangering the public security" and for "publishing false news" (news displeasing to the Government). Press offenses were taken out of the hands of the juries, and the prefects were empowered to issue warnings, two of which might result in the suspension of the paper involved. A warning was issued to a certain paper for saying: "The Emperor has made a speech which, according to the Havas agency, several times evoked cries of 'Long live the Emperor!'" on the ground that "this doubtful expression is unsuitable in the presence of the wild enthusiasm which the Emperor's words excited." For similar offenses individuals were liable to arbitrary arrest at the hands of irresponsible and capricious officials. The professorships of history and philosophy were suppressed, professors were required to shave their mustaches in order to remove "from their appearance as well as from their manners the last vestiges of anarchy," and the frontiers were watched in order to prevent the entry of suspicious persons or undesirable reading matter. In short, it was the Metternich system transported to France.

For support, Napoleon relied on the activity of the clergy, the benevolence of the bourgeoisie, and the conservatism of the peasantry; and he did his best, by conferring material benefits on his people, to merit this support. In particular he smiled on Big Business. The railway mileage was quadrupled, steamship lines were established, De Lesseps was encouraged to build the Suez Canal, the great commercial banks of France (the Crédit Foncier, the Société Générale, and the Crédit Lyonnais) were founded, and beneficial tariff agreements were negotiated with England and with the Prussian Zollverein. As a result, France enjoyed a period of rising prosperity, during which industry and commerce boomed, the national wealth increased, and the cost of living fell. In part,

at least, these activities benefited the entire population. In behalf of the poor, welfare institutions were established. Even the proletariat was not forgotten; in 1864 the law forbidding strikes was repealed. Thenceforth the workers could register their united protests without having to fear outlawry as well as starvation.

These more or less invisible benefits were supplemented by other measures designed particularly to impress the eye. A great program of public works was enacted. Boulevards, planned by Haussmann—useful for artillery fire in case of an uprising—and cut through the medieval Parisian dwellings, transformed the capital into the city of magnificent vistas that we know today. New churches, theaters, public markets, and hospitals added to the general impression of sumptuous elegance. The fortifications were leveled in order to make room for circular boulevards fringed with parks. Expositions were held, at which the composer conducted the “Blue Danube” in person and to which admiring tourists thronged from all over Europe and America. Finally Napoleon endeavored to fascinate by the glitter of his court. Mounted on horseback, his stubby figure showed off to better advantage; and he sought to convey an impression at once martial and dapper by cultivating pointed mustachios and a goatee. Meanwhile the Empress set the mode for the feminine world, outside as well as in France.

As a result of Orsini's attempted assassination of Napoleon in 1858, a Security Act had been passed prescribing heavy penalties for “disturbing the peace or exciting hate or contempt for the government of the Emperor” and had been made retroactive by authorizing the Minister of the Interior to imprison or exile past offenders without trial. A general prominent in the *coup d'état* had been selected to put this last provision into force, and had ordered the prefects to arrest a certain number in each department, *chosen at will*, for purposes of intimidation. In the legislature a negligible group of five, including Ollivier and Jules Favre, elected for his defense of Orsini, made up the Republican opposition.

Napoleon's victory of 1859 had one important effect on home politics—it alienated his staunchest supporters, the Catholics. This fact, coupled with a growing sense of insecurity, led him to look for support among his former enemies; and in 1859 the beginning of a new policy was heralded by an amnesty for the condemned liberals of 1851. At the same time, somewhat greater freedom of discussion was permitted; as the clericals put it, opponents of the Church were allowed “to discuss God on condition that they didn't discuss the Emperor.” More concessions followed: the sittings of the Senate were opened to the public and publication of the debates was permitted.

A decree of November, 1860, made the first definite breach in the autocratic régime: each year the Chambers were to be allowed to express their opinions by a reply to the address from the throne and also to question the Government on matters of policy. In addition, the discussions in the Chambers were to be published *in extenso*. Simultaneously, there was a change of ministers and the press was allowed to indulge in mild criticism of the authorities. Slight as these changes seem, in a country which had been completely stifled they produced a tremendous sensation. In 1863 the Opposition—Legitimist (Bourbon), Orleanist,

Republican, and discontented Imperialists (Catholics and protectionists)—won 32 out of 282 seats and almost trebled its previous vote (1,954,000 vs. 664,000).

Napoleon did not think it wise to rely on reforms alone to maintain his popularity. Remembering the fate of Louis-Philippe, he was determined that France should not be bored and he continued to make a vigorous foreign policy his cardinal bid for popularity. Again he was successful. In 1860, in conjunction with England, he dispatched an expeditionary force to China, through which commercial concessions were obtained. At the same time, in order to protect the Christians from the Druses, he also sent an expeditionary force to Syria. A little later he invaded Indo-China; three provinces of Cochinchina were annexed (1862), Cambodia was converted into a French protectorate (1863), and shortly after, the three remaining provinces of Cochinchina were seized (1867). Territory about half the size of France thereby came under the tricolor, and since an extensive field was opened up to the missionary activities of the Church, the conquest gratified the clericals. These occurrences were too remote, however, to influence the general run of public opinion in France to any considerable extent.

At precisely the right moment, a superb chance to impress the conservatives arose in Mexico, where the anticlericals had seized control and had temporarily suspended the payment of foreign debts. France, England, and Spain intervened in behalf of Mexico's European creditors (1861). Meanwhile a grandiose and subtle scheme for the creation of a Mexican empire, which would enable him to pose as the leader of the Latin "race," was maturing in Napoleon's fertile brain. In order to mollify Austria and conceal his true motives, he proposed to set up as puppet emperor the Archduke Maximilian, brother of Francis Joseph and son-in-law of the King of Belgium. "Incidentally," the French bourgeoisie would obtain a magnificent field for economic expansion and French clericals and imperialists would be highly gratified. To all appearances it was an unparalleled opportunity to kill several birds with one stone.

When Napoleon made it clear that he intended to overthrow the Mexican Republic, England and Spain withdrew. Nevertheless, having conquered Mexico City while the United States was busy with the Civil War and unable to do more than protest, he proclaimed Maximilian Emperor of Mexico; and the young prince set sail with the blessing of the Pope. Apparently Napoleon had succeeded in overriding the Monroe Doctrine where even Metternich had failed.

Not content with having his legions scattered over three-quarters of the circumference of the globe,³ the Emperor of Peace looked about for new worlds to conquer. When the Poles again revolted (1863), he proposed to aid them against their lord and master; but the British, remembering Savoy and Nice, declined to join him and Prussia was undisguisedly hostile, so he was forced to let the matter drop. Needless to say, the proposal did little to improve his relations with the Tsar.

Had his luck finally turned? Spectacular as his triumphs in Mexico seemed, the expedition was keeping 40,000 soldiers busy (a large force for those days) and costing 14,000,000 francs a month. If successful, the game was perhaps

³ In 1853, Napoleon had annexed New Caledonia and the Loyalty Islands.

HEINRICH METT

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CAVOUR

worth the candle—but in 1867, at the “request” of the United States, relieved of its embarrassing Civil War and possessing a large army of veterans, Napoleon withdrew his forces. Maximilian, who refused to abandon his native adherents, was captured and executed, and the Mexican venture collapsed. Napoleon’s chickens were coming home to roost with a vengeance, and it began to look as if he had offended everyone abroad without really satisfying anyone at home.

Further concessions to the liberals were now more imperative than ever. Accordingly the Chamber was given the right to question the ministers on all their acts; public meetings were permitted, subject to regulation; the régime of press warnings was abolished; the necessity for a permit in order to establish a paper was abolished; and in order to suppress one the regular processes of law had to be invoked.

Meanwhile, in both the Chamber and the country at large, opposition was growing, for toward the middle of the century the Industrial Revolution had begun to get in its effects in France, and the urban proletariat flocked to the standards of radical republicanism and socialism. Gambetta, a young and unknown deputy who was to figure as the Father of the Third Republic, made a reputation for himself overnight by attacking the *coup d'état* in the course of defending the subscribers to a monument in honor of one of the victims. In the elections of 1869 the opposition polled 3,355,000 votes to 4,438,000 for the government candidates. The figures for Paris were 234,000 against 77,000, and in nearly all the large centers the opposition achieved a similar preponderance. One hundred and sixteen deputies, exclusive of the Republicans, demanded a responsible ministry.

Harassed by an incurable and excruciating disease, Napoleon resigned himself to the inevitable, dismissed his ministers, and issued a constitutional statute giving the Chamber the right to initiate legislation and to pass a vote of “no confidence.” He then wrote to Ollivier, “I beg you to choose me the persons who can form a homogeneous cabinet with you, representing faithfully the majority of the Legislative Body.” He still held out against the idea of a Prime Minister and ministerial responsibility, but the autocratic empire had given way to the “liberal empire.”

As a result of these concessions, the new ministry found itself with an overwhelming majority in the Chamber; the Left, mostly republicans, known as Radicals and led by Gambetta, was reduced to some forty deputies. Ollivier introduced and carried a further change in the absolutist régime whereby the Senate was deprived of the right to amend the constitution and instead was given a share in ordinary legislation. A plebiscite, held to confirm these changes, resulted in 7,358,000 favorable as against 1,572,000 unfavorable votes (May 8, 1870). If this expression of opinion could be taken as a fair indication, Napoleon had “staged a strong come-back.” Would the Emperor of Peace succeed as a liberal ruler where he had failed as an autocrat?

A STATESMAN IN EMBRYO

The preceding pages have traced the phenomenal rise to power and glory of the new Napoleon, who for a space of twenty years seemed to outdistance

all his rivals. The following pages deal with the far more consequential career of one who was to prove how little the near-great count when the great arrive, one who faced life with no royal pretensions, yet who was to play the game of international chess with real kings and queens and with whole armies as pawns, who was to give the dominant impress to the last half of the century and direct its activities with far greater skill than that shown by Metternich in the first half.

Centuries before there was any Kingdom of Prussia, before the Hohenzollerns had even been heard of in those parts, a little village in the Altmark (Old March) of Brandenburg, nucleus of the future state, gave its name to a family of the lesser nobility. From the beginning, therefore, in that first *Drang nach Osten* (pressure toward the East) when the medieval Empire set out to reconquer what had been lost to the Slavs, the Von Bismarcks were among those to be reckoned with. They grew with the land and the land with them, for they were part and parcel of that semifeudal squirearchy which until the mid-nineteenth century, and even after, was Prussia at its best and its worst. Distinguished for action rather than for thought, throughout the modern era the Junkers of Brandenburg continued to wrest a living from the barren soil, filled the civil and military offices, and fought, bled, and died for the glory of the Protestant God, for the greatness of Prussia, and for the honor of the Hohenzollerns.

Otto Eduard Leopold of Bismarck-Schönhausen,⁴ the man who did more than any other to upset both the Viennese settlement and the balance of power, was born in 1815. His father was an army officer who after the catastrophe of Jena had seen the ancestral estates at Schönhausen in the hands of the French, the ancestral tree pierced by French bayonets, the Old March just across the river torn bleeding from the remainder of Prussia to form part of Jerome Bonaparte's artificially created Kingdom of Westphalia.

To Bismarck, accustomed to life in the open, the city was always a prison. His statuesque carriage and iron physique were acquired by an out-of-doors existence, in the saddle or on foot; and to the world of nature he returned throughout life for relaxation and refreshment. Culture in the narrower sense failed to arouse his interest. He was intractable, and the great lessons of life he learned not from books, but from experience.

At the university he was chiefly distinguished as a redoubtable swordsman. After graduation, he tried his hand as a petty official in the civil service, but he soon gave up in disgust to manage the family estates in Pomerania, at the time when Cavour was serving a similar apprenticeship on the other side of the Alps. The countryside rang with the dare-devil escapades of the "mad" young Junker who could drink a half-dozen lieutenants under the table and who made a reputation for hard riding and straight shooting in a land where such virtues were not uncommon. What his neighbors did not know was that this madcap roustabout was at the same time devouring Strauss, Schopenhauer, Spinoza,

⁴ Von Bismarck. In German, *von* (of) in conjunction with a proper name (originally of a locality) signifies nobility, as does *de* in French. The following is an example of a title containing seven place names: Anne Claude Philippe de Tubières de Grimoard de Pestels de Lévis, Comte de Caylus, Marquis d'Esternay, Baron de Bransac.

Goethe, Shakespeare, and Byron, and doing a deal of hard thinking. Like Cavour again, he traveled in France and England, and in his encyclopedic brain he noted the impressions he received in those countries. But despite all his hail-fellow-well-met exterior, he cherished unsatisfied longings and ambitions. When his only sister married, he wrote, "I feel more than ever my loneliness in the world."

Two women effected the conversion which changed Bismarck from a free-thinker to a pillar of the church and of society—the pietistic wife of an old friend and the girl whom he married and of whom he declared in after years, "My wife made me what I am." She, it is said, was the only intimate he ever had, the only mortal to look beneath the otherwise impenetrable exterior which concealed that turbulent, masterful soul. "Without God, without thee, without children, I cannot think why I should not put life aside like a dirty shirt." "I firmly believe in a life after death, and that is why I am a royalist; by nature I am disposed to be a republican." (Bismarck a republican!)

So far as national affairs were concerned, at the time of his engagement Bismarck was still a nonentity. Two months later he had already made his mark as an Ultra of the Ultras, for, although only thirty-two years old, he had served as a member of the United Landtag of 1847, and had stood forward in unwavering opposition to the liberals and the nationalists. He denied that the War of Liberation had had any constitutional significance. When the liberal benches broke into uproarious dissent, he pulled a newspaper from his pocket and, with a gesture prophetic of the days to come, stood unconcernedly reading until the tumult had subsided. He then continued by asserting that the crown of Prussia was worn by the grace of God, not by the grace of the nation.

Throughout the stormy days of '48 he served the King in every assembly, but was never admitted to office, for Frederick William dared not give offense to both moderates and radicals by appointing such a red-roaring reactionary. Even at the height of the excitement his tongue was never quiet, and it was a tongue that stung with every phrase. Frederick William's refusal to head a liberal empire aroused in Bismarck nothing but satisfaction, for liberalism would have ended the Prussia that meant more to him than all the constitutions ever written. He therefore rejected in no uncertain terms the notion that Frederick William was in honor bound "to play the Don Quixote all over Germany on behalf of sickly demagogues, who imagined their local constitutions in danger." Even at this early date he had formulated the principle of statescraft from which he was never to deviate: "The one sound basis of a great power, which differentiates it essentially from the petty state, is political egoism and not romanticism, and it is unworthy of a great state to fight for what is not connected with its interest." He was even reconciled to the Humiliation of Olmütz, for it meant that Prussia was to join Austria against the liberals, not vice versa.

DIPLOMACY FINDS AN APT PUPIL

When the revolutionary movement had subsided Bismarck was appointed Prussian representative in the revived Diet, where Austria once more reigned

supreme and where for eight years he was to study the German problem at first hand. Bismarck reached Frankfurt with the conviction that it was to Prussia's interest to cooperate with Austria in the maintenance of conservatism. Prying beneath the surface, however, he discovered many things. "No human being," he wrote to his wife, "not even the most malicious skeptic of a democrat, would believe the charlatanism and imposture hidden in this diplomacy." In consequence, he acquired a contempt for human motives that in after life colored all his actions. "There is nothing on this earth but hypocrisy and jugglery." Yet he could return home to play with his children or, under the influence of a Beethoven sonata, to dream of the quiet life of a Prussian country gentleman. Incidentally, he traveled, and managed to meet many who had made or were making Europe. The most dramatic of these interviews was that between the young Prussian Junker and Metternich, when the Imperial Chancellor-to-be rendered his salute to the Imperial Chancellor-that-had-been. The differences between the Germany of Metternich and the Germany of Bismarck are more striking than the resemblances, but as advocates of conservatism and divine-right monarchy the two statesmen were one.

As a result of his sojourn in Frankfurt, Bismarck was rapidly changing his ideas. He became convinced that the Viennese diplomats were simply using Prussia as a cat's-paw and concluded that "in no long time we shall have to fight for our existence against Austria." During the Crimean War, when Francis Joseph tried to induce Frederick William to attack Russia, he borrowed a page from the book of Austrian diplomacy and advocated that Austria be made to pay for Prussian neutrality. Prince William, his future sovereign, to whom he expounded these views, regarded them as manifestations of heresy and insanity. It was not the last time that William was to accuse his faithful servant of such aberrations. With an eye on Austria, therefore, Bismarck became a strong advocate of improving the Prussian army and Prussian diplomacy. Like every great statesman, however, he was growing in caliber; and by 1861 the follies and inadequacies of the Federal Diet brought him to the point of favoring popular representation—but a popular representation that should reinforce, not control, the monarchical system. In this mood, Bismarck broke with even the narrow circle of conservatives who were his sole remaining backers, and for ten years thereafter he stood alone. Once and for all he had decided on the goal toward which he would work: a united Germany, from which Austria should be excluded and over which Prussia should be dominant—a greater Prussia.

With the advent of Prince William to the regency and the inauguration of a quasi-liberal policy, Bismarck was forced into honorable retirement as ambassador to Russia (1859)—almost the only country where his ultra-conservative tendencies would make him *persona grata*. His suggestion that while Napoleon was driving the White Coats into the Mincio Prussia should seize her opportunity to bring Austria to terms fell on deaf ears and simply made him the butt of attacks by the conservatives, who were much more inclined to join forces with Francis Joseph. He could only sit by and gnash his teeth in helpless impotence. At St. Petersburg (now Leningrad), however, Bismarck learned that, thanks to the Crimean War, he had at least one potential ally against

Austria. "The hatred of Austria here exceeds everything I had believed possible."

From Russia he was transferred to Paris, where the Sphinx of the Tuileries held court amid the frail butterflies of Eugénie's train. Here too he won confidence and valuable information by intimating that as a newcomer to diplomacy he would be grateful for any advice his elders and betters should see fit to vouchsafe. And on a flying trip to England his dashing manners and droll tales of how he was going to reconstruct Europe made him a prime favorite. It was not the last time he was to disarm the old-line diplomats by telling the truth. Only Disraeli took him seriously: "Take care of that man; he means what he says."

In the midst of all the festivities and the gayety, however, Bismarck was tormented by the unsatisfied urge to power and constructive achievement. In his letters to his wife he wrote of the sunsets in the Pyrenees, but in his heart he was beside his sovereign in Berlin. Even before his departure from St. Petersburg, a conflict had broken out which was to decide the fate of Prussia and of Germany for a half-century. The constitution granted by Frederick William IV in 1850 was more democratic than any liberal had dared hope. It embodied an elaborate declaration of individual rights and liberties and, still more astonishing, provided for universal suffrage. This apparent liberality was, however, belied by other and more important provisions. The exercise of the suffrage rested on a unique three-class system. Not even Napoleon had devised a more efficient means of thwarting the public will. In each constituency the voters were divided into three classes, on the basis of taxes paid. The few rich men (in some constituencies a solitary individual) who together paid a third of the taxes constituted one class; the next largest taxpayers, perhaps a score of men, who paid another third, formed a second class; while the rest of the people were all lumped into a third class. Each class, meeting separately, chose a third of the electors to which the constituency was entitled; and the electors, in turn, chose the representative. Moreover, the Government designated official candidates, as did Napoleon, and like him resorted to gerrymandering. Consequently the lower house in Prussia always contained a large number of officials—that of 1855 had 72 subprefects—and in addition it shared the legislative power with the upper house, which was composed of hereditary and appointive members. The budget was not presented to the parliament until the money had been spent, and then only to be voted as a whole, without discussion. The entire administration, civil and military, was in complete subordination to the king, who possessed a veto over all legislation; and the ministry was responsible to the Crown alone.

In 1857 Frederick William IV became insane and the rule devolved on Prince William,⁵ who resembled Victor Emmanuel not a little in character and was to play a very similar historical rôle. When William became Regent, a year or so afterward, he appointed a ministry of progressives, hailed by the liberals as the beginning of a new era. He soon made it clear, however, that he had no intention of introducing any fundamental change in the system of

⁵ Vicegerent, Regent (1858-61), and King (1861-88).

government, and a conflict with the parliament developed which centered about the military establishment. Not having been reorganized since 1814, it was badly in need of a thorough revamping, and the requisite changes necessitated the passage of a new budget. The liberals, who in spite of the three-class system had acquired a majority in the lower house, recognized the desirability of an increase in Prussia's military strength, but they regarded the army as above all the symbol of divine-right monarchy. They therefore demanded a modification of the plan proposed by the Government, and proposed an annual military budget. William, who had spent his life in the army, understood military affairs thoroughly. He believed that the program as originally elaborated was necessary, and as a professional soldier and a Hohenzollern he resented interference by civilians. To admit the claims of the parliament would be to establish the principle of ministerial responsibility; the power of the purse, acquired by the English Parliament centuries before, was the crux of the issue. Granted in England, it had reduced the Crown to little more than a figurehead; granted in Prussia, it would destroy the hold of the monarchy over the army and would reduce the king to similar impotence. Compromise was impossible. William dissolved the parliament and appealed to the people, but the maneuver proved worse than useless. In the new house the conservatives could muster only a handful of votes, and the Opposition pressed on. Bismarck rejoiced, for in his opinion the chance had come to break the power of the liberals forever.

William, on the other hand, was in a quandary. How could the ministry govern without a budget? And the alternatives? Submission? Revolution? The repeal of the constitution? Abdication? All looked equally uninviting. Roon, Minister of War and creator of the new army, suggested that his old friend the ambassador to Russia was the man for the job; but William knew that Bismarck would insist on an anti-Austrian policy. Besides, such an appointment would end all hope of compromise. More than once Bismarck was granted "sick leave" and was back in Berlin. But as his masterful personality repelled as well as attracted his sovereign, he returned each time to his post empty-handed. In September of 1862 he received another summons from Roon. Finding William with an abdication drawn up and signed, he persuaded him to tear it up; and the next day his appointment as head of the Prussian ministry was announced.

When Bismarck took up his abode in the Wilhelmstrasse,⁹ which was to be his official residence for over a quarter of a century, public opinion ran the gamut from indignation to amusement, and the chancelleries of Europe laid bets as to whether he would last three months or three weeks.

BISMARCK TAKES THE HELM

Prior to 1914, 1862 is the most important date in the political history of contemporary Europe. Although Bismarck's critics little suspected it, Prussia had

⁹ The location of the Prussian and, later, the German Foreign Office. The French Foreign Office is located on the Quai d'Orsay; the Austrian in the Ballplatz; the British Cabinet in Downing Street.

at last found the genius for whom she had been waiting in vain ever since. Frederick the Great died without a political heir (1786).

The liberals were not among those amused by the recent turn of affairs. The new minister met them with words meant to be conciliatory—since, with a dozen problems of foreign policy awaiting solution, he had no desire for a house divided against itself—but his utterances contained no ambiguity. He began by calling attention to the fact that, manifestly, the first duty of a government is to govern. According to Bismarck's interpretation of the constitution the Crown not only shared the right of legislation equally with the parliament in ordinary circumstances but when an agreement could not be reached it possessed the residual right of legislating without the consent of the parliament. Govern he would, with a majority if possible, and preferably; if not, without one. "Prussia must reserve her strength. . . . The great questions of the day will not be decided by speeches and resolutions of majorities—that was the blunder of 1848 and 1849—but by blood and iron." The declaration brought down the house—about his ears; and his policy was condemned by a vote of 251 to 36. Short of resignation, there was only one course open; and for five years thereafter Bismarck dispensed with a legal budget by collecting taxes under the last that had been approved. At times he could not command more than ten votes in the lower house.

In international as in national politics Bismarck recognized only one crime, one sin, and that a sin against the Holy Ghost: failure to serve the interests of Prussia—and for Bismarck the interests of Prussia and of the Crown were identical. With the parliament disposed of, his one serious difficulty lay in keeping the feet of his distraught master in the way in which they should go; for William was a man of honor, and the new minister was being attacked from behind as well as in front. Many were the struggles in which Bismarck was forced to engage with his sovereign in order to convince him of the wisdom of his plans; but fortunately for the Crown—unfortunately for the world at large—Bismarck always won. Time and again Prussia was saved from what must otherwise have been certain disaster.

The story of the unification of Germany is the story of Bismarck. William was his mouthpiece, Roon forged his thunderbolts. Von Moltke, chief of the Prussian staff, hurled them. Together, the three moved as Bismarck willed, whether in accordance with or against their own desires and judgment. There were no others.

The careers of great men are compounded of good management and good luck. Bismarck's showed the former to an almost unparalleled degree, but from time to time even he was indebted to Dame Fortune. No sooner was he in office than the Russian Poles were obliging enough to revolt again. By assuring Russia of his cordial sympathy, although liberal opinion everywhere and all the other powers were in favor of the Poles, Bismarck made it possible for the Tsar to disregard foreign protests and crush the rebels with the utmost severity. Napoleon proposed intervention; but for fear that he would demand compensation, as he had done in the case of Savoy and Nice, neither England nor Austria was willing to join him in pressing the matter. Once more the unhappy Poles were a vicarious sacrifice to the welfare of another nation, for by strength-

ening the friendly relations he had established with Russia Bismarck forged both the first link in the chain that was to bind Germany together and the sheet anchor of the policy that he was to pursue throughout his entire tenure of office. The next moment he mystified his audience by refusing a Russian alliance—in which, at that stage of the game, the Russian chancellor, Gorchakov, would have held the whip hand.

The Polish situation so incensed France, Poland's traditional ally, that, unable to make good his threats, Napoleon thought it best to create a diversion by reverting to his stellar rôle as champion of Italian nationalism. Accordingly, as though he did not already have enough to keep him busy, he proposed a general European congress at which—under his presidency, of course—all outstanding issues should be settled. England refused to cooperate, and the proposal came to nothing; but in order to enlist Prussia's support Napoleon, as the champion of nationalism again, offered Bismarck his diplomatic backing against Austria—an offer that was shortly to prove of no little value.

THE SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN QUESTION

In the Polish affair Bismarck had reaped without sowing, but the second international issue he was called on to face found him holding the center of the stage. In all of its ramifications the Schleswig-Holstein question was one of the most complicated issues that ever arose to plague diplomats and statesmen; so much so that, according to Palmerston, only three persons had ever understood it: Queen Victoria's dead husband, a certain professor whom the problem had driven insane, and he himself—and he had forgotten. Bismarck, the master diplomat, regarded his handling of the matter as his greatest triumph. Incidentally the Schleswig-Holstein question is an outstanding example of how historical factors pervert what should be matters of justice and nationality, and of how difficult it frequently is to settle boundaries along historical, legal, linguistic, national, or even equitable lines.

Geographically the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein constitute the isthmus that connects the Danish peninsula with the North German plain. The population of Holstein, the southerly duchy, was German; that of Schleswig, Danish, with an infusion of German immigrants who for several centuries had been successfully colonizing the southern portion. Since 1460, when they chose the King of Denmark as their duke, the duchies had been attached to Denmark by a personal union—a constitutional situation resembling the present-day relationship of the Channel Islands to England. Although the Danes and Europe as a whole had come to regard them as an integral part of the Danish kingdom, the inhabitants cherished their historic autonomy and regarded the authority of the king as based solely on his rights as their duke, not in any way on his position as King of Denmark. Furthermore, though Holstein had been part of the Holy Roman Empire and was a member of the Germanic Confederation, while Schleswig had never had any legal connection with Germany, the duchies considered themselves an inseparable unit. Much of the subsequent controversy hinged on this claim to "indissoluble" unity, a claim which rested on old, ambiguous documents and seems to have had little legal

basis. But what people believe is often of more importance than the actual facts, and such unfounded *beliefs* may therefore ultimately become in themselves all-important historical facts.

Prior to the nineteenth century, when the loyalty of the masses everywhere had been primarily dynastic, this situation had aroused little comment. The rise of nationalism in Germany and Denmark brought the matter to public notice, but even nationalism might not have precipitated a crisis had not liberalism stepped in to complicate the issue. So long as there was no parliament, the question of the relationship of the duchies to Denmark proper was not a vital matter. As soon as the King decided that he would grant his subjects a constitution (1848), the Germans in the duchies were up in arms against this "attempt to curtail their liberties and subject them to the yoke of the Danish majority," and they were aided by Prussia, as executor of the will of the Germanic Confederation. The attitude of Russia and England resulted in the restoration of the *status quo ante*, but the King of Denmark promised, under pressure from Austria and Prussia, that there should not be any incorporation of the Duchy of Schleswig into the kingdom (1851). Relations between the Danes and the Germans in Schleswig were embittered by the fact that they were divided along class lines: the Germans constituted the landed and moneyed classes—the aristocracy and bourgeoisie—while the Danes were peasants.

Because of the impending extinction of the Danish reigning house in the male line, the situation was especially ticklish. In the duchies, the Salic Law prevented a woman from inheriting or transmitting the crown; in Denmark there was no such bar. Even this difficulty was apparently overcome when the Augustenburg candidate for the succession accepted a large sum of money and undertook "for himself and for his family" not to "counteract" whatever arrangement the King of Denmark might make. Thereupon, by the Treaty of London (1852), the powers "acknowledged" the integrity of the possessions of the Danish Crown and the succession thereto of Christian of Glücksburg. The treaty also safeguarded the rights of Holstein, but did not mention Schleswig. In drawing up this document, the signatories were motivated, among other things, by their interest in the projected Kiel Canal, which they did not wish to see controlled by any Great Power, and above all, of course, by their determination to prevent any further alterations in the map of Europe. For this reason, the Treaty of London has been referred to as "the high-water mark of those dynastic and legitimist principles which had triumphed at the Congress of Vienna." Whether it merits so severe a condemnation may be questioned, but it certainly was a document that, consciously or unconsciously, looked toward the past rather than toward the future. Throughout the '50's the King of Denmark made repeated attempts to arrive at some solution acceptable to all parties concerned. Needless to say, he was unsuccessful. The German element refused generous offers of autonomy, and their protests and those of their sympathizers in Germany grew louder and louder.

A crisis loomed in the offing when, in 1863, the King brought forward a project for a new constitution for his "Kingdom of Denmark-Slesvig." Holstein was not even mentioned—she might go her way—but whatever else happened, the Danes were convinced that Schleswig was and should be Danish. In spite

of renewed protests from Germany, the project was passed by the Danish parliament, which had lost patience with the continual interference in their internal affairs. The Danes knew that Russia, England, France, and the rest of Scandinavia sympathized with them. They did not believe that Austria would bestir herself in a matter so remote from her interests—and Prussia was absorbed in her constitutional conflict. Two days later the whole affair came to a head when the King died without a male heir and without having signed the constitution. Christian of Glucksburg, who ascended the throne as Christian IX, was between the devil—Bismarck was well cast for the rôle of Mephistopheles—and the deep blue sea, literally as well as figuratively. If he signed, he enraged the Germans; if he refused to sign, he forfeited the loyalty of the Danes—indeed he was warned in no uncertain terms that he would endanger not only his crown but his life. In this predicament the unfortunate new monarch had no real choice.

To make the matter worse the eldest son of the Duke of Augustenburg came forward to claim the duchies. Because he had been a minor when the renunciation was signed, he maintained that his rights had not been impaired. It was a flimsy bit of casuistry; but from one end of Germany to the other resounded the demand that the Diet redeem its inglorious past by securing the duchies for the Prince of Augustenburg, "Duke of Schleswig-Holstein." For the first time in history all Germans outside Austria, from King William to the most extreme liberal, were united—all except the one man who really mattered. To the ordinary international politician the state of public opinion would have been the signal to plunge in gayly without further ado as the champion of German nationalism—and get thrown out by the powers! Not so Bismarck. He had long ago determined to secure the duchies for Prussia, and he could hardly conceal his satisfaction at the turn of events; but for the moment he was obliged to conceal his intentions.

With superb opportunism he proceeded to demonstrate his mastery of the strategy and tactics of diplomacy. His first step was to request the coöperation of Austria, and, thanks to a number of factors, he was actually successful in securing it. Eager as ever to preserve the *status quo*, Austria, unlike the other members of the Germanic Confederation, desired to maintain the integrity of Denmark. Moreover Napoleon had just announced publicly, "The Treaties of 1815 have ceased to exist," and had accordingly proposed a general congress; what he might do if sufficiently encouraged, in view of his known sentiments on nationalism and of his actions in 1859, caused the Austrian ministers no little concern. Prussia was the only strong power on which they felt that they could rely; if she and France got together, there was no telling what might happen. Austria was therefore predisposed to entertain any proposals which Prussia might make.

Bismarck felt sure that the other powers would not intervene actively in behalf of Danish constitutionalism. He accordingly proposed that Prussia and Austria demand the revocation of the Danish constitution, as contrary to Denmark's promise of 1851. If the demand were refused—and he felt sure that it would be—they should occupy Schleswig in order to coerce Denmark and at the same time to uphold the Treaty of London and so prevent the lesser powers

of Germany from seizing the duchies in behalf of the Prince of Augustenburg. "Our fidelity to treaties must be open to no question." (Once fighting had taken place, the treaty would be automatically scrapped.) Then, as though it were an afterthought, intended merely to provide against all possible contingencies, he also suggested that Prussia and Austria sign a convention pledging themselves, in case the situation should change, to regulate the disposition of the duchies between themselves, without consulting any third party. Since all of these proposals accorded with their own views and since they could see no possible reason for refusing, the Austrian ministers gladly agreed (1864). Bismarck's shaft had reached its mark, and the barb was ready to do its work when the victim should begin to struggle.

January 16, 1864, Prussia and Austria sent Denmark a forty-eight-hour ultimatum demanding the withdrawal of the Danish constitution. The moment was well chosen. The Danish parliament was not in session and could not have assembled in time to comply had Christian so desired. As it was, Bismarck had seen to it that the Danes should get the impression that the English Government intended to intervene; and since the English papers were proclaiming in no uncertain terms that England would not desert her little protégé, the Danish ministers were easily deceived by Bismarck's ruse and returned a categorical refusal.

Palmerston approached France and Russia with a view to joint intervention and, when Napoleon and the Tsar, mindful of the Polish affair, politely declined, even tried to persuade the cabinet that England ought to act single-handed. He was checkmated, largely because of Queen Victoria's opposition to interference with the affairs of her daughter's adopted country (the Princess Royal of Great Britain, who was to become the mother of the Kaiser of World War fame, had just married the Crown Prince of Prussia). Thus England and France threw away the opportunity of a lifetime. Bismarck subsequently remarked, "I wasted several years of my life by the supposition that England was a great nation." This hasty and ill-considered inference showed that even Bismarck had his limitations and, shared by Germany as a whole, was to lead to tragic consequences fifty years later.

Denmark, deserted by the powers, stood no chance. During the conflict an armistice was arranged to talk over the possibility of compromise. The ensuing conference was chiefly notable on four counts: (1) England proposed the division of Schleswig on the basis of nationality; (2) Bismarck (of all people!) suggested a plebiscite; (3) the lines representing the minimum demands of the two sides were only some ten miles apart—yet (4) no agreement could be reached. At least the Danes had the courage of their convictions; even in the face of certain defeat they refused to compromise and thereby saved Bismarck from the onus of betraying any apparent obstinacy. The powers thereupon washed their hands of the affair, fighting was resumed, and by the Treaty of 1864, Denmark ceded Schleswig and Holstein to Prussia and Austria. Throughout, Bismarck had been obliged to play a lone hand; his popularity had if possible decreased with each successive step—and the end was not yet.

PRUSSIA WINS THE PRIMACY OF GERMANY

Even with Schleswig-Holstein safely out of the hands of the Danes, the task in hand was far from complete. Up to this time Bismarck had been obliged to cope with William as well as with Francis Joseph. When he had first proposed to annex the duchies to Prussia the suggestion had been pocketed as another evidence of temporary insanity. Once the blood of his countrymen was shed, however, William felt that Prussia was entitled to compensation; and when Austria espoused the cause of the Prince of Augustenburg, he authorized Bismarck to propose conditions. Bismarck purposely made his terms unacceptable: the Schleswig-Holstein troops were to swear allegiance to the King of Prussia, and Prussia was to control the harbor of Kiel and the Kiel Canal. Whereupon the prince, backed by Austria, indignantly rejected this proposition and faded out of the picture. Bismarck's unpopularity reached its apex. It now remained for Prussia and Austria, in accordance with their original agreement, to settle the matter between them. As a temporary stop-gap the Convention of Gastein was concluded: Prussia was to administer Schleswig, and Austria, Holstein. In this way the White Coats were left with Prussians at their back as well as in front.

All this time, Bismarck had in sight his first great objective, the dethronement of Austria as the leading power in Germany. If Austria would step aside gracefully, yielding Schleswig-Holstein as an earnest of her good intentions in this matter, so much the better. War could then be avoided. If not . . . Meanwhile, until war became inevitable, Bismarck was careful to appear conciliatory. Concession after concession was offered, only to be rejected by Austria; and each time William grew more indignant.

When his sovereign's patience was finally exhausted, Bismarck judged the moment opportune to strike. But first he had to secure the neutrality of France. Leaving Roon and Von Moltke to complete the preparations for war, he paid a visit to Napoleon at Biarritz. What passed during the interview has never been revealed, but it appears certain that by playing on Napoleon's claim to be the champion of nationalism he induced the victor of Solferino to stand aside while Prussia grappled with Austria. Whether Napoleon demanded compensation or what Bismarck replied, there is no means of knowing. With the Emperor acting as mediator, Bismarck then turned to Italy, which in return for the promise of Venetia, was induced to enter into an alliance *valid for three months only* (April 8, 1866).

The next day, Prussia proceeded to explode a bombshell in the Federal Diet by proposing a reform of the confederation, to be effected by an all-German parliament elected by universal suffrage. The proposal was a tactical masterpiece; it identified Bismarck as a German as well as a Prussian and presented Austria with the necessity of choosing between two equally unpalatable alternatives. If she accepted, she cut her own throat by surrendering her control over Germany; if not—and Bismarck was sure that she would refuse—she allowed Prussia to assume the leadership of German nationalism.

Realizing at last which way the wind was blowing, Francis Joseph did every-

thing possible to avert his fate, even offering Italy Venetia in return for neutrality—everything except the essential, which was to yield to Prussia the primacy of Germany. This the pride of the Hapsburgs forbade him to surrender without a struggle. Bismarck put on the screws. When Austria consulted the Diet as to the fate of the duchies, he ejected the White Coats from Holstein; in justification he alleged that Austria's action had violated the Convention of 1864 and that she had violated the Convention of Gastein by encouraging the agitation for the Prince of Augustenburg. Still Francis Joseph did not strike back. Finally Bismarck pressed home his attack by suggesting to the Diet that Austria be excluded from the recently proposed federation (June 10, 1866). Austria countered by demanding that the federal forces be mobilized against Prussia, who, she claimed, had broken the treaties of 1815 and had violated the federal constitution by her aggressive move in Holstein. The proposal, which was tantamount to a declaration of war, found nearly all of the smaller states rallying to the support of Austria.

The other powers looked on with comparative indifference at this fratricidal strife, for they were not yet aware that Bismarck was not as mad as he seemed. They had no suspicion of Prussia's true strength, and anticipated that Austria would have no difficulty in suppressing her upstart neighbor, or that at most it would be a drawn battle. Napoleon in particular was by no means displeased at the prospect of an Austro-Prussian war, because he expected it to result in equalizing the power of Austria and Prussia (which he considered the weaker), because of Mexico, because he wanted Italy to get Venetia, and because he counted on acting as arbitrator at the peace table.

The Seven Weeks' War came as a startling and decisive demonstration of Prussian power and of the value of long and efficient preparation. Prussia had no difficulty at all in disposing of the smaller states; within three days the capitals of Hanover, Saxony, and Hesse-Cassel were occupied. Amazing, likewise, was the rapidity with which the bulk of the Prussian forces were thrown into Bohemia, and on July 3, at Königgrätz, was fought one of the decisive battles of history. With over 400,000 engaged, the largest aggregation of effectives since the Battle of the Nations, Von Moltke demonstrated his title to rank as a master tactician; and, thanks to the devastating power of the needle gun, her new rifle, Prussia successfully withstood the Austrian bayonet charges. From the point of view of the military, some improvement was long overdue; for the famous Brown Bess, with which the charges of Napoleon's veterans were repulsed at Waterloo and with which the British were armed as late as the Crimean campaign, was capable at best of putting only one shot in twenty in an eighteen-foot square at two hundred yards! Thanks to the needle gun, also, Prussia's losses were only one-fourth those of her unwieldy opponent; and when the smoke cleared, Austria lay prostrate and the way to Vienna open. That Italy had been defeated on land and sea did not affect the issue.

Never did Bismarck's statesmanship show to better advantage. With William's righteous indignation aroused and the military clique clamoring for a war of extermination, the man of blood and iron remained adamant to all demands for further humiliation of Prussia's fallen rival. On two points only was Austria forced to yield unconditionally: she was compelled to acknowledge

the supremacy of Prussia in Germany and to cede Venetia to Italy. Not a foot of Austrian territory did Prussia exact for herself. Bismarck also insisted on sparing the South German states which had fought on the Austrian side.

In order to force William to agree to his terms, Bismarck threatened him with French intervention. Thinking that the conflict would end in a stalemate, the "sphinx without a secret" had counted on acting as arbitrator at the peace table—for a consideration—and when he saw his opportunity slipping away notified Prussia that he was going to intervene. Bismarck used Napoleon's threat to good advantage in curbing King William, and then himself threatened, if France persisted, to arouse the subject nationalities of Austria. With the Mexican expedition still on his hands, Napoleon was only bluffing, and he finally promised not to interfere if Prussia would agree not to molest the German states south of the Main. Since from the first Bismarck had intended that these states should join Prussia voluntarily, he yielded with apparent grace, and before the Emperor could exact any further conditions concluded peace (August 23, 1866).

Napoleon tried desperately to retrieve some tangible compensation from the wreck. He demanded a piece of the Rhineland belonging to Prussia, Hesse, and Bavaria, a suggestion of which Bismarck made use to change the pro-French attitude of the southern states. Next, Benedetti, the French ambassador, presented a written project for the annexation of Belgium, which Bismarck simply filed for future use. Napoleon's third and last attempt was a request for Prussian permission to annex Luxemburg; when this was refused, he gave up.

Although Austria was treated with surprising and far-seeing magnanimity, Bismarck had no intention that Prussia should fail to obtain suitable material reward for her efforts. By annexing Schleswig-Holstein and the principal northern states which had opposed her, she rounded out her holdings, acquired 5,000,000 new subjects, and increased her territory by almost 25 per cent. At last her possessions stretched unbroken across North Germany, from the French frontier to the Niemen (Memel) and beyond. All Germany north of the Main, non-Prussian as well as Prussian, was formed into the North German Confederation, with King William as President and Bismarck as Federal Chancellor. The significant feature of this new organization was that foreign and military affairs were completely under the domination of Prussia. Finally, alliances were concluded with the South German states.

The sudden burst of popularity that accrued to Bismarck as a result of the Seven Weeks' War furnished him with another opportunity for the display of his unrivaled powers as a statesman. William and the conservatives were all for using their advantage to grind the liberals under heel, but Bismarck knew that it was better to have a united than a divided nation at his back in the work remaining to be accomplished. He therefore introduced and triumphantly carried an indemnity bill to compensate for the illegal acts of which it was claimed he had been guilty.

On the internal history of Austria the War of 1866 had a decisive influence. In 1860 the Imperial Government, discredited as a result of the War of 1859, had felt obliged to abandon absolutism. What to put in its place was no easy matter to decide, for the Hungarians, led by Deák and determined that their

special rights should be recognized, would countenance no form of federalism which included equal rights for the "minority" elements. Before a definite solution was reached, the Seven Weeks' War intervened, still further weakening the imperial authority.

In 1867, by the terms of the *Ausgleich* (Compromise), the imperial structure became a system *sui generis*. Neither unitary nor federal and known therefore as Austria-Hungary or the Dual Empire, from 1867 to 1918 the Hapsburg dominions were divided into two coequal parts. The western and northerly portion, the Empire of Austria, remained under the Germans and under Francis Joseph as Emperor of Austria; the eastern and southerly portion, the Kingdom of Hungary, was placed under the Magyars and under Francis Joseph as King of Hungary. Austria and Hungary each had its own local constitution and government, with its local parliament, ministry, and administration; in internal affairs, therefore, there was complete autonomy. Superimposed on this dualistic régime there was a joint imperial ministry, with control over foreign affairs, the military establishment, and imperial finance.

In 1866, also, Bismarck won another striking victory when with the aid of Bratianu he succeeded in planting Charles of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, a relative of the Prussian Hohenzollerns, on the throne of Rumania, newly fashioned out of the Danube principalities (Moldavia and Walachia).

THE ROAD TO DONCHÉRY

On the morrow of Königgrätz Thiers declared, "It is France that is defeated at Sadowa." (By a charming exercise of Gallic logic, the French have always insisted on referring to the battle by that name; though certainly the Germans, if anyone, should know where it was fought.) In so far as the French were determined to prevent the unification of Germany, the statement was true.

During the succeeding years, when France was looking for "revenge for Sadowa," Bismarck was straining every nerve to perfect his wonderful military organization and to assimilate the non-Prussian troops of the North German Confederation. The French, on their side of the Rhine, were similarly occupied. Copying Prussia, Napoleon tried, ineffectually, to reconstitute his army on a national instead of a professional basis; and he introduced the *chassepot*, a rifle superior to the Prussian needle gun, and the *mitrailleuse*, a primitive machine gun. Thus armed, he looked about for allies. Austria and Italy appeared the logical candidates: Austria was still smarting under her recent humiliation, and in return for Rome and Trent, Italy, always with an eye to the main chance, was quite ready to turn on her benefactor of yesterday. Napoleon, however, dared not abandon the Pope; so for the time the three conspirators shelved the formation of an alliance and merely exchanged letters in which they adhered to "the idea of a triple alliance" and promised to confer on common policies. Meanwhile, the Austrian and French military authorities consulted in secret on a plan of campaign against Prussia.

In order that the South German states should unite with those of North Germany of their own free will, Bismarck was convinced that Germany must

be attacked by her hereditary enemy across the Rhine. Once more, luck was definitely on his side, though curiously enough, the cause of conflict concerned neither France nor Germany directly. Owing to the Spanish Revolution of 1868, the throne of Spain became vacant and the Spanish Government set out to find a new ruler. The crown was offered to Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, the elder Hohenzollern branch which had remained in South Germany since the days when the common ancestor of all the Hohenzollerns enabled his brother-in-law Rudolf to become the first Hapsburg to attain the imperial title (1273). Incidentally, Leopold was a brother of that Charles who had recently acquired the crown of Rumania. He was a logical candidate, for he was married to a Portuguese princess and, strange as it may seem, was more closely related to Napoleon than to the Prussian Hohenzollerns.⁷ The offer was accepted by Leopold (July 2, 1870) and the acceptance approved by King William as the most powerful member of the family and therefore head of the house, but not, it was officially pointed out, as head of the Prussian state. Bismarck advocated the candidacy and may very possibly have originated it. As soon as the news became known, the French rose as a man, for according to them the empire of Charles V was to be reconstituted, leaving France between the jaws of a nutcracker. In reply, Bismarck could argue that since there was no question of a union of the crowns, Napoleon, as the champion of nationalism, had no business to dictate whom the Spanish should select as their ruler.

Hardly deigning to bother with Spain and lacking any substantial evidence that the Prussian Government was involved, the French began by informing the German ambassador that they would not "tolerate" a Prussian prince on the Spanish throne and that they would oppose the candidacy by every means in their power. These representations King William forwarded privately to Sigmaringen, together with an inquiry as to what his relatives there intended to do—a broad hint that he would be relieved to see the candidacy withdrawn. Meanwhile, without waiting to see what was going to happen, the Duke of Gramont, the French Foreign Minister and an ardent chauvinist, read a declaration before the Chamber in which he publicly charged Prussia with engineering the Hohenzollern candidacy and threatened war if it were not withdrawn. Gramont followed up this bombastic pronouncement by dispatching his ambassador, Benedetti, to Ems, where King William was taking a vacation, with instructions to see the King and induce him to obtain the withdrawal of the candidacy. Benedetti was hospitably received, William brought further pressure to bear at Sigmaringen, and Leopold's father, to Bismarck's infinite disgust, informed Madrid and Paris that his son was no longer a candidate. For once in his life Bismarck had suffered a reverse, and all France was wild with joy—though both reactionaries and radicals were piqued that Ollivier's new liberal ministry had gained the credit for what Guizot described as "the finest diplomatic victory that has been won in my lifetime."


Napoleon and Ollivier were willing to consider the incident closed, but the

⁷ Leopold, through the Beauharnais family (the Empress Josephine's first husband was a Beauharnais), was a second cousin once removed of Napoleon.



Courtesy of Keystone View Company

NAPOL EON III



BISMARCK

C O N F I D E N T I A L

French chauvinists did not know when to leave well enough alone; and unfortunately for France and the dynasty, Ollivier was not master in his cabinet nor was Napoleon master in his house. Under the influence of the Empress,⁸ the party of action conceived the idea of still further utilizing King William's conciliatory mood to enhance the prestige of the dynasty. Napoleon and Gramont accordingly dispatched orders to Benedetti to revisit the King, this time for the purpose of demanding guarantees for the future. The twelfth of July, when these instructions were put on the wires, and the thirteenth, when Benedetti set out to comply, were momentous days in history. Managing to place himself in the way as the King was out for his morning walk, Benedetti suggested a promise that the candidature would never be renewed. Again and again William signified his aversion to assuming such an unlimited obligation; and each time, with increasing vehemence, Benedetti reiterated his request. Finally William stepped back a few paces, declared very earnestly, "I have nothing more to add," lifted his hat, and walked on.

In Berlin, Bismarck, Roon, and Von Moltke were dining together that evening when a dispatch arrived from a Foreign Office official attached to the King's staff at Ems.

His Majesty writes me: "Count Benedetti spoke to me on the promenade, in order to demand of me, finally in a very importunate manner, that I should authorize him to telegraph at once that I bound myself for all future time never again to give my consent if the Hohenzollerns should renew their candidature. I refused at last somewhat sternly, as it is neither right nor possible to undertake engagements of this kind *à tout jamais* [for all future time]. I told him that I had as yet received no news, and as he was earlier informed from Paris and Madrid than myself, he could clearly see that my government had no more interest in the matter." His Majesty has since received a letter from Prince Charles Anthony [father of Leopold]. His Majesty, having told Count Benedetti that he was awaiting news from the Prince, has decided, with reference to the foregoing demand, on the suggestion of Count Eulenburg and myself, not to receive Count Benedetti again, but only to inform him through an aide-de-camp: "That his Majesty has now received from the Prince confirmation of the news that Benedetti had already received from Paris [that is, that the candidature had been withdrawn by the Hohenzollern-Sigmaringens], and had nothing further to say to the ambassador." His Majesty leaves it to your Excellency to decide whether Benedetti's fresh demand and its rejection should be at once communicated both to our ambassadors to foreign nations and to the press.

In a flash, Bismarck saw his opportunity. Seizing a pen he converted the Ems dispatch into the following:

After the news of the renunciation of the hereditary Prince of Hohenzollern had been officially communicated to the Imperial Government of France by the Royal Government of Spain, the French Ambassador further demanded of his Majesty, the King, at Ems, that he would authorize him to telegraph to Paris that his Majesty, the King, bound himself for all time never again to give his consent should the Hohenzollerns renew their candidature. His Majesty the King thereupon decided

⁸ At least so the majority of historians assert. Father Lord, who has made a particular study of the origins of the Franco-Prussian War, says not; but see Paléologue, *The Tragic Empress*, p. 133.

not to receive the French Ambassador again, and sent the aide-de-camp on duty to tell him that his Majesty had nothing further to communicate to the ambassador.

A careful reading of the two documents proves that Bismarck's version was neither a forgery nor a falsification, as is often stated, but merely a clever paraphrase. Communicated to the press and interpreted according to the reader's nationality as meaning that either William or Benedetti had been insulted, the famous Ems Dispatch acted as "a red rag for the Gallic bull." The next day, Bastille Day of 1870, Napoleon allowed his cabinet to decide on war. In the legislature, the Minister of War stated, "So ready are we, that if the war lasts two years, not a gaiter button would be found wanting"; and only ten votes, including those of Thiers and Gambetta, were cast in opposition to the necessary credits. "We accept the responsibility with a light heart," declared Ollivier, whose policy, like that of his master, had been peace.

Napoleon had crossed the Rubicon, but not the Rhine; he was soon to discover the danger in mistaking the two. He was counting on Austria and Italy for aid, but for reasons not far to seek soon found himself in complete isolation: every power in Europe cherished grievances against him, and Bismarck, by astute diplomacy, had thrown all the onus of the break on France. England offered her mediation, but quickly subsided when Bismarck produced Benedetti's demand of 1866 for the annexation of Belgium. Declaring that if Austria intervened he would join Prussia, the Tsar took advantage of the situation to tear up the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of 1856; and as soon as the French forces were withdrawn from Italy, the troops of Victor Emmanuel occupied Rome. The Pope thereupon shut himself up in his palace, a voluntary "prisoner of the Vatican"; and except for Trent and Trieste, the unification of Italy was complete.

In Germany, amid a tremendous outburst of national enthusiasm, the southern states flocked to join Prussia; for the first time a united nation was fighting without foreign aid against France. The enthusiasm of the French was equally great, but the contrast between the two military machines was glaring: while the Germans advanced with clocklike precision, to the west of the Rhine chaos reigned. Napoleon's standing army had a paper strength of 750,000, but in reality mustered only 250,000; while the Garde Mobile, rated at 600,000, was not organized at all. Supplies were woefully deficient. Mobilization found the troops in hopeless confusion; one of the generals was unable to locate his army; and on the supposition that the war was to be a campaign of invasion, the troops were provided with maps of Germany only. In short, the Gallic cock resembled nothing so much as a chicken with its head cut off. Thus handicapped at the start, Napoleon stood no show against the genius of Von Moltke. In a series of engagements in Alsace and Lorraine, culminating at Gravelotte, the French were driven back and their main army was bottled up in Metz. A fresh force was improvised at Châlons, but as a result of the demands of the Empress and the fire-eaters for a victory to save the dynasty, was sent to the relief of Metz before it was in any condition to fight. Led by MacMahon and the Emperor, whose illness caused him constant suffering, it was pinned against the Belgian frontier at Sedan, where it surrendered, 81,000 strong, without

having struck an effective blow (September 2). Thus France was left without a single army in the field. The day following the disaster, Bismarck and Napoleon met for the last time on the road to Donchéry. Bismarck could be implacable, even harsh, but he was not lacking in magnanimity; as he reported to his wife, "I dismounted, saluted him just as politely as at the Tuileries, and asked for his commands." The next day, when the news from Sedan arrived in Paris (September 4), Napoleon was deposed—the Second Empire had fallen. ~~In blood it began, and in blood it ended; the Emperor of Peace had appealed to the sword, and the sword had decided the issue—but it was a sword forged in Germany, not in France.~~

RESULTS OF THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR v

All but a few of the inner circle at court were agreed on ending the Napoleonic régime. But what was to replace it? Three separate governments were set up simultaneously. One was the work of the moderates who held the majority in the legislature, led by Thiers. The radicals tried to erect a government headed by the socialist Blanqui. The republicans, under the leadership of Gambetta, set up a third, the Government of National Defense. Backed by the majority of the people and receiving the tacit support of the moderates, Gambetta held on to power and governed France during the remainder of the war.

With the fall of the Second Empire and the proclamation of the Third Republic, the struggle entered a new phase. While the Germans were advancing and besieging Paris, Gambetta, having established his headquarters at Bordeaux, ruled France as a dictator and refused to cede a foot of territory in order to purchase peace. The defense, though hopeless from the outset, was heroic. A *levée en masse* of all able-bodied men between the ages of twenty-one and forty was proclaimed, and new armies were raised; but, poorly equipped and badly led, they stood no chance against the Prussian veterans and the iron will of Von Moltke. With the surrender of Metz and the capitulation of Paris—the fuel exhausted and the food reduced to dogs, cats, and rats—the resistance of the French came to an end.

Ten days before, Bismarck had completed the great work of his career. On the eighteenth of January, 1871, in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles where the Sun King once held court, King William of Prussia was proclaimed German Emperor! To the very last it had been a struggle for Bismarck. It had taken him three weeks to induce his sovereign to accept this "honorary title"; and on the day preceding the great event, while the details were being completed, the man in whose honor it was all being done refused to take part and stood staring moodily out of the window. To his way of thinking as a Hohenzollern, "King of Prussia" was a title that far outranked that of "German Emperor." Even when the ceremony was over and the new Emperor was descending from the dais, he was still disgruntled and passed his faithful servant by to shake hands with the generals. Once more, Bismarck was left standing alone; but the empire he had conceived and created was a reality that was to dominate the history of Europe for nearly half a century.

Bismarck has been repeatedly and severely condemned for the terms he

imposed on France, and his action was cited in justification of the treatment accorded Germany in 1919—as though two wrongs could make a right. It therefore behoves us to get the matter straight. Bismarck did not attempt to dictate concerning the internal affairs of the French. He negotiated with them as equals, not as inferiors or outcasts. He did not lay down terms and force their unconditional acceptance, as he could easily have done; on the contrary, he made substantial concessions. His original proposition called for the cession of all of Alsace and the larger part of Lorraine, the cession of the railroads in annexed territory without compensation, a triumphal entry into Paris, a payment of 6,000,000,000 francs, and the occupation of certain districts until it was paid.

The French objected particularly to losing the Alsatian town of Belfort, the only fortress that had successfully resisted the invaders, and to having the Germans enter their capital. (Apparently they had forgotten the days when Napoleon I rode roughshod through Berlin, desecrated the grave of Frederick the Great, tore Prussia in two, and reduced her to a fourth-rate power.) Bismarck allowed them their choice, and they chose to keep Belfort. He offered them a seven-kilometer radius of territory around the city, and when they also objected to this he increased it to ten. He also modified his original demands in regard to Lorraine. Finally, he reduced the amount of indemnity. As for the entry into Paris, the Germans remained only two days and stayed in one quarter of the city at that. Nor was the conduct of their army of occupation in the provinces objectionable, as the testimony of French historians proves.

By the Treaty of Frankfurt, France agreed to pay 5,000,000,000 francs, and gave Germany the right to occupy certain strategic points until payment was made. Germany agreed to pay for the railroads in annexed territory. Eastern Lorraine, including Metz, and all of Alsace—except Belfort—were ceded to Germany. This last provision was the one most severely condemned. According to some, it created the Alsace-Lorraine question, which more than anything else embittered the later relations of France and Germany. A brief digression is therefore in order to make clear the two sides of the issue.

For nearly two hundred years Alsace had been French; consequently it had benefited from the more enlightened conditions that existed west of the Rhine before and more particularly during the Revolutionary Era. In Strassburg, the principal city, the "Marseillaise" had been written; and some of the most famous leaders of the Revolutionary armies had been Alsatians. In 1871 the native deputies protested in no uncertain terms against the separation of Alsace-Lorraine from France. Incidentally, the French had long insisted that the Rhine was one of their "natural" frontiers.

In extenuation of Bismarck's action it should be made clear that from the beginning, or as far back as history goes, Alsace-Lorraine was inhabited by Germanic peoples. The first civilized state to which it belonged was the Roman Empire. From the break-up of the Roman Empire until the end of the seventeenth century it was included in Germanic political organizations. During the latter part of this period it belonged to the "Holy Roman Empire of the

German Nation.”⁹ In the late seventeenth century, Louis XIV, the Sun King, obtained such a preponderance of power that he was able to ride roughshod over the Germans of the weak and disunited Empire, lay waste their territory, destroy some of their finest buildings, including the historic castle of Heidelberg, and annex most of the territory up to the Rhine. (To be sure, transfer of populations from one sovereignty to another was a much less serious matter at that time than at the end of the nineteenth century.) Lorraine was acquired some hundred years later. Never until 1870 were the Germans strong enough to retake and retain the two districts. In spite of this, the Alsatians clung to their Germanic speech. As for the question of “natural” frontiers, the Vosges are certainly a better military and economic frontier than the Rhine.

The Alsatian question is interesting, for it is one of the few examples of the sentimental element in nationalism balancing all the others. On the one hand, we have the apparent desire of the majority of the Alsatians to remain with France—plus whatever title less than two hundred years of French occupancy might give; on the other, the thousand years and more when the territory had been German, and its geographical and linguistic unity with Germany. However the equation should be solved, the loss of Alsace-Lorraine was the factor which filled the French with undying hatred for Germany, made them determined to get revenge, and laid the foundations for another Franco-German war.

Last but not least, the War of 1870 established the German sword as a permanent weight in the scales of international justice.

⁹ Neither holy, Roman, nor an empire—as Voltaire remarked.



PART III
THE PREWAR ERA (1871-1914):
DOMESTIC AFFAIRS

- THE PREWAR ERA**
VI. THE GERMAN EMPIRE
VII. THE THIRD FRENCH REPUBLIC
VIII. RUSSIA BEFORE THE DELUGE
IX. THE TRIUMPH OF DEMOCRACY IN ENGLAND

THE PREWAR ERA

The six months from July 18, 1870, to January 18, 1871, registered five political events of capital import: the declaration of Papal Infallibility, the overthrow of the Second Empire, the occupation of Rome by Italian troops, the fall of the temporal Papacy, and the establishment of the German Empire. As the climax to a long line of somewhat similar changes, these culminating political events, coupled with outstanding feats in invention, constituted the most clearly differentiated line of demarcation between 1815 and 1914, and ushered in a new epoch.

The Prewar Era of 1871 to 1914 was the Era of Constitutionalism, and correspondingly and *par excellence* the Era of Democracy—though as an effective practice, democracy was much less whole-heartedly accepted in Central and Eastern Europe than in the West. Outside of Russia, constitutionalism, exceptional in 1815, became the mode; and even Russia and the kingdoms of the East eventually did lip service to this all-conquering principle. The Belgian constitution of 1831 ranks as the fifth oldest in Europe; the Swiss dates from 1848. In 1848, also, the Piedmontese constitution, later the constitution of Italy, was granted; and the Dutch constitution was revised. The Danish constitution was promulgated in 1849. Three years later, Portugal, a limited monarchy since 1826, received a more liberal constitution; and not many years elapsed before Greece was similarly favored (1864). Two years after that (1866), the Danish and Swedish constitutions were revised in a liberal sense. In 1867 the Second Reform Bill was passed in England and the constitution of the Dual Empire was promulgated. In 1871 the constitution of the German Empire became law. Three years later, the Swiss constitution was revised, and shortly afterward (1876), Spain, a limited monarchy since 1834, received a liberal constitution. Finally, in 1878, Rumania and Serbia became independent principalities, the independence of Montenegro was reaffirmed, and Bulgaria was granted autonomy. With those of the middle and lower classes who benefited by these changes it became an axiom, a dogma, that "democracy" was the royal road to an earthly paradise.

These new constitutions marked the advent of the bourgeoisie to political power, and for that reason the Prewar Era is also known as the Era of the Bourgeoisie, or more descriptively still, the Era of the Benevolent Bourgeoisie—since the middle class looked with favor on the new developments in politics, economics, and science, and to a lesser extent, in social legislation. The Era of the Benevolent Bourgeoisie seemed to mark the definitive triumph of the prin-

ciples of the French Revolution: liberty, (civil) equality, and to a lesser degree fraternity. To the extent that fraternity signified nationalism, fraternity triumphed in the rise to statehood of several new nations. The unification of Italy and of Germany and the success of the Balkan Christians in escaping from the Turkish yoke proved an immense stimulus to nationalistic sentiments; indeed, with the decay of religious fanaticism, nationalism became and remained "almost the one idea for which masses of men will still die." Incidentally, nationalism enabled the bourgeoisie to turn the united resources of their respective nations to their own ends in competing, industrially and commercially, with the bourgeoisie of other states. Within the European family of nations, nevertheless, the 1870 era was for the most part an era of peace.

Since constitutionalism was the means by which they rose to power, the bourgeoisie were loud in their praises of "democracy" and strong in its defense. Their enthusiasm may also be partly explained by the fact that the democracy of the Prewar Era was distinctly bourgeois in tinge. The leading statesmen were by birth or sympathy bourgeois; the representatives who made the laws were mostly bourgeois; and the legislation enacted was to a large extent bourgeois also. The essentials of the social order in particular remained bourgeois.

The bourgeoisie were nevertheless successful in obtaining the support of a majority of the other classes. The aristocracy, who still ruled the inner circles of high society, were glad to invest their funds in bourgeois enterprises and thereby obtain a gratifying return on their capital. To a lesser extent, the remaining classes were likewise drawn into the fold. The development of the stock company provided a way for the small investor to participate in the bounty of the great capitalists. Over the poor, who had no funds to invest, the bourgeoisie were able to exercise a restraining influence by proclaiming that if business were interfered with unemployment would result and every member of society would suffer. If, on the contrary—as the bourgeoisie were fond of pointing out—the laborer refrained from rocking the bourgeois ship of state and was sufficiently diligent (not to say fortunate) he too might rise to be a captain of industry or a merchant prince. In one respect, one important respect, the bourgeoisie made a definite concession: they embarked on an extensive program of social legislation. And here again, in their attempts to appease the lower classes, they were fairly successful. To their efforts, only the clericals and extremists (socialists, anarchists, and the like) turned a deaf ear.

AUSTRIA AND ITALY

From the defeat of 1866, Austria never fully rallied. Francis Joseph continued to occupy the Hapsburg throne until after the outbreak of the World War; but throughout the remainder of his long reign, although by area and population still entitled to rank as a Great Power (about 240,000 square miles, about 50,000,000 inhabitants), Austria remained a satellite of Germany. Two sets of factors sufficed to explain this state of affairs. Austria was outranked by Germany in population, resources, and above all, in efficiency. Vastly more important, however, was the fact that Austria was fundamentally archaic. Be-

cause of her heterogeneous population she was unable to evoke the principle of nationalism, on which the other Great Powers relied for strength; the sole binding tie, therefore, was the ancient dynastic principle of loyalty to the ruling house. For a while longer this sufficed, since back of the dynasty were the army, the nobility, and the place-seeking, middle-class bureaucracy.

Following the conclusion of the *Ausgleich* in 1867, the two halves of the Dual Empire grew constantly more divergent. The Austrian half became democratic and industrial; the Hungarian remained semifeudal and agricultural. Both experienced constant and increasing difficulty with their "minorities"—minorities which, it will be remembered, constituted the majority of the population. To the end, consequently, the cornerstone of governmental policy remained the old principle, *Divide et impera* (Divide and rule). Deprived of her rule in Germany and in Italy, Austria-Hungary devoted her efforts to exercising an influence in the Balkans.

Italy, like Austria, was forced to accept a somewhat subsidiary rôle. Although founded on the principle of nationality, she was almost as widely split—between the progressive, industrial North and the backward, agricultural South, land of the Mafia and Camorra.¹ "Between Liguria and Calabria there is almost as little similarity of social structure as between London and Portugal or between New York and Peru. . . . The common speech of the millions is in dialects which are practically unintelligible as between regions." In addition—a lack which contributed no little to her fundamental discontent—Italy was greatly hampered by poverty of natural resources. Nevertheless she managed to achieve a considerable industrial development, Milan coming to surpass Lyon as the capital of the silk industry.

The outstanding factors in the prewar history of Italy were a phenomenal increase in population, a tremendous emigration rate, a burning desire for colonies, the highest rate of taxation in Europe, continued friction between Church and State, and above all, an unswerving desire to wrest her remaining unredeemed nationals—*Italia irredenta*—from Austria. Although, under the leadership of such men as Crispi, Italy pursued a resolutely egotistical policy, her career in international affairs was characterized by considerably more failures than successes. She managed to establish a colonial empire, but it was far greater in extent than in value.

THE SMALLER POWERS

The smaller powers, generally speaking, played a rôle proportional to their size—though at times, both in politics and in culture, they actually took the lead. In her 1874 constitution Switzerland initiated the country-wide referendum. In 1890 Luxemburg severed her personal union with Holland. Belgium began compulsory voting in 1893, and country-wide proportional representation in 1899. Norway separated from Sweden in 1905, and distinguished herself as the first country in Europe to establish woman suffrage. Switzerland

¹ Bandit gangs that exercised semipolitical control.

introduced state monopoly of water power in 1908. In 1910 Portugal became a republic.

In Ibsen, little Norway produced the outstanding dramatist of the century. Ibsen was also one of the severest critics of bourgeois complacency and hypocrisy. In César Franck, who was of Germanic extraction, Belgium gave the world one of the greatest musicians of all time; and in Sibelius, Finland produced one of the greatest, if not *the* greatest, of contemporary musicians.

CHAPTER VI

THE GERMAN EMPIRE

THE GOVERNMENT OF IMPERIAL GERMANY

When Germany stepped forward in 1870, under the leadership of Bismarck, to assume the hegemony of Europe, her new constitution became a matter of international as well as national concern. In theory, the German Empire (*Reich*) as established by the constitution of 1871 was a federation, made up of twenty-six sovereign states: four kingdoms, six grand duchies, five duchies, seven principalities, three city-republics, and the imperial province of Alsace-Lorraine. In reality, Germany as a whole had been swallowed by one of its component parts—Prussia.

The dominance of the Prussian Crown and upper classes over the lesser states and over the German people was, however, concealed with consummate ingenuity. The Reichstag (the lower house) was elected by direct and universal manhood suffrage; and in the Bundesrat (the upper house), which represented the governments of the constituent states, Prussia, with five-eighths of the population, had only 17 votes to 41 for the smaller states. Moreover, all laws had to pass the Reichstag, and they became effective without the Emperor's consent.

That Prussia was able to enforce her will notwithstanding was owing to the peculiar position of the Emperor, to the powers of the Chancellor, and to the functions of the Bundesrat. 1. The King of Prussia was *ipso facto* hereditary Emperor (Kaiser); but although he had the right to declare martial law, as *Emperor* his influence on internal affairs was normally slight. Over foreign affairs, indeed, as commander of the army and navy and as the representative of the Empire in its diplomatic negotiations with other countries, he exercised considerable control. Although normally he had to consult the Bundesrat about foreign affairs, he had the right to make treaties of a political nature without so doing and to declare war if the territory of the Empire should be invaded. As *King of Prussia*, his power over internal affairs was great, for owing to the peculiar nature of the Prussian constitution (*cf.* p. 149), he had complete control of the Prussian government and the Prussian representatives in the Bundesrat. 2. The position of Chancellor, which Bismarck had created for his own use, was one of unusual strength. The Chancellor was the only minister mentioned in the constitution; in short, he was the whole cabinet. Other officials,

no matter how exalted, were merely his creatures. Since the Chancellor was appointed by the Emperor and removable only by the Emperor, there was no "ministerial responsibility" (to the Reichstag). The Chancellor and through him the Emperor-King exercised power chiefly by virtue of their control over the Prussian delegation in the Bundesrat. 3. In enacting laws, the Bundesrat shared equal powers with the Reichstag. In practice, the Bundesrat alone initiated legislation, and as the members were appointed by the state governments, they were diplomats rather than representatives. Finally, no change in the constitution could be made and no decrease in taxes or the military establishment could become effective if there were fourteen adverse votes in the Bundesrat—and Prussia controlled seventeen.

For these reasons the Reichstag, compared with the English Commons or the French Chamber, was a body with little influence. By some it was called "a debating society." This is perhaps too derogatory a phrase, in view of the fact that the Reichstag wielded an absolute veto over legislation; but in any case it lacked the power to impose its will on the Government. Prior to the World War there never was any redistribution of seats. In 1912, twelve intensely democratic industrial districts, combined, contained nearly 2,000,000 voters; whereas twelve of the conservative agricultural districts totaled only 170,000 voters. Until 1906, incidentally, members of the Reichstag were not only not paid by the Government but were forbidden to accept compensation from any other source whatsoever.

That Germany did not revolt against this condition of affairs is less strange than at first appears. Germans in general and Prussians in particular had never known anything except a strong monarchy. Whatever their political views, moreover, they could not help having a profound admiration for a system which had accomplished wonders in the past and which was accomplishing fresh wonders almost daily—for, whatever its shortcomings and disadvantages, the monarchy was marvelously efficient. It had unified Germany after the liberals had failed; and under its aegis Germany, in addition to leading the world in international affairs and in social legislation, was bidding fair to overhaul and outdistance her rivals in industry, commerce, science, and technology. In music, with Wagner and Brahms to her credit, she was still the leader; and in scholarship and education she was more than holding her own. Besides, the opponents of the Government were divided: the Socialists, remembering what had happened elsewhere, had no desire to "have their heads cracked in order to put the bourgeoisie in power"; while many of the bourgeoisie feared that any further weakening of the monarchy would prove the prelude to socialism; and bourgeoisie and Socialists alike feared that if the monarchy were excessively weakened the work of 1870 would be imperiled by foreign foes. For this reason, for instance, they were willing that the Emperor should retain a powerful army; and with the heroes of Königgrätz and Sedan at his disposal, the Emperor-King had little fear of any diminution in his prerogatives. Altogether, though on paper the Emperor had less power than the President of the United States, Germany remained the least democratic country of Central or Western Europe.

GERMANY IN THE AGE OF BISMARCK

The history of Germany in the Prewar Era falls into two distinct periods. The first may be called Germany in the Age of Bismarck. From 1871 to 1890 the Hohenzollerns reigned but Bismarck ruled. With the immense prestige he had acquired in the country at large and with William I at his back, throughout these years Bismarck had no difficulty in holding the spotlight.

His first care was to strengthen still further the authority and power of the new Empire. Imperial law codes of all sorts—commercial, financial, criminal, civil—were drawn up and promulgated. The gold standard was adopted, and a new coinage was introduced, bearing the effigy of the Emperor on one side and on the other the arms of the Empire. Twenty-nine million dollars of the French indemnity were laid away in a tower at Spandau, as provision against a possible new war, and an Imperial Bank was created (1875). Construction on the Kiel Canal was begun, the telegraph and telephone systems were administered by the state, ownership of nearly all the railroads still in private hands was acquired by the states, and these railroads rapidly acquired the reputation of being the best in Europe. In this way, Germany set a new standard for public ownership of utilities—a new standard of state socialism.

The first great issue that arose after the establishment of the new Empire was a bitter dispute, known as the Kulturkampf ("civilization struggle," or "struggle for modern civilization"), between Bismarck, as the chief official of the secular Government, and the Papacy, as the head of the Roman Catholic Church. In essence, the Kulturkampf was nothing new: historically, it was merely a new phase of the age-old struggle between Church and State, featured by the dramatic triumph of Gregory VII at Canossa over Henry IV of Germany (1077); practically, it was an extension of a smoldering quarrel between the ecclesiastical authorities and the Prussian state. The question involved, in the ultimate issue, was whether or not the State was to be master in its own house. The Kulturkampf *per se* developed in this wise. In the Syllabus of 1864 (*q.v.*) the Papacy had reaffirmed its ancient claim to superiority over secular authorities, and in 1870 had climaxed a series of reactionary measures by promulgating the dogma of Papal Infallibility. Many churchmen of the Protestant majority in Germany believed that the Papacy was opening a subtle attack on their faith; freethinkers took the view that it was attacking modern scientific culture. As a statesman Bismarck was little influenced by religion, less by theology; but the pronouncement coincided with a number of circumstances that aroused his displeasure and apprehension. He disliked the privileges which the Catholic clergy had obtained in Prussia following the Revolution of '48, and which made them almost a state within a state; he was persuaded that the Jesuit advisers of the Empress Eugénie had been instrumental in encouraging the French Government to declare war; he believed that the Catholic Church was hostile to the new Protestant Empire; and above all, he resented the fact that some of the most vocal opponents of the Prussian Crown and the Prussianized Empire—Alsations, South Germans, Rhinelanders, and Poles—

were Roman Catholics. The last straw was the formation in the first Reichstag of a distinct Catholic party (63 seats), known as the Center. At the moment, the advent of the Center was generally regarded as an occurrence of no great importance, for the new party was thought to be ephemeral. (Whether under different circumstances it would have proved so is an entertaining speculation.) Little did observers realize that they were assisting at the birth of the most stable political combination in modern German history. As Germany's foremost champion of unification and centralization, Bismarck was excessively annoyed at this unexpected apparition, peculiar, among the powers, to Protestant Germany. Encouraged by the fact that some of the South German Catholics who refused to accept the doctrine of Papal Infallibility carried their resistance to the point of breaking away from the Church and forming the Old Catholic group, he decided to take up the gauntlet thrown down by the Papacy and the ultramontanés.

The opening gun in Bismarck's attack was a law passed at the end of 1871 making a legal offense of "abuse of the pulpit" (preaching on political topics). Then, boldly affirming, "To Canossa we shall not go, either in body or in spirit," and copying his Catholic predecessors in the Church-State conflict, he expelled the Jesuits. The Prussian Minister of Public Worship and Education, a moderate, resigned; Falk, a pronounced anticlerical, took his place; and in Prussia a series of laws, famous as the May Laws or Falk Laws, were enacted. Among other things, these laws prescribed that church officials must be citizens of Germany, that they must have taken a three years' course in a German university, and that their appointment must be approved by the Government. Finally, all religious congregations and orders, with the exception of the nursing orders, were dissolved. In the meantime, civil marriage was made compulsory and diplomatic relations with the Vatican were severed. In attempting to enforce the May Laws, which were declared null and void by the Papacy, the Government found that it had its hands full. Eight of the ten Catholic bishops of Prussia were imprisoned or fled the country, hundreds of lower clergy suffered in like manner, over a thousand parishes in Prussia alone were left without the ministrations of the Church—and still the Papacy refused to yield. The Catholic laity, who constituted a third of the population and who were for the most part innocent bystanders, suffered most of all. Deprived of spiritual sustenance, they were in a pitiable plight.

Bismarck, it is true, was winning the battles, but he was in imminent danger of losing the campaign. Most important of all from his point of view, in the elections of 1877 the Center increased its representation almost 50 per cent, and became the largest party in the Reichstag (92 seats). This unpalatable development, coupled with a number of equally important considerations, led Bismarck to reverse his policy. In the first place, the National Liberals on whose support in the Reichstag he mainly relied were losing ground, and he was in danger of finding himself without parliamentary support. Secondly, the alliance between Bismarck and the Liberals was at best a marriage of convenience. Only in the matter of the Kulturkampf did they see eye to eye; the Liberals wanted free trade and ministerial responsibility, whereas Bismarck favored protection and refused to consider the matter of ministerial responsibility. Last but by no

means least, the Socialists were on the increase; and when it came to a choice between the Black International and the Red, Bismarck as a good conservative unhesitatingly chose the Church as the lesser evil. Falk resigned, and in the next few years almost all the anti-Catholic legislation was repealed, with the exception of that pertaining to the Jesuits, civil marriage, and state inspection of schools. Whether, had he been willing to make the necessary sacrifices, Bismarck could have won, remained, therefore, undetermined. As it was, he sustained the first outright defeat of his career and in spirit if not in body followed the great Henry to Canossa.

Having made his peace with the Church and broken with the Liberals, Bismarck turned to his late enemies and formed a coalition of Conservatives and Centerites, known as the Blue-Black Bloc. With this redoubtable group at call, he proceeded to enact a bill committing Germany to a protective tariff (1879). The first important statesman to react against prevailing laissez-faire, free-trade theories, he was convinced—since England had secured a head start in the Industrial Revolution—that protection would benefit German industry. The Conservatives, as representatives of the great Prussian landowners, wanted German agriculture protected against American and Russian competition; and the Center, as the representatives of the peasantry, were similarly minded.

The Kulturkampf over, Bismarck embarked on an equally bitter struggle with the Socialists. The development of organized socialism in Germany had its origins in the work of three men, Lassalle, Liebknecht, and last but not most important of all, Bebel. In 1863, Lassalle—a veteran of '48, a friend of Marx, and a student of Louis Blanc—founded a Workingmen's Association of Germany, reviving in this connection the term "Social Democrat." Meanwhile Liebknecht, a colleague of Marx and a friend of Mazzini, was striving to promote a rival organization affiliated with the First International. With Liebknecht was associated Bebel, who ultimately proved the real organizing genius of German socialism. For a number of years the rival organizations fought each other even more vigorously than they did the Government, and while they did so Bismarck had little cause for apprehension. In the elections of 1871 the Socialists polled only 125,000 out of nearly 4,000,000 votes cast and obtained only two seats in the Reichstag; and in 1874 they polled only 350,000 votes out of 5,000,000 and secured only nine seats. In 1875, however, at a conference held in Gotha, the two socialist factions composed their differences and agreed on a common program. The Gotha Union was an event of international as well as national importance. It marked the formation of the first great national Socialist party, and thereby profoundly influenced the history of socialism elsewhere. In the elections of 1877 the Social Democrats polled nearly 500,000 votes and captured twelve seats in the Reichstag. That Imperial Germany, of all places, should be the scene of such a development filled the Iron Chancellor with indignation and wrath; the internationalism of the socialists, even more than their democracy, was an offense that stank in his nostrils.

Bismarck's campaign against socialism began with a demand for a repressive law of the utmost severity. This the usually submissive Reichstag refused to pass until the second of two attacks on the Emperor by isolated fanatics enabled the Chancellor to command the necessary majority. The Law of 1878—a tem-

porary measure, but renewed at intervals until 1890—was framed to combat all subversive organizations and activities; but in particular, socialist meetings and publications were forbidden and socialist agitators rendered liable to imprisonment or exile. In addition, for the purpose of enforcing these regulations, the Government was empowered to declare "a minor state of siege." For over a decade the socialists were victims of a reign of terror scarcely inferior in intensity to that endured by the liberals under Metternich.

Although an unbending opponent of socialism as a political development, Bismarck, unlike Metternich, did not rely on repression alone. On the contrary he decided to fight fire with fire, and accordingly became the first orthodox exponent and champion of "state socialism." The very year that he had obtained the enactment of his antisocialist measures he had promised, "I will further every endeavor which positively aims at improving the condition of the working-classes." It was some years, however, before he could overcome the prejudices and selfishness of the upper classes sufficiently to accomplish his purpose. Finally, in 1883, a Sickness Insurance Law was passed, in 1884 an Accident Insurance Law, and in 1889 an Old Age and Disability Insurance Law. In each case the necessary funds were obtained from the combined contributions of the employee, the employer, and the State. The motives that actuated Bismarck in accomplishing this truly beneficent and memorable work are not far to seek: he hoped to cut the ground from under the socialists and thereby to strengthen the existing régime. As always, the welfare of Germany was his only concern. The argument he advanced is nevertheless worth repeating: The soldiers of industry ought to "receive a pension just as the soldier in the army who has been disabled or the civil servant who has grown old in the service," in order that the lower classes may realize that "the State is not merely a necessary but a benevolent institution." For the man who was once the Bismarck of '48 to have been the pioneer in such a work seems almost incredible—until it is remembered that Bismarck was a statesman even more than a politician and that the Prussian monarchy had a long history of paternalistic activity. "It is the business of a sovereign, great or small, to alleviate human misery" was a favorite apothegm of Frederick the Great. The greatest importance of Bismarck's achievement in the field of social legislation lies in the fact that it was the model for similar progress in every industrial state in Europe; and by his efforts in behalf of the laboring classes he accomplished a work that has even been pronounced his "surest title to fame."

Repression and bribery alike, however, failed to defeat or placate the Social Democrats, who resolutely kept up the unequal struggle and, like the Church, actually flourished under persecution. The Industrial Revolution was on their side, and in 1884 they obtained 24 seats in the Reichstag, 35 in 1890, 44 in 1893, 56 in 1898, 81 in 1903, and 110 in 1912—at which time they constituted the largest party in the lower house. Their representation would have been far larger still had the electoral districts been equal.

The last great event of the Bismarck Era in Germany came with the inauguration of the German colonial empire. Once unification was accomplished, Bismarck had adopted as the cornerstone of his foreign policy the axiom that Germany was "a saturated state"—that she had all the territory she needed or could profitably use. Colonies he considered a liability rather than an asset.

When, owing to pressure of population, great numbers of Germans began to emigrate—as many as a quarter of a million a year—a hue and cry arose because these expatriates were forced to seek homes under a foreign flag. Why should not Germany, like England, build up a far-flung empire of colonial dominions? Business men began to demand that Germany, like the other powers, should have foreign possessions which would yield raw material and serve as a market for German goods.

In 1884, therefore, yielding to popular clamor, Bismarck annexed extensive holdings, three times the area of Germany, in Africa—German Southwest Africa, Togoland, the Cameroons (Kamerun), and German East Africa. At the same time he acquired a portion of the New Britain Archipelago and a part of the semicontinent of New Guinea. In 1885 he took possession of the Marshall Islands and in 1888 of the island of Nauru. In 1898 Germany obtained the port of Kiao-chow, in China; and in 1899 the western portion of the Samoan Islands, the western portion of the Solomon Islands, the Caroline Islands, the Pelew (Palau) Islands, and the Ladrones (with the exception of Guam). These colonial ventures proved a bitter disappointment. Arriving late in the scramble for land, Germany was for the most part only able to pick up such “unoccupied” areas as other powers had disdained. Although considerable in extent, her territory was unfitted for white settlement, economically of little value, peopled by hostile and warlike natives, and therefore a heavy financial liability. For Bismarck the whole business remained to the end a strictly subsidiary matter—“My map of Africa lies in Europe.”

The year 1888 witnessed the death of the Old Emperor, William I, the accession and death of his son, Frederick III, and the accession of his grandson, the Young Kaiser (William II). Frederick III, almost totally unlike his father and his son, was one of those biological sports which the Hohenzollern dynasty was wont to produce. Lovable, and liberal to the core, he was a tragic figure, for what Fate had given him with one hand she took away with the other. Of his all too brief reign it can only be said that, coming to the throne with the finger of Death already upon him, he could accomplish nothing to undo the work of his illiberal predecessors and advisers. Had he enjoyed normal health and lived to his appointed threescore and ten, it is not too much to suppose that the history of Germany and of the world might have been profoundly altered.

Between the Old Chancellor, set in his ways, and the Young Kaiser, in the full flush of early manhood, trouble was inevitable. Of William II everyone had noted that combativity was a predominating trait, and his own father had written of “his leaning toward vanity and presumption, and his overweening estimation of himself.” William averred that he entertained nothing but the profoundest veneration for his great minister, but he approached his duties as monarch with the determination to rule as well as to reign; Bismarck, accustomed to dominate kings as well as parliaments, was ill disposed to play second fiddle, even to an Emperor; in the broad confines of Germany there was no room for the two. In addition, and sufficient in itself to render a split inevitable, there was the question of foreign policy (*cf.* p. 370). Strange to relate, the conflict arose over the question of the socialists: Bismarck wanted to repress them still further; William preferred first to try conciliation. The break came as the result of an imperial command instructing the Iron Chancellor to draft a new

cabinet order which should direct his subordinates to make their reports to the Emperor in person.

On the eighteenth of March, 1890, the Old Chancellor forwarded his resignation to the Young Kaiser, and the Bismarck Era came to an end. The event was heralded by *Punch*, with its accustomed felicity, in a famous cartoon entitled, "Dropping the Pilot." Over the bulwarks of a ship leans William, clad in imperial regalia, crown and all; descending an accommodation ladder to a rowboat is Bismarck, clad in a rough pilot coat and sea boots.

By way of softening the blow and rewarding faithful service, the former Chancellor—already exalted by the title of Prince, for his work in unifying Germany—was made Duke of Lauenburg. In the history of the truly great—men like Caesar, Beethoven, and Cavour—titles, vons, and the like have no place. A single word suffices to conjure up that colossal figure who gave his name to an age, a word which, with fitting simplicity, constitutes the sole decoration on his last resting-place—Bismarck.

THE PERSONAL RULE OF THE KAISER

The second period of prewar German history, from 1890 to 1914, may be called The Personal Rule of William II. The phrase may easily convey a wrong impression; there was no increase in the crown prerogatives, no constitutional change, and the Chancellors continued to transact most of the business of state. But it was the Kaiser who gave the dominant tone to the Government and held the attention of the gallery. These circumstances, coupled with the fact that by comparison with Bismarck his successors were puny figures at best, make the designation essentially sound.

William II, who resembled his great-uncle Frederick William IV not a little, was versatile—astonishingly so; but for that very reason, perhaps, he was extremely self-contradictory. His chief defect, in other words, was his inclination to excessively erratic gestures and pronouncements. Without question he was gifted; but without question, also, he was uncomfortably impulsive, and he was continually blurting out ill-considered opinions that set people by the ears. No one could ever be sure where to find him. On the one hand he was a patron of modern art, literature, and science; on the other, he was forever emphasizing, in the phraseology of a Louis XIV, his claim to rank as a divine-right monarch. "Looking upon myself as the instrument of the Lord, without regard for the opinions and intentions of the day, I go my way." Certainly he was one of those who—like Cromwell, Robespierre, and Napoleon—imagine themselves destined to a mission; for example, he was wont to picture himself as the leader of the White Race against the "Yellow Peril." Whether he was fitted for such a rôle is another question. As for the causes of his bumptiousness, there is reason to believe that he suffered from an inferiority complex. He had had an unhappy childhood, for he did not get along with his parents, and he was handicapped by a withered arm. Most unfortunate of all, he was a poor judge of men—perhaps, as some have affirmed, it was rather that he could not bear to have really first-class men around him. All his advisers, therefore, were second-rate.

The day that the Kaiser ascended the throne he issued two proclamations, the first to the army, the second to the navy. Four days later he issued one to the nation. The sequence and the time intervals were significant. Most significant of all, in the light of subsequent events, was the attention paid the navy. Previous sovereigns of Prussia and Germany had virtually ignored this branch of the service, whereas under William II its development was almost the only "domestic" political event of importance. Fearful of antagonizing England, Bismarck had steadfastly withstood the pressure of Big Navy enthusiasts; and when the Kaiser's reign opened, the German naval force, as the representative of a Great Power, was a joke—seven ironclads fit for service and a handful of cruisers. The Kaiser determined to remedy this situation. In 1890 the rocky North Sea islet of Helgoland was obtained from England, who was glad to exchange it for the German claims to an insignificant amount of African territory (Zanzibar). Helgoland was converted into a Gibraltar of the North, and served to protect the Kiel Canal, completed in 1895. Thereafter, although Denmark controlled the Sound and the neighboring passages, the German naval forces were simultaneously available for use in either the North Sea or the Baltic. In 1897 Von Tirpitz was appointed Secretary of the Navy, and the following year the first of the Kaiser's navy bills was enacted. In 1900 a vastly more important navy bill was passed, the first of a series which were to give Germany the second rank among naval powers. Incidentally, her new navy raised a considerable financial problem. A yacht is about the most expensive luxury in which an individual can indulge; similarly, a navy is about the most expensive luxury in which a nation can indulge.

Germany under the personal rule of William II exhibited two main characteristics: a distinct decline in diplomatic prestige and a distinct increase in commercial and industrial prestige. Her place as the economic rival and peer of England and of the United States she won by hard work, by efficiency, and by scientific research systematically applied. Every great industrial firm had its staff of trained scientists, sometimes, as in the case of the famous Krupp munitions works at Essen, surpassing that of any university in the world. "These seventy researchers cost us 350,000 francs a year," remarked the manager of a great chemical plant to a visitor. "Nine-tenths of them will produce nothing, but the tenth man may discover something which will enable us to earn several millions a year." Another company spent seventeen years in perfecting a process for the synthetic manufacture of indigo, with results noted elsewhere (see p. 313). Germany's rivals were wont to assert that her products were shoddy, but frequently these rivals fell behind in the race for commercial supremacy because they were less willing than she to cater to their clientele. When they were canvassing South America, German commercial travelers made it a point to see that the South Americans got what they wanted, even if the goods seemed intrinsically inferior in some ways. (And they learned to speak Spanish, too.) German products reached the consumer in good shape, because they were properly packed. Above all, Germany proved to the world the value of efficiency, and that actually, if not potentially, she was the most efficient nation in the world. Certainly a measure of pride in these achievements was quite legitimate.

Possibly her excessive devotion to material achievement helps to explain why under William II Germany, which for centuries had led the world in music, produced only one composer of the first rank, Richard Strauss; and why her accomplishments in literature and philosophy were inferior to those of the period when she was weak and disunited. And although her material triumphs belonged on the credit side of the ledger, there were a number of items on the debit side as well. Declining diplomatic prestige, following, as it did, immediately after the Bismarck Era, was a source of profound annoyance. Second, there were adverse financial items, caused by the navy, the colonies, and the necessity for purchasing raw materials. In spite of the revenue from a rapidly augmenting merchant marine and from foreign investments valued in 1907 at some \$2,250,000,000, Germany's balance of trade during the reign of William II was adverse to the extent of some hundreds of millions a year. Third, there was a good bit of trouble with subject nationalities.

When Alsace-Lorraine was returned to Germany, Bismarck had at first adopted a policy of reconciliation, and his subordinates, likewise, had striven to secure the goodwill of the inhabitants. If they erred, it was on the side of efficiency, for the population preferred the lax methods of the French. The cardinal error, however, which probably accounts for Germany's lack of success in winning the hearts of her alienated children, was the failure to give Alsace-Lorraine the same status as the other component parts of the Empire. Instead, it was made an Imperial Province and was ruled from Berlin. At the end of ten years, when the Alsace-Lorrainers still remained intractable, Bismarck's patience was exhausted; and a period of strict, though not harsh, rule ensued. Eventually this was relaxed, and in 1911 home rule was granted; but from time to time unfortunate incidents, such as the Zabern affair, occurred. In November of 1913 a lieutenant of the garrison at Zabern insulted some Alsatian recruits. Jeered at by the inhabitants, he lost his head, declared martial law, set up machine guns in the streets, and executed bayonet charges. That the nation did not approve this action was demonstrated when the Government was censured in the Reichstag for the first time since the founding of the Empire; but the incident left a bad taste, for the Kaiser took occasion to indulge in one of his ill-timed demonstrations by decorating the officer in question. The Poles, too, remained equally recalcitrant; and the Danish Schleswigers added a third element of nationalistic discontent.

Last among the items on the debit side of the ledger was the feeling of distrust entertained by Germans as a whole toward the Western Powers, and especially toward Russia. Rightly or wrongly, they felt that they were an object of jealousy and that their great neighbors, linked together in a brotherhood of iniquity, were pursuing an *Einkreisungspolitik* (policy of encirclement) designed to rob them of their hard-won gains. To a certain extent their feeling of suspicion and alarm was justified. Although the world at large could not help admiring German efficiency, and warmed to the bulk of hard-working and home-loving Germans, there *was* a certain amount of jealousy; and the Kaiser by his chauvinistic utterances, and the Prussian Junkers by their arrogant and militaristic attitude, aroused widespread and general dislike.

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CHAPTER VII

THE THIRD FRENCH REPUBLIC

THE REPUBLIC IN THE MAKING

The history of the Third Republic during the Prewar Era is of especial importance, for this was the period that witnessed the birth of the France of today—as distinct from the other Continental powers, which since then have changed their forms of government. This is the more singular in that the War of 1870 marked the nadir of French fortunes in modern times. Isolated, discredited, defeated, and trampled under foot, France was reduced from the leading power of the world to the fourth or fifth in Europe. As if to fill her cup to overflowing, an internal revolt of major proportions developed.

Politically the country was divided between three major parties: Monarchists, Republicans, and Extremists (the Imperialists were of course hopelessly discredited). Each of these parties was in turn subdivided into two factions, making six in all: Legitimists, Orleanists, Moderate Republicans, Radical Republicans, Marxian Socialists, and Anarchists of the Proudhon brand. Since the war with Germany was still going on, the Bordeaux Government of National Defense under Gambetta, following the tradition of '93, ruled France more or less dictatorially in the name of public safety and the republic; and although the electorate had had no opportunity to express itself on the recent revolution, Gambetta was supported with a fair showing of unanimity by the various factions.

Early in 1871 the Gambetta Government gave way to a National Assembly, elected by universal suffrage for the purpose of concluding peace. The National Assembly met in Bordeaux and was in the main monarchistic (150 Legitimists and 350 Orleanists), for the reason that the peasantry wanted peace and had consequently voted for royalist candidates. The Republicans—who had stood for continuing the struggle against Germany—numbered only about 250. In order not to precipitate a conflict over the question of the form of government, while Germany remained to be dealt with, the Assembly, inspired by Thiers, entered into a *union sacrée* ("holy alliance"). The monarchists, although refusing to proclaim the Republic as desired by their opponents, refrained from pressing their own views, and instead voted to reserve "the decision that France would make on the definitive form of the government." They then elected Thiers, who had done his best to prevent the war, Head of the Executive Power of the French Republic for an indefinite period. Thiers was a royalist, but

a moderate—devoted to the interests of the middle class and opposed both to the “vile mob” and to absolute monarchy. His election, therefore, did not unduly alarm the Republicans. The use of the term “Republic,” which everyone was free to interpret as he saw fit, was another concession to the Republicans. Since the Gambetta Government had styled itself a republic, it involved no change in terminology. To the royalists, the “Republic” was a stop-gap, to be displaced by a liberal monarchy as soon as the time should be propitious; to Republicans, it signified the bourgeois régime of '92; to the extremists, it meant a socialized state. This compromise constituted the so-called Compact of Bordeaux. Having accomplished this much, the Assembly, ignoring Paris, moved to Versailles, home of the later Bourbons.

Paris, overwhelmingly republican in sentiment and thoroughly disgusted with the inefficient conduct of the war, viewed these maneuvers with displeasure and alarm—sentiments that were aggravated when the Assembly declared the war moratorium on private debts at an end, cut off the pay of the National Guard, and attempted to make them surrender their arms. “The whole commerce of Paris [was] in a state of bankruptcy,” many business men were ruined, the city was full of demobilized soldiers bereft of work and resources, and the attempt to disarm the National Guard was viewed as the prelude to a monarchial *coup d'état*. Remembering well the Eighteenth Brumaire, the July Revolution, the June Days, and the *Coup d'état* of 1851, the Parisians did not propose to be fooled again.

The result was an insurrection, known as the Commune, against the authority of the Assembly. It took its name from the commune (the French term for the government of a municipality) of the City of Paris (in this case irregularly constituted), which led the movement. The Commune was significant as the first serious attempt at a social revolution similar in many ways to that consummated by the Bolsheviks in 1917. The communards were a heterogeneous group: of the 78 members of the governing council who actually took part in its deliberations a score were members of the International, a score Blanquists (anarchistic socialists),¹ the remainder Radical Republicans. According to a bourgeois historian, Hanotaux, these Republicans were the “party of action.” The rank and file were mainly internationalists. There was also an infusion of utopian communists and of Garibaldians and other foreigners. This last group furnished most of the military leaders. Like all important movements, the Commune comprised men of varying inclinations—good, bad, and indifferent.

The communards adopted the Republican calendar and the red flag. Then, despairing of converting the country as a whole to their views, they proposed, in a proclamation of the nineteenth of April, a federal form of government. Contrary to all precedent—France, particularly under the First Republic, had always been strongly centralized—each commune throughout the country was to enjoy “absolute autonomy.” Consciously or not, the communards followed Rousseau even more closely than had the Republicans of the first Revolution;

¹ “Integral, republican, leveling, the adversary of social order, but neither communist, nor separatist, nor socialist: in fact, anarchist.” (The cryptic characterization given by Hanotaux.)

but since they added the idea of the collective or socialized state, their objective was in effect a socialized Switzerland. Military positions, like all others, were to be elective; and all officials were to be subject to removal (a practice later known as the recall). The note of class struggle was sounded: "It is the end of the old governmental and clerical world, of militarism, officialism, exploitation, stock-jobbing, monopolies, and privileges, to which the proletariat owes its servitude and the fatherland its misfortunes and its disasters." The communards, however, disclaimed that they were seeking "the destruction of French unity," for the sovereign communes were to participate in a "voluntary association" or federation. As illustrative of the way in which the Left of yesterday becomes the Right of today, Louis Blanc was on the side of the Versailles Government.

After Thiers had attempted to seize the cannon mounted on Montmartre (March 18), the Commune retaliated by trying to overpower the Assembly. Thiers answered the challenge by assembling 150,000 troops. A second siege of Paris began, surpassing in ferocity the first and marked on both sides by innumerable atrocities. (Interclass struggles are even more bloodthirsty than are international.) Finally the besiegers succeeded in entering the city, and a week of unexampled horror ensued. In the excitement of combat some of the finest buildings—the Hôtel de Ville (Town Hall), the Palace of Justice, and the Tuileries—were destroyed by fire, and the hostages held by the communards, among them the Archbishop of Paris, were shot. Though unauthorized, these final atrocities were represented by the terrified bourgeoisie to be part of a systematic campaign of destruction. On May 28 the last of the insurgents within the city were overpowered.

The number who lost their lives as a result of the Commune will never be accurately known. Thousands perished during the siege, thousands during the street fighting, thousands more were shot, out of hand, without the semblance of a trial. Not to mention the besiegers, "Paris lost 80,000 citizens" outright. In addition to those who paid for their temerity on the spot, 35,000 were arrested immediately afterward, held for examination, and if evidence was found against them, tried by court-martial. And this was only the beginning. Until 1876, courts-martial continued to operate; and no inhabitant of Paris—man, woman, or child of whatever age—present during the uprising was safe. In all, there were 350,000 denunciations, nearly 50,000 trials, and between 10,000 and 15,000 (authorities differ) convictions. Of those sentenced thousands, more unfortunate than their brothers who had fallen on the field of battle, were sent to the penal colony of New Caledonia to endure a living death. Compared with the June Days and other affairs of like nature, the Commune was the most sanguinary and grievous tragedy of the century, and in this respect surpassed even the far-famed Terror. As a result, the extremists were effectually suppressed—but bitter memories remained.

The Monarchists and the Moderate Republicans were now free to settle matters between them; but before a decision was reached, France succeeded in resolving the aftermath of the war with Germany. On September 5, 1873, almost six months before it was due, the last installment of the German indemnity was paid, on the thirteenth the Germans relinquished their hold on

Verdun, and on the sixteenth they repassed the frontier. The unexpectedly rapid payment was a heroic feat and, since it saved a considerable portion of the costs of occupation, was a triumph that earned for Thiers the popular nickname of Liberator of the Territory. The commonly accepted notion that the indemnity came from the stockings (savings) of the peasantry is, however, erroneous; the French people as a whole rose nobly to the occasion, but fifty foreign banking houses, by participating in the payments, made success possible.

Two laws of 1871, together with a few subsequent amendments, determined the local government of France as it exists today. Each department, *arrondissement*, and commune was given a council, elected by universal suffrage, which legislates on matters of purely local interest. The office of mayor was likewise made elective.² But the prefect, the principal official in each department, is still appointed by the central Government, controls the police, and has power to veto the acts of the councils. On the whole, therefore, the system of centralization, established by Richelieu and perfected by Napoleon I, was changed but little; and France remained the most highly centralized state of Europe.

The Assembly, as has been noted, had been elected for the purpose of concluding peace with Germany, and this purpose had been accomplished; yet as time went by, the Assembly continued to sit. Not only did it show no signs of breaking up, but it was openly hostile to the Republicans, keeping the opposition press in close subjection. Gambetta therefore inaugurated a systematic campaign of Republican propaganda, for the purpose of arousing the people to demand the dissolution of the Assembly. Gambetta was a typical Latin in appearance and temperament, and a brilliant, fiery orator—"They call me the commercial traveler. Well! yes, I am a traveler, and I am the salesman of Democracy."

The effect of Gambetta's campaign for "selling the Republic" became evident in the by-elections, when numerous Republicans were elected to the Assembly. Moreover, many of the Councils General sent Thiers addresses commending him for his zeal in preserving the established form of government. Convinced that the country at large was predominantly republican, Thiers was converted, and came out in favor of the Republic as "the régime which divides us least." The Assembly, by no means ready to concede the issue, replied by adopting a declaration calling on the Government to pursue "a resolutely conservative policy." Thiers thereupon resigned and was succeeded by Marshal MacMahon, an ardent royalist. MacMahon installed a reactionary ministry, which entered on an energetic campaign of conservatism. Republican officials were systematically ejected from office in favor of royalists, and the Church was given every encouragement. Gambetta, for his part, redoubled his efforts. "Since the Crusades, France had not witnessed a similar propagandist effort."

Prior to this time, the Monarchists, fortunately for the Republicans, had been hampered by the division in their ranks. The Legitimists were partisans of the Count of Chambord, the so-called Henry V;³ the Orleanists held out for the Count of Paris, grandson of Louis-Philippe. Shortly after the election

² The system in Paris and Lyon is slightly different.

³ See p. 89 n.

of MacMahon the Legitimists and the Orleanists, alarmed by the growing strength of the Republicans, effected a compromise. Since the Count of Chambord was old and childless and the Count of Paris would shortly inherit the succession in any event, the Orleanists decided to recognize the claims of the Legitimists. Apparently the monarchy was as good as reestablished. At the last moment it developed that "Henry V" was unwilling to "abandon the white flag of Henry IV" in favor of the tricolor. No arguments availed to shake his determination; and the moderate royalists, realizing that no ruler so openly reactionary could hold the throne, refused to vote for the restoration. Even MacMahon averred that at the sight of the white flag "the rifles in the army would go off of themselves."

Meanwhile, what was to be done? For three years France had been nominally a republic, a republic in point of fact—but legally it was a country without a constitution! Obviously, such a situation could not last forever, nor could the Assembly prolong its own existence indefinitely. For over a year more the various parties debated the matter in principle: whether they should draw up a constitution at all; and if so, whether it should be permanent or temporary. Six months of 1874 had elapsed before the first question was decided in the affirmative. Another six months passed before the Assembly as a whole began to discuss the actual wording. From the first, there was no question of elaborating a single-document constitution, but merely of framing a series of organic laws. And when the spokesman for the committee presented his report, he said, "To tell the truth, this isn't a constitution that I have the honor to bring you; that name is only fitted for institutions established for an indefinite future; today it is only a question of organizing temporary powers." As the Assembly took up the various propositions, every section caused a fresh battle, every clause a skirmish. Finally on January 30, 1875, through the united efforts of the Moderate Republicans and the Orleanists, the famous Wallon Amendment—which by providing for the future election of presidents definitely committed France to a republican form of government, and which was also the first item of the constitution voted (Article 2 of the Law of February 25)—was adopted by a *majority of one vote*! Under such unparalleled circumstances did the Third Republic make its official bow to the world.

THE FRENCH CONSTITUTION

The constitution of 1875 differs widely from the single-document constitutions of which France, as the foremost constitution-maker of the world, had elaborated an almost endless number. It contains no declaration of rights, no theoretical principles of any sort, but merely consists of five separate laws adopted at different dates.

1. According to the Law of February 25:

Article 1. The legislative power is exercised by two Assemblies: the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. — The Chamber of Deputies is elected by universal suffrage. . . . Article 2. The President of the Republic is chosen by a majority of the votes of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies meeting as a National Assembly. He is elected for seven years. He is eligible for reelection. Article 3. The President

of the Republic initiates laws, concurrently with the members of the two Chambers. . . . He commands the armed forces.— He appoints to all civil and military posts. . . . Each of the acts of the President of the Republic shall be countersigned by a minister. . . . Article 5. The President of the Republic may, with the consent of the Senate, dissolve the Chamber of Deputies prior to the legal expiration of its term. . . . Article 6. The ministers are collectively responsible to the Chambers. . . . Article 8. The Chambers shall have the right, by separate resolutions passed in each by a majority of votes, either spontaneously or at the request of the President of the Republic, to declare that there is need for a revision of the constitutional laws. . . . The resolutions effecting a revision of the constitutional laws . . . shall be passed by a majority of the members making up the National Assembly.

2. By the terms of the Law of February 24 (as modified by the Law of 1884) :

Article 1. The Senate is made up of three hundred members chosen by the departments and colonies. . . . [Article 2. The number of Senators for each political division varies from ten for Paris (the Department of the Seine) to one for each of the three departments of Algeria and for four of the other colonies. Article 4. Senators must be forty years of age. Article 6. Senators are elected by specially constituted electoral colleges, composed of officials and of delegates elected by the municipal councils.] Article 7. Members of the Senate are chosen for nine years.— The Senate is renewed every three years [a third at a time]. . . . Article 8. . . . Money bills shall be, in the first place, introduced in and voted by the Chamber of Deputies. . . .

3. According to the Law of July 16:

Article 1. The Senate and the Chamber of Deputies assemble each year the second Tuesday in January. . . . The two Chambers shall remain in session five months at least each year. . . . Article 2. The President . . . has the right to convoke the Chambers in extra session. He shall convoke them if there is a request for such action, during the recess, from a majority of the members making up each Chamber. . . . Article 5. The meetings of the Senate and those of the Chamber of Deputies are public. . . . Article 6. The President of the Republic communicates with the Chambers by messages. . . . The ministers have the entrée of the two Chambers and shall be heard upon request. . . . Article 7. . . . The President of the Republic may, by a message assigning reasons, request the two Chambers to reconsider a law and this cannot be refused. Article 8. The President of the Republic negotiates and ratifies treaties. He reveals them to the Chambers as soon as the interest and safety of the State permit. [Ordinary treaties of commerce, and so on, must be ratified by the Chambers.] Article 9. The President of the Republic cannot declare war without the previous consent of the two Chambers. [Article 10. Each Chamber has full control of its membership. Article 14 is a declaration of Parliamentary immunity.]

4. The Law of August 2, which defines the conditions governing the election of senators, provides that they may be chosen from any department.

5. According to the Law of November 30, deputies must be twenty-five years of age. They are elected for four years, by secret ballot, and the Chamber is renewed as a whole.

The constitution of 1875 set up a parliamentary régime closely resembling ¹

that of England; but more democratic than either the English or the American systems, in that the President of France has less power than the President of the United States and there is no House of Lords.

Though France was constitutionally a republic, the Monarchists did not abandon the struggle. Except as part of the presidential title, the word "Republic" did not appear in the constitution; and by substituting a king for the president, the Republic could easily have been converted into a limited monarchy. This the Orleanists realized fully when they voted for the constitution—otherwise they would not have done so. MacMahon's term of office was to run until 1880; and the Monarchists were, moreover, strongly supported by the clergy.

For the moment, the main solicitude of the royalists was to retain control of the government. The elections of 1876 resulted in a Republican Chamber; the Senate, however, remained Monarchist. MacMahon at first accepted a Republican ministry, but at the same time did everything possible to encourage and strengthen the royalists. He declared that the ministries of Foreign Affairs, War, and Marine, having nothing to do with internal affairs, were not subject to parliamentary control. He supported the agitation for a war against Italy on behalf of the temporal power of the Papacy, and gave liberally to the erection of the magnificent ultramontane Church of Sacré Cœur, "an expiation for the sins of the Revolution." Finally, on May 16, 1877, he executed the so-called *coup d'état* of the *seize mai* by dismissing the ministry. Then, with the consent of the Senate, he dissolved the Chamber and called for new elections.

The new ministry did everything in its power to influence the elections in favor of the Monarchists: it threw Republican officials out of office, it persecuted Republican papers and meetings, it suspended Republican municipal councils, it presented lists of official candidates. In all this it received the fervid and open support of the clergy, who preached and prayed for a royalist victory. In reply, the Republicans rallied to Gambetta's war cry: "Clericalism, *there* is the enemy!" When the smoke of battle cleared, the Monarchists, in spite of slight gains, had been decisively defeated.

Still MacMahon did not give up the struggle; but when he appointed another conservative ministry, the Chamber refused to have anything to do with it or to vote the budget. The royalists dared not dissolve the Chamber a second time, and MacMahon had to accept a Republican ministry. New senatorial elections gave the Republicans control of the upper Chamber as well; and in 1879, rather than make certain army appointments demanded by the Chamber, MacMahon resigned. The new President set a constitutional example, never since violated, by taking absolutely no part in internal politics; and since that time most French Presidents have been little more than figureheads.

Following the complete victory of the Republicans, the seat of government was transferred from Versailles to Paris, Bastille Day (July 14) was made the national holiday, and in 1884 a law was passed which proclaimed: "The republican form of government cannot be the subject of a proposition for revision. — The members of families having reigned over France are ineligible for the presidency." Throughout the struggle from 1871 to 1879 it was Gam-

betta who by his unswerving devotion, his tactical skill, and above all by his brilliant oratory rallied the ranks and accomplished the final triumph of the Republic.

THE REPUBLIC AT WORK

From 1880 to 1914 the history of the Third Republic was one of consolidation and development. As outstanding political features there were the struggles of the Republicans against the Monarchists, who never gave up hope, the conflicts between the Republicans and the Church, and factional fights within the Republican ranks.

Once assured of power, the Republicans lost their unity. At first they split into three groups: the Left and the Republican Union (the former Extreme Left of Gambetta), who shared the power, and the Radicals,⁴ a new Extreme Left which reproached the Government with being too conservative and opportunist. This constant appearance of new groups on the Extreme Left was to be a familiar sight in the Third Republic, as it had been in the First. Among the Radicals a youngish man by the name of Clemenceau soon came to exercise a preponderant influence. Not particularly successful as a constructive leader, he was a notorious fire-eater who rejoiced in overthrowing cabinets and upsetting the apple cart.

Ministries came and went in unending and dazzling succession. Throughout, however, the Third Republic preserved its eminently bourgeois character; recruited from the ranks of the bourgeoisie and the intelligentsia—shopkeepers, lawyers, journalists, and so on, who inhabited the modest apartments of Paris or the modest dwellings of the "provinces"—whatever other policies they pursued or whatever group they represented, the ministers frowned equally on reactionaries and extremists. They were likewise one in upholding the prestige of France abroad.

In 1881 the Waldeck-Rousseau ministry passed a law guaranteeing full freedom of speech and the right to hold public meetings without even the necessity of procuring government authorization. Another outstanding enactment of the same year was a new press law, one of the most liberal in existence. Up to this time, before they could issue a newspaper publishers had been obliged to obtain permission from the Government and to deposit a sum of money which would be forfeited if they violated the law. This system was abolished, as was the taxation of the press. The only offenses recognized by the new law were slander, libel, inciting to crime, and in certain cases, publication of false news; and the commission of these offenses must be established by a jury.

Believing that "it was the schoolmaster who triumphed at Sedan," recognizing that education is the primary necessity of a democracy, and wishing to eradicate the influence of the Church at its source, the Republicans of 1870 made it their first care to enact the program of obligatory, gratuitous, and lay

⁴ "Radical" is a confusing word to the student of history. Spelled with a small "r," it should refer to any out-and-out critic of an existing régime (under a despotism a liberal would be a radical). Spelled with a capital, it refers to a particular party, at present considered rather moderate in most countries.

instruction envisaged by their predecessors of '92. The way was prepared by the creation of state normal schools free from Church influence (1879) and by the expulsion of the Jesuits, who had controlled education since 1850. The laws which established the present system of instruction are known as the Ferry Laws, from the statesman by whom they were conceived and who, as Prime Minister, sponsored them before the Chamber.⁵ In 1881 primary instruction was made gratuitous. In 1882 it was made compulsory for the ages of six to thirteen inclusive, and religious instruction in public schools was forbidden (though parents could choose whether to send their children to the public or to the "free" parochial schools). Thanks to these measures, France has become a country where illiteracy is practically unknown.

Two episodes of international repute enlivened the period and served to revive the quarrel between Republicans and Monarchists. The first was connected with a general by the name of Boulanger, who played a spectacular, though ambiguous rôle in the domestic and international politics of France. The Bonapartists doubled their vote in the elections of 1885, and the Government, at the suggestion of Clemenceau, appointed Boulanger Minister of War, since he was "the only really radical republican general." Boulanger proceeded to remove royalist regiments from Paris and in general to pursue an antiroyalist policy. His appointment likewise coincided with a period of renewed agitation for a war of revenge against Germany. Boulanger became intimately associated with the leaders of the *Revanche* (Revenge Movement) and increased the number of troops on the eastern frontier. Night and day, work on the construction of new barracks was pressed forward. Boulanger was also given to appearing in public appareled in full-dress uniform and mounted on a prancing charger. It was more than suspected that he aspired to become the "man on horseback" of the Third Republic. His reputation with the crowd mounted by leaps and bounds, and soon he was the man of the hour, the most popular Frenchman since the great Napoleon.

The Government, which knew that France was in no position to challenge Germany, feared that he would embroil the country in war, or initiate a period of personal rule, or both. Soon Boulanger appeared in the royalist camp, and with support from that quarter presented himself as candidate for deputy in various departments—a sort of unofficial plebiscite. Ten times in six months, he was elected to the Chamber, and everywhere he was greeted with frenzied enthusiasm. "Poets sang his praises, musicians composed hymns in his honor . . . the cables of the world vibrated with interminable dispatches recording his exploits and his triumphs. . . . Daily I saw men weep with joy at shaking him by the hand; women stormed his guard and kissed him with patriotic fervor; his portrait was found in the cottages of the poor as in the mansions of the rich. . . . In the most aristocratic houses of Paris the ladies were presented to the General, and curtsied as to an emperor or prince of the blood." Finally he stood for election in Paris, the stronghold of radical republicanism. To the surprise and consternation of the Government, he was elected by a majority of 75,000 (1889). But Boulanger was no Napoleon, for when the

⁵ In France the Prime Minister or Premier is known officially as the President of the Council (of Ministers).

Government finally plucked up courage to charge him with conspiracy against the surety of the state, he fled to Belgium, and not long after committed suicide.

The second of these dramatic episodes created, if possible, even greater excitement. In 1894 Captain Dreyfus, a Jew, was arrested and on the basis of the handwriting of a certain document convicted by court-martial of communicating intelligence to "the enemy" (Germany). He was accordingly condemned to solitary confinement for life on Devil's Island—a disguised sentence of death, and a lingering death of indescribable anguish at that. Those who disliked Jews—and they were not few—derived considerable satisfaction from the verdict. A little later, however, Colonel Picquart of the Army Intelligence Department informed the Minister of War that the document in question was the work of a Major Esterhazy. All that he got for his pains was an assignment to a command in Tunisia. Next the Vice President of the Senate tried to induce the Prime Minister to reopen the case, but even he could accomplish nothing; the honor of the army must be upheld. In order to satisfy public opinion, Esterhazy was brought to trial, acquitted, and effusively congratulated by the court. A small group of intellectuals was, nevertheless, far from satisfied. Foremost among them was the novelist Zola, who wrote an open letter, *J'accuse (I Accuse)*, denouncing the authorities in no uncertain terms. As a result he was himself condemned. In order to settle the matter for good and all, the Minister of War offered an explanation before the Chamber, which by a vote of 572 to 2 ordered his statement posted in each of the 36,000 communes throughout France. Still the case refused to stay buried and soon the whole country was taking sides: on the one hand, the Monarchists, the Church, and the Army; on the other, Anatole France the great novelist, Reinach the famous scholar, Clemenceau the leading Radical, Jaurès the leading Socialist, and the intellectuals generally. The Court of Cassation (Supreme Court) ordered a new court-martial. Conducted with manifest animus, the second Dreyfus trial resulted in a verdict of guilty "with extenuating circumstances"! This time the sentence was ten years on Devil's Island; but strangest of all from a legal standpoint, Dreyfus was immediately pardoned. This side-stepping of the issue the intellectuals likewise refused to accept. Finally (1906) the case was for the second time reopened by the Court of Cassation, which declared Esterhazy guilty and cleared Dreyfus of all guilt, and in the very courtyard where he had been degraded—his insignia of rank torn off, the buttons of his uniform cut away, and his sword broken—he was invested with the Legion of Honor. Started as an attempt to discredit the Republic and the Jews, the Dreyfus case ended by strengthening both groups and discrediting the royalists, who up to that time had still maintained a strong hold over the army. This they lost, and the supremacy of the civil authorities over the military was triumphantly asserted.

The elections of 1893 marked the first considerable success of the Socialists, who for a decade after the Commune had remained completely broken and discredited. In 1884 a law was passed—the work of Waldeck-Rousseau—repealing the Chapelier Law of 1791 and the restrictive provisions of the Penal Code of 1810, and affording trade unions legal protection; but even so, since the Socialists were divided they remained weak. Their most influential leaders

were Jaurès and Millerand of the Independent group. During the elections of 1893, the various Socialist groups, though maintaining their separate identities, united their efforts; in addition, they were assisted by a number of discontented Radicals. Consequently the Right fell from 170 to less than 100; the moderates (the Left during the early days of the Republic), from whom the Government drew its support, elected about 300, as before; the Radicals increased their representation from 120 to about 150; while the new Socialist group on the Extreme Left mustered about 50 deputies (18 Socialists belonging to organized parties, 15 independent Socialists, and the remainder Radical Socialists and independents). Thus the Left as a whole⁶—Radicals, Socialists, and their allies—held about 200 seats, or over a third of the Chamber. From this time on, an increasing number of its leaders rose to prominence. In 1895, France had a Radical Prime Minister; and in 1899 the Cabinet included a Socialist (Millerand).

Much later than England and Germany, strange to say, France too entered on a program of social reform. Because earlier legislation (1841, 1848) remained a dead letter, the Law of 1874 was the beginning of effective social legislation in France. The age limit at which children could be employed in industry was set at 12; young persons from 12 to 15 could be employed only twelve hours; night work and work on holidays was forbidden to boys under 16 and girls under 21; women and boys under 12 were forbidden to work underground. Most important of all, a service of inspection was organized.

The period of intensive social legislation, however, did not begin until the '90's. In 1892 a bill was passed raising the age limit for employment to 13 and limiting the working-hours of boys under 16 to ten and of boys under 18, as well as of women and girls, to eleven. In 1900 the working-day for women and girls and for boys under 18 was reduced to ten hours, in 1902 to nine and a half, and in 1904 to nine. In 1893 a law was enacted safeguarding the health of workers, and another to insure poor workers free medical attendance. In 1894 the first of the French housing-acts became law. In 1898 a workmen's compensation act, for the benefit of industrial workers, was sanctioned; and in 1906 all workers were assured of a day of rest each week. In 1910 an old-age pensions act became law.

EARLY-TWENTIETH-CENTURY FRANCE

In the middle '90's the Republicans were more divided than ever; but as a result of the Dreyfus affair, Waldeck-Rousseau was able to form a Ministry of Republican Defense, supported by a compact majority made up of Radicals and Socialists, plus certain moderates. Since the clergy had been active on the anti-Dreyfus side, the ministry determined on a fight to the finish with the Church. Agitated over the large numbers of children still attending parochial schools, they decided, first of all, to weaken the hold of the Church on education still further. The keynote of the Republican attitude was sounded by Waldeck-Rousseau in a celebrated speech: "In this country whose moral unity

⁶ But excluding the moderates, who still claimed to belong to the Left.

has constituted . . . its strength . . . *two sets of young people*, estranged less by their social condition than by their education, are growing up without knowing each other. . . . Thus little by little two different social orders are developing."

The educational work of the Church was carried on by the "regular" clergy (those living according to a set of rules, or regulations), monks, nuns, and religious orders. In 1901 the Law of Associations was enacted. In general it established the right of association (the right to organize and maintain associations), and associations which did not attempt to curtail the liberty of their members were allowed to function freely—in this respect it was a distinctly liberal measure; but those, such as religious congregations, which subjected their members to discipline were put under strict surveillance and required to obtain the authorization of the Government. The majority of church congregations did not even ask for authorization, and were closed forthwith. Many which did ask for it were refused. Hundreds of congregations were dissolved, thousands of parochial schools were closed, and tens of thousands of monks and nuns were left without employment. In 1904 another law was passed which provided that *all* parochial schools were to be closed within ten years.

This was as far as Waldeck-Rousseau intended to go; but it was soon evident that the uncompromising attitude of the Papacy was bringing relations between Church and State to a climax. In 1904, when the President of France made a trip to Italy, the Pope intimated that if he visited the Quirinal (the royal palace), he would not be received at the Vatican; and when the warning was disregarded, the Papacy protested to the powers. Jaurès, for the Socialists, thereupon demanded that the French embassy to the Vatican be withdrawn—a proposal put into effect by Delcassé, the Foreign Minister. In addition to the argument that the Church was a political menace, the Republicans pointed to the fact that within a half-century the property of the Church had increased in value from 50,000,000 to 1,000,000,000 francs, a grave economic danger; and they argued that, since religion was a private matter, a democracy should not tax its citizens for the benefit of any religion.

In 1905, accordingly, a law was enacted abrogating the Concordat of 1801 and separating Church and State. Roman Catholicism, ceasing to be the state religion, was no longer to enjoy any special privileges; and the Catholic clergy were no longer to be paid by the state (though they were to be pensioned according to length of service). Church property became the property of the state, except that such buildings as were needed for purposes of worship were to be handed over, free of charge, to associations of Catholic laymen. Since the Pope forbade such associations, the law, if enforced in all its details, would have deprived French Catholics of the ministrations of the Church. Briand, who was the author of the law and was charged with its administration in the Clemenceau cabinet, was not desirous of making martyrs; and a supplementary bill was passed permitting the clergy to continue to use the churches notwithstanding, provided a contract were signed between the priests and the civil authorities. To an outsider it seems rather singular that in Catholic France the opponents of the Church were more successful than in Protestant Germany.

During the years just preceding the World War, France was confronted with an ominous spread of syndicalism (see p. 345), and several times the syndicalists staged alarming demonstrations. The culmination of their efforts was the great railway strike of 1910. Since Briand, the first Socialist Premier, was in office, the strikers hoped for sympathy from the Government. In this expectation they were sadly mistaken. Briand met the crisis by issuing mobilization orders calling the strikers to the colors. They were then ordered to operate the railroads, and so broke their own strike.

After the election of 1914 the conservative parties in the Chamber were reduced to a few insignificant groups numbering altogether about a hundred. The remaining deputies were all from parties claiming to belong to the Left; the Unified Socialists alone held over a hundred seats.

During the prewar period, France, though not a highly industrialized country and unable to rival the United States, England, and Germany economically, enjoyed increasing prosperity. In the manufacture of luxuries, such as silk, she maintained a more than respectable place; she was one of the great iron-producing countries; and she profited immensely by "selling her scenery" to tourists, of whom she had the greatest number in the world. Thanks to the industry and frugality of her people, she was also one of the great financial powers—the foremost money-lender of the Continent. Above all, she was fortunate in maintaining a balance between agriculture and industry. The Government was active in taking such steps as it deemed best fitted to promote economic development. France is not particularly blessed with deep-water harbors; so the ports of Dunkirk, Dieppe, Rouen, Paris, Nantes, and Bordeaux were improved, and new ports were created at Le Havre and St. Nazaire. Canals were dug (125 miles, in addition to 625 miles already in use), giving France one of the best systems of inland waterways; roads were built (125,000 miles); and railroads constructed (20,000 miles). A protective tariff on industrial products was enacted in 1892. In the early days of the Third Republic the peasants were backward in their methods of cultivation. Schools and professorships of agriculture were therefore founded (1875-79), and in 1881 Gambetta set up a Ministry of Agriculture. In 1885 a protective tariff on wheat was passed. Between 1800 and 1860 the value of agricultural products increased only 50 per cent (from 4,000,000,000 to 6,000,000,000 francs); between 1860 and 1914 it doubled (increasing from 6,000,000,000 to 12,000,000,000 francs). Most significant of all, prosperity in France was more widely distributed than in any other great state. But opposed to these gains and a source of great worry to the French was the very slow increase in the population of France, while Germany was gaining by leaps and bounds.

The prewar period also saw a notable spurt in French imperialism, initiated by Ferry. In 1870 the French colonial empire was only a little larger than the "mother" country and had a population of only about six million. In 1914 it was eleven times as large as France and had a greater population. The bulk was located in Africa and Asia;⁷ but in addition, over and above what she held in 1815 (St. Pierre and Miquelon, Guadeloupe and Martinique, five ports in

⁷ See Chapter X.

India, the island of Réunion or Bourbon, a part of Guiana, and Senegal), France had acquired a number of islands: Prince Edward Island, Crozet Island, Kerguelen, St. Paul Island, Amsterdam Island, and Farquhar Island in the Indian Ocean (1893), and in the Pacific, Tahiti and the Marquesas Islands (1842), New Caledonia and the Loyalty Islands (1853), the Society Islands (1880), the Austral Islands, the Gambier Islands, the Low Archipelago (1881), and a share in a condominium (joint dominion) with England over the New Hebrides (1906).

In literature, art, architecture, and music France under the Third Republic maintained her reputation for high achievement. A galaxy of artists headed by Monet, Manet, and Cézanne led the new developments in painting, Debussy gave the world a new conception of musical expression, and in Rodin France produced the greatest sculptor since Michelangelo.

CHAPTER VIII

RUSSIA BEFORE THE DELUGE (1855-1914)

THE BREACH IN THE DIKE

When Alexander II ascended the throne of his fathers in the midst of the Crimean War (1855) he inherited a government which alone among the monarchies of Europe had never compromised with public opinion and a social régime which reproduced almost trait for trait that in force in Western Europe a thousand years earlier. Besides being backward, Russia was fundamentally alien to most of Europe in culture. Save for a superficial if brilliant upper crust of westernization, she remained a semi-Oriental state, not unlike the Turkey which all Russians despised so heartily: "Scratch a Russian and you will find a Tartar."

As an incident in international history the Crimean War was one of the most indecisive contests ever staged; but in the history of Russia it was, in its ultimate effects, the most important event of recent times. Accustomed to considering herself and to being considered a colossus among pigmies, Russia suffered a rude awakening when her army of over 2,000,000, of whom 1,000,000 reached the front, proved unable to defend her soil against an allied expedition of 70,000 operating far from its base, and Nicholas I died broken-hearted. Since the Old Régime had demonstrated its incapacity when opposed to the protagonists of Western civilization, drastic reforms were in order.

Not that the idea of reform was new. For years it had been growing, steadily if slowly; but since the Government suppressed all public criticism of a political, social, or economic nature—and, if possible, all private criticism of a similar nature—discontent could find expression only indirectly or in strict privacy. The reform longest overdue, advocated in principle by nearly every ruler since Catherine the Great and by an increasing number of intellectuals, was the emancipation of the serfs.

The history of continuous agitation for reform in Russia begins with the year 1836, marked by the publication of Chaadaiev's *Philosophical Letter* and the first performance of Gogol's *The Inspector*. Chaadaiev maintained that Russia was on the wrong track, and that the obvious remedy was to begin all over by adopting Western ideas and methods. The magazine in which the letter appeared was suppressed, the editor exiled, and Chaadaiev pronounced insane. In fact, by his so-called unpatriotic utterances he lost more adherents than he

gained; but in the '40's there were a considerable number who expressed similar views, and philosophically Chaadaiev was the forerunner of the nihilists. ✓

As the founder of Russian realism in literature, Gogol, in addition to producing one of the great comedies of modern times, exercised an influence on politics by focusing attention on the shocking corruption in the Russian administration. *The Inspector*, a stinging satire on the bureaucracy, created a veritable sensation. The plot centers about a traveler who arrives at a provincial town penniless, is mistaken for a government inspector, and is the recipient of the attentions and bribes intended for that official.

Dostoyevsky, another master of the realist school, wrote stories and novels burning with passionate sympathy for the downtrodden. *A Sportsman's Sketches* by Turgenev, a third great realist, contained vivid descriptions of peasant life which made the serfs appear more attractive than their masters.

From time to time, especially after the Revolutions of '48, groups of young intellectuals appeared. They met informally but regularly, and discussed various topics of public interest—political, social, and economic. Most of the participants were "socialists" of the utopian type, and the members of the near-by circles all knew each other. Discussion was incomparably more animated than in the debating societies and reading clubs of today, for these "parlor Bolsheviks" lived in an age when there were still worlds to conquer, when democracy was still a word to conjure with, and when youth was still earnest—if not flaming. No other outlet for the intellectual emotions existed; and above all, the topics under discussion and consequently the very meetings were taboo. Penalize people sufficiently for doing something they don't believe wrong and immediately a burning issue is created—as the history of prohibition in the United States proves. Sooner or later the associates were imprisoned or dispersed, but their influence lived; persecution kindled a halo about them and added the tradition of sacrifice to their cause. If the tsars had only devised a scheme for fooling the people into thinking that they were participating in government, without really letting them do so—as the Bolsheviks have done—it is not too much to assume that they could have averted the day of reckoning indefinitely. As it was, by the time of the Crimean War even the conservatives began to manifest critical tendencies, while the mobilized militia refused to obey the landlords or the police and engaged in rioting.

Herzen, Father of Russian Liberalism, began his career by serving as leader of a group of these intellectuals. Like many of his colleagues, after his circle was broken up he went into exile, and spent most of his later life in London. There he published the *Kolokol* (*Bell*), which openly criticized existing conditions and institutions. Although such papers were forbidden in Russia, the *Kolokol* was smuggled in, attained a considerable circulation in the late '50's, and even appeared, mysteriously but regularly, on the Tsar's table. Herzen's Three Points were exceedingly moderate: (1) liberation of the peasant from serfdom, (2) liberation of the taxpayer from the knout, and (3) liberation of the press from the censorship. He did not even go so far as to demand constitutional guarantees.

ALEXANDER THE LIBERATOR

Short of revolution, for which Russia was as yet unprepared, reform was only possible if the Tsar were agreeable. Like the Hohenzollerns, the Romanovs exhibited a singular alternation of characteristics, which might be expressed by the phrase "like father, unlike son," and which made their rule, like that of England in Ireland, an alternation of kicks and caresses. Alexander II believed in enlightened despotism as did his father, whose labors he had shared for over ten years; but in temperament he resembled much more nearly his uncle, Alexander I. He was more tolerant than his predecessor, and thanks to a better education, imbued with the rising spirit of humanitarianism. Above all, he was deeply affected by the outcome of the war. He realized that so long as serfdom existed the peasants would never be contented or enthusiastically patriotic and—of greater consequence, if possible, from the governmental point of view—that it was essential to the economic welfare of Russia for them to be emancipated. The overwhelming importance of the peasant question was a concomitant of the fact that, by comparison, the other classes (nobility, bourgeoisie, and proletariat) together were a mere handful—less than 10 per cent of the population.

In 1861 Alexander published a manifesto liberating the serfs. No longer could they be sold along with the land, transformed into household slaves, lashed for trivial offenses, forced to marry contrary to their will, or if they failed to obey, shipped off to the army. No longer could the nobles reckon their wealth in "souls." Alexander had been much puzzled as to what form emancipation had best take, for while the other classes had adopted Western modes of thought, the serfs were still living culturally as well as economically in the Middle Ages. Also, there was the agrarian problem. As in Western Europe during medieval times, while all the land was tilled by the peasants—part of the produce going to the nobles and part to the peasants—the title to all except crown land was vested in the nobles.

In accordance with the terms of the emancipation edict, serfs employed as household servants were freed, but did not receive any land. Serfs engaged in farming were, in addition to receiving their freedom, given the right to the personal use of a certain amount of land. Between the different parts of Russia the fertility of the soil varied, and the amount was varied accordingly; but at best it was no more than they had formerly tilled for their own profit. Even this meager degree of satisfaction was hedged about. The right to the use of the land was declared unconditional; but in return the peasants were obligated to perform certain services for the landlord, unless he permitted them to redeem their services for cash. In this event, the Government advanced the necessary funds, and the peasants were to pay the Government forty-nine annual installments at the rate of 6 per cent on the money advanced. In a sense, therefore, the land was not a gift; rather, the peasants had to purchase it. Moreover, since the assessments were high and the payments correspondingly high, the return was insufficient to enable them to meet their payments—unless they bought or leased more land, hired out as day laborers, or engaged in some form of industry.

The individual peasants were not given full control over their holdings; instead, the administration of the land was intrusted to the peasant village communities, known as *mir*s, which allotted it periodically to the various families and were collectively responsible for the payments. On this account, and because the authorities feared the effects of complete liberty on peasants accustomed to complete subservience, the *mir* was given considerable authority over its members, including the right to keep them forcibly within the group. For the bulk of the peasantry, consequently, there was still no freedom of movement or profession. It has even been said that they were freed from the nobles only to become serfs of the state. This is an exaggeration, but because of the corruption and imperialism of the Government, the peasants, since they paid the bulk of the taxes, were subjected to an additional and crushing burden.

An interesting illustration of the advanced state of opinion in certain conservative quarters at the time of the emancipation edict is furnished by a resolution of the Tver nobility: "The nobles . . . declare before all Russia that they abdicate all their class privileges. . . . The realization of these reforms is *impossible by means of governmental measures*—the way in which our social life has been managed until now. . . . [The only solution] is an assembly of men elected by the whole nation, without difference of class." This resolution was followed by an address to the Tsar: "Sire, we consider it a deadly sin to live and to make use of the benefits of the social order at the expense of the other classes. The order of things is unjust under which the poor man pays a ruble, while the rich man does not pay a kopeck. This could have been tolerated only under the bondage system, but now it puts us in the position of parasites. . . . Besides property privileges, we enjoy the exclusive right of supplying men for the administration of the people . . . we beg that it be extended to all classes." As can be seen, the enlightened aristocracy of this province were animated by the spirit displayed by the French nobles on the fourth of August; had the Government seen fit to take advantage of the situation, it is possible that a truly far-reaching reform might have resulted.

Since the landlord had previously enjoyed entire authority on his estate, the abolition of serfdom created a lacuna which made other changes inevitable. In 1864, therefore—before the establishment of municipal self-government—provincial self-government was instituted. Each county and province was given an elective Zemstvo (assembly) and a Zemstvo Committee, elected by the Zemstvo. The following were entitled to vote for members of the Zemstvo: landlords who owned the equivalent of a hundred maximum peasant allotments, townsmen who possessed equivalent property qualifications, and peasants who were members of a *mir*. The three classes met separately to vote. Each group (*curia*) was entitled to a delegate for every 3,000 allotments or the equivalent, but was not permitted to have more delegates than the other two combined. The Zemstvos were authorized to levy taxes and were intrusted with the management of public health, roads, poor-relief, prisons, commerce, industry, agriculture, and education (the few "public" schools that had existed before were charity institutions). Moreover, they were to be independent of the provincial governors and subject only to the Imperial Senate.

In 1864, also, class tribunals were abolished in principle; and a new system of

courts arose, based on the principle of equality before the law (in minor disputes, however, the peasantry were still in practice subject to their own courts, which retained flogging as a penalty). Formerly, there was no pleading; ordinary officials conducted the trials, rendered the verdict (the defendant was not even permitted to be present), and not infrequently yielded to bribery. Now an independent judiciary with life tenure was created, trials were made public, and the defendant was provided with an experienced lawyer. Jury trial in criminal cases was introduced, and the juries were to deliberate in secret. Corporal punishments such as flogging and branding were abolished in principle. Momentarily, the reform of the judicial system, by convincing the people that the Government was sincerely intent on abandoning its arbitrary practices, did much to revive public confidence.

In 1865 the censorship was partially relaxed: before a publication was suspended the publisher was to be warned twice. And even before the abolition of serfdom the Government had lightened its pressure on the universities and eased the restrictions against foreign travel. In 1870 municipal self-government was introduced; except that elections were based on the Prussian three-class system, it was much like the self-government previously granted the provinces. Finally, in 1874, universal military service was introduced. Though an evil portent for international peace, it was a step forward for the Russian peasant. Prior to that time, the nobility had been exempt and the rich had been able to hire substitutes. The poor who had been unlucky enough to be chosen for service had been obliged to spend twenty-five years in the army, while their dependents got along as best they could; and the conditions of service had been so harsh and degrading as to be considered the equivalent of penal servitude at hard labor. By the law of 1874, only sons and the sole supporters of a family were exempt, and the period of active service was reduced to six years. Corporal punishment was abolished, and the conditions of service in general were considerably improved.

Thus Russia received a régime approximating those in force in the West—*except in the sphere of central government*. This all-important exception by itself goes far to explain what followed and why the tsarist government was to a considerable degree responsible for its own troubles—in that it raised hopes without satisfying them; in that it promised, so to speak, without fulfilling its promises. Another highly important factor was the exclusion of the professional class, by property qualifications, from participation in the political life of both towns and provinces. Discriminated against and denied legal vent for their energies, its members were more than likely to continue their illegal activities. Better no reform at all than one so inadequate, one is inclined to say. For us who know what was to happen, it is easy to see that Alexander II, like his namesake and predecessor, threw away a golden opportunity to serve and save his dynasty—but the perspicacity required was perhaps more than could be expected of a divine-right monarch who was, after all, a mere mortal.

Even Poland was not forgotten. Alexander pardoned the exiles of 1830, removed the tariff barrier between Poland and the rest of the Empire, and in 1861 created a Council of State, with a considerable degree of autonomy. And the autonomy of Finland was revived.

REACTION AND RADICALISM

By his reforms Alexander II diverted into legal channels a certain amount of liberal unrest which might otherwise have become revolutionary, but the ultimate result was something quite different. Prior to the Crimean War, as has been seen, there was a certain amount of criticism, opposition, and even sporadic rebellion, but no widespread feeling that a fundamental change was inevitable, essential, or even possible. Against the unbroken front of autocracy all criticisms had beaten in vain. By demonstrating that reforms *were* essential, the Crimean War served as the opening wedge that resulted, indirectly but eventually, in the overthrow not only of autocracy but of the monarchy itself.

If Alexander thought to allay all discontent by such halfway measures, obviously designed to benefit the autocracy as much if not more than the people, he was soon undeceived. The Poles were still dreaming of independence and were encouraged in their illusions by the success of the nationalistic movement in Italy, the sympathetic attitude of Napoleon III, and the apparent weakness of Russia as revealed by the Crimean War. In 1863 the upper classes again rose in revolt, and went so far as to demand the boundaries of 1772. The opening act in the drama was a massacre of sleeping soldiers. The majority of the peasants held off; and when Prussia sided with Russia, the other powers decided not to interfere. Fifty thousand Poles perished outright, another 50,000 ended their days in Siberia, the Kingdom of Poland disappeared from the map, and Russian was made the language of government and education. The Tsar, however, did not rely solely on repression to solve the problem. The serfs were liberated, given land without having to pay for it, and granted a degree of self-government; so that the majority of Poles were better off *after* the rebellion than before—better off than the corresponding class elsewhere in the Empire. Consequently the Polish peasantry remained loyal to Russia until the time of the World War. Since many liberals who had sympathized with Poland, alienated by the excesses and extreme demands of the Poles, turned chauvinist, a far more important result was that liberalism as a whole—as contrasted with radicalism—received a distinct setback. By way of proof, the *KoloKol* lost five-sixths of its circulation.

In Russia proper the reforms proved hardly more satisfactory. In elaborating the emancipation edict the Government had aimed to satisfy the economic needs of the state and the wishes of the peasantry without unduly impoverishing or estranging the nobility. The result was a compromise which attained none of these objectives: The reform did not go far enough to effect the economic results desired and the nobles were antagonized, while the peasants were if anything more discontented than ever. It is a commonly observed phenomenon that unrest is greatest when conditions are improving, rather than when they are hopeless. The peasants manifested their dissatisfaction in a series of local revolts—over two thousand in the next few years—but these were put down by force and had no effect; more significant in the end, but for the moment of secondary importance, radicalism continued to develop apace.

The decisive event, so far as the Government was concerned, was a fortuitous attack on Alexander, made by an isolated revolutionist in 1866. Since the authorities jumped to the conclusion that it was the result of a widely organized plot, Alexander's zeal for reform cooled no little. Thenceforth, he was continually torn between the necessity for reform and his dislike and fear of the revolutionists. At the very moment, therefore, when further reforms were being introduced, the early reforms were curtailed. The censorship became more strict. Removed from the jurisdiction of the regular courts, political and press offenses were treated as administrative matters, and offenders turned over to the military courts or simply exiled by administrative decree. The Fortress of St. Peter and Paul (the Russian Bastille) and the mines of Siberia were crowded with men who languished there without hope, "forgotten" for the remainder of their lives—a reversion to the *lettres de cachet* of eighteenth century France as perfected by Nicholas I. The Zemstvos were ordered to avoid political topics, and their acts were partially subordinated to the provincial governors. In order to combat nihilism, the scientific high schools were dissolved. Students could then gain admission to the universities only through the classical high schools, where the time devoted to classics and to mathematics was increased, while science was entirely eliminated and the time assigned to history and to modern languages was reduced. Writers who stress the negative aspects of the situation fix on 1866 as the beginning of a reaction that lasted till 1905 and that destroyed all confidence between the state and its citizens.

Meanwhile, radical sentiment continued to grow. In part it was the result of defects inherent in the reforms, in part the consequence of the reaction, in part simply the old story of the ungrateful camel who wanted to crowd his kind master out of the tent. Since the authorities made no distinction between liberals and revolutionaries and since no open criticism was permitted, those who persisted in opposing the Government were forced to become conspirators. Throughout the nineteenth century, radicalism was for the most part the work of young intellectuals; during the '60's and early '70's it manifested itself in the Nihilist and Narodnichestvo movements.

Nihilism was fathered by Pisarev, who began writing in 1861. It was practically the same thing as the eighteenth century Enlightenment championed by Voltaire (see p. 21). Nihilists were ardent proponents of westernization and equally vigorous critics of the institutions and ideals of the Old Régime. Reason, science, and materialism they exalted; orthodoxy, faith, mysticism, and custom they abhorred. They were said to believe in nothing, hence "nihilism" (*nihil*, Latin for "nothing"). This explanation requires restating. Rather, they believed in nothing dear to the hearts of conservative Russians—nothing that could not be proved by laboratory science. "A nihilist is a man who submits to no authority whatsoever, who does not accept a single principle on faith alone," was the definition popularized by Turgenev in his *Fathers and Sons*. Herzen's definition might have found even readier acceptance among nihilists themselves: "Nihilism does not reduce something to nothing, but discerns that under the influence of an optical illusion nothing was taken for something." More specifically, the nihilists maintained that the first essential to progress

was an intellectual revolution, to free the individual from conventions and prejudices; and this they believed could best be accomplished by the spread of science and the scientific attitude of mind. Obviously, such a program was little likely to affect the illiterate peasantry. Though most nihilists ignored political questions as such, they were unsparing in their criticism of all forms of authority; and since some were implicated in revolutionary plots, the term "nihilism" is frequently but incorrectly used in referring to terrorism.

Without popular support, a revolutionary movement is bound to fail; and at this time the proletariat of Russia was only an infinitesimal minority. Some of the radicals, known as Narodniki, therefore turned directly to the peasants. Adherents of the doctrine of *narodnichestvo* ("going to the people"), they took their cue from Herzen's exhortation to the students, "*V narod!*" ("To the people!"). For an appreciation of their psychology some knowledge at least of the utter squalor and misery prevalent among the Russian masses is essential. Only on great saints' days, twenty times a year perhaps, did they taste meat. The majority lived habitually on the ragged edge of starvation, and millions were carried off periodically by famine. The Narodniki were profoundly affected by the sufferings of the peasants, for they believed that the intelligentsia are able to enjoy the benefits of culture only at the expense of the people. They therefore despised such "parlor Bolsheviks" as the nihilists, and considered it their duty to repay their debt by active service and by an educational campaign that would arouse the stolid peasants to a concerted demand for their rights. Like their leader, Lavrov, whose slogan was "the embodiment of truth and justice in social forms," many of the Narodniki were peaceably inclined; but some were influenced by Bakunin (see p. 347), who considered study and knowledge useless so long as the people were not free. He too urged the students to go to the people—but in order to stir them to open rebellion.

The Narodnichestvo Movement, which resulted from these various forces, was unique. That they might share the hardships of the poor, help the needy, and spread propaganda, hundreds of students, either voluntarily or when expelled from the universities for their radical opinions, went to live in the country as doctors, teachers, nurses, or even common laborers. Many of these young enthusiasts came from the best families of Russia (Russians are perhaps the most idealistic of people), and all were filled with the fiery zeal which has characterized the outstanding apostles of the Church. But the peasants were totally unable to comprehend such novel ideas. Accustomed by generations of servitude to implicit obedience, medieval and Asiatic in culture, ignorant and illiterate, most of them were suspicious of these beings from a different world, many were shocked by the bitter denunciations of the Little Father (the Tsar), and some even betrayed their would-be benefactors to the police. Seven hundred and seventy students, including 158 women, were arrested; and the movement collapsed. Between 1860 and 1874, 18,622 convicts in all—mostly political offenders—were exiled to Siberia.

ALEXANDER THE CONQUEROR

During the last half of the nineteenth century, Russia continued her never-ending efforts to expand south and east. Thwarted in the Near East in the '50's, she temporarily turned her attention elsewhere. Under Alexander II Russia consolidated her gains in the Caucasus: not long after his accession Daghestan, on the Caspian, was compelled to submit (1859); and finally, five years later, the Circassians of the Kuban, in the northwest, were forced to surrender, although aided by the Turks, the English, and the French. Thousands of the proud Kuban tribesmen preferred, however, to abandon their homes and seek refuge in Turkey rather than remain under the Russian yoke.

By 1854 the frontier in the Middle East had reached an indefinite line which departed from the location of the present boundary where it approaches Lake Balkhash, ran in a southwesterly direction to the western end of Lake Issyk, down the Chu to its "mouth," across to Petrovsk, down the Syr¹ (Jaxartes) to the Aral Sea, and thence to the Caspian. Russian expansion in Asia was partly the normal manifestation of a growing and colonizing people similar to the pioneers of America, partly the result of the juxtaposition of civilized and barbaric peoples, partly the outcome of the never-satiated demands of Russian traders, and partly the work of accomplished empire-builders—hard-headed, hard-fisted imperialists, who experienced no qualms about the rights of backward minorities. Charming gentlemen, these, to meet across a dinner table; but infinitely less agreeable when seen from the wrong end of a Gatling gun.

In 1860 the then western extremity of the Russo-Chinese boundary was defined by treaty as a line from Lake Saisan (Zaisan), by way of the watershed, to the southern chain of the Tien Shan Range and along that chain to the Khanate of Kokand. It should be remembered that the frontier was not a water-tight or easily defensible line, but consisted chiefly of isolated forts pushed out into hostile and rebellious territory. Beyond the Lake Issyk-Aral frontier lay the turbulent Mohammedan khanates of Kokand, Bukhara, and Khiva, peopled by nomadic Turcomans, Kirghiz, and so on. These wild tribesmen, who failed to recognize Russia's rights as an agent of civilization and as a bearer of the white man's burden, persisted in piratical raids on Russian caravans and even ravaged territory claimed by the Tsar; but Russia possessed a number of worthies destined to teach them better manners. Foremost among these swashbucklers to attain fame was Cherniayev, who took one stronghold after another and ended with the capture of Tashkent (1865), the commercial emporium of Kokand and a metropolis of 100,000. At the moment of attack, Cherniayev had in his pocket orders from the Tsar forbidding the venture, but he was careful not to read them until the city had fallen. Needless to say, Alexander, when presented with this *fait accompli*, did not repudiate his faithful servant; and the newly acquired territory, renamed Turkestan for one of the captured strongholds, was constituted a province. Two years later (1867) Turkestan became a governor-generalship. These activities were "viewed with

¹ Syr Darya.

alarm" by England, which feared for the security of Afghanistan and India. Gorchakov, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, endeavored to allay British apprehensions by asserting (1864) that Russia had been forced to protect herself against marauding tribes and that she merely sought to reach a frontier common to some other state which could and would keep order on its own side of the boundary.

At this juncture Russia was summoned to relinquish her new acquisitions by the Amir of Bukhara, self-styled descendant of Timur and head of a league of the khanates; but at Irjai, the Plassey of Central Asia, 3,600 Russians routed 40,000 tribesmen (1866). Two years later Kaufmann received the surrender of Samarkand, sometime capital of the great Timur and of an empire which had once regarded Moscow as an outlying province. The whirligig of time was working with a vengeance. The Amir signed a treaty acknowledging the overlordship of the Tsar, ceding the province of Samarkand (Zarafshan), and promising an indemnity. Khiva came next. In 1873 Kaufmann took the city by storm, and a treaty was concluded. Beforehand, Russia had assured England that the expedition was purely punitive and that there would be no annexations of territory, but the Khan was forced to acknowledge the overlordship of the Tsar and to pay an indemnity. The Amu² (Oxus) was opened to Russian commerce duty-free. In 1876 the subjugation of Kokand was completed, and the khanate became a province, under its ancient title, Ferghana.

The next to receive a visit from the emissaries of the Great White Tsar were the Tekkes, south of Khiva. Skobelev conducted the expedition sent to "pacify" them and stormed their stronghold, Geok Tepe (1881). This expedition in particular, staged in desert wastes where water was an unknown quantity and where the temperature soared so high that the thermometer burst, tested the staying-power of the Russian peasantry to the full.

At every step of the Russian advance England became increasingly apprehensive. In 1873 she persuaded Russia to recognize the Amu, from Sarikal to the point where the boundary now leaves that river, as the Afghan frontier; but friction continued, and in 1878 a Russian mission visited Kabul. A treaty was concluded which placed Afghanistan under the protection of the Tsar. England, in reply, undertook the Second Afghan War (1878-81), as a result of which a new Amir ascended the throne under British influence.

Alexander distinguished himself as the only tsar since 1689 to relinquish any territory in Asia (except in exchange). His last treaty (1881), signed with China, returned the eastern part of the district of Ili, southeast of Lake Balkhash—the whole having been "temporarily" occupied ten years before "in order to restore order." Since China was required to sanction Russia's possession of the western portion, it may be questioned whether Alexander's motives were altogether disinterested. Moreover, China was required to pay 9,000,000 rubles "to cover the costs of occupation," and to continue to grant Russian subjects free trade from the Tien Shan to the Great Wall.

In this way Alexander acquired an empire in Central Asia stretching from the Caspian to China and from the Aral to the upper Oxus, touching Persia

² Amu Darya.

and Afghanistan on the south, and 1,500 by 550 miles in its extreme dimensions. Though much of this territory was sandy waste, parts were of superlative beauty; and the remainder, like the American Southwest, needed only irrigation to make the desert blossom like the rose. In a few years, as a result of these additions to the Empire, Moscow was no longer dependent on America for cotton.

Greatest of Russia's recent empire-builders was Muravyev, Governor-General of Eastern Siberia. In the Far East, Russia had made no advances worth mentioning since she had concluded the Treaty of 1689. By this document she had recognized the right of China to the basin of the Amur, the St. Lawrence of Asia—a renunciation due chiefly to the inaccessibility of the region involved. The district had remained virtually uninhabited until the mid-nineteenth century, when Muravyev made bold to establish a chain of settlements on the Amur. The first (1850), near the mouth, was named Nikolaevsk in honor of the then reigning Tsar. Shortly after, this able and energetic proconsul likewise began the Russian occupation of the Island of Sakhalin; and in 1855 a treaty establishing a condominium was signed with Japan. In 1858, thanks to the fact that China was distracted by the Taiping Rebellion and harassed by the English and French, Muravyev was able to conclude a treaty by which the entire left bank of the Amur was ceded to Russia. (A condominium was established over the territory between the Ussuri and the sea.) In 1860 China also relinquished the territory between the Amur, the Ussuri, and the sea. Inconsiderable as these two acquisitions appear on the map of Asia, if superimposed on the United States they would extend south from New York City into the Gulf of Mexico and west beyond the upper Mississippi. Still more important was their significance in connection with Russia's eternal quest for a warm-water port. Prior to 1860 her ports on the Pacific, located in the latitude of Labrador, were open less than half the year. Subsequently, on a site selected by Muravyev, at the southern tip of her lately acquired possessions, Russia established a new port. Vladivostok ("Conqueror of the East"), as it was christened, is ice-bound only three or four months and possesses a harbor as splendid as those of Constantinople or Rio de Janeiro. By the end of the century the Amur and Ussuri districts had provided homes for nearly a half million Russian immigrants.

It was Muravyev, created Count of the Amur, who persuaded the Tsar to sell Alaska, his only noncontiguous possession, to the United States (1867). In 1875 a treaty was concluded whereby Japan ceded to the Tsar "the portion of the territory of the island of Sakhalin (Karafuto), of which she is now in possession . . . so that henceforth the whole of the said island of Sakhalin (Karafuto) shall belong in its entirety to the Russian Empire." In return, Russia ceded the Kurile Islands to Japan. Six hundred miles in length, Sakhalin is the seventh longest of the islands, situated mainly in the temperate zone, and is only a very little shorter than Great Britain.

In extent, the conquests of Alexander II were the greatest made by any tsar and could rival those of Alexander of Macedon. Above all, with the exception of southern Sakhalin, they remain Russian to this day; but their importance was hardly recognized at the time and was quickly forgotten when the Rus-

sians once more focused their attention on the Near East. Ostensibly, Russia entered the War of 1877 in behalf of her lesser Slav brethren in the Balkans; incidentally, she hoped to acquire Constantinople for herself. This major objective she failed to attain. Worse still, after a successful campaign she was still further thwarted by a congress of the powers, assembled in Berlin (1878), and forced to content herself with lower Bessarabia and with the district of Kars, which, along with the port of Batum, rounded out her holdings in Transcaucasia. Not that these acquisitions were to be despised, but in the light of earlier hopes they failed miserably to satisfy public opinion.

On internal affairs the effects of the war were much like those of the Crimean War. Defects and graft in the military administration revealed by the campaign against the despised Turks put the Government in no favorable light; and to the Russian way of thinking, the diplomatic rebuff incurred at Berlin was a national humiliation of the first order. Further indignation was aroused by the fact that Bulgaria, liberated by the Russian forces, received a constitution and that the Bulgarian peasantry were better off than the Russian.

The outburst of revolutionary activity which occurred at this time was partly a result of the war, therefore, and partly a natural reaction against the suppression of the intellectuals. In 1877 3,800 suspects were on trial for alleged illegal activity. In 1879 the revolutionaries among the Narodniki, by this time in the majority, formed an Executive Committee for the purpose of conducting a campaign of organized terrorism against the high officials and particularly against Alexander himself. In this way they hoped to frighten him into granting additional reforms. A minority, who favored the old program of social propaganda before political struggle, split off and formed a separate group under Plekhanov.

In the pursuit of their immediate aims the terrorists were astonishingly successful: between 1866 and 1892 alone, terrorism accounted for 30,000 lives. But the ultimate result was quite the opposite of what they hoped. Several times Alexander narrowly escaped; and in 1880, had he not been late to dinner, he would have been killed in the Winter Palace itself. Spurred to redoubled activity, the police cowed the terrorists temporarily; but Alexander recognized that mere suppression was no cure. He therefore decided to restore his earlier reforms in their entirety, and in addition to admit representatives of the people to participation in the central Government. The ninth of March, 1881, he signed a decree to this effect, but postponed publishing it until the thirteenth.

Meanwhile a fresh plot was maturing. At the end of February two of the ringleaders were arrested; but Sophia Perovskaya, granddaughter of a former Minister of the Interior and daughter of a Military Governor of St. Petersburg (now Leningrad), went on with the preparations. On Sunday the thirteenth, despite the entreaties of his advisers, Alexander attended the usual military review. As he was returning, a bomb thrown at his carriage injured some of his escort. The Tsar insisted on alighting to inquire after the victims, and was mortally wounded by a second bomb. Such was the untimely end to one of the most important reigns in Russian history, and with Alexander died all attempts at reform from within.

ALEXANDER III

Alexander III, who ascended the throne in 1881, was cast in the mold of his grandfather. A magnificent physique, a narrow mind, and an inflexible will were the outstanding qualities of this scion of autocracy, who, like all the tsars, firmly believed himself to be the divinely appointed guardian of his flock against a pack of ravening wolves. Everything possible combined to render the new monarch a tsar of the antediluvian type: the influence of his tutor, Pobiedonostsev, the disillusioning after-effects of the Turkish War, the constantly impending threat of assassination, and above all, the example of his sire's unhappy end. Even so, his first resolve was to let the work of his predecessor stand: "Change nothing in the orders of my father. This shall count as his will and testament." This decision the majority of his advisers approved, but three factors led him to change his mind: the advice of Pobiedonostsev, the advice tendered his father by William I of Germany, and an appeal from the terrorists asking a representative assembly and pardon for all political offenders—which Alexander deemed an insult to the memory of his father.

Thenceforth, for nearly a quarter of a century, Russia submitted to the influence of Pobiedonostsev, who was to a large extent responsible for making Alexander what he was and who since 1880, as Procurator of the Holy Synod, had been the immediate head of the Russian Church. Pobiedonostsev was an archreactionary, who never wavered in his faith in autocracy, who considered westernization and all its works anathema, and who formulated a veritable philosophy of conservatism (*Reflections of a Russian Statesman*). "Parliament is an institution serving to satisfy the personal ambition, vanity, and self-interest of its members." Not only did he regard Western institutions as inherently bad, but even more emphatically he denied that they suited the semi-Asiatic, semi-medieval conditions in Russia. The third of the triumvirate who presided over the destinies of the Empire during this period was Plehve, appointed Director of Police in 1881, whose zeal in the discharge of his duties was matched only by his ruthless efficiency. As time went on, and in particular after an attempt on his life had shattered his health, Alexander took less and less interest in affairs of state and allowed his ministers a free hand in their "departmental satrapies."

The four cardinal points in the policy of Alexander III were autocracy, orthodoxy, economic betterment, and Russification. Autocracy meant first of all the crushing of all subversive elements. This was the duty of Plehve, and so well did that redoubtable minister succeed that the terrorists were soon killed off, imprisoned, or reduced to impotence. As should have been apparent beforehand, terrorism was worse than useless, for it simply made the Government more reactionary, resulted in the slaughter of the popular leaders, and completely alienated the liberals. Alexander III, far from being a humanitarian, was an out-and-out cynic. Secondly, therefore, autocracy meant thoroughgoing reaction against the liberalizing tendencies of Alexander II. The Zemstvos were further subjected to the provincial governors, and the electoral law was so revised that they became little more than congresses of nobles. The censorship grew even more strict, the universities lost the last vestiges of their autonomy,

and the peasant schools were handed over to the control of the clergy. Further to supervise the peasantry, land captains, with judicial as well as administrative powers, were appointed from the nobility.

In Russia the familiar alliance between Church and State reached its logical extension, for the higher authorities of both were identical. This situation, together with the fact that the clergy were an effective force in rendering the illiterate peasantry conservative, explains why the Government was so desirous that all Russians should be adherents of the Orthodox Church. Many, however, refused to subscribe. Some of these dissenters were sectarians; some were members of entirely different faiths—Roman Catholics, Jews, and inhabitants of territories which had been added to the Empire by conquest. Believing these heterodox groups a source of weakness and danger, the Tsarist Government made strenuous efforts to convert them. In the case of the Jews and some of the sectarians, the methods employed not only exceeded the bounds of peaceful persuasion, but were distinguished by almost inhuman brutality. Not infrequently the unfortunate sectarians were forbidden to hold services of their own, or were exiled to Siberia, and in some instances their children were even taken away from them.

The Government attempted to pacify the people by economic reforms. The head tax on the peasants was abolished, and the installments due on their land were reduced. New regulations making it easier for them to rent government land were promulgated, and they were assisted to migrate to Siberia. A beginning was made toward the enactment of labor legislation. The budget was balanced, the Trans-Caspian Railroad extended to Samarkand, and the Trans-Siberian begun.

In order to comprehend what was meant by Russification, a brief survey of the prewar Empire is essential. In the less than four centuries between 1505 and 1895, Russia developed from a Muscovite principality of some 800,000 square miles into a contiguous empire of over 8,500,000—an average advance of better than fifty square miles a day. Never had the world seen such an organized agglomeration of contiguous territory.

In 1881 a Russo-Persian treaty established the Atrek as the boundary between the domains of the Tsar and the Shah on the eastern shore of the Caspian. In 1884, contrary to her promises to Great Britain, Russia demanded and received the submission of the Tekkes of the great Merv oasis. A convention with Persia consecrated this fresh advance. Continued negotiations between Russia and England over the Afghan boundary fell through when Russia insisted on obtaining Penjdeh. Afghanistan thereupon seized the disputed district, but 40,000 Afghans were ignominiously routed by 1,200 Russians. War with England seemed certain until diplomacy found a way out (diplomats occasionally have their uses); and in 1887 the boundary between the Hari Rud (Tejend) and the Amu was delimited. Russia obtained Penjdeh, but relinquished her claims to territory on the left bank of the Amu. In 1893 a treaty with Persia effected minor exchanges of territory east and west of the Caspian, and defined the frontier from Baba Durmaz to the Hari Rud and Zulfikar on the Afghan frontier.

In 1895, under Alexander's successor, the formal boundaries of the Tsarist

Empire attained their greatest extent by virtue of an agreement with England settling the status of the Pamirs. The boundary of Afghanistan was extended from the source of the Amu, in Lake Victoria (Zor), to the Chinese frontier. In this way a narrow strip of Afghan territory—lying between the new boundary and the frowning heights of the Hindu Kush, and sometimes only fourteen miles wide—was interposed between the Russian and British holdings, and the rôle of Afghanistan as a buffer state was further increased in importance. In 1898, Russia "leased" the Liaotung Peninsula, with the warm-water harbor of Port Arthur, from China; and in 1913 she established a protectorate over Outer Mongolia.

So much of the territory acquired in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was inhabited by aliens that in the late nineteenth these minorities constituted a majority of the population. Of the 175,000,000 who made up the total at the outbreak of the World War, the Russians proper (Great Russians) constituted only 47 per cent. Sixty million of the minority peoples had little or no feeling of kinship for the Russians. These particularly dissatisfied elements included: 18,000,000 tribesmen in Central Asia; a number of small peoples (totaling 5,000,000) in Caucasia; groups of Asiatics scattered among the Cossack colonists in southeastern Russia; a considerable scattering of Rumans and large numbers of Ruthenians in southwestern Russia; 11,000,000 Poles, 4,000,000 Lithuanians and Letts, 3,000,000 Germans, and 8,000,000 Finns and Esths along the western border. Another element present in great numbers (7,000,000), but not exclusively in any one locality, was the Jews. All these peoples differed from their Russian overlords in language, most of them in religion, and many in race.

For all his cynicism, there never was a more Russian tsar than Alexander III. Foreigners he disliked, but he positively despised the subject minorities. Russification, another term for nationalization, was the policy of assimilation pursued by the authorities. In principle Russification was analogous to Americanization, but in practice they showed little resemblance. In addition to eliminating the last vestiges of local autonomy and attempting to enforce religious uniformity, the Government sought to introduce Russian as the language of culture as well as of administration. The strongest opposition to this attempt was encountered from the Poles and Finns, peoples with a well-developed nationalism of their own, and from the Jews.

The Jews in particular incurred the dislike of the Russians, who despised them as inferiors in race and culture and hated them because they differed in religion and language. Every effort was made to render these unhappy people miserable. Since 1804 they had been forbidden to settle outside a district in the southwest known as the Pale. Alexander III forbade them to settle outside the towns, even in the Pale, and finally ordered those already in Central Russia to depart. In a single year 17,000 were deported from Moscow, and in a short time over 250,000 had left the country, mostly for the United States. The number admitted to the universities was limited to 3 per cent of each student body, and they were barred from the legal profession and forbidden to acquire land. Worst of all, the Government countenanced wholesale pillaging and massacres of Jews by the Russian populace—a form of Jew-baiting known as a pogrom.

Pobiedonostsev predicted that "a third of them would be converted, a third would emigrate, while the rest would die of hunger."

The Poles were too well cowed to put up much of a struggle, but the resistance offered by the Finns was long and bitter. Ever since 1809, when their country was torn away from Sweden, they had maintained that they were bound to Russia only by a personal tie through the tsar (who was Grand Duke of Finland), in the same way that Hungary was linked with Austria. This belief Alexander I and Alexander II had sanctioned and respected. The Finns had their own legislature, coinage, postal system, customs system, and even an army, which was not to serve outside the duchy. To jingoistic Russians the fact that Finland alone enjoyed such privileges and that in Finland alone the powers of the tsar were limited by a written constitution was an abomination. In 1890 Alexander announced that Finland was "in the ownership and sovereign possession of the Russian Empire"; and forthwith appointed committees to bring the Finnish coinage, customs, and postal service into harmony with those of the Empire as a whole. The Finnish press was curbed, and an attempt was made to introduce Russian as the language of government.

THE ACCESSION OF NICHOLAS II

In 1894 Alexander III, who might well be called the Last of the Tsars, died, and the scepter passed to Nicholas II, who combined all the worst characteristics of the Romanovs without possessing any of their ability. Nicholas had more than his share of Russian mysticism, and in this resembled Alexander I; but he entirely lacked Alexander's strength and liberalism. He was well-meaning enough—in fact would have made an unsurpassed contractor to pave the highways of the nether kingdom—but he was cursed with that crowning defect in an autocrat, lack of backbone. In addition, he was tactless, and aside from a rather mulish determination to uphold his prerogatives, had no clear ideas on any subject. Such was the man who, in accordance with the principle of primogeniture, inherited the power of a Louis XIV. To make matters worse—since the tsars, unlike Louis, seldom overstepped the bounds of the hereditary nobility in choosing their ministers and advisers, and since the bourgeoisie and intelligentsia, therefore, were automatically excluded—the basis of the régime Nicholas inherited was so narrow that it is difficult to find a parallel, even in the Middle Ages. Moreover, no effective attempt was made to correlate or oversee the ministerial satrapies.

An illuminating side light on the character of Nicholas was furnished during his coronation. As a result of criminal incompetence on the part of the police, several thousand onlooking poor were crushed to death. Instead of canceling the remaining festivities, Nicholas, in order to demonstrate his firmness of character, went ahead with the schedule, and even took part in the dancing that same evening. Such "firmness" in a ruler leads to but one end—an end which overtook Nicholas in 1918 in a cellar in Ekaterinburg (Sverdlovsk).

Further to exhibit his strength of character, Nicholas, in reply to the delegates sent to congratulate him on his accession, delivered an address in which

he declared that "the principle of autocracy will be maintained by me as firmly and unswervingly as by my lamented father."

During the reign of Alexander III, Pobiedonostsev had been the power behind the throne. For a decade after Alexander died, Pobiedonostsev *was* the throne. Nicholas soon showed that, with all his goodwill, his declaration of policy was no idle boast, that he was determined to follow in the steps of his predecessor or proceed even further along the road toward autocracy. Finland, therefore, had little to hope for at his hands. In 1899 he issued a manifesto to the effect that, although the Finns would be allowed to preserve their local self-government, he himself would decide matters "within the scope of the general legislation of the Empire," and made clear that the scope of such legislation would be wide. In effect, this flagrant violation of the Finnish constitution meant the end of Finnish autonomy. Undeterred by a petition signed by over half a million Finns—practically every adult male who could write—Nicholas proceeded along the line which he had marked out. Finnish newspapers were suppressed, Finnish officials supplanted by Russian, local stamps replaced by those of the Empire, Finns compelled to serve in the imperial army, and in 1902 the Finnish Senate was relegated to the position of an advisory body. So much for Russification in Finland.

Related to Russification, though not an official part of the government program, was Panslavism. The Panslavists were nationalists of an ultra-imperialistic turn of mind. Never weary of extolling the historic glories of the Slavs, they entertained extravagant hopes for the future, not merely for the Slavs within the Empire but for the Slavs as a whole, wherever they might be—in Serbia, Montenegro, and Bulgaria, the Poles in Germany, the Poles, Ruthenians, Czechs, Slovaks, Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs in Austria, and the Serbs and Bulgars in Turkey. They argued that the Russians, as citizens of the Great Slav Power, should take an active interest in the struggles of their lesser brethren; and the more ardent among them even dreamed of a Greater Russian Empire which should unite all Slavs within its bounds. On the contrary Witte, one of Nicholas's ministers, made an illuminating remark about the "vain, turbulent Balkan peoples, who have nothing Slav about them and are no more nor less than badly baptized Turks"; but neither his comment nor the fact that the Bulgarians were originally Finno-Ugric, rather than Slavic, worried these enthusiasts. Some Panslavists went even further in their imperialistic romancing—witness the following rhapsody: "In future, Asiatic Russia will be simply synonymous with Asia!"

The early years of the reign were chiefly notable as the period when the Industrial Revolution in Russia began to gather impetus. Although the household serfs, when liberated, had gravitated toward the city, the first effects of emancipation had on the whole been unfavorable to industry, for many industrial workers returned to the country in the hope of sharing in the division of the land. Later the movement reversed itself, and by the time of Nicholas industrialization was well under way. This development was a result of several factors operating in conjunction: because of the phenomenal increase in rural population and the consequent inadequacy of the allotments, more and more peasants emigrated to the industrial centers; the landlords who, because of the

emancipation, could no longer make their estates pay sold out and put their money into industry; finally, the twenty years preceding were the golden age of railway-building.

Russia had experienced great difficulty in getting her railroad construction started, but by 1875 had established a net of main lines 11,270 miles long. By 1894 she had 24,300 miles of trackage; and in 1912 about 50,000, so that she ranked second in Europe in aggregate mileage. Most of the lines were single-track, however, and compared with the 260,000 miles of trackage in the smaller territory of the United States, her showing was not particularly impressive. Per 100 square miles she had only about .3 miles of railroad, as compared with about 1 for the United States, 3 for Great Britain, and 7 for Belgium. Her most notable achievement was the Trans-Siberian, completed in 1905 and double-tracked during the World War. At least her transportation system was sufficiently developed to furnish the basis of a considerable industrial development.

From 1900 to 1914, coal production more than doubled. In 1914 Russia ranked fourth in textile production. Between 1886 and 1914 her output of iron increased nearly tenfold. In 1901 she was producing half the world's oil supply (by 1914, however, production had declined about nine-tenths), and in a decade (1904-13) the value of lumber exports rose from 13,000,000 to 164,000,000 rubles. The impact of the Industrial Revolution in Russia may also be gauged by an inspection of the figures showing the increase in the proletariat: between the middle and the end of the nineteenth century the number of industrial employees increased from less than 500,000 to about 3,000,000, and nearly 50 per cent of this increase took place in the last decade.

The Industrial Revolution had all-important political effects. The lot of the proletariat was by this time vastly improved in western countries, but this example was lost on Russia. After a sporadic attempt at labor legislation, the Government, convinced that industry alone could bolster up the falling revenues, fell completely under the sway of the industrialists and became little better than the policeman of capitalism. For this situation Witte, Minister of Finance, was largely responsible. The parvenu bourgeoisie of Russia were even more self-centered and obnoxious than the nobility, who as a rule preserved at least a semblance of patriarchal relations with the peasants, and by association with the bourgeoisie the Government lost the patriarchal flavor which throughout the reign of Alexander II it had preserved by refusing to identify itself with the interests of the upper classes. In the late '80's there were many industries where 25 per cent of the employees were under fifteen years of age, and the hours of labor ranged from 13 to 16.

Almost all factories pay wages monthly in arrear, and even then the pay office keeps half a month's wages in hand. . . . Much more frequently payment is made only on great feast-days, eight times, six, five, even only four times in the year. . . . In other factories they [employees] only receive their wages at the expiration of the period of their contract. . . . In several factories a whole month's wages is stopped if a workman voluntarily gives up his employment. . . . The regulation in the Schlippe chemical works runs: "If the workman leave the factory before the end of his period of service, he receives only half of the stipulated wages." In the cotton mill of Balin & Co., Makarov, the rule is: "Workers and foremen who enter the

factory at Easter must remain here till October, otherwise the whole of their wages is confiscated." In the workshops of the Volga-Tver Shipping Company the following contract has to be signed: "I undertake to leave one-tenth of my monthly wages always in the hands of the pay office. . . . This tenth I lose if I am punished for any sort of offense."

Such practices were contrary to law—but what chance had the poor workman to obtain his rights by a lawsuit? If he even complained he was apt to lose his job. Thus the bourgeoisie and the Government combined to kill the goose that laid the golden egg. The living-conditions endured by the Russian proletariat were as bad as in mid-nineteenth century England. Frequently five to nine persons were herded in a single room, three to five in a bed. Most baneful of all from the economic, social, and political point of view was the injury done to agriculture in the interests of the bourgeoisie by protecting industry and encouraging the export of grain.

As elsewhere, industrialization was partly a result, partly the cause of a phenomenal increase in population. At the opening of the nineteenth century the population of the Empire was 40,000,000, by 1851 it had risen to 67,000,000, in the second half of the century it doubled, during the first fifteen years of the twentieth century it increased 30 per cent, and in 1914 it stood at 175,000,000—the estimated total for Europe as a whole at the beginning of the preceding century. (Part of this increase was due to the annexation of conquered territory.) During the first half of the nineteenth century the urban population rose to 4,700,000, or over 9 per cent; by 1897 it had risen to 16,335,000, or 13 per cent.

ORGANIZED OPPOSITION DEVELOPS

The student of Russian affairs is now in a position to inquire why the Empire suffered the absolutism of the tsars so long ("suffer" is the correct word, for every government, no matter how absolute, rests on a certain foundation of public approval, or tolerance). In the first place, the various non-Russian minorities never made common cause, or acted in conjunction with the Russian revolutionists. Similarly, the various factions of Russians in opposition to the Government failed to get together. Thus the Romanovs, like the Hapsburgs, could rely on the old principle, *Divide et impera*. Second, the peasants were neither inclined to revolt (they wanted reforms, but were not prepared for revolution) nor in a position to do so unaided. The facilities for education were pitifully inadequate; and as a result the vast majority were illiterate, densely ignorant, and almost completely under the thumb of the clergy. Like the general run of agriculturalists, they were conservative by nature, and they had a superstitious veneration for the Little Father and his glorious dynasty. They were too widely scattered, moreover, to engineer a successful rebellion against a government equipped with a modern army and a far-reaching railroad system. Third, the ruthlessness and efficiency of the notorious Third Section (the governmental department directing the imperial secret police, frequently known as the Okhrana) kept in check or subjection many, particularly among the middle class, who might otherwise have acted as leaders. The censorship was likewise remarkable for its efficiency, and helped to prevent the spread of radical ideas.

Fourth, the army remained loyal to the dynasty until the final crash. Fifth, patriotic Russians, even those of a liberal turn of mind, feared the dangers of democracy as applied to a polyglot empire. In their minds, loyalty to the autocratic monarchy and to Russia were practically synonymous. Sixth and most important of all, the class which might have conducted a revolt was for a long time few in numbers. It is particularly difficult to determine the size of the proletariat in prewar Russia. Of the three million or so industrial employees, many engaged in industry only temporarily, returned to their farms between whiles, and so did not really belong to the proletariat. The proletariat proper therefore constituted only some 2 to 3 per cent of the population. Even so, it provided a more substantial basis for revolt than the few hundred isolated intellectuals on whom the terrorists depended.

The doctrines of Marx were slow to gain a foothold in Russia, chiefly because he advanced no specific ideas on the agrarian problem. In 1879, as has been seen, a small faction of the Narodniki, under Plekhanov, seceded and formed a separate Marxist group—it could hardly be called a party. For years this group of intellectuals remained a staff without an army. In 1895, by refusing to better working-conditions, the bourgeoisie brought on the first great strike. Witte promised reforms, but failed to keep his word. By a second strike the workers effected a reduction of the working-day to 11½ hours. These were events of the utmost importance: they taught the proletariat that the Government could not be trusted, made them conscious of their power, and provided the socialists with a following. At the time, Plekhanov was in exile; the socialist leader on the spot was a young man named Ulianov, who concealed his identity from the police under the *nom de guerre* Lenin. In 1898 nine leaders representing isolated Marxist groups met secretly in the First Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labor party. Their objective was “the complete victory of socialism” through the efforts of the proletariat. As editor of the projected party organ they elected Lenin, at the moment in exile in Siberia. The meeting had little immediate effect, for soon after five hundred members of the party, including two of the three members of the Central Committee, were arrested. In general, however, the police regarded the socialists as much less dangerous than the terrorists.

The Second Congress of the Social Democrats and the first of real importance met in 1903. The platform adopted was a compromise between the views of Plekhanov, the titular leader, and those of Lenin, who by this time was the real power in the party.

The Russian Social Democratic Labor party sets as its immediate political aim the overthrow of the Tsarist autocracy and its replacement by a democratic republic, whose constitution would guarantee: 1. The supreme power of . . . a legislative assembly composed of representatives of the people and comprising one chamber. 2. Universal, equal, and direct rights of suffrage in elections both for the legislative assembly and for all agencies of local administration for all men and women . . . secret voting in elections; the right of every voter to be a candidate for all representative bodies; two-year parliamentary term; salaries for representatives of the people. 3. Wide powers of local administration, with provincial autonomy for regions distinguished by special conditions and ways of life and elements of population. 4. In-

violability of the individual and of places of residence. 5. Unrestricted freedom of conscience, speech, press, assembly, strikes, and organization. 6. Freedom of travel and occupation. 7. Abolition of class distinctions and complete equality of rights for all citizens regardless of sex, religion, race, and nationality.

The platform also called for the separation of the Church from the State and from the school, for an eight-hour day and other moderate labor legislation, and for a reapportionment of the land. The section dealing with the agrarian question was the work of Lenin.

No sooner were the Social Democrats well organized, however, than they fell to quarreling among themselves. Even the dominating faction split—into the Bolshevik (Russian for “Majority”) and Menshevik (“Minority”) groups, the former led by Plekhanov and Lenin, the latter by Martov and by Bronstein, who was subsequently to achieve fame under the name of Trotsky. The Bolsheviks, though few were workers themselves, advocated a strict worker membership; the Mensheviks were for admitting the intelligentsia and the petty bourgeoisie. Despite their name, in the the party at large the Bolsheviks remained in the minority until the fall of 1917.

The Social Democrats, who primarily aimed to represent the proletariat, were not the only lower-class party in the field. The cause of the peasants was championed by the Social Revolutionaries, who emerged as a party in 1901 and who were for the most part Narodniki under a new name. The Social Democrats welcomed the Industrial Revolution as a means of developing a class-conscious proletariat. The Social Revolutionaries hoped to avoid the capitalistic stage and pass directly to pure communism, based on the mir. Like their predecessors the Narodniki, they were inclined to rely on violence to achieve their ends; while the Social Democrats—at least the Menshevik wing—inclined to rely on political action. The organization of the Social Revolutionaries brings to light an interesting feature in the tactics of the police. At one time the leader of the Social Revolutionaries was a certain Azev, who was also an agent of the Okhrana and who played his dual rôle so cleverly—it was he who arranged the assassinations of the Grand Duke Sergius and Plehve—that historians are at a loss to determine which was his primary function. The Social Revolutionaries based their hopes on the misery of the peasantry. Small and inadequate as were the original peasant allotments, as population increased they became more inadequate still; and the payments, stretching out interminably, were a constant source of discontent. In 1905 there were 10,500,000 peasant farms averaging less than 20 acres apiece, 1,000,000 peasant farms averaging about 40 acres, 1,500,000 farms averaging about 125 acres—while 30,000 great landlords owned estates which averaged over 6,000 acres. And with the large number of children per household and the primitive methods of cultivation still used in Russia, 20 acres was not sufficient for the support of the average Russian family.

The Constitutional Democratic party of 1905 was the outgrowth of an illegal group of liberals formed in 1903. It represented the middle class (the liberals among the bourgeoisie, the intelligentsia, and the professional class) and was devoted to the cause of parliamentary democracy based on Western models. All these parties shared a common hatred of autocracy, and stood for repre-

sentative government with universal, direct, equal, and secret balloting; but otherwise they had little in common.

In 1896 the university students, goaded on by the Government, began to stir anew. When the St. Petersburg students were forbidden to celebrate their university fête, they set out for the Vagankovo cemetery to hold a memorial service for those who had died during Nicholas's coronation; but they were driven back by the Cossacks, and 105 were exiled to Siberia. In 1899 a number of St. Petersburg students were flogged with knouts. In 1900, when the students met to discuss the policies of the Minister of Education, 500 were arrested and 183 were drafted into the army. Further demonstrations led to more floggings, and in St. Petersburg seven students were killed.

Students and Social Revolutionaries now raised the standard of terrorism anew, and more successfully than ever. Although 60,000 arrests were effected in thirty months, the Minister of Education, the Minister of the Interior, and the Governor of Ufa were assassinated, and finally (on July 28, 1904), Plehve himself was laid low. What might have happened in the normal course of events was not to be known, for once more war intervened to shape the destiny of Russia.

THE FIRST RUSSIAN REVOLUTION (1905)

In 1856, Russia lost to a coalition of lesser Western Powers, in 1878 she won with difficulty from a decadent Oriental power, in 1905 she lost to an Oriental power and a comparatively small one at that—though in reality Japan represented Western enlightenment, while Russia exhibited all the defects of Asiatic despotism. The decision to enter the war (1904) was in no small degree a result of the discontent of the proletariat and the peasantry, for the bureaucracy hoped that external irritation would allay internal irritation. One of the most ardent advocates of a strong-arm policy was Plehve. From start to finish, the whole affair was an illuminating commentary on the Tsar and tsardom. Coming on top of the Hague peace proposals, the mere fact of plunging into an obviously imperialistic venture—"the most frivolous and fatal of all imperialistic wars of spoliation"—created an impression of instability and hypocrisy. Russia's manner of entering the war was remarkable, to say the least; for throughout the Tsar was conducting private negotiations entirely unknown to his Minister of Foreign Affairs. His agent was Admiral Abaza, who was acting in the interests of the Yalu Co. for the exploitation of Korea, in which several of the Grand Dukes had a financial interest.³ The extent to which the bureaucracy misjudged the military situation can be seen from a report submitted, prior to the outbreak of hostilities, by the Minister of War. "If we want to strike . . . we could not select a more favorable moment than the present, when everything [in the Japanese military administration] is still in a state of chaos. . . . We are perfectly ready, and could in the space of thirteen days have four hundred thousand men on the Japanese [sic] frontier, which is three times as many as would be needed. . . . The war would be a simple military promenade." As a matter of fact, the Russian losses have been estimated at

³ In Russia members of the reigning house held the title of Grand Duke; in Austria they were Archdukes.

from 200,000 to 400,000 men and from 1,000,000,000 to 5,500,000,000 rubles. The soldiers fought "like lions led by asses," but their hearts were not in this imperialistic gamble; and the strategical situation, coupled with the unprecedented incapacity and corruption that pervaded every branch of the Russian military administration, made defeat almost certain.

Every Japanese victory in the East was a victory for the critics at home. In November of 1904 a congress of Zemstvos met and issued a demand for reforms, among which was a representative assembly. These demands, though echoed on every side, met with no response from the Government except for an imperial edict containing a vague promise of measures *to be carried out by the ministerial bureaucracy*. Thus matters stood when the proletariat took a hand. On January 20, 1905, eighteen days after the fall of Port Arthur, the workers of practically every factory in St. Petersburg went on strike. Their leader was a priest, named Gapon, who had been operating with the connivance of the police. The strikers decided to present a petition to the Little Father—not a demand, but a humble, despairing appeal. When informed of their intentions poor Nicholas was in a terrible state of mind. Unable to decide whether to receive his lowly subjects—as his father had once done under similar circumstances—or to forbid the demonstration altogether, he fled the city. On Sunday, January 22 (9),⁴ unaware that the Tsar had left, the workers, headed by Gapon, set out for the Winter Palace. Armed only with sacred images and a portrait of the Tsar, they were chanting prayers as they marched. Suddenly, with no sort of warning, they were greeted by volley after volley of bullets, and hundreds fell dead and dying. Up to this time, the people had blamed the ministers for their woes and had believed that the Little Father, if only he knew their sufferings, would help them. At a single blow, the wanton carnage of Bloody Sunday shattered the faith of the masses and did more to further the cause of revolution than all the preceding centuries of oppression.

Not content with this exhibition of firmness, the Government appointed General Trepov Governor-General of St. Petersburg, with dictatorial powers over the imperial police. Distinguished as a reactionary of the reactionaries, Trepov proceeded to add further laurels to his fame as an artist of the knout and the saber. Notwithstanding, things rapidly went from bad to worse. Mutinies, peasant uprisings, strikes, and middle-class protests multiplied. Armed revolt broke out in Poland and the Caucasus, and in order to keep the state railroads in operation it was necessary to proclaim martial law. On February 17 the Tsar's uncle, the Grand Duke Sergius, was assassinated. An imperial manifesto reaffirming the principle of autocracy (March 3) was followed, the same day, by a manifesto bearing the signature of the Minister of the Interior, which announced the Tsar's intention "to summon the worthiest men elected by the people for participation in the drafting and consideration of legislative measures." Under the circumstances, this empty promise had little effect in quieting public opinion—the less so since no date was set when the reforms were to take effect, the representatives-to-be were granted no power, and the Government continued its policy of repression, virtually unabated. Disaster after disaster was

⁴ Before the World War, the Russian (Julian) calendar was thirteen days behind the Western (Gregorian).

reported from the front. In June, in reply to a deputation of liberal nobles, the Tsar reiterated his vague promise of reform: "My will—the will of the Tsar—to summon representatives of the people is unshakable." Again the effect was offset by the action of the Government in punishing the newspapers which ventured to discuss the matter. An ominous sign was a successful mutiny on the battleship *Potemkin*.

On August 19 Nicholas issued a manifesto promising the establishment of an elective Duma in January, but as usual he lagged behind public opinion. His latest promise would have gratified the majority of his subjects fifty years earlier, and might have been accepted a year or even six months before. Now it was noted that the proposed Duma (parliament) was to be elected on the basis of a narrowly limited class franchise, that it was to have consultative powers only, that the members were to be removable, and that the Tsar had taken care to make clear that he was "preserving the fundamental law regarding autocratic power." Consequently, every faction in opposition to the Government rejected this compromise, the people continued to agitate, and the authorities continued their repression.

In October, Russia witnessed the most remarkable demonstration of popular opinion known to history. A general strike, the hypothetical general strike of the syndicalists, actually took place. The Ministry of Finance, the state bank, the postal and telegraph services, the urban and provincial administrations, the courts, lighting plants, railways, stores, domestic servants, ballet dancers, and even private professional men—as well as factories, mines, and shipyards—all ceased to function. The entire life of the nation, official as well as unofficial, was paralyzed.

On October 27 the workers in St. Petersburg elected a committee to direct their efforts. The committee was known as the Soviet (Council) of Workers' Deputies and was composed largely of Mensheviks, with Khrustalev (Nosar) as chairman and Bronstein as vice chairman. It was this Bronstein who was by all odds the most noteworthy figure of the 1905 Revolution. Only twenty-eight years old, he was in no sense a proletarian, but contrariwise, the son of a Jewish mill-owner; he came from abroad only after the revolution began; he was comparatively undistinguished as a party member; and he was personally unknown to the masses over whom he attained ascendancy. Notwithstanding, he was the real driving force behind the movement, and after Khrustalev's arrest was elected to the chairmanship of the Soviet. Most important of all, he acquired experience and a reputation which were to stand him in good stead when, as "Trotsky," he stepped on the stage of world history twelve years later.

Among those who watched Trotsky win his spurs was Lenin, the leader of the Bolsheviks; but Lenin took no part in the meetings of the Soviet and contented himself with remaining a silent if interested spectator. Soviets of workers and of peasants as well were formed elsewhere. For these local units the St. Petersburg Soviet acted as a sort of general headquarters and, in this chaotic period when the Government was practically helpless and the real power lay in their hands, displayed no little ability in controlling the turbulent masses. The day after the formation of the Soviet, the liberals, under the leader-

ship of Milyukov, had met and organized the Constitutional Democratic party, commonly known as the Cadets.

Just as the syndicalists had predicted, the Government was forced to capitulate. On October 30 (17) the Tsar issued another manifesto, prepared by Witte, directing his ministers to grant civil liberty, widen the franchise, "establish as an immutable rule that no law can ever come into force without the approval of the State Duma, and [see to it] that the elected of the people were secured a possibility for real participation in supervising the legality of the acts of authorities appointed by Us." As if to seal the pact, Pobiedonostsev was dismissed; likewise Trepov, who had rendered himself particularly odious by a circular in which he had instructed the soldiers "not to spare cartridges." Witte, who ranked as a moderate conservative, was appointed Minister in Chief. In order to indicate that the ministry was not to be a cabinet on the Western model, the title Prime Minister was avoided.

Technically, the October Manifesto converted Russia from an autocracy into a constitutional monarchy, but this statement exaggerates the change involved; the word "constitution" was not used, and the Russia envisaged by the October Manifesto was obviously not a monarchy of the Western or even of the German type. The Duma was to share legislative power with an appointive Council of State, it was to have no power at all over many important matters, and most significant of all, it was to have no power over the ministry, which could not be forced to reply to or even listen to opposition. The prerogatives of the Tsar remained for the most part unaffected: his title was still Emperor and Autocrat by the Grace of God; he still controlled the ministers, while the ministry had no control over him; he had the power of veto and "the full right of administration"; most important of all, perhaps, he retained the power of the purse—by virtue of the Bismarckian principle that in the event of the Duma's failing to pass the budget, the previous budget should remain in force. Russia had reached the point attained by England in the seventeenth century or, as some say, under King John in the early thirteenth.

THE FIRST REVOLUTION ON THE WANE

As the Government hoped, the appearance of the October Manifesto proved the turning-point in the revolutionary movement. Up to this time, all progressive Russians had been united by their common detestation of autocracy, and it was their united front which had forced the authorities to yield. Now the progressives split. The Russian Tories, mostly the landed gentry under the leadership of Guchkov, broke away from the Cadets and formed the Octobrist party, which accepted the terms of the manifesto and decided to cooperate with the Government so long as it did not become reactionary. The Cadets refused to consider the reforms final, but decided to see what could be accomplished by constitutional means. Various factors combined to separate them from the workers. Aside from the question of tactics, there were divergences in objectives. The Soviet insisted on agitating for an eight-hour day, a purely class aim which alienated and alarmed many of the bourgeoisie. Even more ominous were the evidences of class antagonism that appeared in the provinces.

Mysterious gangs beat schoolchildren and students, whom, as intelligentsia, they regarded as representatives of bourgeois democracy. Peasants begged their priests to write the Tsar not to allow his autocratic power to be diluted in favor of the intellectuals. Even the workers were disunited. The St. Petersburg Soviet desired to continue the struggle in behalf of "a democratic republic, the best means for the further struggle of the proletariat for socialism," but so many workers accepted the new régime that the strike had to be called off. This did not mean that resistance ceased, by any means; for the irreconcilables were determined to push their advantage if possible. Mutinies broke out at Kronstadt and elsewhere, a republic was proclaimed in the Baltic Provinces, and there were many similar occurrences, which gave the Government sufficient convenient reasons to continue its policy of combining concessions with repression: the autonomy of Finland was restored, and martial law was declared in Poland; the peasant dues were reduced, and immediately after the proclamation of the October Manifesto a four-day massacre was begun in Odessa. A thousand or so were killed, and five thousand wounded. Moreover, since public meetings were forbidden, the constitution was violated as soon as issued. Twice more a general strike was called, but in each instance the movement was a failure. The *coup de grâce* came when Lenin called the third strike, during which the Bolsheviks staged an uprising in Moscow. For thirteen days they held out against the government troops, but by the end of 1905 they were overpowered. The mopping up, done by punitive columns which ranged the country in search of suspects, afforded the soldiery ample opportunity to work off the inferiority complex they had recently acquired at the hands of the Japanese. "Have no prisoners; act without mercy," were their instructions, and they were obeyed to the letter. It was the Armenian massacres all over again, but this time it was Russian against Russian instead of Moslem against Christian.

The continued activity of the proletariat—ill-advised, ill-timed, and ill-omened—sealed the fate of the revolution. Realizing that it had weathered the worst, the Government awaited the new Duma undismayed. The elections were boycotted by both extremes: on the one hand by the reactionary Unionists (Union of the Russian People), who recognized no limitation to autocracy; on the other, by the Social Revolutionaries and the Bolsheviks, who refused to co-operate with the bourgeoisie. Although the electoral law had been framed in such a way as to allow the proletariat only a minimum of influence, the results were an overwhelming defeat for the Government. Out of 490 seats, the Cadets captured nearly 200, the moderate Laborites about 100, the nonparty members 100, the Poles 30. The Octobrists, the only party willing to coöperate with the Government, obtained only a handful; the Mensheviks, on the extreme Left, an even smaller handful. Evidently the Duma was to be a body with hardly any Right, and *all the representatives without exception were opposed to autocracy*. Left a general without an army, Witte found that his position had become intolerable. To the workers, who referred to him as "the 'liberal' broker" and refused to have anything to do with him, he was scarcely more acceptable than Trepov or Pobiedonostsev. He had hoped for support from the liberals, but this was withheld when he made clear that he would not countenance any further reforms. Bereft of backing, therefore, he was power-

less against the reactionaries at court and, on the eve of the opening, resigned. Goremykin, a tool of the Tsar, took his place.

On May 10, 1906, the First Duma assembled. The Tsar refused to receive the address to the throne calling for a responsible ministry, and instead sent word that it must be mailed to the Imperial Chancery. The first bill presented by the Government was for funds for a laundry and a greenhouse at the University of Yuriev! Flagrant slights such as these put the members in a fighting mood, and the session came to a climax when the Cadets introduced a bill for the expropriation of landed estates without compensation. Realizing that the Cadets could not rely on the Left to stage another revolt, the Government stood its ground. On the twenty-first of July the members found their meeting-place surrounded by a cordon of troops and a notice of dissolution posted.

Since nothing was said in the October Manifesto about dissolutions, and ministerial responsibility was by implication excluded from the promised reforms, the move was not illegal; but certainly it was contrary to the spirit of the law. Reminiscent of the Tennis Court Oath of 1789 was the action of some 200 of the members who met at Viborg, in Finland, and issued a manifesto demanding a responsible ministry and land reform, and calling on the people not to pay taxes until a new Duma should be summoned, but the effect was nil.

As a gesture of conciliation the Tsar replaced Goremykin by Stolypin, a somewhat less reactionary conservative. As a further concession the peasants received the remission of their future land payments, including arrears, and were given the right to withdraw from the *mirs* and exercise full control over their holdings, their farms were consolidated, and it was made easier for them to purchase additional acreage. By these means the Government hoped to stimulate an increase in agricultural production, of which there was crying need, and above all, to create a class of peasant proprietors, like that in France, on which it could rely through thick and thin. Since the conditions of *mir* control resulted in disadvantageous strip tillage, much like that which obtained in England prior to the Agricultural Revolution, the move was economically sound, and it was by far the most statesmanlike effort made by the Romanovs in the last half-century of their rule. But since there was no radical readjustment of land tenure, these measures were quite inadequate to eradicate the sufferings and discontent of the peasants, who never lost sight of the main point—that their holdings were insufficient to guarantee them even the most modest living, while the landlords remained in possession of immense estates.

Stolypin stood for a middle-of-the-road policy. On the one hand he resisted the demands of the reactionaries for a permanent dissolution of the Duma, and even for a formal modification of the electoral law; on the other hand he put down disorders and criticism with a severity and an efficiency that would have made Plehve himself envious. In 1906 alone, 35,000 were exiled; and in 1907, 2,000 were sentenced to death, 4,000 to hard labor, 6,000 were banished to Siberia, and 11,000 received other forms of punishment.

Stolypin relied on chicanery and on the loyalty and gratitude of the peasants to bring about favorable results in the new elections. Lenin, realizing that the revolution was on the wane, mystified his party by changing his tactics and

advocating that the Bolsheviks participate. The Social Revolutionaries and extreme conservatives likewise decided to take part. As a result, the Right and the Left increased considerably (there were about three times as many Social Democrats in the Second Duma as in the First), and the number of Cadets decreased greatly. To the intense disappointment and disgust of the Government, the new majority was even more radical than the old. The Second Duma met on March 5, 1907, and immediately locked horns with the Government, though among themselves the parties could reach no agreement.

On May 13 the Fifth Congress of the Social Democrats met in London, and during the sessions voiced its belief in "the inevitability of an open conflict between the masses of the people and the armed force of absolutism." On June 14, alleging that they were conspiring against the Crown, Stolypin demanded the expulsion and arrest of the Social-Democratic deputies. When the Duma delayed its answer in order to investigate the charges, Stolypin issued a decree of dissolution (June 16).

The Government thereupon proceeded to revise the electoral law. The subject nationalities lost most of their seats (Poland and Asiatic Russia lost 73 out of 110, while the Moslems of Turkestan and the steppes were disfranchised), and over half the new electorate was drawn from the upper classes. In the Third Duma of 1907, consequently, the Octobrists and their allies had a clear majority. From then on, the Duma was simply a debating society.

BETWEEN TWO WORLDS

Nicholas II had triumphed, and it only remained to be seen how far the reaction would go. Those who had signed the Viborg Manifesto were imprisoned and permanently deprived of the franchise, and thirty-one Social-Democratic deputies were deported to Siberia. To detail further the characteristics of the reaction would in the main involve a recapitulation of the systems of Nicholas I and Alexander III. Meanwhile the terrorists began a fresh campaign, the most successful of all, and the Government lived on the brink of a volcano. In 1906-07, 4,131 officials were killed or wounded. Stolypin replied with vigor. Suspects were tried by court-martial, and during the five years that he held office over 3,000 persons were executed—to say nothing of the thousands sent to Siberia. In 1908 the casualties among officials dropped to 1,009, but eventually Stolypin paid for his efficiency with his life (1911).

It is only fair to point out that the policy of the Government was not entirely one of repression. In 1912 the land captains were replaced by justices of the peace, and the amount expended on education was so increased that by the outbreak of the World War approximately half the children in Russia were receiving instruction. The chief trouble with despotism as applied to Russia was its inefficiency. The most benevolent, enlightened, industrious, and able of tsars could hardly oversee an empire so vast. And Nicholas was far from able. In addition, the Russian bureaucracy was frequently callous and not infrequently brutal. The factor which in a sense justified absolutism and made it almost a necessity was the fundamental indolence of most Russians, of whatever type or class.

By 1910 the number on strike annually had fallen to 4,000. In April of 1912, however, a strike broke out in the Lena gold mines in Siberia. Workers were arrested, and when a demonstration was staged in their behalf, troops fired on the miners and killed some three hundred. Thereupon a wave of strikes broke out all over Russia, and the number participating that year rose to not far from a million. It was by utilizing the trial of those responsible for the Lena Massacre to arraign the entire tsarist régime that Kerensky, a young leader of the Social Revolutionaries, made a name for himself. As the fatal hour of August, 1914, approached, the strike movement increased in intensity and vehemence. In July 400,000 workers in St. Petersburg were engaged in a political strike, and barricades were springing up in the suburbs.

A significant part in the history of Russia just prior to the war was played by Beletsky, Director of Police. Beletsky based his tactics on the old idea that the revolutionists were less dangerous than the liberals, and secretly encouraged the former. The growth of Bolshevism was therefore the joint accomplishment of Beletsky and Lenin. Beletsky's principal agent was a certain Malinovsky, a member of the Central Committee of the Social Democrats, manager of a Bolshevik newspaper (the *Mysl*), a delegate to the 1912 congress at Prague, a Social-Democratic deputy in the Fourth Duma and chairman of the Bolshevik faction. Chernamazov, another agent of the police, was one of the editors of the Bolshevik *Pravda*. In a way, the Government was justified in minimizing the importance of the proletarian opposition, for the revolutionists shrank steadily in numbers from 3,000,000 in 1905 to 46,000 in 1910.

Although the peasants remained comparatively inarticulate, the agrarian problem that confronted Russia just before the World War was of a far graver nature—a cancer that was eating at the very vitals of the state. The majority of peasants never availed themselves of the privilege of leaving the mir, accorded by the Stolypin reforms. The total who did so was less than 2,500,000, and the amount of their land less than 50,000,000 acres, that is, only about one-eighth of the peasant holdings. Far from improving their condition, half the peasants were not even breaking even, and many million had fallen below the level of subsistence. Of the remaining 50 per cent, 30 per cent were barely keeping their heads above water financially, and only 20 per cent were making real progress. These conditions resulted in part from excessive exportation of grain, which the Government encouraged for the purpose of balancing the budget and at the same time protecting industry. Thereby a vicious circle was created. In order to meet his exorbitant expenses out of the proceeds of his tiny holdings, the peasant sold grain which he needed for his own consumption; and the more he sold, the less he received (the lower prices went). Thus the purchasing power and strength of the peasants was undermined and the entire national economy adversely affected. Until the agrarian problem was faced and solved, Russia could not hope for permanent contentment; and in refusing to meet the issue courageously and effectively, the tsars lost their best and perhaps their only chance to stabilize the Old Régime.

Industrial strikes and agrarian discontent were not the only alarming symptoms. The Duma, although elected under pressure, was growing restless, and even the conservatives began to protest. The United Nobility expressed open

dissatisfaction with the blunders and crimes of the "petrified bureaucracy." Kononov, Vice President of the Duma, declared, "The conflict will grow and deepen." Guchkov, the leader of the Octobrists and former President of the Duma, asserted that the Government was ruining the country and that a second revolution was "inevitable." Pushkin, another Octobrist, announced publicly, "The Government has once more succeeded in uniting the entire Russian public, and in bringing back the mood of 1904. . . . Soon will strike the midnight of the last dark day."

In the history of prewar Russia the astonishing thing is not the progress recorded, but rather the inherent human conservatism revealed. "The country had reached a stage in its historical development which it was impossible to maintain either intellectually or politically, either socially or economically." Yet to this situation—as perilous for them as for the state as a whole—the Government and the vested interests remained indifferent if not blind. As Carlyle has observed: "It is singular how long the rotten will hold together, provided you do not handle it roughly. For whole generations it continues standing, with a ghastly affectation of life, after all life and truth have fled out of it." Perhaps, after all, the student of human affairs should devote less time to investigating the causes of progress and more to seeking to determine why mankind does not progress faster.

Some have charged that the Russian Government welcomed the World War, as a means of uniting the country in the face of a common enemy; and there is evidence to bear out the hypothesis. However that may be, the wonder is that the authorities—when and if they reflected on the results of former wars—did not avoid war at any cost.

family, prominent in English history since the days of Elizabeth. Balfour was also noteworthy as the foremost example of the scholar-statesman produced by England. An aristocrat, a philosopher, a Fellow of the Royal Society, President of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, a sportsman, a musician, and a born diplomat and debater, he made his way to the front without apparent effort or ambition, largely by the charm of his manner and the indubitable keenness of his intellect.

More prominent than either Salisbury or Balfour, however, was Joseph Chamberlain, a politician of a very different type. Chamberlain, who was first of all a highly successful business man, began his political career as a reforming mayor of Birmingham and a radical Liberal (frequently referred to as a republican); he ended it as a Conservative and the foremost imperialist statesman of England. The evolution is significant. At the time when he led the Liberal-Unionist forces out of the Liberal camp, he was commonly regarded as Gladstone's logical successor. During the second Salisbury administration he remained in informal alliance with the Conservatives. When the third Salisbury ministry was formed, he entered the cabinet as Secretary of State for the Colonies, a post then rated as of secondary importance. Thanks to his efforts and to the fact that the Conservatives again expended the greater part of their energy on imperial concerns, he rapidly became one of the dominant figures, if not the dominant figure, in the Government. Twice married, he is also noteworthy as the father of the half-brothers Austen and Neville Chamberlain, both of whom were to make their mark in the postwar politics of Great Britain.

Chamberlain was responsible for the important social legislation passed by the Conservatives during the last two Salisbury administrations. In 1897 a Workmen's Compensation Act was passed, which obligated industrial employers to insure their employees against accident; and in 1900 this measure was extended to cover agricultural workers. In 1901 a comprehensive Factory Code, which forms the basis of the existing industrial system, was drawn up. Chamberlain's proposal (1892) to enact an old-age pensions law, however, was considered too radical by the majority in both Conservative and Liberal ranks.

The great dramatic event of the period was the Boer War, which shook the Empire to its foundations but resulted in making the whole of South Africa British. During the war and just at the opening of the twentieth century, fittingly enough, "the Queen" died (January, 1901). "Queenly as a woman and womanly as a queen," almost the sole remaining link between Britain and its far-flung dominions, Victoria had grown to symbolize something very dear to the hearts of her countrymen. Her passing marked the end of an era—and as such it was regarded by even the humblest of her subjects, though few realized how rightly.

Eventually Chamberlain became imbued with the idea that the Empire should form a tariff block against the rest of the world. The scheme was christened imperial preference; and in 1906 the Conservatives, influenced by Chamberlain, went to the polls as advocates of imperial preference *vs.* free trade. On this issue they suffered the worst defeat sustained by any party prior to 1932.

THE LIBERAL ERA OF 1906-1914

The elections of 1906 returned the Liberals to power with a clear majority of 84 over all other parties combined. On most measures they could count 136 votes outside the party, making a grand total of 513; the Conservatives were left to constitute an insignificant opposition of 157.

Although the triumph of the Liberals seemed and was for the moment the outstanding result of the election, the advent of a considerable Labor vote proved in the long run of even greater significance. The appearance of Labor members in Parliament was not, strictly speaking, a novelty—in 1874, for the first time, two Labor-Liberal members had been elected—but the early Laborites were too few to exert an influence and they were moderates who carefully eschewed any taint of radicalism, not to say socialism. In 1884 two socialistic organizations were founded: the Social Democratic Federation and the Fabian Society. The members of the former were revolutionary Marxists; the Fabians, opposed to both Marxism and utopianism, pursued a frankly opportunist policy. Among their outstanding leaders was Bernard Shaw; most of the rankers, too, were intellectuals. One of these early Fabians was a young man of Scotch peasant origin named J. Ramsay MacDonald. Neither the Fabians nor the Social Democrats prospered greatly; in the course of ten years they attracted only some 5,000 and 800 members respectively. In 1892, for the first time, three or four independent Laborites were elected to Parliament. Not long after, Keir Hardie, who was their leader, succeeded in forming the Independent Labor party. Notwithstanding its name, the party was socialistic; it avoided using that word for fear of arousing British prejudices. Ramsay MacDonald took part in the formation of this group also.

The Laborites soon realized that in order to make any considerable progress they must secure the coöperation of the trade unions, which were well organized and well supplied with funds. The decisive event in the history of the Labor party, as it was later called, was the Special Conference of 1900, at which the trade unions, the Independent Labor party, the Social Democrats, and the Fabians were all represented. The conference decided to form a committee from all four factions, known as the Labor Representation Committee, to act as a general staff during the elections, the four groups retaining their separate identity. Ramsay MacDonald first came into prominence as secretary of this committee, and it was this organization which in 1906 obtained the election to Parliament of 29 Laborites. The new Commons also included 24 Liberal-Labor members, and thus mustered 53 representatives of labor in all.

With their formidable majority as a weapon and the Laborites to egg them on, the Liberals entered on a period of renewed reform that is second to none in importance. In 1906 they were responsible for a Workmen's Compensation Act, which applied to *all* workers not previously protected and which almost doubled the number affected. Moreover, employees were to be compensated for certain diseases, as well as for accidents. A second act of the same year provided that schoolchildren whose parents were unable to buy them adequate

food should be fed by the state. A third safeguarded the funds of trade unions from suits for damages and permitted union pickets to employ peaceful persuasion during strikes. In 1907 a bill was passed providing playgrounds and free medical attendance for schoolchildren. In 1908 an Old Age Pensions Act became law, and an act which restricted the work of miners to eight hours a day. This last measure was the first direct attempt to regulate adult *male* labor by statute. The mere presence of workmen in a mine in excess of eight hours was to be deemed *prima facie* evidence of violation of the law.

By providing for the establishment of Trades Boards with authority to fix a minimum wage in the "sweated" industries, the Trades Boards Act of 1909 introduced another new principle. In 1909, also, a Fair Wages Clause was voted: "The contractor shall, under penalty of a fine or otherwise [,] pay rates of wages and observe hours of labour not less favourable than those commonly recognised." In 1911 an Unemployment and Ill-health Insurance Act was passed; the insurance against ill health was general, that against unemployment applied to a limited number of trades only. In 1912 the Government undertook, not without grave misgivings, to see that the coal-miners received a minimum wage.

The prewar history of Great Britain culminated in a fight to the finish over the Lloyd George budget and the Parliament Act of 1911, a fight which brought to a climax the age-old rivalries between Liberals and Conservatives and between Commons and Lords. In 1909 Lloyd George, Chancellor of the Exchequer in the Asquith cabinet, introduced a budget with several revolutionary provisions. In order to cover the mounting costs of social legislation and of the navy, he proposed to increase the income and inheritance taxes, levy new taxes on large landed estates, and add a special surtax for incomes over £5,000 (about \$25,000) and on unearned incomes (incomes from investments). In other words, it was a budget which, in order to relieve the poor, laid the burden of taxation on the rich. Warmly defended by Snowden for the Laborites, the budget was passed by the Commons, but was rejected by the Lords. This act of the Lords was the culmination of a long series of rebuffs which had irritated the Liberals. It was the Lords who, in the ultimate issue, had blocked Gladstone's Irish legislation, who had prevented the Liberals from disestablishing church schools and from abolishing plural voting (the privilege enjoyed by some of voting several times in the same election), and from other similar steps. In general, the Liberals were angered because, since the Lords were overwhelmingly conservative, the Conservatives retained a veto over legislation whether they had a majority in the Commons or not. The rejection of the budget was a more than usually flagrant act, since for so long as men could remember, and long before that, it had been a constitutional principle that the Commons should have the deciding voice on money bills. Accordingly, led by Asquith, the Commons voted, 349 to 134, that the action of the Lords was "a breach of the constitution and a usurpation of the rights of the House of Commons." Then in order to test the sentiment of the nation, Asquith held a new election. The Conservatives gained a hundred seats, but the Liberals, the Laborites, and the Irish members combined still had a majority of over a hundred; and when the budget was reintroduced it was passed by the Lords.

Bent on securing revenge, the Liberals next proceeded to attack the "Lords' veto." Asquith held another new election, the parties returning with almost identically the same numbers. The ministry thereupon carried a bill through the Commons to restrict the power of the upper house; in order to make sure of the assent of the Lords, Asquith obtained a promise from the King (Edward VII) to create any peers necessary. As in 1832, the mere threat was sufficient, and thus the Parliament Act of 1911 became law: Any money bill from which the Lords withhold assent for a month automatically becomes law; any bill, other than a money bill, passed by the Commons in three successive sessions also becomes law automatically, even if rejected by the Lords, provided that two years elapse between the second and third readings. The Lords are therefore left with a mere suspensive veto. The Act of 1911 also shortened the maximum duration of a parliamentary session from seven to five years. In 1911, too, a bill was passed which provided that members of Parliament should draw a salary. In the course of a hundred years old England had advanced a long way on the toilsome path toward democracy.

THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION: ¹ CROWN, PRIME MINISTER, AND CABINET

Constitutionally, at least, England is a land of glittering paradoxes. In theory the country is a limited monarchy, but the monarchy is so greatly limited that in effect it is a democracy—and one of the most advanced democracies in existence at that. The seat of government, commonly referred to as London, is in reality Westminster, a separate unit administratively from the city proper. The constitution, as a result of an evolution seven centuries long, is complicated to an unparalleled degree—so much so that even in their definitions no two authorities on the subject agree. It is therefore as difficult as it is fascinating to study. The broad outlines are clear, but because it is compound, not unitary, the details are hazy; and for the same reason it is doubly puzzling to those who live in states with unitary constitutions.

The English constitution is made up of what may be called, for lack of a better all-inclusive term, "rules" governing the exercise of the sovereign power. These regulations are of two kinds: (1) those which "are in the strictest sense *laws*, since they are rules which (whether written or unwritten, whether enacted by statute or derived from the mass of custom, tradition, or judge-made maxims known as the common law) are enforced by the courts," and (2) those which may be called conventions or precedents.

1. The first class is divided into four subcategories: (1) certain historic documents, such as Magna Carta (1215) and the Petition of Right (1628); (2) certain treaties, such as the Act of Union (1707); (3) certain important statutes, such as the Bill of Rights (1689), the Reform Bills (1832, 1867, 1884, 1918, and 1928), and the Parliament Act (1911); and (4) the mass of legal customs, tra-

¹ The present account is a picture of the British constitution as established before the World War and as it functions today—the two being the same in all essentials. In regard to such matters as the composition of the two houses, the account has been brought down to date (1934). Such changes as are treated in the chapter on postwar England are not, however, included.

ditions, and judicial maxims (for example, "The king can do no wrong") known as the common law.

2. Important as these legal elements are, they are not a whit more important than the extra-legal conventions which enshrine and consecrate many of the most striking features of the constitution. It is merely a convention which determines that the king shall not veto a bill passed by Parliament, that a ministry which does not enjoy the confidence of the Commons shall resign, that Parliament shall meet in two houses, and that a bill must be read three times before becoming law. Yet these seemingly fragile conventions are binding for more than one reason. First of all, if violated they would lead to illegal acts. If Parliament were not summoned during the year, the Mutiny Act would expire and the Government would have no authority over the army. Secondly, if the more fundamental conventions were violated there would be a revolution. Thirdly and most important of all, it is "the thing" to follow precedent; and the British believe in observing the rules of the game.

According to strict legal theory, the King of England is still an absolute monarch, with almost all the powers of a Henry VIII (1509-47). Every formal act of government is done in his name: he appoints all the officers of the Established (Anglican) Church and of the State; he summons, prorogues, and dissolves Parliament; without his assent no bill can become law; in his name justice is dispensed; war is declared and peace made as if by him alone; if Helgoland is to be ceded to Germany, it is the king who cedes it; if Cyprus is to be annexed, it is the king who annexes it; the army, the navy, and the air forces are his. If he should assassinate the Prime Minister, no court in England could take cognizance of the act since "the king can do no wrong." Yet in practice, since every act is done by the authority of a minister responsible to Parliament, the king "reigns but does not rule."

In order to understand this curious situation, the student of English affairs must grasp the present-day distinction between sovereign and Crown. Originally the two were one, just as the state revenues were once the personal revenues of the king. Today, the powers that the sovereign formerly held have been transferred to the Crown—a convenient term for designating the supreme executive and policy-framing agency, which in practice is a combination of sovereign, ministry, and Parliament. The expression, "the Crown," as used in England, is therefore the equivalent of "the State" in other countries. It is a noteworthy fact that, whereas the powers of the sovereign have constantly diminished, those of the Crown have increased (as, for example, by the addition of an air ministry, and a system of old-age pensions).

Just *how much* influence the monarch now exercises is a moot question. Queen Victoria followed public affairs with keen interest, and is known to have intervened decisively on several historic occasions. On her account Peel did not take office in 1839, and it was she who forced Palmerston to resign in 1852. Edward VII had a considerable part in the formation of the Dual Entente (1904). The most important of the ostensible functions remaining to the king is to act as the chief and almost the only tangible link between the mother country and the great self-governing Dominions.

The Prime Minister is the real ruler of England. Yet technically no such

official exists!—for constitutionally he is merely *primus inter pares* (the first among equals). Until recently (1906) he was not even entitled to any social precedence; and as the nonexistent incumbent of a nonexistent office, he draws no salary—as *Prime Minister*. The salary he receives is merely that of whatever cabinet office, usually that of First Lord of the Treasury, he happens to hold. As a matter of fact, the English Prime Minister is the most powerful official of any democratic state. He is responsible for the bestowal of all titles and honors, and for nearly all high appointments: those of all his colleagues (though, like himself, they must be members of one of the Houses of Parliament), all (Anglican) Church officials, the important professors at Oxford and Cambridge, the ambassadors, the colonial governors, and so on. He composes the speech read by the king at the opening of Parliament, proposes most of the legislation, and he—or his Secretary for Foreign Affairs—conducts negotiations with other countries.

Nominally, the Prime Minister is chosen by the king; actually, save as a matter of form, the king has nothing to say about it. Usually the Prime Minister is elected, *though never directly*: the politicians of each political party, in caucus assembled, choose a leader, and the leader of the party which has the largest membership in the Commons as a result of an election is the man the king normally appoints. If the balance of power in the House shifts, the king may, under circumstances which will be explained shortly, summon another leader to office. Unlike the President of the United States, the Prime Minister retains office and can fulfill his pledged word to the letter so long, but only so long, as he is supported by the legislature and the legislative session lasts. The English Government is therefore much more sensitive to public opinion than the American, and no permanent conflict can possibly develop between the executive and the legislature—it is hardly correct to speak of the two as separate in England—such as existed at the time Wilson was trying to obtain the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles. (Wilson himself, it may be noted in passing, advocated the cabinet system for the United States.) The Commons can signify their disapproval in a variety of ways: they may reject a bill which the ministry insists on trying to pass; they may vote an amendment which the ministry refuses to accept; they may pass a vote of censure criticizing some specific act; or they may express general disapproval by a vote of “no confidence.” If any of these things happens, the Prime Minister has the choice of two alternatives: he may resign forthwith, or appeal to the country by calling a general election.² In case he resigns, the leader of His Majesty’s Opposition takes office.

Theoretically this constitutionally fictitious Prime Minister is merely unofficial chairman of the constitutionally fictitious cabinet. In effect, the cabinet is a committee of Parliament, or rather of the largest party in Parliament; historically, it is a committee of the Privy Council, an outgrowth of the King’s Court (*Curia Regis*), which was in turn an outgrowth of the Great Council. The early kings, who were absolute in fact as well as in theory, required their

² In case of a “snap” or “surprise” vote which he considers unrepresentative of the opinion of the House, the Prime Minister sometimes disregards an adverse vote.

great feudal retainers to assist them with advice. These feudatories, so assembled, constituted the Great Council. Since they had plenty to do on their estates, they could meet only periodically. A chosen few, the King's Court,³ lived with the monarch all the time, in order to assist him in routine business. In the course of time, this court acquired so many functions and therefore contained so many functionaries that an inner group of advisers, known as the Privy (Personal) Council, developed. Eventually, when this body, too, grew unwieldy, the king made a practice of consulting with some of the more prominent members only. These select officials met in the king's closet or cabinet, hence the name. Finally, when Parliament became supreme, the king was forced to choose his "cabinet" according to the wishes of the House of Commons.

Today the Privy Council *per se* is for the most part an honorary body of some three hundred—including the Princes Royal, the archbishops of the Anglican Church, a number of peers, the members of all cabinets past and present, certain colonial statesmen and other officials, and even a few literary and scientific figures. Such *official* acts as the Council still performs can be transacted by a quorum of three. At present, the most important function of the Privy Council is to act as a Supreme Court for the Dominions.

The cabinet is one of the wheels within wheels, or rather the hub of the main wheel, which gives the Government its "drive." The ministry is a committee of the ruling party in the House of Commons; the cabinet is a committee of the ministry (the two terms are often used interchangeably). The ministry includes *all* the higher officials of government (not including members of the permanent civil service, of course) appointed by the Prime Minister when he comes into office—some 66 in all, including parliamentary under-secretaries, certain court officials, and the like. The cabinet is made up of an inner circle of the highest officials in the ministry. They are individually and collectively responsible to the Prime Minister and until after the World War, they always agreed, outwardly at least, on all matters of policy. Although any other minister may resign or even be forced out of office without affecting the ministry as a whole, if the Prime Minister retires, the entire ministry must resign with him.

Since the Prime Minister has the privilege of deciding which officials are to make up his cabinet, its composition cannot be predicted with certainty; of late, however, a score or more ministers have without exception been included. (During the World War a small, inner War Cabinet was formed.) For a half-century or so, thirteen officials have always been accorded cabinet rank: three particularly historic figures, the Lord High Chancellor (incumbent of the oldest and most honorable office in the realm), the First Lord of the Treasury, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer; six great administrative officials, the First Lord of the [Board of] Admiralty and the Secretaries of State for Home Affairs, Foreign Affairs, the Army, the Colonies, and India; the Secretary of State for Scotland; and three historic officials whose positions are sinecures and who in effect therefore are "ministers without portfolio"—the Lord President of the [Privy] Council, the Lord [Keeper of the King's] Privy (Personal) Seal, and

³ Primarily in the sense of a retinue, not a judicial body.

the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster.⁴ Since the Secretaryship of State for the Air was created, the holder has been included in the cabinet—making six regular secretaries of state. Besides the fourteen ministers enumerated, seven of more recent origin than the first thirteen are usually included: the First Commissioner of Works, the Postmaster-General, the Presidents of the Boards of Trade, Agriculture, and Education, the Minister of Health, and the Minister of Labor. Sometimes the Attorney-General is also accorded cabinet rank. Since there is no supreme court and the ministry, in addition to supervising the execution of the laws, introduces all important bills, the English system, unlike the American, is based on a union rather than a separation of powers. (There is, of course, an independent judiciary which safeguards the rights of individuals.)

THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION: PARLIAMENT

The outstanding feature of the English constitution is the supremacy of Parliament. Theoretically, Parliament consists of the king or the "king-in-Parliament," as the technical phrase goes, the Lords, and the Commons; practically, Parliament consists of the cabinet and the Commons, with the Lords playing a decidedly minor rôle and the king a mere "super."

Originally, as has been noted, the king was accustomed to summon his great retainers, ecclesiastical as well as lay, to court for the purpose of giving him advice. Subsequently, representatives from the towns and from the counties were added; and to the idea of representation was added that of election. The "model" Parliament of 1295 contained five elements: the spiritual peers (archbishops, bishops, abbots, and so on) and the lay peers, both summoned personally, the lower clergy, two knights elected by each county, and two citizens or burgesses elected by designated cities or boroughs. These five elements might conceivably have met separately or in almost any combination—in three estates (classes), for instance, as they did on the Continent: clergy (upper and lower), nobles (lay peers), and commoners (knights and other citizens). As a matter of fact, the lower clergy ceased to attend, the spiritual and lay peers met together, and the knights and citizens together—making two houses. At first the members of Parliament disliked to attend, as they were always asked for money. After a while, the obligation to grant funds was twisted into a right to withhold grants; and the Commons discovered that by demanding redress of their grievances before granting supplies, they could get what they wanted. The "power of the purse" proved mightier than that of the sword. Later still, they began to demand an accounting. Since "the king can do no wrong," since it did not seem respectful, therefore, to question him, and since the Commons were extremely reluctant to believe that he could intend to do any wrong, they began to hold his ministers responsible; in 1641 one minister (Strafford) lost

⁴ Under George IV and William IV the revenues of the sovereign and the State were separated. The king surrendered most of his hereditary revenues in return for a salary ("civil list"), but retained his right to the revenues of the duchies of Cornwall (devoted to the support of the Prince of Wales) and Lancaster.

his head as a result. The ministers accordingly developed a very wholesome respect for Parliament.

At the end of the prewar period the Commons were elected on the basis of a franchise which included the great majority of adult males. One distinctly undemocratic feature nevertheless persisted—plural voting. Although entitled to cast only one vote in any given constituency, a voter might take part in the election wherever he held property.

Of the 615 members of the House of Commons all but a dozen represent geographical constituencies; the incumbents of the twelve exceptional seats are elected by the degree-holders of universities (two for Oxford, two for Cambridge, and so on). Incidentally, this constitutes another type of plural voting. Contrary to the American practice, however, members of Parliament may represent any constituency, whether resident therein or not. This is a distinct advantage, for it makes all the political talent of the country available. For instance, if the thousand ablest men in the British Isles all lived in London, 615 of them could be elected, instead of the comparatively few to which that city would be entitled under the American system.

In England, as in the United States and in most other countries, there is no representation of minorities so far as individual constituencies are concerned. In each it is a case of "winner take all." Thus with 615 seats to be contested, it would be possible for a single party to obtain all 615 by a majority (or plurality) of 615 votes, leaving the other party or parties completely unrepresented. This situation has led to numberless anomalies. For example, in the 1922 election, in Central Portsmouth—where the Conservative candidate won, with 7,666 votes as against 7,659 for a National Liberal, 7,129 for a Liberal, and 6,126 for a Laborite—73 per cent of the voters went unrepresented. The Conservatives as a whole polled 5,500,000 votes, the Laborites 4,200,000; yet the Conservatives obtained almost two and a half times as many seats (344 to 142). With only 38 per cent of the vote, they were in a majority of 73. In the election of 1923 they again polled 38 per cent—and were in a minority of 99! In 1929, with only 8,300,000 votes, the Laborites captured 289 seats. The Conservatives, with 8,600,000, received only 260! The Liberals, with 5,300,000, obtained only 58! No wonder that many Englishmen are ardent advocates of proportional representation.

A person cannot refuse a nomination to Parliament, and even if elected against his will, cannot resign. This does not mean that escape is impossible. There is a rule that, with certain exceptions, no one holding an office under the Crown may occupy a seat in the House of Commons. All that an unwilling member of Parliament has to do, therefore, is to apply for an appointment as Steward of the Chiltern Hundreds. Originally this officer had custody of certain brigand-infested forests; today the stewardship exists for no other purpose than to provide a way of getting out of serving in the House—in other words it is simply an exit! On at least four occasions since 1850 it has been granted and resigned twice in the same day.

The House of Lords has about 750 members. By far the most important element is the hereditary English peers: dukes, marquises, earls, viscounts, and

barons.⁵ The British peerage is a unique institution: although the eldest son may be accorded a courtesy title, the family of a peer are not peers. The peerage is therefore a sort of supernobility. On the death of his father, the eldest son succeeds to the title, the seat, and the family property; the younger sons must shift for themselves, and for this reason the British nobility tends to fuse with the commoners. Most of the present peerages are comparatively recent creations. In large part, they are a result of the Industrial Revolution, as can be deduced from the fact that in 1714 there were only 209—and many of those have since become extinct. The first peerage bestowed for literary merit alone was that awarded Tennyson (1884). The first professional artist so honored was Lord Leighton (1896). Lord Kelvin and Lord Lister are examples of men of science elevated to the peerage. The number of military heroes so elevated is much larger, and includes the Duke of Wellington (younger son of a peer), Earl Roberts, Lord Kitchener, and Earl Haig. In addition to the hereditary English peers, the House of Lords admits a few princes of the blood royal, 26 lords spiritual (archbishops and bishops), 16 Scottish peers, a score of Irish peers, and 6 "law lords."

The sovereignty of Parliament is unlimited. If Parliament should choose to declare England a republic, even a Bolshevik republic, it could do so without legal hindrance. No act of Parliament, therefore, can be unconstitutional (it is for this reason that England has no Supreme Court); it is only the acts of individuals that are unconstitutional. It has been said that the only thing Parliament cannot do is to make a man a woman, or a woman a man. But since Parliament is supreme, by the same sign it cannot bind its successors. What any Parliament does the next Parliament can undo.

Although theoretically the sovereignty of Parliament is unlimited and although theoretically, with its backing, the Prime Minister is supreme, owing to the exigencies of practical politics it is equally or more correct to speak of the supremacy of the cabinet. For the Prime Minister to retain power, he must carry the majority of his cabinet—his party leaders—with him (*cf.* the fall of the MacDonald government in 1931); and for the Commons to overthrow the ministry, where the party has a majority (not merely a plurality), some of the party followers must desert to the Opposition. Since this involves bringing the Opposition into power, party members in the House will follow the dictates of the cabinet and allow many government measures of which they disapprove to pass rather than surrender power as a party.

⁵ A baron is addressed as Lord — (a form of address common to all peers). A baronet bears a hereditary title, but is addressed as "Sir (first name)," and is not a peer. The title held by a knight, who is also addressed as "Sir," is not hereditary. The highest order in the world is the Order of the Garter (1344). The most famous medal for valor is the Victoria Cross (1856).



PART IV

THE EXPANSION OF EUROPE

X. THE NEW IMPERIALISM

XI. THE BRITISH EMPIRE-COMMONWEALTH

CHAPTER X

THE NEW IMPERIALISM

THE NEW IMPERIALISM AND THE OLD

One phenomenon that should strike every student of history as peculiarly significant is the spread of European culture over almost the entire globe. From the viewpoint of universal history this world-wide diffusion of a culture is a comparatively recent phenomenon; the earlier cultures of which we have definite knowledge were confined to comparatively small regions and, whatever their interactions, maintained largely dissimilar characteristics.

Until modern times, the most widespread culture area known to history was the Greco-Roman, which extended little outside the Mediterranean basin. Owing to the loss of North Africa, the Iberian Peninsula, and the Near East to the Saracens, the West European area of the Middle Ages was considerably smaller. Not until the dawn of the Age of Discovery, heralded by the Columbian landfall in America and by the pre-Columbian explorations in Africa, did the Europeanization of the world begin.

The process went through two more or less distinct phases, which may be called the Old Imperialism and the New Imperialism. Although primarily motivated by a desire to tap the wealth of the East, the Old Imperialism, which began in the fifteenth century, achieved its most noteworthy results in the Western Hemisphere. There vast stretches of thinly populated territory provided the basis for true colonization—the transplanting of European peoples and culture *in toto* to a new soil—and gave rise to the great Anglo-Saxon states of North America and the republics of Latin America. Throughout this phase, in accordance with the Mercantilist Theory, the interests of the colonies were regarded as strictly subsidiary to those of the mother country: dependencies were allowed no political freedom and were also forbidden to have economic relations, even, with any but the homeland. The Old Imperialism petered out toward the close of the eighteenth century, with the end of the First French Colonial Empire (1763) and the disintegration of the First British Empire (1783). In consequence, prophets arose who proclaimed that colonies were barren ventures, sure to drop away from the mother country, like ripe fruit from the parent stem, as soon as they had attained sufficient development. The natural result—despite the gains of territory achieved by England at Vienna—

was an abatement of interest in colonization, a mood which dominated the first part of the nineteenth century.

Eventually the pendulum began to swing the other way, and the second phase of overseas expansion opened. It is impossible to date the New Imperialism with exactitude. (If the so-called Opium War of 1840-42 be taken as its opening, England, as might have been anticipated, began it.) Its main effects, however, became evident during the Prewar or 1870 Era. Nationalism was its father; its mother was the Industrial Revolution. The Industrial Revolution called for greatly increased supplies of raw material on the one hand, and for increased markets for finished products on the other. Both could be supplied in sufficient quantities only by extra-European countries. The Industrial Revolution also gave rise to large amounts of surplus capital; conversely, as competition became more severe, the returns on domestic capital constantly decreased. Here again the virgin opportunities presented by colonies could be of profit. Rates of return beyond the wildest dreams, sometimes as high as 100 or even 200 per cent, awaited the fortunate adventurer. Loans, for instance, could be made to backward countries, "protected" or otherwise. A French loan of 35,000,000 francs (about \$7,000,000) to Tunis netted the Bey only about 6,000,000; the remainder, in the form of interest charges, brokerage fees, and the like, went into the pockets of Europeans. Ferry, the great promoter of French imperialism, set forth the arguments for overseas expansion in the following appealing terms: "European consumption is saturated: it is necessary to raise new masses of consumers in other parts of the globe, else we shall put modern society into bankruptcy and prepare for the dawn of the twentieth century a cataclysmic social liquidation of which one cannot predict the consequences." Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, another prominent and ardent imperialist, put the case no less dramatically: "Colonization is for France a question of life and death: either France will become a great African power, or in a century or two she will be no more than a secondary European power; she will count for about as much in the world as Greece and Rumania in Europe."

In the New Imperialism, nationalism found its complement: the possibilities of nationalistic expansion in Europe exhausted, the colonial field opened up new worlds to conquer. Germany and Italy in particular, when they had reached the natural limit of their development in Europe, gazed with envious eyes on the overseas domains of their more fortunate neighbors and resolved, if possible, to acquire similar possessions. During the nineteenth century the pressure of population in Europe was relieved by emigration to the Western Hemisphere, especially to the thinly populated United States. In this way millions of Europeans found homes, but since this resulted in the loss of man power, it was not a way that was viewed with equanimity by the home governments; colonies, it was hoped, might remedy the undesirable situation. For this reason again, Germany and Italy, as the chief sufferers from overpopulation and emigration, felt strongly the urge to expand.

Although colonies might fatten the pocketbook of the capitalist, to the "man in the street" they offered little tangible advantage. But here the blind, unreasoning spirit of conquest, grown strong during the nationalistic wars of nearly a century (1792-1871), got in its deadly work; the vicarious satisfaction afforded

the common citizen of a power whose possessions were on the increase—a conquering power—was always sufficient to insure imperialistic politicians a popular backing. Each additional bit of red, or blue, or green on the map was visible evidence of exotic lands where “our flag” heralded the march of “civilization.”

As during the days of the Old Imperialism, religion too played a not unimportant part. The territory acquired as a result of the New Imperialism was made up of lands where “the heathen in his blindness” bowed to strange gods, and thither zealous missionaries hastened with tidings of the true faith. If Catholics and Protestants differed as to just what that true faith was, such differences only whetted their proselyting enthusiasm. That democracy was no hindrance to the New Imperialism was evident from the actions of England, France, and the United States.

Imperialism has been described, in general terms, as the process of Europeanizing the world; in its more immediate and less philosophical aspects the New Imperialism was the scramble for financial concessions, for economic advantage, and above all, for political control—at the expense of lesser and more backward peoples. Some of the more specific objectives were railroads, waterways, ports, coaling-stations, cable stations, and mines.

Because of the Monroe Doctrine, European political expansion in the Western Hemisphere had become impossible. Consequently the New Imperialism perforce turned its main attention to the two great continents of the Eastern Hemisphere, where most of the land was already densely populated and where the inhabitants already possessed a considerable degree of native culture.

THE OPENING-UP OF CHINA

A glance at the map of Eurasia gives the impression that Europe is fated to be a mere appendage of Asia. Yet in view of the number of Nature's decrees set aside by man, it need cause no surprise to find Asia, rather, an appendage of Europe—to find the tail wagging the dog.

Asia was the magnet that first drew the sturdy Portuguese navigators and the tiny barks of Columbus from the sheltering shores of Europe. Portugal marked the path of empire in the East, but her power in the Indies waned before the advance of the Dutch, who, though continuing to dominate most of the Spice Islands, yielded in turn to the rising power of Britain. France remained to dispute the field; but with the Peace of 1763 she too withdrew from the contest in India. Meanwhile, in Siberia, the stalwart Slavs were conquering an empire half again as large as China and, in contrast to other European empires, their domain possessed the inestimable advantage of contiguity. The Russians began their conquests in Asia when (1582) a band of Cossack outlaws crossed the Urals and captured Sibir (Isker), a khanate capital which gave its name to the whole of northern Asia. In little over fifty years the Russians had reached the Pacific (1636).

But although Europe was stretching out her arms north and south, the one Great Power of the Far East, calmly oblivious to what was taking place, still slumbered on in splendid and scornful isolation. In those days China—with an

area greater than the whole of Europe, with a population running into hundreds of millions, and with vast, untapped resources—was almost as unknown and unapproachable as Darkest Africa.

Centuries before Europe emerged from the mists of feudal anarchy, China had developed a civilization in which the higher arts predominated. Densely ignorant of what was going on elsewhere and secure in their feeling of superiority to all foreign "barbarians," the Chinese until well into the nineteenth century remained blind to the world without and content so to remain. The position their emperor was supposed to hold in the world was sufficiently indicated by his title, The Son of Heaven. As he claimed suzerainty from the Pamirs to the Loochoo (Liu-Kiu) Islands and from the Sea of Okhotsk to the southern tip of Cochin-China, his realm in its extreme dimensions extended 3,000 miles from east to west and an equal distance from north to south. His officials were chosen by examinations in classics that had been handed down unchanged for a thousand years. To the Chinese, as to Europeans of the Middle Ages, "progress" was a word without meaning or appeal.

The only country in treaty relations with China was Russia (from 1689). With the other nations of the West, China's only connection, and this strictly unofficial, was through traders, mostly British, Americans, and Portuguese, who were established at Canton and at Macao (where, by dint of bribery, the Portuguese had maintained themselves since 1557). On both sides the conduct of transactions was a monopoly. The East India Company controlled the British trade, and in turn dealt only with a guild of Chinese merchants, known as the Cohong—never directly with any government officials, even those of the lowest rank. The Cohong fixed prices, the tariff, and the amount of "squeeze" (the graft inevitably exacted by Chinese officials). In their anxiety to make sure that their lucrative traffic would not be cut off, the foreigners submitted to other inconveniences and indignities as well. Thus, as though unfit to associate with the Chinese, they were compelled to remain in a "factory" outside the city. These peculiar conditions, coupled with the fact that, while the natives at first had no desire for foreign goods, the traders came long distances and incurred grave risks, led the Chinese to believe these "barbarians" dependent on their bounty; and not having the slightest realization of the military power of the Europeans, they accordingly continued to regard all outsiders as inferiors.

Gradually the English came to regard this state of affairs as unsatisfactory. In 1834 the monopoly of the East India Company ended,¹ and the Government undertook to oversee the trade with China. This change made no impression whatsoever on the Chinese. They were content with existing conditions, and they refused categorically to enter into relations with the British officials.

China's splendid isolation was abruptly terminated as the result of a conflict over this state of affairs and over an economic issue. The Chinese were great consumers of opium, and opium was obtained from poppy grown in India. With commendable enlightenment, the Chinese Government undertook to stamp out the traffic in this noxious drug (1800). The profits were too great, however, for the British merchants to give up the trade without a struggle; many Chinese, too, were interested parties. The resulting situation was much

¹ In accordance with an Act of 1833.

like the present drug-war in the United States, or in some ways even more like the prohibition problem from 1920 to 1933; and with the connivance of native merchants, opium was smuggled in on a large scale (30,000 chests in 1837). From first to last the affair was complicated by the Chinese doctrine of collective responsibility, according to which a group of associates, business, political, and so on, was required to furnish a scapegoat if a member who had committed an offense could not be found. As is usual in such situations, it was at bottom a clash of civilizations.

On the opium question the Chinese Government was determined not to give in. By surrounding the foreign settlement, they forced the British to surrender 20,000 chests, worth an enormous fortune. Not content with this rather high-handed procedure, they demanded that the British (with whom they classed all foreigners) sign a bond guaranteeing that neither they nor *any other foreigners* would import opium in the future. The issue was further complicated by the untoward death of a Chinese citizen, killed during a riot between sailors and natives. Worst of all, the British authorities were unable to identify the culprit. One step led to another. The Chinese authorities were determined to prevent the resumption of the opium traffic and to avenge the death of their countryman, and even threatened hostilities because a victim—*any* Englishman, it mattered not whom—was not surrendered, to be strangled in place of the missing criminal; the British were equally determined to have done with a situation which they deemed intolerably humiliating.

The inevitable result was war—the first armed conflict of importance between the Celestial Empire and a modern European state (1840). China was worsted, needless to add, and by the Treaty of Nanking, which ended the "Opium War" in 1842, agreed to pay a big indemnity, cede the island of Hong Kong to England, and open four additional ports where foreign consuls could be stationed (Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo, and Shanghai). In addition, the Cohong was abolished, and the principle of the Open Door was recognized, that is, that all foreign nations should have equal trading privileges. Strange as it may seem, nothing was said about the opium traffic; but the treaty stipulated that a regular tariff should be established and that the rate could not be altered except by mutual agreement. In short, as a result of the Treaty of Nanking, China lost control of her customs duties.

Less than a year later, in the General Regulations of 1843 (possibly even during the negotiations of the Treaty of Nanking), the principle of extraterritoriality, destined to cause so much trouble in the future, was laid down. This principle the British considered essential because foreigners could not obtain a fair trial, according to Western standards, in Chinese courts. Most important of all, through the Opium War "the Far East was opened to exploitation by the trade and the modern factory production of European countries, backed by all the new means of communication made possible by modern inventions."

Unfortunately for all concerned, the Chinese did not choose to observe their agreements; and constant clashes culminated a few years later in two new official wars, in which, on account of the murder of a French missionary, England was joined by France. When, after the first of these fresh defeats, the Chinese persisted in treating foreigners as barbarians and refused to allow the

European plenipotentiaries to proceed to Peking (now Peiping), the capital, in order to conclude peace, the Emperor's summer palace was burned and Peking itself was bombarded and captured. This time the Chinese were forced to pay another indemnity and to agree to the establishment of foreign embassies in Peking (1860). Even so, they did not wake up to their true world status.

Whether to ascribe the beginnings of a land-grabbing policy in China to Portugal, to England, or to Russia is difficult to determine. In a sense Portugal and England began it, with Macao and Hong Kong; but these were comparatively small matters. Russia began it on a large scale when she forced China to recognize her supremacy over everything north of the Amur (1858). Shortly afterward, in her never-ending quest for an ice-free port, Russia demanded and received the region east of the Ussuri (1860). At the southern tip of this new territory she established Vladivostok, a great naval base looking out on the Sea of Japan. France followed suit by relieving China of her possessions in Indo-China (1862-85). In 1886 the British completed their conquest of Burma, over which the Chinese claimed a shadowy suzerainty. And *still* China did not see the light.

THE AWAKENING OF JAPAN

The plight of China in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth century demonstrated the dangers confronting a nation that refuses to keep up with the times. The history of Japan during the same period demonstrated the dangers inherent in molesting a "backward" but contented people. As late as the mid-nineteenth century the island empire of Japan, a cultural offshoot of China, was in a like stage of development and frame of mind. Although the Dutch and Chinese were allowed to trade at Nagasaki, albeit under conditions even more onerous than those that prevailed at Canton, foreigners were otherwise excluded under pain of death, and natives were forbidden to leave. From time to time, half-hearted and unsuccessful attempts to open up the country had been made by Russians, British, and Americans; but those who attempted to do so were insulted or roughly handled for their pains.

Japan differed from China in several important respects. Though densely populated, it was minute in area and numbers by comparison and possessed extremely meager resources. Only about a sixth of the land was arable. But what the Japanese lacked in other respects they made up in fighting ability and a patriotic spirit that death alone could quell.

The basis of organization was feudal: the great lords, backed by a warrior class, were in control, while the common people remained in absolute subjection. The Emperor, like the rulers of certain other Oriental countries, was considered too sacred to mingle in ordinary affairs; the real power, therefore, was in the hands of a hereditary Prime Minister known as the Shogun.

Almost overnight, the situation was changed from top to bottom. In 1853, to the consternation of the Japanese, an American naval squadron, Commodore Perry commanding, dropped anchor in the Bay of Yedo (Tokyo). Perry's visit was motivated by three considerations: America wanted protection for her whalers, some of whom had from time to time been wrecked on the Japanese coast and subjected to brutal treatment; America wanted a coaling-station

on the route to China; and last but by no means least, America wanted to open the country to her trade. Duly impressed by the first steamships to approach the capital and by such other modern inventions as sewing machines—not to mention big guns—Japan agreed to open two ports to American shipping. The Shogun who made the decision was bitterly attacked by certain factions; but the argument in favor of a new policy was successfully driven home by the British, who bombarded a Japanese port in retaliation for the murder of an Englishman.

The majority of the Japanese were now thoroughly converted to the necessity of fighting fire with fire. Furthermore, the Mikado (Emperor), who was inclined to be antiforeign, died; and Mutsuhito (1867-1912) came to the throne. The opening year of his reign witnessed a "revolution" of the first importance: the Shogun resigned his hereditary powers, the nobility relinquished their feudal rights or were forced to give them up, and the Emperor recovered his position as absolute sovereign.

Once resigned to the inevitability of westernization, the Japanese determined to accomplish the transition as quickly and as thoroughly as possible; and as a sequel to the Revolution of 1867 every department of Japanese life was reconstructed from the ground up. The result was a transformation unique in compass and rapidity, beside which the Industrial Revolution in England or even in Germany was positively snail-like. "When Perry came to Yokohama, he might have been looking into Babylon . . . save that there was far less experimentation in the air." In approximately a quarter of a century thereafter, Japan accomplished five thousand years of cultural evolution.

The telegraph was introduced (1868) and railway construction was begun (the first railroad was opened in 1872). The regulations against foreign intercourse were repealed, foreign travel was encouraged, and commissions were sent abroad to study and report on different phases of Western civilization. The principle of compulsory elementary education was adopted (1872). The primary and secondary schools were modeled on those of America, the universities on those of France, and vocational education, following the model of Germany, was emphasized. Eventually provision was made for university training for women (1902). The adoption of universal military service (1872) made possible the development of a modern army, trained under German direction; and a navy was built under British direction.

Finally, in 1889, a constitution, modeled on that of Prussia, was promulgated. The Emperor, who was declared the source of all power, was to govern through a cabinet responsible to him alone, and to control the purse. The legislature was to be bicameral, with an upper house of peers and a lower house elected by all males over twenty-four years of age who paid a direct tax of about \$7.50. All bills were to pass both houses, and in theory legislation could originate in either house. The following year a new judicial system and law codes, prepared with the assistance of French and German advisers, were introduced. Although her great industrial development was just beginning to take place, Japan had laid the foundations for her career as a modern state.

Meanwhile her territorial status had been undergoing minor adjustments: she had acquired the Bonin (1873) and Loochoo (1881) Islands, and by sur-

rendering her claim to the southern half of Sakhalin, had obtained the Kuriles from Russia (1875). The center of Japan's foreign policy, however, was Korea, another hermit country (and a vassal of China), where she was playing the same rôle which America had played toward her. In 1876, following unsuccessful attempts by French and Americans, she induced the Koreans to sign a treaty of amity and commerce; Japan, for her part, recognized Korean independence. Needless to say, China was unwilling to sanction this turn of affairs; but she was foolish enough to sign a convention with Japan whereby the two powers undertook to pursue a hands-off policy unless internal disorders should necessitate intervention, in which event they would keep each other informed (1885).

In 1894 the Korean Government appealed to China for aid in suppressing a rebellion. The Chinese dispatched troops, at the same time informing Japan that they would be pleased to have her protect her nationals. Once in, the Japanese executed a palace revolution, as a result of which war broke out between China and Japan. Foreign observers were unhesitating in their belief that China's overwhelming superiority in numbers would prove decisive. Moreover, she had made a pretense at developing a modern military machine, and on paper her navy was vastly superior. But as events were to prove, the powers had missed their guess by a wide margin. Japan quickly established control of the sea, occupied Korea, and invaded Manchuria; she was ready to turn south when the Chinese decided to sue for peace.

In 1895, by the Treaty of Shimonoseki, China recognized the independence of Korea, agreed to pay Japan an indemnity, and relinquished Formosa, the Pescadores Islands, and the Liaotung Peninsula. The Treaty of Shimonoseki was therefore a logical continuation of the process by which China was being shorn of her outlying possessions; but the loss of the Liaotung Peninsula, a part of Manchuria, was in addition an encroachment on China proper.

The results were far from pleasing to the powers, and Russia, backed by France and Germany, demanded the return of the Liaotung Peninsula. In the face of such a combination the Japanese were powerless; but they never forgot this gratuitous injury on the part of Germany, nor the comparatively friendly attitude of England. For Russia's part in the affair they were not unprepared.

The effects of the Sino-Japanese war were far-reaching, and have caused the years 1894-95 to be regarded as the turning-point of recent Far-Eastern history. Hitherto, although aware of China's weakness, the powers had to a certain extent respected her potential might; now her weakness was demonstrated beyond a doubt. Japan, on the contrary, had demonstrated that she was a force to be taken into account.

CUTTING THE CHINESE MELON

The powers soon gave proof that their seeming solicitude for China was actuated by no altruistic motives. First of all, Russia obtained the right to build the Trans-Siberian Railroad across Manchuria—thereby cutting the distance to Vladivostok by hundreds of miles.

The scramble for territory in China proper was initiated by Germany, who

up to this time had lagged behind in the race for overseas dominion. In 1897, by way of compensation for the murder of two German missionaries, she demanded and received a ninety-nine-year lease on Kiao-chow, a strategic port, and the sole right of railway construction, as well as of the exploitation of the coal mines, in the province of Shantung. Germany's action served as the signal for a more or less concerted move on the part of all the powers. In 1898 Russia satisfied a portion of her most compelling ambition through a "lease" on the very Liaotung Peninsula, with the great warm-water ports of Port Arthur and Darien (Talien or Dalny) that she had so magnanimously guarded from Japan. Simultaneously, England acquired Weihaiwei, "for so long a period as Port Arthur shall remain in the occupation of Russia"; and France capped a series of economic concessions with a lease on Kwang-chow. But a surprising show of resistance was made when poor Italy, habitually unlucky in such matters, attempted to acquire Sanmen Bay; China mustered sufficient courage to refuse (Italy's navy, of course, was third-rate).

In some of the agreements made with China it was specific that with these acquisitions went economic rights in the hinterland; in others there was a tacit implication to that effect. These rights or claims the powers proceeded to strengthen by agreements among themselves: France staked out the south as her sphere of interest; Japan, an area opposite Formosa; England, the vast basin of the Yangtze; Germany, the Shantung Peninsula; and Russia, Manchuria. Only a comparatively small area in the vicinity of Peking, therefore, was to remain under the complete control of the central Government. Apparently China as an independent state might disappear at any moment.

One power of the first rank stood aside during this scramble for Chinese territory. Although America was second in volume of Chinese trade at the time China had been opened up, and although she had taken the lead in the opening up of Japan, her energies had subsequently been absorbed by the Civil War and, later still, by her industrial development; while the "Battle of the Concessions" was in progress she was engaged in a conflict of her own with Spain. When the Spanish-American War was over, her thoughts returned to the East. Since annexation was not in line with her political principles, Secretary Hay revived the Open Door Policy in the form of a note to the powers demanding equality of commercial opportunity (1899). Though contrary to the basic concept underlying the concessions, the demand was granted in principle.

As might have been anticipated, the covetous actions of the European powers, plus the intense hostility aroused by the missionaries, finally led to a violent reaction in China. After an abortive hundred days' attempt at thoroughgoing westernization, initiated by the young Emperor, the tension culminated in the Boxer Rebellion of 1900. The Dowager Empress, the ruling force in China since 1860, resumed power, made the Emperor a virtual prisoner, and gave her backing to the antiforeign Society of Harmonious Fists. The Boxers, so called, tried to "drive the foreigners into the sea"; many Europeans and Americans were massacred, and the legations at Peking were cut off, until rescued by a joint relief expedition sent by the Western Powers and Japan. The net outcome of the Boxer uprising was that China had to promise an indemnity

of some \$320,000,000, permit the establishment of permanent legation guards, and allow the powers to police the area from Peking to Tientsin, the nearest port.

The center of interest then shifted to Manchuria, where it has remained more or less continuously ever since. This all-important district comprises an area situated since 1860 in the extreme northeast of the Empire; as the home of the (Manchu) dynasty it has been considered since time immemorial an integral part of China proper. Almost half again as large as Texas and three times as large as the British Isles, it possesses untold resources in minerals, timber, and agricultural products—in particular the soya bean, which furnishes the Japanese with food, oil, and fertilizer—and is a region capable of supporting a population of 100,000,000. No wonder the land-starved Japanese cast hungry glances in that direction. To Russians, also, Manchuria was of more than passing interest, for it was surrounded by Russian territory on three sides and was the hinterland of Port Arthur, Russia's only ice-free harbor.

In 1900, in order "to safeguard Chinese interests," Russia threw her troops into Manchuria. Not content with this veiled aggression, she attempted to exploit Korea and supported the natives in their opposition to the Japanese—which was indubitably more dangerous, since Japan, owing to geographical propinquity and for historical reasons, not unnaturally considered Korea a sphere of Japanese influence.

In 1902 Japan concluded an alliance with England—her first with a European power. Each country promised, if the other were attacked while protecting its interests in China or Korea, to "maintain a strict neutrality and use its efforts to prevent other powers from joining in hostilities. . . . If any other power should join in hostilities against that ally, the other power will come to its assistance . . . and make peace in mutual agreement with it." Japan was now ready to settle accounts with Russia. She first summoned the Russians to evacuate Manchuria and to recognize Japanese predominance in Korea. When this summons was refused, she reduced her conditions to a demand for recognition of her exclusive rights in Korea alone. Russia attempted to temporize, but Japan would brook no evasion or delay. Without bothering to declare war, she attacked the Russian squadron off Port Arthur (the night of February 8-9, 1904). This time at least, world opinion agreed, she was biting off more than she could chew; whatever luck she might have against the moribund empire of China, it was a foregone conclusion that she did not stand the smallest chance of success against the colossus of Europe. Consequently England and the United States, who favored Japan, had no difficulty in persuading the other powers to stand aside while Russia finished off her Lilliputian assailant.

The advantages, however, were not all on one side: in the field of active operations Japan was the equal of Russia on sea and had an overwhelming superiority in land forces; moreover, the Russian land and naval forces were both divided. But Japan had only about 250,000 first-line troops and less than that number of reserves to oppose a *peacetime* army of nearly 1,000,000. Strategically, the question was whether the Japanese could get their effectives across to the mainland and crush the Tsar's Far Eastern armies before the Rus-

sians could bring their reserves into play. Russia, conversely, had to stave off the Japanese advance until she could transport her reserves three or four thousand miles and achieve numerical superiority. The Trans-Siberian Railroad, which was single-track and not even complete, was her only avenue of approach. Worst of all, although the Russian soldiers were courageous to a superlative degree, the service of supply was a scandal.

Although the Vladivostok squadron ranged the Pacific, the Japanese made good their crossing to the mainland and thereby successfully attained their primary objective, for the Port Arthur fleet remained under cover. When it finally emerged it was defeated. An unbroken string of small victories on land helped to raise the Japanese morale. During the second phase of the struggle interest centered on the six months' siege of Port Arthur, which on both sides was marked by outstanding heroism. Nearly 100,000 casualties were suffered by the Japanese; the defenders, who numbered less than 50,000, lost half their effectives before yielding.

The third phase, comprising the main operations of the mobile armies, culminated in a great battle at Mukden, with over 300,000 in line on each side—the largest number employed in a single engagement prior to the World War. Since the Russians lost nearly a third of their effectives and the Japanese less than half as many, it was a resounding victory for Japan. But since the remainder of the enemy withdrew intact, Japan had failed of achieving her "Sedan." As yet, Russia's resources were hardly tapped, while the Japanese were nearing the end of their reserves. The fourth and final phase of the struggle was a gallant but futile attempt on the part of Russia to regain control of the sea; she sent her Baltic fleet all the way around Africa, only to meet another and even more crushing defeat at the hands of Admiral Togo (May 27-28, 1905).

Added to his troubles at home, this culminating disaster led the Tsar to accept the intervention of the United States. Japan's hand was strengthened by President Theodore Roosevelt, who had notified Germany and France when war broke out that he would tolerate no repetition of the events of 1895. The Treaty of Portsmouth of 1905 settled the terms of peace: Japan obtained recognition of her supremacy in Korea, recovered her rights to the southern half of the island of Sakhalin, and regained the Liaotung Peninsula. The rest of Manchuria was to be returned to China. A more important result than any mere "scrap of paper," Japan had demonstrated beyond peradventure that she was a power of the first magnitude.

Though Japan expressly promised to return the bulk of Manchuria to China and to observe the principle of the Open Door, in practice she did neither. By the Treaty of Portsmouth she also received the southern part of the Manchurian Railroad; and the possession of this strategic line, together with an agreement negotiated with China whereby Japan promised to conform to previous agreements in regard to exploitation "so far as circumstances permit," enabled her to step into Russia's shoes.

While the Chinese sat helplessly by as Japan and Russia fought over their territory, England was establishing a virtual protectorate over the distant west-

ern province of Tibet (1904);² and throughout the early part of the twentieth century the powers were still further strengthening their hold over China proper by financial concessions. If the foreign capitalists could only succeed in harnessing China's inexhaustible supply of cheap labor, the fabled wealth of the East would indeed be theirs beyond the wildest dreams of avarice. In 1907, France and Japan signed an agreement promising mutual support for their Asiatic activities. In 1907, also, Japan and Russia secretly agreed to regard the Nonni as the dividing line between their spheres in Manchuria, and Japan recognized Russia as paramount in Mongolia. When the United States proposed the "commercial neutralization of Manchuria" (1909), she was supported by Germany and China; but the other powers refused to sanction this principle.

Surely it was high time that China too learned that she must fight fire with fire; and signs were not lacking that she had. Western studies were introduced into the schools (1902), interest in Western ideas spread with remarkable rapidity, and many Chinese went abroad to study. The hoary system of classical examinations for the civil service was at last abolished, and an attempt was made to organize a national army (1906). More striking still, a constitution was proclaimed (1908). These progressive steps might have won the dynasty a new lease of life had not the Emperor and the Dowager Empress, last of the able Manchus, died on successive days, leaving no one of ability to direct affairs.

Meanwhile a movement with far different aims was on foot. In 1905, under the leadership of Sun Yat-sen (at one time a refugee in America), a society of revolutionary republicans had been organized. Conditions were in their favor—the heavy taxes, levied to meet the foreign indemnities, and the famines of 1910-11, which aggravated the normally abnormal pressure of population.

In 1911 a revolution broke out. The Regent called on Yuan Shi-kai to save the dynasty—but Yuan was unsuccessful. Fourteen provinces declared against the Manchus, and a provisional government under Sun Yat-sen was set up at Nanking. Finally an armistice was concluded. In order to assure the success of his cause, Sun resigned so that Yuan might be elected first President of the Chinese Republic. In January, 1912, the Emperor abdicated; the Manchus, who ruled since 1644, had fallen.

Outer Mongolia immediately took advantage of the revolution to proclaim her independence (1911); soon after, Russia recognized her autonomy and "persuaded" China to do likewise (1913). Elsewhere in Asia, the New Imperialism was flourishing like the proverbial green bay tree. In 1898 America "fell heir" to the Philippines and Guam. Between 1904 and 1907 Siam lost 20,000 square miles of territory to France; and in 1909 she was forced to relinquish four rich Malay States, comprising 15,000 square miles, to Great Britain. In 1907 Great Britain and Russia divided Persia into spheres of influence, with a neutral zone between, and Russia agreed that Great Britain should control the foreign relations of Afghanistan. And in 1910—when Japan threw all pretense to the winds and proclaimed the Korean Peninsula the Japanese Province of Chosen—Korea ceased to be the Belgium and instead became the Ireland of the Far East. Japan was emboldened to consummate this revolution by the

² Recognized by the Manchus in 1906, but denounced by the Chinese Republic.

attitude of the United States, who privately sanctioned a veiled protectorate and who made it plain that she would not oppose even more rigorous measures.

When the World War broke out, the only Asiatic countries left with a semblance of real independence (disregarding the tribes of the Arabian Desert) were Turkey, the buffer state of Siam (what was left of it), what remained of China—and Japan. Bearing in mind that both Turks and Japanese were born and proved fighters, the student of world affairs should have little difficulty in deducing the basis of their singular good fortune.

But even so, Asia was better off than Africa.

THE OPENING-UP OF AFRICA

Three facts in regard to Africa explain its peculiar place in the history of the European world. Apart from Europe it was the continent best known to Europeans in ancient times (its northern coast constituted an integral part of the Mediterranean world, and Egypt and Carthage were the granaries of the Roman Empire). Yet Africa was the last continent to enter the orbit of modern European history. Today it is the continent most completely under the domination of Europe politically.

When the Moslems swept from Arabia across northern Africa in the seventh century, the cultural unity of the Mediterranean world was shattered. "Africa begins with the Pyrenees," so runs the old saying—a commentary on the fact that before the invention of railroads waterways were the normal means of communication and the Pyrenees a greater barrier than the Straits of Gibraltar. It was comparatively easy, therefore, for the Moors to extend their conquests into Spain; and throughout much of the Middle Ages the Iberian Peninsula was culturally as well as politically a part of Mohammedan Africa and Asia. Incidentally, the level of culture in Moslem Spain was appreciably higher than in Christian Europe.

Cut off by a wall of alien culture, Europe lost what knowledge she ever had of Africa beyond the Sahara. It was *terra incognita*, of which only legends and myths remained to satisfy the curiosity. (Far more was known of Asia—and that was little enough.) As a matter of fact, there was little curiosity. Economic as well as political causes were at the bottom of this indifference—Asia was the source of European luxuries—and economic causes were at the bottom of the revival in geographical knowledge which took place at the end of the Middle Ages. Trade with the East was monopolized by the Italian states, notably Venice and Genoa, who dominated the eastern Mediterranean. Naturally this monopoly was distasteful to Spain and Portugal, but so long as they remained more or less under the Moslem yoke they were in no position to dispute the matter. When Portugal, which first succeeded in getting rid of the Moors, began to look for a new route to the East, her attention turned to Africa. Slowly her tiny craft crept southward along the western coast, past Cape Bojador (1434), Cape Verde (1445), the mouth of the Congo (1482), and finally, in 1488, around the Cape of Good Hope. The way to the magic East lay open, the Age of Discovery had dawned; and in 1498 Vasco da Gama rounded Africa and reached India.

Meanwhile Spain had entered the field, and it was more than a coincidence

that the fall of Granada, the last Moorish stronghold in the Iberian Peninsula, and the momentous voyage of Columbus occurred in the same year. Even had Columbus never received his inspiration, the New World would not long have remained unknown, for in 1500 a Portuguese navigator by the name of Cabral, while on his way to the Indies, was driven out of his course and owing to the proximity of South America to Africa discovered Brazil—another instance of the influence of geography on history.

Over all of Africa discovered by their explorers the Portuguese claimed sovereign rights; but beyond establishing isolated trading-stations along the coast, they did nothing to enforce their claims and were unable to make good their monopoly. Other nations, the Dutch, French, and English, followed in their wake; but none, with the exception of the Dutch on the Cape, established true colonies in the black man's country. Outside of the extreme south and the Mediterranean coast, the climate was prohibitive. Even the Cape was chiefly valued by most Europeans as a stopping-place on the long road to the Indies. Luxuries such as gold, ivory, spices, and slaves—the last by far the most important—were what the inhabitants of Europe sought in the wilds of the Dark Continent.

During the early nineteenth century the situation remained virtually unchanged. The northern coast, with the exception of Morocco, remained under the suzerainty of Turkey—though the native rulers, except for the payment of a yearly tribute, were really independent—while the Cape (conquered by the English in 1806) was the only other well-defined territory subject to a foreign power. European knowledge of the interior was summed up in the phrase "Darkest Africa"; the map of the interior was therefore a blank. In the first place, as already pointed out, only the extreme north and the extreme south are fit for true colonization; the interior of the north is a vast desert, Central Africa a heat-ridden and almost impassable jungle. In the second place, the entire south is a basin-shaped plateau surrounded by a ring of mountains which render the rivers difficult if not impossible of navigation—in a country where river travel is the obvious means of exploration. Both its geography and its lack of obvious resources were negative influences to account for the lack of knowledge and interest in Africa.

The first important territorial change after 1815, the French occupation of Algiers in 1830, came as an accident rather than as a step in the New Imperialism. Nevertheless, the conquest of Algiers was important, for it marked the beginning of the Second French Colonial Empire. By coincidence, it was the last of the Bourbons who set France on the path to acquire her present great overseas domain. For a long time the Barbary States of North Africa had been chiefly occupied in piracy, and so powerful were they that even Louis XIV was reduced to treating with the corsair chiefs. (The first country in modern times to beard the corsairs in their den was the United States.) Piracy was proscribed by the Congress of Vienna, but no adequate means of suppression were provided. The relations of France with Algiers were complicated by debts which the Dey claimed were owed him. When the French refused to pay, their consulate was pillaged, their ships were stopped, and

their postal packets were held up; and when the consul demanded redress, the Dey struck him with a fly-swatter. Seeing an opportunity to retrieve his fallen prestige, Charles X sent out an expedition which captured the city of Algiers.

When the government of Louis-Philippe came into power, it was at first unable to decide whether to continue the occupation or to withdraw. Since the natives in the vicinity of the city were hostile, making future conflicts inevitable, the decision to remain entailed the conquest of the rest of Algeria. In her attempts at "pacification" (conquest), France met a redoubtable antagonist in Abd-el-Kader; and it was not until 1847, after a huge expenditure in men and money, that he was defeated and captured. Although not in itself a part of the New Imperialism, the occupation of Algeria was of fundamental importance for a second reason: owing to the necessity felt by France of protecting her Algerian possessions, it led eventually to the occupation of Tunisia, a step which was to mark the beginning of the New Imperialism in Africa.

During the first half of the century, the only other colonization effort of capital importance was the creation of the South African Republic and the Orange Free State by dissatisfied Boer farmers who emigrated from Cape Colony.

THE SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA

Although, as has been suggested, the so-called Opium War may be taken to mark the beginning of the New Imperialism, it was in Africa and in the 1870 Era that the movement displayed its most characteristic and striking features.

Interest in Central Africa was aroused by a number of missionaries and explorers, foremost among them Livingstone and Stanley. From 1840 on, Livingstone, a Scotch explorer-missionary, spent most of his life in Africa. His most famous accomplishment was a transcontinental trip from Algoa Bay, a little south of the Congo, to the mouth of the Zambezi—during which he discovered the Victoria Falls, the greatest cataract in the world. While Livingstone was opening up southern Africa, others were beginning the exploration of equatorial Africa. Speke, also a Britisher, solved the "riddle of the Nile" by tracing its course from Lake Victoria³ to Khartoum (1862); and Du Chaillu, a Frenchman, discovered the pygmies (1865). Livingstone's exploits made him so famous that when he disappeared for several years and was given up for lost, James Gordon Bennett, owner of the New York *Herald*, sent out his star reporter, Stanley, to establish the facts. Stanley's trip and his account of his adventures, *How I Found Livingstone*, aroused intense interest, similar to that later created by the polar explorations of Peary, Amundsen, and Byrd. Persuaded to become an explorer on his own account, Stanley traversed the heart of Africa, from Zanzibar to the upper waters of the Congo and down that river to its mouth. This expedition, which made known a watercourse second only to the Amazon in size, was the most important exploit of its kind and was attended by innumerable hardships and dangers. Stanley's three white companions all died on the way. His story of his trip, *Through the Dark*

³ Victoria Nyanza.

Continent, enjoyed immense popularity. Tales of exotic animals such as gorillas and giraffes, of strange peoples like the pygmies, of wonderful plants that produce rubber, and of the possibilities of obtaining coffee, cocoa, and other tropical products fired the bourgeoisie with enthusiasm and caused widespread awakening of interest in the potentialities of Africa as a field for expansion.

✓ No one was quicker to realize the import of Stanley's explorations than Leopold II, King of the Belgians. In 1876 he summoned a conference at Brussels that resulted in the creation of an International Association for the Exploration and Civilization of Africa. From the first, the lead was taken by Belgians; Leopold contributed most of the necessary funds from his private fortune, and gradually the Association came under his complete control. Stanley was hired to found stations and make treaties with the native chiefs, who had only the haziest notions as to what it was all about.

In 1880, however, with the exception of an increasing number of coastal stations, notably those of France in the west and on the Gulf of Guinea, most of the vast continent of Africa (three times as large as Europe) was still a little-known "no man's land." England controlled approximately 250,000 square miles; France, about 170,000; the Boers, some 150,000; Portugal, less than 40,000; and Spain, 1,000—a little over 600,000 altogether, out of a total of more than 11,000,000.

✓ The Partition of Africa, which followed, resulted from the general causes enumerated in connection with the description of the New Imperialism, from the activities of Leopold of Belgium, from the desire of France to indemnify herself for her losses during the War of 1870, from the desire of Germany and Italy to take rank as colonial powers, and from the determination of England not to be outdone.

The first important European acquisition after 1880 was Tunis. During the '70's Tunisian tribesmen had staged an average of two hundred raids a year into Algeria. Normally the French took little notice; but in 1881, having determined to absorb Tunisia, they seized on one of these periodical incursions as a pretext to establish what was to all intents and purposes a protectorate. The French further camouflaged their action with a declaration that no military occupation or annexation was intended. The following year England occupied Egypt and the Italians formally entered the race for colonies by proclaiming a protectorate over their holdings on the Red Sea, a step imitated by France in 1883.

When the year 1884 began, Germany was still without a foothold in Africa—or for that matter, anywhere else outside Europe. Not wishing to offend the British, and not believing in colonies anyway, Bismarck had resisted the pressure of colonial enthusiasts to enter the race for overseas dominion; and when he finally decided to yield, he first consulted England to find out if she had any objections. Receiving a noncommittal reply, he proceeded to annex a number of vacant areas—German Southwest Africa, Togoland, the Cameroons, and German East Africa. As soon as Germany took action, England bestirred herself; as an illustration of how extremely close the race was, the British representative arrived in the Cameroons only five days after the Germans had concluded their treaty with the natives. France was by no means behind her rivals;

in the same year she concluded no less than forty-two treaties with the chiefs in the hinterland of her West African possessions, and in 1885 she also began to strengthen her long-standing but shadowy protectorate over the great island of Madagascar. As it turned out, therefore, Bismarck was placed in the somewhat anomalous position of having caused the forces working for the New Imperialism to come to a head.

In 1884-85 Africa attained the dignity of a general European question when the powers met in Berlin to decide the status of the Congo basin and to lay down rules for future annexations. Leopold had the satisfaction of seeing the Congo Free State recognized as a sovereign and neutral power and placed under his personal rule.

When the coastal territories were allocated, it remained to decide the relationship of these various holdings to the interior, a matter complicated by mutually conflicting ambitions. Portugal and Germany aspired to connect their holdings in East and West Africa. Italy was casting covetous eyes toward the native state of Abyssinia. France wanted to link her western holdings with her colony on the Red Sea. Cecil Rhodes, a typical nineteenth century imperialist, was dreaming of an uninterrupted British empire "from the Cape to Cairo." Obviously, not all of these ambitions could be realized.

Time and again war clouds gathered, but eventually the powers adjusted their differences without recourse to arms. The most important of the nineteenth century settlements were two treaties of 1890: an Anglo-German Agreement, whereby England traded Helgoland in exchange for a free hand in Zanzibar; and an Anglo-French Agreement, whereby England recognized the French protectorate over Madagascar and French priority in the Sahara.

Only four armed conflicts of importance, none involving more than one Western Power, took place between organized states. In 1882 England invaded and subjugated Egypt. Italy attempted to establish a protectorate over Abyssinia, but desisted after a crushing defeat at Adowa (1896). The South African Republic and the Orange Free State came into conflict with England, and as a result of the Boer War (1899-1902) were annexed to the British Empire. In 1911-12 Italy wrested Tripoli from Turkey.

Among the powers the keenest rivalry was that between England and France over the Egyptian Sudan; and when a British force under Kitchener met a French expedition under Major Marchand at Fashoda (1898), it looked for a time as if a European conflict were inevitable. Finally France gave way, and in 1904 the two countries came to an agreement whereby France recognized England's supremacy in the Nile basin, and England blessed the French ventures in Morocco. In 1912, France accordingly proclaimed a protectorate over Morocco; and Turkey, as a result of her war with Italy, lost Tripoli, the last African possession over which she still retained any shadow of control.

In 1914 there were only two independent states left in Africa: Liberia, a republic founded for the benefit of American freedmen; and Abyssinia, which since Adowa had been treated with unwonted consideration. In 1919, at the conclusion of the World War, Germany lost all of her colonies; the larger part, Asiatic as well as African, were transferred to the British as "mandates."

BY THEIR FRUITS

The colonies acquired as a result of the New Imperialism are profitable to a favored few, but to the "mother" country as a whole they are mostly quite the reverse. A brief statement concerning Algeria, considered by the French the most important of their overseas possessions, should be sufficient to prove the point: "Before 1900, the one obvious fact was the permanent deficit—that for 1900 alone being over 86 million francs [about \$17,200,000], and the accumulated total since 1830 close on five milliards [about \$1,000,000,000]! Every year France had to give a credit to Algeria even to balance the civil budget. . . The Algerian development was unhealthy for all concerned, and, taking all factors into account, the expenses of Algeria in 1910 were at least double the receipts, artificial budget-balances notwithstanding." *Algeria proves a whole heap*

Naturally enough, the authorities endeavor to conceal the true situation. "The official publications of Algeria purported to make out a profit each year, even in the nineties, whereas those published in Paris revealed a marked and permanent deficit!" For the French colonies as a whole, "the budget of the Colonial Minister [who does not control the three North African states (Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia) nor Syria] reflects far less than half the purely colonial charges. . . . The above budget, for example, places the military cost of the colonies at 320 million francs—a sufficiently formidable sum. But to it has to be added the expense of the colonial troops which are under the Minister of War. In 1922 their charge was 219 million francs, as compared with the 185 millions under the Minister of the Colonies, yet the former sum did not occur in any colonial accounts. In addition, many colonial charges figure in the budgets of the Ministries of Marine, Education, and Foreign Affairs; the Minister of Public Works has extensive colonial appropriations, especially for communications." Incidentally, the Moroccan and Syrian Wars of the postwar decade cost the French at least 5,000,000,000 francs!

How poorly the New Imperialism performed even its primary functions is also demonstrated by the French colonies. Despite the extreme protectionist system generally in force, "of 6 milliard francs' [about \$1,200,000,000] worth of colonial produce imported to France before the War, two-thirds could have come from the French colonies, yet actually 90 per cent. of this trade was in the hands of foreigners! . . . This position continued and, in 1920, France obtained only 10 per cent. of her food-imports from the colonies and 5 per cent. of her raw materials; and even such products as sugar and coffee and cocoa, wool and cotton came from foreign colonies."

As an outlet for surplus population, moreover, most of the colonies acquired as a result of the New Imperialism proved decidedly disappointing. In 1897, in a territory some four times as large as Germany there were only 2,182 resident Germans, two-thirds of whom were officials or soldiers. According to recent statistics the white population of certain colonies in relation to total population is as follows: Uganda (B) 1,995 out of 2,920,000, Nigeria (B) 3,900 out of 18,000,000, the Congo (Bn) 25,179 out of 8,803,422, Italian Somaliland 1,856 out of 900,000, Rio Muni (Sp) 130 out of 100,000, French West Africa 15,399

out of 13,541,611, and French Equatorial Africa 2,502 out of 3,127,707. "Apart from Algeria, with its 750,000 French subjects, the entire overseas Empire of France has only 1,044,000 European settlers, the great bulk of them officials" ⁴ (less than a fourth of a settler per square mile!).

The Belgian Congo was perhaps the outstanding prewar example of the evils of imperialism. Early in the twentieth century, rumors became current that under the personal rule of Leopold there existed in the Congo a condition of disguised slavery unparalleled in the annals of any "enlightened" administration.

Whether or not the protests emanating from the powers were a result of the knowledge that Leopold had gradually and secretly violated the spirit of the original agreement, which stipulated that "the trade of all nations shall enjoy complete freedom," matters little. A decree of 1885 had declared all "vacant lands" the property of the state (what constituted "vacant lands" was left to the state—that is, to Leopold himself—to decide). Later, a secret decree reserved to the state the monopoly of the ivory and rubber in the "vacant lands" (1891). The natives were obliged to "sell" their products to the state, were forbidden to leave their villages, and were tortured if the output was unsatisfactory. Only in a small district on the lower Congo was there any freedom of trade. This distasteful state of affairs was aggravated by another secret decree creating a vast Crown Domain for the exclusive benefit of Leopold himself (1896).

Sir Edward Grey declared that the Congo State had "morally forfeited every right to international recognition" and in substantiation of his verdict quoted Cromer, who had declared the régime the worst he, Cromer, had ever seen. Public opinion in Belgium was finally aroused, and in 1908 the sovereignty of the Congo was transferred to the Belgian nation and the administration placed under the supervision of the parliament. At the outbreak of the World War there were those who were unkind enough to pronounce the invasion of Belgium a not unpoetic retribution for the treatment accorded the blacks in Central Africa.

A comparison of the empires of today with those of 1815 furnishes some interesting data on the New Imperialism. In territorial extent, the greatest empire of 1815 was that of Russia, followed in order by those of Spain, England, Portugal, Turkey, Denmark (of little value), Holland, and last of all, France.


The approximate figures in the accompanying table indicate the situation today ⁵

⁴ The last clause seems more than questionable. Possibly the author meant to say, "In the majority of its overseas possessions officials make up the great bulk of the European population." I have been unable to find any details except the following for 1900:

Senegal	620 officials to 470 colonists
French Sudan	107 officials to 184 colonists
French Guinea	241 officials to 42 colonists
Ivory Coast	398 officials to 52 colonists
Dahomey	363 officials to 33 colonists
French Congo	580 officials to 78 colonists
French Guiana	521 officials to 579 colonists

⁵ Arranged according to an evaluation which attempts to balance areas with populations and economic factors. The figures for Denmark and Norway are so deceptive that they are not worth mentioning.

	<i>Area</i>	<i>Population</i>		<i>Area</i>	<i>Population</i>		<i>Area</i>	<i>Population</i>
British colonies	18,061,250	425,210,000	Great Britain	88,750	44,790,000	British Empire	18,150,000	470,000,000
Russian Empire							8,145,000	160,000,000
French colonies	4,470,000	60,000,000	France	212,660	42,000,000	French Empire	4,682,660	102,000,000
Dutch colonies	788,000	61,000,000	Netherlands	12,600	8,000,000	Dutch Empire	800,600	69,000,000
Portuguese colonies	800,000	8,247,000	Portugal	34,250	6,200,000	Portuguese Empire	834,250	14,647,000
Belgian colonies	918,250	9,000,000	Belgium	11,750	8,000,000	Belgian Empire	930,000	17,000,000
Spanish colonies	133,000	2,250,000	Spain	190,000	22,000,000	Spanish Empire	323,000	24,250,000
Italian colonies	872,000	2,340,000	Italy	119,700	42,120,000	Italian Empire	991,700	44,460,000



The British Empire stands head and shoulders above all others in area, in population, and in economic value; but the Russian Empire has the inestimable advantage of contiguity and is for the most part in the temperate zone. France is a poor third in the colonial field, though she is far ahead of all her other European competitors with the exception of Holland, whose colonial empire makes up in value what it lacks in size. Yet little Holland, whose empire as a whole ranks only seventh in area, still holds in the East alone an empire fifty-eight times as large as the "mother" country—larger than the British Isles, France, Holland, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Switzerland, Austria, and Italy combined!

In the interim between 1815 and the present, Germany acquired and lost a large colonial empire. Relatively and absolutely Spain lost the most. Turkey lost her empire, and Portugal a large portion of hers.

Russia and England alone were great in both periods; but the outstanding *gains* were made by France. As late as 1870 the French colonial empire was comparatively insignificant. Yet today, as General Mangin (who earned his nickname of "Butcher" Mangin during the World War) has proclaimed, France is not the "poor little" country with which many are wont to sympathize, but an empire of 100,000,000. During the war nearly 2,000,000 colonials, of whom 680,000 were actual combatants, served in France.

For purposes of comparison, figures for the two other great empires of today follow. Japan proper has an area of 148,750 square miles and a population of 64,450,000; the Japanese colonies, exclusive of the new state of "Manchukuo" (Manchuria, and so on), have an area of 114,150 square miles and a population of 26,900,000. The Japanese Empire as a whole has, therefore, an area of 262,900 square miles and a population of about 91,350,000. "Manchukuo" contains some 400,000 square miles and perhaps 30,000,000 inhabitants.

In 1790 the United States contained 892,135 square miles and 3,929,214 inhabitants. Today continental United States has an area of 3,026,789 square miles and 122,775,046 inhabitants; her official possessions (including Alaska and the Canal Zone), acquired in the pursuit of her "manifest destiny," comprise about 711,606 square miles and about 14,233,389 inhabitants; and her unofficial protectorates (Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Panama, not to mention Nicaragua) have an area of 107,367 square miles and a population of 7,083,097.

In the world at large, in 1914, apart from the Great Powers there remained at most five independent countries with an individual population in excess of 10,000,000 (and in only one case in excess of 20,000,000)—China, Spain, Turkey, Brazil, and Abyssinia.

CHAPTER XI

THE BRITISH EMPIRE-COMMONWEALTH

BRITAIN'S WORLD-ENCIRCLING EMPIRE

As the most noteworthy instance of that general process whereby European history is gradually becoming world history, the British Empire merits more than passing consideration. Of the manifold political organisms created by man since the dawn of history it is by all odds the most striking and the most interesting. Philip II of Spain laid claim to more territory, but much of his domain was ill-organized, unorganized, or even ill-defined. The realm of Genghis Khan was a mere agglomeration of conquests, soulless and ephemeral. The Roman Empire, the only prototype of the British, had only a fraction the area and population, and nowhere near the complexity.

In the words of the classic phrase, "The sun never sets on the Union Jack." But even this vivid epigram falls far short of indicating the true magnitude of the unique creation known as the British Empire. In the Northern Hemisphere it extends from the equator to 37° , and from 42° to 83° . In the Southern Hemisphere it extends unbroken from the equator to 47° , and from 64° to the pole (including territorial waters from 50°). If the two be taken together, consequently, there is not a degree of latitude that, either in the Northern or in the Southern Hemisphere, is not found in some British possession. In longitude, exclusive of antarctic possessions it covers over three-fourths of the earth's circumference; inclusive of antarctic possessions there are not five degrees of longitude unbroken by some spot that owes allegiance to the British Crown. Not only is the old saying a gross understatement, therefore, but actually there are not fifteen minutes of the day when it is not local noon at some point in the British Empire! It need hardly be added that such an extent of territory comprises every type of climate and vegetation. Incidentally, England is very close to the center of the land hemisphere, and New Zealand is the closest of any large land body to the center of the water hemisphere. In all, the Empire includes over a fourth of the population and nearly a third of the habitable land area of the globe.

Curious though it may seem, the primary difficulty encountered by one who deals with the British Empire is to determine what it comprises, since many places are omitted from the official lists which, when viewed from a realistic standpoint, obviously belong there. The present account will therefore include

all countries whose sovereignty is in any way impaired by treaty obligations to Great Britain.

Moreover, it is impossible to arrive at any satisfactory classification of the heterogeneous collection of political entities of which the Empire is composed, ranging as they do from those which are entirely self-governing to those which are under the absolute domination of Great Britain, and including some where the control is exercised openly and others where it is concealed under a variety of disguises. An analysis from what may be termed the humanitarian point of view, showing which of the component parts would remain within the Empire if every shadow of coercion were removed, would be the most satisfactory of all. Unfortunately, this criterion is precisely the most difficult of all to apply—impossible in most cases, so complicated are the racial and nationalistic factors involved. And even where these factors themselves seem clear, one cannot be sure of the result. South Africa, for instance, is a case in point.¹

From an administrative point of view the Empire may be divided, roughly, into four categories. 1. India alone, with the India Office, has a separate administration. 2. The Dominions Office is devoted to the affairs of the self-governing Dominions. 3. The Colonial Office has the oversight of the bulk of the Empire, so far as the number of separate entities is concerned—the majority of the crown colonies and the official protectorates. 4. Certain of the component parts have no connection with any of these three organizations: the most noteworthy are Egypt, the Sudan, Zanzibar, and Aden—all under the Foreign Office (Aden for political affairs only). The Channel Islands and the Isle of Man likewise belong in this category.

The most satisfactory method of classification, on the whole, seems to be an analysis from the legalistic point of view (see Appendix IV), according to the amount of control exercised by Great Britain or, conversely, the amount of freedom enjoyed by the colonies; although owing to the conflict of theory and practice, this method too presents almost insuperable difficulties. Moreover, from the governmental point of view the Empire presents an almost infinite variety of types, ranging from the Dominions, coequal with the mother country, Tristan da Cunha, which has no government, Egypt, which is theoretically independent, and Iraq, which is practically independent, down through the various types of crown colonies, some of which have organs of self-expression and others no freedom whatsoever. Thus the Empire includes one region still under a trading company (British North Borneo), one "native" state held by an Englishman as his private domain (Sarawak), one leasehold (a part of Hong Kong), and one triarchy (Naru), and it participates in the government of two condominiums (the Sudan and the New Hebrides) and one polyarchy (Tangier). The case of the protectorates is particularly complicated. Though none are theoretically British soil, nor are their inhabitants British citizens, here their resemblances end. Some, like Uganda, have the status of ordinary crown colonies. Some, like Zanzibar and Oman, while preserving their nominal independence, are in reality under British administration. Others, like Egypt and Tibet, are merely subject to certain specified restrictions. Finally there are the

¹ See pp. 274-78.

"mandates," acquired as a result of the World War, which theoretically are not part of the Empire at all, but which have nevertheless been pronounced inalienable! Some are virtually independent (Iraq); others are administered as integral parts of crown colonies.

In passing, it may be noted that in addition there are "spheres" (such as portions of southern Persia) hardly to be classed as parts of the Empire and normally mere objects of "benevolent interest"—but where Britain does not scruple to intervene by force of arms if necessary.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SELF-GOVERNMENT IN CANADA

Prior to the nineteenth century no such thing as a "dominion" was known; today the Dominions are supremely significant elements in the Empire. The most interesting phase of Empire history, therefore, is the development of the six self-governing Dominions—Canada, Newfoundland,² Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and the Irish Free State.

In 1763, at the end of the long Anglo-French struggle for colonial supremacy, Canada became part of the Empire. The American Revolution, which followed almost immediately, had its repercussions in Canada. The revolutionists tried, unsuccessfully, to draw Canada into their movement; at the same time Canada furnished a refuge for American loyalists. With the conclusion of peace, England, so far as North America was concerned, was left in the anomalous position of having lost thirteen colonies that were predominantly British and having retained a region which was predominantly French. Canada proper, known as the Province of Canada and inhabited by the greatest number of settlers by far, was the center of gravity and interest, as opposed to the maritime provinces.

How much influence the American Revolution had on British policy is a matter of controversy; strange to say, the consensus of opinion seems to be that it made the English less rather than more liberal toward their colonies. The Quebec Act (1774) helped to keep the French loyal by guaranteeing the privileged position of their church, civil law, and language, but did little toward satisfying any aspirations toward autonomy. Indeed the Quebec Act specifically took back the promise of representative government made in 1763. In 1791 the Province of Canada was divided along linguistic lines into Upper Canada (later Ontario), where the British had settled, and Lower Canada (subsequently Quebec). Each was given a separate government, with an assembly elected by the property-owners and having the disposition of taxes; but the executive was appointed by the Crown and responsible to it alone. This concession introduced representative government, a long-accepted principle of British colonial policy, but not responsible government. The new system did not work well: it gave rise to continual conflicts between the assemblies and the governors, and between the two nationalities; and the year Queen Victoria came to the throne these difficulties culminated in rebellions in both provinces. The disturbances were quelled, but the home Government was undeniably and for

² In December, 1933, for financial reasons Newfoundland asked the mother country to change her status temporarily to that of a crown colony, and the petition was granted.

good reason alarmed, and Lord Durham, son-in-law of Lord Grey of the Great Reform Bill, was sent over to investigate.

Lord Durham's *Report*, issued in 1839, has been characterized as the Magna Charta of British Colonial History. Durham recommended that Upper and Lower Canada be reunited, expressed the hope that all the British possessions in continental North America would eventually come under a common government, and advocated the introduction of responsible government.

Obviously, the third of these recommendations was by far the most revolutionary and important. Various definitions of responsible government—or Dominion status—as it existed prior to the war may be given, of which the simplest is "autonomy." More specifically it meant that the colonial assembly or legislature (using the two terms interchangeably) should enjoy the powers of a parliament and control the colonial ministry in so far as internal affairs were concerned. The powers of the governor would consequently be reduced in the same way that those of the king, whom he represented, had been reduced in England itself, except that matters of imperial concern would remain under the authority of the ministry and Parliament at Westminster. Lord Durham himself characterized responsible government as "the responsibility to the . . . Legislature of all the officers of the Government, except the Governor"; and he proposed that "the Colonial Governor . . . be instructed to secure the co-operation of the Assembly in his policy, by intrusting its administration to such men as could command a majority; and . . . given to understand that he need count on no aid from home in any difference with the Assembly, that should not directly involve the relations between the Mother Country and the colony. . . . The constitution of the form of government—the regulation of foreign relations and of trade with the Mother Country, the other British colonies and foreign nations—and the disposal of the public lands are the only points on which the Mother Country requires a control." And also, of course, the control of the military establishment, which Durham thought superfluous to mention. (As a matter of fact, it was not long before the Dominions acquired the right to establish tariffs and to raise armies.)

In political circles, more especially in Parliament, where his statesmanlike views were rabidly opposed, Durham's *Report* was the cause of deep-seated surprise and consternation. The moment when it appeared was one of widespread discouragement over colonial prospects, owing in large degree to the advocates of laissez-faire. Bentham in particular, in a pamphlet entitled *Emancipate Your Colonies*, had proclaimed it useless to attempt to retain colonies. (In fact it was Bentham that had chiefly influenced Durham, with whom he was on intimate terms.) Durham was bitterly attacked and, discouraged and discredited, died shortly after he issued his *Report*. His work, however, lived on. Although his third suggestion was condemned by Parliament, Upper and Lower Canada were reunited in 1840. Of adopting his second recommendation there was as yet no question, so far as Parliament was concerned.

At precisely what moment Durham's suggestion as to responsible government was adopted cannot be said. On account of the attitude of Parliament, the English ministry, though not fundamentally hostile itself, was unable to act openly or officially. In curiously English fashion, therefore, responsible gov-

ernment in the colonies was introduced without any act of Parliament or any formal pronouncement. Much was left to the discretion of officials on the spot. A few months after Durham's *Report* was submitted, Lord Russell, who had presented the Great Reform Bill, sent the following instructions to the new Governor of Canada: "The importance of maintaining the utmost possible harmony between the policy of the Legislature and of the Executive Government admits of no question; and it will of course be your anxious endeavour to call to your Counsels and to employ in the public service those persons who, by their position and character, have obtained the general confidence and esteem of the inhabitants of the Province." This order constituted the first semi-official decision on the subject. Three weeks later (also in 1839) the English ministry issued more precise instructions:

on the question of what is called "Responsible Government." I have to instruct you . . . to refuse any explanation which may be construed to imply an acquiescence in the Petitions and Addresses upon this subject . . . While I . . . see insuperable objections to the adoption of the principle as it has been stated [by the colonists], I see little or none to the practical views of Colonial Government recommended by Lord Durham, as I understand them. The Queen's Government have no desire to thwart the Representative Assemblies of British North America in their measures of reform and improvement . . . There is no surer way of earning the approbation of the Queen than by maintaining the harmony of the Executive with the Legislative authorities . . . I have not drawn any specific line beyond which the power of the Governor on the one hand and the privilege of the Assembly on the other ought not to extend. . . .

And two days after the home Government, going even further, laid down the essential principle that officials should no longer continue to hold office during good behavior, but should "be called to retire from the public service as often as any sufficient motives of public policy may suggest the expediency of that measure." This last dispatch was made public by the Governor. In practice, however, the early governors of reunited Canada often failed to abide by these principles.

It is therefore the third Earl Grey, the Secretary for Colonies and son of Earl Grey of the Great Reform Bill, and Lord Elgin, son-in-law of Lord Durham, to whom the credit is due for the definitive introduction of responsible government—though still unofficially, without the benefit of parliamentary pronouncement. In 1847 Lord Elgin arrived in Canada as Governor-General, with specific instructions from Grey to introduce responsible government and with a firm determination to complete the work begun by his father-in-law; and from that time on, the principle, as well as the practice, has stood unchallenged. The first Prime Minister whom Elgin installed was of French extraction, and it was Elgin who handed over to the Canadians entire control of their civil service, formerly filled with imperial nominees.

Grey was likewise responsible for the almost simultaneous introduction of responsible government in Nova Scotia; and by 1860 this revolutionary practice had been put into effect in New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, Newfoundland, New Zealand, and all of the Australian colonies with the exception of Western Australia. The worst fears of the pessimists seemed realized when

Canada used her new freedom to pass a protective tariff which taxed English goods (1859). But although the English Government protested, it went no further.

THE DOMINION OF CANADA

The system of a unified government for all of Canada proper, as enacted in 1840, proved unsatisfactory to the two nationalities involved. Some compromise between absolute union and complete separation seemed the only way out. Moreover, it was obviously desirable, as Durham had pointed out, that all the continental colonies of British North America should participate in some form of common government. So Canada again led the Empire, this time in the direction of federation, when in 1867 a solution was reached by the formation of the Dominion of Canada from the four provinces of Quebec, Ontario, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia. The constitution—contrary to that of the United States, because of the tragic drama just enacted south of the Canadian boundary—granted the individual provinces only very limited authority and left the residual powers to the central Government. In the early '70's Manitoba, British Columbia, and Prince Edward Island threw in their lot with the original participants.

Throughout its history as a Dominion Canada has been confronted with two major problems, subdivided into four minor problems: the problem of nationality, involving the question of nationality proper and the geographical question; and the problem of foreign affairs, involving the relationship of the Dominion to the two Great Powers in whose orbits Canada revolves.

Macdonald, the first Premier, held office for all but five of the first twenty-four years (until 1891). His task was to fashion the foundations of a nation out of a group of colonies isolated by history, nationality, and geography. British Columbia was completely cut off, not only by the Rockies but by vast unsettled prairies; and except by water, even the inhabitants of the Maritime Provinces had no communication with their blood brothers in Ontario or with their fellow citizens in Quebec. The howling wilderness around Hudson's Bay was even more isolated, and still belonged to the great company whose name it bore.

Within ten years the railroad to Halifax was opened, two years later (1878) all British territory on the continent was proclaimed part of the Dominion, and within twenty years the C.P.R. (Canadian Pacific Railroad, 1886) had linked the great western ocean with the St. Lawrence. This all-important line is the Union Pacific or Trans-Siberian of Canadian history—more important, if possible, for even today there are no automobile roads connecting eastern and western Canada or across the Canadian Rockies. Though the completion of the C.P.R. marked a stage in westward expansion, the movement as a whole is still in progress. Even after the admission of Alberta and Saskatchewan to the Dominion (1905), Canada in its settled portion remained, and remains, almost unique in shape—a sort of Chile, 3,000 miles long by some 400 broad, strung out along the northern boundary of the United States. Climate is the obvious explanation. Although in area the Dominion is appreciably larger than the con-

tinental United States, the northern half is too cold to attract or to support any considerable population.

Laurier, the Liberal leader who succeeded Macdonald when the period of Conservative rule came to an end, was of French extraction and a Roman Catholic. Although championing the privileges of his coreligionists within the Dominion and those of Canada within the Empire, he strove for a closer understanding between the French Canadians and the British and for closer coöperation between England and her eldest daughter. It was a difficult rôle, one that made him the object of bitter attacks from all sides, but one that he played with conspicuous success. During his term of office a Canadian contingent was sent to the Boer War and a bill was passed providing for a Dominion navy, a sort of compromise between direct aid for the imperial navy and no aid at all.

Unfortunately for Laurier, he also chose to champion closer, or rather freer, relations with the United States. Although there had been no armed conflict between the two countries for nearly a century, the problem of trade relations had never been permanently solved. For a brief time in the middle of the nineteenth century, a policy of reciprocity had been in force; but this mutually advantageous connection had been terminated by the United States. Shortly before the World War an attempt to revive this relationship was made by certain groups on both sides of the line, in fact a measure making it possible was passed in the States. Laurier took it up, but Canadian sentiment as a whole, stirred by the rash and unwarranted pronouncements of American politicians, was unfavorable. Consequently he was thrown out of office, for fear that reciprocity would lead to Canada's becoming "an appanage of the United States."

BRITISH AUSTRALASIA

England's domain in the South Seas commenced to take form only after she had lost her most valuable colonial possession, and never did a great empire have such a strange and sorry beginning. Five years after the treaty which ended the American Revolution and the year before the outbreak of the French Revolution a penal colony was established at Port Jackson, later Sydney. Though many of the exiles were merely poor unfortunates, don't ask an Australian whether his ancestors were among the first settlers! The region had been for all practical purposes *terra incognita*, and so slight was the European knowledge of Australasia at this time that Tasmania was generally believed to be part of the continent.

Since Australia was inhabited by comparatively few natives and those few extremely backward and not especially warlike, the supremacy of the whites was quickly established and the aborigines were either relegated to a position of impotence or, in the case of the Tasmanians (the most backward people known to historic times), utterly exterminated. Geographical factors played a conspicuous part in the history of Australia. It was a quarter of a century before the settlers penetrated the mountains which parallel the eastern coast, less than fifty miles away; and almost three-quarters of a century before any Europeans succeeded in crossing the vast uninhabitable desert which forms

the interior—and after the offer of a reward of £10,000 (about \$50,000). Although a gold rush in the middle of the century accounted for the most sudden rise in population, the staple industry from the first was herding. At the insistent demand of the free inhabitants the penal system was finally abolished, and six colonies grew up. Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria, Tasmania, and South Australia were accorded self-government in the '50's. Victoria originated vote by secret or Australian ballot (1855).

Owing to differences over the question of tariff policy, confederation did not come until 1900, when the six colonies, including Western Australia, united to form the Commonwealth. The residual powers were, by the constitution, left to the individual states. Australia is slightly larger than the continental United States; approximately half, however, is arid, torrid, or both. With a colonial empire of her own, Australia now constitutes an empire within an empire, for in addition to receiving custody of the British portion of New Guinea, as a result of the World War she was awarded a mandate over the German portion, with its outlying islands, and over the former German possessions in the Solomon Islands.

Farthest in the chain of England's world-encircling empire, and separated from Australia by 1,200 miles of open ocean, but "the most English of the British colonies," New Zealand is one of the garden spots of the earth. The death rate is the lowest on record.

New Zealand, whose main islands together are twice the size of England proper, was first annexed by the intrepid explorer Captain Cook (1779), but the English Government disavowed the act! During the early nineteenth century British adventurers and missionaries appeared from time to time; not until 1840, however, was the territory formally taken over by the Crown. The native Maoris, comparatively advanced and extremely warlike, occasioned no little trouble.

Like Australia, though so much smaller in size, New Zealand was at first divided into six separate colonies. The constitution of 1852 provided for a central legislature and self-government, and in 1876 the country was unified by the abolition of the provincial councils. The growth of population has been the most remarkable on record: in the twenty years between 1861 and 1881 it increased almost 400 per cent (from less than 100,000 to very nearly 500,000), an average of over 50 per cent every five years for that period considered as a unit.

The history of New Zealand contains some features of more than usual interest. Triennial parliaments and manhood suffrage were introduced at a comparatively early date (1879), and in 1891 New Zealand became the foremost exponent of state socialism. Direct taxation on personal property was replaced by steeply graduated land and income taxes. Woman suffrage (1893) was followed by the introduction of compulsory arbitration in labor disputes (1895). A new system of voting was instituted (1908), which provided that a second ballot should be taken on the two leading candidates of a group if no one of them had received a majority. The list of governmental ventures in the economic field is long, and includes a bank and private loans, the trusteeship of private estates, housing for workers, life insurance and fire insurance, mines,

oyster beds, sawmills, cattle-breeding, and railroads. A land act provided for the purchase of large estates, to be broken up into small farms, and in the case of owners who refused to sell voluntarily, conversion was made compulsory.

With various small possessions scattered over the South Pacific and with a mandate over the former German territory of Western Samoa, New Zealand too rules a miniature empire within an empire. With the Samoans, the New Zealanders have experienced some of the trials involved in shouldering the white man's burden.

BRITISH SOUTH AFRICA

In South Africa, England has been confronted with problems of race and of nationality vastly more complicated than those in Canada and New Zealand. Settled by Dutch and Huguenots, who subsequently amalgamated, the Cape was wrested from the Netherlands in 1806; this conquest was legitimized by the Congress of Vienna. Although British settlers soon began to take up land, England valued her new possession chiefly as the best stopping-point mid-voyage to India—since there was then no Suez Canal. The earlier settlers, known as Boers (Dutch for "peasants"), were a more than usually backward people and failed to appreciate the privilege of being under British rule.

Because slavery was the basis of the Boer economy, the particular point at issue was the question of the treatment to be accorded the natives. To the Boers, the humanitarian attitude of the English seemed quixotic to a degree—the Boer attitude was similar to that of the South before the Civil War—and they considered the compensation awarded them when their slaves were freed quite inadequate. For many, indeed, emancipation spelled financial disaster.

In the '30's a movement known as the Great Trek took place; a large part of the Boers left British territory and trekked north and east across the Orange River. Natal, where they settled, was soon annexed by England (1842), however; consequently the more independent of them resumed their wanderings and joined their kinsmen who had established the Orange Free State. Even there the Boers were not secure, for shortly afterward the Free State was likewise annexed (1848); those who persisted in their determination to escape British domination were forced to move again, this time across the Vaal into what became the South African Republic or the Transvaal. Then, suddenly, the British reversed their policy, and the independence of both republics was recognized (1852 and 1854).

Nature, however, had different plans. When the rich Kimberley diamond field was discovered in Free State territory, British adventurers rushed in. The native chieftain of the Kimberley district ceded his claims to the English, who speedily annexed it (1871); the Boers were forced to console themselves with an indemnity. In the Transvaal, also, things were not going too well; the Boers, who were factious and not too efficient in political affairs, quarreled among themselves, managed their finances so badly that salaries of officials remained unpaid, and had serious trouble with the natives. The upshot was that their relations with the natives were denounced by the British as a standing menace to the peace of all South Africa, and an imperialistic official sent out by the

Disraeli government professed to find sentiment in favor of annexation. Nevertheless, when Disraeli proceeded in accordance with this opinion, the Boers did not submit tamely; at Majuba Hill a British detachment met a famous and crushing defeat (1881). Gladstone, who came into office advocating Boer independence, resisted the pressure of the imperialists to avenge the disgrace, and concluded a convention which granted the South African Republic a large degree of self-government but stipulated for the maintenance of British suzerainty. When pressed for further concessions, Gladstone negotiated the Convention of London (1884). In this no mention was made of the question of suzerainty, the British contenting themselves with a suspensive veto over Transvaal foreign affairs. Thus both sides were left to draw their own conclusions. The Boers of course regarded the whole affair as an indication of British cupidity and also of British weakness.

Scarcely had matters quieted down when Nature again intervened. In 1886 the richest gold field in the world was discovered on the Rand, in Transvaal territory. Foreigners—uitlanders (outlanders), as the Boers called them—flocked into the country until they outnumbered the natives, owned half the land, and paid three-quarters of the taxes. Although this development disturbed the primitive conditions of Transvaal existence ("Mrs. Kruger [the wife of the President] . . . kept dairy cows and sold milk to the neighbors"), in some ways it was not unwelcome to the Boers. It meant greatly increased wealth, for exorbitant taxes were levied on all imports used by the miners, and the government dynamite monopoly was a gold mine in itself. These exactions were a source of constant annoyance and grievance to the uitlanders, especially since they got almost no benefit from the taxes. At first they looked for redress through the ballot; but in order to prevent the Transvaal from being voted into the Empire, the Boers raised the franchise residence-qualification from five to ten years, and later so hedged the suffrage about with additional qualifications that it became practically impossible to obtain. Deprived of all possibility of legal redress, the miners appealed to their home Government, and the world was thereupon treated to the extraordinary sight of Britain demanding that her nationals be accorded foreign citizenship. When Kruger, the President of the South African Republic, showed little inclination to yield, the uitlanders decided to take matters into their own hands.

Cecil Rhodes, the energetic and imperialistic Prime Minister of the Cape, lent them a sympathetic ear. Son of an English vicar, Rhodes had emigrated from England to Africa in search of health, and while still in his teens had laid the foundations for one of the great fortunes of history. As his contribution toward world domination by Britain, he was now dreaming of extending the British domains in Africa "from the Cape to Cairo." With his connivance a raid on Boer territory was staged by a friend of his, Dr. Jameson. Although the raid failed and Jameson and his men were captured, although the British Government had had no hand in the affair, and although Jameson was imprisoned and Rhodes deprived of his honors, the effect on public opinion was world-wide. To continental nations hostile to England it was final proof of the evil intentions of most, if not all, Englishmen. The Kaiser telegraphed Kruger, "I express to you my sincere congratulations that without appealing to the help of friendly

powers you and your people have succeeded in repelling with your own forces the armed bands which had broken into your country, and in maintaining the independence of your country against foreign aggression." With Britannia ruling the waves, he might better have kept his mouth shut, instead of raising hopes that he was powerless to fulfill. As for the Boers, the raid simply increased their dislike of England and their belief that the British could not fight.

It is hardly surprising that after this the concessions offered by Kruger were not particularly far-reaching and were far from satisfying to the uitlanders. Both sides were arming; and "Joe" Chamberlain, the Conservative minister in charge of the Colonial Office, was not the man to pour oil on the troubled waters. With negotiations at a standstill and with British reinforcements constantly arriving from overseas, the Free State joined her sister republic in a forty-eight-hour ultimatum: England must agree to disperse her troops concentrated on the frontier, refrain from increasing her forces in South Africa, and withdraw such reinforcements as had already arrived.

The events of the Boer War, 1899-1902, were a surprise to both sides. The Boers believed themselves more than a match for the British, and expected aid, if necessary, from the Continental powers. The British did not anticipate that the affair would last six weeks; on paper, their calculations were justified, for the Boers probably never had more than 40,000 in the field at a time and the total Boer effectives were certainly under 100,000. Man for man, however, the Boers with their vastly superior knowledge of local conditions of warfare were more than a match for the British; and sustained by their belief in the righteousness of their cause and by a naïve faith that would have done credit to Cromwell's Ironsides, they trusted in the Lord to bring them through, no matter how insuperable the odds. They were therefore able to put up a resistance that ranks with the great defenses of history.

The Boers took the offensive; and during the first phase of the operations, led by Botha, they inflicted a number of humiliating defeats on the British and besieged several towns, including Ladysmith. The British general, apparently unable to cope with the situation, was relieved; and Lord Roberts took over the command, with Kitchener of Khartoum as chief of staff. During the second phase, despite Botha's brilliant leadership the Boers were gradually driven back; at the end of six months their field armies had been routed, their capitals captured, and the republics annexed. Apparently the war was over—but in reality it had just begun, for it was truly a nation in arms with which the British were confronted. During the third phase, the Boers, led by Botha and Smuts, fell back on guerrilla warfare, an art of which they proved themselves past masters. Permanently cut off from their sources of supply in many cases, they experienced hardships unknown even to the majority of soldiers in the World War. Nevertheless they fought doggedly on; and small bands—often a mere handful of men—conducted raids hundreds of miles into enemy territory, where they lived from hand to mouth on such munitions, transport, and food as they could capture. To cope with the situation, Kitchener finally initiated a fourth phase by erecting cordons of wire entanglements, with block-houses every thousand yards, and concentration camps into which the non-combatant population was herded. Although this policy elicited a storm of in-

dignation from sympathizers with the under dog, the testimony of a Boer combatant goes to prove that the British were as humane as it is possible for an enemy to be; the Boers carried their severely wounded to the British to be cared for, and "the English soldiers, both officers and men, were unfailingly humane." Boer resistance finally wore down, but only after Britain had put 250,000 troops into the field. Even then, the bitter-enders, strong in their patriarchal faith, were for continuing the hopeless struggle; but the wiser councils of Botha and Smuts prevailed.

If the war in itself was an episode on which the British cannot dwell with any great feeling of pride, never perhaps did England show greater wisdom than in her handling of the postwar situation. By the treaty which ended the conflict, the sovereignty of Great Britain was recognized. In return, England promised the Boers a responsible government as soon as conditions would permit, together with equality for the Dutch language in education and judicial matters. She likewise guaranteed the persons and property of the Boers, and agreed that no special taxes should be laid to pay for the war. Finally, she granted £3,000,000 (about \$15,000,000) for purposes of reconstruction, offered to loan additional sums free of interest, and distributed goods to the Boer farmers gratis or sold them at cost. In 1906 the British made good their major promise to the Transvaal, and the following year they likewise granted the Orange Free State responsible government.

Shortly afterward, in 1909, Cape Colony, Natal, the Transvaal, and the Orange Free State united in the Union of South Africa—a federal state even more strongly centralized than Canada and similarly binational and bilingual. With the Boers in the majority, Botha became the first Prime Minister; the Unionists, the British party, constituted a friendly opposition.

Like Laurier, Botha, while preserving the autonomy of South Africa, was bent on securing the coöperation of the two nationalities. He was hampered by a faction of the Boers under Hertzog, a general during the war and a member of the cabinet, who maintained an unfriendly attitude toward the Empire and wanted to rule in the interests of the Boers alone. The ill feeling between the two wings of the South African party (Boer) eventually became so tense that a split resulted: Hertzog seceded in order to form the Nationalist party, which continued to call for independence but which was impotent in the face of the united South Africans and Unionists.

The native problem was still the most serious. Not content that the Europeans were already outnumbered four to one, the British had introduced large numbers of Chinese to work the mines; in addition, there was a still larger immigration of East Indians. The treatment accorded the Chinese brought charges of brutality and slavery; discrimination against the Indians aroused hostile sentiment in India. As a final complicating factor—a result of working-conditions that were far from satisfactory—violent syndicalist agitation developed among the white miners. Just before the World War a great strike on the Rand was followed by a combined strike of railroad hands and miners, and a committee of strikers in Johannesburg raised the red flag. Botha proclaimed martial law and put down the rising with some bloodshed.

The wisdom of Britain's policy after the Boer War was demonstrated during

the World War. Although a fraction of the Boers seized the opportunity to embarrass the English, the majority, under Botha, rallied to the Empire, put down the rebellion, conquered German Southwest and East Africa, and sent money and men to support the war in Europe. Botha and Smuts were members of the Imperial War Cabinet of 1917; and Smuts, acting as unofficial representative of the Dominions at large, was a member of the British War Cabinet of six. The part that he played at Versailles belongs to the history of Europe and of the world. At the Peace Conference Hertzog, as leader of the intransigents, demanded the restoration of the Boer republics. Needless to say, Lloyd George refused to entertain any such notion; but in return for her services the Union was awarded a mandate over German Southwest Africa and, with the oversight of three native protectorates, became another empire within the Empire.

When Botha died just after his return from Paris, Smuts' took his place as Premier. The Nationalists had been constantly increasing their representation in the parliament, and as a result of the next general election became the largest single party. Smuts was in a precarious position. At first he attempted to reunite the Boers; but when the Nationalists held out for independence, he turned to the Unionists and induced them to fuse with the South African party.

Not long after, there was another strike on the Rand; nearly the whole district was for the moment in the hands of revolutionists. Smuts proclaimed martial law and succeeded in suppressing the strike, but at a considerable cost of lives on both sides; his vigorous policy therefore earned him the hatred of the miners. The Europeans in general were considerably alarmed, moreover, by the relatively large increase of natives, as shown by the census of 1921, and by the failure of the Government to settle the question of native administration. As a result, the Government met defeat in the general elections (1924); and Hertzog became Prime Minister of a Nationalist-Labor coalition cabinet.

Apparently England's liberal policy had been a failure, after all; but the worst fears engendered by this change of ministry have not been realized. Like most radicals when in office, Hertzog proved that his bark was worse than his bite, for although maintaining the right of a Dominion to secede *in principle*, he declared that such a move would be "a flagrant mistake and a national disaster." His pronouncement did not, however, prevent the party secretary from issuing a simultaneous statement to the contrary and demonstrating thereby that Hertzog was not in complete control of his following.

Recent legislation has been largely devoted to the problem of the natives, with the aim of preventing them from underselling white labor but at the same time assuring them fair treatment. The solution has therefore been along the lines of segregation. Under the circumstances this absorption with the racial problem is readily understood.

IRELAND UNDER ENGLAND

Heretofore it has been customary for historians to treat Ireland as part of Great Britain, but today a new orientation seems proper. Though the youngest of the Dominions, Ireland was a British possession long before there was any

"overseas" empire. The uninformed commonly refer to the "English" conquest of Ireland; as a matter of fact, the conquest was originally simply an extension of the Norman conquest of England itself, which it followed by just about a century. The Irish were fighting among themselves, and one of their chiefs asked Anglo-Norman nobles for aid, promising them land as a reward; the Norman kings of England automatically became overlords of Ireland and were acknowledged as such by the local chieftains.

For a long time little serious effort was made to alter the loose feudal basis of this conquest; rather the invading nobility tended to become Irish. English authority was virtually restricted to the Pale, a district extending only some twenty miles outside Dublin. The real trouble began in the sixteenth century, when the King of England espoused the Reformation and tried to convert the Irish, when repeated conquests or attempts at conquest were followed by repeated rebellions. The chief tangible result was the establishment of a strong colony of Protestant English and Scotch in the north.

Throughout most of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries matters went from bad to worse. Under the penal laws the Irish, as Roman Catholics, were persecuted and denied political and civil rights; under the Mercantile System Irish industries were legislated out of existence, for fear that they might compete with those of England. Worst of all, continual rebellions led to continual confiscations of land, until over 90 per cent was owned by absentee English landlords.

At the end of the eighteenth century, when English policy took a momentary turn for the better, Ireland was granted legislative independence; whereupon the Irish parliament wiped out the anti-Catholic penal laws and accorded Catholics the franchise. But when, while England was absorbed in the wars of the French Revolution, the Irish took advantage of the situation to revolt afresh, England persuaded the Irish parliament, mostly by bribery, to vote itself out of existence, extinguishing the last vestiges of Irish independence (1800).

At the opening of the nineteenth century, Ireland was the most discontented part of the Empire—a distinction she has retained, almost uninterruptedly, to the present day. Although Ireland as a whole had, indeed, a fair share of representation, the Catholic Irish, like their coreligionists in England, were disqualified from sitting in Parliament. Yet when O'Connell, greatest of Irish leaders, decided to oppose the Protestant candidate for County Clare, it was a foregone conclusion that he would receive the most votes. The English Government was faced with the alternative of either refusing to allow a morally, though illegally, elected representative to sit or repealing the disqualifying legislation. Therefore—with great reluctance and simply for fear of another revolt in Ireland, as Wellington himself admitted—the English Parliament passed the Catholic Emancipation Act. This concession, like most which followed, evoked little gratitude from the Irish, who felt they had won by force. Moreover, what little value as a gesture of conciliation the measure had was vitiated by the simultaneous passage of an act so altering the basis of the Irish franchise that almost nine-tenths of the county electorate lost the vote.

Catholic Emancipation removed only one grievance, and that perhaps the

least important. In the early '30's the Irish question was the question of tithes. The so-called Church of Ireland was in reality the Anglican Church—"established" in that the entire population were required by law to contribute to its support a tithe (literally, a tenth of their income); and yet of some 8,000,000 Irish, nearly 6,500,000 were Roman Catholics. To the impoverished peasants this galling situation meant not only humiliation but hardship. Moreover, "on an Irish Sabbath morning the bell of a neat parish church often summons to worship only the parson and an occasional conforming clerk, while two hundred yards off a thousand Catholics are huddled together in a hovel, and pelted by the storms of Heaven." A tithe war resulted; but the only results at first were a stringent coercion bill and, when Grey proposed remedial legislation, the fall of the Whig "Reform Ministry"—not the last time that an English cabinet was to meet defeat on an Irish issue. When the Whigs returned to office, they found themselves dependent on the Irish votes in Parliament. O'Connell, forced to choose between the doubtful possibility of securing relief by supporting the Whigs and the still more doubtful possibility of successful revolt, chose the former. As a reward, the attempt to collect tithes directly was abandoned; instead, somewhat reduced, they were converted into a land tax. But although theoretically this tax was to be paid by the landlords, in reality the net result was higher rents. Such a solution was obviously only a stop-gap.

The next great event in Irish history after Catholic Emancipation—and *the* great event of the century—was the Famine. Throughout the first half of the century, two trends were outstanding: a phenomenal, reckless increase in population, and the dependence of the peasantry on a single crop, the "Irish" potato. In 1845, when that crop failed, the majority of the lower class, because they had already been living on the bare edge of subsistence, found starvation staring them in the face. Despite the repeal of the Corn Laws and such other measures as the English Government could take, tens of thousands died and hundreds of thousands were forced to emigrate—most of them to America. In the spring of 1847, even, the deaths in workhouses alone exceeded 10,000 a month; and in six years the population dropped from over 8,000,000 to about 6,500,000. Still the decline continued; and at the opening of the twentieth century, Ireland, with less than 4,500,000 inhabitants, was the only country in Europe whose population was less than it had been a hundred years before.

The famine, plus the dissatisfaction at O'Connell's failure to obtain far-reaching reforms and the general situation throughout Europe, resulted in the Young Ireland Rebellion of '48, which added one more to the revolutions of that eventful year and to the long list of unsuccessful Irish revolts.

So far, the condition of Ireland had in many ways grown worse; and for a number of years no relief appeared. The Irish, however, did not remain quiescent; the '60's were the years of Fenianism, a revolutionary movement arising among those who had emigrated to America and aiming to establish a republic. Fenianism was accompanied by the usual outbreaks of sporadic violence on the part of the Irish, and of alarm on the part of the English.

IRISH REFORM

At this critical juncture Ireland found a champion in Gladstone. To his suggestions for Irish reform the Conservatives under Disraeli turned a deaf ear; but as many of the English were Nonconformists, opposed to the Established Church at home and sympathetic in consequence with the Irish on religious tolerance, the electorate gave him a mandate to deal with the matter when the question was referred to the country. In 1869, accordingly, Gladstone effected a settlement of the religious issue. The "Church of Ireland" was disendowed (deprived of much of its property, though permitted to retain the church buildings actually in use) and also disestablished (Church and State were entirely separated). No longer was the Irish peasant to pay tithes for the support of an alien faith; no longer were "Irish" bishops to sit in the House of Lords; and nearly two hundred Anglican parishes ceased to exist, in theory as well as in fact.

Even so, the problem most essential to the welfare of the Catholic Irish, the agrarian problem, remained to be solved. Since the only industries of importance were located in the Protestant province of Ulster, Catholic Ireland, overwhelmingly agricultural, could not possibly be prosperous or contented until the evils of absentee landlordism were corrected. The Irish had fixed on the "three F's"—fair rent, fixity of tenure, and "free sale"—as the basis of their demands. Since the peasants were without even the dubious alternative of joining the industrial proletariat and since it was therefore a question of "land or starve," the landlords could get almost any rent they wished and, for the same reason, were always able to find new tenants. Consequently, in addition to a fair rental, the Irish demanded that the peasant should not be evicted so long as he paid his rent, and finally, that he should have the right to sell any improvements he had made. The last of these three demands referred to what was perhaps the worst feature of the system: that the landlords were not legally obliged to compensate their tenants for improvements. Not to mention the injustice involved, this feature of the Irish land system was an economic evil of the worst sort, since no tenant wanted to invest money in farm improvements for the benefit of his successor or his landlord. As a result of these conditions, nearly half the population lived in single-room huts, not infrequently along with the cows and chickens as well; only the proletariat of the industrial slums and possibly the near-serfs of tsarist Russia were worse off.

Gladstone's Land Act of 1870 aimed to remedy these conditions by providing that if evicted, the tenant should be compensated for improvements, that if evicted for any reason other than nonpayment of rent, he should receive compensation, and that the state should lend peasants wishing to acquire land a certain percentage of the purchase price. As the Conservatives pointed out, the act was based on the revolutionary principle (socialistic in fact if not in theory) that the right of private property is not absolute and sacred, but conditioned by its effects on public welfare. Though the act pointed the way for later legislation, the results were practically nil; landlords continued to rid themselves of

undesired tenants by the simple expedient of raising the rent, and there were almost no sales of land (only one per annum, on the average, up to 1877!).

So little effect had these gestures of goodwill in quieting Irish unrest and crime that the English Government almost immediately resorted to increased measures of coercion. This dual procedure was typical; every piece of remedial legislation was followed—chronologically if not causally—by fresh outbursts of violence on the part of the Irish and these, in turn, by renewed severity on the part of the English. For this reason their policy has been characterized as an alternation of caresses and kicks. During his second administration Gladstone passed another Land Act (1881). By providing for a Land Court with authority to fix rents for a period of fifteen years, this recognized the basic principle of the three F's. Like Gladstone's first land act, it contained land-purchase clauses; but again the effects were disappointing—and peasant proprietorship was the crux of the all-important agrarian problem.

Meanwhile, under the leadership of Charles Stewart Parnell the Irish question was entering its final phase. Though a Protestant of English descent, Parnell was the greatest Irish leader of the later nineteenth century and was able to rally all shades of Irish opinion in support of Home Rule. His policy was to use the Irish vote in Parliament to obstruct all legislation until in desperation the English should submit to his demands. In his immediate aims Parnell was highly successful, for by taking advantage of the rules of parliamentary procedure to filibuster he made it almost impossible for the House of Commons to transact business; on one memorable occasion the debate lasted forty-one hours at a stretch. Yet the English refused to be coerced.

When Gladstone took office for the third time, in 1886, the Parnellites held the balance of power between Liberals and Conservatives. For this reason, and because Gladstone was convinced of the necessity and justice of satisfying the Irish, he devoted almost the entire session to the problem of Home Rule; but the Liberals split on the issue and the bill was lost.

When the Conservatives returned to power (1886), the Irish were treated to an unusually severe dose of coercion, which seemed at least partially justified by the decrease in crime that followed. Coercion, however, was at best a palliative, not a cure; eventually even the Conservatives became so far convinced of the necessity of solving the Irish question that they themselves passed a Land Purchase Bill (1891). This provided that the Government should henceforth advance the entire purchase price, not merely two-thirds. Even this progressive step failed to solve the problem, for there remained the difference between what the tenants could and would pay and what the landlords were willing to take. In 1893 Gladstone made his second attempt to introduce Home Rule; this time the measure passed the Commons but was thrown out by the Lords. In the general election which followed, the country made clear that in regard to this matter it likewise was unwilling to budge.

During the next ten years (1895-1905) the Conservatives, though never failing to keep a firm hand on the lawless elements in Ireland, attempted to "kill Home Rule with kindness." In 1898 a Local Government Act gave the Irish a share in the management of their own affairs; but the results were disappointing to the English, for the new councils were used as organs of protest. The

establishment of an Irish Department of Agriculture and Other Industries proved more satisfactory. Best of all, a real solution of the agrarian problem was reached in 1903 with the passage of the Wyndham Land Act, whereby the Government gave purchasers of land a bonus of 12 per cent to bridge the gap between the price offered and that asked. Thereafter peasant proprietorship made such rapid gains that two and a half times as much land as the acreage under crops, an amount equal in area to almost all the arable soil, changed hands.

IRELAND BEFORE AND DURING THE WORLD WAR

Even with the religious and land problems of Ireland solved, the problem of her political relations to England remained. The usual course of nationalistic evolution was reversed. Political agitation came first. With the foundation of the Gaelic League (1893), however, Ireland gave birth to a cultural renaissance. Gaelic, understood by perhaps 10 per cent of the population, was revived, and Irish poets and playwrights began to attract attention abroad. An important coöperative movement in agriculture also arose.

At the same time political agitation in a variety of forms continued. Parnell had passed from the stage, and the leadership of the Home Rule movement in Parliament had fallen to Redmond, who abandoned obstructionist tactics and relied instead on persuasion. At the same time two new factions emerged. Under the leadership of Arthur Griffith, the Sinn Féin ("We Ourselves") party arose and challenged the fundamental tenets of Redmond's nationalism. The Sinn Féiners asserted that Ireland could never attain her aspirations by political means and that she did not want Home Rule anyway, that she was a separate kingdom (similar to Hungary) linked with Great Britain solely through the Crown. Although abandoning armed revolt as impractical, they believed that by passive resistance (complete noncoöperation) Ireland could force England to yield. They therefore advocated that the Irish build up their own industries, refuse to buy taxed goods, refuse to recognize the existing courts and administration, and refuse to take part in the Parliament at Westminster. An even more revolutionary party, harking back to Fenianism and to the Rebellion of '48, were the Republicans, who stood for the complete repudiation of all connection with England. Prior to the World War neither of these last two parties attained any widespread influence.

When the English Liberals returned to power in 1906 with an overwhelming majority, they showed little inclination to imperil their position by espousing Home Rule. Even those English willing to make any other necessary concessions considered the Irish incapable of self-government and feared that if Home Rule were granted, the safety of England would be jeopardized by the close proximity of a nation maddened by a sense of age-old injustice. In 1910, however, when the general election left the Irish again holding the balance of power in Parliament, Ireland's opportunity came. In order to pass the Lloyd George Budget and the Parliament Act, Asquith made a bargain with the Irish members; in return for their support, he promised to champion Home Rule. Thus by their persistent opposition to Irish demands the Lords had ended by com-

passing their own downfall. The Third Home Rule Bill was introduced in 1912 and in spite of the suspensive veto exercised by the Lords became law in 1914: Ireland was to have a separate legislature for internal affairs, but was to retain a portion of her representation in the English Parliament, which was to legislate on matters of imperial concern.

Meanwhile a fresh complication had arisen. No sooner had the passage of the bill become imminent than the Ulsterites declared that they would never submit to its provisions, that they were British and British they were determined to remain, that they had nothing in common with the rest of Ireland, and that as they were paying a disproportionately large share of the taxes, they were not going to see them used for the benefit of others. To which the Catholic Irish replied that Ireland was destined by Nature to be a unified nation and that they wouldn't accept Home Rule without Ulster.

Here was a serious *impasse*. A moment's inspection revealed that, whatever Nature might have decreed, Ireland of the early twentieth century was in reality not one nation but two, or rather, one and a part of another. To be sure, Ulster was only one province out of four, and was not entirely Protestant—its Protestant majority, in fact, being rather slim—but if the South had a right to separate statehood because the majority of her population wished it, had not Ulster an equal right to a separate existence, since a majority of *her* population wished it?

When the Government showed a determination to proceed, the Ulsterites began to arm. The Ulster Volunteers were formed, and a provisional government under Sir Edward Carson was organized. The South was not slow to take up the challenge, and a committee from Sinn Fein and the Irish Republican Brotherhood formed the National Volunteers. The South was particularly aggrieved because the British appeared to manifest more zeal in suppressing the Nationalists than in combating the Ulsterites. Since neither Carson nor the Nationalists would yield an inch, conferences called by the Government and even by the King failed to arrive at a solution. Civil war seemed inevitable—when the advent of a still greater conflict turned the attention of the British to the Continent, and the application of Home Rule was suspended for the duration of the World War.

Redmond's declaration that Ireland would throw her lot in with England proved rather less than a half-truth. To be sure, the Irish Guards fought loyally and well, and recruiting in the South was not entirely unsuccessful. But a considerable proportion of the Irish remained apathetic, and not a few openly repeated, "England's need is Ireland's opportunity." Though the abortive Easter Rebellion of 1916, encouraged by Germany and marked by the momentary control of Dublin by the Republicans, was not serious in itself, the after-effects were fatal. The repression was not more severe than could be expected of any government under the circumstances, but the fifteen ringleaders executed were so many more Irish "martyrs." Their fate, together with the imprisonment of hundreds of their followers, seems to have been the decisive factor in turning public sentiment into radical channels. Even the American troops, when they arrived, were greeted with none too polite wishes for the success of the Germanic powers.

BIRTH AND HISTORY OF THE IRISH FREE STATE

Late in 1917 a convention of Sinn Feiners elected De Valera, one of the leaders of the Easter Rebellion, to the presidency, thereby marking the amalgamation of the two radical parties. An attempt to introduce conscription further incensed the Irish. During the general election of 1918, Sinn Fein captured 73 of the 106 Irish seats; the majority of the remaining districts were carried by the Ulsterites; the Home Rulers almost disappeared. The Sinn Feiners refused to take part in the proceedings at Westminster, and instead formed an assembly of their own, the Dáil Eireann; whereupon the Dáil elected De Valera "President of the Irish Republic" and set up a separate ministry. De Valera was another of the surprising leaders whom the Irish have at times chosen to follow. He was not a native, but the son of an Irish-American mother and a Latin-American father.

Ireland now had two governments: one, though illegal, backed by the nation; the other, though legal, bereft of all support from the people. One of the first acts of the republican administration was an appeal to the Peace Conference; but Wilson deemed the affairs of Ireland a matter to be settled within the Empire, and they received no encouragement. Although unable to gain official help from America, De Valera was successful in raising large sums among American citizens of Irish extraction.

England made two simultaneous efforts to dispose of the Irish question: a fourth Home Rule Bill was enacted, providing separate governments for the North and the South; and a determined effort was made to reduce southern Ireland by force. This final chapter in the seemingly endless tragedy was even more appalling than those which had preceded. An army of British regulars, together with the hated Black and Tans, appeared and engaged in a fight to the finish with the republican army. Every field, every street, every house, became a potential battleground. Truly, war is hell, as one expert on the subject is said to have testified, and as every veteran of the World War will agree; but the war in Ireland showed that even in a modern hell there are degrees. For savage ferocity this heart-rending struggle has never been equaled in modern times by any conflict between regularly constituted states. Shot down from ambush or massacred in cold blood, the British, adopting a policy of reprisals, ordered that the houses in the vicinity of an ambush should be burned. And reprisals inevitably led to counter-reprisals. The worst sufferers of all were the miserable noncombatants (if, in a struggle of this nature, it be correct to refer to the civil inhabitants as such), caught between two fires and treated as enemies by each side in turn unless they actively opposed the other. Throughout, the Irish furnished an example of the strength of nationalism second to none.

Though the English gained the upper hand, they finally concluded that the game was not worth the candle and resigned themselves to anything short of a republic. In 1921 a treaty was accordingly drawn up, signed by Griffith and Michael Collins, whereby it was determined that Southern Ireland should receive Dominion status. The Irish relinquished their representation in the Eng-

lish Parliament, but agreed to continue their land annuities. Northern Ireland retained the status accorded her by the fourth Home Rule Bill, with her delegation at Westminster.

With the establishment of the Irish Free State (*Saorstát Éireann*) it was hoped that peace had at last arrived—but as the English had prophesied, even this hope proved illusory. When the *Dáil* met, De Valera stood out for a republic and the treaty was accepted only by the narrow margin of seven votes (64 to 57). De Valera thereupon resigned, and Griffith was elected President of the "Irish Republic" by a scant two votes. Another meeting of the *Dáil* was called to choose a provisional government; but the republicans refused to attend, precisely as the *Sinn Féiners* had formerly refused to participate in the British Parliament. Collins was elected President of the Ministry (Prime Minister). To fashion a government and an administration out of whole cloth would have been a herculean task at best; with an army worse than useless—shot full of republican intrigue and in some cases in open revolt—and a country divided in allegiance, the prospect looked desperate.

For the moment there was a lull while both sides awaited the results of the elections. Meanwhile, since the constabulary had been disbanded the new Government set about organizing a substitute. The ministry intended that the police should operate unarmed, so that the Government should rest on a civil, not a military, basis. But although the elections demonstrated that the overwhelming majority (92 to 36) approved the Free State, De Valera proclaimed that the republic was the only legitimate government. Collins was forced to accept the challenge or abdicate his authority.

Emerging from the gory conflict with England, the Irish therefore found themselves in the throes of a civil war. Hardly had the struggle begun when Griffith died and Collins was killed in ambush. No outstanding leaders remained, and the arduous task of guiding the infant state devolved on Cosgrave (1922). For almost a year, while armed bands terrorized the countryside in the name of the republic, the Government lived in a state of siege, behind steel plates and wire entanglements; not even the conditions of the preceding period had been worse. Finally—by enlisting 40,000 men, executing the worst malefactors, imprisoning thousands more, and instituting a reign of counter-terror—the authorities succeeded in restoring order. And although over a quarter of the new *Dáil* (1923) were republicans and less than half were government followers, the independents stood solidly behind the constitution.

After saving the Free State from anarchy Cosgrave was faced with the hardly less difficult task of preserving it from bankruptcy. For a country with exceedingly meager resources, Southern Ireland was confronted with staggering financial and economic problems. The income tax was higher than in England itself, and there were a series of bad harvests. Nevertheless, the Government undertook a program of extensive industrialization, culminating in the gigantic hydroelectric plant on the Shannon.

One of the most interesting and, at first sight, astonishing aspects of the new Government's policy was its impartiality in matters of religion. It appointed Protestants as five of the nine high-court judges, did not seat a single cleric in the Senate, and removed education from the hands of the Church.

In 1925 an agreement was at last concluded, after long and seemingly endless negotiations, that settled the boundary between the Free State and Northern Ireland. No rectifications were made, though demanded and anticipated by both sides. By way of compensation, however, the Free State was released from liability for its share of the public debt of Great Britain. The settlement was a disappointment to both parties—but perhaps the easiest solution to an otherwise almost insoluble problem. In 1927 the De Valera Republicans announced that they would abandon their policy of noncooperation, take the oath of allegiance, and enter the Dáil.

In no other democratic state of Europe, postwar or prewar, did a government remain in power so long as did Cosgrave's. Assuming the reins of office under the most trying circumstances, to the surprise of all he retained the support of the Dáil and the people for almost a decade—a signal tribute to his outstanding achievements. Unfortunately no statesman, however great, who is dependent on the popular will can last forever; in 1932 De Valera, still howling for a republic, was elected in his stead. De Valera, "the most reasonable man in the world so long as he has his own way," forthwith earned an unenviable reputation as the one radical who, when induced into office, did not moderate his views. He continued to demand a republic just as insistently as ever and, by refusing to continue the English land annuities, even went back on the promise to pay that Ireland had made through her duly elected representatives. On May 19, at his instigation, the Dáil banned the oath to the Crown—the most important constitutional link with England remaining.

INTRA-EMPIRE RELATIONS

After the slump in colonial interest that had characterized the earlier part of the nineteenth century a decided revival of imperial consciousness took place. It would be difficult to appraise all the factors involved. Success begets pride, and the Second and Third³ British Empires were creations of which any people might well be proud. The imperialistic doctrines and effusions of Disraeli played a considerable part, together with his acquisition of the Suez Canal and his proclamation of Queen Victoria as Empress of India. Rhodes and Joseph Chamberlain took up the refrain; and Kipling, with his lilting verse, pictured the story of overseas expansion in terms that all could appreciate. Much was made of Victoria's Golden Jubilee; still more of her Diamond Jubilee, when a colorful procession with colonial and native troops from every corner of the globe served as a graphic reminder of the complex and ever increasing power of Imperial Britain.

Colonial Conferences between the home government and the Dominion Premiers took place on both occasions. In 1897, in particular, Chamberlain made an earnest attempt to tighten the bonds between England and her adolescent offspring. The problem as a whole subdivided into three main issues: imperial defense, economic relationship, and political coördination.

³ Excluding the Angevin Empire (which would make a fourth). The Second British Empire is that which England has held and developed since 1783. The Third (a reshaping of the Second) is the present-day Empire-Commonwealth.

Although, as England pointed out, the navy at least was quite as much their concern as hers, the suggestion that the colonies contribute substantially to imperial defense aroused little enthusiasm. In the preceding decade all the self-governing colonies, with the exception of Canada, had given small sums; but at this time, only Cape Colony was moved to offer an increased contribution. With no great success Chamberlain also sounded out the colonies on the possibility of forming an imperial Zollverein. To the question of imperial coördination, the foremost issue under discussion, the colonies remained even more indifferent. Jealous of their newly acquired freedom, they were by no means ready to see it curtailed; Laurier, spokesman for the largest of the autonomous colonies, politely but plainly indicated that Canada, at least, did not welcome any such suggestion.

Another factor that served to stimulate imperial consciousness and to prove that the Empire was still a creature of life and blood was the Boer War, when contingents from Canada and Australasia took their stand beside the imperial forces. Although Laurier pointed out that the participation of Canada was voluntary and that of six recent wars engaged in by England Canada had taken part in only three, England, bombarded by hostile criticism from the Continent, felt vastly comforted by these tangible evidences of loyalty.

In 1897 Canada had responded to the idea of imperial coördination to the extent of lowering her tariff on English goods 25 per cent; and at the Colonial Conference of 1902, England concentrated on the tariff-union idea, christened Colonial Preference. Chamberlain proposed that England abandon her traditional free-trade policy and create a tariff barrier against all except members of the Empire; in return the colonies were to grant free trade with England. He hoped that economic coöperation would eventually lead to closer political coöperation. Owing chiefly to the disinclination of the English themselves to change their ways, his rather enticing proposition fell through. Even so, some of the colonies lowered their tariffs on English goods. Imperial Preference, as it came to be called, remained a more or less live issue, bobbing up from time to time, particularly in England, to complicate domestic politics.

The Conference of 1907 brought no startling developments, but that of 1911 was of especial interest. Joseph Ward of New Zealand proposed a superparliament for the entire Empire; each self-governing portion, including England, was to have a representative for every 200,000 inhabitants. Since England herself was strongly opposed to the suggestion, her opposition, coupled with the obstacles of time and space, sufficed to wreck the scheme. New Zealand then brought forward a proposal for the creation of a Dominions Office, separate from the Colonial Office—a suggestion which later bore fruit (1925).

It was the German naval program which finally stirred the Dominions to action on the problem of imperial defense. Australia and New Zealand contributed ships and Canada promised three; but the Canadian Senate blocked the appropriations after they had passed the House, and the Australasian colonies were displeased when, owing to the exigencies of naval strategy, their units were removed from the home waters.

Final proof of imperial unity came during the World War, when from the farthest corners of the Seven Seas the lion's brood answered the call. In Flanders

fields and on the slopes of Vimy Ridge, on the shores of Gallipoli and throughout the Near East, Britons from the Great Northwest, the African veldt, and the isles of Australasia fought side by side with their brothers from the banks of the Thames, the Clyde, and the Shannon and sealed their kinship with their blood. In recognition of these exploits the Dominions were accorded seats at the council table of the Peace Conference and in the Assembly of the League of Nations.

The most important event of recent Empire history was the Imperial Conference of 1926, which issued the Balfour *Report* defining the status of Great Britain and the Dominions. According to this report, they are "*autonomous Communities within the Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations*. . . . Every self-governing member of the Empire is now the master of its destiny. In fact, if not always in form, it is subject to no compulsion whatever." "Dominion status" has therefore taken on a new meaning; the term "responsible government" is now reserved to indicate what was formerly meant by either phrase.

The new imperial designation, Commonwealth of Nations (which first appeared in the Irish Treaty), has caught the public fancy and is frequently employed in place of the term Empire; but the precise meaning of the phrase and of the Balfour Declaration are matters which have ever since exercised theorists as well as laymen. Is the Balfour pronouncement to be taken literally? With the Dominions negotiating separate treaties, with Canada and the Free State appointing their own diplomatic representatives, and with all the Dominions, except Newfoundland,⁴ possessing membership in the League, one is inclined to believe that such is indeed the valid interpretation. Have the worst fears of the Manchester School been realized? Has the Empire in reality dissolved into its component parts? For an answer the student of imperial affairs may turn to another pronouncement of the 1926 Conference. In deference to Irish susceptibilities the phrase "United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland" was dropped from the royal title. The new title reads: George V, by the Grace of God, of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas King, Defender of the Faith, Emperor of India.

INDIA: STATUS AND EARLIER HISTORY

Although last in the royal title, India is by many regarded as the brightest jewel in the British crown—so essential, say some, that without it there would be no true empire. One authority who entertains this view adds: "Here is the story, in full detail, of the imperialism of our own day. . . . If the record is a fair one, then, to a not inconsiderable degree is imperialism justified; if the record is tarnished, then is imperialism condemned." Be that as it may, with its undoubted importance, with its complex organization, and with its peculiar

⁴ See note on page 268.

position as the only part of the Empire possessing a separate administration, the subcontinent and subempire of India surely merits separate consideration.

To refer to India as a subempire is certainly warranted. Part of India proper, British India, is administered directly; part consists of protectorates, known as the Native States, where the British are content merely to give "advice." Nepal and Bhutan, belonging geographically to the peninsula, are theoretically independent but practically protectorates. In addition to the Indian Peninsula, the India Office dominates almost the entire northern coast of Arabia, has administrative control of the southern coast (the political control is exercised by the Foreign Office), and exercises "benevolent" supervision over the southern coast of Persia, over Afghanistan, and over Tibet.

And to refer to India as a subcontinent is not unwarranted. Including Burma and Baluchistan, it extends considerably over 2,000 miles from east to west; and nearly 2,000 (from latitude 8° to latitude 37° , the latitude of Virginia) from south to north—in other words, from well within the tropics to well within the temperate zone. In area it is larger than Europe excluding Russia; and if it be remembered that Europe itself is merely a peninsula attached to the land mass of Eurasia, the terminology appears increasingly correct. If it be remembered also that India is isolated from the rest of Asia by the highest mountains in the world, the picture is complete.

Within the confines of so vast an area great diversity of vegetation and of climate are to be expected. Some localities have over five hundred inches of rainfall a year, others less than five. The population is immense—about 320,000,000 (two-thirds of the entire population of the Empire, or three-fourths as many inhabitants as Europe as a whole). India is therefore densely populated; but owing to climatic diversity the population is unevenly distributed. One-eleventh of the area, with a density of over 500 per square mile, contains one-third of the population; while two-fifths of the area, with a density of less than 100 per square mile, contains only one-eleventh of the population. The population is rural rather than urban: there are only thirty-three cities of over 100,000, and less than one-tenth of the inhabitants live in towns of over 5,000.

Moreover, reminiscent again of Europe, India has a population that is far from homogeneous. In fact there are said to be nearly 2,400 main castes and tribes and 222 distinct languages. Over 200,000,000 of the inhabitants are classified as Hindus, about 70,000,000 as Mohammedans, 11,000,000 as Buddhists, and about 5,000,000 as Christians—in addition to countless lesser sects. Most important of all, Hindu India is burdened with a caste system which by force of custom prevents a man from rising above the station in life into which he is born. With such diversities it is not surprising that India has never developed any true sense of nationality, and the claim of the English that such a development is beyond the bounds of possibility does not seem entirely unfounded.

The political situation in India at the time when it was first visited by the English was a reflection of such conditions. And at the opening of the second millennium of the Christian Era India had been subject to a series of Mohammedan invasions, which, under a descendant of Tamerlane, had culminated

in the establishment of a feudal Mogul Empire. Like all places subject to a feudal régime, the peninsula was a prey to constant warfare. Semi-anarchy resulted.

The astounding achievement of transforming the domains of the Grand Mogul into the realm of the Britannic Empress of India was primarily the work of no more imposing body than a private trading concern entitled Company of Merchants of London Trading into the East Indies. Commonly known as the British East India Company, this organization was founded in the year 1600. Owing to the necessity of protecting its cargoes from the Dutch, who were its great rivals, and from the natives, the company sent out armed fleets, had its private army, and in general exercised semipolitical functions. Its landholding activities were at first confined to establishing trading-posts on the coast; the site of Madras was the first British acquisition on the mainland (1640). In the mid-eighteenth century, when the Europeans were still confined to the coast, France had supplanted Holland as England's principal rival; but the struggle which resulted in the acquisition of Canada registered likewise the supremacy of the British in India (1763). During the contest with the French, who invoked native aid, England became embroiled with the Indians as well, and committed to a policy of conquest. The process was an endless chain: each fresh acquisition led to fresh conflicts, and these in turn to fresh acquisitions. (Less than a century later the French were to repeat the process in Africa.) Under a series of remarkable leaders, British power spread rapidly: it was Clive, the one-time clerk, who defeated the French, and Warren Hastings who began the development. Lord Wellesley, elder brother of the Duke of Wellington, and the Marquis of Hastings carried it to fruition.

In 1815, India was still under the control of the East India Company, although a certain amount of government supervision had been instituted (1784); and the British were still solely interested in extending their political sway and safeguarding their economic interests. Subsequently they began to feel the necessity of caring for the natives. This new phase of British activity was initiated by Lord Bentinck (1828-35). With considerable diffidence, for fear of interfering unduly with local customs, he abolished the *sati* (*suttee*), the usage which dictated that a widow should burn herself to death on her husband's funeral pyre. (Can any more extreme example be found of the power of custom?) In 1817 no less than seven hundred unfortunate women perished in this horrible fashion in the province of Bengal alone. Bentinck also stamped out the murderous gangs of Thugs, a hereditary caste of assassins who infested and terrorized the country. In addition, the rate of female infanticide was reduced, the law was codified, and a beginning was made toward educating the natives. Most important of all, perhaps, a beginning was also made toward admitting the natives, formerly excluded from all posts of command, to minor offices in the civil service.

Not even England has been uniformly successful in her colonial adventures. Under Bentinck's successor, for fear of Russian influence she tried to interfere in Afghanistan, but suffered one of the most ignominious and overwhelming

defeats in her history. Of the British force retreating through the Khyber Pass, infamous from then on, only one man escaped to tell the tale.

Lord Dalhousie (1848-56), a disciple of Peel, was perhaps the greatest administrator ever sent to India. Dalhousie was first of all a great conqueror; British India, when he left, was between a third and a half larger than when he arrived, and the frontiers of India proper were very nearly what they are today. Expansion was accompanied by internal consolidation and the development of resources. Railway construction, the introduction of the telegraph and the "ha'penny" post, trade expansion, and the foundations of a system of national education may be listed among Dalhousie's outstanding achievements.

INDIA FROM 1857 TO 1914

In 1857 occurred the Sepoy Mutiny, the most momentous event of the century in Indian history. The causes were manifold and are not fully determined; but among them were the rapid westernization resulting from Dalhousie's reforms, discontent among certain native dignitaries, the resentment caused by missionary activities, and the belief engendered by the Crimean War that England was weakening. The occasion for the outbreak was the introduction of the famous "greased cartridges." The native (Sepoy) troops outnumbered the British forces six or eight to one. A new Enfield rifle was introduced that fired a cartridge greased with the fat of cows and pigs. Using this weapon did the soldiers no bodily harm; but in loading, the cartridges had to be bitten—and the cow was sacred to the Hindus, the pig unclean to the Moslems.

A mutiny among the Sepoys resulted (such is the force of ideas), which rapidly spread to the civilian population. The revolutionists dragged the aged Mogul Emperor from retirement, proclaimed his restoration, and entered on a war of extermination. Surrounded by frenzied mobs of natives, tortured by fever, by starvation, and by the pitiless tropic sun, the little British garrisons were in dire straits; the gallant defenders of Cawnpore, who surrendered under promise of safe conduct, were massacred in cold blood, together with the women and children. The siege of Lucknow and its relief by the Highlanders are famous in song and story. With the help of loyal Sikhs and Gurkhas India was reconquered, but as a result of the mutiny the East India Company went out of existence. In 1858 the administration was transferred to the Crown and a separate Secretaryship for India was created in the English cabinet. Later, India's new status was appropriately symbolized when Queen Victoria was proclaimed Empress of India (1877).

For fifty years after the Sepoy Mutiny few events of outstanding importance in the internal history of the peninsula took place. On the frontiers, however, with which the administrators of India were never content, there was continual activity. Early in the century the British had begun to transform the Persian Gulf into an English lake. In order to suppress piracy they had acquired a naval base (at Basidu, in 1817), and although the particular spot chosen did not prove satisfactory, England thenceforth was more or less continuously mixed up in the affairs of the Gulf and of Arabia. In 1839, with

what later appeared remarkable foresight, she annexed Aden, another "half-way" post to India, which after the building of the Suez Canal was to become of far greater importance. Late in the century, when an even more aggressive policy developed, the British acquired protectorate rights over most of the Arabian coast from Aden to the Tigris delta. On the Persian side of the Gulf as well, at Bushire, a residency had been established; and there also, when she deemed expedient, England did not scruple to intervene in local affairs. Baluchistan was divided into a British sphere and a protectorate. With Afghanistan alone the British were loath to interfere after their first unpleasant experience; although they did so when it appeared to them necessary, and it was there that Lord Roberts acquired his reputation. So long as Russia kept her hands off, however, England was content to let well enough alone. Eastward, she was busy extending her sway over Burma.

At the opening of the twentieth century India was governed by a civil service of some 100,000. For the most part it was composed of good men and true, but it was still overwhelmingly British. Above was the Viceroy, and a Secretary in Westminster who was theoretically amenable to the control of Parliament but whose actions were seldom questioned. Although the Industrial Revolution was beginning to make itself felt, with disturbing effects, and although there was some so-called nationalist unrest among the upper middle class, who had imbibed English Liberalism at the universities, conditions in India presented no alarming symptoms. The population at large experienced a considerable amount of misery, which the nationalists laid at England's door; but it is difficult to see how the charge was justified. Misery there had always been—more, in all probability, rather than less. England was certainly not responsible for the caste system; taxation in British India was lower than in the Native States; and by irrigation and sanitation the British had done much to check the immemorial famines and pestilences which had scourged the Indians, high and low.

The Viceroy, a typical British proconsul, was Lord Curzon (1899-1905). A thoroughgoing student of Indian affairs from the practical as well as from the theoretical standpoint, Curzon had approached his task determined to do his best for India according to his lights. And so he did.

Much of his time was devoted to the protection of the frontiers. In order to safeguard the Afghan border he created a new unit, the Northwest Province, where by means of "tribal allowances" the frontiersmen were bribed to keep the peace—a curious procedure, this, for the greatest empire on earth, but by no means unique in British imperial history, for the same practice was employed in Afghanistan itself and in Arabia. When the Germans tried to secure a terminus for the Berlin-to-Baghdad Railway at Koweit, the only good port available, they found themselves forestalled by Curzon; and Curzon it was who sent a British man-of-war to prevent the Russians from establishing a coaling-station in Persia. Similarly, he effectively foiled the machinations of the French in Masqat (Oman). These measures were but continuations or logical extensions of previously existing policies. Most important of all, perhaps, Curzon prevented Russia from gaining a foothold in southwestern China, by

forcing the great Province of Tibet to sign a treaty which rendered it in effect a British protectorate.

In India itself Curzon was far from idle. No viceroy ever did more for irrigation, and the whole economic and administrative life of the country felt the quickening touch of his masterful personality. In his manner, if not in his aims, however, Curzon was unfortunate. His university reforms and his partition of Bengal were advantageous, but productive of much criticism from the natives; together with his difficulties in getting along with even his British associates, they led to his recall.

After Curzon retired, England made her first real concessions to the slowly rising tide of unrest. The Morley-Minto Reforms provided that a certain number of Indians should be elected, not simply appointed, to the councils, which were given the right to discuss the policy of the Government and to pass adverse resolutions. The resolutions were not binding on the Government, needless to say; and the representatives who passed them were not elected by direct vote or from territorial constituencies, but from specially created constituencies, such as universities, chambers of commerce, municipal and district boards, and religious bodies. Consequently the Morley-Minto Reforms could hardly have been said to introduce true representative government, let alone responsible government.

It would be stretching the facts considerably to deduce that these concessions were wrung from the British. Gandhi was beginning to take his place as the foremost native leader; but so far his protests, directed against the evil effects of the Industrial Revolution, were still purely economic. His proposed remedy was a return to hand industry. A small radical minority were vociferous, but apparently not very influential. Revolutionary societies, too, were springing up, and the Viceroy narrowly escaped from assassination; but prior to the World War, Indian nationalism did not appear to be a serious threat. Moslems and Hindus were still at swords' points; and so long as this state of affairs continued, the British felt that their rule was justified and that they had little to fear. *Divide et impera* was a policy with which the British were as well acquainted as any other imperialists.

EGYPT PRIOR TO THE WORLD WAR

So far, only seven parts of the Empire have received detailed consideration—all, with the exception of Ireland and Newfoundland, acquisitions of comparatively recent date. The overwhelming majority, considered as separate units, remain, therefore, to be treated. Of these lesser dependencies Egypt occupies the most important position.

The population map of Africa is a peculiar and intriguing sight. The continent as a whole is thinly populated. Certain spots in the extreme south show dark, and Nigeria has a fair density of population; but with these exceptions the only dark area is a narrow strip along both sides of the Nile, hardly wider than the river itself. Oldest of the world's great culture areas, since the dawn of history the banks of the Nile have yielded sustenance to the fellah, who

until yesterday knew no thought but to serve his despotic masters. Only some 13,000 square miles out of 380,000 of Egyptian territory are settled, or capable of supporting a settled population; yet this small area provides a living for 12,000,000 people. Divert the Nile, and Egypt would disappear, engulfed by the billows of the trackless Sahara—leaving simply another Tripoli. One additional feature of Egyptian geography commands the closest attention: a “ditch in the sand” traversing the Isthmus of Suez and linking the Mediterranean and the Atlantic with the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the Pacific.

From 1517 on, Egypt constituted a part of the Ottoman Empire. How, early in the nineteenth century, she acquired a status semi-independent of the Sultan has already been revealed (p. 132). According to the testimony of Lord Cromer, this autonomous Egypt became “an earthly paradise for all who had money to lend at usurious rates of interest, or third-rate goods of which they wished to dispose at first-rate prices”; consequently in a few years 100,000 foreigners had descended on the unfortunate country (in 1836 there were only about 3,000). With energy and skill worthy of a far better cause they bled Egypt for all it was worth—and more too. Their task was easy, for they did not even pay taxes. The British contractors who improved the harbor of Alexandria, for instance, overcharged about 80 per cent. Particularly profitable were the loans to the Khedive. Funds borrowed in London or Paris at from 3 to 6 per cent were turned over to the Egyptian Government at from 12 to 20 per cent. The climax came in the '60's, when the Khedive attempted a great program of constructive improvements: the Suez Canal, irrigation canals, railroads, schools. Between 1863 and 1876, consequently, the Egyptian debt rose from £3,000,000 to some £90,000,000 (an increase of something like \$435,000,000, over \$80 a head in a country where the overwhelming mass of the population were practically paupers). Doubtless the Khedive overreached himself. Perhaps he was extravagant in addition. Certainly he paid huge, though more or less essential, bribes to his Turkish overlords; and certainly he was an Oriental despot, who gave his subjects nothing to say about the government or the expenditure of taxes. That these factors did not figure heavily in the count seems clear from a report of the English paymaster-general who was sent to investigate: “The present crisis . . . may be attributed almost entirely to the ruinous conditions of the loans raised for pressing requirements.” Incidentally, Egypt was beginning to show remarkable improvement. But however correctly such a report diagnosed the trouble, the plight of the Khedive gave his critics an opportunity to dilate on his “carnival of extravagance and oppression.”

The net result was that, first of all, he was obliged to sell his shares in the Suez Canal, and England acquired control (1875). Secondly, as most of the debt was owed to foreign creditors, England and France intervened, persuaded the Sultan to depose the Khedive in favor of his less able and energetic son, and established a Dual Control over Egyptian finances (1879). Although a nationalistic movement was already under way, the situation might have rested there had they not proceeded to introduce a large number of highly paid foreign officials and at the same time put hundreds of Egyptian officers on half-pay. Thereupon, the army, led by an officer, Arabi Pasha, forced the Khedive

to accept a nationalist ministry. The new ministry was circumspect in its actions, agreed to respect the foreign debt, and demanded control of only the purely Egyptian portion of the budget; but as antforeign riots were on the increase, England and France were apprehensive of what might happen in the future. Moreover the Khedive furnished them with a convenient excuse for further intervention by begging for assistance. Last but not most important of all, there was the Suez Canal, threatened by desert tribes.

Turkey was willing to intervene, but only if permitted to strengthen her shadowy hold over Egypt. England was agreeable, but France was willing for Turkey to act only as an agent of the powers. England proposed Anglo-French intervention, but France declined to participate unless authorized by the powers; and the powers refused such a mandate. Finally Italy was invited to share the honors—and the blame—but likewise declined. In 1882, therefore, a British fleet, unaided, bombarded Alexandria and a British army of occupation defeated and captured Arabi Pasha.

Rather than withdraw and allow the country to relapse into "anarchy," Gladstone decided that the British should remain so long as "necessary." Theoretically no change took place, for the Khedive continued to reign (under the nominal overlordship of the Sultan). Nevertheless he found it advisable to follow the "suggestions" made by Lord Cromer.⁵ Cromer, to be sure, was only British Consul-General—not a particularly exalted official nor outwardly distinguishable from the consuls-general of the other powers; but British Tommies still paraded the streets of Cairo. A note from the British authorities to the powers announced that "Her Majesty's Government are desirous of withdrawing . . . as soon as the state of the country and the organization of proper means for the maintenance of the Khedive's authority will admit of it." In the next forty years sixty-six similar declarations emanated from the same quarter. Queen Victoria, however, and the Prince of Wales (later Edward VII) were more realistic in their points of view and made no such pretenses.

Meanwhile, although the Khedive reigned, Cromer ruled; and under his rule, despite almost insuperable obstacles, Egypt prospered. Cromer judged, rightly, that the only way to redeem the country from bankruptcy was to begin by borrowing still more, for productive purposes. Seven million pounds went to meet immediate obligations, leaving for constructive work £1,000,000. This was put into irrigation; and when the great Assuan Dam was completed, all Egypt below the first cataract was able to raise two crops a year instead of one. The deficit became a surplus, which was applied to reducing the debt. At the same time Cromer was busy with social reforms. No longer did the rhinoceros-hide kurbash descend on the bare back of the slothful fellah. In addition, Cromer abolished the *corvée* (forced labor for the state), did away with graft, pushed railroad construction, and saw that justice was administered.

Just when the British had been occupying Egypt the situation had been further complicated by a revolt in the Sudan, the wild plateau region to the south of Egypt proper. Since the Nile crossed this plateau and a hostile power controlling the Sudan could therefore jeopardize Egypt's water supply, and since Egypt claimed sovereignty, the British had been indirectly affected. The

⁵ To employ the title acquired by Sir Evelyn Baring in 1892.

revolt was headed by the Mahdi, a religious fanatic. For a war in the Sudan, to add to his troubles, Cromer had no stomach or resources; but the Egyptian Government wanted to extricate its garrisons. General "Chinese" Gordon, a British officer famous for his handling of native troops, volunteered for the work and was sent out single-handed. Apparently Gordon underestimated his task; before he could make good his retreat, he was shut up in Khartoum. There he remained for the better part of a year, while the British and Egyptian governments debated what to do. When they finally decided on a relief expedition—a tremendous undertaking considering the nature of the country to be traversed—more time was lost in debating the route. Meanwhile Khartoum was captured by the Dervishes, and Gordon and 11,000 of the garrison were massacred. The storm of indignation that descended on Gladstone's head as a result has already been noted. His ministry fell; but his successor was no more eager than he to take up the quarrel. For a decade, therefore, the Sudan was left to its own devices.

After accomplishing the economic rehabilitation of Egypt, Cromer set about reorganizing the army; Colonel Kitchener was appointed Sirdar. The material at the disposal of the new commander was not prepossessing, but proved better than it looked; and not for nothing had Kitchener been chosen for the post. Two weeks after the Italians met their crushing defeat at Adowa (see p. 261) and at the very moment when a French expedition was pushing through the jungles of Central Africa toward the upper Nile, Kitchener received his marching-orders.

It was no dress parade. Building railroads and making sure that there should be no second fiasco, Kitchener toiled on toward his objective for two and a half years, wearily but with the inevitability of Fate. In 1898, at Omdurman, his little army of 23,000, of which only two brigades were British, met 40,000 Sudanese. Elated by earlier successes, the Dervishes charged with reckless abandon; but the British squares held. Of the enemy 11,000 were killed and 16,000 wounded, while the allies lost less than 400. Khartoum was occupied, and over the fateful spot the flags of Great Britain and Egypt flew side by side. The joint display was symbolical; thenceforth the Sudan was a condominium, under the "joint" rule of England and Egypt. It would be entertaining to speculate on what its theoretical relationship to Turkey was!

Advancing south from Khartoum, Kitchener encountered Major Marchand, with a detachment of the French army, ensconced on the banks of the Nile at Fashoda, as has already been recorded. Marchand was politely invited to withdraw, but although no match for Kitchener, politely declined. While the wires between Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay hummed with diplomatic threats and imprecations, the two conquistadores sat eyeing each other. Finally, with as good grace as they could muster, the French retired.

In 1907 Cromer resigned. To the end, his rule had been a despotism—veiled and benevolent, but absolute. It is doubtful whether anyone else ever accomplished more for the material welfare of a people intrusted to his charge; but to any measure of Egyptian control he was unalterably opposed. (To be sure, there was a Legislative Council, but it was powerless.) Worse still for

Anglo-Egyptian relations, Cromer often offended public opinion needlessly. He neglected to go through the forms of consulting the Khedive, and frequently did not even invite Egyptian officials to public ceremonies. Friction and at times open conflict developed; and at such times Cromer did not hesitate to use force.

Under Cromer's successor an attempt was made to placate Egyptian opinion; more natives were admitted to the civil service, the property qualification for the franchise was reduced, and the Assembly was accorded the right of interpellation. But with the Young Turks setting up a real parliament, Egyptians did not find these sops very satisfying. Nationalism became more vocal, and was aggravated by religious fanaticism.

When Kitchener became Consul-General, his appointment was taken as unmistakable warning to the Egyptians to be good. Kitchener, however, did not rely solely on the Big Stick. His Five Feddan Law made it impossible to seize small agricultural holdings for debt, and his Organic Law of 1913 altered the complexion of the Assembly by greatly increasing the proportion of elective members and by granting the right to debate hitherto forbidden topics, such as foreign affairs. Notwithstanding, the Egyptians were determined to be satisfied with nothing short of independence. At this juncture the World War intervened.

THE RESIDUAL EMPIRE

The Dominions, with the exception of Ireland and Newfoundland,⁶ are young; the crown colonies are many of them old. The Dominions, with the exception, again, of Ireland, contain much sparsely inhabited territory; the crown colonies are for the most part densely populated. Why, then, have the crown colonies remained subject to England, while the Dominions have attained their freedom?

A further comparison may help to explain this somewhat anomalous situation. The Dominions, Ireland and Newfoundland still excepted, are large; most of the crown colonies are comparatively small. The Dominions lie mainly in the temperate zones; the crown colonies mostly in the tropics or the arctic regions, where at best the white man can lead only a precarious existence. The Dominions are controlled by whites; while in the crown colonies the whites are often hopelessly outnumbered. For these reasons the crown colonies are under more or less autocratical rule. Those with a comparatively free type of government are in the minority. Only three of the oldest—the Bahamas, Barbadoes and Bermuda—have a lower house that is entirely elective, and even they have an appointive upper house. Three others—British Guiana, Ceylon, and Cyprus—have lower houses with an elective majority. Of the remainder, including protectorates administered as crown colonies, twenty-one have a legislative body that either contains an official majority or is entirely nominated by the Crown. Ten lack any legislative body whatsoever. Nevertheless, secure in the goodwill of the mother country and happy in administra-

⁶ See note on p. 268.

tions that are able and honest, the crown colonies show little disposition to rebel.

A number of miscellaneous units remain. The Channel Islands, the last remains of England's precolonial Anglo-Norman Empire, are joined to England only in a personal union; their ruler is not George V, King of England, but Georges Cinq, Duc de Normandie. Though neither the Channel Islands nor the Isle of Man rank as Dominions, both enjoy autonomy. Southern Rhodesia has responsible government, except that the administration of native affairs is reserved to the Imperial Government. Malta has complete control over internal affairs. There are a number of unofficial protectorates, not on a crown-colony basis, to many of which reference has already been made. There are numberless little islands under no organized government—most of them uninhabited, and without value save as potential coaling-stations. And finally, there are the mandates acquired as a result of the World War, of which the most important is Palestine.⁷

Such, in brief outline, is the stupendous organization built up by a hardy and adventurous people inhabiting an island smaller than New York and Pennsylvania combined, and little larger than Utah. Criticize the results of their empire-building one may; but at the same time it must be admitted that in dealing with that most difficult of problems known to this world of imperfections, the problem of human relationships, Britain has shown a genius hitherto unparalleled in history.

⁷ See p. 620.



PART V

THE CULTURE OF YESTERDAY

XII. NINETEENTH CENTURY CULTURE

CHAPTER XII

NINETEENTH CENTURY CULTURE (1815-)

GEOGRAPHICAL DISCOVERY

Of the innumerable dauntless explorers who during the nineteenth century made known an unexplored two-thirds of the land surface of the globe, only a few can be mentioned here.¹ In spite of native opposition, making discovery difficult and dangerous, the very heart of Asia was visited by a number of explorers in the first half of the century, beginning with Humboldt (G), who traversed the region east of the Caspian (1829), and Huc (F), who succeeded in reaching the capital of Tibet (1846). By the end of the century Africa was fairly well known; and the same may be said of the interior of Western North America a half-century earlier.

The task of tracing the northern coast of America was begun by Franklin (E) and his colleagues (beginning 1820). It was completed by Hudson Bay employees and by the score or more of search parties sent out when all of the hundred and thirty-four participants in Franklin's final expedition perished; some seven thousand miles of island coast were explored. McClure (E), leader of one of the parties, accomplished the oldest ambition of European discoverers when he traversed (1850-53) the Northern Hemisphere water route from Europe to Asia, the famous Northwest Passage—a route, as it turned out, of no economic importance. Later, Nordenskiöld (Sh) navigated the Northeast Passage (1878-79), completing the outline of the habitable continents—of which South America, curious as it seems, was the least well explored at the end of the century.

The polar regions have of course been the most difficult of penetration, and for that reason have witnessed the most tragedies. Owing to the greater isolation, extent, and frigidity of the south polar regions, arctic exploration far antedates antarctic. The early high-latitude records in the Far North were all British. Hudson established a mark of $80^{\circ} 23'$ (1607) which stood for the better part of two centuries and was only slightly exceeded by Phipps (1773, $80^{\circ} 48'$) and Scoresby (1806, $81^{\circ} 30'$). A record of $82^{\circ} 45'$ made by Parry (1827) stood for almost fifty years more, until surpassed by Markham, of the Nares expedition, who reached $83^{\circ} 20'$ (1876). Leadership passed to non-British explorers for the first time when Lockwood (A) of the Greely expedition advanced to $83^{\circ} 24'$ (1882). Greely's force was only one of a chain established for purposes

¹ Those connected with Africa have been treated in Chapter XI.

of scientific observation by ten participating nations. Owing to the failure of relief to reach them for almost three years, most of Greely's party perished of starvation. Seven only out of twenty-four men survived, and they by the narrowest margin; yet throughout the ghastly struggle to reach succor and keep body and soul together they preserved their records and scientific collections. Many of these early explorers found that the ice on which they traveled was drifting back as fast or even faster than they could advance. When relics of the ill-fated *Jeannette* (one of the ships of a United States naval expedition), which had foundered north of Siberia, turned up off Greenland, Nansen (N) conceived the unique and daring project of drifting, frozen in the ice pack, across the Pole. His ship, the *Fram*, reached $85^{\circ} 55'$ (1895), setting up a record still unsurpassed by ships; while Nansen, cutting loose from the vessel entirely, advanced to $86^{\circ} 13'$ with but a single companion. His return to civilization, part of the time without supplies of any sort, was an epic abounding in almost incredible hardships and hairbreadth escapes. Man had now conquered half the distance to the North Pole that had remained when Hudson set up his record; and Cagni of the Abruzzi expedition (I) crawled a few miles further to $86^{\circ} 34'$ (1900)—but some two hundred more still waited to be covered. In daring, none exceeded Andrée (Sh), first to approach by air (1897), who set out in a non dirigible balloon, only to perish before even reaching his goal.

In the Antarctic, Captain Cook had advanced to $71^{\circ} 10'$ without seeing land, proof that at best it must be a desolate country of eternal snow; but human curiosity refused to be satisfied with this utilitarian solution of the mystery of the Great Southland. With the accidental discovery of the South Shetland Islands (1819, perhaps earlier), the history of the Antarctic merged into world history.

The next great antarctic explorer after Cook was Bellinghausen (R), who to a large extent circumnavigated the Antarctic (1819-21) in higher latitudes than Cook, thereby reducing the potential area still further. He was the first to discover land within the Antarctic Circle (the islands he named Peter I and Alexander I). Weddell (E) surpassed Cook's record by reaching $74^{\circ} 15'$ in the South Atlantic (1823). The first to see (1839) that portion of the great continental mass known as Wilkes Land was Balleny (E). A new record of $78^{\circ} 4'$ south of New Zealand was established by Ross (S), who discovered two active volcanoes and the great ice barrier and sea which bear his name (1840-42). It was the end of the century, however, before Kristensen and Borchgrevink (N) achieved the distinction of being the first to set foot on the Antarctic Continent (1895). Later, by reaching $78^{\circ} 50'$ (1900), Borchgrevink bettered the record set up by Ross. Less than one-eleventh of the land surface of the globe, in all, remained unexplored; and since the only large tracts were those surrounding the poles, considerably less than one-eleventh was unknown.

MEDICINE PRIOR TO PASTEUR AND KOCH

The development of medicine in the nineteenth century was if possible more outstanding than that of the other departments of knowledge, but the great advances were not achieved until the latter part of the 1800's. The first half of the

century was dominated by old theories, and the principal innovations were new methods of diagnosis. Laennec (F) shares with Auenbrugger the credit of founding modern clinical, or practical, medicine; his contribution was auscultation, the art of listening to bodily sounds through the stethoscope, which he invented for the purpose (1819). Auscultation, coupled with the post-mortem methods of Morgagni, made it possible, by correlating symptoms with their anatomical effects, to describe and to identify many hitherto unknown diseases. Louis (F) founded medical statistics and introduced pulse-timing by the watch. A fourth method of diagnosis, testing the blood pressure, owed its introduction to Poiseuille (F), who devised an instrument whereby it could be accomplished (1828). As late as 1833, however, bleeding was still the favored method of treatment, and in that year alone, 41,500,000 leeches were imported into France.

The first step in the development of modern surgical practice and the greatest boon ever conferred on pain-stricken humanity was the introduction of ether as an anaesthetic. Those who have undergone an operation, however slight, without anything to drug their senses can readily appreciate this wonderful advance. Imagine having a leg removed under such circumstances! No wonder that before the introduction of general anaesthetics few were able to stand the shock of an amputation. The credit for introducing ether is not easy to assign. Davy suggested the use of laughing gas (1798), Faraday (E) that of ether (1818), but for some obscure reason neither suggestion was adopted. 1846 is the date usually given for the definitive introduction of general anaesthetizing; the credit is divided between two Americans—Jackson, who made the suggestion, and Morton, who administered the gas. In addition to relieving the anguish of patients, the new practice enabled surgeons to take their time, and so do infinitely better and more complicated work. Soon hospitals were performing more operations in a day than formerly in six months.

Müller (G) is important on account of his Law of Specific Nerve Energies, with its implications for the scientific method in general (1840). Müller maintained that each sense organ can only give rise to its own peculiar sensation, and that, conversely, the same stimulus applied to different organs gives different sensations—theories which obviously imply that objects are *not* apprehended immediately or in their true attributes and which thereby uphold the philosophic dogma of Kant.

Semmelweis (H) was the leading figure of a revolution in obstetrics. Previous to his discovery, a half, two-thirds, or even three-quarters of the women in some maternity wards died of puerperal fever. By simply washing his hands in antiseptics before performing an operation (1847), Semmelweis found that he could reduce the mortality among his patients from 9.92 per cent to 1.27—an important contribution toward lowering the death rate and increasing the population.

The mid-nineteenth century saw the appearance of several important medical inventions: hypodermic injections were first given (1845) by Rynd (Ih); the laryngoscope, invented (about 1850) by Garcia (Sp), made possible the examination of the throat; the ophthalmoscope, invented (1852) by Helmholtz (G), enabled the physician actually to look inside the eye; the clinical thermometer was introduced in the late '60's.

More than a half-century elapsed after Jenner announced his triumph over smallpox before any definitive advance toward the scientific conquest of disease was registered. "At the middle of the last century we did not know much more of the actual causes of the great scourges of the race, the plagues, the fevers and the pestilences, than did the Greeks." This state of affairs need cause no surprise if the empirical nature of the conquest of smallpox be understood. Jenner merely found out *what* would prevent the affliction, without having any idea *why* inoculation produces that result. Before man could conquer disease scientifically instruments of research had to be developed, the causes of disease discovered, the history of disease determined, the correct theory formulated, and the old theories overthrown.

That many small organisms seem to develop "out of thin air," without being born, had long puzzled scientists and had given rise to the Theory of Spontaneous Generation. Men believed that maggots, scorpions, and even mice could originate without the assistance of parents! The earliest blow to this theory was the proof, furnished by Redi (I) in 1668, that maggots result from eggs laid by flies. The invention of the microscope only complicated the problem, for the discovery of bacteria (1683) and the difficulty of preventing these microscopic organisms from developing led scientists to persist in the belief that something can come from nothing.

For three centuries after its invention the microscope did little more than reveal the existence of a problem—a problem whose magnitude (or should one say diminutiveness?) may be indicated by the fact that a dot of the size of those used as periods in this volume would cover about 250,000 average bacteria. Some of these microorganisms, indeed, are so minute that they have not yet been seen. Not until improvements were made in the nineteenth century did the microscope become a scientific weapon of first-rate importance, and then only could the problem of disease be attacked with hope of success. These improvements were the work of Lister (note well the name!), whose law of aplanatic foci (1830) made a science of the manufacture of achromatic lenses; Dollond (E), whose oil-immersion lens (1844) made possible a magnification of 1,000 diameters; Abbe (G), who introduced the substage condenser (1870); and Zeiss (G), who invented the apochromatic lens (1880). An important side line was the introduction (1871) of stains in making microscopic slides (Weigert, G). Until about 1860, therefore, bacteria were known only to experts; and even to them, chiefly as curiosities. Their rôle in the drama of disease and in the economy of nature was unknown and unsuspected.

THE RISE OF SCIENTIFIC MEDICINE

To cure disease is a magnificent accomplishment; to prevent it a far greater. It is accordingly some comfort to reflect that the two nations which have done the most in modern times to destroy human life have produced the two men, Pasteur and Koch, who did the most to preserve it. While France and Germany were hating each other and fighting each other and laying the foundations for the most successful attempt at race suicide yet staged, these two colleagues in science, one French and the other German, were engaged in a campaign against

disease that made them as truly brothers in the army of humanity as though they had stood shoulder to shoulder in the same laboratory. Together they laid the foundations of bacteriology and of the science of preventive medicine. Strangest of all, one was a chemist and the other an unknown country practitioner, neither of whom in the normal course of events would ever have been heard of in the medical profession at large. But Pasteur and Koch never let adverse circumstances stand in their way.

A descendant of generations of tanners and great-grandson of a serf, Pasteur was another of the supreme scientists who develop late, and in his examinations for a *collège* degree did only moderately well. His whole career was conclusive proof that, in the world of science at least, "genius is only patience." Starting in 1856 with investigations of alcoholic fermentation in the beetroot industries at Lille, where he was teaching, he soon proved that fermentation is caused by organisms, not by chemical changes. He therefore concluded that spontaneous generation was a myth, that the phenomena of fermentation are similar to those of disease, and that—just as some of his predecessors had suspected—many diseases are produced by germs. But could he succeed in convincing the medical profession at large where others had failed? Year after year, in the hope of disposing forever of the Theory of Spontaneous Generation, Pasteur continued his experiments; he even climbed to the great glacier on Mont Blanc in order to obtain pure air for his investigations. Two of his demonstrations were particularly conclusive. He sterilized an open flask and its contents, and plugged the aperture with cotton. So long as the flask remained upright, the contents remained sterile; as soon as the flask was tipped, so that the contents came in contact with the cotton, putrefaction set in. In another, similar experiment, he used a flask with a swanlike neck, so curved as to prevent dust from entering. In this case the aperture was left open; but notwithstanding, the contents remained sterile indefinitely. The part played by Pasteur in demolishing the Theory of Spontaneous Generation he himself explained with characteristic modesty: "We use the flasks of Spallanzani, or of Schwann, for, mark it, I do not introduce any new method of work, I am content with operating well where others operated badly, with avoiding causes of error which rendered the experiments of my predecessors uncertain and contradictory." The climax of this phase of Pasteur's career came in 1864, when the élite of the scientific and fashionable worlds of France crowded the auditorium of the Sorbonne to hear him describe his work and present his conclusions. Referring to the experiment last described, he said:

I have taken my drop of water from the immensity of creation. . . . I question it, begging it to recommence for me the beautiful spectacle of the first creation. But it is dumb, dumb since these experiments were begun several years ago; it is dumb because I have kept it from the only thing man cannot produce, from the germs which float in the air, from Life, for Life is a germ and a germ is Life. Never will the doctrine of spontaneous generation recover from the mortal blow of this simple experiment. . . . There is now no circumstance known in which it can be affirmed that microscopic beings came into the world without germs, without parents similar to themselves.

Pasteur carried his point with the majority. The Theory of Spontaneous Generation was abandoned, and its place taken by that known as the Theory of Biogenesis ("all life from preëxisting life"). Yet, strange as it may seem, this change did not entail the acceptance of the Germ Theory of Disease. Scientists admitted that fermentation could be produced only by living creatures, but the majority of physicians still denied that microorganisms had anything to do with causing illness. How do we know, they argued, that germs are not the result rather than the cause of disease?

At this point Koch stepped on the stage, with his investigations of anthrax. Pasteur's junior by twenty years, Koch lacked the advantages of an official position; on the contrary, he was an impecunious country doctor with no specialized training—condemned, one would say, to eke out a precarious and monotonous existence among the stolid peasantry of East Prussia. But Koch had a mind that refused to rest and that no surroundings, however prosaic, could dull. He was forever brooding over the mysteries of disease. On his twenty-eighth birthday his wife, little anticipating the result, presented him with a microscope; with no other laboratory equipment than what he could devise out of materials at hand, he set to work. Soon he was attracted by anthrax, a disease that was carrying off cattle and sheep by the thousand and was threatening his fellow men with a horrible death. The germ, the first microorganism to be identified, had already been discovered (1855) by Pollender (G); and Davaine (F) had worked on it, but had failed to convince others of its importance. Koch compared the blood of healthy and diseased animals and discovered that the diseased always contained minute particles resembling tiny sticks. Using this contaminated blood, he inoculated mice, employing a sliver of wood for lack of a syringe, and observed that they invariably died. He managed to make pure cultures of the germs, the first of such cultures known to history. Since no technique for attacking the problem had been invented, and for lack of better apparatus, he isolated the microbes by breeding them on potatoes. He then watched them multiply with unbelievable rapidity, made new cultures from the old, and with germs from his pure cultures—also for the first time in history—produced disease artificially in animals. Obviously these microbes must be the cause, not the result, of the disease—the Germ Theory must be true. Thus Koch proved what had never been proved before: that a certain kind of germ inevitably causes one certain kind of disease, and that an organism so small as to be invisible to the naked eye can multiply in a few days or hours until it kills another organism millions upon millions of times larger. All the time he was constantly interrupted to tend slatternly mothers, squalling babies, and smelly farmers. And often he ran into difficulties. He found that anthrax germs sometimes die easily; yet he knew that there were fields which were perpetual plague areas. What possible explanation could there be? He discovered that under certain conditions germs transform themselves into spores, or seeds, which will live indefinitely, and if they come in contact with animal blood will change back into active germs. Finally, in 1876, he was able to publish the life history of anthrax—a milestone in the evolution of medicine and the starting-point of a new method of research on infectious diseases.

From then on, the career of Koch was a succession of triumphs. His methods

of research, published the following year, laid a secure foundation for subsequent advances in bacteriology. He next published a study on wound infections, demonstrating conclusively that they are caused by germs. In 1880 he was elevated from his country practice to a research position in Berlin, and two years later devised the first good method for making solid cultures of all types of bacteria (the gelatin-plate method). From this discovery many authorities date the beginning of scientific bacteriology.

Just after Koch had published his first historic treatise, Pasteur was likewise attracted to the study of anthrax. For four years he experimented. He raised successive cultures, each greatly diluted, the first 1/1,000, the second 1/1,000,000, the third 1/1,000,000,000, and so on. Yet the *hundredth* generation of these germs still proved fatal to animals into which they were injected! Manifestly the effects were due to an organism that multiplies with unbelievable rapidity in each successive culture—so rapidly that, *under favorable conditions*, it is capable of increasing by the million in a few hours. It has been estimated that if multiplication went on unchecked, the descendants of a single cell would weigh 148,356,000 pounds in three days! These experiments also demonstrated that germs can live indefinitely independently of the human body. Pasteur was also working on chicken cholera at this time. He noted that if he removed the germs from a culture and subsequently introduced fresh germs, the latter failed to grow. Then, one day, after unsuccessfully attempting to induce cholera by means of a culture that had grown stale from sitting around too long, he inoculated the same chickens with fresh germs—and found that his subjects were immune! He had unwittingly accomplished the first step toward the scientific understanding of vaccines. Encouraged by this success, he tried letting anthrax germs age in the same way; but they transformed themselves into spores. At this point Fate again intervened. The temperature-regulating device of his incubator went wrong, and the culture was submitted to 42° C. instead of 37°—which produced the desired result! In 1881 Pasteur was invited to make a public test on cattle. The animals were divided into two equal groups. One was inoculated; the other at first received no treatment, but was set aside as a control. Then both groups were injected with anthrax germs. In a few days all the unvaccinated animals had died, while all the vaccinated survived. Here was an additional and, from the point of view of the public, an even more convincing argument for the Germ Theory. Soon farmers all over France were profiting by the epoch-making discovery, and thousands of cattle were saved. Pasteur was awarded the Grand Cordon of the Legion of Honor; but before accepting, he saw to it that his assistants received the ribbon of the Legion.

Of the many diseases which contribute to make life hideous, none was more dreaded in Pasteur's day than rabies, commonly known as hydrophobia. The mortality was practically 100 per cent and the suffering horrible beyond description. The prestige of the Germ Theory was further enhanced when Pasteur evolved a treatment which proved successful when applied to dogs. In 1885, following five years of labor and climaxing a lifetime of devotion to science, Pasteur had the courage to apply this treatment to human beings as well; after a million or more years of existence man had finally evolved a scientific method of attacking disease. Thus argument after argument was advanced by Pasteur

and Koch, proving that in order to do away with infectious disease it is only necessary to prevent germs from getting in their deadly work.

Pasteur was singularly fortunate in the extent to which he was able to observe the results of his labors. Among his earlier triumphs was the rehabilitation of the silk industry. In France alone the mulberry, the "Tree of Gold," had formerly produced an income as high as 100,000,000 francs (about \$20,000,000). In a few years the return fell to 8,000,000 francs; the blight spread; and by 1864 only Japan was immune. Pasteur devoted six years to the problem, fighting against overwhelming odds, for as he finally proved, there were two distinct diseases involved. It has been estimated that the monetary value of his achievements was sufficient to cover the entire indemnity of the War of 1870. Last but by no means least, his researches on fermentation led to the "pasteurization" of milk, which has saved the lives of countless thousands of infants.

Another great step in child hygiene was accomplished when Credé (G) introduced the practice of treating the eyes of newborn infants with silver nitrate (1884). Previously, through infections contracted at birth, thousands of babies had lost their sight annually.

The most beneficent and widespread result of Pasteur's work came from the application of his theories to surgery. Though the introduction of anaesthetics had relieved the suffering of patients on the operating-table, septic poisoning was a constant menace, owing to the inability of the medical profession to prevent infection with any degree of certainty. The chances of recovery from even a slight operation were dubious, the hospitals were little better than pesthouses, and those who had to undergo an operation in the head, chest, or abdomen, or for a compound fracture, knew that their chances of surviving were less than even.

When Pasteur was beginning his work, one of the great English surgeons was Lister, a son of that Lister whose improvements on the microscope had made the work of Pasteur and Koch possible. Hearing of Pasteur's early investigations of fermentation, Lister saw the implications for his own field of work and in 1865 began the practice of antiseptic surgery. As will be observed, this was prior to the general acceptance of the Germ Theory of Disease. Lister at first applied antiseptics to wounds after operation. Later he introduced the use of antiseptics in the operating-room, and before he died had the satisfaction of knowing that his methods had been the means of saving more lives than had been destroyed by the armies of Napoleon. The introduction of antiseptic surgery also enabled surgeons to undertake many operations previously impossible. More recently, surgeons have been able to accomplish the same end more efficiently by aseptic surgery, that is, by performing operations with sterilized instruments under conditions of scrupulous cleanliness.

NINETEENTH CENTURY SCIENCE: ASTRONOMY

The nineteenth century marked the beginning of the Age of Science proper, not so much on account of the marvels that scientists accomplished in their own circumscribed fields of endeavor as because in this century pure science for the

first time took the lead in directing human progress by laying the foundations for and pointing the way to practical inventions.

In astronomy the priority held by France and England at the beginning of the century passed to Germany, thanks to Bessel, who sacrificed a promising business career for a miserably paid assistantship in that science. Eventually, as head of the first efficient German observatory, at Königsberg, he became the Founder of *Exact* Astronomy, a title earned through calculating the true positions of the stars by eliminating the errors inherent in the observations of their apparent positions. Not only that, but by eliminating the errors in observations made at Greenwich in the mid-eighteenth century and recalculating the positions of the stars at that time, he even pushed the beginnings of exact observation back a century. His most spectacular achievement was accomplished in 1838, when he made the first approximately accurate measurement of the distance of a star (as distinct from a planet). The importance of this feat, which had baffled the skill of even the great Herschel, lay in the fact that it furnished concrete evidence of the earth's revolution around the sun and of the magnitude of the universe. The fruits of his labors can be appreciated by a comparison of two famous catalogues: Bessel's catalogue of 1818 listed 3,222 stars; the catalogue of 1857-63, resulting from the work of Bessel and his assistant, listed 324,198 stars in the Northern Hemisphere alone.

Shortly before the middle of the century (1842) the first efficient observation of a solar eclipse disclosed the sun's corona, one of the discoveries that proved the sun a fiery ball, not a habitable globe as was believed at the beginning of the century.✓

✓In 1845 occurred what has been termed "the most brilliant single achievement of nineteenth century science." A young Englishman named Adams, scarcely two years out of the university, presented the observatories of Cambridge and Greenwich with the mathematical location of a hypothetical planet.✓While still an undergraduate he had been intrigued by the unexplained perturbations of Uranus, and he had surmised that they must be caused by an unknown planet, not, as some assumed, by any failure of gravitation to operate. Laplace had solved the problem of determining the perturbations produced by a known planet; but no one, not even he, had attempted the reverse process. Armed only with pen, ink, and paper and assuming only Newton's law of gravitation, Adams had calculated the mass and orbit of his supposed planet. Because of professional jealousy or for some other reason, the astronomers to whom he communicated his results neglected his suggestion until a Frenchman, Leverrier, had likewise and independently calculated the elements and had presented them to the Berlin Observatory, which found the planet, subsequently christened Neptune, precisely as predicted—the most impressive demonstration ever offered of the theory of gravitation.

✓Contemporary astronomy was ushered in by astronomical photography and spectrum analysis. The first photograph of a celestial object, the moon, was made in 1840.✓The photographic plate of today records stars ten thousand times fainter than can be seen by the naked eye, and an enormously greater number than can be distinguished by means of a telescope alone.✓The eye and the brain record impressions partially, inexactly, and temporarily; the camera

records what it sees completely, exactly, and permanently. Finally, the eye and the brain are subject to self-deception, but the camera cannot lie. Photographical observation, now almost exclusively employed, has thus to a large extent eliminated the errors due to the personal equation (errors made by the persons taking the observations).

"Matter exists in nebulae with a density at least a million times lower than anything we can approach on earth, and in certain stars at a density nearly a million times greater." Yet how can these macrocosmic laboratories be made to yield information to man? Spectrum analysis, which has solved the problem, was begun (1802) by Wollaston (E) and was perfected (1860) by Kirchhoff and Bunsen (G) along lines laid down by Fraunhofer (G) a half-century earlier. The device by which spectrum analysis is carried on, the spectroscope, is an instrument consisting of a telescope from which light falls through a narrow slit on to a prism, revealing the spectrum. A star moving along the line of sight a hundred miles a second appears to an observer with a telescope to be standing still; spectrum analysis enables the astronomer to study its direction of travel and its velocity. This "wireless telegraphy" between worlds (which antedated the wireless) proved that the sun is a fiery, gaseous ball; also that not all stars are suns, but that they are divided into a number of entirely dissimilar classes—some gaseous, of falling temperature; some meteoritic, of rising temperature. The identity of radiant heat and light was also established by this means. Last but most important of all, spectrum analysis reveals the existence of unknown elements by making known the chemical constituents of heavenly bodies billions of miles distant. For example: Frankland and Lockyer (E) detected an unknown substance in the sun to which they gave the name helium (1868); Hillebrand (G) extracted from pitchblende a gas he assumed to be nitrogen (1879); Ramsay (S) proved this gas to be a mixture containing this same element helium (1894).

NINETEENTH CENTURY SCIENCE: CHEMISTRY

The progress of chemistry in the nineteenth century, though somewhat less spectacular than that of the other sciences, was nevertheless of fundamental importance for the world of today. Dalton's Atomic Theory at first gained little credence, though Berzelius (Sh) drew up accurate tables of the combining weights of elements (1818) and still further approached the modern tabulation of the elements by omitting heat and light, which, strangely enough, had been retained by Lavoisier.

Hardly was the Atomic Theory propounded when Prout (E) came forward with the hypothesis that the atoms of the heavier elements are themselves composite, built up of atoms of hydrogen (1815). Though Prout gained even fewer adherents than Dalton, he furnished food for thought and foreshadowed the unifying accomplishments of the twentieth century physics.

Organic chemistry is chiefly indebted for its theoretical foundations to Liebig (G), who, as the Father of Scientific Agriculture, is also one of the heroes of applied chemistry. More important even than his own achievements was his influence on others, for with his appointment to a chair at Giessen (1824) that

comparatively insignificant university became the greatest chemical school not only of Germany but of the world. Here he founded the first university laboratory. "At Giessen all were concentrated on the work, and this was a passionate enjoyment. . . . Pupils came to me from all sides. . . . With the first successes there began at that small university an activity such as the world had not yet seen. . . . A kindly fate had brought together in Giessen the most talented youths from all the countries of Europe. . . . Everyone was obliged to find his own way. . . . We worked from break of day until nightfall. . . . The only complaint, which was continually repeated, was that of the attendant, who could not get the workers out of the laboratory in the evening when he wanted to clean it." No wonder that with such a spirit at work Germany became the leader of the world in applied chemistry.

Up to this time organic and inorganic matter were believed to form separate kingdoms, with no structural affinities in common. An important break in this supposed line of demarcation was made when Wohler (G) succeeded in preparing an organic product out of inorganic materials, and thereby accomplished another step toward the concept of the unity of Nature (1828). The year before, Wohler had discovered aluminum, destined to prove subsequently of the greatest practical importance.

In the mid-nineteenth century (1856) a boy of eighteen discovered the possibility of making dyes from coal tar, a by-product previously considered worse than useless. Though Perkin was English, his countrymen made no use of his discovery; it remained for the Germans to create from the manufacture of aniline dyes one of their greatest and most remarkable industries. Today drugs as well are made from this "waste" material.

Not until 1858, when another Italian, Cannizzaro, took up his theory, was the work of Avogadro rescued from obscurity and the Atomic Theory firmly established. For the first time chemists became acquainted with the true atomic weights, previously confused with equivalents, or combining weights (the weights of elements required to replace a unit weight of hydrogen). Cannizzaro also did much toward obliterating the artificial distinction between organic and inorganic chemistry, and thereby further corroborated the hypothesis of the unity of matter.

In 1858, also, occurred what has proved from the practical standpoint one of the greatest discoveries in the history of chemistry. As a sequel to determining the structure of organic compounds, Kekulé (G) was able to expound the laws of synthesis, which have enabled the chemist to construct almost numberless compounds from three or four elements. Thanks therefore to Kekulé, the Newton of Organic Synthesis, chemists have been able to create artificially in the laboratory nearly every known substance, from camphor and madder to adrenalin and mustard gas, and have thereby upset the economic balance of great industries. Not long ago India had a million acres of indigo under cultivation, worth \$20,000,000 a year (1897); by the opening of the World War the value of the indigo raised in India had fallen to \$300,000, while Germany was producing in her laboratories 96 per cent of the total output synthetically. Today chemists are considered the most practical of scientists, and it is universally

recognized that no nation which does not have its quota of chemical leaders can hold a place in the forefront of industrial advance.

From the intellectual standpoint at least, "the greatest generalization" achieved by chemists was Mendelyev's Periodic Law. Arranging the known elements in order of atomic weight, Mendelyev (R) was able to demonstrate (1871) that they show a certain periodicity, to assign correct weights to doubtful elements, and to predict the existence and properties of unknown elements—all but one of which have since been discovered.

NINETEENTH CENTURY SCIENCE: FARADAY

In the field of physics—or for that matter, judged for novelty and for practical effect, in any field of science—the greatest discoveries of the period were those relating to electrical phenomena. The distinction achieved by electrical science was the more astonishing in that prior to this time electricity had been of no practical value whatsoever.

Twenty years after the invention of the voltaic pile, Oersted (Dh) took the second fundamental step in the development of electrical knowledge and laid the basis for the science of electromagnetism when he demonstrated that a magnetic needle can be deflected by a live wire situated in the vicinity. This demonstration proved: first, that there was some relationship between electricity and magnetism, and second, that the wire had created a sphere of influence, or "field," in its neighborhood, a form of "action at a distance." Though it had taken Oersted thirteen years to make his discovery, little did he imagine what stupendous consequences were to result from his seemingly trivial observation. As though floodgates had suddenly been opened, a torrent of achievements followed.

One week after the news of Oersted's discovery reached Paris, Ampère demonstrated that parallel currents of electricity attract each other when running in the same direction, but repel each other when running in the opposite direction. Seven years later (1826) Ohm (G) formulated the fundamental law that bears his name, which explains that the rate of flow of an electrical current is equal to the pressure divided by the resistance of the conductor. Meanwhile the measurement of electricity had been made possible by the invention of the galvanometer (1820), a device whereby a current indicates its strength by moving a magnetic needle across a dial; and Sturgeon (E) had invented the electromagnet, a second means of converting electrical into mechanical energy (1823). Sturgeon's magnet, used in many electrical devices, consisted of a horseshoe-shaped bar of soft iron wrapped with wire which carried a current.

"The greatest experimentalist of all times, and the greatest physical discoverer that ever lived"—such was Faraday (E). A blacksmith's son, with no education to speak of, Faraday began life as a bookbinder's apprentice and became interested in electricity through an article in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, read in leisure moments. Certainly the cost of producing all the editions of the *Britannica* ever published has been amply repaid by the effects of that single article. One of the most astonishing things about Faraday was that to the end

of his career he had little or no knowledge of mathematics. His début in the world of science came when he got a job cleaning Davy's laboratory.

Faraday made his first great discovery in 1821. Oersted, as has been noted, had succeeded in deflecting a magnetic needle; Faraday, remembering Oersted's comment that the "electric conflict acts in a revolving manner," sought to advance one step further and thereby achieve continuous motion. Soon he was able to record: "I . . . have been able to make the wire revolve around a magnetic pole, or a magnetic pole round the wire, at pleasure." Electromagnetic rotation, a further step in the conversion of electrical into mechanical energy, had been achieved and the first step in the creation of the electric motor taken. It was ten years, however, before Faraday accomplished those triumphs of electrical science which more than anything else were to make his name immortal—ten years of fruitless endeavor, followed by ten days of crowning achievement. Of the experiments of 1831 the most famous was that during which he mounted a copper disk, connected with a galvanometer, between the poles of a horseshoe magnet and when the disk was revolved by means of a crank, observed that the needle of the galvanometer moved—showing that electricity was being generated. Thus Faraday constructed the first primitive generator (dynamo) and began the conversion of mechanical into electrical energy. Subsequent experiments led him to suggest that there was a definite connection between electricity and light; and later still (1845) he proved that all substances, including human tissue, have a definite reaction to electricity.

Faraday was the first to liquify "permanent" gases, as distinct from vapors (an erroneous distinction drawn by physicists of the time). Today liquid ammonia and sulphur dioxide make possible the production of artificial ice and the refrigerating machinery used in transporting fresh meat, fruit, and vegetables to markets thousands of miles from the point of origin. Yet in spite of his accomplishments, which eventually brought untold wealth to others, Faraday like many scientists and inventors died almost penniless. When asked to name his most important discovery, Davy replied, "Michael Faraday." By another great scientist Faraday has been placed on a plane with Archimedes and Galileo and acclaimed greater even than the latter.

NINETEENTH CENTURY SCIENCE: GREAT PHYSICAL GENERALIZATIONS

Lavoisier had demonstrated the indestructibility of matter. The next great generalization of a similar nature was the principle of the Conservation of Energy, associated with Joule (E) on the experimental side and with Helmholtz (G) on the theoretical. By a series of experiments (1839-45) demonstrating that "whatever mechanical force is expended, an exact equivalent of heat is *always* obtained," Joule, a protégé of Dalton, created a new conception of heat and energy. Since heat is the power of producing work and since the total energy involved in his experiments was constant—the energy merely being transformed, that is, what was lost in work being gained in an exactly equivalent amount of heat—Joule had arrived at a proof of the Conservation of Energy. In other words, he had proved that electrical energy, chemical energy,

light, heat, work, and all other forms of energy are mutually equivalent. Joule announced his discovery in 1847; in the same year, Helmholtz, working independently, gave the theory its classical formulation in a paper entitled "The Conservation of Force." Helmholtz subsequently defined the principle by stating that "the *quantity of force [energy] which can be brought into action in the whole of Nature is unchangeable*, and can neither be increased nor diminished."

By demonstrating the equivalence of heat and work Joule established the idea of heat as a mode of motion, and completed the overthrow of the Caloric Theory. The Conservation of Energy also proved that all the energy in evidence today must have existed from the beginning of time (though in varying forms). As Tyndall (Ih-E) said in concluding his famous lectures on *Heat* (published in 1863):

The discoveries and generalizations of modern science constitute a poem more sublime than has ever yet been addressed to the intellect and imagination. . . . This law generalizes the aphorism of Solomon, that there is nothing new under the sun, by teaching us to detect everywhere, under its infinite variety of appearances, the same primeval force. To Nature nothing can be added; from Nature nothing can be taken away; the sum of her energies is constant. . . . The Law of Conservation rigidly excludes both creation and annihilation. . . . The flux of power is eternally the same. It rolls in music through the ages.

And of this principle, frequently considered the most important generalization of all time, it has also been said that "it has been the guiding and controlling spirit of all scientific discovery, or of invention through the application of scientific principles." More inclusive than Darwin's more famous theory²—for it comprehends many phenomena that lay outside the scope of Darwin's analysis, as well as those with which he dealt—it is of particular importance to physicists, who are constantly engaged in studying the transformations of one form of energy into another.

Joule's announcement would have received little attention to begin with had it not been for a young Scotchman, William Thomson (later Lord Kelvin), by some authorities characterized as the greatest scientist of the century. It was fitting, therefore, that the complementary principle of the Dissipation of Energy or Second Law of Thermodynamics should be propounded by Kelvin himself (1851). The principle of the Dissipation of Energy asserts that while the *sum* of energy *as a whole* is constant, *useful* energy is continually diminishing by disintegration into nonuseful, or dissipated heat. Kelvin therefore concluded that "within a finite period of time past, the earth must have been, and within a finite period of time to come the earth must again be, unfit for the habitation of man"—a prophecy that will probably interest the man of today less than it will his remote descendants.

The circumstances attending the discovery of the Conservation of Energy should be an inspiration to all who stand on the threshold of a career. Joule when he presented his evidence was only twenty-five, a brewer, and therefore no more than a scientific amateur—though by no means a dilettante—and was completely unknown to the scientific profession. When Thomson focused the

² See pp. 319-20.

attention of the scientific world on Joule's findings, he himself was only two years out of Cambridge. And when Helmholtz wrote "The Conservation of Force," he was still doing his military service.

The constant tendency of all energy toward a minimum of availability, postulated by the principle of the Dissipation of Energy, was christened (1865) "entropy" by Clausius (G), who asserted that "the entropy of the universe tends to a maximum." Entropy is of primary importance as the most reliable evidence of the existence of "time"—that is, sequence, or movement, in a given line of motion—and of time direction. When the scientist finds entropy increasing, he knows that he is moving toward the future; when diminishing, that he is tracing a problem backward toward its beginnings. The Principle of Entropy, with its consequences and its implications, has occasioned more discussion among scientists and philosophers, from that day to this, than any other principle of science; by Eddington (E) the Principle of Entropy has been accorded "the supreme position among the laws of nature."

The Atomic Theory received support from the physicists when Clausius maintained in his Kinetic Theory that gases, like other types of matter, are composed of atoms; and when Joule, taking it literally rather than symbolically, calculated that a gaseous atom of hydrogen travels 6,225 feet a second (1857).

Faraday had been puzzled by the phenomenon of induction, the fact that, with no apparent physical connection, electricity can produce effects across space; he had disliked this mysterious "action at a distance." Some physical connection, he reasoned, must exist—but what? Maxwell (S), another great scientist of the mid-nineteenth century, was likewise intrigued by action at a distance. In an effort to explain it, he began as an undergraduate to translate Faraday's ideas into mathematical notation. Faraday had propounded the hypothesis of an intimate connection between electricity and light. Studying the two by mathematical analysis, Maxwell came to the conclusion that if an electromagnetic wave could be observed and measured, it would be found to obey the laws of reflection and refraction and to have the same speed as light, only with a lesser rate of vibration (which is the reason why it cannot be seen, just as there are certain "sounds"—vibrations—that cannot be heard because their rate of vibration is too great). In short, he decided that electricity and light are simply divergent manifestations of the same fundamental phenomenon.

Maxwell's conclusions were accepted; but they were only theory, unconfirmed experimentally. The necessary evidence was supplied by Hertz, a German professor (1887). Hertz succeeded in creating, and experimenting with, the high-frequency waves of which Maxwell had spoken (subsequently known as Hertzian waves), measured their length and velocity, confirmed their reactions, and demonstrated how they spread throughout space, as the concentric waves caused by a pebble thrown into a pond spread across the surface.

NINETEENTH CENTURY SCIENCE: LYELL

In spite of Hutton geology continued to be based on the Theory of Catastrophism until that theory was overthrown by Lyell (S), whose *Principles of Geology, Being an Attempt to Explain the Former Changes of the Earth's Surface*

by *Reference to Causes now in Action* (1830-33) converted scientists to an acceptance of uniformitarianism. With the exception of Darwin, for whom he prepared the way, Lyell probably had a greater influence on popular thought than any other scientist of the day; in fact he was the first of those nineteenth century scientists who, often unwittingly and unintentionally, knocked the props from under the Victorian universe. By a wealth of illustration and logical reasoning, rather than by the introduction of any new principles, Lyell's great work of popularization made it plain even to the general reader that the earth has been an incalculable length of time in reaching its present state, and therefore that the famous biblical chronology of Bishop Usher is no longer tenable.³

NINETEENTH CENTURY SCIENCE: DARWIN

The most startling biological discovery of the early nineteenth century was the identification (1827) of the human ovum by Von Baer (R). Von Baer's discovery proved: first, that mammals, including man, reproduce by means of eggs, as do the lower animals; second, that the human embryo does not consist of a perfectly formed miniature being, as had been supposed, but in its earlier stages is indistinguishable from that of many other mammals; and third, that the whole hereditary inheritance is transmitted through a cell only 1/200 of an inch in diameter.

The next important discovery in biology was made by Schwann (G), who pointed out that animals as well as plants are made up of cells (1839). Thus, as Schwann said, "one common principle of evolution⁴ is laid down for the most highly differentiated elementary parts of the organisms, and this principle of evolution is the cell-formation."

An interesting event of 1856 connected with the Theory of Evolution⁵ was the first discovery of the skeletal remains of a prehistoric (Neanderthal) man, found in Rhenish Prussia, near Dusseldorf, but not universally accredited for some time. The first identification of a prehistoric (flint) implement as such was made by De Perthes (F) in 1846; but this evidence of man's antiquity was not accepted until attested by Prestwich (E) in the same year that Darwin's *Origin of Species* was published.

The most striking coincidence of history, perhaps, is the fact that the most influential scientist and the greatest statesman of the nineteenth century were both born on the same day—one in a log cabin in the backwoods of Kentucky, the other in a comfortable but undistinguished dwelling on the banks of the Severn. Darwin (E), whose theories set the world agog in 1859, was far from an infant prodigy; in his youth he showed no promise of future eminence. He received the usual classical education, and in order to please his father began the study of medicine. Giving that up, he entered Cambridge to prepare for the ministry, spent most of his time in sports, and graduated only tenth among those not seeking honors—enough to condemn him as a mediocrity in the eyes of his countrymen. Next he took up geology and obtained a berth as

³ See the marginal notes of the King James Version.

⁴ Using the term in its general, not its technical, sense.

⁵ In its technical sense.

naturalist without pay on *H.M.S. Beagle*, bound on a scientific expedition around the world which lasted almost five years. As with most great scientists, his career was simply another proof that genius is mainly the capacity for taking infinite pains, and this although during the long years when he was investigating the problem of heredity—years when he was the friend and confidant of Lyell—"he never knew one day of the health of ordinary men."

Darwin began the investigation of his particular problem by studying the breeding of domestic animals. It is obvious that progeny, though resembling their parents, are in no case identical with them but always exhibit minor variations. By taking advantage of this law of nature and selecting stock in which desired traits were accentuated, breeders like Bakewell had discovered the possibility of modifying their strains, almost at will. In order to realize what can be done in this way, one has only to consider all the various breeds of dogs. Darwin began to wonder whether Nature worked on a similar plan; and if so, how. In 1838 he happened to read Malthus's famous Essay on Population (see p. 27), wherein Malthus calls attention to the fact that throughout the animal kingdom many more individuals are born than can possibly or profitably survive, and that as a result the weaker perish in the struggle for food. Thus a single codfish bears some five million eggs, all but two or three of which meet untimely ends. This struggle for existence, to which Malthus had called attention, gave Darwin his basic idea:

As many more individuals of each species are born than can possibly survive; and as, consequently, there is a frequently recurring struggle for existence, it follows that any being, if it vary however slightly in any manner profitable to itself, under the complex and sometimes varying conditions of life, will have a better chance of surviving, and thus be *naturally selected*. From the strong principle of inheritance, any selected variety will tend to propagate its new and modified form.

Repeated *ad infinitum*, this process, by compounding minor differences, would in time evolve separate species.

After formulating his working hypothesis, Darwin spent twenty years of patient labor collecting facts and making experiments—so steep is the toilsome path whereby the scientist attains the summits of achievement! In 1859 he published his capital work—the most influential book of the nineteenth century—*On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or The Preservation of Favored Races in the Struggle for Life*. For the first and perhaps the only time in history a work of erudition proved a best-seller; the original edition was exhausted the day that it appeared! In this historic volume Darwin pounded his famous evolutionary hypothesis, which caused the theory of the separate *creation* of immutable species to be abandoned and replaced by the concept of the *evolution* of all species from a simpler form of life. Many, notably Lamarck (see p. 34), had anticipated his findings in one way or another, and evolution was in the air;⁶ but Darwin was the first to give the theory a causal explanation acceptable to scientists.

Briefly stated, the main features of the Darwinian hypothesis in its developed form are as follows: 1. There are more individuals of every species born than

⁶ For example, "In Memoriam" was published *before* the *Origin of Species*.

can survive. 2. Therefore, within each species, between the various species, and between the individual and its environment as a whole, there is a constant *struggle for existence*. 3. *Variation*—differences between members of the same species—makes some individuals better adapted to their environment and consequently better fitted to survive than others. 4. This brings into operation the Law of Natural Selection between those individuals and species better fitted to survive and those less well fitted. 5. The result is the *survival of the fittest* (sometimes facetiously paraphrased as “the survival of the fittest”).

The most radical feature of the Darwinian Theory of Evolution was the place assigned to man. Prior to this time, many were prepared to accept the general idea of evolution as applied to the lower animals, but most people persisted in the belief that man belonged to a separate kingdom. In his second great work, *The Descent of Man* (1871), Darwin worked out the implications of his theories as applied to the origin and development of man. By unfriendly contemporaries and by many uneducated persons today, Darwin has been accused of saying that man is descended from a monkey. As a matter of fact, the Darwinian hypothesis merely maintains that the apes are man's closest relations in the animal kingdom and that both they and man are descended from a common ancestor, never identified, but known in popular parlance as “the missing link.”

NINETEENTH CENTURY SCIENCE: OTHER BIOLOGISTS

Any award of credit for the evolutionary hypothesis should include mention of Wallace (E), who, beginning his investigations twenty years after Darwin, reached identical conclusions before Darwin published his. Wallace forwarded his work to Darwin, thereby fortifying the latter in his convictions, and the two published their findings together.

The first to discover the basic laws of heredity was an Austrian monk named Mendel. The conclusions that he reached were published (1866-69) only in the *Proceedings* of an obscure scientific society at Brünn, the little Moravian town in which he lived, and consequently remained unaccepted and virtually unknown until the very end of the century. The Mendelian Laws were then rediscovered and accorded universal recognition.

One of Darwin's colleagues in the field of biological research was his cousin, Galton (both were grandsons of Wedgwood, known as “the most successful and original potter the world has ever seen”). On account of the obscurity of Mendel, Galton is regarded as the founder of the study of heredity and “eugenics,” a term he originated. His principal work, *Hereditary Genius* (1869), demonstrates that the laws of heredity apply to the mind as well as to the body. Since this concept was at variance with current notions of the soul and of “the freedom of the will” and since he ranked the ancient Greeks above modern Europeans, the book was greeted chiefly with derision and dislike.

In addition to the upheaval that was the direct result of Darwin's theories, another revolution in thought was in progress, related and if anything even more important, but for various reasons creating rather less excitement—a revolution that extinguished current animistic conceptions and strengthened the

tendency, inherited from the eighteenth century, toward belief in a universally applicable mechanism.

Since the time of the classical Greeks men have wavered in their interpretations of the life force between mystical and materialistic explanations. Even after the rise of modern science had eliminated the supernatural as an explication of the phenomena connected with inorganic matter, mystical interpretations of biological phenomena persisted. At the opening of the nineteenth century the fundamental physiological concept, universally accepted, was the Theory of Vitalism. It was believed that all animals, including man, were animated by a mysterious "vital force" that could not be explained by mechanical laws.

The first to deal vitalism a telling blow was Wöhler (see p. 313). Then came the doctrine of the Conservation of Energy, which applied to biology meant that the manifestations of energy in organisms are simply the result of the quantity of potential energy received into the body as food. Scientists accordingly set to work to extend the laws of physics and chemistry to biology. From his experiments with dogs, which indicated that the intake of energy in the form of food agreed with the output within 0.47 per cent, Rubner (G) was able to present results that accorded closely with the Principle of the Conservation of Energy (1894). Accounts of experiments on human beings published (1901) by Atwater, Rosa, and Benedict (A) showed agreement within two parts in a thousand. If scientists had been able to achieve a complete explanation of all biological phenomena by the laws of physics and chemistry, the entire universe and everything therein would have been reduced to a mechanism of predetermined cause and effect surpassing even the conceptions of the justly famous Calvin. In plain language, science would have eliminated free will—and the soul along with it!

Several factors, taken together, explain why this threatened revolution stirred up less opposition than that caused by Darwin. First of all, the public was slower to grasp the implications. Second, it was busy fighting Darwinism. Third, scientists were less successful in their investigations along these lines than they had been in solving the problems previously encountered. Fourth, scientists generally rejected the hypothesis *in toto* or said that although biology might eventually master the laws governing vital *phenomena* as completely as astronomers comprehended those of the heavenly bodies, science could never explain what matter and consciousness *themselves* are.

In any case, vitalism was thrown overboard, along with the Metternich System, leaving nothing to take its place; skepticism and agnosticism increased apace; and the irreligious, when driven to the wall for a response to the fundamental questions concerning life, could only throw up their hands and answer one inquiry with another—"Who knows?"

MODERN CRITICISM

To one other department of achievement in the realm of the purely intellectual, the rise of modern criticism, passing consideration at least is due—though it is hardly correct to speak of it as a department, for it was rather a technique

and a spirit that permeated and underlay many lines of activity. Prior to the nineteenth century, men were prone to accept documentary evidence at its face value. From the weight of *authority as such* they had indeed freed themselves, as has already been noted, and they were quite ready to disregard what some eminent authority said on the basis of conflicting evidence, experimental or documentary; but they lacked both the attitude and the technique to attack documentary *evidence itself* in a fundamentally critical spirit and to determine its intrinsic value. The distinction is subtle but all-important. For the printed or written word, therefore, they still had much the same naïve respect as the man of the Middle Ages or the uneducated man of today.

The fundamental importance of the rise of the experimental method in science was that in so far as applicable, it emancipated men from dependence on such unreliable, second-hand means of information. But since all documents alike were still grist to their mill, they were little better off than before in regard to matters about which it was impossible to acquire evidence by observation or experiment. As a hypothetical example, assume a document purporting to contain a statement by Aristotle. The men of the Middle Ages, as has been pointed out, would have accepted the statement unquestioningly unless it happened to conflict with the pronouncement of some more revered authority, such as the Bible. The men of the eighteenth century might have rejected the statement *entirely* if it conflicted with the results of scientific experiment; but where conflicting evidence was lacking, they were equally unable to determine *how much* faith to put in the *document itself*. They failed to inquire whether Aristotle had really said what was attributed to him; whether, if he said it, he had actually seen the events or phenomena in question; whether he was competent to pass judgment; and whether he was swayed by emotional bias.

For the development of a critical technique we are indebted particularly to the historians who evolved the method known as Historical Criticism. Confronted with a document, the historian seeks an answer to four fundamental questions: Is the document genuine, that is, is it what it purports to be, or a forgery? Was the witness (author) in a position to know the facts? Was he "competent," that is, constitutionally and technically equipped to testify as to the facts? Did he intend to tell the truth? Once these questions are answered, the historian is in a position to appraise the value of the evidence.⁷

Foremost among those with whom the establishment of the new technique is associated were two great German professors, Niebuhr and Ranke. Although the grandson of a peasant, Niebuhr was extraordinarily gifted. He was possessed of a card-catalogue memory, and had mastered twenty languages before he was thirty. After assisting Stein with the administration of Prussian finances in the Liberation Epoch, he joined the faculty of the new University of Berlin (1810). Niebuhr made history an independent science, and at the end of his career was "the acknowledged monarch of European scholarship."

Ranke, greatest of modern historians, likewise taught at Berlin (beginning in 1825). Even more than Niebuhr he was responsible for the formation of the canons of Historical Criticism and for the education of a school of trained his-

⁷ In actual application, the technique is of course much more complicated than appears from this summary description.

torians. He is particularly noteworthy for his insistence on the use of reliable first-hand sources and for the scientific detachment with which he handled his material.

Modern critical scholarship was the basis of the new social sciences—anthropology, sociology, and the like—which sprang into being in the nineteenth century and achieved important results. Critics in these various fields subjected to searching examination the evidence, sacred as well as profane, on which constituted authority, ecclesiastical and secular, rested its claims to respect and obedience. Take, for instance, a passage from *The Golden Bough* (1890), a popular study of primitive custom and belief published by Frazer (S): "It is now easy to understand why a savage should desire to partake of the flesh of an animal or man whom he regards as divine. By eating the body of the god he shares in the god's attributes and powers. And when the god is a corn-god, the corn is his proper body; when he is a wine-god, the juice of the grape is his blood; and so, by eating the bread and drinking the wine, the worshipper partakes of the real body and blood of his god."

Most influential of all was that branch of investigation known as the Higher Criticism, which brought the canons of modern scholarship to bear on the Bible and on revealed religion in general ("revealed" by a deity to man; consider, for example, the delivery of the tables to Moses or Mohammed's account of the origins of his faith). Every passage of Scripture, canonical and apocryphal, was submitted to scrutiny, with damaging results for preconceived theories. One thing at least was made clear from the composite nature of the Scriptures as established by these scholars: the Bible is not "inspired" in the sense of being revealed by God direct. To Protestants this was a worse blow than to Catholics, since they had only Scripture on which to rely as a foundation for their faith.

Two of these Bible critics achieved international fame. Strauss (G) was one of the leaders of the Tübingen School of Higher Criticism. His *Life of Jesus* (1835), the first biography of Christ written under the inspiration of modern historical criticism, denied the miracles and treated the Savior not as God but as a human being, higher than but not different in kind from ordinary mortals. Needless to say, this point of view was anathema to the Trinitarians who formed the overwhelming majority of communicants, Protestant as well as Catholic; and not many years earlier, it would have cost Strauss his liberty, if not his life. Strauss also pointed out that "few great men have existed of whose history we have so unsatisfactory a knowledge as that we have of Jesus." In making this pronouncement Strauss pointed the way for those who have maintained that Jesus was merely a mythical figure who never really existed.

Renan (F) was the author of another *Life of Jesus* (1863), written from the same point of view. Educated for the priesthood, Renan left the Church and became a distinguished Orientalist. His studies led him to believe that Scripture and Christian theology are simply an evolution of pagan fable and myth. Because of his gifts as a stylist and because he was deprived of his professorship at the Collège de France by Napoleon III, Renan achieved even greater fame than Strauss. Invited to ally himself with the Protestants, he is said to have replied, "I may have lost my faith—but not my reason."

In addition to developing a universally applicable technique, giving the impetus to a galaxy of new sciences, and throwing light on a host of important problems, historians were above all responsible for the rise of a true historical sense—a clear appreciation of the present as the product of forces working in endless evolution in the past.

INVENTION AND DISCOVERY, 1815-1858

Of the avalanche of nineteenth century inventions only a few can be mentioned here. The selection is more or less arbitrary, but the aim is to focus attention on the decisive steps in basic achievements which either proved of the greatest utility or paved the way for subsequent developments. As to the history of individual inventions the testimony of experts is so confusing (owing doubtless to the poverty of historical data) that it is often impossible to determine which of several claimants or contributors is the actual inventor or when the invention took place.⁸ Moreover, the intrusion of chauvinistic nationalism into the history of invention—each country endeavoring to establish its priority—adds another element of confusion.

Regular commercial service between Europe and America, by sailing packet, was only established in 1816. This service is of particular interest because the cargoes were chiefly immigrants and because of the shocking conditions under which the poor wretches traveled. Packed in like sardines, without any distinction whatsoever of sex, they even had to furnish their own food and cook it themselves. There was one case of a packet which took a hundred days to cross; in consequence, seventeen of her passengers died of starvation.

Already established in inland and coastal navigation, on the high seas the steamship was slow to displace the sailing vessel. The rivalry was not a simple contest, with economy and efficiency allied against expense and inefficiency, but one between economy linked with inefficiency on the one hand, and efficiency coupled with expense on the other. Sailing vessels were more economical and not infrequently rivaled the early steamships in speed, but the greater dependability and greater average speed of steamers finally decided the issue—though not until the '90's did the steam tonnage of the world surpass that under sail.

For decades steamers were little more than sailing vessels fitted with engines. The first ship to cross the Atlantic equipped with a steam engine was the *Savannah* (1819), but steam was used only eighty hours during the month of crossing and the project was soon abandoned. In 1824 the first purely steam line, the General Steam Navigation Company, was founded. The first ship employing steam that plied regularly between the Old World and the New (West Indies) was the *Curaçao*, a vessel of English construction but Dutch registry, which began her service in 1827.

It may not be beneath the "Heroic Muse of History" to record that matches were invented in 1827. The importance of this invention will be appreciated by those who recall that prior to that time men were dependent on the flint

⁸ For the benefit of the reader the author is sometimes more dogmatic than the state of historical knowledge warrants.—Author

whenever they needed a fresh fire or a light. Matches were of immeasurable importance in furthering the introduction of gas and kerosene.

One of the capital steps in the application of power was the invention of the water turbine, perfected in 1832 by Fourneyron (F). The water wheel is one of the oldest applications of power; and attempts—relatively unsuccessful—had already been made to construct turbines. As evolved by Fourneyron, the turbine is a special form of water wheel, incased with the actuating stream of water in such a way that nearly all the energy is utilized. Power is delivered direct to the drive shaft without the intervention of a reciprocating device—which was essential in the steam engine—and the shaft revolves much faster than in a reciprocating engine. Under a head of water of only 4.59 feet, Fourneyron's engine delivered 50 horse power (the average Watt engine was only 20 horse power); and shortly after the middle of the century a turbine developing 800 horse power was installed in Paris. The prime importance of the turbine lies in its availability in regions like Switzerland, Italy, France, Norway, and Ireland, which are deficient in coal but have abundant water power. Hydraulic power is cheaper than steam, is more suitable for the generation of electricity, and with the perfection of long-distance transmission can be furnished to widely remote areas—though this important aspect did not appear until the end of the century. Last but not above all, "hydroelectric energy will keep our lamps and wheels going until physicists learn to break up atoms and thus open up new stores of pristine power from 'founts that ne'er can run dry.'"

An important advance in technology was the invention (1839) of the perfected steam hammer by Nasmyth (S). The device was invented, that is, the sketches were drawn, in little over half an hour!—a feat perhaps unparalleled in the history of invention. Previously steam hammers had exhibited many disadvantages: they had utilized steam only on the down stroke, had been hauled up by cams, had possessed an extreme fall of only 18 inches (which was considerably reduced in striking large objects and which precluded work on very large objects), and had been equipped with no means for controlling the force of the blow. Nasmyth's hammer utilized steam throughout its action, and the impact could be regulated with such nicety that an expert operator could pick up a moistened wafer from a watch without breaking the crystal.

Only brief consideration is essential to a realization of what a different world this would be without rubber. Rubber boots for the fisherman, rubber gloves for the surgeon, rubber hose for the fire truck, rubber tires for the automobile—these are only a few of the numberless articles of everyday use that would be nonexistent or very different but for vulcanization, invented by Goodyear (A). For some time rubber had been in limited use; but as then prepared, it would decompose in the presence of heat or on contact with various common acids, such as vinegar. After many vain attempts to eradicate these drawbacks, Goodyear purchased the rights to Hayward's sulphur-cure process. This development was an advance, but he was still far from his goal. Goodyear, however, was one of those persistent individuals whom Fortune delights to favor, and in 1839, happening to drop some rubber mixed with sulphur on a hot stove, he noted certain changes which eventually resulted in the perfected process of vulcanization.

Photography, if its ultimate foundations be included, has a long history; so gradual has its progress been that it is next to impossible to select a few definite men as its inventors. As for photography proper—the making of images by the action of light—the first photograph was made (about 1802) by Wedgwood (E). Wedgwood's photographs were contact prints, valueless as permanent records because they faded rapidly. The first *permanent* photograph was made (1822) by Niepce (F), but the quickest exposure took several hours. After forming a partnership with Daguerre (F), Niepce died, leaving his colleague to reap the triumph that attended the announcement of the "daguerreotype" in 1839. The daguerreotype, however, produced only one picture per exposure, with no way of making copies. Meanwhile Reade and Talbot (E) had invented processes that produced negatives from which any number of prints could be made. In reality, therefore, their processes contributed more to future development than did the daguerreotype. Even so, it is doubtful if photography as a popular diversion would have survived the first burst of interest it aroused had there not been almost yearly improvements. For instance, Goddard (A), by using bromine instead of iodine, cut the time necessary for exposure from twenty minutes to twenty seconds (1840). In the latter part of the century Eastman (A), the Ford of photography, made the camera available to amateurs as well as professionals, poor as well as rich.

Photography proved far more than a fascinating toy, more even than a wonderful new memory, whose accuracy completely outdistances that of man's natural memory. Its value as an adjunct to astronomy has already been noted. In physics and chemistry likewise it rapidly became an invaluable instrument of research. Soon the whole solar spectrum was photographed in colors (1842).

The camera plate records rays to which our eyes are blind. Ether waves may vary widely in length. . . . The eye can see only those waves not larger than 33,000, nor smaller than 72,000 to the inch. The sensitized plate registers waves varying from 25,000 to 50,000,000 to an inch. . . . Every different kind of atom can produce a characteristic series of colors or rays differing from every other, just as every musical instrument produces a different quality of sound or wave-form. Many such light rays are invisible, and can be studied only by photographing them.

Today the camera is so efficient that photographs of electrical waves and of the flight of bullets can be made in a five-millionth part of a second, and it is even possible to take pictures in the dark!

Though preceded by attempts to construct an electrical telegraph, the first decided improvement (1794) in rapid long-distance communication since the prehistoric invention of signal fires had been the semaphore telegraph of Chappe (F). The first step toward the invention of the electric telegraph was the discovery, made by Gray (E), that electrical influence can be conveyed to a distance by insulated wire (1729). The first commercial telegraph of the type now in use was developed by Morse (A). The basic idea was conceived during a conversation on Faraday's discovery of induction, which had occurred the preceding year. Utilizing Sturgeon's principle of the electromagnet, Morse immediately set to work, but for three years made little progress. Indeed he might never have succeeded had he not learned of the accomplishments of the

scientist Henry (A), who had invented the intensity battery and the relay and had constructed a telegraph line as a laboratory experiment. Much of Morse's mechanical apparatus and code was due to his associate Vail (A). Though his instrument was completed in 1838, owing to lack of funds it was 1844 before the first commercial line was opened. Of peculiar importance as the first practical application of electricity, the telegraph made possible the operation of high-speed trains and ushered in the present era when inhabitants of cities hundreds of miles apart can communicate almost as quickly as fellow townsmen.

The "great Atlantic ferry"—that is, regular transatlantic "steam" service between the chief ports of Europe and the United States—was initiated in 1838 by the *Great Western*; the oldest existent transatlantic line was founded in 1839 by Cunard (C). The first Cunarders were substantially the same in every respect as the *Great Western*—wooden side-wheelers of 1,156 tons, 207 feet long, carrying a full spread of sail, consuming nearly 5 pounds of coal an hour per horse power, and averaging about 8½ knots, or fourteen days for the passage.

When it was first proposed to build ships of iron, the notion was scouted with the utmost ridicule. *Iron!*—which would obviously sink in water? The successful construction of iron vessels by Wilkinson (E) as early as 1777 made little impression; but from 1819 on, a number of small iron ships were launched. They soon proved to be stronger, lighter, more capacious, and far less inflammable than those of wood.

The use of the screw propeller was suggested (1752) by Bernouilli (F), Fitch (A) successfully demonstrated one (1796), and other inventors did likewise; but for decades the paddle wheel as used by Fulton remained the accepted method of propulsion for steamers. Ericsson (Sh-A) and Smith (E), working separately, are credited with introducing the screw propeller (patents of 1836).

The *Great Britain*, commissioned in 1844, was the first large vessel fitted with a propeller and was also the first large iron vessel. Cast up by a storm two years after completion, she remained stranded eleven whole months without breaking. Subsequently hauled off and doing good service, she was instrumental in bringing about the adoption of these two cardinal points of naval construction—though it was a decade more before they were generally accepted by the great transatlantic companies.

The greatest improvement in printing since the steam press arrived was the type-revolving press, invented in 1846 by Hoe (A). Previously the setting of type lay flat, and paper was pressed down on it, a sheet at a time. Hoe conceived the idea of locking the type to a horizontal revolving cylinder around which were arranged impression cylinders carrying rolls of paper, which all made contact with the type cylinder simultaneously; in this way as many copies could be in process of printing as there were impression cylinders. As each impression cylinder was capable of producing a thousand copies an hour, a ten-cylinder press could turn out 10,000 newspapers an hour—an increase of 800 per cent over König's press of 1814.

Before the invention of stereotype plates printing had to be done from a single setting of type or additional settings had to be made. About 1725 a stereo-

type process had been invented by Ged (S), but it failed on account of the jealousy of type-founders and compositors. About 1856 an improved process was invented by Walter (E). A papier-mâché mold was made from the setting of type, and in this mold as many plates as needed could be cast.

Not since the Middle Ages had any explosive of importance been introduced. In 1846 Schonbein (G) invented guncotton, fifty times more powerful than powder, and Sobrero (I) invented nitroglycerin. "Without explosives we could not mine enough coal and iron, the country over, to keep one fair-sized steel plant operating." Besides releasing new and much-needed sources of energy, Schönbein and Sobrero unwittingly assumed partial responsibility for the bigger and better wars that have flourished since their day—a heavy responsibility.

In spite of the time saved by the cradle, further improvements in harvesting machinery were essential if production of foodstuffs was to keep pace with population. Apparently the first machine reaper was invented (1812) by Common (E), but the machine from which those now in use developed was invented in 1831 by McCormick (A). McCormick was finally able to set up his own factory, and by 1851 was producing a thousand reapers a year. Hussey (A), a rival inventor, built a machine (1832) with a cutter that all other machines eventually adopted. McCormick enabled the farmer to harvest grain six times as fast as with the old cradle.

Until such inventions as McCormick's reaper could be produced cheaply they were of little importance. Cheap production can only be achieved through quantity production; quantity production of machines involves interchangeable-part manufacture; and for the extensive development of interchangeable-part manufacture further improvements in machine tools were necessary. Fortunately a number of such improvements were made at this time. In 1854 Lawrence, Stone, and Howe (A) invented the turret lathe. Previous lathes had been fitted with only one tool; the new machine was equipped with a revolving turret holding several tools which could be used alternately. The turret lathe was the father of the present-day automatic lathe, which performs one operation after another with seemingly human intelligence.

A whole series of important inventions were made by Brown (A): the vernier caliper reading to thousandths of an inch (1851), the application of the vernier to protractors (1852), the micrometer caliper (1867), the universal milling machine (1862), and most important of all, the universal grinding machine (1876), which revolutionized the whole process of manufacture by introducing the practice of hardening first and then grinding to the desired degree of accuracy.

To Bunsen (G), who invented (1855) the burner which bears his name, many a modern housewife is indebted for the most valuable device that graces her kitchen. Incidentally, Bunsen's invention was merely intended for the laboratory and only subsequently was adapted to the gas stove.

INVENTION AND DISCOVERY, 1859

Which of the manifold and marvelous aspects of the nineteenth century should be emphasized? Should it be called the Age of Science, the Age of Evo-

lution, the Age of Steam, the Age of Invention, the Age of Oil, or the Age of Steel? Each is correct, but for the average man the last is possibly the most important. Without quantity production of steel, made possible by Bessemer (F-E), many of the commonest features of the present Euro-American civilization would be radically different, or absent altogether. The laborious crucible process in use a century ago could supply only enough for such small articles as knives and springs; and the mammoth liners, giant bridges, huge railway terminals, and colossal skyscrapers of today would all have been impossible. It was Bessemer, therefore, who was the godfather of the new architecture that arose in France in the mid-nineteenth century.

Most inventions that are outgrowths of warfare have done more harm than good; Bessemer steel is a possible exception. The Age of Steel is a result of the Crimean War, for Bessemer was moved to investigate the production of steel in order to improve the manufacture of cannon. His basic inspiration was that of refining molten pig iron by blowing air through it under high pressure; since the heat generated is sufficient to keep the metal liquid, no fuel is needed. The process was unsatisfactory, however, until he learned to add a compound known as *spiegeleisen*. (How much credit is due Mushet (S) for the discovery is a moot question.) This step in production was first accomplished by a separate process; but in 1859 Bessemer was able to pour steel direct from the converter. To Bessemer alone goes the credit of creating the complicated machinery employed—with a converter that, weighing, together with its contents, from twenty to forty tons, could be controlled by a single man or boy. Bessemer's all-important advance in metallurgy made it possible to produce steel at greatly reduced cost—one-seventh the former price—and in quantities sufficient for any construction, no matter how gigantic. By some it is regarded as the greatest of all inventions, and is taken to mark the beginning of the New Industrial Revolution that characterized the second half of the century.

The year 1859 was a red-letter date in the history of invention for a second reason: with the launching of the first French ironclad, the laying down of the first British ironclad, and the consequent end of England's wooden walls, it marked the birth of modern navies.

The year 1859 was a red-letter date for still a third reason: it marked the opening of the present phase of the petroleum industry, though its significance in this connection was not sensed at the time and is only clear in the light of a century of history.⁹ A hundred years ago there was no petroleum industry in America, and none of particular importance elsewhere. To be sure, petroleum was known to the ancients; the Chinese apparently had a continuous history of oil-well drilling; and an unimportant industry, based on the extraction of petroleum from the oil-bearing shale (rock) and sand discovered in 1498, had been started in Alsace (1785). In America, much to the disgust of operators, petroleum was encountered in the course of drilling salt wells.

Today the industry ranks second only to agriculture and railroads in the United States, and is of vital importance to the world at large; without petroleum "the machine age probably never would have developed." "Not a wheel

⁹ The early records of the petroleum industry are conflicting and well-nigh impossible to disentangle.

turns without being smoothed by it. We can make light and heat by hydro-electric power, but the great turbines move on bearings that are smothered in petroleum." And automobiles, airplanes, and oil-burning steamships are dependent on it for power.

The year that Young began the distillation of a deposit of petroleum found in Derbyshire, 1847, marked the beginning of the modern petroleum industry. Prior to that date, the principal source of lubricants was whale oil, and whale oil and tallow candles were the principal sources of light. Whaling constituted a flourishing industry, in which fortunes were made; but whales were getting scarce. By his process, Young obtained lubricants, paraffin, kerosene, and gasoline. His lubricants were better than animal grease, and the paraffin made superior candles; but since there were no kerosene lamps or gasoline motors, the kerosene and gasoline were waste products. When his supply of petroleum was exhausted, Young used Scotch coal, and later shale, as raw material.

In 1852 Stobwasser of Berlin invented a kerosene lamp. To city dwellers who have forgotten that in many rural districts kerosene is still the standard illuminant, this development may seem unimportant. Such lamps, imported into the British Isles and America, created a demand for kerosene. From being a waste product, "coal oil" leaped into demand, and shortly the demand exceeded the supply; also, certain American manufacturers were learning the uses and economy of mineral lubricants. Soon fifty plants, licensed under Young's patent, were producing petroleum from coal in the United States.

Bissell, a lawyer and a graduate of Dartmouth who had his attention called to natural petroleum by Professor Crosby of his alma mater, formed a company for the exploitation of surface oil. The venture was a failure; but Bissell was encouraged by Professor Silliman of Yale and, remembering the boring of salt wells, was inspired to use the same process for obtaining oil. He therefore formed another company and leased land from the earlier concern. Operations were intrusted to a minority stockholder, Drake; for publicity purposes he was dubbed "Colonel." As he was a train conductor with no experience in this type of venture, he engaged the services of a salt-well driller by the name of Smith. In 1859 Drake's well "came in." According to competent authorities this was the first well in the Western world drilled for the express purpose of obtaining petroleum. Three hundred tons of oil were produced in the United States the first year, 70,000 in 1860, 357,000 in 1865, and 1,255,000 in 1875.

The first American patent for a kerosene lamp was granted in 1859, but—a good example of the course of invention—there were forty more applications in the same year and an average of some eighty for the next twenty years. Until Daimler began to make use of it in his motor, however, gasoline continued to be regarded as a waste product; consequently the object in distilling petroleum was to obtain as great a percentage of kerosene as possible.

INVENTION AND DISCOVERY, 1860-

Morse had presaged the introduction of the submarine telegraph, but the first important cable successfully laid was that across the Channel (1851). Fifteen years elapsed, marked by two heartbreaking failures, before permanent

cable communication was established between the Old World and the New—an achievement involving heroic feats of engineering and scientific skill, in which Lord Kelvin played a leading rôle with the invention of the mirror galvanometer and the siphon recorder. The cable of 1858, before it broke, could transmit only fifteen letters a minute; but it was not long before the rate was increased and the "tired business man" could read the preceding day's news from all over the world at his breakfast table. In recent years it has been possible to send 2,500 characters a minute! By making possible a world market, particularly in such essential commodities as wheat and cotton, the cable has proved of outstanding economic importance.

The most momentous advance in railroad engineering since the introduction of the locomotive was the invention (1868) of the air brake by Westinghouse (A). It was all very well to construct high-speed trains, but what about stopping them once they had gathered impetus? This problem was solved by the Westinghouse brake, which reduced the distance required to stop a train by 90 per cent!

As was quite fitting, the beginnings of the 1870 Era in politics coincided with inventions that rendered the era as novel from the point of view of material culture as from that of international diplomacy.

In spite of increased production, demand for news exceeded supply until two more inventions strengthened the foundations of popular journalism—which was to exercise so profound an influence over the politics of the half-century following. The rotary perfecting press, as improved by Walter (1868), solved the problem of printing from a continuous roll of paper. A device for folding papers after printing, invented by Duncan and Wilson (E), filled a long and sorely felt need (1870).

New applications of power were of even greater importance. Following the discoveries of Faraday, many attempts had been made to construct electric generators and motors; and advances in generator construction had been made by Pixii (F) in 1832, by Pacinotti (I) and many others. The first commercially successful generator was produced in 1870 by Gramme (Bn). Most previous inventions of electrical apparatus had been in a sense valueless, their operation dependent on the meager power of batteries; now electrical power was available in limitless quantities. The Age of Electricity had dawned!

In 1873, when a number of Gramme generators were to be exhibited in Vienna, a clumsy workman accidentally connected one with another already in operation. Imagine the astonishment when the machine so connected began to revolve with terrific rapidity! In the course of history there have been a considerable number of accidental inventions, but none more important. Henry had invented an electric motor (1829), but because battery-driven, this invention too had meant little or nothing. It remained for an unknown blockhead to demonstrate that in Gramme's generator the world had a motor superior to those previously developed, to lay the foundations of all subsequent electrical power developments, and to usher in the great era of electrical invention.

In 1871 the first triple-expansion steamship and the first express liner made their appearance. The former reduced coal consumption 60 per cent. The latter, the *Oceanic*, was an iron ship of 3,807 tons, 420 feet over all. She was

propelled by a screw, but carried considerable sail, and she made $14\frac{1}{2}$ knots, consuming 2 pounds of coal an hour per horse power. In 1876 the first steel ship appeared, a further advance that rapidly rendered the new iron vessel obsolete.

Vastly more important than the express liner was the "tramp," which evolved from the steam collier (1852) and which began to appear in increasing numbers at this time. The tramp steamer was the outcome of the invention (1856) by Elder (S) of the compound or dual-expansion engine, in which steam after being used in one cylinder was passed on for use in a second and by which coal consumption was reduced 25 to 50 per cent—a solution to the difficult problem of making the cargo steamer a commercial success. To these unimpressive little vessels, far more than to the great ocean greyhound, mankind owes the economical exchange of goods that has ushered in the day when food products from every quarter of the globe appear on the table of the average family and that has transformed the world into a single interdependent economic unit. In 1880 the refrigerating ship, a special and important type of tramp, began its career by conveying a cargo of frozen mutton from Australia to London.

From the quantitative point of view, the most important prime mover in use in the Euro-American culture area is the internal-combustion engine. This preeminence it owes to its light weight, the ease of operation, and the fact that, unlike the steam engine, there is no consumption of fuel except when the motor is actually in use. The first proposition for the construction of an internal-combustion engine in the modern sense (1794) was made by Street (E); the first of these motors actually constructed—of the gas-atmospheric type—was evolved by Cecil (E) about 1820. Samuel Brown (E) built gas-atmospheric engines that were sold and used.

Barnett (E) was the first inventor to emphasize the importance of compression (1838); Lenoir (F), using street-lighting gas as fuel, the first to build a commercially successful gas engine (1860). De Rochas (F) drew up the first complete statement of theoretical requirements, his celebrated four-cycle (1862); and in 1876 Otto (G) produced a machine in which they were embodied. Otto's invention, which rapidly supplanted all others, launched the internal-combustion motor on its amazing career.

The most important subsequent improvements were those made by Daimler (G). The smallest previous types had weighed not less than 1,100 pounds per horse power and had attained less than 200 r.p.m. In the '80's Daimler developed an engine weighing only 88 pounds per horse power and developing a hundred r.p.m. He also introduced the use of gasoline as fuel. In short, Daimler went far toward making the automobile, the submarine, and the airplane possible.

When Bell (S-A) first succeeded in transmitting the sound of a human voice over a wire, the telephone was born (1875); by 1876 he was able to send a complete sentence. Though the first commercial switchboard was installed in 1878, nearly twenty years elapsed after Bell's first fundamental achievement before there were a million telephones in use in the entire United States; and many Americans can easily recall the day when they had no "phone."

One of the earliest results of the perfecting of the dynamo was the intro-

duction of electric street-lighting; to Brush (A), who publicly demonstrated his electric arc in 1877, is due the principal credit. Important as had been the invention of gas lighting, the flickering, open-jet burner was after all a puny contrivance, quite incapable of producing a Great White Way; to the present denizen of New York or London it would seem as antiquated as does the kerosene lamp to one accustomed to the electric bulb. With the improved electric arc Davy's dream came true, and for the first time a really powerful source of illumination was commercially available.

Gas lighting as a device for illuminating streets would have been doomed had it not been for Auer (An), subsequently Count of Welsbach, who invented (1886) the famous burner or mantle that bears his name, and produced incandescent gas light not only for street-lighting but for use in the home as well. Nevertheless, some Americans can readily remember using open-jet burners.

The history of the trolley car is of interest mainly as an illuminating example of the progress of invention. In 1832 the horsecar appeared in New York, and forthwith proceeded to displace the horse-drawn omnibus; in the '80's the "trolley" displaced the horsecar as the latest thing in transportation; today the trolley is waging a losing fight for existence. Within the lifetime of a single generation, a startling invention put in an appearance, made fortunes, and was forced into the ditch by the competition of more up-to-date methods of locomotion.

A remarkable example of dual invention and a further important application of power were the steam turbines of Parsons (E) and De Laval (Sh). In such a turbine, steam plays a rôle analogous to that of water in the turbine of Fourneyron. Parsons's first engine appeared in 1885; an important improvement was the Curtis (A) turbine which combines the advantages of the Parsons and De Laval machines. A steam turbine is only one-tenth the size of a reciprocating engine of equal horse power, and is therefore particularly suited for marine usage. For example, the *Mauretania*, which held the transatlantic record longer than any other steamship (1907-29), is equipped with turbines.

For a long time inventors had been trying to devise a machine which would set type and so do away with the primitive, slow, character-by-character hand setting. No real success was achieved until the invention of the linotype (1886) by Mergenthaler (G-A); this machine does not set type but actually makes it while the compositor operates a typewriter-like keyboard.

In 1894 the Cunarder *Campania* went into service—a liner of about 13,000 tons, 600 feet long. Built of steel and equipped with triple-expansion engines and twin screws, but without sails, she attained a speed of 22 knots. Only 3,000 tons of coal were required for a transatlantic voyage, whereas, if the 1840 rate of consumption had continued, 9,000 would have been needed. For the first time since the introduction of steam, the British lost the blue ribbon at the close of the century, when it was captured by the *Kaiser Wilhelm* (22½ knots) of the North German Lloyd, and shortly after by the *Deutschland* (23½ knots) of the Hamburg American Line.

DARWINISM AND THE PUBLIC

During the nineteenth century for the first time science had a profound effect on thought in general, even on the thought of the average man; and the interactions between science, politics, religion, and economic life were far-reaching and intricate. Of the various scientific theories that affected popular thought those of Darwin were by far the most influential. In a consideration of the spread of his ideas, two facts of peculiar interest stand out: first, the comparatively rapid progress the Darwinian hypothesis made among scientists and a minority of leaders in all walks of life; and second, the violent hostility it at first aroused in the general public, particularly among ardent churchmen and those of the older generation.

A half-dozen previous discoveries or theories were ready at hand to reinforce, supplement, and extend the work of Darwin: the idea of progress, the discovery of the reproductive similarities of man and other mammals, the discovery of the basic affinity of organic and inorganic matter, the discovery of the conservation of energy, the atomic theory, the new geology, the nebular hypothesis, and the discovery of prehistoric implements and skeletal remains. Together with Darwinism they contributed to the formation of that larger concept of evolution which may be defined as the "natural history of the cosmos including organic beings, expressed in physical terms as a mechanical process." Here, then, was another great *Weltanschauung* (world view or philosophy of life) ready to supplement or supplant the four with which the nineteenth century began its career.¹⁰

Similarly, Darwin's views accorded with the concept of free competition held by liberals, and provided them with a potent weapon in their fight against theological obscurantism. They also fitted in nicely with the advances achieved by the Industrial Revolution and by nineteenth century inventors. Conservatives in general could point to the aristocracy as an outstanding example of the survival of the fittest. Neo-Darwinism—the deduction drawn by many followers of Darwin that his theories justified the individual and the state in pushing weaker opponents to the wall—provided extremists with a logical point of attack in their criticism of the existing social system, while cosmopolitans (see p. 24) could inveigh against the dangers of such a doctrine as applied to international affairs.

Contrariwise, Darwin's views were as radically opposed to the teachings of the clergy as those of Copernicus. According to the churches the various species were created by God separately, as described in the Bible (Book of Genesis), and man was created subsequently to have dominion over them all. Moreover, man had begun his existence in a state of perfection (Paradise), from which he fell through disobedience to God's commands. Paradise (Heaven) could be regained only by obedience to God's commands as transmitted by the Church. This doctrine the clergy held on to the more tenaciously as almost their last stronghold of supernatural control. They were powerfully aided by the disinclination of the human mind to accept new ideas.

¹⁰ See Chapter II.

A scientist pure and simple, quietly and unobtrusively pursuing his appointed way, Darwin was concerned only with the professional implications of his theories; not so some of his followers. Pushed to their logical conclusions, his theories and those of his fellow scientists meant that there had never been any biblical Creation or any Fall. Instead, as the result of an unbroken process of evolution from the simplest forms of life to man himself, the various species had appeared gradually, in the course of untold eons. Each species and each individual, aided only by native ability and by the whims of Fate, had struggled on by dint of conflict with all other individuals and all other species. Man was not a sin-tainted outcast—higher than the beasts and distinct from them—but merely the highest of his fellow creatures, bearing the evidence of his animal origin and together with them engaged in an all-inclusive struggle for existence. Out of the black infinity of the past he had come, into the infinite future he was bound, world without end. The Heaven and Hell of the Bible were merely figments of man's fancy; the true, the only, Heaven and Hell were not behind or before, but were here and now, on earth.

These implications Darwin's disciples were not slow to draw. To them, Darwinism was a cause, a shining faith of which they were the apostles and for which they were ready if necessary to lay down their lives. (Fortunately for them they lived in an age when such self-sacrifice was unnecessary.) Sallying forth from the laboratory and the study, the paladins of the new faith entered the lists of public controversy and challenged all comers. Foremost among these crusaders was Huxley (E), "Darwin's bulldog," as he delighted to style himself. Striding boldly into the enemy camp, Huxley delivered a resounding attack against the citadels of revealed religion with the declaration that "there is no evidence of the existence of such a being as the God of the theologians" (*Man's Place in Nature*, 1863). Furthermore, if there were no divine lawgiver there could be no divine law as the canon of human conduct: "The actions we call sinful are part and parcel of the struggle for existence."

SCIENCE AND THE THEOLOGIAN

Nothing loath, the theologians girded up their loins, and soon the battle was joined all along the line. If Copernicus and Newton had dethroned God and Man, their misdemeanors were nevertheless a mere bagatelle. The gravamen of Darwin's crime, the theologians felt, was that he had deprived the universe of all purpose—surely a capital offense, if true! Moreover, while the effects of eighteenth century science had been largely restricted to the upper classes, with Darwin science began to reach the average man. His theories were therefore assailed with unexampled virulence; even in England it was decades before the conflict subsided. The net result was a very considerable increase in irreligion and indifference, and many broke away from the churches altogether. Others, likewise unable to subscribe to the dogmas of their fathers but hopeful of effecting changes from within, lingered on in the sheltering arms of the Church. According to the church and the locality in question, the degree to which these tendencies manifested themselves and the reactions of the clergy varied widely.

In Protestant communities the effects of the Higher Criticism, science, and materialism¹¹ were distinctly disintegrating. Since the days when Luther took refuge in the Bible as secure and adequate authority, Protestants had relied on the Good Book as the sufficient and firm foundation for their faith; now scientists and critics alike were shaking that foundation till the superstructure rocked. In general, three main groups developed. Those on both extremes felt that science and religion were irreconcilable, but they went in opposite directions according to whether they rejected the former or the latter. The third group, midway between, was composed of the indifferent, those who feared censure, and those who sought to reconcile science with religion.

Among Anglicans, for instance, this cleavage eventually resulted in four groups. Broad Churchmen represented the desire for reconciliation. Low and High Churchmen alike looked askance at science; but while the former tended to become more narrowly Protestant and evangelical, the latter, significantly enough, approached nearer and nearer to the official position of the Church of Rome. Within the High Church party, a group of university scholars, headed by Keble, began the Oxford Movement. These youthful enthusiasts emphasized the basic similarities of the Anglican and the Mother Church, and a number of them actually "went over to Rome" (1845). Of the converts, Newman and Manning, who subsequently became Roman Catholic cardinals, were the most prominent.

The struggle within the Protestant churches was in most cases less severe and prolonged than that within the Roman Catholic fold, for the Protestants inclined toward liberty of conscience and were therefore more willing to compromise and better able to do so without losing face. This they did by throwing unessential dogma overboard and by adopting a historical approach to the Bible.

Because the Papacy is slower to issue pronouncements itself than to condemn those of others, and on account of the conflicting statements of lesser church officials, the attitude of the Roman Church toward science during the nineteenth century is difficult to treat or even to determine with exactitude. Certainly it was more liberal than it had been for many centuries, and in general those who confined their attention to the physical sciences were not molested. In 1822 the Church officially sanctioned the Copernican theory, and Catholics pointed with pride to the work of Pasteur and later to that of Mendel. But ordinarily where scientific conclusions impinged on the field of human conduct, as in the biological sciences, they were viewed by the Church with grave alarm and displeasure. Moreover, in the field of social conduct or, more exactly, that ill-defined sphere where political and religious jurisdiction overlap, the Church relaxed its official attitude not one jot or tittle, but continued to claim supremacy in the fields of religion and morality, and consequently the right of ultimate supervision over every aspect of civil life. This state of affairs was important; for on the Continent politics, religion, and "pure" culture (science, and so on) were in effect inseparable and their interactions were constant. For example, at the very moment when science was reaching its most startling conclusions and liberalism achieving its greatest triumphs, Pius IX, frightened

¹¹ Not merely philosophical materialism, but also the tendency to exalt material comfort.

by the revolutions of 1848, went out of his way, so it seemed, to emphasize the supernatural in religion and condemn many of the views of the liberals—a course of action that was interpreted by hostile critics as a sign of obscurantism and a declaration of war not only against liberalism in politics and religion but against modernism in science as well.

Thus the dogma of the Immaculate Conception, promulgated in 1854, made it compulsory for all good Catholics to believe that the Virgin Mary had been conceived without original sin (as contrasted with the rest of mankind, who, according to the Church, are “conceived in sin”). Such a pronouncement was viewed by many as a step backward, the logical culmination of the cult of the Blessed Virgin which in the Middle Ages had almost supplanted the worship of Christ himself.

In the encyclical *Quanta cura* and the *Syllabus of Errors* (1864) Pius enumerated many beliefs of the liberals and proceeded to denounce them en masse and in detail. The encyclical condemned “liberty of conscience and of worship,” the opinion “that the will of the people . . . constitutes a supreme law,” socialism and communism, those who “presume with notorious impudence to submit the authority of the Church . . . to the judgment of the civil authority,” and even those who “affirm that the best condition of society is that in which the power of the laity is not compelled to inflict the penalties of law upon violators of the Catholic religion.”

The *Syllabus of Errors* contained eighty sections, in which Pius specified other *errors condemned*, including: (1) pantheism; (2) naturalism; (3 to 6) various forms of rationalism; (7) the Higher Criticism;

(13) The methods and principles by which the old scholastic doctors cultivated theology are no longer suitable to the demands of the age and the progress of science; (16) Men who have embraced any religion may find and obtain eternal salvation; (17) At least the eternal salvation may be hoped for of all who have never been in the true church of Christ; (19) It appertains to the civil power to define what are the rights and limits within which the Church may exercise authority; (23) The Church has not the power of availing herself of force, or any direct or indirect temporal power; (27) The ministers of the Church and the Roman Pontiff ought to be absolutely excluded from all charge and dominion over temporal affairs; (45) The entire direction of public schools . . . save an exception in the case of episcopal seminaries, may and must appertain to the civil power; (77) It is no longer necessary that the Catholic religion shall be held as the only religion of the State, to the exclusion of all other modes of worship; (80) The Roman Pontiff can and ought to reconcile himself to and agree with progress, liberalism, and modern civilization.

In 1870 the Vatican Council, the first ecumenical meeting of church prelates since that held at Trent three centuries before, proclaimed the dogma of Papal Infallibility: “The Roman Pontiff, when he speaks *ex cathedra*—that is, when in discharge of [his] office . . . he defines a doctrine regarding faith or morals . . .—is possessed of . . . infallibility. . . . Therefore such definitions are *per se* immutable and independent of the consent of the Church.” An encyclical of 1879 reaffirmed the authority of Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274) as the official philosopher of the Church.

Although so far as its own communion was concerned the Church recognized

only two categories, (1) Roman Catholics and (2) all others, Roman Catholic laymen comprehended five diverse groups. 1. At one end of the scale were those who openly left the Church, bourgeoisie and proletariat for the most part, and who, because of their fiery and unrelenting hostility to the Church and everything for which she stood, became known as Anticlericals. Constituting the backbone of the republican parties in Catholic countries, they never forgot the oppression which had characterized the policy of the Church when she had had the upper hand under the Old Régime,¹ and for that reason wherever republicanism got the upper hand antireligious atrocities were the normal result. The Church, for her part, remembering the oppression under which she had suffered during the era of the French Revolution, returned the dislike of the republicans with interest. 2. A considerable group, more especially among the upper classes, remained nominally within the Church to the extent of having their children baptized and confirmed, but took little or no interest in it otherwise. This ambiguous attitude was due to inertia and to a feeling that religion, as a valuable means of controlling the lower classes, must be supported outwardly if not inwardly. These "subscribing" Catholics corresponded to the group of indifferent Protestants who appeared in church on Easter and Christmas but whose seats remained vacant the rest of the year. Indeed, it may be contended that the growing indifference to institutionalized religion, among Catholics and Protestants alike, is really the most significant development in recent church history. Until the nineteenth century, men might be fervently religious or bitterly opposed to the Church—but indifferent never. Sincere or "good" Catholics, commonly known as Clericals, were themselves divided among the three remaining groups. 3. Liberal Catholics or Modernists were those who wished for liberalizing changes in dogma and policy which would bring the Church into harmony with the New Science and the non-monarchical governments. 4. A fourth group, represented by the Old Catholics of South Germany, opposed such recent innovations in dogma as Papal Infallibility and, like Luther in an earlier day, wanted to bring the Church back to a more primitive and what they considered a "purer" state. 5. The extreme Catholic group headed by the Jesuits and known as Ultramontanes, and backed by the peasant masses, rejected all compromise, managed to keep a firm hold on the destinies of the Church, and maintained the dogmas of the sixteenth century in full force.

Wherever monarchical government survived, "the throne and the altar," whatever their private differences, continued their immemorial alliance in the face of republicanism. This alignment seems somewhat strange in view of the egalitarian nature of Christ's teachings, but from a consideration of the trying events of the Revolutionary Era just referred to, some of the causes for its persistence will readily be grasped. And this political opposition on the part of the Church enabled its opponents to claim that it was not only obscurantist but actively undemocratic, unpatriotic, and even treasonable.

SCIENCE AND THE PUBLIC

For other illustrations of nineteenth century thought on religious topics certain outstanding lay writers may be consulted. Strauss and Renan, like most of their eighteenth century predecessors, contented themselves with attacking the dogmas of revealed religion—excrescences added to Christianity, they claimed, by the organized churches—but hesitated to assail Christianity as such. Not so Nietzsche, the most original philosopher of modern times. Nietzsche was the son of a German pastor, and both his grandfathers were clergymen; but while an undergraduate at the University of Bonn, where he had been sent to study theology, he turned against religion under the influence of the great pessimistic philosopher Schopenhauer (though his mature philosophy was the direct antithesis of his famous predecessor's).

From his study of antiquity Nietzsche was impressed with the difference between the zestful, positive attitude toward life displayed by the pagan Greeks and the pessimistic, negative attitude of nineteenth century Christians. He came to the conclusion that the values which rule present-day civilization are the product of a slave morality adopted from the Jews, who as a conquered people had learned to call the cautious, the clever, the adaptable, and the humble "good," rather than the bold, the vigorous, and the joyful.

To Nietzsche the "good," the "true," and the "beautiful" (values that have dominated European culture for nearly two thousand years) were mere catchwords, lacking objective basis and simply connoting arbitrarily assigned values. The logic of his contention is clear when we consider that moral or ethical estimations of the same practice, such as polygamy, vary diametrically in various parts of the world. The true basis of value, Nietzsche declared, is "the will to power," which designates as good, true, and beautiful only those things useful to the individual. "Even . . . our present values . . . are the expression of a will to power—but of the will of the impotent, the humble, the feeble, the subjected, the peace-loving, who by means of these values wished to predominate and—have succeeded." From this subservience to convention Nietzsche desired to free the individual, for the pursuit of a higher destiny. Accordingly he denounced the religion, philosophy, and democratic theories of his day as romantic illusions, designed to reduce men to a dead level and to render them content to stay there. To Nietzsche everything his contemporaries saw as white was black, and their black was his white; to the conservatives he was a religious revolutionary, while to the radicals he was a social reactionary. Nevertheless, his influence on the times, even if it was not what he intended, was profound. In his *Antichrist* (1888) in particular he assailed the teachings of Christ; for to Nietzsche Christianity as revealed in the Sermon on the Mount was a debasing creed that sapped the vitality and was fit only for a race of weaklings and degenerates.

At the other end of the scale, among the noblest religious utterances of the century and of all time stand Newman's *Apologia*, his great prayer, and Francis Thompson's (E) "Hound of Heaven." The various shades of opinion between are well illustrated in the works of the English poets. "Qua Cursum Ventus"

and "Perchè Pensa?" by Clough introduce the intellectual struggles of the Oxford Movement. "In Memoriam" (particularly the Introduction and sections 54-56), "The Higher Pantheism," and "Vastness," by Tennyson, portray the pious mid-Victorian, struggling more or less successfully to retain his hold on religion. "Dover Beach" and "The Last Word" by Matthew Arnold, and "Invictus" by Henley, depict the Victorian still further losing his hold on religion, but taking refuge in stoicism. The unrivaled popularity of Fitzgerald's translation of Omar Khayyám's *Rubáiyát* is convincing testimony to the wide appeal of Epicureanism to men of the later nineteenth century. Swinburne's "Hertha" is a poetic paraphrase of Darwin. His "Garden of Proserpine," Dowson's "Vitae Summa Brevis," and the "Earthly Paradise" of Morris are varied expressions of the deepening skepticism and pessimism of the times. And finally, James Thomson's "City of Dreadful Night" is a poignant reaction to both science and the Industrial Revolution. Among non-English-speaking peoples, Baudelaire, the French poet, gave voice to the most engaging expressions of the despair that was sweeping over many of the intellectuals of Europe as a result of the triumph of mechanistic science and of the prosaic middle class.

THE UNSOLVED RIDDLE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE: THE UTOPIANS

During the first half of the century, when the appalling effects of the Industrial Revolution and unrestrained laissez-faire were most apparent in England, an increasing number of philanthropically-minded members of the middle class throughout Europe developed programs of radical reform, to which they gave the name of socialism. Among the more important of these theorists were Owen (E), Saint-Simon (F), Fourier (F), and Cabet (F). In despair of remedying conditions at large or from the top down, most of them advocated the formation of small, artificially created communities where everything was to be shared in common. They hoped that these communities, when and if founded, would spread and eventually regenerate society as a whole. As manager of the mills at New Lanark, Scotland, Owen approximated such an experiment; but although he was notably successful, similar attempts elsewhere, of which there were a considerable number in the United States (Brook Farm being the most famous), were mostly dismal failures. Owen also had a scheme for replacing money with "labor currency"—suggestive of the "energy dollars" advocated by modern American technocrats—and took an active and not insignificant part in the Reform Movement.

Obviously these theorists contemplated reforms that were designed to go much further than anything proposed by the liberals and to strike at the very roots of society. Unfortunately there is no generic term that includes all types of extreme reformers. "Socialist," frequently so employed, has caused endless confusion. For lack of a better word "extremist" may be employed.

On account of the visionary nature of their schemes, remote from and out of touch with the conditions of everyday life, these early extremists are commonly known as utopian socialists, after More's famous *Utopia*; but since they were really communists it is more logical and clearer to call them utopian communists. Though they labored with the utmost goodwill and devotion, their schemes proved impracticable; and above all, they failed to reach the masses

for whom they were working. At most, they helped to formulate a body of doctrine.

When the extremists attacked "the unsolved riddle of social justice," they soon reached the conclusion that existing methods of production, bad as they were, were a lesser evil than the existing system of distribution. Nearly all of them, therefore, devised formulas designed to remedy this situation. Saint-Simon advocated distribution in proportion to services rendered. Fourier believed that all should be assured a subsistence and that five-twelfths of the profits should be allotted to labor, four-twelfths to capital, and three-twelfths to management. Louis Blanc—who is classed with the utopians although he was the first to appeal directly to the workers and was a socialist, not a communist—suggested the principle of distribution "to each according to his needs, from each according to his ability."

Louis Blanc has been seen in action during the Revolution of '48, when his attempts to demonstrate his ideas were blocked by the malevolence of his colleagues. The essence of his doctrine (*The Organization of Labor*, 1839) was his denunciation of competition—laissez-faire, or the "war of all against all"—as the fundamental evil of society, making inevitable the destruction of the weak by the strong. He recognized that men are not created equal, but argued that greater talents entail greater responsibility. "Whosoever will be chief among you, let him be your servant." He held that in order to remedy the existing situation the first essential was to guarantee everyone an opportunity to work, and that this could be done by the creation of "national workshops" which, supplying machines to the laborers who were too poor to buy them, would force private factories out of business.

THE UNSOLVED RIDDLE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE: MARX

In passing from the utopians and Louis Blanc to Karl Marx, the student of extremist doctrine leaves the foothills behind and at a single bound finds himself in the presence of Mt. Everest itself. Whether or not the writings of Marx have any intrinsic value, whether they have helped or hindered the advance of socialism, this much is certain: Marx is the magnetic pole, the North Star, of extremist doctrine by whom all subsequent writers of similar bent have oriented themselves, whether to follow or to attack his theories—and as such he merits his title of Father of Scientific Socialism. As an influence he cannot pass unnoticed; if concrete evidence be needed, let the reader only reflect that for millions of Russians there is no god but Marx and Lenin is his prophet.

Grandson of a German rabbi and son of a convert Jew who was a typical bourgeois, Marx was born in the Rhineland. He studied law at Bonn and philosophy, history, and the rest at Berlin, consorted with the young Hegelians, and became an ardent liberal. He was granted a doctorate by the University of Jena, but was prevented from obtaining a teaching position by his extreme views, and joined the staff of a radical newspaper. When the paper was suppressed, he moved to Paris, where he associated with various extremists, including Blanc, Proudhon, and Bakunin, studied the writings of Owen, and rapidly changed from a liberal to a socialist. He also made the acquaintance of Friedrich Engels (G), henceforth his *alter ego*. Ejected from France, Marx took

refuge in Brussels. There, on the eve of the Revolution of 1848, he and Engels published the *Communist Manifesto*. During the Revolutionary Period he was again in France and Germany, and after the collapse of the movement he settled in London, where he spent the rest of his life in poverty, poring over the Blue Books in the British Museum to gather material for his monumental work on capital.

Marx was above all a writer. Although the *Communist Manifesto* was rather lost in the excitement of the revolutionary movement, it has taken its place next to the *Origin of Species* as one of the two most influential literary productions of the century. In it is contained the essence of Marxian beliefs and doctrines, as outlined in the following abstract:

The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles. Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild master and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition. . . .

Our epoch, the epoch of the bourgeoisie, possesses, however, this distinctive feature: it has simplified class antagonisms. Society as a whole is more and more splitting up into two great hostile camps . . . bourgeoisie and proletariat. The executive of the modern State is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie. . . . The bourgeoisie . . . has left remaining no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous "cash payment." . . . It has converted the physician, the lawyer, the priest, the poet, the man of science, into its paid wage-laborers. . . .

The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them all the relations of society. . . . The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. . . . Industries . . . no longer work up indigenous raw material . . . products are consumed not only at home, but in every quarter of the globe. . . . We have intercourse in every direction, universal interdependence of nations. . . . The bourgeoisie has subjected the country to the rule of the towns. . . . It has made barbarian and semibarbarian countries dependent on the civilized ones, nations of peasants on nations of bourgeois, the East on the West. . . . Modern bourgeois society . . . is like the sorcerer who is no longer able to control the powers of the nether world which he has called up by his spells. . . . It is enough to mention the commercial crises . . . because there is . . . too much of the means of subsistence. . . . How does the bourgeoisie get over these crises? On the one hand by enforced destruction of a mass of productive forces; on the other, by the conquest of new markets, and by the more thorough exploitation of the old ones. That is to say, by paving the way for more extensive and more destructive crises, and by diminishing the means whereby crises are prevented.

. . . Not only has the bourgeoisie forged the weapons that bring death to itself; it has also called into existence the men who are to wield those weapons . . . the proletarians. . . . The lower strata of the middle class—the small tradespeople, shopkeepers, and retired tradesmen generally, the handicraftsmen and peasants—all these sink gradually into the proletariat. . . . Thus the proletariat is recruited from all classes of the population. . . . What the bourgeoisie therefore produces, above all, is its own grave-diggers. Its fall and the victory of the proletariat are equally inevitable. . . .

The immediate aim of the Communists is . . . : formation of the proletariat into a class, overthrow of the bourgeois supremacy, conquest of political power by the proletariat. . . . Communism deprives no man of the power to appropriate the products

of society: all that it does is to deprive him of the power to subjugate the labor of others. . . . The selfish misconception that induces you to transform into eternal laws of nature and of reason the social forms springing from your present mode of production and form of property . . . this misconception you share with every ruling class that has preceded you. What you see clearly in the case of ancient property, what you admit in the case of feudal property, you are of course forbidden to admit in the case of your own bourgeois form. . . . What else does the history of ideas prove, than that intellectual production changes in character in proportion as material production is changed? . . .

The proletariat will use its political supremacy to wrest, by degrees, all capital from the bourgeoisie, to centralize all instruments of production in the hands of the State, *i.e.* of the proletariat organized as the ruling class; and to increase the total of productive forces as rapidly as possible. Of course in the beginning this cannot be effected except by means of despotic inroads on the rights of property, and on the conditions of bourgeois production; by means of measures, therefore, which appear economically insufficient and untenable. . . .

In the most advanced countries the following will be pretty generally applicable:
 1. Abolition of property in land and application of all rents of land to public purposes. 2. A heavy progressive or graduated income tax. 3. Abolition of all right of inheritance. 5. . . . A national bank with state capital and an exclusive monopoly. 6. Centralization of the means of communication and transport in the hands of the State. 7. Extension of factories and instruments of production owned by the State. . . . 8. Equal liability of all to labor. Establishment of industrial armies, especially for agriculture. 9. . . . A more equable distribution of population over the country. 10. Free education for all children in public schools. Abolition of children's factory labor in its present form. Combination of education with industrial production, etc., etc.

When . . . all production has been concentrated in the hands of a vast association of the whole nation, the public power will lose its political character. . . . The proletariat . . . will . . . have swept away the conditions for the existence of class antagonisms, and of classes generally, and will thereby have abolished its own supremacy as a class. In place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonisms, we shall have an association, in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all.

. . . Proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win. Workingmen of all countries, unite!

✓ As can be seen, Marx stressed four concepts: first, economic determinism—the doctrine that economic factors have been the determining element throughout history—otherwise known as the economic or materialistic interpretation of history; second, the idea of the class struggle; third, the inevitability of the dictatorship of the proletariat; and fourth, internationalism as opposed to international rivalry.

Das Kapital (Capital), Marx's *magnum opus*, was an elaboration of these ideas and an attempt to provide them with a scientific foundation, based on history and economics and drawn in considerable part from his extensive researches in the British Museum. The central theme of *Das Kapital* is the Theory of Surplus Value. Ricardo held that all value is determined by labor. William Thompson (Ih) and others had drawn the logical deduction that the laborer should get all the profits. Marx consulted Ricardo with substantially the same result; fundamentally, therefore, his theory is not original. But he was much more

systematic, profound, and above all, more influential than his predecessors. It is worth noting that it was by way of Marx that Ricardo, curiously enough, found his way into the Bolshevik camp. Since according to Ricardo *all* value is determined by labor—that is, by the amount of labor required in production—the market value of commodities and even the value of labor itself is so determined. Thus the value of labor (meaning interchangeably either the laborer or the work that he produces) is determined by the amount of labor (work) required to produce (the) labor(er), which is the amount it is necessary for the laborer to expend in order to earn enough to subsist and reproduce. This amount, according to Ricardo, is exactly what the laborer receives in wages. But the commodities he produces bring a great deal more than this in the market; the difference, which the capitalist pockets, Marx calls surplus value. As the capitalist does nothing toward creating this surplus value, again according to Ricardo, Marx argues that he should be expropriated. In the opinion of its admirers *Das Kapital* made socialism a science, as *The Wealth of Nations* had made economics a science.

Marx provided socialism with a systematic body of doctrine, a philosophy, and a creed; but above all, he was the first writer among the extremists to capture and to hold the imagination of the masses. In 1864 an international congress of workmen was held in London, and an association was formed, later known as the First International. Marx was the moving spirit and displayed no little organizing ability; but the association did not prosper. When Marx obtained the adoption of a radical platform, Mazzini and the moderates withdrew. The War of 1870, the failure of the Paris Commune, and the rise of national socialistic parties sapped the strength of the International; the death-blow was a quarrel between the Marxians and the Bakuninian anarchists. The last congress with wide representation was held in 1872, and four years later the First International was formally dissolved.

THE UNSOLVED RIDDLE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE: MISCELLANEOUS ASPECTS

Throughout history the outstanding weakness of the extremists—who hate each other even more cordially than they do their opponents—has been their inability to present a united front against the enemy. In this they are the opposite of the conservatives, who are always willing to make common cause in the face of the Red Specter; and these facts go far to explain why until the World War the one side achieved no brilliant victories and the other suffered no overwhelming defeats.

In 1889 a Second International was formed, definitely pledged to peaceful, political action. On only one other matter, antimilitarism, was there complete unanimity. This last point is the more noteworthy since it was the nationalistic stand of the various delegations in 1914 which eventually split the Second International and deprived it of a great part of its influence.

From Marx flowed a diverse stream of thought. In order to differentiate himself from the self-styled socialists of the utopian school Marx adopted the designation "Communist"; but it is commonly asserted that Marx really was a so-

cialist. What is the truth of the matter? In order to determine, it is necessary to consider first the meaning of the term "Communist." A communist is one who believes in public or collective ownership of all property, personal as well as real, "consumers' goods" as well as means of production. Today there are few if any communists—with the exception of certain anarchists—just as there are few believers in absolute democracy. That being so, who are the "Communists" of whom frequent mention is made? The "Communists" of today believe in the collective ownership of means of production (factories, mines, water power, railroads, and so on), but not of consumers' goods (personal property)—but so do socialists, and so, for that matter, did Marx. What, then, is the distinction between socialists and "Communists"? "Communists," pointing out that so far no great revolutions (transformations) have been accomplished peaceably, reject political action and advocate the use of force; ownership of the means of production would be vested in the state—but a new state, under the dictatorship of the proletariat, created after the destruction of the present state. Socialists, rejecting the use of force, rely on parliamentary action; they would merely take over the state as it exists and modify it to suit their needs. Both "Communists" and socialists claim descent from Marx. As can be seen, Marx was no communist. Neither was he a "Communist" strictly speaking, for in general he was inclined to rely on political action; but as a last resort he certainly did not reject force. The Paris Commune received his unqualified approval: "This insurrection is a glorious deed for our party." Moreover, he looked for the dictatorship of the proletariat and a new type of social organization. The stand taken by Marx was therefore somewhere between those of present-day "Communists" and socialists; consequently, both are right and both wrong in their claims, but on the whole the "Communists" have the better title as his heirs.

It is interesting to reflect that many of the measures advocated by Marx and his colleagues have been introduced at one time or another in the form of "state socialism"; indeed, every activity of the state is in a sense a form of socialism—the postal service, the fire department, the lighthouse and lifesaving services, the public schools and public hospitals, the state forestry service, reclamation projects in the United States, state railroads in Germany, state telephone and telegraph services in France, and state broadcasting in England.

THE UNSOLVED RIDDLE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE: SYNDICALISM AND ANARCHISM

In addition to "Communists" and socialists of varying brands, there are syndicalists and anarchists, also of varying brands. The origins of syndicalism are complicated and obscure, though it is essentially a French development, and Pelloutier, an anarchist who became secretary of the French trade unions (1894), had much to do with building it up. This circumstance accounts for the fact that it savors of anarchism; but the philosophy of its foremost exponent, Sorel (*F, Reflections on Violence*, 1910), is avowedly Marxism "revised toward the left." His ostensible bias, however, does not preclude the possibility that Sorel is in reality more indebted to Proudhon. The fundamental bent of syndicalism is well indicated by the original meaning of the word (*syndicalisme* is French

for "trade-unionism"). Syndicalists agree with "Communists" and socialists in wishing to see the ownership of means of production taken out of private hands but, like the anarchists, they desire the immediate and complete abolition of the state. They contend that the *economic* framework of society is more fundamental and more important than the *political*; that a bureaucracy of political officials, no matter how beneficent, would necessarily be inefficient in dealing with economic affairs. In place of geographical representation, consequently, they want to see society organized in a federation of industrial units, with each unit a union of all the workers in an entire industry—a sort of industrial democracy. Syndicalists likewise reject parliamentary action, as useless and as tending to introduce dissension over politics and religion; instead, they rely on "direct action," the "general strike" of all workers in particular, to paralyze capitalism. Just before the War, syndicalism became increasingly strong in Latin countries and, in the form of the I.W.W. (Industrial Workers of the World), it even invaded the United States.

For convenience these varying currents are arbitrarily summarized in the accompanying table. The one point on which all extremists ("Communists," socialists, syndicalists, and anarchists) agree is internationalism—coöperation rather than competition between nationalities.

MAIN CURRENTS OF EXTREMIST THOUGHT

	<i>Aims in Regard to Collective Ownership</i>	<i>Method Advocated</i>	<i>Destructive Objectives</i>	<i>Transitional Form of Government</i>	<i>Ultimate Form of Government</i>
Communism	All goods	(Obsolete) *			
Present-day "Communist"	Means of production	Violence	No private property in means of production and <i>eventually</i> no state	Dictatorship of proletariat	Voluntary association
Marxism	Means of production	Parliamentary action and violence	No private property in means of production and <i>eventually</i> no state	Dictatorship of proletariat	Voluntary association
Syndicalism	Means of production	"Direct action" (general strike)	No state and no private property in means of production		Voluntary association
Terroristic Anarchism	†	Violence	No state and no private property in means of production		Voluntary association
Pacifistic Anarchism	†	Education	No state and no private property in means of production		Voluntary association
Socialism	Means of production	Parliamentary	No private property in means of production		Parliamentary

* Except as continued by certain anarchists.

† There is great divergence among anarchists on this subject. Some would not disturb the institution of private property, others would only nationalize means of production, while still others advocate communism.

Anarchism, which goes to the opposite pole from socialism, is extreme individualism, idealized. Instead of concentrating all control, economic as well as political, in the hands of the state, anarchists would eliminate every vestige of authority. With all class distinctions and forms of coercion abolished and with all nations and races enjoying absolute equality, mutual relations would be conducted by free associations, forming and dissolving at will. Naturally such principles involve unlimited belief in the innate goodness of man and in human perfectibility.

Proudhon, the penniless French workman from whom modern anarchism draws its direct inspiration, was an older contemporary of Marx and the first theoretical extremist of note to emerge from the lower classes. In *What is Property?* (1840) he shows himself at one with the communists in his condemnation of private *property*, for his answer is, "Property is theft." At the same time, in opposition to the Communists, he advocates the right of private *possession*, basing this contention on the belief that all should have free access to the instruments of labor—access prevented, he maintains, by private property—provided that possession be justified by productive use. As Proudhon was a pacifist, his panacea for effecting his aims was a plan for a national bank that would enable workers to obtain the instruments of labor. In return for commodities deposited therein, the bank would issue labor money exchangeable for other commodities involving a like amount of labor. Such a bank, he believed, would drive private capital out of existence. In the anarchistic society that was his ultimate goal, there was to be no government, which to Proudhon signified oppression, no matter what the form. With better conditions, he believed it would become evident that there was no substantial inequality between individuals; thus with all working an equal length of time with equal ability, their work would all be of equal value and all should receive the same reward. Proudhon's main contribution, perhaps, was his insistence on freedom, as opposed to the minutely regulative policy of socialism, with its all-absorbing state.

An equally important figure in the history of anarchism was Bakunin, a Russian noble who had served as an officer in the Imperial Guard and had resigned as a result of the drastic suppression of the Polish revolt. As a student in Germany Bakunin, like Marx, came under the influence of Hegel and later, in Paris, under that of Proudhon (the "great master of us all"). Ordered home, he refused to obey, and his property was confiscated. He took part in the Revolutions of '48, was arrested, was handed over to the Russian authorities, and spent six years in prison. Subsequently, escaping from Siberia, he succeeded Proudhon as the leading anarchist of the world, formed a secret brotherhood, and later joined the First International.

Three main tenets were proclaimed by Bakunin (*God and the State*, 1882): (1) atheism, "the substitution of science for faith"; (2) the destruction of the state, which he believed to be the sole impediment to the immediate and automatic inauguration of anarchistic society; and (3) rejection of political action. Such activity he considered worse than useless, because it would divert the workers from their main purpose, which in his estimation could be achieved only by violence. By reason of this doctrine, Bakunin was the Father of Terrorism. "We object to all legislation, all authority, and all influence, privileged,

patented, official, and legal, even when it has proceeded from universal suffrage, convinced that it must always turn to the profit of a dominating and exploiting minority, against the interests of the immense majority enslaved." Since Bakunin was not a systematic thinker, it is difficult to obtain a clear picture of the society he envisaged. At one time he speaks of a "state of things in which all necessities for production are owned in common by the labor groups and the free communes"; at another, he says that "the liberty of man consists solely in this, that he obeys the laws of nature." In order to maintain this freedom, it is only necessary, he asserts, that natural laws be ascertained by scientific discovery and diffused among the masses—a belief that smacks of the eighteenth century Enlightenment. Bakunin and his followers are responsible for the bad name acquired by anarchists in general, and for the fact that the average man always thinks of an anarchist as running about in a red shirt with an armful of bombs. In reality, most anarchistic authors repudiate the teachings of Bakunin, subscribe rather to the pacifistic brand of anarchism, and are the most idealistic and harmless of men.

On the question of property there is wide divergence among anarchists. Some would leave the institution of private property undisturbed or, like Proudhon, merely substitute the scarcely distinguishable form of private possession. Others, like Bakunin, would introduce collective ownership of the means of production, but not of consumers' goods. Still others, like Kropotkin, advocate communism. Were it not for the even greater fame attained by Tolstoy, Kropotkin, another Russian noble, would be considered the greatest anarchist since Bakunin.

THE UNSOLVED RIDDLE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE: TOLSTOY

The nineteenth century produced no personality more fascinating than Tolstoy. Beyond any other man of recent times, beyond any historic figure whatsoever, with the possible exception of St. Francis of Assisi, he sought to follow the teachings of Christ literally. In so doing he became the foremost anarchist and pacifist of the age, revered throughout the entire world.

Count Leo Tolstoy (1828-1910) was a scion of the Russian nobility. Position and fortune plus a highly moral nature resulted in a spiritual conflict that ended only with death. After a childhood spent on family estates in the country came the *Sturm und Drang* period, when he flitted from one form of activity to another: intermittent university studies, fashionable dissipation, philanthropic management of his property. The divergent influences at work on a Russian of his position—eighteenth century philosophy, semi-Oriental mysticism, association with high society, contact with the peasantry—combined to keep him dissatisfied. Finally he went into the army. Service in the Crimean War and a trip to western Europe, in addition to readings in Rousseau, completed his disgust with Western civilization, the "superstition of progress"; he therefore resigned from the service. During the period of early maturity, however, while producing his great novels *War and Peace* and *Anna Karénina*, he managed to stifle his doubts in the creative activities of home life and imaginative writing.

At forty-five the perplexities he had lulled to rest awoke to torment him more fiercely than ever. At first he became an active member of the Orthodox Church, but he soon left it again to turn to intensive study of Scripture. Rejecting

belief in miracles, the divinity of Christ, a personal God, and personal immortality, Tolstoy came to the conclusion that the essence of Christianity—the essence of all true religion—is to be found in the Sermon on the Mount and in particular in Christ's admonition to "resist not evil." Around this central theme of nonresistance his whole doctrine developed. He therefore concluded that everything based on violence or compulsion in any form was wrong: private property, the Church, education, and above all, the State. Soon after his "conversion," he began to dress and perform manual labor like a peasant and gave all his property to his family, from most of whom he became more and more estranged spiritually. When past eighty, he stole away from home, died in a station master's cottage, and was buried without the offices of the Church.

The Kingdom of God is Within You is perhaps the best expression of his social and political doctrines. From it the following extracts are taken (Chapter VIII):

The majority . . . only through a long course of mistakes, experiments, and suffering are brought to recognize the truth of the [Christian] doctrine and the necessity of adopting it. People often think the question of nonresistance to evil by force is a theoretical one, which can be neglected. Yet this question is presented by life itself to all men. . . . If the Roman, or the man of medieval times, or the average Russian of fifty years ago . . . was convinced . . . that the violence of authority was indispensable to preserve him from evil; that taxes, dues, serfdom, prisons, scourging, knouts, executions, the army and war, were what ought to be, we know that now one can seldom find a man who believes that all these means of violence preserve anyone from any evil whatever. . . .

The governments of our day—all of them, the most despotic and the liberal alike—have become what Herzen so well called "Ghengis Khan with the telegraph": that is to say, organizations of violence based on no principle but the grossest tyranny, and at the same time taking advantage of all the means invented by science for the peaceful collective social activity of free and equal men, used by them to enslave and oppress their fellows.

. . . Everyone is caught in the circle of violence . . . made up now of four methods of working upon men. . . . The first and oldest method is intimidation. This consists in representing the existing state organization (whatever it may be—free republic or the most savage despotism) as something sacred and immutable, and so in inflicting the cruelest penalties for any attempt to alter it. . . .

The second method is corruption. It consists in plundering the industrious working people of their wealth by means of taxes and distributing it in satisfying the greed of officials, who are bound in return to support and keep up the oppression of the people. These bought officials, from the highest ministers to the poorest copying clerks, make up an unbroken network of men bound together by the same interest—that of living at the expense of the people. . . .

The third method is what I can only describe as hypnotizing the people. . . . It begins in their earliest years in the compulsory schools, created for this purpose, in which the children have instilled into them the ideas of life of their ancestors, which are in direct antagonism with the conscience of the modern world. In countries where there is a state religion, they teach the children the senseless blasphemies of the church catechisms, together with the duty of obedience to their superiors. In republican states they teach them the savage superstition of patriotism and the same pretended obedience to the governing authorities. . . .

The fourth method consists in selecting from all the men who have been stupefied

and enslaved by the three former methods a certain number, exposing them to special and intensified means of stupefaction and brutalization and so making them into a passive instrument for carrying out all the cruelties and brutalities needed by the government. . . . They are shut up together in barracks, dressed in special clothes, and worked upon by cries, drums, music, and shining objects to go through certain daily actions invented for this purpose, and by this means are brought into an hypnotic condition in which they cease to be men and become mere senseless machines. . . .

Some persons maintain that freedom from violence, or at least a great diminution of it, may be gained by the oppressed forcibly overturning the oppressive government . . . but they deceive themselves. . . . The oppressed would be another set of people, and coercion would take some new form. . . .

The slow progress of eighteen centuries has brought the Christian nations again to the necessity of deciding the question they have evaded. . . . Formerly men could accept or refuse to accept the solution given by Christ, now that solution cannot be avoided, since it alone can save men from the slavery in which they are caught like a net. . . . I think it is Max Müller who describes the amazement of an Indian convert to Christianity who . . . came to Europe and saw the actual life of Christians. . . . We need only recall the preparations for war, the mitrailleuses [machine guns], the silver-gilt bullets, the torpedoes and—the Red Cross; the solitary prison-cells, the experiments of execution by electricity—and the care of the hygienic welfare of prisoners; the philanthropy of the rich, and—their life, which produces the poor they are benefiting.

. . . In 1892 . . . William [II], the *enfant terrible* of state authority, who says plainly what [most] people only think, in addressing some soldiers gave public utterance to the following . . . "*In these days of socialistic sedition it may come to pass that I command you to fire on your own kindred, your brothers, even your own fathers and mothers—which God forbid!* even then you are bound to obey my orders without hesitation." This man expresses what all sensible rulers think, but studiously conceal. . . .

Every savage has something he holds sacred, something for which he is ready to suffer, something he will not consent to do. But what is it that is sacred to the civilized man of today? They say to him: "You must become my slave, and this slavery may force you to kill even your father," and he . . . quietly puts his head under the yoke. . . . The contradiction between life and conscience and the misery resulting from it have reached the extreme limit and can go no further.

During the nineteenth century, when the birth pangs of nations and of democracies were consuming the political energy of Europe, little thought was given to international affairs in the abstract. Only here and there an isolated voice was heard pleading the cause of mankind as a whole. Mazzini, who dreamed of a Republic of Mankind, was never weary of reminding his countrymen that nationalism without international coöperation is not only ignoble but positively wrong:

Humanity is a great army moving to the conquest of unknown lands, against powerful and wary enemies. The Peoples are the different corps and divisions of that army. Each has a post intrusted to it; each a special operation to perform; and the common victory depends on the exactness with which the different operations are carried out.

And wherever human nature grows better, wherever a new truth is won, wherever a step forward is taken on the path of education, of progress, and of morality, it is a step, a gain, which will bear fruit sooner or later for the whole of Humanity. You are all soldiers of an army which moves by diverse ways, divided into different bands, to the conquest of a single enterprise.

In whatever band you may be, wherever a man is fighting for right, for justice, for truth, there is your brother; wherever a man suffers through the oppression of error, of injustice, of tyranny, there is your brother. Free men and slaves, **YOU ARE ALL BROTHERS**. Origin, law, and goal are one for all of you. Let your creed, your action, the banner beneath which you fight, be likewise one. Do not say, *The language which we speak is different*; tears, actions, martyrdom form a common language for all men, and one which you all understand. Do not say, *Humanity is too vast, and we are too weak*. God does not measure powers, but intentions. Love Humanity. Ask yourselves whenever you do an action in the sphere of your Country, or your family, *If what I am doing were done by all and for all, would it advantage or injure Humanity?* and if your conscience answers, *It would injure Humanity*, desist; desist, even if it seem to you that an immediate advantage for your Country or your family would ensue from your action.

Pasteur gave utterance to a similar thought:

Two opposing laws seem today to be contending: a law of blood and death which, each day inventing new means of conflict, compels nations to be always prepared for the field of battle; and a law of peace, of work, of salvation, which only thinks of freeing man from the plagues which beset him. One seeks only conquest by violence; the other the relief of humanity. One places a single human life above all the victories [ever won]; the other sacrifices a hundred thousand lives to the ambition of a single man. . . . Which of the two laws will prevail over the other?

ECONOMIC HISTORY: SCIENTIFIC AGRICULTURE

The outstanding features in the economic history of the nineteenth century are the preëminence of England, the Industrial and Agricultural revolutions on the Continent, and the beginnings of scientific agriculture. From 1815 on, England maintained her priority as the great industrial and commercial nation of the world for a hundred years, thanks to the lead she had captured prior to that date and to the fact that in Germany and France the Industrial Revolution did not even get under way much before the middle of the century. In 1789, France equaled England in textile production; but in 1835 English production was four times as great. A subsidiary reason was that England guarded her inventions jealously, under heavy penalties, and did not remove her restrictions on the export of machinery until 1825.

Germany was divided politically—the desire for economic betterment, in fact, was a contributory factor in the unification movement—and her urban population was comparatively insignificant; but there seems to have been no conclusive reason why, once the Revolutionary Era was over, France should not have experienced an evolution similar to that which had taken place in England. She had managed to get hold of many English inventions at an early date (one of Watt's engines reached Le Creusot in 1782), she possessed substantial resources and a well-developed urban population, the Revolution had freed in-

dustry from governmental and guild interference, and the authorities did everything in their power to stimulate production; but in 1815 a bare fifteen establishments in all France were using steam, and those in the majority of cases for pumping only. The principal reasons, perhaps, for the slow growth of French industry were the moderate increase in aggregate population and the concomitant fact that the peasantry were content with their lot and consequently were not tempted to shift from agriculture to industry. In spite of all this, France was ahead of the rest of the Continent in 1815; but in the new developments it was usually Germany who took the lead.

A not unimportant point that may be mentioned incidentally was the adoption of the gold standard by England (1816). In this respect too other countries—preferring for some time to remain on the silver standard—were slow to follow her lead.

With the population of Europe steadily and rapidly increasing, further improvements in agriculture were still essential. Scientific agriculture—as contrasted with the empirical, trial-and-error improvements achieved by eighteenth century England—had its foundations in the work of three outstanding theorists, coupled with research in the field. The first to conduct field research along scientific lines (beginning in 1834) was Boussingault, a professor of chemistry at Lyon and the proprietor of a farm at Bechelbronn in Alsace. Here the manures used and the crops obtained were carefully analyzed and weighed and the results tabulated, showing exactly what had been put into the soil and what had been taken out by plants. These statistical analyses were published in the *Annals of Physics and Chemistry*, of which Boussingault was an editor.

The oldest experiment station still in existence is that at Rothamsted, England (Boussingault's having disappeared after the War of 1870), where, on his private estate, Lawes initiated a series of significant observations (1839). Some crops were grown without fertilizer, some with manure, and some with an artificial fertilizer, Superphosphate, which Lawes invented. Made of bones decomposed by an acid which releases the phosphate, Superphosphate, which Lawes patented (1843) and of which he began the manufacture, was important as marking the advent of the artificial fertilizer industry. Even more important, since the supply of bones, like that of manure, was limited, were his successful experiments with mineral phosphates as a fertilizer. Last but not most important of all, Lawes demonstrated the fertilizing value of nitrogen, of which the first cargo, in the form of guano from Chile, was imported in 1835. (During the latter part of the century, nitrates from the extensive deposits wrested from Bolivia by Chile in 1884 were the commonest form of nitrogenous fertilizer.) At Rothamsted, also, animal-feeding was first studied scientifically.

Third and greatest of the triumvirate to whom scientific agriculture owes its rise was Liebig (see p. 312), foremost of agricultural chemists, who interpreted the facts gathered at Bechelbronn and, in his *Chemistry in its Relations to Agriculture* (1840), erected them into a system. In this important work he explained scientifically what plants live on, how they get their food, and what the farmer must do in order to prevent soil exhaustion. In addition to stressing phosphates and potash, Liebig showed that farmyard manure, on which farmers

depended and of which the supply was limited, could be supplemented, if not supplanted, by artificial fertilizers.

ECONOMIC HISTORY: CONTINENTAL DEVELOPMENTS

Advance in agriculture and to a still greater extent in industry was dependent on the development of transportation. By 1850, in spite of political handicaps, the Germanic powers had their trunk lines laid out—3,000 miles in Germany proper and a thousand more in Austria, forming an almost unbroken system from the North Sea and the Baltic to the Adriatic. France had only 2,000, Russia a mere 300; the other Continental powers, with the exception of the Low Countries, had corresponding low amounts of trackage. England, by way of contrast, already had 6,621. By 1870, however, the trunk routes throughout most of Europe were outlined. In this connection may be mentioned the completion of the stupendous Mont Cenis (1870) and St. Gothard (1880) tunnels through the Alps and the opening of the all-important canal across the Isthmus of Suez (1869), an event in celebration of which Verdi wrote his great opera *Aida*. The Suez route cut the distance from London to Bombay nearly in half, from 11,220 to 6,332 miles.

As a result of the Inclosure Movement of the eighteenth century, middle- and small-sized farms almost disappeared in England; elsewhere the tendency was in the opposite direction, for on the Continent and in Ireland the nineteenth century saw the rise of a class of peasant proprietors. In France the Revolution of 1789 had completed the destruction of the manorial system and the creation of a large number of independent peasants. In Germany the work of emancipating the serfs and eliminating the open-field system occupied the entire period until 1870. In Russia the emancipation movement did not begin on a large scale until 1861.

One of the most important innovations of recent times is diversification of diet. In the evolution toward a more healthful and agreeable diet, the potato assumed a leading rôle. By 1815 it was established as a staple in Germany, and toward the end of the century 40,000,000 tons were raised there annually—nearly twice the tonnage of the entire grain crop.¹² In 1815, Germany—indeed, Europe as a whole—was dependent for sweetening on honey or sugar raised in the tropics. By the middle of the century the cultivation of the sugar beet, valuable alike to man and to animals, was well established.

By 1850 the large proprietors of Germany had begun to practice the modern agricultural methods adopted in England a half-century earlier. Exhibitions of agricultural machinery were being held, and Germany was beginning to make the new types herself. By 1870 the three-field system was dead. As the influence of Liebig spread, farmers also began to adopt the principles of scientific agriculture. The great potash deposits at Stassfurt, previously considered worthless, began to be exploited; in the fifty years between 1861 and 1911, production, rising from 2,000 to 9,500,000 tons a year, enabled Germany to take the lead in agricultural chemistry. By 1870 the yield of wheat per acre had increased 50 per cent—from 20 to 30 bushels.

¹² Much of the potato crop, however, was used in the production of alcoholic drinks.

In France in 1850 conditions were similar to those in England a century earlier; in other words, they had changed little since the Middle Ages. Some advances had been made, such as improvements in stock and the introduction of the potato and the sugar beet, but the system of cultivation had scarcely altered. The amount of land lying fallow each year had been reduced less than half, the threshing machine only came into general use after this date, and most of the more complicated types of farm machinery were not adopted, even on the larger estates, until the end of the century.

ECONOMIC HISTORY: THE RISE OF GERMANY

The most striking features in the industrial history of the nineteenth century, beyond the privileged position retained by England, are the sudden rise of Germany and that of the United States. To a greater or less degree the entire Continent of Europe underwent a transformation, but Germany completely outdistanced her rivals.¹³ Among the Great Powers, France was a poor fourth; compared with her neighbor across the Rhine, her industrial development was decidedly slow, so slow, indeed, that it could hardly be called an industrial *revolution*. Elsewhere, the Industrial Revolution came later still—in such places as China and India, in fact, it is just beginning to make itself felt.

In one respect Germany was slow to advance. Although Stein had abolished (1807) the legal distinctions between the Estates in Prussia—enabling nobles to buy peasant land and peasants to buy urban land, and allowing free choice of occupation—elsewhere in Germany the Guild System survived, legally, and the principle of the “career open to talents” was not generally established until the latter half of the century. In Saxony a law of 1840 solemnly proclaimed that every village might have only one tailor, shoemaker, carpenter, baker, butcher, blacksmith, saddler, and so on. These occupations were all guild trades, and without special permit no others were to be carried on. In 1868 in Mecklenburg grain had to be brought to the manorial mill to be ground. The North German Confederation Trade Law of 1869 was the first to make a sweeping break in these conditions. Such industry as existed outside the bounds established by these restrictions was for the most part the cottage type of hand production.

Coincident with the establishment of the Empire, and stimulated in considerable measure by it, the Industrial Revolution struck Germany with full force, bringing in its train the factory system, the proletariat, and Big Business, and in the suddenness with which it developed eclipsing the record established by eighteenth century England. Even in France, though from 1852 to 1912 the number of establishments using steam increased only tenfold, the total horse power increased fiftyfold. In each of the last two decades of this period the amount increased over 50 per cent—and these figures take no account of the use of the electric motor and the internal-combustion engine, which after they were introduced placed power within the grasp of the smallest producer.

The following tables provide some illuminating data on the evolution of industrial Germany:

¹³ Belgium alone, though on a much smaller scale, of course, experienced a degree of industrialization comparable to that of England, Germany, and the United States.

	<i>Great Britain</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>France</i>
<i>Production in Millions of Tons</i>			
<i>Coal</i>			
1871	118	38 *	13
1913	292	279 †	41
<i>Pig Iron</i>			
1860	3.8	.53	.9
1910	10	14.8	4
<i>Steel</i>			
1880	3.7	1.5	1.3
1910	7.6	13.1	2.8

* 8.5 lignite.

† 87.5 lignite.

Only the United States, with an area ten times as great, produced more iron and steel; in the electrical and chemical industries Germany was definitely the leader. Her most remarkable achievement, perhaps, was her *rate* of growth in shipbuilding.

	<i>Great Britain</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>France</i>
<i>Merchant Ships</i> <i>(millions of tons)</i>			
1850	3.5	.14	.68
1870 Steam	2.5	.1	.15
Total	6	1	1
1910 Steam	10.4	2.4	.8

Much of the French fleet was British-built, while just before the World War Germany had a merchant marine that qualitatively was a match or more than a match for the British. Her 900-foot liners were the largest in the world (the *Berengaria*, *Majestic*, and *Leviathan*, formerly the *Imperator*, *Bismarck*, and *Vaterland*).

The development of German commerce and industry is even more clearly indicated by the growth of the urban centers where the proletariat lived and worked. In the sixty years between 1850 and 1910 the population of Germany almost doubled—and practically all of this increase was urban. In 1850 the twelve cities which were the largest in 1914 had less inhabitants than Paris and Lyon combined. In 1910 over a fifth of the population—two-fifths as many inhabitants as made up the entire 1850 population of the territory that later composed the Empire—lived in cities of 100,000.

ECONOMIC HISTORY: CONSEQUENCES

As a result of these fundamental changes in the constitution of society and in spite of increased crop yield per acre and the reclamation of hundreds of miles of uncultivated land, Germany followed England into the category of nonsupporting, food-importing nations at almost exactly the same time that

American wheat began to enter the European market in quantity (about 1875).

Italy, less highly industrialized but also with far less adequate resources and a population mounting at about the same rate, likewise became nonsupporting. France, also less industrialized but with a more slowly increasing population, was just about able to supply her people with the necessities. Overwhelmingly agricultural, and possessing vast fertile wheat-growing areas, Russia alone among the Great Powers of Europe was not only able to support her huge and rapidly increasing population but also continued to export large quantities of wheat to other countries.¹⁴

With the rise of modern industry came modern methods of distribution, though throughout the first half of the century, for lack of stores as distinct from workshops the average consumer was still dependent on local produce—apart from what he could buy from the itinerant peddler and the local yearly fair. The great international fairs were on the decline, by the middle of the century in Germany, earlier in France; and in the larger towns shops were displacing the local fairs. An interesting example is afforded by the great Bon Marché department store in Paris, which was opened in 1852 and forty years later had an annual turnover of \$7,500,000. In the Middle Ages prices were established through bargaining between craftsman and customer (even today bargaining is the normal course of procedure in retail selling in many parts of the Continent). Nowadays, thanks to the telegraph and the cable, every staple commodity, such as wheat and cotton, has a world price, practically the same in London, New York, and Sydney and established by such organizations as the “futures” markets for coffee opened at New York and Le Havre in 1882.

With the extended development of railroads and ocean-borne trade, international commerce came to supply not only luxuries *per se* and many such luxuries as were rapidly becoming necessities but a great number of staples: one-third of the coal used by France, four-fifths of the wheat consumed by England, thirteen-fourteenths of the wool employed by Germany, and practically the entire supply of cotton, rubber, and mineral oils of all three.

In spite of such unmistakable evidences of the interdependence of nations, nearly all European governments, in true mercantilist spirit, maintained tariff walls on every side—not that they lacked evidence to prove the folly of such a policy! The beneficial effects of the Zollverein and of free trade in England should have opened their eyes, as well as the Anglo-French Treaty of 1860, as a result of which France was able to dispose of 65 per cent of her silks in Great Britain.

Politically, economic dependence and cutthroat competition were of the gravest import. In former days, when nations were self-sufficing, a war was not necessarily disastrous. Under the new conditions, if the supply of food and other necessities should be cut off, either at the source or by blockade, an ugly situation was bound to arise, which—as in the case of Great Britain—might assume catastrophic proportions. Such were the considerations that decided England to adopt a two-power standard for her navy (see p. 232) and that

¹⁴ As a matter of fact, much, if not all, of the grain exported from Russia was needed by the peasants. It was likewise true, however, that much of the land was not properly cultivated,

partially accounted for the bigger and better armies maintained by the Continental powers. Conflicting economic interests resulted in constant friction, even in times of peace, and led each nation to seize as much of the world's raw-material-producing areas as possible—heedless that such a policy was apt to precipitate the very catastrophe most feared by all and that all were hoping to avert.



PART VI

PREWAR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

XIII. IF YOU WISH FOR PEACE—

XIV. TOWARD ARMAGEDDON

CHAPTER XIII

IF YOU WISH FOR PEACE—¹

THE HEGEMONY OF GERMANY

The War of 1870 marked a revolution in the states system of Europe. For approximately three and a half centuries, from 1519 until 1859, European politics had centered more or less continuously around the rivalry between France and the Hapsburgs; and throughout those three hundred and forty years the Balance of Power had been the ideal at which the majority of European politicians aimed—the principle that the various powers should be kept as nearly equal in strength as possible, so that no single country should be in a position to dominate. Whenever any one power got too strong, a coalition of lesser powers invariably arose in opposition. Thus the Balance of Power had been evoked by France for the purpose of combating the Hapsburgs, at the time when that dynasty controlled Spain as well as Austria; and the same principle had been adopted by the other powers when, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, France herself became *the* Great Nation—great in man power and organization—and under Louis XIV and Napoleon threatened to engulf the Continent.

With the fall of Napoleon, Europe had felt even more strongly the necessity of maintaining the Balance of Power, and for a while had come nearer to attaining an equilibrium than ever before or since. During the Restoration Era no one power stood out, as had the Hapsburgs in the sixteenth century and France in the seventeenth and the eighteenth. Austria under Metternich was the leader in diplomacy. Russia, the great military power, was primarily interested in domestic issues and took part in the affairs of western Europe only intermittently and incidentally. England, even more isolated, was content with ruling the seas. France, the black sheep of Europe, was the most isolated of all; though for a score of years after the middle of the century, under the second Napoleon (Napoleon III) she seemed to have regained her priority.

And during those three centuries and a half, Prussia, unheeded and almost unobserved, had been forging slowly to the front. By dint of hard work, efficiency, and strict economy the Hohenzollerns had been raising her step by step from a fourth-rate power to a power of the first rank. But the human mind accepts new ideas only under compulsion. Although admittedly more formi-

¹ *Si vis pacem, para bellum*—"If you wish for peace, prepare for war."

dable than Spain, Prussia in 1815 was still regarded by outsiders as distinctly second-rate—a satellite of Austria hardly to be mentioned in the same breath with England, France, Russia, or Austria herself.

Then, one by one—so suddenly that the European chancelleries were left gasping for breath—the props were knocked from under the old system. The Crimean War revealed that Russia's colossal war machine was by no means invulnerable. The War of 1864 indicated that England was unlikely to intervene in Continental affairs. The War of 1866 marked the downfall of Austria and proved that she, rather than Prussia, was the true satellite. Finally, the War of 1870 put an end to the hegemony of France and made it possible for Prussia to swallow the rest of Germany whole. Thanks to the genius of Bismarck, Germany, poor, despised, and maltreated, became the undisputed dictator of the Continent. Thenceforth the diplomats of Europe danced attendance at the Wilhelmstrasse as they formerly had danced attendance on Louis XIV and Napoleon.

Disraeli, with his acute sense of political reality, realized fully what had happened: "This war represents the German Revolution, a greater political event than the French Revolution. . . . There is not a diplomatic tradition which has not been swept away. . . . The balance of power has been entirely destroyed." That the long-desired, long-overdue unification of Germany had necessitated the force of the Prussian sword for its attainment was a fact of no secondary importance. Small wonder if Germans drew the conclusion that might makes right.

What would Bismarck do with his newly acquired power? Would he go on, as Revolutionary and Napoleonic France had gone on, and try to conquer the Continent? Fortunately Bismarck founded his policies on the axiom that Germany was a saturated state—that she had acquired all the territory she needed or wanted—and that henceforth the task was one of internal consolidation. Meanwhile she must protect herself.

Germany after 1870 was confronted with a far more difficult problem than France had faced in the days of the Great Monarchy or of Napoleon. France had possessed excellent natural frontiers in nearly every quarter and had been threatened by no great neighbors. Germany, on the contrary, had few geographical frontiers worth mentioning and three first-class powers jostling her elbows.

England, Bismarck believed, was a negligible quantity, provided only that he were careful to avoid giving the British needless offense. The British fleet, to be sure, was the one fighting machine in a class with the German army—but the whale was content to rule the seas, leaving the elephant supreme on the Continent. Italy, too, Bismarck felt that he might safely disregard, as of secondary importance. Three powers remained to be dealt with, Germany's three great neighbors. With France he asked nothing better than to live in peace, but on the basis of her past performances he feared her hostility, feared that, chagrined by the loss of Alsace-Lorraine and of her predominance in European affairs, she would be continually on the watch for an opportunity to obtain revenge by rebuilding her fallen fortunes at Germany's expense. Moreover, blood and iron had been essential to the unification of Germany, and it was on

the firm base furnished by her army—universally recognized after 1870 as the best in the world—that German hegemony in the last analysis rested. With not undue caution, therefore, Bismarck determined to maintain the supremacy of the German military establishment. This done, it only remained to keep France, so isolated that she could not form an anti-German coalition.

The two remaining powers of the Continent were his real problems, for with Russia and Austria friendly he had nothing to fear from France. From the first his policy had been based on friendship with Russia, a friendship that had made possible all his successes; and in the War of 1866 he had been careful to treat Germany's sister nation to the south as leniently as possible, in the hope that in the future she too might be converted into an ally. If he could secure the friendship of both, he would avoid being dependent on either.

A year or so after peace between Germany and France was concluded, the Tsar and Francis Joseph paid Emperor William a simultaneous visit which was of more than social import. Both were angling for a German alliance, but at the time no formal agreement was concluded. The three emperors merely agreed informally to stand together against the rising tide of socialism and for the defense of the monarchical principle, of conservatism in general, and of the *status quo*.

In 1873, however, a definite alliance took shape, known as the League of the Three Emperors (*Dreikaiserbund*). A decade earlier, much to the surprise of those who had misunderstood his motives, Bismarck had refused an offer of alliance from Russia; now that he held the whip hand it was another matter. Emperor William and his nephew the Tsar signed a convention whereby each promised to aid the other with 200,000 men in case of attack by a third power. The Tsar and Francis Joseph thereupon signed a convention of a less specific nature—for the avowed purpose of "imposing the maintenance of the peace of Europe against all subversions, from whatever quarter they may come"—which was in turn accepted by William. As will be readily seen, the League of the Three Emperors savored strongly of the Holy Alliance. Had this alignment persisted there would have been no World War in 1914, for no one would have dared attack a combination of such strength. Furthermore, Russia would not have acted as she did.

THE BALKAN VOLCANO AGAIN

The first rift in the friendly relations between Germany and Russia came as a consequence of the "war scare" of 1875. Not long after the War of 1870, certain factions in Germany came to the conclusion that France was recovering too rapidly; some of the newspapers even published articles advocating a "preventive" war, which should crush the French for good and all and so prevent their undertaking a war of revenge. Bismarck had no notion of embarking on any such venture, but France and some of the other powers were genuinely alarmed. Queen Victoria appealed to her son-in-law, the Crown Prince of Germany, to keep his country from going to war; and Gorchakov, Russia's all-too-active Foreign Minister, persuaded the Tsar to declare that he would not

allow France to be crushed. Thereupon Gorchakov grandiloquently announced, "Now peace is assured"—much to Bismarck's irritation.

In attempting to balance the Balkan interests of his allies Bismarck encountered his real difficulties. This was ironical, for in his opinion "the whole Eastern question was not worth the bones of a Pomeranian grenadier." Furthermore, he had created his own dilemma by throwing Austria out of Germany and Italy and so leaving her with no direction in which to turn except toward the southeast.

In 1875 the Turkish provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina revolted and declared for union with Serbia. Three peoples beside the Turks were vitally interested in the affair: the Austrians, whose territories almost surrounded the rebellious provinces; the Serbs, who were blood brothers of the rebels; and the Russians, who were cousins of the Serbs. As Austria and Russia, however, agreed to act in concert, if at all, it seemed for a while that in so far as it concerned the powers, the matter might be settled amicably.

Unfortunately for Bismarck, the powers as a whole were unable to decide what to do, particularly since England persisted in "putting her money on the wrong horse." Encouraged, therefore, by the failure of the powers to agree, by the attitude of Britain, and by the belief that Austria would not allow Russia to intervene, the Turks proceeded against their rebellious subjects by force of arms. Meanwhile the revolt had spread to the Bulgarians, another Christian people subject to Turkey, and the Serbs had intervened in behalf of their kinsmen in Bosnia. Serbia was disastrously defeated and only saved by a Russian ultimatum to Turkey. The Bulgarian revolt, characterized by the butchery of a goodly number of defenseless Moslems, led to the famous Bulgarian massacres: the Turks swept the Bulgarian countryside with fire and sword, wiped out scores of villages, and slaughtered thousands of unhappy Christians. Popularized by Gladstone, who used them as party propaganda against the Disraeli Government, the Bulgarian Massacres proved too much for even the English, and the powers presented a united front in their demands for reform under foreign supervision. In order to forestall such an unwelcome possibility, the new Sultan, Abdul Hamid (1876-1909), proclaimed a liberal constitution. It was not the first nor the last time the Turks made promises they failed to fulfill; but as a result of the Sultan's action and England's consequent refusal to join the other powers in pressing the demands, the matter was allowed to drop. Gorchakov, however, had prevailed on Austria to sign a new agreement, which gave Russia permission to attack Turkey in return for Bosnia and Herzegovina. When the conference of powers dissolved, Russia, arrogating to herself the rôle of the champion of Christendom, opened hostilities.

The War of 1877, in which Rumania joined on the Russian side, promised to be a walkaway for the Christians; but at Plevna they met with an astounding check at the hands of a Turkish force only a third as large. From July until December their attacks broke on this rock of Turkish resistance. Although ultimately worsted by Totleben, the hero of Sevastopol, the Turks demonstrated beyond a doubt that their reputation as fighters was not undeserved. With the fall of Plevna the Russians pushed rapidly forward, in spite of the severe

In 1879, by concluding a formal defensive alliance with Austria, Bismarck accordingly took what proved the most fateful step of his later career. Both powers agreed: first, to support each other against an attack by Russia, and second, to remain neutral if the other should be attacked by any power except Russia (for example, France or Italy). The wisdom of Bismarck's decision to ally with the weaker of his neighbors is open to question and has, indeed, been widely questioned. Moreover, the choice of Austria raised the possibility of a war on two fronts—against Russia and against France. Incidentally, this decision was his most direct contribution toward laying the train that was to lead to the World War. His justification, in his own words, was that "in the interest of the European equilibrium the maintenance of Austria as a strong, independent Great Power is for Germany an object for which she might in case of need stake her fortune with a good conscience." To this extent he also justified the *aims*, though not the *methods*, of his successors. He repeatedly warned Austria that the alliance was strictly defensive and that he would not support her imperialistic ambitions in the Balkans. For the next thirty-five years the Austro-German alliance remained the pivot of the European states system.

The choice made by Bismarck at this time did not mean that he had abandoned all hope of a tripartite agreement. He specifically announced that he had formed the Dual Alliance merely to hold the Panslav flood in check until the peace party at St. Petersburg could get the upper hand and he could renew the League of the Three Emperors. His calculations proved correct. The Tsar soon realized that Russia had gone too far in her anti-German demonstrations and even before the Dual Alliance was concluded had begun to back water. With Giers in control of the Foreign Office, in place of Gorchakov, the way was cleared for an understanding.

In 1881 the League of the Three Emperors was renewed on the basis of a fresh agreement. This time each of the parties promised to remain neutral if either of the others were at war; and it was agreed that there should be no changes in European Turkey without common consent, leaving Russia free to do as she wished in Asiatic Turkey. The three powers further agreed to make Turkey keep the Straits closed to all non-Turkish vessels of war, and to allow Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia to unite if they so desired.

In 1882 Italy made overtures to the Central Powers and the Dual Alliance accordingly became the Triple Alliance. The new alignment was of Bismarck's making, in a sense, but not of his seeking. After 1871 he had encouraged France in her colonial ambitions, hoping to distract her from thoughts of Alsace-Lorraine; and in 1881 France had seized Tunisia. This *fait accompli* was a cruel blow to Italy, who needed colonies as badly as any country in Europe and had marked the territory for her own. The nearest point in Africa to Sicily, it had been part of the Roman Empire, which the Italians had romantic dreams of reviving, and it contained a hundred Italians to one Frenchman. Above all, with the exception of Morocco Tunisia was the last unappropriated spot really suitable for white colonization. Unsupported, Italy was in no position to dispute the French claims, but she determined that the future should find her with a powerful ally at her back. Italy's decision to join the Dual Alliance was also motivated by her fear that some Catholic power would inter-

vene in an attempt to restore the Pope. In this new accession to the ranks Bismarck found no particular cause for rejoicing—with his usual foresight, he had little faith in the trustworthiness or the abilities of his new allies ("They have such a large appetite and such poor teeth," he had once remarked)—but for the moment at least it placed a potential enemy on the flank of France.

In 1881 Serbia had become a satellite, virtually a protectorate, of Austria, as a result of which she was able to proclaim herself a kingdom the year following; and in 1883, as a result of the Treaty of Berlin, Rumania (who had proclaimed herself a kingdom in 1881) also joined the Central Powers, in the hope of recovering Bessarabia. At the same time General von der Goltz, called to reorganize the Turkish army, began laying the foundations for German influence on the Bosphorus. In 1888 the alliances between Italy and the Central Powers and between the Central Powers and Rumania were further strengthened by an alliance between Italy and Rumania.

In 1887 England had negotiated an agreement with Italy, whereby the two powers promised to support each other in the Mediterranean (whether by force of arms was not made clear) "in every difference which may arise between one of them and a third power"—meaning France. At the same time England had entered into a similar indefinite agreement with Austria concerning the Near East, and Spain had agreed to act in concert with the Triple Alliance in regard to Northern Africa. Thus at the close of the Bismarckian Era France was more thoroughly isolated than ever. All these alliances, be it noted, were defensive; never had any power been so successful as was Germany in dominating the cabinets of Europe by peaceful means.

Meanwhile the Balkan problem remained unsolved. Neither Austria nor Russia contemplated trying to acquire any more territory in that direction, but they watched each other jealously in the interests of peaceful penetration. In the Balkans the Austrians in particular had reason to hope for an economic outlet such as the Western Powers had found in their colonies and Russia had found in Asia. The Vienna-to-Constantinople railway, opened in 1888, was hailed as a great step in this direction and was destined to become an important link in the famous Berlin-to-Baghdad project.

Though Austria and Russia were resigned to keeping the peace, trouble was not slow in developing. In 1885 Eastern Rumelia revolted, tore up the Berlin Settlement, and joined Bulgaria. Serbia thereupon demanded a strip of Bulgarian territory by way of compensation, and was encouraged by Austria, in spite of repeated warnings from Bismarck, to enforce her demands at the point of the bayonet. In view of what was to take place in 1914 the whole affair was little short of ludicrous. Serbia was badly defeated, but Russia refused to renew the Dreikaiserbund when it expired in 1887. Instead, she proposed a separate neutrality treaty with Germany alone; in case Germany attacked France (or Russia attacked Austria) the agreement was to be void. That Bismarck readily acceded proves how essentially pacific he was. As between Austria and Russia, the net effect was that Germany agreed to stand by the power attacked.

The so-called Reinsurance Treaty outlasted Bismarck's term of office and has been characterized as "the very keystone of the Bismarckian structure" (at times he even considered not renewing the Austrian alliance). If the interpre-

tation be true, it is all the more essential to note the difficulties that rendered the maintenance of such an alignment increasingly difficult, in the face of the senior agreement with Austria. Bulgaria continued, year in and year out, a cause of dissension. The Bulgarians betrayed a somewhat astonishing independence and, to the Russian way of thinking, decided ingratitude in that they refused to remain mere protégés of Russia. In so doing they were supported by England and Austria, whereas France supported Russia. A considerable group of Russians, particularly the vociferous and influential Panslavists, began to clamor for a French alliance. Though they received no support from the Tsar or from Giers, the Government was consequently subject to increasing pressure from public opinion. More important still, as it turned out, were the new Russian tariff and an imperial decree forbidding foreigners to acquire or inherit land in western Russia. Since many Germans owned estates in the Baltic provinces, Germany viewed the matter in much the same light that Americans viewed the action of Mexico during the World War in regard to oil lands. A violent campaign against Russian securities ensued in the German press. Knowing that more than half of those held abroad were owned in Germany, Bismarck took no steps to curb this manifestation, thinking it would teach the Russians how dependent they were on German credit. Indeed he even took a hand in the affair himself by issuing a decree that forbade the Imperial Bank to accept Russian securities as collateral; as a result they fell rapidly in value. This proved to be the worst mistake Bismarck ever made, for he failed to take into account the fact that the French, who by now had recovered from the disaster of 1870, had large amounts of surplus capital to invest. Russia accordingly turned to France, and in 1888 a Franco-Russian loan for 500,000,000 francs (about \$100,000,000) was heavily oversubscribed on the Paris Bourse. It was a glorious day for France (but as it ultimately turned out, a sad day for French investors). The following year Russian officials began to seek technical advice from the French as to the best way to reorganize and equip their army. They purchased the Lebel rifle for their troops, promising never to use it against France.

Throughout his term of office, however, Bismarck succeeded in his difficult feat of "keeping five balls in the air at once," and to the end the peace of Europe was preserved. The Man of Blood and Iron may be fairly accused of having at times set England, France, and Russia by the ears, so that they might not combine against Germany, and even of having profited by their disputes when it came to acquiring colonies, but whenever there was any threat of war he was to be found exercising his good offices and his great power in the interests of peace. "Had he not been there, the nations would have had it out." With the passing of Bismarck, an age in history closed.

THE DIPLOMATIC REVOLUTION, 1890-1907

In 1890, just after Bismarck resigned, Russo-German relations took a fatal turn—not because his handling of Russia had been a serious miscalculation, but because owing to his retirement a change in policy occurred. That his mistake was by no means irretrievable is shown by the fact that at the very moment

of his departure Giers requested a renewal of the Reinsurance Treaty. He met with refusal, for by the time the decision was made, a generation for whom Bismarck did not figure as a demigod was in control.

The circumstances, because more than usually peculiar, are of more than usual interest. Although after getting rid of Bismarck the Kaiser was determined to direct his own affairs, he favored the renewal of the treaty. His change of mind was the doing of a certain Baron Holstein. The cream of the jest is that Holstein was merely an underofficial of the Foreign Office, a sort of *éminence grise* scarcely ever seen by the Kaiser and until recently unknown, even by name, to well-informed students of diplomacy. Yet this most mysterious of backstairs potentates was to be the deciding influence in the formation of German foreign policy for upwards of ten years. Apparently he made more mistakes than any other diplomat of his generation—something of a record.

Holstein's calculations were based on the axiom that an alliance between republican France and the Autocrat of All the Russias was unthinkable, which line of reasoning proved him a poor student of history. Though refusing to renew the Reinsurance Treaty, the Kaiser did all in his power to preserve friendly personal relations with the Tsar, and to the end "Willy" and "Nicky" kept up an animated and affectionate correspondence; but Russia suspected Germany of plotting with England, her arch enemy. The Anglo-German Treaty of 1890, whereby Great Britain surrendered Helgoland in return for a free hand in Zanzibar, was taken as proof of an "understanding" between the great military and naval powers—and fear of offending England seems, as a matter of fact, to have been the deciding factor in determining Germany's course of action throughout the period immediately preceding the World War. The climax came when the renewal of the Triple Alliance was ostentatiously proclaimed in 1891. Russia was convinced that England was a party to the transaction.

Left to herself, Russia inevitably gravitated toward France. The impending consummation of a new alignment became evident when a French fleet entered Russian waters for the first time since the Crimean War. At Kronstadt the Tsar boarded the flagship and stood with bared head while the band played the marching song of the sansculottes of '93. It was a dramatic scene and a significant one as well, for in tsarist Russia the "Marseillaise" was regarded in much the same light as the "Internationale" is viewed in capitalistic countries of today; Russians were forbidden to perform it, not only in public but even on a piano that might be heard from the street.

Shortly afterward the two Governments signed a diplomatic accord. France was eager to cement the understanding by a military convention, but the Russian Government moved slowly. Not until the following year (1892) was a definite military bargain drawn up by the chiefs of staff and approved in principle by the Tsar; and only in 1894 did an exchange of diplomatic notes make the alliance binding. Meanwhile France continued to back Russia's loans, until by 1906 she had advanced the Government over 7,900,000,000 francs (about \$1,580,000,000), to say nothing of vast sums loaned by French capitalists for private enterprises.

Since disrupting the Concert of Europe in 1820,² England, with few deviations, had maintained her policy of "splendid isolation." Why should she, with the Channel as a bulwark and protected by her superb fleet, bother with the quarrels of Continental nations? Free from entangling alliances, she could judge each case on its merits when it arose, and take action accordingly. In so far as she had any inclination, it was toward her German cousins, whose accomplishments she could not help admiring; and this natural inclination was strengthened as a result of Russian aggression in the Middle East, continual friction with France over colonial matters—and the fact that Bismarck took care not to tread on her toes. From 1887 on, in fact, through her Mediterranean and Near East accords, she was linked, vaguely and indirectly, with the Bismarckian system. This connection seemed ample, and more than once she rejected offers of alliance from Bismarck (1877, 1879?, 1887?, and 1889). In 1888, the year before she adopted her two-power navy standard, Lord Salisbury declared, "The alliance [sic] with Austria covers the only weak point in the English position."

By the end of the century, however, England was forced to recognize that this state of affairs entailed serious drawbacks. Fashoda brought her into even graver conflict with France and seriously threatened to involve her in war (see p. 297). Above all, the Boer War showed how complete was her isolation, politically as well as geographically. From one end of the Continent to the other resounded demands for intervention. Had England not controlled the seas it is more than probable that the war would have ended far differently. Her nebulous agreements with Austria and Italy were no guarantee of security; and even had these powers seen fit to bestir themselves in her behalf, it was doubtful whether they could have accomplished anything of real value. The British were therefore sufficiently alarmed so that they finally decided to look about for a friend among the great military powers. Because of their existing ties and for other reasons already enumerated, they turned first to Germany.

When the Kaiser came to the throne, he had been notoriously Anglophile; his first visit to his grandmother's court was a veritable love feast. "At Malplaquet and Waterloo Prussian and British blood was shed in a common cause" was one of his felicitous phrases, to which the *Morning Post* had rejoined, "Neither England nor Germany thinks of war, but it becomes daily clearer to both that if war is forced on them they must stand or fall together. No paper alliance is required."

Together with the friction that arose between the Kaiser and his uncle, the future Edward VII, the Kruger telegram seemed to point toward a possible reorientation of German policy; in 1898, nevertheless, encouraged perhaps by a chance remark dropped by the Kaiser to the effect that he had striven for an English alliance for the past eight years, Chamberlain approached the imperial ministers. When actually confronted with the possibility, the Kaiser, who, as has been said, was notoriously erratic, decided with characteristic German logic that the British were trying "to find a Continental army to fight for their interests." The most potent reason for Germany's refusal, however, was her fear of offending Russia!

² See p. 90.

Chamberlain refused to be discouraged. He had conceived of a still greater alliance, and following a second visit of the Kaiser to England the next year, startled the world by his Leicester speech: "That understanding of which I have spoken in the case of America might, if extended to Germany, do more perhaps than any combination of arms to preserve the peace of the world. At bottom the character of the Teutonic race differs very slightly indeed from the character of the Anglo-Saxon race. If the union between England and America is a powerful factor in the cause of peace, a new Triple Alliance between the Teutonic race and the two great branches of the Anglo-Saxon race will be a still more potent influence in the future of the world."

In 1901, accordingly, Chamberlain again broached his project. Holstein replied with the proposal that England and Japan join the Triple Alliance, whereupon negotiations fell through. The Kaiser was still obsessed with the notion that England wanted to use his army against Russia, and—just as Holstein had been incapable of realizing that Russia and France could reach an understanding—was unable to conceive of England coming to terms with France and Russia. The upshot was that, fearful of offending Russia and England, Germany ended by losing both. Thereupon, in 1902, for lack of something better and in order to protect her Eastern interests, England formed an alliance with Japan.

In 1902 also, judging that the Central Powers were in a fair way to lose their preponderance, Italy signed a secret agreement with France. Each promised neutrality if the other "should be the object of a direct or indirect aggression" or even in case the other "as the result of a direct provocation, should find herself compelled, in defense of her honor or her security, to take the initiative in a declaration of war." In this clever but not entirely scrupulous fashion Italy (who originated the "art" of modern diplomacy) managed to get a foot in both camps. The Italians maintained that their new commitment did not contravene the terms or the spirit of the Triple Alliance; but it is doubtful whether the Central Powers, had they known what was going on, would have admitted the validity of the contention.

It is questionable whether, in any case, the English Parliament could have been persuaded to sanction a German alliance; in spite of the traditional friendship between the two nations, there were other factors that operated more and more to keep them apart. In addition to the fact that Germany was becoming an increasingly serious rival of England in trade and that, to a certain extent, she conflicted with England in the colonial field, there was the violent abuse of England that arose in Germany during the Boer War. Add to these the determination of Germany to build a first-class fleet, and it is small wonder that the English were annoyed if not alarmed.

In any indictment of the Kaiser's judgment his naval policy must figure most heavily of all. As has been noted, the British Naval Defense Act of 1889 had proclaimed the two-power standard—that England must have a fleet equal in strength to that of the combined navies of any two other powers. The reason was obvious: England's very existence depended on her fleet; if she lost control of the seas to a hostile power, not only would the Empire be imperiled but she herself would starve to death in a few months. At the time when Bismarck retired and the Kaiser took over personal direction of affairs, the German navy

had been relatively insignificant; and prior to the initiation of Germany's new naval policy in 1896 England had possessed more than a third of the world's tonnage in warships, Germany still ranking only a poor fifth.

On the occasion of the naval review at Spithead at the time of Queen Victoria's Diamond Jubilee, the Kaiser, irritated by the poor showing of his vessels, telegraphed: "I greatly regret that I cannot give you a better ship. . . . But I will never rest till I have raised my navy to the same standard as that of my army." Ominous words, if taken at their face value!—but at that time hardly more than a rhetorical gesture. Even the appointment of Von Tirpitz as head of the Admiralty and the Naval Bill of 1898 were not calculated to arouse apprehension.

With the Naval Bill of 1900, which doubled the program of 1898 and came at the time when England was sorely tried by the Boer War, Germany definitely entered the race for sea power. Tirpitz declared, "Germany must have a battle fleet so strong that even the adversary possessed of the greatest sea power will attack it only at great risk to himself." Though the wording, to be sure, was defensive, a fleet so strong would at the same time be a menace to English supremacy, since the British had so many scattered possessions to protect—and sea power has the unfortunate peculiarity that it cannot safely be shared.

Twice repulsed by Germany, England perforce turned to France although not long before Salisbury had categorically affirmed, "France is, and must always remain, England's greatest danger." The year that Fashoda had darkened Anglo-French relations, a new minister, Delcassé, had entered the Quai d'Orsay. Delcassé was convinced that France must either compound her differences with England or surrender the hope of recovering Alsace-Lorraine. The year following, therefore, he made an agreement recognizing the British claim to the Upper Nile. Delcassé's desire further to promote good feeling with England was temporarily blocked by the attitude of the French public during the Boer War.

When Edward VII ascended the British throne in 1901, Delcassé acquired a sympathetic and able ally. Edward had spent much of his long career as Prince of Wales in Paris or on the Riviera. He spoke French fluently and was decidedly *persona grata* to the people of France. In 1903 he paid his first formal visit to Paris as king and managed to leave an impression of distinct cordiality. In 1904 this visit bore fruit in the formation of the Entente Cordiale. No formal alliance was concluded, but a series of conventions settled all outstanding Anglo-French colonial disputes—over Newfoundland, Siam, Madagascar, the New Hebrides, and above all, over Egypt and Morocco. France recognized the predominance of England's interests in Northeast Africa, while England accorded France a free hand in the Northwest. Since with few exceptions England and France had been rivals from the days of William the Conqueror, the formation of the Entente Cordiale was as much a diplomatic revolution as the alliance between republican France and imperial Russia.

Although, as just pointed out, the Entente Cordiale was not a formal alliance, it resulted in secret military and naval arrangements or "conversations," as Grey, the British Foreign Minister, euphemistically termed them. Without even letting the majority of his colleagues in the cabinet know, Grey approved

and confirmed conversations between the military and naval staffs of the two countries, by which elaborate technical arrangements were concluded that became the basis of strategic plans. The naval negotiations were conducted by Lord Fisher, subsequently famous as the author of the proposition to "Copenhagen" the German fleet (during the Napoleonic Wars England, although not at war with Denmark, made a sudden descent on Copenhagen and seized the Danish fleet). By the time of the first Moroccan crisis, Grey "assumed that all preparations were ready. . . . In the event of an attack upon France by Germany . . . public opinion would be so strong that no British Government could remain neutral." These preparations continued. "A complete revolution in the organization of the British Army" was effected, providing for an expeditionary force of 160,000 for service in France. British and French officers reconnoitered the possible fields of operation in France and *Belgium* (the whole wall of the London office of the Direction of Military Operations was covered with a gigantic map of Belgium, indicating all the practicable roads). In 1912, by agreement, the British fleet concentrated in the North Sea and the French fleet in the Mediterranean.

In 1904 England was still unwilling to treat with "the bear that walks like a man"; but in 1907, with the conclusion of an Anglo-Russian accord, a third diplomatic revolution took place and the Entente Cordiale became the Triple Entente. The basis of this final and most important alignment was a series of territorial agreements between Grey and Izvolsky, similar to those already concluded with France and relating to the frontier of India. England and Russia both agreed not to interfere with Tibet, and Russia recognized the preponderance of British interests in Afghanistan by withdrawing her diplomatic agents. The "integrity and independence" of Persia were guaranteed, but the country was divided into three spheres: a northern sphere, under the influence of Russia; a central sphere, which was to remain a neutral zone; and a south-eastern sphere, under British influence.

The entente of 1907, like that of 1904, contained no military clauses; but as early as 1908 Russia privately agreed to mobilize all her forces in case of a German mobilization, even one against England. In 1911 Russia was informed by France that the French army was "in a position to take the offensive [sic] against Germany with the aid of the English army on its left wing."

Once again Europe had reverted to the Balance of Power—this time a balance founded not on kaleidoscopic combinations dictated by the caprice of the moment, but on a fixed alignment of all the Great Powers arrayed in two opposing camps. Year by year more men, greater guns, and more deadly battleships gathered on either side. Ostensibly defensive in purpose, would the new alliances result in keeping the peace, as many hoped, or would they prove a series of powder trains leading to a cataclysm far worse than any Europe had yet experienced?

THE BALANCE OF POWER, MOROCCO, AND THE BOSNIAN CRISIS

During the years from 1907 to 1914, Morocco and the Near East occupied the center of the international stage. At the opening of the twentieth century,

Morocco (the Sherifian Empire) was the last desirable territory in Africa still unoccupied by a European power. Internal conditions were semichaotic, and when England made her offers of alliance to Germany she suggested that they occupy and partition the country. Spain and France had long had their eyes on this territory. As early as the fifteenth century the Spanish had obtained a foothold, and the French were able to argue that Algeria would never be tranquil so long as Morocco remained in a turmoil. Legally, all the powers were entitled by treaty to be consulted on Moroccan affairs.

France began by buying off Italy, promising in return not to oppose Italian aspirations in Tripoli (1900). She then proceeded to negotiate with England and Spain. The public clauses of the agreements provided for the maintenance of the Sultan's independence; but secret clauses paved the way for the partitioning of the country between France and Spain, France to get the lion's share (1904). This done, Delcassé felt in a position to devour Morocco without further difficulty—without heeding the extensive commercial interests of Germany or even consulting her—and he accordingly presented the Sultan with a demand for "reforms."

Confronted with what was virtually a *fait accompli*, Germany was uncertain how to proceed. For a year she awaited some gesture of conciliation. In 1905, on his way to the Mediterranean the Kaiser stopped at Tangier, demanded that Germany be accorded equality in Morocco, and intimated that he would support the freedom and independence of the Sultan. Germany then proposed an international conference. Delcassé opposed the suggestion, but was forced to resign when the cabinet failed to support him. Thereupon a great outcry arose in Entente circles against Germany's "unwarranted" interference in the "internal" affairs of France.

The Conference of Algieras (1906) began by affirming the sovereignty of the Sultan and the commercial equality of the powers. To this extent it was a victory for Germany. But the French and the Spanish were accorded the important privilege of policing the country. In a wider sense, too, the conference was a German defeat; it cemented the Anglo-French Entente and revealed that Austria was Germany's only stanch supporter, America and even Italy supporting the French.

Not long after, further disorders in Morocco gave France an excuse to extend her control and eventually to occupy Fez (1911). As Germany pointed out, these encroachments were a violation of the Algieras Act; but by this time the Kaiser was resigned to seeing France have her way. Any attempt to prevent her would probably mean war, "so let us get out of the affair with dignity, so that we may finally have done with this friction with France." On the other hand, the Kaiser was determined, not unreasonably, to obtain compensation. A German gunboat, the *Panther*, was therefore dispatched to Agadir "in order to protect German interests." Late the same year the contestants finally came to terms: in return for some 100,000 square miles of the French Congo, Germany accorded France a free hand in Morocco. In this way she made the best of a bad bargain and sold her birthright (if either France or Germany had any rights) for a mess of pottage. What should have been far more important, Germany demonstrated her willingness to compromise; but

for this, as a matter of fact, she received less than no credit. The French and their allies declared that France had been outrageously treated, and they accordingly determined not to compromise in case another crisis should arise. The following year (1912) the French proclaimed a protectorate over Morocco.

Of the many tangled threads which go to make up the history of the Near East none is more important than the problem of Austro-Serbian relations. From the day when Austria, alone among the European powers, first assisted the Serbs against their oppressors—the day in 1717 when Prince Eugene defeated the Turks and liberated Belgrade—Serbs and Austrians had been on friendly terms; and from 1878 to 1903 Serbia was as definitely the protégé of Austria as Bulgaria was the protégé of Russia. Though Serbia was disgruntled by the Austrian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, she was mollified when she received Pirot and Nish, districts which Russia had intended should go to Bulgaria; and the Austro-Serbian alliance of 1881 was followed by a reciprocally advantageous tariff. In 1885, when the Serbs were overwhelmingly defeated by the Bulgars, it was Austria who saved them from virtual annihilation.

In 1903 the relations of Austria and Serbia were suddenly reversed, owing to a dynastic revolution which was therefore the incident that ultimately led to the World War. One night, without warning, the King and Queen of Serbia were dragged from their beds and murdered in cold blood by a band of "patriots"; prominent among the conspirators were two army officers, Dimitriević and Tankosić, who were to achieve even wider notoriety in days to come. Thereupon Peter I of the Karageorgevitch dynasty ascended the throne. His brother was an officer in a Russian Guards regiment, his sisters-in-law were married to Russian Grand Dukes, and Peter himself forthwith adopted an anti-Austrian and pro-Russian policy. Under Karageorgevitch leadership, in imitation of the House of Savoy, Serbia began to aspire to the rôle of a South Slav Piedmont. This ambition was of course a direct threat to Austria—who only aggravated matters by shutting her frontiers to Serbian pork products, thereby precipitating the so-called Pork War and making the Serbs more acutely conscious than ever of their need for an outlet to the sea.

In 1908 the Near East Question entered a new and still more critical phase. The Turkish progressives, known as Young Turks, engineered a revolution and compelled Abdul Hamid to restore the constitution of 1876. As it happened, the Young Turk Revolution synchronized with the Buchlau Bargain between the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Izvolsky, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs: Austria agreed that Russia should consummate her historic mission of opening the Straits to Russian warships, and Russia agreed that Austria should annex Bosnia and Herzegovina.

When the revolution in Turkey broke out, Bulgaria was the first to profit; she immediately proclaimed herself an independent kingdom, and her ruler took the somewhat ambitious title of Tsar of the Bulgarians. The next day Francis Joseph presented the world with a *fait accompli* in the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Immediately a wail of indignation arose from Turkey, Serbia, and Russia. The Turks were too weak to do anything, and contented themselves with an indemnity; but Russia, who found that she was unable to consummate her part of the Buchlau Bargain, began to prepare for war in

support of Serbia. (Izvol'sky subsequently claimed that the Buchlau Bargain—which was verbal—specified that any action taken should be simultaneous.) Austria stood firm, and Russia was compelled to back down, as she was in no condition to confront the Central Powers after her recent defeat at the hands of Japan. Serbia, unaided, was obliged to promise "to live in future on good neighborly terms" with Austria (1909).

The Bosnian crisis had four important results: It angered Russia, it enraged Serbia, it deceived the Central Powers as to the extent that Russia would go in support of Serbia, and it further alienated Italy from her allies. With aspirations of her own in the Balkans, Italy was piqued because she had been kept in the dark. Consequently she signed the *Racconigi Bargain* with Russia: Italy promised her support if Russia should try to gain control of the Straits; Russia, in return, accorded Italy diplomatic support in Tripoli.

Inspired by the example of the French in Morocco and assured of the goodwill of Russia and France and the neutrality of Germany and Austria, Italy was the third power to take advantage of Turkey. In 1911 she declared war, and thanks to her control of the sea was able, so far as the Turks were concerned, to conquer Tripoli at her leisure; the natives, however, put up a stiff resistance. Thus Turkey lost her last foothold in Africa, for Egypt was virtually an English protectorate. The territory gained by Italy was of slight value, but the Italians were gratified in that their flag now floated over a considerable portion of the North African coast. The Germans, who were seeking the friendship of the Turks, were considerably annoyed. Italy also occupied the Dodecanese (Greek in population), with the proviso that she should continue to hold the islands until the Turks finally evacuated Tripoli.

AND STILL THE BALKANS

In 1908 the Young Turks had seemed on the point of rejuvenating the Ottoman Empire. They had begun by proclaiming the equality of all religions and nationalities; and for a moment, therefore, Christians, Jews, and Mussulmans had forgotten their differences. Turks, Greeks, Bulgars, Rumans, Serbs, and Armenians outdid each other in protestations of goodwill. It was not long, however, before the Turks made it evident that equality was to be interpreted in its literal, not its liberal, sense, that all nationalities were to be equally lacking in privileges, and that in reality equality was merely a cloak for intense Turkification. Soon the Armenian massacres were resumed, and once more the subject nationalities began to line up against the common oppressor.

In the weakness displayed by the Young Turk régime when attacked by Austria and Italy the independent states of the Balkans saw their opportunity. The Turks believed that mutual hatreds precluded any possibility of a united attack from this quarter, but the Christians were at last beginning to realize that in union there is strength. Venizelos, the Cretan leader who was to prove the foremost Greek statesman of modern times, initiated a new phase of Balkan history when he effected an understanding with Bulgaria. Russia, by drawing the Bulgars and the Serbs together in a combination that she intended should serve as a marplot for Austria, played an important rôle. In 1912 alliances were

formed between Bulgaria and Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece, and Serbia and Montenegro.

When Turkey discovered what was happening, she hastened to conclude peace with Italy. The powers, conscious of the dangers inherent in any disturbance in the Balkans, made a twelfth-hour attempt to enforce their time-worn policy of bolstering up Turkey: on October 8, 1912, they issued a warning that no change in the *status quo* would be permitted. That very day, however, little Montenegro declared war; and less than a week later she was joined by her allies. Turkey professed to despise her small antagonists, who taken collectively were hardly half her size; here at least was a situation where sea power, to which the Turks in large measure owed their defeat in the Italian War, would play little part. Each of the allies fought on its own front, as had been agreed, and each was successful. The Montenegrins added fresh laurels to the many they had won in the past. The Serbs regained the hope of centuries when they entered Üskub, capital of their medieval empire, and took Monastir and Durazzo (Durrës). The Greeks annexed Crete, occupied the Aegean Islands, and captured Salonika, which the Turks had held since 1430. The Bulgars who perforce bore the brunt of the attack overwhelmed the main Turkish forces in a great battle at Lüle Burgas and drove them to the Çatalja (Çatalca) lines in front of Constantinople.

In the face of this *bouleversement* the powers saved their faces by declaring that the *status quo* no longer existed! The Turkish Government signed an armistice, and was on the point of concluding peace when a revolution placed the party of resistance in power. The struggle was therefore resumed; but the fall of Adrianople to the Bulgars, reenforced by the Serbs, convinced the new Government that further resistance was useless (March 26, 1913). The Treaty of London (1913) left Turkey only that portion of her European possessions east of a line from Enos to Midia. Serbia, however, was deprived of Durazzo, and Montenegro was likewise deprived of Scutari, which after the armistice she had persisted in reducing in spite of the warnings of the powers. Instead, despite the protests of Russia, Scutari and Durazzo were given to Albania, a new state erected at the behest of Austria and Italy.

The creation of Albania was the cause of the Second Balkan War. According to the terms of the Balkan alliances Bulgaria was to have the greater part of Macedonia, while Serbia was to absorb the Albanians. By forcing Serbia to relinquish her Albanian conquests, including the port of Durazzo, the powers deprived her of her expected gains and, worst of all, prevented her from obtaining an outlet to the sea. Serbia thereupon requested a reapportionment of territory which would at least allow of direct communication with the Greek port of Salonika. But to this petition the Bulgars, standing on the letter of their agreement, turned a deaf ear, refusing to surrender any of their portion of Macedonia and even exacting Monastir, which the Serbs themselves had captured—although Serbia had exceeded the terms of the agreement in assisting in the capture of Adrianople. Possibly the Bulgars remembered how the Serbs had behaved in 1885.

Not content with this display of cupidity, and believing, doubtless, that this intransigent attitude rendered a conflict inevitable, the Bulgars tried by a

treacherous attack to separate the Serbs and Greeks and thereby precipitated the Second Balkan War—only to suffer an unbroken series of defeats. On both sides the struggle was marked by frightful atrocities, perpetrated by the brothers in arms of yesterday and equaling, if not exceeding, anything blamed on the Turks. The Montenegrins joined the Serbs, and shortly afterwards Rumania, followed by the Turks, entered the war. Surrounded by an almost unbroken ring of opponents, the Bulgars stood no show; never has the old adage "Pride goeth before a fall" been more aptly demonstrated.

In exactly one month Bulgaria was at the mercy of her foes. The victors, who were in anything but a charitable mood, showed no more interest than she in questions of international equity; and by the Treaty of Bucharest Bulgaria was shorn of the greater part of her hard-won conquests. Kavalla, inhabited by Greeks, to be sure, but her best port on the Aegean, went to Greece. Since Greece already had more ports than she needed, this was at best a questionable award. The advance of Rumania had been quite uncontested. Without the loss of a man, therefore, she gained nearly 3,000 square miles of northeastern Bulgaria, with a population, mostly Turkish, of some 275,000. By the Treaty of Constantinople (1913), Bulgaria returned Adrianople to Turkey.

As a net result of the Balkan Wars Serbia increased her territory 82 per cent, Greece hers 68 per cent, Montenegro hers 62 per cent, and Bulgaria hers 29 per cent. More important still for the peace of Europe, the Balkan nations now hated each other more than ever—worse than they had formerly hated the Turks. Most important of all, the Balkan Wars led to increased tension between Austria and Serbia and between Austria and Russia, and to increased military preparations in both camps of the powers—especially by Russia, who determined not to be caught napping again (see p. 377).

ANGLO-GERMAN AFFAIRS AND THE QUESTION OF THE STRAITS

Throughout this period Anglo-German relations were a source of continual friction, which centered about the rivalry resulting from Germany's naval policy and from her policy in the Near East—both departures from the policies of Bismarck. The Germans strove hard to allay the fears of the British in regard to naval armament. "The notion that the fleet is building against England is utter folly. The English apprehension of a great fleet not yet in existence is simply unintelligible. We have no idea of building a fleet as strong as the English." The last statement was true. As he had said, Von Tirpitz only aimed to create a navy of such strength as to make it *risky* for any other navy to attack, and so make Germany a force respected and deferred to in world politics. Germany, as a Great Power, claimed a perfect right to do. The British, naturally, failed to see the German point of view, believed that actions louder than words, and when Germany again increased her fleet in 1906, they grew more and more irritated and alarmed. Apparently the Germans were unable to appreciate that a "risk fleet" was at the same time a menace to England, which had long lines of communication to protect. Her attempt to maintain the two-power standard in the face of such competition was a severe

strain on the British pocketbook. Germany's costs of construction were much lower than those of England and her crews were paid much less. In addition, Fisher, the First Lord of the Admiralty (whose motto was "Ruthless, Relentless, and Remorseless!"), made the mistake of being overclever. In 1905 he laid the keels of a new type of fighting craft known as dreadnoughts. This innovation had two important results: it more than doubled the cost of capital ship construction, and by rendering all previous battleships obsolete enabled Germany to compete on a much more equal footing with England, who had an overwhelming superiority in the older types.

At various times—in 1908, 1910, and again in 1912—England made attempts to reach an understanding with Germany with a view to bringing about a naval holiday. Both sides evinced goodwill, but the fundamental points of view were too divergent to permit of any agreement. In 1912, for instance, the Germans insisted that a political and colonial entente should precede naval reductions, while the British held out for the converse.

Anglo-German relations were likewise complicated by Germany's forward policy in the Near East. In 1902-03 Germans received concessions for a railroad which was to run through Asia Minor to Baghdad and Basra on the lower Tigris—the genesis of the famous Berlin-to-Baghdad Railway. They tried to secure the financial cooperation of British and French interests, but the British refused to participate. Though the Kaiser imparted a semipolitical tone to Turco-German relations, it is highly improbable that Germany had in mind anything more serious than economic penetration. In any case the Berlin-to-Baghdad project created a clash of interests centering in Constantinople and the Persian Gulf and thereby increased the tension between Germany and England and that between Germany and Russia. Moreover, it afforded an opportunity for a good deal of loose talk in Entente circles about a German Empire stretching from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf, to India—or Heaven knows where.

The Question of the Straits, which primarily concerned Russia, is so interesting and important that a brief survey seems in order at this point. In 1833 Russian diplomacy attained its zenith in this matter, when the Sultan agreed to close the Straits to foreign warships wishing to *enter* the Black Sea. In 1840-41, England and France succeeded in partially reversing this decision: the Treaty of London and the Straits Convention provided that the Straits should also be closed to warships desiring to *leave* the Black Sea. The Treaty of Paris of 1856, which confirmed these new decisions, contained clauses forbidding Russia (and Turkey) to maintain warships on the Black Sea. During the War of 1870 Russia took occasion to denounce these clauses; whereupon the powers negotiated a new Treaty of London permitting Russian and Turkish fleets on the Black Sea but also allowing foreign warships to enter the Straits if the Sultan thought it necessary in order to safeguard the other clauses of the Treaty of Paris. At the Congress of Berlin, in 1878, England went still further. Declaring her intention to observe these provisions only in the case of "independent decisions of the Sultan," she served notice, in diplomatic language, that in any given case if she chose to consider the decision as independent she

would observe it and if not, she would act as she saw fit. This almost complete reversal of the situation existing in 1833 was one of the factors that determined Russia to renew the League of the Three Emperors in 1881. Article III of the secret agreement declared that "the three Courts recognize the European and mutually obligatory character of the principle of the closure of the Straits. . . . They will take care jointly that Turkey shall make no exceptions."

At the end of the nineteenth century, Russia entertained four alternative or supplementary aims in regard to the Straits: to keep the Straits closed to foreign warships, to open the Straits to Russian warships, to seize the heights of the Bosphorus, to acquire control of Constantinople. In 1896 the Russian Ambassador to the Sublime Porte proposed that the Straits should be seized by a *coup de main*. The plan was sanctioned by Nicholas II and taken under consideration by a secret ministerial council. The president of the Council, the Minister of War, and the Minister of Marine favored it, and Witte thought that it was going to be carried out, though he and Pobiedonostev did not approve. In the end, their opposition, coupled with practical difficulties, led to its being abandoned. In 1897 Russia and Austria agreed to respect the *status quo* in the Balkans, and the Straits Question was "put on ice" while Russia devoted herself to Far Eastern affairs.

One of the reasons why Russia yielded to England in 1907 was that she hoped, as a result, to gain support for her ambitions in regard to the Straits; and all through the foreign policy of the later tsars the leitmotif of the Straits was in evidence. The Buchlau Bargain of 1908, as will be remembered, included Austrian support for the opening of the Straits to Russian warships; and the Racconigi Bargain of the year following assured Russia of Italian support. In 1911, accordingly, Russia put out a feeler. Germany, counting on the refusal of England, accorded her full consent, and Italy and Austria again pledged their support. But England refused to commit herself, France followed suit, and Izvolsky suffered a diplomatic rebuff.

Only two possible ways by which Russia could hope to succeed remained: a *coup de main* in time of peace, or a general European war. At various times between 1912 and 1914 the first possibility was considered and abandoned. The second was left. A secret report of December, 1913, submitted by Sazonov to the Tsar, is of interest at this point: "While repeating my wish for the prolongation so far as possible of the *status quo*, it is also necessary to repeat that the Straits Question can hardly advance a step except by favor of European complications." Sazonov therefore urged that plans be matured to seize the opportunity in case such complications should arise. At another special meeting of the Council on February 21, 1914, Sazonov returned to the charge. His report of December 5, including the statement that it was "necessary to proceed without delay to the preparation of a program, elaborated in every direction, which should aim at the assurance in our favor of the historic question of the Straits," was considered, and the adoption of such a program recommended. The minutes of the conference, submitted on April 5, received the Tsar's entire approval. It is said that when war finally came, Izvolsky exultingly declared, "*C'est ma guerre!*"—"My war has arrived!"

CHAPTER XIV

TOWARD ARMAGEDDON

"Will historians ever succeed in simplifying the causes of the World War, as they have simplified those of other great wars?" is the ever recurring plaint of the historian as he toils through the seemingly endless mass of war documents and memoirs. Already there are more than can be digested in any ordinary lifetime—enough to bury the student alive—and still they come pouring in. And the longer the historian reads, the harder it is to see the forest for the trees. Perhaps such simplification will be possible when those of us who lived through the crisis have gone our ways and the heart no longer stirs at the mention of Liège, the Marne, Tannenberg, Ypres, Verdun, Château-Thierry, or the Argonne. Even then it must be from lack of interest and effort rather than from exhausting the material.

Be that as it may, for those who live in the Postwar Era and above all for those of us who fought and saw our friends lay down their lives in that indescribable carnage, the years from 1871 to 1914 are first, last, and all the time "the Prewar Era," the period when *the* War was preparing. Look at it from that angle we must, intentionally or not, and thus looking, inquire, "Was the World War the result of a plot, at once human and inhuman? Or was it rather something demoniac and beyond human control?"

The foregoing chapters, more particularly the last, constitute a chronological review of some of the more important events and factors which underlay the war; the present chapter is an attempt—however unsuccessful and unsatisfactory—at a systematic analysis of the causes, with particular reference to the situation in 1914. The first three sections are devoted to what may be called the fundamental causes, the remainder to the immediate causes.

PEACE OR WAR?

It is strange that in weighing the forces that made for peace or war one hardly thinks to mention religion. Europe is predominantly Christian, yet for well-nigh two thousand years Christianity not only has proved unequal to the task of keeping its adherents from flying at each other's throats but often has actually aggravated their hatreds. The nations pray to the Prince of Peace, never more fervently than on the eve of battle, but always on such occasions

their prayers are the same as those that arose from the lips of pre-Christian warriors invoking aid of their tribal god in smiting their enemies.

Of the other factors to be appraised, some acted on one side, some on the other, while some were uncertain in their net effect. To begin with, it should be pointed out and emphasized that during the last half of the nineteenth century there was a strong antiwar trend in certain quarters in every European country, and in most quarters in most countries (a trend that arose early in the century). Six factors or groups of factors making for peace resulted.

1. There was a considerable amount of official cooperation seeking to limit the possibilities of friction. The monetary union of the Latin states (1865) and the Scandinavian monetary union (1873), the copyright union (1874), the postal union (1874), the telegraph union (1875), the international bureau of weights and measures (1875), the patent union (1883), the railway tariff union (1890), and the customs tariff union (1890)—these are instances of these efforts. The neutralization of various states (Switzerland, Belgium, and Luxemburg) and the internationalization of the Danube operated in the same direction.

2. Many unofficial agencies, also, were working directly or indirectly toward the elimination of international friction and so toward the prevention of war. Among them may be mentioned the Institute of International Law (1873).

3. International societies, scientific and otherwise, developed, which held periodic congresses that tended to bring men of all nations together in amicable cooperation.

4. Pacifism made notable gains during the nineteenth century. In 1816 a peace society was founded in England. From 1843 on, international peace congresses were of more or less frequent occurrence; and the Bureau International de la Paix was established (1891) to serve as intermediary between the peace societies in different countries. The Nobel Peace Prize stimulated individuals to work for peace. The increase in pacifistic writers like Tolstoy was significant; more significant still the increase in conscientious objectors who, like the Quakers, were willing to face social opprobrium and even imprisonment rather than take part in what they considered legalized murder. (If war is ever ended—all other preventatives having failed—it may well be through the refusal of its potential victims to take part.) The socialists, ardently opposed to war, worked hard through their national and international organizations to prevent it. Their rapidly growing strength was therefore a good omen for the maintenance of peace.

5. The first great attempt to secure peace by a general convention was the Hague Conference of 1899, called by Nicholas II of Russia. Twenty-six states participated, and in a second meeting in 1907 forty-four states took part. Though the attempt to limit armaments was unsuccessful, owing chiefly to the opposition of Germany, the rules of international law were codified, the launching of projectiles from balloons and the like was condemned, as was the use of poison gases and dumdum bullets, and provision was made for the creation of a panel of judges who might be called in to arbitrate international disputes.

6. In 1903 the first compulsory arbitration treaty was drawn up, between England and France; and by 1910 over a hundred similar treaties had been

concluded. Unfortunately, matters affecting "national honor or vital interests" were specifically excluded from the operation of these treaties.

On the eve of the war, as a result of these peace efforts and of factors to be mentioned, many well-informed people honestly and firmly believed an all-European war not only "unthinkable" but really impossible. Europe, to their way of thinking, was too civilized to permit of such an eventuality. A good example of this ostrichlike method of reasoning was furnished by the *New York Times*, which in the very middle of the July crisis of 1914 declared editorially that a general European war was "too dreadful for imagining, and because it is too dreadful it cannot happen" (July 28).

Before those factors which undoubtedly tended to create friction are given consideration, four factors or sets of factors that were uncertain in their net effects will be taken up.

1. What of the influence exercised by economic factors? On the one hand, unequal distribution of natural resources, pressure of population, tariff barriers, trade rivalry, and imperialism were certain to cause friction and ill feeling. Then there were those industries which would profit by war; in a capitalistically organized society, their owners might conceivably welcome it. On the other hand, it was argued that the economic integration of the modern world made for peace, that the great international banking houses would withhold credit and not allow their governments to precipitate a conflict, and finally that modern warfare would prove so costly that the economic foundations of society would crumble at the first onslaught and thus compel the belligerents to make peace.

2. The ultimate effects of universal military service likewise gave rise to varying estimates. The prevalence of this practice is commonly attributed to the influence of Prussia. This is only a half-truth, at best, for as a matter of fact conscription was initiated by France in an obscure act of 1798. "There is perhaps no law on the statute-books of any nation which has exercised . . . more far-reaching influence on the future of humanity than this little-known French act." Prussia, after the catastrophe of Jena, copied France. It is true that it was Prussia who convinced the world of the value of universal military service; between 1868 and 1875 all the Great Powers, with the exception of England, followed her example—including France, which in the meantime had gone back to a professional army. Military enthusiasts argue that if a nation is well armed other nations will hesitate to attack, and that a realization of the horrors of war, gained through military service, will make a nation anti-militaristic rather than the reverse. It has even been asserted, on the basis of a comparison between countries having military service and those relying on the volunteer system, that "it is the logical conclusion of such comparisons that militarism only exists in countries where there are no citizen armies, and that, where there are citizen armies, they are one of the elements which make for permanent peace." Nevertheless it seems self-evident that an unprepared nation is less apt to be aggressive than one that believes itself better prepared than its neighbors.

3. What of secret diplomacy? One cannot but feel that there is a germ of truth in the old notion that if those who made the wars had to fight the battles

there would be fewer wars. The old-line diplomacy still has its defenders—those who maintain, not entirely without reason, that the people are too ignorant to pass on such matters; but this is merely throwing a smoke screen around the issue. Doubtless the etiquette of diplomacy has its value, for if two nations are at swords' points they are less likely to clash if polite than if they say exactly what they think of each other. So it may be true that negotiations are best carried on in the quiet of the conference room, but the course of the negotiations and the results at least should be known. It is astonishing how, even in the least autocratic countries, diplomats were accorded the privileges of a sacred caste and how free they were from parliamentary control. Democratic England furnished an outstanding example of this state of affairs. An additional and crowning evil of the old diplomacy was the tendency of its high priests to conduct operations without any consideration for the merits of the case—merely with a view to wringing concessions from others. Such conduct inevitably left scars.

(4) And last of all, what about the alliances? Would the consciousness of opposing strength cause each side to hesitate, or would any feeling of hesitation be outweighed by the consciousness of possessing an array of allies who could be counted on for aid?

A third category of factors, seven in number, clearly served to intensify international hostility.

(1) First and foremost was the widespread rise of nationalism, coupled with the so-called dictates of national "honor," which led nations to conduct themselves according to the outdated dueling code that formerly governed the actions of individuals.

(2) More specifically, there were the nationalistic trends in education, which stimulated and maintained a warlike spirit in the younger generation. History as taught in most countries was not an impartial presentation of evidence, but a means of disseminating propaganda; the idea was studiously inculcated that certain countries were "natural" enemies, that the highest manifestation of patriotism is exemplified in the dictum "My country right or wrong."

(3) The jingo press was forever making the task of the peacemakers more difficult by indulging in unnecessary, humiliating, and frequently unfounded denunciations or criticisms of foreign countries. Subtle slurs are often more enraging than open insults.

(4) Irredentism provided copious ammunition for the nationalistic armory. In spite of the biblical admonition against covetousness, nearly every European nation entertained ill-concealed designs on some "unredeemed" portion of its neighbors' territories.

(5) International relations prior to the war were in a state aptly described as "international anarchy." Peace, until comparatively recent times, had been regarded as a purely negative condition prevailing only in the intervals between wars. In many quarters this idea survived, and it had even been bolstered up with new arguments. Of the manifold influences that contributed to this end only a few can be mentioned here. The ethics of Machiavelli, who held that necessity of state is the final justification of all action, had been borrowed endlessly by politicians from Frederick the Great to Bismarck, until it dominated

international statecraft. Darwin's doctrines concerning the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest played a potent rôle, for a school of neo-Darwinians arose who applied these doctrines to the sphere of international relations. Much was therefore heard of "the biological necessity for war." The prophecies of Malthus were repeated. Socialists, although abhorring war, proclaimed that capitalism made it inevitable. Aside from the influence of the doctrinaires, there was the self-evident fact that in international affairs there was no tribunal with power to enforce its decrees to which nations could appeal. Consequently in international relations, even though generally discarded in private relationships, the psychology of "an eye for an eye," trial by combat, and the duel survived.

6. Exaltation of war, closely related to neo-Darwinism and widely prevalent in certain quarters, was another force acting in the same direction. Many exuberant nationalists proclaimed that a nation which did not expand was decadent, that in war man exhibited to the highest degree the supreme qualities of cooperation and altruism. Military heroes received grand crosses, the plaudits of the multitude, election to the highest offices. ("Lesser" heroes had to be contented with a bit of ribbon or a university degree.)

7. Finally there was the all-important matter of mob psychology. When war was threatened or declared and "our boys" went swinging down the street to the roll of drums and the blood-stirring strains of martial music, "our flag" at their head, it was virtually impossible for the man of military age to stand on the side lines or for any individual to retain an impartial frame of mind. (Pacifists could well make it their first ambition to prohibit military bands.) Ostracism, economic pressure, or prison bars, even, implemented the will of the herd.

THE TEMPER OF THE TIMES: THE ENTENTE AND SERBIA

The present section will be devoted to that most difficult of tasks, an estimate of the psychological factors peculiar to the various countries of Europe. In England, where interest was largely absorbed by the Irish crisis, the public was still psychologically in the Splendid Isolation Era. Grey and a few of his colleagues on the bridge were aware that the good old "ship of state" was in need of careful steering. The Tory press published occasional scareheads, and a play, entitled *An Englishman's Home*, which depicted a German invasion of the British Isles caused a momentary ripple of excitement. But in so far as the general public thought of foreign affairs at all, it was as something remote, troublesome at times but by no means alarming. Why should they be perturbed? Nearly a thousand years had elapsed since the last real invasion of Great Britain. (When an invasion of the United States by some hostile armada of the air takes place, it will probably find the American public in a like frame of mind. Peoples, as well as politicians, are usually several jumps "behind the game.")

The situation in prewar France is more difficult of analysis. The wound caused by the loss of Alsace-Lorraine was still unhealed, and the extreme chauvinists were rather more vociferous than usual; but it is doubtful in the

extreme if the French peasant, absorbed in his little farm, or the majority of the people at large would have countenanced an avowed war of revenge.

In Russia the peasantry, who constituted the overwhelming bulk of the population, were as densely ignorant as the Patagonians of international affairs, as of everything else connected with politics—and anyway, they didn't count. Public opinion, in so far as it was vocal, was in the hands of the Panslavs and the militarists. These incorrigibles were forever denouncing Germany and fishing in troubled waters. In addition, they were considerably alarmed by a fresh resurgence of socialism. For the moment they were engaged in furthering an army reorganization which was due to be completed in 1917.

Serbia, though one of the minor powers only, calls for somewhat detailed treatment. For a considerable time two more or less distinct parties of particular importance had existed there. On one side were the Radicals, who controlled the government but who, despite their name, were rather moderate. Their leader was Pašić. On the other side was a group of revolutionary anarchists, inspired by the doctrines of Bakunin. The Bosnian crisis of 1908 had united these two groups in opposition to Austria and had resulted in the formation of the Narodna Odbrana (National Defense), a society which engaged in all sorts of activities calculated to further the cause of Serb nationalism. Though the members sought to make their activities appear cultural and legal, they carried on the training of guerrilla troops, welcomed Austrian Serbs to their ranks, and formed secret committees in Bosnia to promote their work on Austrian soil.

The policies of the Narodna Odbrana, however, were too mild to satisfy the revolutionists. In 1911 they organized a new and strictly secret society named Union or Death, but commonly known as the Black Hand. With branches in Montenegro, Macedonia, Croatia, and Dalmatia, as well as in Bosnia, the Black Hand was especially active among the Serbs outside the kingdom. Colonel Dimitriević, a participant in the murders of 1903 and also a member of the Narodna Odbrana (as were many of his followers), was the leader of this notorious fellowship. The Black Hand was not exclusively a military clique, as has been asserted, but included among others the secretary of the Court of Cassation, the secretary of the University of Belgrade, a secretary of the Foreign Office, and the Commissioner of Police. Incidentally, the two organizations used the same Bosnian agents and "tunnels" ("underground railways"). It was therefore very difficult to tell them apart, and consequently they were often confused.

Their promises of 1909 to the contrary notwithstanding, there was one thing on which all Serbs were united, secretly if not openly—namely, the destruction of Hapsburg power by fair means or foul. Elated by their successes in the Balkan Wars and conscious of their increased strength, they felt the day approaching when they would be in a position to measure swords with Austria—nay, more, that it had already arrived if only they could be sure of support from their Big Slav Brothers in Russia (backed in turn by their Entente allies), from whom they received constant encouragement.

THE TEMPER OF THE TIMES: THE CENTRAL POWERS

Well might Austria, conscious of the state of Russo-Serbian relations and absorbed in the increasingly difficult task of keeping her subject peoples in hand, be apprehensive. The inevitable clash of interests was aggravated by the fact that the Austrians regarded the Serbs as inferiors. Remembering the rich cultural history of Vienna—beloved of Gluck, Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven, and Schubert, and boasting the oldest and proudest dynasty in Europe—one can easily understand the Austrian attitude. Imagine the feeling in the United States if Mexico attempted to annex the American Southwest!

The power of the greatest interest and the one by far the most difficult to analyze was Germany. How strike a balance between the Germany where army officers arrogated to themselves the privilege of elbowing women into the gutter (although in justice be it added that similar occurrences have been known to take place in Paris, the fountainhead of polite conduct) and the Germany revered of musicians, scientists, poets, and philosophers the world over—land of exquisite folk songs, home of tender Christmas celebrations? Within the narrow limits of the present volume certainly, no attempt can be made to reconcile the extremes.

Did most Germans dislike the English as much as certain writers indicate? And did the English reciprocate? There is ample evidence to the contrary. Some Germans disliked the English, and some English disliked the Germans—just as some Americans dislike the English, some the French, some the Italians, some the Germans, and vice versa. That is human nature. On the whole, however, the relations between individual Germans and individual English were amicable, and frequently they were distinctly cordial.

Politics, to be sure, was a different matter. To the German way of thinking, the British Government was clearly actuated by imperialistic motives, and Britain, as represented by her Tory imperialists, was the Vampire of Europe. Germany feared the jealousy of England, the vengeance of France—above all, she feared the overwhelming preponderance of the Slavic hordes. Many Germans were obsessed with the notion that they were being encircled by enemies. They firmly believed that their three great rivals, having seized all the desirable portions of the earth, were selfishly leagued together, under the leadership of Edward VII, to throw an iron ring around Germany and to deprive her of her "place in the sun." Fear of this alleged *Einkreisungspolitik* (Encirclement Policy) motivated the increases in German armaments and led even the Socialists to sanction the war credits of 1914.

Entente diplomats were able to divert attention from their own imperialistic activities by declaiming against the Machiavellian designs of Germany as evinced by the pan-Germans; for these ill-advised mischief-makers were responsible for preposterous propositions, for example, that all the "Teutonic" countries ought to belong to Germany—Switzerland, Belgium, Holland, and even Scandinavia. To accept such loose-mouthed utterances as credible evidence of responsible German policy is to betray an almost childlike naïveté.

Three writers in particular were responsible, inadvertently, for giving Germany a bad name abroad. Nietzsche, the first of these ideologues, expressly disclaimed that he was a patriot and openly proclaimed militarism inimical to civilization, because it hampered the activities of the individual. His four *Unzeitgemässen Betrachtungen*, aimed at the perverse effects of the victories of '64, '66, and '70, were designed to restore Germany to intellectual pursuits. There would be no need to say more did not hostile critics quote some of his sayings, out of context, as condemnation of Germany. For instance, as has been pointed out many times, he declared: "Ye shall love peace as a means to new wars, and a short peace more than a long." But those who quoted this aphorism neglected to add that what Nietzsche aimed at was a condemnation of Christian ethics and a justification of the biological necessity for war in general, not a justification of a German war of aggression; also that, as a philosopher, he was interested in expounding the impulses that move mankind as a whole. He specifically protested against the dominance of the state and the spirit of nationality, asserted that the state and civilization are antagonistic, denounced race hatred, and declared for a cosmopolitan blending of nations.

The idea of the Culture State, so strongly condemned by Nietzsche, found its foremost exponent in Treitschke. In his exaltation of the state as the center of human existence, Treitschke merely followed in the steps of Hegel; moreover, the concept that pictures man as a social being, first of all and above all, is a profound truth, which was no monopoly of these thinkers but goes back to the Greeks. And in his insistence on the omnipotence of the state and on its freedom from the laws binding individuals, Treitschke was likewise following in paths that led back at least as far as Machiavelli. His dictum, "Patriotism is the highest and holiest of passions," might have been heard in paraphrase in every classroom in Europe and America. Those who quoted Treitschke as saying, "The living God will take care that war shall always return as a terrible medicine for the human race," neglected to supplement this prophecy with his qualifying and supplementary statements: "The State has power precisely in order to assert itself as against other equally independent powers. . . . Thus the idea of one universal empire is odious," and, "The ideal towards which we strive is a harmonious comity of nations."

Bernhardi, author of the famous volume entitled *Germany and the Next War*, was the center of the attack on pan-Germanism. This position he owed to the prevailing mistranslation of the title of his fifth chapter, "*Weltmacht oder Niedergang*." Though literally correct, "World Power or Downfall," the common translation, is entirely misleading unless the exact meaning be understood or unless a freer and more enlightening translation be substituted. What Bernhardi meant, and all that he meant, was that the time had come when Germany, still essentially a Continental power, must either become "A World Power or [resign herself to her] Downfall." In other words, he merely claimed that, in the same way that England, France, and Russia were World Powers, Germany ought to have a "place among the World Powers," with interests and an influence that were world-wide. In fact he was simply paraphrasing Leroy-Beaulieu (see p. 246), at a considerably later date.

Bernhardi fortified his proposition with the old argument, drawn from


biology, that "there can be no standing still . . . for us, but only progress or retrogression, and . . . it is tantamount to retrogression when we are contented with our present place . . . while all our rivals are straining with desperate energy, even at the cost of our rights, to extend their power." By way of answer to those who accuse Bernhardi of fomenting plans for a world war and world conquest, another quotation may be added, anent the Roman Empire: "Such an empire never can or will rise again."

Nietzsche, Treitschke, and Bernhardi may all three be condemned, rightly, for accepting the Machiavellian principles (using the term "Machiavellian" in its correct sense) that the state is subject to no law and that war is therefore a justifiable instrument of national policy; also for helping to uphold the neo-Darwinian notion that war is a biological necessity. Thereby they contributed to create an atmosphere and a public sentiment prejudicial to the peace of the world. But in any such condemnation must be included the numberless exponents of those same concepts who flourished in every country of Europe (not to mention the United States)—not simply in Germany.

A mistranslation or misinterpretation, similar to that which rendered Bernhardi odious, made the famous German song "*Deutschland über Alles*" appear the symbol of a mad desire on the part of Germany to dominate the world. "*Deutschland, Deutschland, über alles, über alles in der Welt*" was mistranslated "Germany, Germany, over everything, over everything in the world." As a matter of fact, "*Deutschland über Alles*" was written before the unification of Germany, when the Germans were in no position to dream of dominating the Continent, let alone the world; the exhortation "Germany, Germany, *above* everything" was merely an appeal to all Germans, far and wide, to sink their petty loyalties as Bavarians, Saxons, Hanoverians, Hessians, or what not in a higher loyalty to a united Germany—to put Germany "*above* everything in the world."

The myth of a German intent to dominate the world, current during the war, is exploded by a competent authority in the following graphic words:

Conceding [for the sake of argument] that 65, or even 75 million Germans [including Austro-Germans] might possibly be able eventually to establish their military predominance over 160 million Russians; 35 million Turks; 14 million Czecho-Slavs; 8 million Yugo-Slavs; 15 millions more in the Balkan States; 12 million Poles; 10 million Magyars; 34 million Italians; 40 million French; 4 million Swiss; 24 million Spaniards; 5 million Portuguese; 10 million Scandinavians; 6 million Dutch; and 7 million Belgians—conceding that 75 million Germans might succeed in establishing their rule over these 380 million Europeans, there would still remain for them the difficult task of rendering their position so secure over the subject territory (permanent occupations everywhere) that they could devote sufficient of their remaining strength to the reduction of the 45 millions in the British Isles, who, by that time, would, no doubt, have secured the willing assistance of the whole of the yet unconquered world. The British subdued, the work of world-domination would still be only half done, or rather not done at all. For as Napoleon could defeat one nation after another, but could not persuade nor compel them to remain defeated, so Germany would find that, pending the completion of her enterprise, Russia would recuperate and fight, etc., etc.



XVI. DANGER SPOTS IN 1914

For every expression of legitimate or illegitimate German ambition it is possible to find a similar expression from the pen of some Englishman, Frenchman, Russian—or American. The worst that can be said of prewar Germany is that, owing to the historical factors previously enumerated, militarism and all its works and pomps had obtained a somewhat stronger ascendancy over the minds of her people and over her government than it had elsewhere. A fitting close to this section may be found in a quotation from Lord Roberts of Boer War fame.

How was this Empire of Britain founded? War founded this Empire—war and conquest! When we, therefore, masters by war of one-third of the habitable globe, when *we* propose to Germany to disarm, to curtail her navy or diminish her army, Germany naturally refuses; and, pointing, not without justice, to the road by which England, sword in hand, has climbed to her unmatched eminence, declares openly, or in the veiled language of diplomacy, that by the same path, if by no other, Germany is determined also to ascend! Who amongst us, knowing the past of this nation, and the past of all nations and cities that have ever added the lustre of their name to human annals, can accuse Germany, or regard the utterance of one of her greatest Chancellors a year and a half ago, or of General Bernhardt three months ago, with any feelings except those of respect?

DANGER SPOTS, ARMAMENTS, AND LEADERSHIP IN EUROPE OF 1914

By 1914 a century had elapsed since Napoleon had left for Elba and the last all-European conflict had ended (disregarding the episode of the Hundred Days). The Congress of Vienna, as has been seen, created almost as many problems as it solved. In the hundred years that had intervened some of those problems had been solved. Germany and Italy had been unified and freed from Austrian domination. Belgium and Norway had attained independence, and a group of independent states had risen in the Balkans on territory formerly held by Turkey. But other problems persisted.

In seeking possible causes of a European war, a brief review of the territorial problems that remained is first in order. The Catalonian question in Spain was an internal matter and therefore not apt to cause international complications. In spite of the great colonial empire that she had acquired, France had never forgotten the "Lost Provinces." All Italy dreamed of liberating *Italia irredenta* from the Austrian yoke—the Trentino, Trieste, and Italian Istria. The more ardent spirits talked of the "recovery" of Dalmatia, and even of the recovery of Nice and Savoy. Most Serbs lived only for the creation of a Greater Serbia—which should include Montenegro, northern Albania, and the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in Austria—and above all, in order to secure an outlet to the sea. Greece wanted the Dodecanese, southern Albania, the Greek cities of Asia Minor, and if possible Constantinople itself. Bulgaria longed to recoup her losses in the Second Balkan War by the recovery of western Macedonia, as much of the northern coast of the Aegean as possible, and that part of the Dobruja lost to Rumania. Rumania had her eyes fixed on Transylvania and Bessarabia. For Russia the goal of all ambitions was the Straits—at the same time that the Finns, Esths, Letts, Lithuanians, Russian Poles and a score of


other nationalities awaited an opportunity to free themselves from the Russian² yoke. Little Denmark had never lost sight of the Danes in Schleswig. Germany, like Russia, contained discontented minorities: the Danes in Schleswig (just referred to); a second fraction of the Poles, in West Prussia, Posen, and Upper Silesia; and a part, at least, of the inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine. Austria-Hungary was confronted with the most serious problem of all. There, as has been seen, the majority of the population was made up of "minorities": the North Slavs (Czechs, Slovaks, a third fraction of the Poles, and the Ruthenians), the Rumans, the South Slavs (Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes), and the Italians. No sane person in Austria-Hungary or Germany wanted to annex any more territory in Europe (unfortunately there was a small minority who were not altogether sane on these questions); the Germanic powers had quite enough trouble with the minorities already on their hands. Austria, indeed, had taken the place of Turkey as the Sick Man of Europe.

In seeking possible motives it may also be worth while to inquire which of the two alliances was in the better position to begin a war. Omitting Italy, as an obviously uncertain quantity, consider first of all peacetime armies. France and Russia had 2,239,000 men as compared with 1,239,000 for the Central Powers, an excess of exactly 1,000,000 or over 80 per cent—not to mention the small but highly efficient expeditionary force of the British. (Italy's 273,000 added to the forces of the Central Powers still left France and Russia with a huge preponderance—over 750,000, or nearly 50 per cent.) In trained reserves the Entente preponderance was greater yet: 5,070,000 for France and Russia to 3,358,000 for Germany and Austria. And if untrained reserves, of which the British and French empires had an incalculable number, are included, the preponderance of the Entente in man power was literally overwhelming. Of course the German troops were better trained and equipped, and their inferiority was therefore less than appears.

For the period from 1910 till 1914 the expenditures of France and Russia for military purposes were also larger, \$2,320,444,291 to \$1,855,878,805. From any calculation based on these facts one would be apt to conclude that—unless as a desperate gamble to overcome the increasing superiority of their rivals—the Central Powers were not apt to take the lead in commencing a war.

The number of prominent personages involved in the beginnings of the World War is almost legion, but some were much nearer the center of the stage than others. Grey, England's Secretary for Foreign Affairs, was typical of a certain shade of Liberal opinion—a conscientious gentleman, devoted to the maintenance of peace, but capable of cutting some rather sharp corners. From first to last, Grey was primarily a member of the country gentry. Because chance had made him a grandson of the sponsor of the Great Reform Bill, he was also a diplomat *malgré lui*. Like many of his caste who have helped England to "muddle through," he knew England but not the Continent. For these reasons he was incapable of transcending the broad principles of British policy laid down by his predecessors.

In France the outstanding figure, strange to say, was the President. Poincaré was a Lorrainer of '71, a staunch advocate of the entente with Russia and



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MARX

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England, and a champion of the dignity of France against any aggression, real or fancied. If Poincaré did not will the war he believed it inevitable—which was just as bad in the end.

In autocratic Russia the pivotal figure was Nicholas II, the weakest of the Romanovs, in whose nerveless hands absolutism was fraught with more than usual danger. Actually, in so far as the scepter was wielded at all, the Tsaritsa did the wielding; if she had been the recognized ruler Russian policy would at least have possessed the continuity it lacked under her impressionable husband. The Tsaritsa was wholly wrapped up in her desire to transmit the autocratic power unimpaired to her only son, a child afflicted with haemophilia. In addition there was Sazonov, the Foreign Minister and on occasion a chauvinist, who was to play the most fateful rôle of all in Entente circles.

On the side of the Central Powers the all-important figure was the Kaiser, Supreme War Lord of Germany's magnificent military machine. The Kaiser is one of the enigmas of history. Though possessed of no little talent and brilliance, he was extremely erratic—a serious defect in the responsible ruler of a Great Power. His attitude toward England, for instance, was as full of contradictions as was his character; at times, as during the Boer War, he permitted himself to make statements that were little short of provocative. Yet he was never weary of reiterating his desire for peace, and most of his conscious influence on Germany's foreign policy seems to have been in that direction; it is only fair to point out that for a quarter of a century during his reign Europe was undisturbed by any conflicts of major proportions. The easiest way to deal with the Kaiser is to pronounce him a pathological case and let it go at that; apparently his withered arm had an appreciable influence on his psychology. Unless some sort of neurosis be presumed the student is hard put to it for an explanation. Being the cynosure of every eye in Europe would be enough to turn nearly anyone's head. Be that as it may, the Kaiser has been pronounced "the most brilliant Hohenzollern since Frederick the Great" and "the most brilliant failure in history."

The Kaiser seemed unable or unwilling to select men of first-rate caliber. As a result his advisers were by no means fitted to curb his impulsive inclinations. Bethmann-Hollweg, on whom the mantle of the Iron Chancellor had descended, was a well-intentioned bureaucrat, completely overshadowed by his imperious master and by the younger Moltke, chief of the General Staff.

Francis Joseph, who wore the crown of the Hapsburgs, had usurped the throne in '48 in a desperate effort to put back the hands of the clock. Politically a legacy from the eighteenth century, he had been unfortunate enough to linger on into the twentieth, and strange as it may seem to those acquainted with the subsequent course of events, he was chiefly interested in rounding out his days in peace. Unluckily for him and for Austria, Francis Joseph was in his dotage; his idea of accomplishing his purpose was to avoid official responsibility as much as possible—yet he refused to delegate his power to those best fitted to relieve him. Like the Tsar, therefore, his chief contribution toward causing the war was his neglect to discharge his imperial prerogatives effectively.

Count von Berchtold, his Foreign Minister, was a typical diplomat of the old school, an ardent chauvinist, and a firm believer in the efficacy of the Big

Stick. Fate had decreed that in the summer of 1914 he should occupy the center of the stage; and behind Berchtold loomed Conrad of Hotzendorff, chief of the Austrian general staff.

And finally there was the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, nephew of Francis Joseph and heir to the throne—the most enlightened Hapsburg since Joseph II and the ablest since Maria Theresa. Francis Ferdinand was an advocate of trialism: he wished to transform the Dual Monarchy into a Triple Monarchy, by admitting the Slavs to partnership with the Germans and the Magyars—just as the Magyars had been admitted to partnership in 1867. For this reason he was hated by Germans, Magyars, and Slavs alike. Serbia in particular feared that he might succeed in reconciling the Austrian Slavs to Hapsburg rule and so end her dreams of a Greater Serbia. Francis Ferdinand's relationships with the ruling classes were complicated by his morganatic love match with Sophie Chotek, a lady of rare charm and character, but who had had the bad taste to be born a mere countess rather than a royal princess and who was therefore looked down upon and treated with ill-concealed contempt by his family. No further evidence of his strength of will and independence of character is needed.

These, then, were the men on whom, above all others, hung the fate of Europe in the summer of 1914.

SARAJEVO

During the early part of 1914 the prospects for peace were brighter than usual. There were no fresh complications of outstanding importance in international politics, and some of the old ones were solved or were approaching solution.

The last diplomatic crisis of note had been caused by the appointment of General Liman von Sanders of the German army to reorganize the Turkish military establishment. Liman had been appointed at the request of the Young Turks to succeed Von der Goltz, and Von der Goltz had been appointed along with various British and French officials who were to reorganize other branches of the Turkish administration. Furthermore the new appointment had been discussed with the Tsar and with King George. But Sazonov, with his eye on the Straits, took umbrage and a crisis had resulted. On this occasion, however, Russia had been restrained by England and France; the matter was settled by advancing Liman a grade in the Prussian service, which by the terms of his contract automatically raised him to a field-marshalship in the Turkish army and removed him from command of the troops in Constantinople. Thus it was proved that if those less intimately involved were willing to exert a little pressure, matters of international concern could be settled without leaving scars. In the early summer two new Anglo-German accords were ready to be signed. One concerned Africa; the other, which was the more important, dealt with the Near East (Baghdad Railway).

In June Francis Ferdinand paid an official visit to Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia. His object was threefold: to preside at the army maneuvers, to give his wife an outing, and to win the loyalty of the peasantry by affording them a glimpse of their future ruler. The Archduke stayed at a little resort a few

miles from Sarajevo, and the Friday after his arrival made an unofficial trip to the city to do some shopping. He and his wife walked about quite unprotected among the crowds, were recognized, and were greeted with loyal acclamations. Francis Ferdinand had expressly stipulated that his visit should be attended with as little ceremony as possible, so that the people might see him near at hand—this probably explains the lack of police attendance, which later gave rise to rumors of a conspiracy in official circles against his life.

Sunday, June 28, was the day of the official visit. It was also the most famous of Serb anniversaries, Vidov-Dan (St. Vitus's Day)—the day when, five hundred and twenty-five years before, Serbia lost her liberty in the Battle of Kossovo, but when, coincidentally, the Turkish conqueror fell beneath the knife of a Serb assassin. On this beautiful June day, therefore, Sarajevo was filled with a holiday throng. No attempt was made to line the streets with troops; and as the cavalcade of royal automobiles approached the Town Hall a bomb, thrown from the crowd, wrecked the car behind that containing the Archduke and severely wounded one of his staff. Francis Ferdinand proceeded on his way, notwithstanding; but when the ceremonies were over, he insisted on driving back to inquire for the officer who had been wounded. Instead of winding through the town as had been planned, however, it was decided to proceed straight down the main street. Apparently the chauffeur of the car in the lead forgot this, for he swung off, according to the original plan. The Archduke's car followed, was ordered to turn back, and in order to do so, had to stop. If ever Destiny took a hand in human affairs it was at that moment.

As the car paused, a youth named Princip, who had crossed over from an earlier position on the opposite side of the street, stepped forward and fired two shots heard round the world—the first shots of the World War.

If Francis Ferdinand, the one man who might have revived the moribund Hapsburg empire, had not been assassinated, there would have been no Austro-Serbian War, and therefore no World War, in the summer of 1914—perhaps none at all. Thus as the most important murder in history it deserves detailed consideration. The facts were slow in coming to light (some aspects of the case, indeed, are not yet fully explained). As soon as the news reached Vienna, suspicion fell on Serbia, and an official was sent to investigate. He was a lawyer, impressed with the gravity of his mission and determined to make no charges that could not be fully substantiated by legal evidence. One extract from his report, often quoted, has been taken to contain the essence: "There is nothing to prove, or even to cause suspicion of the Serbian Government's cognizance of the steps leading to the crime, or of its preparing it, or of its supplying the weapons." (On this sentence the authors of the Treaty of Versailles founded their famous War Guilt accusation against the Central Powers.) The fallacy of allowing this single sentence to stand for the whole report is the fallacy involved in taking a passage out of its context. In the first place, the word "Government" should be italicized, at the very least. In the second place, many of the conclusions presented were quite different in effect from those quoted. On the subject of anti-Austrian propaganda (more than likely to result in such a crime) the report stated, "The evidence that this agitation is stirred up by societies in Serbia and is tolerated by the Serbian Government is sufficient,

although scanty." Of the assassination itself the report affirmed that there was "hardly a doubt that the crime was resolved upon in Belgrade, and prepared with the coöperation of Serbian officials, Ciganović and Major Tankosić, who provided bombs, Brownings, ammunition, and cyanide of potassium," that "the bombs came from the Serbian Kragujevac arsenal; and that the three assassins, with bombs and weapons upon them, were secretly smuggled across the frontier to Bosnia by Serbian agencies."

Other facts were established later. Princip was a Bosnian (so an Austrian) Serb, inspired by Greater Serb propaganda, who for some time had been a member of the Narodna Odbrana. In the spring of 1914 he was in Belgrade, where he was shown a newspaper clipping telling of Francis Ferdinand's intended visit to Sarajevo. He and two others thereupon planned the murder. Major Tankosić gave them revolver practice and furnished them with weapons. The necessary funds came from Colonel Dimitrijević, who by this time had risen to be chief of the intelligence department of the Serbian general staff.

Two questions remain to be decided: Whether the Serbian Government was legally or morally responsible for the murder of the Archduke; and if so, to what degree. Clearly it was guilty of countenancing the agitation that led to the assassination. One of those active in the plot, Colonel Dimitrijević, was a high official of the Serbian army. (These are facts that no one disputes.) To what extent is it possible to draw a line between the Government and such high officials? According to both private and international law, an employer is responsible for the actions of his employees.

One additional point, behind which the apologists for Serbia take refuge, remains to be settled. Was the Government, the Pašić ministry, aware of the plot and therefore an accessory before the fact? Despite its assurances to the Austrian Government, the Serbian Government did not even try to apprehend the conspirators; on the contrary, it aided them to escape. In 1917, during the war, Dimitrijević was executed by the Government "for conspiracy against the heir to the throne." There are those who affirm that the real reason was a desire to get him out of the way and so close his mouth forever. In any case, the record of the trial was suppressed.

After the war, when Serbs began to boast of participation in the plot, an article was published (1924) in which Ljuba Jovanović, Minister of Education in the Pašić cabinet, stated quite calmly: "One day M. Pašić said to us (he conferred on these matters more particularly with Stojan Protić, who was then Minister of the Interior; but this much he said to the rest of us) that certain persons were making ready to go to Sarajevo to murder Franz Ferdinand." The article at first caused no particular comment in Yugoslavia; apparently the facts were too commonplace to merit attention. When outsiders began to say that Jovanović had let the cat out of the bag, some equivocating attempts were made by the Yugoslav authorities to discredit his statements. But when Seton-Watson, a British historian who is an ardent champion of the Serbs, wrote to the Yugoslav Government asking for an official denial, he received no reply. Finally, in 1929, the authorities permitted a tablet to be erected on the spot where Princip "proclaimed liberty."

Unless further evidence is forthcoming, the historian must incline to the

opinion that the Serbian Government was indeed an accessory before the fact, if it did not actually encourage the assassination. By those forced to admit that Serbia was privy to the murder, it has been urged in exculpation that the Serbian Government *did* warn Austria. This assertion is untrue. A Serbian official told an Austrian official that Bosnia was an unhealthy place for the Archduke to go, that a rifle might easily go off in his direction while he was watching the maneuvers; but there was no intimation of a definite plot.

As for the merits of the fundamental quarrel between Austria and Serbia, there is not and can never be any agreement. Each must and will decide for himself. Those who believe that the Serbian cause was just and that the Serbs had a right to use any means whatsoever to further their ends, *even including assassination*, will take their side; those who do not will side with Austria. *Whatever* the decision may be, any consideration of the immediate causes of the war must begin with Dimitriević and Tankosić, who earned for themselves a place in history that few will envy them.

BERCHTOLD HAS HIS WAY

The Sarajevo crime evoked a chorus of condemnation throughout the world; then while the investigation was being conducted, there was a momentary lull. Presently a special messenger appeared in Berlin with a "personal" letter from Francis Joseph to the Kaiser (in reality it had been drawn up by Berchtold). It was for the most part devoted to a program evolved by Tisza, Prime Minister of Hungary, for a diplomatic realignment in the Balkans; but it also commented, as though incidentally, on the recent tragedy.

The attack on my poor nephew is a direct result of the agitation of the Russian and Serbian Panslavs, whose single aim is the weakening of the Triple Alliance and the disruption of my Empire. According to all indications, the crime of Sarajevo is not the deed of a single individual, but the result of a well-arranged plot whose threads reach to Belgrade; and though presumably it will be impossible to prove the complicity of the Serbian Government, there can be no doubt that its policy of uniting all the South Slavs under the Serbian flag promotes such crimes, and that a continuation of this situation spells lasting danger for my dynasty and for my territories. . . . You too will be convinced that a friendly settlement of the antagonism which divides Austria from Serbia is no longer to be thought of, and that the peace policy of all European monarchs is threatened so long as the source of criminal agitation in Belgrade lives on unpunished.

The closing paragraph contained an allusion to the fact that the Kaiser had frequently warned Austria against her anti-Serb policy and against trying to prevent Serbia from obtaining a port.

The Austrian ambassador, who presented the letter to the Kaiser, delivered the following reply to his government: "His Majesty authorized me to report that in this case also we could reckon on Germany's full support. Russia, furthermore, he thought, as things stand today, was in no way ready for war. . . . His Majesty said he understood how hard Franz Joseph, with his well-known love of peace, would find it to invade Serbia; but if we had really decided that military action against Serbia was necessary, he would be sorry if

we left unused the present moment, which was so favorable for us." The last phrase referred, of course, to the pro-Austrian sentiment resulting from the murder of Francis Ferdinand.

The principal charge laid at the door of the Kaiser is that he handed Austria a blank check. As just seen, the charge is true in so far as a possible *Austro-Serbian* war was concerned; but the circumstances must not be forgotten. In his family history Francis Joseph was perhaps the most unhappy monarch who ever sat on a throne. His brother, the unfortunate Maximilian whom Napoleon III made puppet emperor of Mexico, fell before a firing squad. His sister-in-law, Maximilian's wife, went insane as a result. His son and heir committed suicide or was murdered, no one is certain which. His wife was killed by an anarchist. And to complete the tale came the tragedy of Sarajevo. The Kaiser, for his part, was a close personal friend of Francis Ferdinand, whom he had just visited; his feelings on receipt of the news of the assassination are therefore easy to imagine.

Another important factor must be taken into consideration. Germans did not anticipate that the Serbian crisis would lead to a general European war. Remembering what had happened in 1908, they believed that Russia would at least wait until 1917, when her military preparations would be completed, before attacking. Above all, they could not believe that the Tsar would countenance assassination of royalty. The verdict of Professor Fay, the best-informed authority on the subject, is, "The Kaiser and his advisers on July 5 and 6 were not criminals plotting the World War; they were simpletons putting 'a noose around their necks.'"

The Kaiser, who was on the point of leaving for a vacation cruise, did not postpone his trip. Before leaving, early the next morning, he had brief interviews with the military authorities in which he told them of his conversation with the Austrian ambassador but said that he did not anticipate any trouble and that he saw no cause for any officials to cut short their vacations or for military preparations. These facts alone should be conclusive evidence that Germany did not plan or even anticipate a world war. (Yet the conferences of the sixth were the events which gave rise to the widely accepted legend of a "Potsdam Council" during which, it was said, "the Kaiser and his imperial crew" deliberately plotted to begin a world war.)

Fortified by his assurance from the Kaiser, Berchtold prepared to deliver an ultimatum to Serbia; but first he had to secure the consent of the other Austro-Hungarian ministers. In laying his plans he met with opposition from Tisza, who considered it dangerous to be too hard on Serbia. Finally Tisza changed his mind and consented to the sending of an ultimatum, because he believed that Austria's enemies were determined to throttle her sooner or later, because of the evidence collected at Sarajevo, and because he considered that "the language of the Serbian press and of Serbian diplomats was so presumptuous as simply not to be borne"—language which the British ambassador at Vienna characterized as "amounting almost to condonation and even approval of the dastardly outrage." If Austria did not act energetically she would lose her status as a Great Power. Tisza insisted, however, on the adoption in full Ministerial Council of the following resolution: "Austria, aside from slight regulations

of boundary, seeks no acquisitions of territory as a result of the war with Serbia." Francis Joseph was not even in Vienna when the ultimatum was drawn up; Germany was purposely kept in the dark until it was on the way.

At 6 P.M. on July 23, the Austrian ultimatum was presented. This hour had been selected because by then Poincaré, who was making a visit in St. Petersburg, would be on the high seas returning to France!

The ultimatum contained eleven demands. Serbia was required to express formal disapproval of any anti-Austrian propaganda and activities, and to suppress any further manifestations thereof. In the enforcement of certain of these measures and in the trials of the individuals charged with the Sarajevo crime, Austrian officials were to participate. Serbia was required to reply within forty-eight hours.

Did these demands render war inevitable? (Since Berchtold intended to provoke war, the question may seem academic in the extreme; but at the risk of "flogging a dead horse," the matter is worth brief consideration.) It has been asserted that the demand for Austrian participation was an infringement of Serbian sovereignty to which no independent state could assent. Even on this point, however, there is a difference of opinion. Rightly interpreted, it is not certain that this demand did constitute such an infringement. Germany in 1919 was required to permit the participation of Allied representatives in the Leipzig trials; and more humiliating ultimatums have been presented and accepted on slighter grounds (for example, the Italian ultimatum to Greece in 1923 and the British ultimatum to Egypt in 1924). Consider the provocation, and imagine, for instance, what would have happened had the Tsarevich been assassinated by a Bessarabian with the connivance of Rumania, or even had the son of an American President been assassinated by a Mexican under similar circumstances! As for the time limit, ultimatums always contain some such provision; and unfortunately forty-eight hours is a common limit.

A few minutes before six on the afternoon of the twenty-fifth, Serbia handed the Austrian Minister her reply, which was not a complete acceptance of the Austrian terms. Forewarned of the tenor of the note by the Serbian mobilization, which was announced at three o'clock, and acting in accordance with instructions, the minister severed diplomatic relations and caught the 6:30 train out of Belgrade. The situation was ominous indeed, but as yet neither side had begun actual hostilities.

Exactly what contemporary reactions to the Serbian reply were is difficult to gauge. The most damning testimony, it must be admitted, came from the Kaiser, who declared that "with it every reason for war drops away." This did not mean that the Kaiser had changed his mind, but it is added proof that he was not looking for war, and it marked the beginning of a split between Germany and Austria over the question of how the Serbian affair should be handled. After presenting this testimony, it will probably be superfluous to present any more—at least to those already convinced. Nevertheless, there *is* more to be said. The Serbian reply, which was cleverly couched, sought to give the impression that Serbia was acceding to all reasonable demands. As a matter of fact, only two of the eleven demands were accepted outright; one was flatly refused, and the remainder were accepted only with such reservations as to render the

acceptance of very doubtful value—and in any case, Austria had little reason to trust Serbia. Much has been made of the fact that Serbia offered to submit the affair to the Hague Tribunal if her reply was not satisfactory; but as has been seen, matters involving vital interests or national honor were universally considered beyond the competence of that body.

Immediately after the assassination and prior to the delivery of the ultimatum, public opinion, except among Serbs in Austria and Serbia, was clearly in favor of Austria. After the rejection of the Serbian reply, public opinion swung definitely against Austria and against Germany, who was considered Austria's accomplice—for it was argued that Austria would not dare act without German backing. The reasons for such a *complete* revulsion of feeling are not far to seek.

Austria failed to prepare the ground, before delivering her ultimatum, by first presenting her case. Consequently the international public did not realize that Serbia was the guilty party, but looked rather upon Austria as the aggressor. When Austria did present her case, along with her ultimatum, the authorities everywhere were too busy with the practical matter of trying to avert war to go into the merits of the quarrel. Apparently Sazonov and Grey did not read the dossier at all. The newspapers, with their usual tendency toward condensation, incorrectly asserted that Serbia had accepted all but one of the Austrian demands. This statement, proclaimed in the headlines, stuck in the public consciousness and far outweighed any more judicial appraisals—such as the editorial in the New York *Times* which recognized that in the face of the provocation offered "it could not be supposed that Austria would consent to debate such a quarrel." Even those who took the trouble to find out that there was more than one side to the dispute were affected by that curious twist of the human mind which transfers sympathy from the aggrieved to the accused. This psychological aberration is clearly seen, over and over again, when the public tries to save a brutal murderer from the just consequences of his acts.

Throughout the ensuing days Austria dragged Germany along the path toward the abyss by presenting her with one *fait accompli* after another, and in the beginning, Germany rendered herself liable to such treatment by maintaining—rightly or wrongly, wisely or unwisely—that the quarrel between Austria and Serbia was a matter to be settled by those parties alone.

The following section is a consideration of the Twelve Days during which the powers plunged one by one into the vortex, but first a momentary examination of some of the other incidents immediately preceding is in order.

On July 20 Poincaré arrived in Russia for a three days' visit. Already the atmosphere was charged with electricity. At one of the state banquets the French ambassador was seated next to the wife of the Grand Duke Nicholas. This patriotic lady assured him enthusiastically: "War is going to break out. Nothing will be left of Austria. You will get Alsace-Lorraine back. Our armies will meet in Berlin. Germany will be annihilated." Far from trying to restrain Russia, Poincaré took every occasion to assure her of the fidelity of the French to their treaty obligations, and declared to his ambassador, "Sazonov must be firm, and we must support him." Poincaré's pronouncements were treated "as a blank check by which France promised full support to Russia in whatever

measures she should take." Germany was not alone in handing out blank checks.

At the moment that Poincaré arrived, Grey had proposed direct conversations between Russia and Austria. When this suggestion was presented by the British ambassador, Poincaré vetoed it, immediately and emphatically, on the grounds that "a conversation *à deux* between Austria and Russia would be very dangerous" (to the peace of Europe? or to the opportunity for a war of revenge?)!

THE FATAL TWELVE DAYS

So far, apart from the assassination of Francis Ferdinand, nothing irrevocable had been done. For twelve hectic days and nights the harassed diplomats of Europe made frantic efforts to avert war between Austria and Serbia if possible; if not, to prevent it from engulfing the other powers.

On July 24 Grey proposed mediation between Austria and Russia by Germany, Italy, England, and France. To this suggestion Germany returned a favorable response, but Russia and France opposed it.

On July 25 a number of steps were taken by Russia that brought Europe measurably nearer to the brink. At a Crown Council the Tsar approved five momentous decisions: 1. Sazonov was empowered to order a partial mobilization, against Austria, whenever he saw fit. 2. Troops were ordered back from maneuvers to their standing quarters. 3. The senior classes at the military schools were made officers. 4. A state of war was proclaimed in the frontier districts facing Austria and Germany. 5. Most important of all, secret orders were issued putting into force the regulations pertaining to the "Period Preparatory to War." These regulations provided that in the frontier districts reservists were to be called up, mobilization orders studied, horses purchased, naval vessels recalled to port and fully equipped, and so on. In the districts affected, in other words, the result was practically equivalent to mobilization. Such preparations could not escape the attention of Germany. But when she demanded an explanation, the Minister of War gave "his word of honor that no sort of mobilization order had yet been issued"! France likewise began military preparations: troops were recalled to standing quarters, officers were ordered back from leave, and provision was made for the transportation of the forces in Morocco. Late in the day Austria ordered partial mobilization against Serbia.

On July 26 the British took three steps, of which the first two were important and more or less contradictory. King George assured the Kaiser's brother, Prince Henry, who was visiting in England, "We shall try all we can to keep out of this, and shall remain neutral." At the same time the naval authorities ordered the fleet to remain concentrated. As it has been maintained that this action should have served as warning to Germany, Grey's commentary is of great interest—"It must not be taken to mean that anything more than diplomatic action was promised." Meanwhile Grey proposed a conference of the ambassadors of England, France, Germany, and Italy, to mediate between Austria and Serbia. Germany still maintained that war should and could be localized, and she accordingly refused "to summon Austria before a European court of justice in her case with Serbia." Germany was not alone in believing that the

conflict could be localized. The *New York Times*, for instance, asserted that it was "beyond doubt that the Kaiser . . . can prevent war altogether or confine it within local and narrow limits."

On July 27, the day when the Kaiser returned from his vacation, Italy made what was perhaps the most sensible suggestion of all—that the powers should advise Serbia to submit to the Austrian demands in their entirety, and so allow Serbia to save her face by submitting to the powers as a whole rather than to Austria alone. Unfortunately the suggestion passed almost unnoticed.

Germany was at last beginning to doubt the possibility of localizing the conflict; when a telegram arrived from her ambassador in London saying that Grey had issued a sharp warning and had suggested that the Serbian note be used as a basis for negotiations, she forwarded the suggestion to Vienna. Thus Germany placed herself on record as the one power which substantially modified its original position in the interests of peace.

Up to this moment Austria had given Germany to understand that she had no intention of declaring war or of beginning military operations before the twelfth of August. On July 28, however, upon receipt of Grey's suggestion, Berchtold immediately declared war on Serbia. He was then able to maintain that the suggestion had come too late. War had begun, and again Berchtold had had his way—but so far it was only a local conflict.

Germany thereupon stepped forward with a sensible suggestion, known as the Kaiser's Pledge Plan: a proposal that the Austrians stop their advance as soon as they had occupied Belgrade, and hold the city as a pledge for the fulfillment of their demands. Unfortunately this possible alternative likewise received little consideration.

On July 29, having heard nothing from Berchtold (who kept his allies in the dark for sixty hours), Germany sent repeated requests to the Ballplatz for a reply. She furthermore urged Austria to enter into direct negotiations with Russia, and notified England and Russia of her action. The Kaiser himself sent a personal appeal to the Tsar. Germany also began to take her first military precautions, recalling officers and men from leave, protecting railways, and so on—measures similar to but less extensive than those which had been in force for some days in Russia and in France.

At this point interest shifts from the Central Powers to Russia. Ever since the decision empowering Sazonov to declare partial mobilization, the Russian staff had been in a terrible state of mind. Since no one had ever considered the possibility of a war against Austria in which Germany was not involved, no plan for partial mobilization had been formulated; furthermore, partial mobilization, if attempted, would leave conditions in the utmost confusion in case general mobilization should follow.

When news of the Austrian declaration of war against Serbia arrived on July 28, Sazonov decided that it was too late for halfway measures; the next day he accordingly persuaded the Tsar to sign a decree for general mobilization. As the order was about to be sent out, however, it was countermanded by the Tsar, who had just received the Kaiser's appeal, and the order for partial mobilization was substituted. In transit the Kaiser's message had crossed with one from the Tsar in which that unhappy potentate prophesied, "I foresee that very

soon I shall be overwhelmed by the pressure brought upon me and be forced to take extreme measures which will lead to war." An enlightening commentary on the constitutional position of autocrats—weak-kneed ones, at least! The same day Grey made a proposal almost identical with that of the Kaiser—an Austrian halt in Belgrade—and midnight found Germany still futilely wiring to Vienna.

At 2:55 on the morning of July 30 Germany sent a dispatch to her ambassador in Austria, "We must urgently and earnestly submit to the consideration of the Vienna cabinet that it should accept mediation." Five minutes later another wire followed, ". . . We must decline to allow Vienna to drag us wantonly, and in disregard of our counsels, into a world conflagration." Unfortunately for Germany and for the world, these despairing exhortations were of no avail; events elsewhere decided the issue.

The morning of July 30 Sazonov and the Russian military authorities set to work to induce the Tsar to change his mind again. When interviewed over the telephone, Nicholas proved obdurate; the best they could do was to obtain an audience for the afternoon. In the meantime Sazonov had a talk with the French and British ambassadors in which he stated (apropos of a proposal that Austria modify her ultimatum), "If Austria rejects this proposal, preparations for a general mobilization will be proceeded with, and European war will be inevitable." The British ambassador evidently made no attempt to put on the brakes, and the French ambassador reiterated that France was prepared to fulfill her obligations. When his advisers arrived, the Tsar was pale and nervous, fully cognizant of his awful responsibility, of the millions of lives that depended on his decision. For nearly an hour Sazonov labored to convince him that war was inevitable. Finally, when the general whom Sazonov had brought with him remarked (with malice aforethought?), "Yes, it is hard to decide," poor little Nicholas retorted angrily, "I will decide"—and forthwith yielded. Sazonov immediately hurried to the ground floor, notified the chief of staff, and added: "Now you can smash the telephone. Give your orders, General, and then—disappear for the rest of the day."

The officer who dispatched the order has described the scene at the Central Telegraph Office. "Every operator was sitting by his instrument waiting. . . . A few minutes after six, while absolute stillness reigned in the room, all the instruments began to click in unison. At that instant the great epoch began." The statement is no exaggeration of the importance of the event. The die was cast. At that moment the Prewar Epoch ended, for the rest of Europe as well as for Russia—but little did those present realize that it was the downfall of the Romanovs rather than the triumph of Panslavism that they were heralding.

In order to appreciate fully the effect of Russian mobilization on the course of events, it must be remembered that it was an axiom of the military authorities that "mobilization means war." Sazonov showed that he understood this as clearly as the experts. And particularly was this true as between Russia and Germany, for Germany counted on her more efficient mobilization to offset Russia's enormous superiority in man power. Once the Russian steam roller was in motion, there was no chance that Germany would sit quietly by and

wait while it gathered momentum. From this point on, therefore, every move was predetermined.

On the thirtieth, also, Sir John French, who had won his spurs in the Boer War, was appointed commander-in-chief of the British Expeditionary Force; and France ordered *couverture* with restrictions. Five army corps and all the cavalry were to be mobilized, and the covering units were to take up their stations. In order to deprive Germany of the opportunity to accuse France of indiscretions and so influence British or Italian opinion unfavorably, the troops were instructed to remain a short distance back from the frontier. This maneuver gave rise to the myth of the "ten-kilometer withdrawal," for it was asserted that "France withdrew her troops ten kilometers in order to avoid war." As a matter of fact, no definite distance was stipulated, the matter being left to the discretion of the military authorities.

On July 31 Germany proclaimed a state of "threatening danger of war" and sent ultimatums to Russia and France, demanding that the former demobilize and that the latter make known her intentions. Austria ordered general mobilization, and Italy notified France that she would remain neutral. Germany had advised Austria to purchase the loyalty of Italy by offering her the Trentino, but Austria had obstinately refused. Italy, for her part, was able to justify her actions on the ground that the Central Powers were not fighting a defensive war. The real reasons for her course of action are clear—indeed they have been admitted by frank Italians: her fundamental interests were opposed to those of Austria, and she had determined to see which side was the strongest and which would pay the most for her assistance. "Sacred egoism," therefore, and sacred egoism alone, dictated her decision.

On August 1, in answer to the German inquiry, the French replied, "France will act in accordance with her interests." They thereupon began general mobilization. Germany declared war on Russia, and mobilized likewise—the last great military power to take this decisive step.

On August 2 Germany invaded the neutral Duchy of Luxemburg—but no one except the Luxemburgers seemed to get at all excited about it.

For several days the French had been doing their best to obtain a formal pledge of support from the English. Though Grey was willing, he dared not commit himself while uncertain of the cabinet and Parliament. Only after receiving a promise of support from Bonar Law, the leader of the Conservatives, did he venture to assure the French that "if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against the French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power." From then on, England was potentially at war (imagine the fleets of two powers *not* at war hammering each other to pieces!), though Parliament and the country at large were still blissfully ignorant of the fact that they were in the slightest degree committed.

That evening Germany presented Belgium with a twelve-hour ultimatum demanding that German troops be allowed to pass through Belgian territory. By way of excuse Germany alleged that France was on the point of executing a similar move. If Belgium refrained from resisting, Germany would guarantee her sovereignty and integrity and make good any damage.

The morning of August 3 Belgium replied that she refused to "sacrifice the honor of the nation and at the same time betray [her] duty toward Europe." This news was in the hands of Grey that afternoon when he appeared before Parliament. Grey began with a brief sketch of Anglo-French relations since the formation of the Entente Cordiale, including mention of the military conversations, the naval accord of 1912, and his promise of the preceding day. He insisted, however, that these "were not binding engagements" and that they were not to be construed "as restricting the freedom of the Government to decide what attitude they should now take, or . . . the freedom of the House of Commons to decide what their attitude should be." Obviously there was a glaring inconsistency in these statements, though it is possible that Grey himself was unaware of it. In regard to Belgium, he maintained that if "we run away from those obligations of honor and interest . . . I am quite sure that our moral position would be such as to have lost us all respect." Under the circumstances he had little difficulty in obtaining parliamentary support. Three of the cabinet resigned, but their action did not affect the issue. On August 3, also, having received the reply from Brussels, Germany began her invasion of Belgium.

On August 4 England sent Germany an ultimatum demanding that she agree to respect Belgian neutrality and that she reply by midnight. Bethmann-Hollweg was deeply agitated when the British ambassador, who reports the interview, presented himself. "He said that the step taken by His Majesty's Government was terrible to a degree; just for a word—'neutrality,' a word which in wartime had so often been disregarded—just for a scrap of paper Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation. . . . For strategical reasons it was a matter of life and death to Germany to advance through Belgium."

The remainder of the British ambassador's account details his last hours in Germany, when—with the exception of a single demonstration on the part of an excitable crowd, for which the German Government at once offered full apology—the British staff "received all through this trying time nothing but courtesy at the hands of Herr von Jagow and the officials of the Imperial Foreign Office."

Certainly the British ministers did not sit with their hands folded, waiting for a reply to their ultimatum. None came and none was expected. In a sense, therefore, the expiration of the time limit was merely symbolic—but symbolic of terrible things, for at midnight the British Empire entered on the greatest struggle in its history, in the history of the world, with England committed to give her all.

WHEN ALL IS SAID AND DONE

Why did a spark from the most backward corner of the Hapsburg Empire kindle a conflagration that ultimately engulfed every Great Power in Europe, spread to many of the smaller ones, and even involved the majority of non-European states? Though some of the more fundamental causes have been considered, a brief summary of the motives and the more immediate responsibilities of the individual powers is of interest.

The primary cause for the *outbreak* of the World War was the Austro-

Serbian quarrel, the final merits of which each must decide for himself. Pro-Serbs will maintain that it began with the Congress of Berlin and the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908. Yet even had Austria not annexed Bosnia, Serbia would have desired to incorporate the other South Slav districts of Austria—provinces that had been Austrian for centuries and which perhaps had no great desire to share the benefits of Serbian rule. So long as Serbia persisted in her purpose, a conflict was inevitable. Since high Serbian officials shared the responsibility for the first blow and the ministry apparently countenanced it, Serbia must bear a heavy share of the blame. More than any other country Serbia welcomed the war, if only she were to be backed by Russia and France and so would stand a fair chance of achieving her historic mission of truncating Austria, as she had helped truncate Turkey and as Piedmont had truncated Austria a half-century earlier.

With a considerable show of reason, Austria held that her prestige as a Great Power was vitally affected, that it was a matter of life and death for her to retaliate, and that half-measures were worse than useless. In 1909 Serbia had promised good behavior; yet this did not prevent the tragedy of Sarajevo. The motives of a state that refuses to sit still and wait to be dismembered are at least understandable—whether or not the methods employed can be approved. As for Russia, whose intrigues with the Serbs were notorious, Austria considered her Serbia's accomplice. For a generation Panslavists had been proclaiming in no uncertain terms that the way to Constantinople lay through Berlin and Vienna. If the Austro-Serbian dispute had been adjudicated by the powers, the result would have been a compromise, without the shadow of a doubt; for that reason Austria continued on her way unheeding. In so far as such conduct deserves condemnation, in so far as the use of war as an instrument of national policy is to be condemned, the Austrian Government in general and Berchtold in particular are condemned. For their share in bringing about an Austro-Serbian War they too must bear a heavy responsibility—and for the World War as well their responsibility, though unwittingly assumed, is by no means light. Finally, it may be pointed out that Austria, in the ultimate issue and in contradistinction to Russia, was fighting for her life.

So long as Austria was Germany's main ally and her only dependable one, Germany felt compelled to stake her existence on the maintenance of Austria's integrity and prestige. With Austria diminished or degraded, Germany believed that she would be left helpless between France and Russia. Just before the storm broke, the Kaiser declared, "Any German who still disbelieves that Russia and France are working full steam for an early war against us . . . is fit for a madhouse." It was with these thoughts in mind that Germany foolishly handed Austria a blank check; but neither Germany nor Austria anticipated that Russia would intervene, and least of all that England would take up the quarrel. There is ample evidence to this effect. After the war Chamberlain said, "Is it not, at any rate, clear that our intervention came as a great surprise and a great shock to the German Government, that they were totally unprepared for it . . . ?" There is also the corroborative testimony of Wilson, "We know for a certainty that if Germany had thought for a moment that Great Britain would go in with France and with Russia, she would never have undertaken

the enterprise." When it became apparent that a general European war might develop, Germany made sincere though belated efforts to avert such a calamity.

Russia was responsible in that she encouraged the nationalistic and anti-Austrian policy of the Serbs. She was also responsible to the extent that she apparently advised the Serbs to reject the Austrian ultimatum and carried on secret military preparations that alarmed Germany. Most of all she was responsible for making an all-European conflict certain by beginning general mobilization. Her motives too are understandable. If she refused to act she surrendered her rôle as champion of the Slavs, and her prestige would be measurably impaired. By a successful war, also, she hoped to acquire the Straits, the ultimate goal of Russian ambition. Very possibly internal conditions may have led the Russian ministers to desire foreign war as an antidote, following the well-known principle; for, by curious coincidence, at the very moment when Poincaré was being welcomed to the strains of the "Marseillaise," Cossacks were striking down workers for singing the same anthem.

Did France enter the war on account of Serbia? Obviously not. France was guilty in that she handed Russia a blank check. Without French support Russia would never have dared attack the Central Powers. If they had so desired, the French could have got out of it by declaring that they had only agreed to support Russia in a defensive war—but French prestige would have suffered heavily. Above all, with Russia and England on her side she stood better than an even chance of recovering Alsace-Lorraine and her priority in European affairs.

Grey, though admittedly sincere in his desire for peace, has been severely criticized. It has been asserted that had he taken a definite stand one way or the other he could and would have prevented a world war. There is much to be said for the argument. If he had left no doubt in Germany's mind that England would support France and Russia, Germany would have acted earlier and more vigorously in the direction of averting the crisis. Conversely, if he had told France and Russia flatly that England would not support them, they too would have been much more careful what they did. Indeed it may be questioned, even in the face of the arguments previously advanced, whether France would have gone in at all if she had not counted on England. To be sure, France committed herself before she was *positive* what stand England would take, but there can be no reasonable doubt that she was relying on English support.

Why *did* England support France? For Serbia she cared no more than did France. From first to last Grey reiterated in unmistakable terms that "the dispute between Austria and Serbia was not one in which we felt called to take a hand. Even if the question became one between Austria and Russia we should not feel called upon to take a hand in it." "The idea of . . . any of the Great Powers . . . dragged into a war by Serbia would be detestable." Nor did England go in on account of Belgian neutrality (not to mention Luxemburg). Long before, Gladstone had pointed out that England was not bound to *maintain* the neutrality of Belgium, though she was bound to *respect* it—as was Germany. That Belgian neutrality was not the deciding issue is proved by the fact that Grey promised France naval support before he knew about the invasion of Belgium. As it was, Belgium proved an excellent selling-point, which saved

Grey from the necessity of justifying his prewar policy and helped to arouse British opinion. (England probably *would* have gone into the war on account of Belgium—not merely or so much because Belgium was neutral as because, since the days of Elizabeth, it had been a cardinal point of British foreign policy not to allow the Low Countries to fall into the hands of any strong power.) England went into the war because Grey had incurred an “obligation of honor” to France and because British prestige was involved. For better or for worse she had abandoned her splendid isolation and had allowed herself to become entangled in the system of Continental alliances. What happened was the logical outcome. If England stood aside, France and Russia would consider that she had gone back on them; and at the end of the war she would be confronted with a uniformly hostile Continent.

The conflict was the offspring of fear no less than of ambition. The Old World had degenerated into a powder magazine, in which the dropping of a lighted match, whether by accident or design, was almost certain to produce a conflagration. . . . It is also a mistake to attribute exceptional wickedness to the Governments. . . . Not one of them, when it came to the point, desired to set the world alight. . . . The outbreak of the Great War is the condemnation not only of the clumsy performers who strutted for a brief hour across the stage, but of the international anarchy which they inherited and which they did nothing to abate.¹


From one point of view the outbreak of the war seems absurd, incredible, barbaric, childish; from another, it seems absolutely unavoidable. The more one considers the matter, the more he must incline to agree with the pacifists, who take the teachings of Christ literally and deduce that it is our attitude of mind that is at fault; with those critics of our present system who assert that nationalism, capitalism, and imperialism combine to make war inevitable; or with those who maintain that our knowledge has outrun our wisdom and that we are simply children playing with loaded guns.

¹ Professor Gooch.



PART VII
WAR AND PEACE

XV. "THE BIG SHOW"
XVI. CARTHAGO DELENDA EST



XVII. THE WESTERN FRONT

CHAPTER XV

'THE BIG SHOW'

Contested on a dozen different fronts—on land, in the air, on sea, and under the sea—only by extreme simplification of a drama almost impossible of simplification can the World War, the most stupendous of human tragedies, be rendered in any degree intelligible. Battles that in any previous war would have been major engagements were mere skirmishes.

When hostilities broke out, all the contestants expected that the affair would be over in a few weeks, or at worst in a few months. The Germans planned to celebrate Christmas in Paris. With the English, "Business as Usual" was the order of the day; the British troops, marching to the tune of "Tipperary," set out as for a holiday.

THE IRON DICE

Every military power has a staff whose duty it is to elaborate plans of campaign to meet all possible contingencies. The Allies, more particularly the French and the British, planned to cooperate, but at first made no attempt to unify their staff work. The French had a fairly competent staff; Kitchener, as Secretary for War, did yeoman service for England, but was hampered by the civilian authorities; the Russian staff was notoriously deficient. The Central Powers had the advantage of advice from the great General Staff of the Imperial German Army.

German strategy at the opening of the war was based on the Schlieffen Plan, formulated in 1905 with an eye to two fundamental considerations: the Central Powers had fewer men; but Russia was expected to be slow in mobilizing. It was therefore decided that the Austrians, with slight assistance from Germany, should hold Russia in check while Germany hurled the bulk of her forces against France. After the French armies had been annihilated at one crushing blow, Germany would be free to finish off Russia at her leisure.

Since success would depend on speed coupled with an element of surprise, Schlieffen's strategy explains the invasion of Belgium. Against the line of the Vosges, strongly defended by nature and by man, Germany might batter for weeks, months, or even years without obtaining a decision. The only alternative was to outflank this position by passing through the Belgian plain and the weakly fortified territory of northern France. Granted the premises, Germany's plan was strictly logical. Whether she would have done better to rest on the

defensive in the West and try to crush Russia instead cannot be discussed here. The example furnished by Napoleon was not encouraging.

The Allies knew something of the Schlieffen Plan. As has been seen, they had reconnoitered the Belgian battlefields; their pretended surprise at the invasion of Belgium contained an element of hypocrisy, and their ineffectiveness in meeting the attack, if it redounded to their moral credit, was no tribute to their military skill.

✓ A successful general must be a good gambler—a gambler whose nerves are unshaken, or better still, one who has no nerves. According to the Schlieffen Plan, only 10 German divisions were to be allotted to the Eastern front, while 62 divisions were to be thrown against France.¹ Of these, 9, organized in two armies, were to hold the Alsace-Lorraine front; the remaining 53, divided into five armies, were to deliver the attack. These five armies—three advancing through Belgium (the two on the right containing 26 divisions) and two through Luxemburg—were to pivot on Metz in concentric circles. At first their line of march would be almost due west; when they had reached the Aisne, they would be advancing south; by the time they had reached the Vosges, still pivoting, they would be advancing *east*. In this way the French would be caught between the hammer (the five pivoting armies) and the anvil (the two armies holding the Vosges). The French field armies disposed of, Paris would be at the mercy of the Germans whenever they chose to take it. Such was the grandiose plan conceived by Schlieffen, whose dying legacy was the exhortation, "Make the right wing strong!"

A plan of such intricacy required genius for its execution as well as genius for its conception. The coordination of five colossal armies advancing at different rates of speed, upon different radii, and on a constantly changing front, called for skill of the highest order. The necessary marching alone, to say nothing of any fighting, would impose a strain on the right wing almost beyond human endurance—and it was on the First Army, composing the right wing, that success or failure would depend. When Schlieffen retired, his place was taken by the younger Moltke, heir to a magical name but, unfortunately for Germany, lacking the ability and the iron nerve of his famous uncle. Of 9 new divisions that became available after 1905, Moltke allotted 8 to the left wing and only 1, plus a second, withdrawn from the Eastern front, to the right.

After the outbreak of war, he made even graver errors. Yielding to the inhabitants of East Prussia, who were terrified by the unexpectedly rapid advance of the Russians, he detached four divisions from the right wing for service on the Eastern front (where they arrived after the crisis was over). During the advance he detached 7 more for local operations in Belgium and northern France (which Schlieffen had assigned to the Territorial Reserve), and on top of this, even sent some additional divisions to Alsace, where the French had developed a local offensive.

On August 5, while the main armies were completing their mobilization, an advance party attacked the fortifications of Liège, in eastern Belgium. Recently strengthened with the newest type of invisible, subterranean earthworks, these

¹ German and French divisions, when up to quota, contained about 12,000; British divisions about 15,000.

forts ranked among the most formidable in Europe. It was therefore a matter for no astonishment to anyone, unless to the Germans, when the first attacks failed. Germany thereupon sprang her first surprise: gigantic 42-centimeter (16-inch) howitzers, which were the latest product of the famous Krupp works and were capable of delivering a shell weighing almost a ton. The day before the main armies arrived Belgian resistance at Liège collapsed (August 17). On the twentieth, Von Kluck, commanding the First Army, entered Brussels, and the Second Army appeared before Namur, the last fortress on Belgian soil. The Germans were actually *ahead* of their schedule, a fact effectually disposing of the wartime legend that the heroic resistance of Belgium alone saved Europe. On August 7 the French had begun a sentimental and premature invasion of Alsace, but it was not until the twenty-first—as their right wing was beating a hasty retreat—that the French left and the German right met, on Belgian soil. The Battle of Charleroi and Mons had opened.

On August 10 the first of England's "Contemptibles," advance detachments of the little British Expeditionary Force of 70,000 that was to represent the Empire in the opening days of the war, set foot on the Continent. By the eighteenth Sir John French had all of his effectives across the Channel and on the twenty-second he took up a position beside his allies, south of Mons—four divisions of infantry, the first corps under Haig, and a cavalry division under Allenby. England had little to give, but it was of her best, "a rapier among scythes."

• On August 23, French was attacked by the German First and Second armies, 160,000 men and 600 guns against 300 guns and 70,000 men. For a moment the British Tommies, led by the flower of the English nobility, met and checked the Teuton rush. But for a moment only. It was a gesture as futile as it was magnificent, for Joffre, the French commander, had been outgeneraled and beaten in every important sector. Superior skill, not superior forces, had decided the issue. Already the units on the British right were in retreat. If he were to prevent his command from being cut off and annihilated, French had no choice but to retire also—the beginning of a retreat that seemed to have no end, as the irresistible gray-green tide swept on toward Paris. A nightmare of rearguard actions followed, each without apparent effect, each the prelude to a fresh retreat—past the frontiers, past Cambrai, across the Somme, across the Oise, across the Aisne, the Ourcq, and the Marne. The German hammer was beginning to swing swiftly and relentlessly eastward, the pincers were beginning to close.

The Schlieffen Plan dictated that the First Army in its enveloping movement should pass to the west and the south of Paris, and so sweep before it any mobile forces that might be in the vicinity. In the midst of operations, Moltke made his second fundamental mistake by ordering Von Kluck to change the direction of his southwesterly march, follow the Second Army in a southeasterly direction, and so pass to the east of Paris.

On September 5 when the Germans were still *in advance of their schedule*, their line extended in a great convex arc from Meaux, just east of Paris, to Verdun, with their advance posts more than halfway from the Marne to the Aube. The French, with their flanks covered by the Verdun and Paris defenses, were

in a strong tactical position. Moreover, the anguishing period of the retreat had on the whole been in their favor: they had gained time to bring up their reserves, while the Germans had been obliged to march much further and had been getting further and further from their base. But Joffre was still absorbed in his tactical retreat. Meanwhile Gallieni, the commander of Paris, had noted the German line of march and Von Kluck's exposed flank. He accordingly proposed to Joffre that the main French armies make a stand and that his own mobile force of 60,000 be thrown against Von Kluck's right. With considerable hesitancy Joffre accepted the suggestion, and early on the morning of the sixth threw all of his reserves into the fight in a desperate attempt to stem the German tide. The result was the First Marne, one of the decisive battles of the world's history.

For five days the decision hung in the balance, as Titan wrestled Titan for the advantage. When the engagement opened, the Germans had a slight advantage in numbers, 900,000 to 850,000, but at the close the Allies had nearly 1,000,000 men in line. Eventually Gallieni's pressure on its exposed flank was too much for the First Army. Since the sorely needed divisions that Moltke had thrown away were not there to draw on, Von Kluck was forced to transfer troops from his left in order to strengthen his right; and a gap, which in time became a chasm of twenty miles, yawned between the First Army and the Second. Into this gap the British and French poured their forces, threatening Von Kluck's rear and the Second Army on its right. When the Second Army withdrew, Von Kluck was forced to follow suit; and on the evening of September 10, the Germans ordered a general retreat. Gallieni had saved France.

THE RACE TO THE SEA

The German failure at the Marne involved the collapse of the Schlieffen Plan and, as it turned out, the loss of the war; but from the point of view of the Allies the immediate effects were decidedly disappointing. No part of the German forces was annihilated, and the number of guns² and prisoners captured was inconsiderable. Moreover, this period was the costliest of the entire war for the French. Between August 21 and September 12 they "lost nearly 330,000 men killed or prisoners, or more than one-sixth of their total loss in killed or prisoners during the whole fifty-two months." From August 21 to 24 and from September 5 to 9, a period of less than eight days, they suffered 450,000 casualties.³

During the second phase of the war the invaders retreated in good order and stopped when they reached the heights of the Aisne. There they successfully defended during another fierce engagement (September 13-21).

At the moment when the First Aisne had died down, the line of battle extended from Switzerland to the Oise. There it was left hanging in the air, so to speak. The third phase of the war in the West was the so-called Race to the Sea. Each side rushed up fresh contingents and wheeled them into line, the French on their left, the Germans on their right. The Germans wanted the

² Artillery, as distinct from "small arms" (rifles and pistols) and machine guns.

³ That is, killed, wounded, captured, sick, and missing.

line, when established, to be as far west as possible. In particular they hoped to seize the Channel ports, for with these in their hands the British would be forced to land supplies further down the coast, whence transportation would be impeded by French cross-traffic. Conversely, the object of the Allies was to establish the line as far east as they could, and if possible to shut the Germans off from the coast entirely. As a net result the battle front was extended almost due north from the junction of the Aisne and the Oise to Nieuport on the Belgian coast. This first stage of the Race to the Sea was over by October 20. Meanwhile Antwerp had fallen and the Belgian field army had retreated down the coast, under cover of the British fleet, to join the Allies. All of Belgium except the extreme western corner was in German hands.

The final act of the 1914 campaign in the West was the First Battle of Ypres. The First Battle of Flanders, as it is also called, resulted from the attempt of the Germans to break through the new and thinly held line and capture the Channel ports. Everywhere from Arras to the sea the engagement raged with greater or less fury, but it was against Ypres that the Germans delivered their most savage and protracted attack. Around this picturesque Flemish town the line formed a salient, which was held by the British and constituted the pivot of the Allied defenses in the north. From the end of October until the middle of November these positions were subject to practically uninterrupted assault by the greatest army in the world, superior in numbers and overwhelmingly superior in equipment. It is a military axiom that even a well-trained outfit is apt to break when its losses exceed 20 per cent, but the World War upset all calculations. In the carnage of Ypres, although outnumbered almost 8 to 1, one British division which entered the battle with 400 officers and 12,000 men came out with only 44 officers and 2,336 men!

The defense of Verdun by the French is popularly considered the supreme example of Allied heroism, but Verdun was at least strongly fortified, by nature and by science; in the dismal lowlands of Flanders the British had no defenses, and the Germans held the only elevated ground. Concealment was impossible, short of digging a hole and crawling into it, and a hole was more than apt to fill with water. During the winter the defenders plowed knee-deep through seas of mire or stood in icy water waist-high. Duck boards disappeared as fast as laid. In some sections life became amphibious and the soldiers were drowned in the trenches. Nothing was left but to "stick it." This the British did, through four years of indescribable and seemingly endless agony; and in defense of the ancient town of Ypres 250,000 soldiers of the King laid down their lives.

The failure of the Germans in Flanders in 1914 marked the end of the Race to the Sea; from Switzerland to the Belgian coast both sides dug in. Mobile warfare on the Western front disappeared until 1918, and was succeeded by the war of position, more familiarly known as trench warfare.

1914 IN THE EAST

Thanks to Russia's underhanded mobilization measures, her first advance was surprisingly rapid and thereby contributed no little to save France. In this respect, indeed, it was possibly the deciding factor of the war on land. Although

poorly equipped, the Russians were led by an able and devoted chief, the Grand Duke Nicholas—the only royal commander to achieve outstanding distinction in the war as a tactician and a strategist. Early in August his armies began to invade East Prussia, defeated the Germans, who were inferior in strength, and soon were in virtual control of the stronghold of Prussian squirearchy. The German capital became the Mecca for streams of terrified refugees, bearing tales of atrocities similar to those concerning Belgium. At the moment, Russia's success was the one drop of consolation in the Allies' cup of woe, and they comforted themselves by calculating how long it would take the Cossack "steam roller" to reach Berlin.

The German general staff was in something of a blue funk, and Moltke was even persuaded to detach two corps from the right wing in the West and dispatch them to the Eastern front (where they arrived after the vital need had passed). Von Hindenburg, called from retirement after the outbreak of hostilities, was appointed to the East Prussian command, with Ludendorff, who had just achieved fame at Liège, as his chief of staff. Hindenburg proved an outstanding example of the German commanders who have inspired respect, if not terror, in the hearts of their adversaries. Perhaps the foremost general produced by Germany during the war, he was a heroic figure, cast in the Bismarckian mold—a sound mind in a sound body, with a grasp of military essentials acquired by years of intensive devotion.

Confronted with this colossus, the Russians experienced one of the most dramatic reverses in history. They had made the error of advancing in two separate armies—one from the east, the other from the south—operating without liaison and trusting to effect a juncture in German territory. Worst of all, the generals in immediate command were incompetent and took no precautions to remedy the defects inherent in the plan of campaign. Hindenburg possessed that quality most essential in a supreme commander, most lacking in Moltke—daring. He saw his opportunity and took it—albeit the dangers involved were extreme, as the Russian armies were only sixty miles apart, and either one alone outnumbered the Germans in men and in guns. (One cannot help wondering what the result would have been had he and Ludendorff been in charge on the Western front during the opening days of the war.) Leaving a screen of only two cavalry brigades to hold Königsberg, Hindenburg threw his inferior and tired forces between those of the enemy, attacked the columns advancing from the south on August 26, and by the thirty-first had the Russian Second Army bottled up among the woods and swamps of the Masurian Lakes. Only one corps made good its retreat. Four others met irretrievable disaster, and the Germans took 90,000 prisoners. Tannenberg was the most clean-cut victory of the war, a veritable Sedan; and Hindenburg, thenceforth the idol of his countrymen, was made a field marshal and, shortly after, commander-in-chief on the Eastern front. Having disposed of the Russian Second Army, he turned on the First, which had remained inactive, and drove it back to the Niemen.

Throughout the war Germany's neighbor to the south proved a weak sister, for the diverse elements in the "Polyglot Empire" made poor material from which to weld an efficient military machine. On September 1 the Austrians in Galicia were attacked by Brusilov, a subordinate of the Grand Duke Nicholas



FIND THE ARTILLERY!

(Courtesy of British)

CAMOUFLAGED MOTOR ROUTE

(Courtesy of Keystone Victor Company)



Courtesy of Keystone View Company

GAS!

A TANK

hitherto unknown to fame. When Lemberg fell on the third, 100,000 prisoners remained in Russian hands, and thereafter Brusilov was no longer unknown. A second attack (September 6-10) drove the Austrians in headlong flight to the Carpathians, where they made a desperate but uncertain stand while the Russians advanced on Cracow. With the Slavic hordes to keep them busy in the East, the Austrians met even more ignominious defeat in the South at the hands of little Serbia. Not only were their attempted invasions repulsed with heavy losses but they even had to defend their own frontier against invasion.

Hindenburg, attempting a counteroffensive in order to relieve his allies, made two determined drives on Warsaw. The pressure on the Austrians was removed, and Hindenburg captured another 90,000 Russians, but both drives failed of their objective. The second died down on Christmas Eve with the Germans still thirty-five miles short of the Polish metropolis.

So ended 1914. Though the Germans had failed to carry out their original plans, they were comfortably situated. Their own territory was intact, and they were in possession of sizable areas of enemy territory; in particular they held 70 per cent of the coal resources of France, 80 per cent of her steel industries, and 90 per cent of her iron ore. In addition, Turkey had entered the war on their side. The factors that actuated Turkey were clear—German diplomacy and fear of Russian designs on the Straits.

1915 IN THE WEST

With the inauguration of trench warfare in the fall of 1914, the conflict in the West entered a phase which lasted until the spring of 1918. Germany became a vast beleaguered camp and the struggle a titanic War of Attrition, with German preparation and efficiency opposed to the limitless potential resources of the Allies. The flanks were protected by Switzerland, which maintained an armed neutrality, and by the sea. Consequently Germany was impregnable so long as she could ward off frontal attacks; and as every tactician knows, the advantages in a frontal attack are all with the defense—the chances of success almost nil, short of a miracle.

This situation the German staff quickly grasped. Realizing also its implications relative to any offensives of their own, they left their Western front lightly manned and turned their attention elsewhere. Secure in their line of multiple trenches—row behind row, sometimes twenty-five miles in depth and so intricate that the loss of a few miles of front or even of secondary defenses was a comparatively insignificant matter—they were quite content that their adversaries should throw away their relatively slender resources in fruitless endeavors. Not so the Allies. From beginning to end, rightly or wrongly, they were obsessed with the notion that the war must be won or lost on the Western front (*how* they evidently had only the haziest notion), with the result that it was very nearly—lost there.

Strategical difficulties were not the only ones confronting the Allies in the West. In addition there was, first of all, the problem of man power, which arose from the fact that England had never adopted the principle of universal military service but had clung instead to a volunteer professional establishment.

This question in itself was complicated. By the end of 1914, England had lost more men than she had sent over in her original expeditionary force, in fact nearly half her entire professional army, of which it was imperative to conserve a portion to handle recruits. For a long time, therefore, her efforts were largely devoted to raising, equipping, and training her forces. The process was retarded for two reasons. Although her upper classes rallied magnificently, the nation as a whole failed at first to take the war seriously. Secondly, England persisted in clinging to the principle of voluntary enlistment, which she did not abandon for conscription until January of 1916—and still more time elapsed before Kitchener's New Army could reach the trenches. Britain's efficiency was also seriously hampered by the steadfast refusal of her old-fashioned and bullheaded "experts" to adopt modern methods prior to the war (just as the French went in with red pantaloons). Consequently her soldiers entered the conflict without rifle grenades, bombs, trench periscopes, or Very pistols, and without any instruction in their use—to say nothing of more complicated types of matériel (equipment).

Russia had plenty of man power—more than she could equip, in fact—but was pitifully deficient in matériel. France had a high proportion of trained men, but although she was much better off than her allies in respect to matériel (artillery, particularly heavy artillery, airplanes, ammunition, and so on), she was nevertheless distinctly inferior to Germany in most types of equipment.^{8a} Under modern conditions no force lacking proper matériel can hope to even hold its own, much less make an impression on the enemy. No one will belittle the importance or the heroic work of the infantry in the World War; but without artillery to blast away enemy wire and keep down enemy artillery, and without airplanes to provide information and to direct fire, the infantry could do little more than wait to be slaughtered in cold blood. Airplanes in particular revolutionized warfare. No move, unless made under cover of darkness or cleverly camouflaged, could escape their eyes; for this reason surprise attacks were next to impossible.

On top of all these obstacles the Allied staff work, both tactical and strategic, was woefully deficient. Time and again the attacks were ill-prepared and ill-executed, and the Allied commanders persisted in hurling their men against impregnable positions. Not infrequently in the early months the infantry, when pleading for artillery support, received the reply that the gunners had strict orders to husband their ammunition. Frequently the troops were decimated in their trenches before the advance even got under way; more frequently they were held up by intact wire and mowed down by machine-gun fire; still more frequently the gains (some tens or hundreds of yards of untenable trenches, in return for hundreds or thousands of casualties) were pathetically if not ludicrously disproportionate to the lives expended—and always they were too slight to be of real value. The eagerly awaited, always hoped-for "break-through" never came. Finally even the civilian chiefs became disgusted. One day when Haig announced to Lloyd George, "Tomorrow I shall take Passchendaele," the Prime Minister retorted sharply, "You take one vil-

^{8a} The author saw old-fashioned recoil-less artillery in use at Verdun as late as the summer of 1918.

lage and we lose Serbia. You take another and we lose Rumania. I've had enough of your villages!"

At this point an attempt should be made to describe the characteristics of modern warfare. Except during an attack or raid, the troops in the front lines spent practically their entire time in trenches and dugouts beneath the level of the ground, peering at the enemy through periscopes or from special observation posts; to do otherwise would have been to court almost certain death at the hands of an enemy sniper. Imagine such a battle line six hundred miles long, to take only the Western front, with millions of men, sometimes only ten yards apart; engagements in which whole outfits were wiped out or all but wiped out; a war in which every outfit had to be constituted anew, time after time, until scarcely a man remained of the original command. How can the printed page give any notion of that eternity of heroism compressed into a few hours or minutes—the unrelenting cold and wet of winter, the filth and the lice, the waiting in cold sweat at dawn for an attack, the inferno of the advance, the despair of a retirement or retreat? Day after day, week after week, month after month, year in and year out it continued, with only such diversions as were afforded by the "rest" camps and an occasional leave to break the monotony. Often, setting out for the rear an outfit was hurried back to the lines to aid in repelling an unexpected attack, and many men went without leave for two years at a time.

To be able to do justice to such a war one should have served in the infantry, the artillery, and the air forces, and in the services of supply—which outnumbered the active services. (In this war of nations in arms ten men were required behind the lines to keep one at the front.) One must have seen the battle front lit by searchlights, Very lights, and the flashes of big guns, felt it tremble at the endless concussion of artillery and bursting shells, heard the roar of a great barrage, rising like some fantastic symphony in hell—the incessant bark of field pieces,⁴ like the rattle of a stupendous machine gun, punctuated by the many-toned, deep-throated bass of the heavies and accompanied by the shrill staccato treble of the machine guns themselves.⁵ One must have witnessed the deeds of unsung and generous heroism, and the friction, half jesting, half genuine, between the various branches of the service—infantry cursing the artillery and the air force, and the active services cursing the services of supply, the military police, and the staff. Above all the staff! One must have assisted at a field station or in a hospital. One must have been present during an airplane raid on Paris or a Zeppelin raid on London. One must have worked in a munitions plant. And one must have lived in the homes, far from the din of battle—the homes of England, of France, of Russia, and the homes of Germany as well—where oppressed and grief-stricken fathers and mothers and sisters and younger brothers grew thin on starvation rations that "the boys at the front" might "carry on."⁶

⁴ A 75 (3-inch) could deliver 15 to 20 shots a minute, but under actual battle conditions the rate seldom exceeded 6.

⁵ A machine gun delivered approximately 300 shots a minute.

⁶ Since the war a *Dictionary of Official War-time Organizations* has been published which contains perhaps eight "live" entries to the page—a total in excess of 2,500 such organizations for England alone.

Two operations of 1915 on the Western front deserve individual mention. To the west of Neuve-Chapelle the Germans were holding an obtuse salient against which Sir John French decided to launch an attack. The operation was designed to demonstrate the practicability of an advance preceded by sufficient artillery preparation; the ultimate objective was the heights east of the city. By collecting a reserve of ammunition and every spare gun on the British front of every type, French was able to put a bombardment (March 10) four times as heavy as any he had yet produced—four shells to the yard, or more than were used in a year and a half of the Boer War. The line of obliterated trenches in the center was carried with ease, and the artillery dropped a curtain barrage in front of the infantry as the advance continued; *but* it proved impossible to reach (let alone take) the heights beyond, for on the right and the left the preparation had been inadequate. In those sectors the advancing contingents were frightfully cut up; no more ammunition was available for further bombardment; some of the supports did not arrive until seven hours after the engagement began; and although the cavalry as usual were held in readiness for a break-through, they returned without having been in action—also as usual. French had advanced a mile on a front of three—at a cost of 13,000 lives (nearly twice the number that had been killed on both sides at Gettysburg, nearly 50 per cent more than had been killed in the whole Boer War, nearly four times as many as had been killed in the War of 1864). Small wonder that the active services cursed the staff and the country at large began to question. A general with the training of a business executive would have learned a lesson, and so did the doughty English staff—but in the reverse direction. The attack had partially succeeded: a little more artillery and the next attack would be a complete success, so they reasoned; the cavalry would pour through, the whole German line would crumble, and all they would have to do would be to march gayly on to Berlin. One all-important factor they entirely failed to apprehend: the greater the preparation, the more evident it would be to the enemy, who would thereupon take corresponding precautions to meet it. Failing to apprehend this factor, the Allied staffs went calmly on their way—and the men in the trenches paid the price.

The other engagement that calls for mention was the Second Battle of Flanders. In front of Ypres on April 22, the defenders observed a strange greenish cloud moving from the German trenches toward their lines. Soon pandemonium reigned. Coughing, frothing at the mouth, blue in the face, blinded, a stream of French soldiers came staggering terror-stricken toward the rear. Another horror had been added to warfare, to further justify Sherman's encomium—*gas!*⁷ No wonder a four-mile breach opened in the lines! The sequel defies description. That the Germans did not run the Allies into the sea is a mystery explained by the fact that they were themselves astonished at the effectiveness of their new weapon, that they had not prepared to take the offensive on a large scale, and above all, by the heroism of the Canadian

⁷ The gas first used was chlorine; later a variety of gases were used, ranging from tear gas to the dreaded mustard gas. The idea had been suggested to the Japanese by a British chemist during the Russo-Japanese War. We hope that he was at Ypres to observe the effects. Today chemists are prophesying the uses of gases against which there will be no possibility of protection and which will make it possible for a single airplane to wipe out a city like New York—in the next war!

brigades. Lacking any protection against the deadly menace and outflanked by four divisions, these stalwart empire-builders nevertheless gave ground so slowly that their demoralized and disorganized brothers-in-arms were able to re-form and stem the tide. Of eighty-eight machine-gunners in a certain battalion, only one survived; the units holding St.-Julien were wiped out to a man! Anyone interested in computing the breaking-point of troops should take note of these figures. When the Allied lines were again stabilized, those to the northeast of Ypres were less than two miles from the city, instead of over four and a half.

Since Germany at no time gained any decisive advantage from the use of gas, it merely served to enhance her reputation for barbarity.

1915 ELSEWHERE

The first spectacular occurrence contingent on Turkey's participation in the conflict was an attack on the Suez Canal. Though the Turks hoped to embarrass England seriously and the British were genuinely alarmed, the difficulties of transportation between Palestine and the Isthmus of Suez rendered the expedition little better than a fiasco (February 3).

The Turkish declaration of war had given a new direction to Allied hopes for succoring the Russians, who had early signified crying need of material. Tales were current that in order to make up for their lack of shells the Russian commanders were sending enough men against the German wire to fill it up, so that their remaining troops could advance over the dead bodies. It was a common practice for unarmed soldiers to wait for rifles in the second line till the first line had been killed, and frequently the Russian privates were armed only with a sword bayonet and a hand grenade. If it should prove possible, as the Allies hoped, to force the Dardanelles, results of the utmost importance would follow: Russia's vast man power could be equipped so as to show up to the best effect, her grain supply would satisfy the needs of France and England for foodstuffs, Greece and Rumania might be induced to join the Allies, and Bulgaria dissuaded from joining the Central Powers.

The execution of the scheme was intrusted to England, who was to open the Straits by means of her fleet. Though enticing, the plan was at best questionable, as warships are always at a disadvantage when competing with shore batteries; and in this case nothing definite was known concerning the strength of the forts. From beginning to end the affair was a ghastly series of blunders. The approach of a reconnoitering squadron, early in November of 1914, put the Turks on their guard. February 19, 1915, with a week's attack on the fortifications at the mouth of the channel, the Dardanelles Campaign began in earnest. The preliminary attack on the narrows began on March 6, and the grand attack was delivered on the eighteenth. Three capital ships were mined, and two seriously damaged. Thereupon the Allies abandoned the attempt to force the Straits—in all probability at the very moment that victory lay within their grasp.

With the immediate threat to the Suez Canal removed, the English decided to "carry the war into Africa" by a land attack. This strategy had the ad-

vantage of diverting the Turks from further attempts on Egypt. The Gallipoli Peninsula, which was chosen as the field of operations, was surrounded by high cliffs affording few good landing-places and presented a difficult terrain throughout. Instead of 150,000 men, the least that Kitchener believed necessary, the Allies employed only 70,000 inexperienced troops, most of them Anzacs (Australian and New Zealand Army Corps). Forewarned a second time by the naval attack, the Turks had a third warning early in March when, weeks before the opening of the assault, the first contingent reached the neighborhood. The attacking forces were terribly mauled in landing (April 25) and throughout the first six months suffered an average of 795 casualties a day. To make a long story short, the campaign dragged out its weary length, replete with heroism and horror, until finally abandoned (January 9, 1916).

Some time before their attack on the Dardanelles, the British had directed their attention toward the Turkish holdings in Mesopotamia, where their Indian garrisons might operate to advantage, and hither a small force had been dispatched in November of 1914. Success crowned their early efforts, which fell short of Baghdad by only a narrow margin. Retreating, the little army was bottled up in Kut-el-Amara, and after a gallant resistance of a hundred and forty-seven days Townshend was forced to surrender (April 29, 1916). England's prestige in the East, where her Mohammedan subjects were showing signs of unrest, had suffered two severe setbacks.

Throughout the early months of the war much apprehension was caused both camps by the attitude of Italy. Would she remain neutral, or join one of the contesting factions? The Italians having declared that they would act from no sentiment except "sacred egoism," each side put forth efforts to decide the matter in its favor. Fear of the British fleet had something to do with the result, but Italy's decision hinged primarily on the Austrian territories that she coveted. The Hapsburgs finally offered to cede most of those that were inhabited by Italians.

But the Allies, who were offering other people's property, were able to bid higher; by the Treaty of London (April 28, 1915) they guaranteed Italy the Tyrol as far as the Brenner Pass, Trieste and the surrounding territory, northern Dalmatia, Valona (Avlona), the Dodecanese, Adalia, and additional territory in Africa. The reprehensible aspect of this treaty was not that the Allies promised Italy certain territories which, although not legally Italian, were clearly Italian by nationality, but that they also promised her others that were German (the lower Tyrol), Serb (northern Dalmatia), Albanian (Valona), Greek (the Dodecanese), and Turkish (Adalia), and that one of the injured parties was a friend and an ally, whom they were in honor bound to protect. In the end the highest bidder won, and Italy declared war against Austria (May 23). If the winners hoped that the Italian straw would break the Hapsburg camel's back, their disappointment must have been keen. The Austrians did their best fighting against their ancient enemies and sometime allies, geography stood the Dual Monarchy in good stead, and the Italians made little impression on the tough Alpine boundary.

Germany, as previously remarked, had temporarily abandoned all attempt to break through in the West. In the East, Russia was holding a front nine hun-

dred miles in length, and it was at the southern end of this line that the important events on the Eastern front were taking place. Brusilov was strengthening his hold on the passes of the eastern Carpathians, with a view to invading Hungary and so forcing Rumania to enter the conflict if she wanted to gain Transylvania. Austria was striving to prevent this, and in particular she was struggling to relieve Przemyśl. On the whole, the Russians were getting the better of the argument, and on March 22, after a siege of nearly seven months, they entered the city and captured 120,000 prisoners.

Suddenly the great blow fell. On May 1 Mackensen descended on the Russians in Western Galicia like a bolt out of the blue. At his back was the strongest group of German armies ever mustered under one general and an overwhelming concentration of artillery—1,500 heavies, to make no mention of lighter guns. Under a rain of 700,000 shells the Russian trenches simply disappeared, and the Russians along with them. Most astonishing of all was the Germans' ability to keep their preparations completely concealed. From May 1 to the end of September the troops of the Grand Duke Nicholas were hurled unceremoniously backward, fighting so fiercely that entire army corps were reduced to less than 1,500 bayonets, but impotent at any time to stay the onslaught—back, back, back, out of Przemyśl, Lemberg, Warsaw, Bukowina, and Courland, till the German right had crossed the Pruth in front of Czeronowitz, their center had advanced beyond Pińsk, the left almost to Riga and Dvinsk. During July alone Germany captured 145,000 prisoners. Notwithstanding his masterly retreat, which saved the Russian armies from annihilation, the campaign cost the Grand Duke Nicholas his command and it won Mackensen a field-marshalship.

Serbia alone remained to be dealt with, and Serbia's hour had struck. The task was easy, for in September Bulgaria had thrown in her lot with the Central powers and with her late antagonist, Turkey. Surrounded by enemies on three sides, Serbia was between the Devil and the deep blue sea. When Mackensen had finished, though 130,000 of her soldiers and part of her civilian population had escaped to the Allies after a harrowing and heroic retreat through mountain fastnesses, Serbia as a separate factor had ceased to exist. The only foothold in the Balkan Peninsula retained by the Allies was their base at Salonika, which they had obtained, too late to influence Bulgaria or to save Serbia, by cynically violating Greek neutrality. Though Greece had protested, not even Belgium had heeded. So ended 1915, with the Central powers universally triumphant except in the West.

1916

At the outbreak of hostilities a Coalition cabinet had been formed in England. When this proved unwieldy, a special committee was created the following November, of whom the regular members were Asquith, the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, and Kitchener, Secretary for War. Between his two picturesque colleagues Asquith was something of a nonentity from the first. The outstanding member of the trio was the Victor of Omdurman, on whom British conduct of the war chiefly depended; Churchill

lost credit as a result of the Dardanelles Campaign. A figure of increasing importance was Lloyd George, appointed to the new office of Minister of Munitions. In this post he showed commendable talent, and when Kitchener went down on the *Hampshire* in June, he became Secretary for War.

In October of 1915 a new ministry had been constituted in France, headed by Briand, with eight men under him who had previously been Premiers in their own right. On the fifteenth of December following Haig, who had commanded the First Corps at Mons, succeeded French as British commander-in-chief; and on the twenty-fourth of January Parliament passed the Derby Conscription Act. Over 5,000,000 men had joined the colors voluntarily, but Britain was resolved that every available Englishman should do his bit.

In the spring of 1916 Germany, fresh from her triumphs elsewhere, was again ready to try conclusions in the West. To push further into Russia might place her in the position occupied by Napoleon at the close of 1812. France, the mainstay of the Allies yet the nearest to exhaustion, was the obvious objective; and Verdun, the strongest and most famous fortress on the Western front, the natural point of attack. No break-through was contemplated—as is proved by the fact that 90 divisions stood idle elsewhere—but thanks to England the Allies in the West were growing in strength, and Germany wanted to strike before her enemies could synchronize their attacks. Moreover, Verdun was a tempting salient, which would be difficult for the French to keep supplied. To the Crown Prince, a deficient tactician, was to go the honor of the nominal command and the glory of the victory.

The task the Germans had set themselves was no mean undertaking. Vauban's great citadel still stood; but entirely apart from that an elaborate arrangement of modern defenses crowned the heights which encircled the city and overlooked the plain to the east. This formidable system was made up of a chain of detached forts—the smallest with a 155 (6-inch howitzer) in a disappearing and revolving turret, two 75's sweeping the ground toward each neighboring fort, and a battery of machine guns—all constructed after the most approved plans and surrounding the city with an unbroken ring of fire. In addition, three concentric lines of fieldworks had been erected.

The First Battle of Verdun, which lasted from February till August, may be divided into two major phases and these in turn into several minor episodes. On the morning of February 21 the artillery preparation began—twelve and a half hours of cannonading, 100,000 shells an hour, on a front of six miles. Under this withering fire the front lines disappeared, and in the late afternoon the infantry paraded into possession of the French positions. The loss of ground was impressive, but as the tactics employed by the French consisted in holding their front lines lightly and they had others on which to fall back, they were not seriously disconcerted. The next day, though the German artillery was no longer firing over a predetermined range and resistance was stiffening, the French operations were still in the nature of a strategic retreat. In four days the Germans advanced four miles on the northeast, reached the heights of the plateau, and captured Fort Douaumont, the reputed key to the defense. Nevertheless the French held doggedly on, though they had been in continuous action for five days against five times their strength in men and ten times

their strength in guns. On the twenty-sixth came the first counterattack, and Pétain arrived to take over the defense; the attack in this sector did not cease, but the first episode was over.

Having failed of a decision in the northeast, the Crown Prince transferred his attack across the Meuse and approached from the northwest. There the key to the defense was Mort Homme Hill, virtually unassailable on its steep front although it could be approached from the west by way of Hill 304. Hill 304, in turn, had to be gained by way of the Wood of Avocourt, halfway up its western slope. In this sector the Germans delivered their second attack, inferior only to the first in intensity. Between March 17 and April 9 they gained a mile on a front of six, but again their culminating effort fell short. By this time they were suffering more heavily than the French and it was time to stop—if it had not been at the end of the first attack.

But the honor of the dynasty was involved. The fourth of May witnessed the opening of a second phase, not less awful than the first, which continued into August. This second act was characterized by renewed attacks in the Mort Homme sector and on the northeast, and in both localities slight gains were made. There were slopes on Hill 304 and the Mort Homme where the ground was raised several yards by the heaps of German dead. Across the river, Fleury was carried and the assault reached, but did not carry, Fort Souville. The last week in June the peril was so grave that Pétain made every preparation for evacuating the right bank of the Meuse. Luckily for the Allies, it proved the high-water mark.

Verdun was not decisive for either side—even if the Germans had won it might not have been—but it was an event which the French rightfully rank above all others in their military exploits. It proved that their infantry were as steadfast in defeat as they were dashing in attack, that the 75 in defense was more than a match for the heavies in offense, and finally it revealed a new general of the first rank—Pétain. Twenty-three French divisions destined for the Somme offensive had been used up, but the Germans had used up 50—300,000 casualties for a hundred and thirty square miles of desert. In twenty square miles or so of this area there was not a foot unchurned by shellfire; the ground was as bare as a bald man's pate. In a sense Verdun *was* the turning-point of the war: "*Ils ne passeront pas!*"—"They shall not pass!"

The Allies, as previously noted, were only too prone to go their several ways, too little given to concerted action. In 1916, however, France, England, Russia, and Italy determined, now that their resources in trained and equipped men were getting formidable, to concert their action, keep Germany busy, and so prevent her from transferring troops from one front to another. Unfortunately for their plans, just as they were about to get under way Austria opened up an offensive in the Trentino that kept Italy more than busy. While the Crown Prince was still hammering at the gates of Verdun, however, Brusilov cut loose on the southern end of the Eastern front (June 5). At the end of ten weeks, to their complete surprise, the Germans had lost East Galicia and Bukowina, 300,000 men taken prisoner, twice that number in killed and severely wounded, and 400 guns. In addition, their line had been lengthened by two hundred miles.

Meanwhile the Allies in the West undertook to fulfill their part of the contract. At the time their bombardment began (June 24), the immediate objectives were clear: to ease the pressure on Verdun and to prevent Germany from sending reinforcements against Russia. On July 1 when the infantry hopped off, it was to enter a greater contest even than that at Verdun—the "blood bath of the Somme." When their drive ended in the fall, the Allies had accomplished their immediate objectives and had shown that they could give as well as take. They had kept the bulk and the best of the German army engaged, had proved that their new levies were equal to any task, had proved that they could outfight the German artillery on the offense as well as on the defense. And if the ultimate purpose of military strategy be the elimination of enemy forces, they were accomplishing their larger purpose—at a price. It was war of attrition with a vengeance. Whatever the conclusions of the higher command, to most of those beyond the inner ring, civilians as well as the rank and file, the price seemed exorbitant: 794,238 casualties (453,238 British and 341,000 French), as against 537,919 for Germany, in exchange for a hundred and twenty square miles—three times what Germany had paid for approximately the same amount of territory at Verdun! The Somme may have shaken German morale, as the higher command hoped, but it shook Allied morale at the same time and gave the British ample cause to remember the roses of Picardy as well as the poppies of Flanders.

The Somme had two additional consequences: during the action Hindenburg became chief of the general staff, with Ludendorff still his right-hand man; and simultaneously (August 27) Rumania threw in her lot against the Central Powers. Allied hopes ran high as a result of this extension in the German line, but those who counted their chickens reckoned without Hindenburg, Mackensen, *et al.*; before the year was out Rumania had gone the way of Serbia, and Germany had obtained the Rumanian grain fields.

Even if the Central Powers could not conquer Europe, their defense thus far was impregnable; and even if the Allies were not any worse off than they had been a year earlier, their achievements, with the exception of the defense of Verdun, the Russian offensive in East Galicia, and the capture of Gorizia by the Italians, were nothing "to write home about"—the censor permitting.

The most important political change of the year was the resignation of Asquith. Thanks to DORA (Defense of the Realm Act) Lloyd George, who succeeded him, was absolute dictator, independent not only of the King but of Parliament as well. For the moment at least, civil liberties suffered as complete eclipse in England as in all other belligerent countries. A few days after Lloyd George took office, Germany made a proposal "for the restoration of a lasting peace" (December 12). The Kaiser had written the Imperial Chancellor, "A ruler is wanted who is inspired by a desire to deliver the world from sufferings without minding possible wrong interpretations of his act." The opportunity to negotiate was declined by the Allies, individually and collectively, and without thanks (December 30). It is futile to speculate on what might have happened, or to call to mind how many millions of lives might have been saved, had the offer been accepted. By the majority of those whose sympathies were and are pro-Ally the matter will be dismissed with a gesture;

yet it should be remembered that it was at this very time that Wilson did his best to bring the belligerents together, and stoutly maintained the advantages of "peace without victory."

THE EARLY PART OF 1917

Early in 1917 Britain partially retrieved her failures against Turkey by the capture of Baghdad (March 11); but this remote and inconsequential success was small consolation in the face of the terrific disasters suffered by the Allies elsewhere.

On the Western front the situation underwent a considerable change when, guided by her new commander, Germany executed a strategic retreat to the "Hindenburg Line." The new position diverged from the old south of Arras, running just west of St. Quentin to a point a little northeast of Soissons and thence easterly. By this maneuver Germany surrendered some of her conquered territory, but only a strip that was nowhere more than about twenty miles in depth. Her salient, instead of forming a fairly acute angle, now formed a fairly obtuse one; her line was thereby shortened; and in the section of the front concerned, the Allies were now forced to operate over ground systematically devastated in order to render their task more difficult. Furthermore, new positions had been prepared in advance with almost super-Teutonic efficiency.

In front of the first line was a belt of wire 25' broad, and so thick that it was impossible for a man lying on the ground to see through it. In the line itself were double machine-gun emplacements of ferro-concrete 125 yards apart, and other lesser emplacements were dotted all over it. . . . More belts of wire defended the support line, which was the main line of defense. Here a continuous tunnel had been dug in the chalk at a depth of over 40 feet. . . . It was roofed, lined and bottomed with 9" x 3" timbers, and had numerous rooms leading off it. It was lit throughout by electricity. Large 9" trench mortars with concrete emplacements stood at the traverses, and were fed with ammunition from below. Strong machine-gun positions covered the line from behind.

The first engagement after the German retreat was a "show" put on by the British in front of Arras, against the northern pivots of the Hindenburg Line. Although the greatest Allied offensive to date (the artillery preparation was the most formidable yet, "the first hour of the Somme repeated, but a hundred-fold more awful"), the Battle of Arras, like every Allied action on the Western front so far, was a compound of successes and disappointments—in this case with the two rather evenly balanced. It marked, first of all, the "coming of age" of the new British army, its proved ability to stage an offensive of the first rank "on its own." In the first twenty-four days (April 9-May 3) four times as much territory was taken as in the corresponding period on the Somme; and although double the number of German divisions were engaged, the British suffered only half the number of casualties. Of the 104 enemy divisions in action, 74 had to be withdrawn to refit. Moreover the British took Vimy Ridge and demonstrated that the famous Hindenburg Line itself was not impregnable. But although they seized their immediate objectives with

something like ease, they failed to advance more than a few miles. The ultimate and important objectives remained unattained. In the final analysis, therefore, Arras was only an added, if improved, stage in the "war of limited objectives," the war of attrition.

The Second Battle of the Aisne, known also as the Battle of the Chemin des Dames and the Champagne Offensive, was designed to supersede the "war of limited objectives" by the once hoped-for break-through to a decision. The project was evolved by Nivelle. After achieving successes of peculiar audacity in the later stages of the Battle of Verdun, Nivelle had succeeded Joffre as commander-in-chief of the French armies (December 16). He planned to attack on a fifty-mile front, extending eastward from the southwesternmost point of the German salient, and he calculated on capturing Laon the first day and rolling up the whole Hindenburg Line from this point north. Even had everything been in his favor, the grandiose project was probably beyond the bounds of human achievement. The heights along which ran the Chemin des Dames, north of the Aisne, were by nature among the most formidable positions in Europe and they had been strongly fortified by the Germans, who were in no mood to relinquish them. Moreover, things were by no means in Nivelle's favor: the plan was known in detail to the enemy, who had captured his orders on prisoners; his men were weary and discontented (many had gone without leave for two years, and the state of the French hospitals was lamentable); and Nivelle himself did not enjoy the full confidence of the Government, which kept insisting that he justify his plans.

The action opened on April 16, and by the end of a month most of the Chemin des Dames salient had been taken; but Laon, only five miles further, was almost as far off as ever, and the losses had been terrific. Under other circumstances the outcome would not have been fatal; under existing circumstances it came near being, for the French had pitched their hopes so high that their disappointment was correspondingly exaggerated. A mutiny broke out among the troops, and Nivelle was superseded by Pétain (May 15). As an episode in the accustomed war of attrition the Second Aisne could have passed muster, but the truth was that France as a nation had reached the point where she was beginning to question that method of warfare.

The failure of Nivelle in Champagne marked the nadir of Allied hopes—a nadir that was to continue for over a year. In the early months of the war, albeit they grumbled unceasingly at the sanguinary optimism of the staff, the soldiers went at their task with enthusiasm. In spite of repeated and disheartening setbacks they were confident that somehow a miracle would happen and the war end with a flourish. Two apparently contradictory elements contributed to buoy them up. They came out imbued with a crusading spirit, instilled into them by a powerful press propaganda in regard to the Belgian atrocities, and an iron will to beat the unspeakable Hun; but the nearer they got to the Boche the less they heard of atrocities. They discovered that their enemies were "verra respectable men, and grand fighters," as one of the Highlanders put it. At first there was considerable display of chivalry on both sides. Good-natured banter would pass between the opposing trenches. "Poor old Jocks," the Germans would call out, "how is it on your side?" And the British would reply

in kind. The British would play the old familiar songs, and the Germans would sing them. And at Christmas time of the first winter there was an informal armistice and fraternizing between the two camps—to the not inconsiderable alarm of the authorities.

But as the weary months dragged on into years and the survivors of the original operations became a pitiful handful, optimism was succeeded by fatalism and defeatism. The war was never coming to an end, the soldiers felt—or if so, *they* would not live to see it. They fought on, doggedly, since it was their duty; but there was no longer any pretense at heroism or exaltation. They were all caught in a trap—British, French, Germans, and their several allies alike—from which no one could find the issue. It was simply a dirty mess which they must endure and “muddle through,” if fortunate enough to be among the survivors.

And it was a common saying that the survivors were not necessarily the most fortunate. Thousands who escaped actual destruction were crippled for life or mutilated beyond recognition. Worst of all, many who survived without bodily injury were turned into driveling idiots by what they had been through. The wonder is that *any* person of real sensibility who participated in the carnage of the World War retained his reason.

As a result of all this British officials felt called on to issue an order forbidding their men to sing a certain popular ditty, half braggadocio, half frankness, with the words:

I want to go home! I want to go home!
The bullets they whistle, the cannon they roar;
I don't want to stay here any more.
Take me over the sea, where the Allemand can't get at me.
Oh my! I'm too young to die! I want to go home!

After Nivelle's failure in front of Laon, mutinies in ten French divisions threatened to disrupt the entire war machine; and among the civilian population of France, though their rations were superior to those of British civilians in quantity and quality, there were ominous mutterings. The fact that in spite of stringent regulations wealth was still able to purchase luxury contributed in no small degree to stimulate discontent. In Italy conditions were even more serious.

Shades of discouragement settled still more thickly when it became apparent that Russia had struck her last effective blow; despotism, trickery, weakness, and corruption had done their work and done it well. In March, almost without a blow, the tsarist Government capitulated to its domestic foes; though there were 160,000 soldiers in the Petrograd⁸ garrison, hardly a single unit could be relied on. After the abdication of Nicholas II, Kerensky attempted to carry on; but he was hopelessly handicapped by internal dissensions. Effective military operations became impossible, and when an entire regiment withdrew from a crucial point in the line on July 19, a hopeless debacle ensued. At Brest Litovsk the Bolsheviks, who had driven Kerensky from power and taken over the Gov-

⁸ During the War St. Petersburg was rechristened Petrograd, because the ending “burg” was German.

ernment, made peace with the Central Powers. The Eastern front disappeared, and Germany was assured of a supply of foodstuffs.

SURFACE OPERATIONS AT SEA

So far no mention has been made of naval operations. Does this mean that Britain's proud fleet had remained useless and idle? Far from it. While the poilus and the Tommies were straining their hearts out to reach a decision on land, the navy was performing an essential function, or rather a number of functions: (1) sweeping German commerce from the seas; (2) eliminating commerce-destroyers; (3) making possible the capture of the German colonies; (4) safeguarding the British Isles; (5) protecting Allied commerce; (6) overseeing the transport of troops; and (7) neutralizing the German battle fleet. Most of these functions were interlocking, and all were tied up with the two primary functions: destroying the German battle fleet or confining it to port, and destroying or confining hostile commerce-raiders. Operations were therefore carried on by two more or less separate parts of the navy: first, by the battle fleet, dreadnoughts and battle cruisers, which patrolled the North Sea from its bases in the British Isles, and as the German battle fleet spent most of its time in the Bight behind the defenses of Helgoland, was forced to play a waiting game; and second, by the light cruisers and auxiliaries, which ranged the Seven Seas.

1. The first objective was attained in no time at all and with no trouble to speak of. Within a week Germany's great sea-borne commerce had disappeared; thenceforth, so long as Britain continued to rule the waves, the Germans in their beleaguered fortress had to be supplied from within or through neutral channels.

2. The second objective likewise gave little trouble. Germany had a number of commerce-raiders that made brilliant records and took their toll; but compared with the total of Allied tonnage, their inroads were insignificant. The most famous of these sea hawks was the *Emden*, which after an adventurous career in the Indian Ocean was finally run to earth by the Australian cruiser *Sydney*, of superior armament (November 9).

Meanwhile the British were treated to something of a thrill when Von Spee, with the German Far Eastern squadron, met and virtually annihilated a somewhat inferior British squadron under Cradock, off the coast of Chile (November 1). The English managed to get between their opponents and the setting sun and were shot to pieces in short order. The Battle of Coronel was the first and the last out-and-out defeat of any magnitude that a British naval unit suffered during the war. Von Spee subsequently sailed for the Falkland Islands, where he was surprised and crushed by a vastly superior English squadron sent out for the purpose. "Let us do honour to a gallant foe," writes an Englishman. "The German admiral did his duty as Cradock had done his, the German sailors died as Cradock's men had died, and there can be no higher praise. They went down with colours flying. . . . In all that hell of slaughter, which lasted for half a day, there was no thought of surrender. Von Spee and Cradock

lie beneath the same waters, in the final accord of those who have looked unshaken upon death."

3. With their enemies penned up in Central Europe, the Allies were free to pick off the German colonies at will. On August 23 Japan declared war on Germany and advanced to the siege of Tsing-tao. This fortress was the key to Kiao-chow, Germany's foothold on the Shantung Peninsula, and was her only stronghold to surrender between 1914 and 1918. The German colonies in the Pacific soon capitulated, mostly to colonial troops. The outcome of the war in Africa was equally inevitable, though there the conflict was more prolonged, complicated as it was by a rebellion among the Boers. Most of the Boers, notably Botha and Smuts, rallied to their foster mother—signal proof of Britain's wisdom in dealing with her colonies.

4. From time to time the Germans "raided" the eastern coast of England, slipping between the North Sea patrols and shelling a few towns, but they never attempted to land troops. These barbarities, of little or no military value, were the most senseless indulged in by Germany during the war.

5-6. The navy made possible the transportation of troops and supplies from both England and overseas to the Western front. Having lost her great industrial regions, France could not conceivably have continued to function had not the British kept open the paths of commerce.

7. The effective execution of all these operations depended ultimately on the control exercised by the battle fleet, which spent its time patrolling the North Sea. Owing to modern developments in naval warfare—such as the submarine and new methods of mine-laying—operations were carried on under comparatively unknown conditions; the British had, therefore, to act with particular care. The German strategy was sound, and the only one that held any chance of success: to wait in the hope that some lucky accident, the explosion of a mine field or a submarine attack, would so deplete the English fleet that it could be engaged on terms of equality or near-equality. A year and the better part of another slipped away, and it began to look as if the Germans would never come out.

On the last day of May, 1916, Beatty, in command of the main battle cruiser squadron, was out on patrol. At 2:20 P.M. one of his scouts sighted the German battle cruiser squadron to the northeast. Notifying Jellicoe, who was already under way with the battle fleet, he engaged the enemy at 3:48. The famous Battle of Jutland was on. Though Hipper was outnumbered and outclassed—for he had only five battle cruisers, while Beatty had six of heavier armament and in addition four dreadnoughts in support—he courageously fought his way south, in order to entice the English into the presence of his own battle fleet, and soon Beatty had lost two of his best ships. The Germans demonstrated marked superiority in nearly every respect, and so far had carried off the honors.

About 4:30 Beatty sighted the German battle fleet, and thereupon put about, to act as a decoy in his turn. The ruse worked, and at 6:15 Von Scheer found himself confronted with the pride of England's navy. In the face of such odds, retreat was the only sensible course of action. At 6:30 he mystified the British by executing an about-face, previously considered impracticable, and headed west-

erly. Most astonishing of all, Von Scheer subsequently executed a second about-face and returned to the attack at seven. This was Jellicoe's opportunity, but instead of closing he veered off. Von Scheer thereupon executed a third about-face. So totally unexpected and so cleverly executed were these maneuvers that not once did the British even discover what had happened. With their swifter vessels they then set out to cut the Germans off from their base. This they did, but only after dark; and as Jellicoe was unwilling to risk a night engagement, Von Scheer slipped safely through the British fleet.

Jutland, in addition to being the only major naval engagement of the war, was the greatest sea fight of all time. Opinions as to the outcome differ rather radically. In the first place, it must be remembered that the Germans were heavily outnumbered: 16 dreadnoughts and 6 predreadnoughts to 28 dreadnoughts, 5 battle cruisers to 9, no armored cruisers to 8, 11 light cruisers to 26, and 63 other vessels to 80. The relative strength of fleets can be determined pretty accurately by a comparison of their capital armaments. The English preponderance in heavy guns indicates clearly how great was the disparity: 200 over 12-inch and 146 12-inch against none over 12-inch, 144 12-inch, and 100 11-inch. And other things being equal, the results of a modern naval engagement can be determined in advance with almost mathematical certainty. The Germans would have been fools to risk a fight to the finish—and whatever they were, the Germans were no fools.

The British lost more heavily: 3 battle cruisers and 11 other vessels against a secondary battleship, a battle cruiser, and 9 others; 6,274 men against 2,545. That the Germans lost more heavily in proportion to their forces matters not in this connection, for they inflicted heavier losses on a superior fleet. In this sense Jutland was a German victory, and one of which they might justly be proud. "In our long and glorious naval history," wrote one Briton, "nothing directly comparable with this tragedy stands recorded."

That is only half the story, however, and by far the less important half. The important point is—and here is where the question of losses relative to forces engaged and *forces available* comes in—the British could better afford to lose than the Germans (as any tyro at chess will appreciate). After the Battle of Jutland the German battle fleet ventured out just once—only to refuse battle.

Considerable criticism was directed at Jellicoe for having fought what may be termed a defensive battle or a battle of limited objectives, rather than taking chances in the hope of wiping the German fleet off the map. Such a victory would have opened the Baltic and would have made it possible for France and England to bolster up Russia. Certainly Jellicoe missed his chance during the seven o'clock attack, and certainly he lacked the Nelson touch. However that may be, when it came to the question of a night engagement he fought with the realization that the Germans were definitely superior in this department of warfare, that the *entire* system of Allied defense rested on his shoulders, and that if by any evil turn of fortune British control of the seas were broken, the Allies would crumple. To build a modern battleship is an affair not of weeks or of months, but of years; to train a seaman takes even longer than to train a soldier. With England dependent on foreign supplies for her very existence,

any unnecessary risk which might threaten her imports of foodstuffs was folly. She already controlled the seas; the important thing was to see that she did not lose control.

AMERICA AND BRITISH SEA POWER

When war broke out, neutrals were placed in an exceedingly vexatious and difficult position, owing to the extent of the conflict. The Allies gained control of all news channels and did not scruple to conduct an intensive and frequently dishonest propaganda, in the endeavor to influence neutrals in their favor. In this connection, much was made of the Belgian "atrocities," and a famous report on the subject, subsequently largely discredited, was issued over the influential signature of Lord Bryce.

The United States, however, continued the policy of isolation (much like that pursued not long before by England) that had been the cornerstone of her attitude toward Europe since it was first enunciated by Washington; Wilson announced firmly that America would remain neutral "in fact as well as in name." A number of motives, in addition to traditional policy, dictated this course of action. The sympathies of the inhabitants were far from unanimous. Some Americans, more particularly those in the East, favored the Allies. A smaller number, mainly German-Americans and Irish-Americans, favored the Central Powers. The majority, especially those in the Middle and the Far West, were apathetic. In any case, the overwhelming majority felt that as the quarrel was neither of their seeking nor making and did not concern them, there was no good reason why they should take part in it. The spark that had ignited the international powder-magazine was kindled in a spot of which most Americans had never heard, and the victim of Sarajevo was a man about whom they cared nothing. As late as 1916 (May 27) Wilson said of the war, "With its causes and objects we are not concerned. . . . We are in no sense or degree parties to the present quarrel."

In pursuing her policy of neutrality, America intended to assert her rights as well as perform her duties, and from the very first there was friction over neutral rights. International practice, as recognized at the time, harked back to the Declaration of Paris of 1856, which declared: (1) that a neutral flag covered enemy goods, except contraband; (2) that neutral goods, with the exception of contraband, were not liable to seizure; and (3) that a blockade to be legal must be effective (that a "paper" blockade was not legal).

Since 1856 the matter of contraband had given rise to endless controversy; and according to the dictates of expediency, the individual powers tended to jump from one side of the argument to the other. During the Russo-Japanese War, for instance, Great Britain as well as the United States strongly protested against Russia's seizure of foodstuffs, fuel, and raw cotton whether these goods were bound for a military destination or not.

The most generally, though not universally, approved decision on the subject of contraband was the Declaration of London of 1909. Goods in naval transit were divided into three classes: absolute contraband, conditional contraband, and those which were not to be treated as contraband under any circumstances. The first class consisted of goods "exclusively used for war" (including

"their unassembled distinctive parts"), but with which were listed implements "made exclusively for the manufacture of munitions" and "animals suitable for use in war." The second class consisted of goods "susceptible of use in war" and included food, railway stocks, material for telegraphs, fuel, lubricants, barbed wire, binoculars, and chronometers. The third class included cotton, rubber, hides, manures (nitrates, and so on), and metallic ores. Belligerent powers were authorized to add to the list of contraband goods other "articles and materials which are exclusively used for war," but it should be emphasized that this was intended to cover hypothetical future inventions only, not to open the way for indiscriminate extension of these categories. All normal cases had been covered, and the line between the respective classes made sufficiently clear by their defining clauses. The Declaration of London furthermore provided that contraband was to be seized only upon proof that it was destined for enemy forces, such proof to consist in documentary or other sufficient evidence that the vessel concerned was bound for an enemy port. "Failing the above presumptions, the destination is presumed innocent."

It was upon the Declaration of London that the United States took her stand at the outbreak of hostilities and she called on the belligerent powers to do likewise. Germany and Austria of course agreed, provided that their opponents did the same. The matter then depended on the British. England also professed willingness—but with certain "modifications and additions." This diplomatic reply was tantamount to a polite announcement that she would do as she pleased; and on September 21 she arbitrarily added a number of articles from the third class to her list of contraband: copper, lead, glycerine, ferrochrome, hematite iron ore, magnetic iron ore, rubber, and hides. From the first therefore, England manifested a disposition to disregard both the most widely recognized rules of international etiquette—rules that she had just accepted in principle—and the usages for which she herself had previously contended. Under the circumstances, she should have been prepared to admit that "all's fair in love and war" and to have other powers follow her lead, without whining. America then abandoned her attempt to enforce the Declaration of London and fell back on a general statement that she would insist on her rights as "defined by the existing rules of international law and the treaties of the United States" (October 22). A week later England made further additions to her contraband list. Nor was this the end. Hardly a month passed that she did not issue a revised and augmented list.

Great Britain not only established arbitrary and capricious lists of contraband but she also entered on a policy of detaining vessels carrying these goods to neutral ports, justifying her actions on the ground that the cargoes were in reality destined for Germany. To be sure, she had good reasons for her suspicions; but not even incontrovertible proof could render her actions legal. Naturally this course of procedure was vexatious in the extreme to neutrals, and the United States protested vigorously against these illegal "restrictions upon the rights of American citizens on the high seas."

Soon after the opening of hostilities, on August 11 and September 26, England charged Germany with illegal mine-laying (though not, as has been implied, with laying floating mines—merely alleging that the mines "have in

numerous instances been found adrift from their moorings"). Germany denied the charge with well-founded arguments. On November 3, alleging that Germany had "scattered mines indiscriminately" and that she was herself actuated by a desire to protect neutral shipping, Great Britain declared "the whole of the North Sea . . . a military area. . . . Vessels will be exposed to the gravest danger from mines which it has been necessary to lay."

THE UNITED STATES ENTERS THE WAR

During the first six months Germany, in contrast to England, gave America no serious cause for offense; but she was beginning to tire of British logic. If England could flout the rules of international law, transport munitions from neutral countries for killing German soldiers, and starve German women and children, why should not Germany take such preventive measures as she could? Was not sauce for the goose sauce for the gander, if all were indeed fair in love and war? Germany's surface vessels were impotent, but she still had a comparatively new and untried weapon in reserve.

Prior to the World War little use had been made of the submarine; and during the early months it was regarded by England as a weapon of distinctly inferior value, almost a negligible quantity. Her first bitter realization of its potentialities came when, owing to lack of caution, three of her cruisers were torpedoed almost simultaneously by the same sub (September 22).

February 4, 1915, Germany declared that she would establish a "war zone" around the British Isles within which her subs would sink all enemy vessels, if necessary without warning. This was a violation of the international usage that a merchantman should be warned so that its crew could escape. Owing to the tactical disadvantages of the submarine, Germany was forced to violate this rule if her campaign were to succeed. A U-boat could be put out of action or sunk by a single hit, and was therefore in mortal danger if it approached a surface craft. Neutral vessels, as well as British, were imperiled, owing to the practice indulged in by the British of sailing their ships under neutral flags (for example, on February 6, 1915, the *Lusitania* entered Liverpool flying the American flag). Germany justified her course of action on the ground that the British were starving German civilians and had violated the Declaration of London and even the Declaration of Paris,

since their naval forces have captured on neutral ships German property which was not contraband. . . . They have declared the North Sea in its whole extent to be the seat of war. . . . The neutral powers have in the main acquiesced. . . . To a certain extent they have even contributed . . . by prohibiting the export and transit of goods destined for peaceable purposes in Germany. . . . Great Britain invokes the vital interests of the British Empire which are at stake in justification of its violation of the law of nations. And the neutral powers appear to be satisfied. . . . The time has come for Germany also to invoke such vital interests.

In these days wars are fought between nations in arms; lip sticks, cotton, and fat from milk for babies may become high explosives, and the containers from canned goods "potato-masher" grenades. Distinctions between absolute and

conditional contraband and those between conditional contraband and non-contraband are therefore highly artificial (but so are distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate warfare). To this extent Britain was *justified*; but that did not make her actions *legal*. Certainly her stand was open to criticism, because: (1) although she claimed to be a sportsmanlike nation, calling for the observance of rules, she altered the rules after the game began; (2) she was the first to break the rules; and (3) while demanding the observance of international etiquette and posing as the champion of civilization, she broke the very rules upon which she professed to take her stand. Germany's stand was *illegal*; the only question is whether she was *justified*. Both sides were guilty of acting as though two wrongs could make a right, as though because their opponents violated a rule they were justified in doing likewise or going even further—but again it should be emphasized that England was the original offender.

The United States was in much the same position that she had occupied prior to the War of 1812, and it remained to be seen which of the belligerents would first strain her patience to the breaking-point. Throughout the crisis of the next two years England showed herself more unbending than did Germany. She felt that she held the whip hand, diplomatically as well as in point of fact, and she determined to use it to the utmost. The United States suggested, as a *modus vivendi*, that Germany restrict her submarines to legal activities and that England allow foodstuffs to enter Germany under American supervision, so as to assure their reaching civilians only. Germany returned a favorable reply; England, what was tantamount to a point-blank refusal. She then proceeded to declare a blockade—which was admittedly ineffective. Germany accordingly went ahead with her threatened depredations, with the inevitable consequence that Americans traveling on British vessels were frequently lost and American ships, even, sunk. On the last day of April, 1915, a warning to Americans not to travel on British vessels, issued by the German Embassy at Washington, appeared in the New York papers. The next day the great Cunarder *Lusitania* sailed, and on May 7 she was torpedoed off the coast of Ireland with a loss of over a thousand lives, including more than a hundred Americans. Germany stood her ground, refused to disavow the act, since the *Lusitania* was an auxiliary, and ascribed the loss of life mainly to the explosion of a cargo of ammunition. The charge as to the munitions was inferentially and untruthfully denied by the United States Government.

Meanwhile, under cover of the furor raised by Germany's submarine activities, England's treatment of neutral shipping became more and more high-handed and obnoxious. American mail, even, was not left unmolested, and repeated protests were cynically disregarded. In a note of July 21, protesting to the Germans against the conduct of their submarines, Wilson conceded that "the Government of the United States and the Imperial German Government are contending for the same great object . . . the freedom of the seas. The Government of the United States will continue to contend for that freedom, from whatever quarter violated." On January 18, 1916, the United States proposed that England abandon her practice of arming merchantmen if Germany would agree to restrain her submarine attacks within legal bounds; but as

usual England refused, for Wilson and Ambassador Page had privately admitted their sympathy for the Allied cause.

On March 7, despite his vaunted neutrality, Wilson approved a secret "gentlemen's agreement" with the British, in which he promised "on hearing from France and England that the moment was opportune, to propose that a Conference should be summoned to put an end to the war. Should the Allies accept this proposal, and should Germany refuse it, the United States would probably enter the war against Germany. . . . If such a Conference met . . . and if it failed to secure peace, the United States would probably leave the Conference as a belligerent on the side of the Allies, if Germany was unreasonable." This agreement the British were loath to invoke, for fear that Wilson would disapprove of their war aims; but they no longer, if ever, feared that America would intervene in behalf of the Central Powers.

Finally, after the sinking of the *Sussex*, a British ship with American passengers (March 24, 1916), the United States sent Germany an ultimatum. In reply the German Government promised (May 4) to limit its submarine attacks to the fighting forces of belligerents, with the proviso that the United States compel the British also to observe the rules of international law. With the gentlemen's agreement in her pocket, England, far from changing her policy, openly denounced the Declaration of London and placed eighty-five American firms on the blacklist (July). Needless to say, no ultimatum from the United States was forthcoming. No wonder Germany concluded that America was too Anglophile or too cowardly to stand up for her rights.

Eight months after approving the gentlemen's agreement Wilson won his second election on a slogan of "He kept us out of war" (proving how little war sentiment there was in the country); less than two weeks after the "peace without victory" speech the German ambassador at Washington was handed his passports (February 3, 1917); and on April 6 America embarked on a crusade to make the world safe for democracy. While the war lasted, nothing more was heard of neutral rights or freedom of the seas.

The factors that led Wilson's countrymen to applaud his apparent *volte-face*—and not all of them did, at that—are not too easy to determine. Foremost among them, of course, was the fact that Germany, weary of well-doing so long as England was permitted to do as she pleased, had announced that she would resume unrestricted submarine warfare. Throughout, Germany was too logical, too frank. Where others merely *acted* on the principle that "all's fair in love and war," Germany proclaimed it openly, and this principle accorded ill with America's idealism—some would say hypocrisy. Moreover, Germany could not comprehend that even though the United States might put up with any number of other insults, she would not indefinitely brook the loss of American lives. All of which went back to the fundamental difficulty—that Germany labored under a strategic disadvantage which obliged her to endanger American lives if she were to combat British illegality effectively. (A possible way out was rejected. At one time, in response to a flood of petitions, a resolution prohibiting Americans from traveling on armed belligerent ships was introduced in the United States Senate; but the resolution was defeated through Wilson's influence.)

But other factors weighed heavily in the balance. Blood *is* thicker than water. The United States is predominantly Anglo-Saxon, and for over a century the two great English-speaking peoples had been at peace. Lexington, Concord, and Bunker Hill were affairs of the past; but Americans remembered with gratitude the friendly attitude of England during the Spanish-American War, as contrasted with the hostile attitude of Germany. There was also "the traditional alliance with Republican France" (albeit the autocratic Bourbon Government had been actuated by no altruistic motives during the American Revolution). The Allies owed America debts of over \$1,500,000,000 which they would be in no position to repay if they lost the war (as it turned out, this factor might well have been omitted from consideration). The intensive, unscrupulous, and cleverly conducted propaganda of the Allies must not be forgotten. The activities of Dumba, the Austrian ambassador, and of Boy-Ed, Von Papen, and other agents of the Central Powers who fomented strikes and sabotage in American munition plants, in an effort to prevent the Allies from obtaining supplies, and the so-called Zimmermann Plot, a last-minute attempt on the part of Germany to induce Mexico to attack the United States, added fuel to the flames.

THE LATTER PART OF 1917

The Allies had good reason to welcome an addition to their ranks; it may be fairly questioned whether after the collapse of Russia and without the entry of the United States they would not have been forced to conclude a peace of negotiation. As it was, no sooner did they learn that America was definitely committed than they set about presenting her with a series of *faits accomplis*. February 8 Japan requested a promise of Shantung and the German islands in the Pacific north of the equator. To these demands Great Britain, France, Russia, and Italy acceded. February 14 Russia agreed that France should have Alsace-Lorraine and no questions asked, that she should redraw her eastern frontier as she saw fit and include the Saar basin within her new boundaries, and that the left bank of the Rhine should be torn away from the remainder of Germany. On March 11 France, in return, accorded Russia complete liberty of action in reshaping the eastern frontiers of the Central Powers; the tsarist Government insisted on "the exclusion of the Polish question as the subject of international discussion." To the credit of England, be it added, she disavowed these machinations of her Continental allies as soon as revealed.

The entrance of the United States into the war helped to right the balance disturbed by the withdrawal of Russia; but since her military establishment was a negligible quantity, since Wilson had persistently opposed preparedness, and since she failed to profit by the experiences of the Allies, her military co-operation was slow in developing. Although a Fourth of July parade of American troops in Paris did much to hearten the war-weary French and their allies, the landing of the first contingents of the A.E.F. on June 25 was not an event of military importance.

While waiting for America's potential strength to make itself felt, the Allies suffered another stunning blow when Italy all but collapsed in the face of an

Austro-German attack at Caporetto (October). In less than a month the Italians were driven from Hapsburg territory to the Piave, with a loss of some 800,000 effectives—of whom only 160,000 were sick and wounded. Caporetto was by far the greatest "single" catastrophe of the war.

On the Western front the Allies carried out several more or less successful operations. The British staged a show at Ypres (the ever present, ever memorable "Wipers"). As usual, they were hampered by mud, and by the German occupation of all the elevated ground; but for nearly two years they had been conducting an intensive and extensive underground offensive, and by the use of mines they hoped to spring a surprise that would enable them to clear the Belgian coast and turn the northern flank of the German defense system. Messines Ridge was their first objective. Five miles of galleries, charged with a million pounds of explosives, had been constructed; and on the morning of June 7 nineteen volcanoes leapt into action. The first day Plumer achieved a complete success—a perfect example of the war of limited objectives. Advancing two and a half miles on a front of ten, with astonishingly few losses, he stormed heights that were considered impregnable. But the British still had the Passchendaele Ridge to cope with, and at this point they ran up against Germany's new system of "elastic" defense by "pill boxes" (small concrete machine-gun nests, impervious to the ordinary barrage). By November 10 the entire ridge, last of the preliminary objectives, was in British hands, and the Germans had lost all the points which afforded observation over Ypres; but owing to excessive wet and mud (the final stages of the Third Ypres were in all probability the muddiest battle known to history) and other difficulties encountered in consummating what should have been the earlier stages, no progress to speak of had been made toward the north. Degenerating into an episode in the war of attrition, the offensive proved the costliest ever put on by the British alone (230,000 casualties). In the end they lost more heavily than the enemy, and the morale of the troops was correspondingly undermined.

In the fall of 1917 a victorious counteroffensive was staged by the French at Verdun (August 20-September 8), during which, at comparatively small cost, they regained nearly all they had surrendered when the Crown Prince first attacked.

In front of Cambrai, Byng executed a novel and interesting surprise attack. No artillery preparation was employed; instead, the demolition of enemy wire was intrusted to the tanks, which had made their first appearance on the Somme. The Germans were taken completely by surprise; and for two days, until reinforcements could arrive, the British had things their own way. Byng carried the heavily fortified Siegfried Line, the Siegfried Reserve Line, and a portion of the final line the first day (November 20). For a moment it looked as though the cavalry might actually have their chance. But the breach was not wide enough, and the strategic points on the flanks held till the German supports arrived. At the end of a week the British had occupied a salient six miles in depth and sixty square miles in area. Then the enemy counterattacked on the flanks. On the left they made little progress, but on the right they used the new tactical methods elaborated at Caporetto—concentration of reserves only on the eve of assault (for purposes of deception), gas shells instead of the

usual high-explosive barrage (to avoid cutting up the terrain), and a complement of machine guns, trench mortars, and field guns to accompany the first wave of infantry. This time the British were taken by surprise. They were overwhelmed before they knew what was happening, found the apex of their salient untenable, and were compelled to abandon most of their gains. Only sixteen square miles were retained, and worst of all, they lost seven square miles of their original positions. Tactically, therefore, the Battle of Cambrai resulted in a stalemate; and even had Byng carried his final objectives in the first rush, the British would have been confronted with their old difficulty—lack of sufficient reserves to follow through. The only indisputably good results were the diversion of some of the German divisions destined for Italy, and more important still, the revelation of a new offensive weapon of extraordinary value—the tank.

The most clean-cut work accomplished by the Allies in the latter part of 1917 was Allenby's brilliant advance on Palestine, which resulted in the capture of Jerusalem December 11. Jerusalem was far from the main fronts, however, and in the face of the Caporetto disaster such minor successes were cold comfort. Nor was the situation on land the Allies' chief concern.

When the Germans gambled on bringing the United States into the war, they based their calculations on four main premises: (1) that the submarine would starve England into submission; (2) that American troops would never get across and so, since the United States was already financing and supplying the Allies, its change in status would involve no real change in conditions—or a change for the worse so far as the Allies were concerned if the U-boat campaign were successful; (3) that in any case the German army would beat France to her knees before the Americans could arrive in numbers; and (4) that if by any chance American troops did succeed in getting over in force they would be ineffective. It looked like a gamble worth taking; and as things turned out, Germany's calculations came so close to being correct that it was a miracle she did not win the war.

In April of 1917 U-boats sank almost exactly 450,000 more tons of British shipping than were constructed; for the entire year, although over 1,000,000 tons were launched, the excess of losses averaged nearly 200,000 tons a month. How, then, was tonnage to be found for the transportation of American troops, when even before the intensive submarine campaign opened England had need of every ton of British shipping? The first two premises on which Germany had calculated seemed in a fair way to materialize: England was rapidly approaching the starvation point, and when Germany sprang her great offensive in the spring of 1918, Pershing had only four trained divisions to offer his sorely pressed allies.

From the latter part of 1916 to the early months of 1918 there was more or less peace talk on both sides. In November of 1916, after the death of Francis Joseph, the new Emperor, Charles I, on his accession to the throne issued a manifesto indicating his desire to see the end of hostilities. He expressed the same wish to the Kaiser, who replied that he prayed for peace but could not beg for it. Charles thereupon put out feelers through the intermediary of his brother-in-law, Prince Sixte, a member of the Belgian army. The offer included

the relinquishment of Alsace-Lorraine, the restoration of Belgium, the restoration of Serbia, plus access to the sea (in return for the cessation of anti-Austrian propaganda), and the rectification of the Italian frontier. Great Britain and France expressed interest, but owing to the intransigent attitude of Italy negotiations broke down. On July 19, 1917, the Reichstag passed a vote in favor of "a peace of understanding and . . . permanent reconciliation. With such a peace, forced acquisitions of territory and political, economic or financial oppressions are inconsistent. [The Reichstag] also rejects all schemes which aim at economic barriers after the war. The freedom of the seas must be made secure. So long, however, as the enemy governments threaten Germany . . . the German nation will fight."

During the summer the Pope made strenuous efforts to bring about an understanding, and appeared to be accomplishing something; but by then Wilson, who was rapidly becoming the spokesman for the Allies, was no longer in a "peace without victory" mood. On October 20 Kerensky declared for a peace with "no annexations and indemnities." After his fall the Bolsheviks took up the cry—Trotsky calling for "the unconditional recognition of the principle of self-determination for all peoples"—and it was subsequently echoed by Germany (December 25).

The Allies, however, proved obdurate—though here and there in the Allied ranks there were signs of more moderate councils. Lord Lansdowne published a letter in which he said, "We are not going to lose this war; but its prolongation will spell ruin for the civilized world" (November 28); and Lloyd George made a speech (January 5, 1918) which was vastly more moderate than his previous utterances—an almost exact foreshadowing, in fact, of Wilson's Fourteen Points. Even these concessions failed to bring the disputants within striking distance, and on February 4 the Supreme Council at Versailles declared the discussion at an end.

More symptomatic of the true purposes of the Allies than their not unfavorable peace rejoinders were certain noteworthy political changes: the creation of the Supreme War Council, with control over all but military affairs (November 7, 1917), and the appointment of Clemenceau as French Premier (November 16). The old "Tiger" with a bull-walrus head rapidly became the symbol of French "will to victory."

THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE OF 1918

Germany was now ready to see whether her third calculation was correct, and early in 1918 she began the process of beating France into submission. During the winter, for lack of men the French had been obliged to disband a hundred battalions. In 1917 380,000 fewer recruits had entered the British army than in 1916, and in March of 1918 Haig had 180,000 less infantry than in March of 1917. Germany, on the contrary, had been able to transfer the bulk of her troops on the Eastern front to the Western, and for the first time possessed a considerable preponderance in effectives. The Allies were therefore forced to stand on the defensive until the Americans could get into line. Since Germany was maneuvering on interior lines, she had the added advantage of

being able to concentrate her forces without revealing where she intended to strike.

Preparatory to crushing the French, Ludendorff, who had become the dominating personality in German military affairs, set out to separate the Allies; in order to accomplish this, he decided to strike first at the British right, where it joined the French left. In conjunction with the tactics elaborated at Caporetto and Cambrai, he planned to employ the new method of attack by "infiltration." Instead of attempting to overwhelm or sweep back the line of defense unbroken, the advance, consisting of picked "shock troops," was to filter through at strategic points, honeycomb the opposing positions, make way for supporting artillery and infantry, and thus "surround" the enemy. The analogy of a hand pushing its way into putty or dough illustrates the procedure. To Hutier, who had first employed the new tactics, was assigned the position of honor opposite the juncture of the British and French lines.

The Allies realized, of course, that an attack was impending, and Haig foresaw exactly where the blow was to fall; but he had recently extended his lines, so as to relieve the French, and he now held a hundred and thirty miles of front with approximately the numbers available, before Russia collapsed, for the defense of only eighty. Moreover he was obliged to keep the bulk of his reserves in the north, where his lines were comparatively near to the sea and where he could not afford to lose much ground. Consequently his Fifth Army, on the right, was inadequately supported, although it held the most ground—72,000 yards, the division on the extreme right occupying 30,000, or over a yard per man. Haig's defense was organized in three zones; an advance zone, with a line of outposts, a battle zone, and a defense zone. It was argued that once an attack was broken up in the advance zone, it could not conceivably pass the battle zone; consequently the defense zone was not even completed when the action began.

On March 21, 37 divisions, constituting the first wave of the German assault, flung themselves on the British Third and Fifth armies holding the fifty-mile sector between Arras and the Oise. The conditions under which Ludendorff began the Second Battle of the Somme were ideal. A heavy mist rendered the visibility so poor that the defense was unable to see fifty yards. Before the British were even aware that an advance was on, the Germans had passed the zone of machine-gun fire and the outposts and those in the advance zone found themselves surrounded—and the fog prevented any warning's being sent back. The Germans had exactly twice as many divisions in action as the British; the Fifth Army was outnumbered four to one. By noon, the first zone was overwhelmed and Von Hutier was attacking the second.

By late afternoon of the second day the Fifth Army was fighting in the defense zone, and gaps had begun to open in the line. Worst of all, Haig had exhausted his reserves, for Pétain refused to believe that the attack was more than a *feint*. All night the retreat continued, and all the morning of the third day—the most appalling day in British military annals. More gaps appeared; in fact it looked as though the whole Fifth Army were dissolving. By evening Hutier had advanced as much as nine miles, while the British had lost 25,000 prisoners and 400 guns. That day, also, the Germans began shelling Paris—at a

distance of seventy-two miles! The sole ray of hope came from the fact that Ludendorff had taken three days to do what he had expected to accomplish in one.

Still the French failed to appear, and the enemy were relentlessly pressing on into the widening gaps. By the twenty-sixth the Allies had lost all they had regained as a result of Hindenburg's strategic retreat in the spring of 1917, and the entire Fifth Army was fighting on ground never touched by the enemy since the Western front was first established. For six days the worst gap was held by a motley aggregation from the byways and hedgerows: stragglers, individuals returning from leave, the personnel of a machine-gun school, members of labor battalions, American and Canadian engineers, anyone and everyone—officered by men they had never seen before.

Ludendorff's original plan had called for a break-through north of Amiens; when the Allied defense began to stabilize, this was changed into an attempt to capture Amiens itself and its railroad—the main line of interallied communications. Throughout the month the situation remained critical. The French were slow in coming, and Von Hutier advanced to within two short miles of the precious artery; but there he was stopped. In less than a week his men had advanced thirty-eight miles, fighting all the way; they were short of food and munitions, and they had outdistanced their heavy artillery.

It is impossible to depict this greatest of battles.⁹ In the first month of the First Verdun the French had faced 20½ German divisions; in less than a month in 1918 the British faced 102. Germany conquered some 1,500 square miles—twelve times as much as at Verdun—in addition to what she had relinquished, and in two weeks she captured 90,000 prisoners and 1,300 guns. Of Haig's 58 divisions 46 had been engaged, which meant that they were no longer fresh, and the Germans lost fewer men.

Although the Germans performed prodigies, the results were not altogether unfavorable for the Allies. Germany was adding measurably to the extent of front she was obliged to defend, and she was committed to a policy of offense; thenceforward it was a case of win or lose. England abandoned her practice of retaining a large force for home defense and shipped 355,000 additional troops across the Channel. She also decided to find the necessary tonnage for American troops. Last but not most important of all, she agreed with her allies on a unified command. In the thick of the battle (March 26) Foch was intrusted with coordinating military operations, and on April 24 he was formally appointed generalissimo on the Western front. Short and slight, Foch was in many other ways the antithesis of Hindenburg.

Ludendorff's second blow, intended as a diversion, was likewise delivered against the British. Striking in front of Lille, he was again successful in opening a gap but, lured on by the Channel ports, made the mistake of throwing in his reserves when resistance stiffened. On April 11 Haig issued his famous order: "There is no other course open to us but to fight it out . . . with our backs to the wall." The Germans made an impressive dent in the British lines,

⁹ The fighting during the closing phase of 1918 covered a wider front, but was a series of simultaneous engagements rather than a single battle; moreover, on the side of the Germans, who were in no condition to offer effective resistance, it was in the nature of a retreat.

forced the British to evacuate all they had won in the Third Battle of Ypres, and rendered 9 British divisions unfit for service. But Ludendorff had by now lost over 500,000 men, including the cream of his reserves.

Nevertheless he still enjoyed a preponderance of 40 divisions (208 to 168), and on May 27 he launched his third great offensive. This time it was the French along the Chemin des Dames who were honored with his attentions. His aim was to drive toward the Marne, then toward Compiègne, and finally, by uniting the two salients, to take Paris and Amiens. Because the sector of attack was considered impregnable, the French were unwary; and never, perhaps, did the Germans move so unobtrusively or so fast. For the moment, by an advance of twelve miles in a single day, they actually exceeded their own hopes. An incident of the second day's fighting, relatively unimportant but significant nevertheless, was the recapture of Cantigny by the American First Division. It was the first offensive staged by an American unit in the World War. The fourth day the Germans held some ten miles of the Marne, with outposts on the south bank—an advance of thirty miles, during which they had captured 30,000 prisoners and 400 guns. Unfortunately for them, however, the new position was a sharp salient; and although by June 6 they had captured 58,000 men and 650 guns, their efforts to broaden it made little impression. Subsequent attacks likewise failed, and for a month there was a lull.

At sea the worst was over. Increase of shipbuilding in England and America, the convoy system, the depth bomb, and other measures had checkmated the U-boat. American troops came pouring into France, not merely by hundreds or thousands, but by tens of thousands and hundreds of thousands—100,000 in April, 200,000 in May, and over 250,000 in June. Strategically, 1918 was the Waterloo Campaign all over again, with Foch in the rôle of Wellington and Pershing playing the part of Blücher. The majority of the Americans, however, were raw civilian levies; it still remained to be seen whether Germany's fourth premise would hold water.

By the middle of July, Ludendorff was ready to make his fourth and final bid for victory—his Peace Drive. This time he planned to strike east and west of Rheims, capturing the city, cutting the Paris-Nancy railroad, and making a huge gap in the French front. "If my offensive at Rheims succeeds, we have won the war." "If the German attack at Rheims succeeds," admitted Foch the same day, "we have lost the war." He did not fear a limited extension of the Marne salient southward, but he was determined to keep it from being widened. At midnight of the fourteenth the heavies lifted their prophetic voices once more, to herald the supreme effort of the Central Powers. On the fifteenth the Germans pushed the tip of their salient forward from one to three miles, merely rendering it additionally vulnerable; but at Château-Thierry the American Second Division held firm, and east of Rheims no real progress was made. For two days more, with little effect, the Germans continued their sledgehammer blows.

Though the Allies had been on the defensive for almost four months, Foch had laid his plans and was only biding his time. On the eighteenth, without any warning barrage, a swarm of 321 tanks followed by French and American infantry charged out of the woods against the entire right of the Marne salient;

the tactics of Cambrai had been repeated—but this time there was no “come-back.” In the center of their sector the Allies advanced eight miles, and the salient, which had become a pocket, was thereby rendered untenable. Though the numbers engaged were not impressive, compared with what had gone before, it proved the apex of four years’ fighting. Germany’s every calculation had failed. The tide had turned!

GÖTTERDÄMMERUNG ¹⁰

Having captured the initiative, Foch determined that his opponents should know no rest; and at last, thanks to the timely arrival of the Americans, he had the preponderance in effectives which would allow him to strike blow after blow, first in one sector and then in another.

For the moment he contented himself with shepherding the Germans out of their pocket on the Marne. By the end of July the salient had disappeared, the Paris-Nancy railroad had been freed from danger, and the Second Battle of the Marne was over. His next concern was to safeguard the Paris-Amiens line. On August 8, accordingly, Haig took up the good work, south of the Somme. Four hundred tanks cleared the way, Von Hutier was taken completely by surprise, the Germans were in many instances overwhelmed before they even realized an attack was impending, and the cavalry advanced twenty-three miles beyond its point of concentration. So closed the historic “Black Day of the German Army,” to borrow Ludendorff’s phrase. Thereupon the French, attacking below the British right, captured Montdidier and advanced six miles beyond. Amiens and its railroad were now out of danger. On July 13 and 14, Ludendorff was in conference with the Kaiser and the Chancellor, urged peace, and offered his resignation (which was not, however, accepted). No longer was there any question of winning a victory; it only remained to be seen whether, in the hope of securing favorable terms, Germany could make a stand that would enable her to hold out through the winter.

But Foch had no intention of allowing the Germans to catch their breath. From August 21 to September 12 Haig struck a series of blows at various points along his front, achieving an uninterrupted string of successes, still further depleting the German resources, and biting deeply into the Hindenburg Line in the north. And now it was the turn of the Americans. For the first time in history they had a separate army ready to operate on European soil, and as a preliminary operation they were assigned the reduction of the St.-Mihiel salient, which rendered the French position at Verdun a salient. As a matter of fact, Ludendorff had decided to withdraw, owing to scarcity of men, but he was caught in the act. On September 12 the outfits attacking the two sides of the salient effected a juncture, and by the end of the third day the heights of the Meuse had been cleared. In the two months that had elapsed since the middle of July the Germans had lost 500,000 men, and Foch had increased his reserves by an equal amount. The stage was set for the final scene.

¹⁰ *The Twilight of the Gods*, the name of the last of the operas in Wagner’s famous *Ring der Niebelungen*.

Whatever Ludendorff might achieve on the Western front, elsewhere the Central Powers had reached the end of their rope. The astounding thing about the whole affair was the staggering abruptness with which their various fronts collapsed; just as the Allies had resigned themselves to spending the rest of their lives at war, it was all over.

Until the autumn of 1918 the Allied army at Salonika had done nothing to justify its existence. When Bulgaria entered the war, Greece was by treaty bound to assist Serbia, but failed on account of King Constantine, brother-in-law of the Kaiser. Venizelos, who had advocated a policy of intervention, was forced out of office. Subsequently he set up a separate government at Salonika. The Allies blockaded Greece (a curious situation), systematically violated her neutrality, and finally compelled Constantine to abdicate. In the fall of 1918 a rejuvenated Greek army constituted the largest single element among the forces at Salonika. The terrain confronting the Allies was supposedly impregnable, but on September 15 the Serbian contingent began an attack. In ten days the Bulgarians were cut off from their Teutonic allies, and on the last day of the month Bulgaria signed an armistice.

The downfall of Turkey was almost equally sudden. Assisted by the Arabs, who had been won over by Lawrence, Allenby opened a drive north of Jerusalem on September 19. On October 1 he entered Damascus; 60,000 prisoners and 300 guns had fallen into his hands. On the twenty-sixth the Baghdad Railway was cut, marking an advance of three hundred miles; and on the thirtieth, Turkey signed an armistice. An empire once the most powerful in the world had crumbled like a rope of sand.

The Austrian debacle was the swiftest and the most complete of all. The main advance of the final Italian offensive opened on October 27, and by the end of the month the Austrian retirement had become a rout. If the Hapsburgs had sinned, they paid for it in full. Already, as a result of civil revolt, their empire lay in fragments. On November 4 the Hapsburg forces grounded arms forever, and the oldest and proudest dynasty in Europe passed from the stage.

Until September Foch had contented himself with striking successive blows, here and there. Now he was ready to turn his *urpeggio* into a grand *crescendo*, with all the members of his orchestra acting in concert. For Ludendorff the vital problem was to protect his only good line of communications, the railroad that ran from Metz—by way of Conflans, Mézières, and Valenciennes—to Lille.

The position of honor on the right Foch intrusted to Pershing's First Army. The American field of operations was the most difficult terrain on the entire front, the Argonne Forest, where in over four years the French had been unable to make any impression. Owing to the vital strategic importance of the Argonne, as well, any threat here was bound to meet strong resistance. To Pershing fell also the honor of opening the combined offensive. (In the course of the battle 1,200,000 Americans saw service; the casualties were 10 per cent.) On the twenty-sixth the Americans advanced six miles, and the next day Haig chimed in, in front of Cambrai, followed on the twenty-eighth by the Belgians, south of Dixmude, and the French, north of the Vesle; by the 1st of October

two hundred and fifty miles of front, from the Meuse to the sea, were ablaze. From then on there was practically no let-up.

The Germans fought with superb courage, as befitted a nation that for four long years had held the world at bay. Mere boys were pressed into service, but even so the ranks were depleted; the soldiers were disheartened, and the Allies gave them no rest. Obviously the struggle was hopeless, for the very organization of the peerless imperial army was cracking. On October 1 Hindenburg informed the Kaiser that Germany must have peace. On the fourth the Chancellor sent President Wilson a note, the result of which was an animated correspondence (to be treated in detail in the next chapter). On the twentieth the Allies had cleared the Belgian coast and had reached the Dutch frontier. Less than a week later Ludendorff resigned (October 26). Exhausted German divisions numbering less than a thousand were returned to the line, some without artillery, trench mortars, or machine guns: twenty-five had been disbanded. The remnants of the old officer class upheld their traditions, and the machine-gunners performed miracles—but it was like pouring water into a sieve.

By the end of October, although their air forces, transportation, and services of supply were at times absurdly inadequate (trucks and food sitting idly at the base), the Americans had cleared the Argonne. On November 1 Liggett, in command of the First Army, began the final advance to cut the railway line from Metz to Mézières. On the left and in the center the British and French kept the enemy more than busy. In three days Liggett advanced eighteen miles, and on November 4 he had the railroad at Montmédy and Longuyon under fire. Elsewhere too it was a red-letter day, for the British scattered 32 German divisions, taking 19,000 prisoners and 450 guns.

Never did the fortitude of the Germans—with overwhelming odds and certain defeat staring them in the face—show to better effect. Never did the valor of the Teutonic peoples rise to greater heights than when Anglo-Saxon, Norman, American, and German, Catholic Austria and France, Protestant Germany, England, and America, met in “that last weird battle in the west.” Gone were the days of Roland and his paladins, of Harold and his housecarls, of Custer and his horsemen. To all but the trained eye, even the Guards—Grenadier, Coldstream, Scots, Prussian, and the rest—were indistinguishable from the line regiments. Of the ancient notions of warfare nothing remained but the certainty that the old stamina of the race had not deteriorated, that men were still willing to fight to the end—though they knew not why. It was a sight to rejoice the ancient war gods, to wring the heart of the Prince of Peace, to cause any sane student of civilization unalloyed misgiving.

On the fifth of November, when the retreat had developed into a rout, Wilson notified Germany that the Allies were ready to grant an armistice. The next day the victorious First Division of the American Army reached Sedan. The German delegates, headed by Erzberger, entered the Allied lines on the seventh, and the following morning met Foch near Compiègne. When a commander writes his terms in the blood of his dead son and countrymen, he is not apt to err on the side of overleniency; Germany was given seventy-two hours to decide. On the ninth the Kaiser abdicated and a republic was proclaimed. Had there been any chance of resistance, there is little doubt that the Germans

would have refused. As it was, they signed, under protest, at 5 A.M. on the eleventh of November—the day the British entered Mons. At eleven in the morning firing ceased.

That night, when Paris and London were going mad with joy, the advanced camps were so quiet "that one would have thought they belonged to brave men defeated"—as quiet, almost, as the abodes of those others whom some would remove from their hard-earned resting-places.

Leave them in peace,
Break not their last, long post
Where in the dark before the Paris portal
They stemmed the tide and broke the Teuton boast,
Or where their blood will leap immortal
In poppy flame in Flanders' fields
And endless striving yields
To dreamless peace.

CHAPTER XVI

CARTHAGO DELENDA EST¹

THE MESSIAH OF DEMOCRACY

On the thirteenth of December, 1918, the *George Washington* steamed into the harbor of Brest. On board the *George Washington* (what more fitting name?) was Woodrow Wilson, the Messiah of Democracy, bound from the New World to the Old for the purpose of bringing the Great Crusade to an appropriate conclusion. The following day he reached Paris. America had come of age, and in his person was to take her place at the European council table as a power of the first magnitude.

Small wonder that Wilson carried with him an exalted sense of his mission. During the war he had emerged as the acknowledged spokesman of the Allies and, more than any other individual, had contributed to the downfall of German autocracy. It is even doubtful whether without him Foch could have terminated the war in 1918. Now he was arriving at the Peace Conference to continue his rôle as spokesman, and on every side acclamations of frenzied joy greeted his approach. No conquering hero ever received a more soul-stirring welcome. Moreover, it was a solemn as well as a joyous occasion, a truly awful occasion, for on his shoulders alone rested the supreme hopes and expectations of a war-worn and waiting world.

Europe, when the President touched its shores, was as clay ready for the creative potter. Never before were the nations so eager to follow a Moses who would take them to the long-promised land where wars are prohibited and blockades unknown. And to their thinking he was that great leader. In France men bowed down before him with awe and affection. Labour leaders in Paris told me that they shed tears of joy in his presence, and that their comrades would go through fire and water to help him to realize his noble schemes. To the working classes in Italy his name was a heavenly clarion at the sound of which the earth would be renewed. The Germans regarded him and his humane doctrine as their sheet-anchor of safety.

"Probably to no other human being in all history," testified Smuts, "did the hopes, the prayers, the aspirations of so many of his fellows turn with such poignant intensity." As a member of the forces that fought in the Great Crusade, the author believes that similar sentiments were entertained by the ma-

¹ "Carthage must be destroyed"—Cato's famous motto.

jority of the soldiers. Materially, as well, the situation was all in Wilson's favor. For the time being Germany had ceased to count. Whereas the Allies were exhausted, the American army was at the peak in numbers and equipment. Financially and for its food supplies Europe was completely dependent on the United States. Then too, America had no ax to grind.

In view of subsequent developments it is essential to interpolate a few words regarding the circumstances of Wilson's trip. It has been said that he should never have left home, that "he should have remained in America, in the rôle of America, speaking occasionally as if a nation spoke." Familiarity breeds contempt, it is true; but to remain at home, he felt, would constitute a betrayal of trust, for to no one could he leave the elaboration of his plans for a just peace. He has been criticized for bringing his wife and the wives of several of his suite. Certainly it caused adverse comment, particularly among the soldiers, to see these ladies flying about in high-powered motor cars to social gatherings and on sight-seeing trips; but such matters could have had little influence on the outcome. The festivities in which Wilson personally joined during the better part of his first month abroad have likewise constituted a basis for reproach. As a matter of fact, this delay was primarily the fault of Lloyd George, who saw fit to indulge in a general election and did not arrive till the twelfth of January. A more weighty criticism has been based on the fact that Wilson's immediate suite consisted entirely of his creatures and that he made virtually no attempt to avail himself of the talent of the Republican leaders.

The gravest charge that can be brought—though not simply against Wilson—as to this serious matter of allowing two months to elapse after the armistice before getting down to business is that during all that time and during the period of the Peace Conference as well, Germany was kept blockaded. Maintained at the behest of France, for no sufficient reason, the postwar blockade added an incalculable sum to the total of human suffering and embitterment. If Germany had turned Bolshevik, as the Allies greatly feared, it would have been no one's fault but their own.

What was Wilson's attitude of mind when he arrived in France? No human being, however great, can escape entirely unscathed from the prejudices of the milieu in which he lives. Wilson was earnestly and deeply desirous of acting justly, impartially; but he and his advisers had been soaked in Allied propaganda for over four years. Though he was inclined to distrust the British, he had become entirely converted, probably without realizing it, to the fundamentals of the French attitude. "The wrong done in 1871," for instance, was one of his obsessions—and had he not come to Europe to right the wrongs of the world?

One more accusation connected with the preliminaries of the conference is that directed against the choice of Paris as the place of meeting. Aside from the difficulty of finding a neutral city with accommodations for an assemblage of such size, the choice was a tribute to the heroism of France, of which her allies had not the heart to deprive her. Though Wilson realized the dangers involved and was on his guard, there is no telling what the French might not have accomplished had they played their cards with a little more finesse. As it was, they insisted on trying to drag him out to see the devastated regions, an attempt

which he resisted and at which, when pressed, he became distinctly annoyed. But Paris itself, twice threatened by the German armies and in its piles of captured guns, bomb-splintered churches, posters, and the rest still bearing evidence of the late struggle at every turn, was saturated with war atmosphere. And the French leaders lost no opportunity to dilate on the sufferings of poor "little" France. The author was present when Wilson attended the opera, a performance preceded by a tableau consisting of a woman in Goddess of Liberty costume singing the "Star-spangled Banner" and another, in Alsatian costume, the "Marseillaise." It was a brilliant, a stirring occasion; but little calculated to allay the passions.

PREPARATIONS FOR A WILSONIAN PEACE

Before a study of the Paris Conference, a review of the pre-armistice negotiations, knowledge of which is essential to any consideration of the peace terms, is a necessary preliminary. On October 4, 1918, Germany had sent Wilson a note requesting an armistice. In this note she had agreed to accept "the program set forth by the President of the United States in his message to Congress of January 8, 1918, and in his later pronouncements, especially his speech of September 27, as a basis for peace negotiations." What, then, was this program to which Germany had reference?

Wilson's speech of January 8, 1918, had contained his famous Fourteen Points, his

program of the world's peace . . . the only possible program . . . : 1. Open covenants . . . openly arrived at . . . always . . . in the public view. 2. Absolute freedom of . . . the seas. . . . 3. The removal, as far as possible, of all economic barriers. . . . 4. Adequate guarantees . . . that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety. 5. . . . Impartial adjustment of all colonial claims. . . . The interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined. 6. The evacuation of all Russian territory and . . . unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development . . . under institutions of her own choosing; and more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind. . . . 7. Belgium . . . must be evacuated and restored, without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free nations. . . . 8. All French territory . . . restored, and the wrong done . . . in 1871 . . . righted. . . . 9. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy . . . along clearly recognizable lines of nationality. 10. The peoples of Austria-Hungary . . . accorded . . . autonomous development. 11. Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro . . . restored; Serbia accorded . . . access to the sea; and the relations of the several Balkan states to one another determined . . . along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality. . . . 12. The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire . . . assured a secure sovereignty . . . other nationalities . . . autonomous development, and the Dardanelles . . . permanently opened. . . . 13. An independent Polish state should be erected . . . inhabited by indisputably Polish populations . . . assured . . . access to the sea. . . . 14. A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.

. . . We have no jealousy of German greatness. . . . We do not wish to injure her or to block in any way her legitimate influence or power. We do not wish to fight her either with arms or with hostile arrangements of trade if she is willing to associate herself with us . . . in covenants of justice and law and fair dealing. . . . Neither do we presume to suggest to her any alteration or modification of her institutions. . . .

On February 11 Wilson had further declared:

What we are striving for is a new international order based upon broad and universal principles of right and justice—no mere peace of shreds and patches. . . . *There shall be no annexations, no contributions, no punitive damages.* Peoples are not to be handed about from one sovereignty to another by an international conference. . . . National aspirations must be respected; peoples may now be dominated and governed only by their own consent. "Self-determination" is not a mere phrase. . . .

On April 6 he had affirmed:

We are ready whenever the final reckoning is made to be just to the German people, deal fairly with the German Power as with all others. There can be no difference between peoples in the final judgment if it is indeed to be a righteous judgment. . . .

On the Fourth of July he had continued:

It is our inestimable privilege to concert with men out of every nation what shall make not only the liberties of America secure, but the liberties of every other people as well. . . . These are the ends for which the associated peoples of the world are fighting and which must be conceded them before there can be peace: *First*, the destruction of every arbitrary power anywhere . . . or . . . at least its reduction to virtual impotence. *Second*, the settlement of every question . . . upon the basis of the free acceptance of that settlement by the people immediately concerned. . . . *Third*, the consent of all nations to be governed in their conduct towards each other by the same principles of honor and of respect for the common law of civilized society that govern the individual citizens of all modern States. . . . *Fourth*, the establishment of an organization of peace which shall make it certain that the combined power of free nations will check every invasion of right. . . . *What we seek is the reign of law, based upon the consent of the governed and sustained by the organized opinion of mankind.* . . .

Wilson's final pronouncement of this kind had been made on September 27:

Shall strong nations be free to wrong weak nations . . . ? Shall peoples be ruled and dominated, even in their own internal affairs, by arbitrary and irresponsible force . . . ? Shall the assertion of right be haphazard and by casual alliance or shall there be a common concert to oblige the observance of common rights? No man, no group of men, chose these to be the issues of the struggle. They *are* the issues of it; and they must be settled,—by no arrangement or compromise of interests, but definitely and once for all. . . .

No peace shall be obtained by any kind of compromise or abatement of the principles we have avowed. . . . To achieve by the coming settlements a secure and lasting peace, it will be necessary that all who sit down at the peace table shall come ready and willing to pay the price. . . . That price is impartial justice in every item of the settlement, no matter whose interest is crossed; and not only impartial justice,

but also the satisfaction of the several peoples whose fortunes are dealt with. . . . Germany will have to redeem her character, not by what happens at the peace table, but by what follows.

And, as I see it, the . . . League of Nations and the clear definition of its objects must be a part, in a sense the most essential part, of the peace settlement itself. It cannot be formed now. . . . It would be merely a new alliance. . . . It is not likely that it could be formed after the settlement. . . .

But these general terms do not disclose the whole matter. Some details are needed. . . . These, then, are some of the particulars . . . : First, the impartial justice meted out must involve no discrimination between those to whom we wish to be just and those to whom we do not wish to be just. It must be a justice that . . . knows no standard but the equal rights of the several peoples concerned; Second, no special or separate interest of any single nation or any group of nations can be made the basis of any part of the settlement which is not consistent with the common interest of all; Third, there can be no leagues or alliances or special covenants and understandings within the general and common family of the League of Nations; Fourth, and more specifically, there can be no special, selfish economic combinations within the League. . . . Fifth, all international agreements and treaties of every kind must be made known in their entirety to the rest of the world. . . .

On these terms, therefore, Germany, on October 4, had agreed to lay down her arms. Referring in his reply of the fourteenth to his speech of July 4, Wilson stated that the destruction of the arbitrary power of the Imperial Government was a necessary precedent to peace; on the twenty-third he declared even more emphatically, "The United States cannot deal with any but veritable representatives of the German people."

The day before, at the suggestion of the new Chancellor, Prince Max of Baden, the Reichstag had already voted far-reaching changes in the constitution. On the twenty-eighth a mutiny broke out among the sailors at Kiel, and the last of the month the Kaiser left Berlin for good. November 3 his acceptance of the reforms was published—but it came too late; revolution, which resulted in the fall of the Wittelsbach Dynasty, broke out in Bavaria on the seventh. On the ninth the abdication of William II was announced, the Republic was proclaimed, and the Kaiser crossed the Dutch frontier.

To charge the Kaiser with cowardice and heap opprobrium on his defenseless head is doubly unjust, as unjust as it is senseless. In view of Wilson's terms the only patriotic thing he could do, the *only* thing he could do, was to get out of the way. In his final move, moreover, he was merely the plaything of Fate. His abdication was published before he signed it; at Spa he was put into a car bound for an unknown destination—and found himself in Holland. In their heart of hearts the Allies were only too glad. They could not have convicted him of any illegality—would not if they could, for they had no desire to become responsible for a royal martyr.

Wilson had communicated his correspondence with Germany to the Allies. November 5 they issued their reply:

The Allied Governments have given careful consideration to the correspondence which has passed between the President of the United States and the German Government. Subject to the qualifications which follow, they declare their willingness to make peace with the Government of Germany on the terms of peace laid down in

the President's Address to Congress of January 8, 1918, and the principles of settlement enunciated in his subsequent Addresses. [On the subject of Clause 2 they] reserve to themselves complete freedom . . . when they enter the Peace Conference. . . . They understand that compensation will be made by Germany for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies and their property by the aggression of Germany by land, by sea, and from the air.

The same day this reply was communicated to Germany.

Concerning the subject peoples of Austria-Hungary, Wilson had informed the Austrian Government on October 18 that he was "no longer at liberty to accept a mere 'autonomy' of these peoples as a basis of peace, but is obliged to insist that they, and not he, shall be the judges of what action on the part of the Austro-Hungarian Government will satisfy their aspirations and their conceptions of their rights and destiny as members of the family of nations."

To any open-minded and impartial judge "it is at least clear that the diplomatic correspondence of the autumn of 1918 led to (1) legal obligations binding the Powers on one side and Germany on the other side, and (2) moral obligations binding upon the Powers and Austria-Hungary alike." With three important exceptions—in regard to the freedom of the seas, in regard to Austria-Hungary, and in regard to the financial settlement—the Allies entered the Peace Conference committed to a Wilsonian peace.

TOO MANY COOKS OR TOO FEW?

Eventually the seventy plenipotentiaries of the twenty-seven powers of the Grand Alliance reached Paris; not only they but a corps of other delegates, a thousand and thirty-seven officially listed, and a young army of experts and secretaries (the British delegation, for example, numbered nearly two hundred, with an equal number of clerks and typists, and occupied five hotels), not to mention the representatives of various interests of doubtful standing—Irish, Schleswigers, Åland Islanders, Finns, Estonians, Letts, Lithuanians, Ukrainians, Russians, Ruthenians, Albanians, Egyptians, Zionists, Lebanese, Druses, Syrians, Kurds, Armenians, Georgians, Circassians, Kirghizes, Lesghians, Persians, Hindus, Mingrelians, Buryats, Malays, Koreans, and what not. For the moment Paris presented a cross-section of almost the entire Eastern Hemisphere. Many of the unofficial representatives were imported and their expenses paid by some one of the powers; the hearings, if any, that they received were, as House admitted, "perfunctory"—the more so since those in control were *frequently in total ignorance* of the subject under discussion. Among those who failed to obtain an official hearing were not only the Russians themselves but also the secessionist states of Russia (for what reason it would be difficult to say), with the exception of Poland. Consequently the Treaty of Versailles had nothing to do with the establishment of the Baltic States. All the belligerents had made preparations for the peace, some of these preparations very elaborate; even before they entered the war the Americans had organized a staff, the British in 1917. Yet it is interesting and amusing to note that at the opening of the Conference none of the British experts on at least one country had ever been in that country.

Of the delegates from the lesser powers Venizelos enjoyed the greatest prestige, but there were others of note: Beneš, apt pupil of President Masaryk of Czechoslovakia; Pašić, "Grand Old Man" of Serbia; Bratianu, "the strong man of Rumania"; Crown Prince Emir Faisal of the Hejaz, the most colorful figure of all; Wellington Koo, from the great republic of the East; and Paderevski, turned statesman in behalf of his beloved Poland and by some pronounced even greater in that rôle than as a musician. An important development was the separate representation accorded the British Dominions, Botha and Smuts, for instance, speaking for South Africa.

The similarities of the Paris Conference to the Congress of Vienna are almost startling—almost enough to persuade one that history does repeat itself. Wilson, in nearly every respect, was the Tsar Alexander. And the Paris Conference, like the Congress of Vienna, proposed a principle—Wilsonian Self-Determination—that it violated as often as it saw fit. The diplomats of 1815, however, were frankly reactionary, while their successors of 1919 were more culpable in that they pretended to uphold the cause of progress.

Work began, the day Lloyd George arrived (January 12), with an informal meeting between Wilson and the heads of the three Great Allies; the Japanese joined their colleagues the next day. The Great Powers decided to keep all discussion in the hands of a Council of Ten (drawn from their own ranks), to exclude press representatives, to issue only brief *communiqués*, and to submit their decisions only for ratification in the plenary sessions. In agreeing to exclude the smaller powers and the general public Wilson made the first of his tactical errors, for he thereby lost support of which he was to experience grievous need. Incidentally, the plenary sessions were rendered a farce.

The Council of Ten, or Supreme Council, was composed of the heads of the four Great Powers and their Foreign Ministers, plus two Japanese: Clemenceau, Wilson, Lloyd George, Orlando, Pichon, Lansing, Balfour, and Sonnino, plus Saionji and Makino (these last contented themselves, for the most part, with the rôle of silent spectators). Not unimportant parts fell to others: Dutasta, Principal Secretary-General; Hankey, unofficial secretary to the Big Four (as later constituted); Tardieu, Clemenceau's right-hand man; and House, Wilson's *alter ego*. Certainly the Council had its hands full, for the problem of framing the terms of peace was the least of its troubles; hardly a day, hardly an hour, passed when it was not interrupted to consider some matter of life and death—some famine or some new war in a remote corner of Europe.

With the first plenary session on the eighteenth of January, anniversary of the founding of the German Empire, the Peace Conference officially opened. (In this respect, at least, the diplomats of 1919 did better than their predecessors of 1815.) Considering the date, one feels sure that the French, with their eye for the dramatic, purposely delayed until then. Poincaré, who delivered the address of welcome, constituted himself the "keynoter," rehearsing the time-worn myth of German villainy and Allied innocence and adding, "There is no need of further information." Possibly Poincaré had never had the benefit of reading the conclusions of that shrewd savant who said, "An opinion about the basis of which there is a quality of feeling which tells us that to inquire into it would be absurd, obviously unnecessary, unprofitable, undesirable, bad

form, or wicked . . . is a non-rational one, and probably, therefore, founded upon inadequate evidence." Clemenceau, *Père de la Victoire* (Father of Victory), was elected president of the Conference and of the Council of Ten; as Wilson explained, it was another special tribute to the sufferings and sacrifices of France. In accepting office Clemenceau replied with the urbanity befitting his years and his nationality: "The greater the sanguinary catastrophe which devastated and ruined one of the richest regions of France, the more ample and more splendid should be the reparation."

Easily the most arresting figure of the assemblage, by reason of his hold over the imagination, Wilson was separated from his colleagues by temperament, training, and objectives. Primarily he was a student; they, men of action. He was first of all a college professor; they, politicians. His interests centered in the League of Nations. They were interested solely in the practical, concrete details of the settlement—ready to give him his toy *if*, in return, he would accede to their demands. Spiritually and politically, therefore, he was the loneliest man in Paris. For the most part he played a lone hand against the field.

A moral force of incalculable weight, Wilson ranked less than first-rate intellectually. Not a philosopher-king, not a philosopher, not a king, not a prime minister, not even a politician *per se*, he was at a tremendous disadvantage. His principles were largely if not wholly adopted from other people; and aside from some drafts for the League, he arrived without a detailed program. At the conference table, therefore, he appeared a constantly captious critic, the more so since the Allies, by yielding on their most preposterous propositions (which they had never really hoped to see carried in the first place), were able to present an appearance of conciliation. In this connection America's disinterestedness was a positive disadvantage, for Wilson had nothing with which to bargain. Incidentally, he was ill-informed on many matters of fact.

To compensate for his fundamental disadvantages Wilson had little by way of personality. In man-to-man contacts he stood always a little aloof, and was continually at odds with even his closest associates; and at the council table, as opposed to the isolation of the lecture platform or the presidential chair, he was at his worst. Lacking experience in the strategy and tactics involved—in the art of seeming to concede without losing ground, of affording an opponent an opportunity to save his face, of abandoning an attack at the front door in order to enter by the rear—he was reduced to digging in still more stubbornly when it came to a crisis. ("Digging in" for five months on end is a wearing and ungraceful performance.) In addition, he was a comparatively slow thinker, by no means agile or adroit, and was continually outgeneraled in consequence. Finally, although it cannot be said that he disdained or refused advice, he frequently failed to profit by it. His colleagues of the American delegation were by no means fitted to make up for his deficiencies in any case, and even House dropped more and more into the background. Yet with all his defects "he was the one force of the ["big"] four making consistently for a clean peace"—so far as his lights would permit, one may add, for on more than one occasion they were lamentably smoky.

Lloyd George, the diminutive Wizard from Wales, has been compared with

Disraeli; from the beginning his career ran at a distinct tangent to those of most British leaders. "No plenipotentiary ever approached the task of rebuilding a ruined world with a more slender equipment of detailed knowledge." "He made decisions rapidly and with little regard for details or fundamental principles." There is an unforgettable picture of a session during which he leaned toward Bratianu with a yawn, "You were speaking about Transylvania—show me it on the map." And then of Lloyd George down on the floor on all fours, searching for Transylvania with his finger! Whatever his weaknesses he did not let them trouble him. Why should he? He was endowed with that priceless gift of the gods, a winning personality (without which all others are as nothing, and with which few others are necessary). "It was simply impossible not to like him," Lansing declared. Add keen Celtic wit, the ability of the Celt to achieve by instinct what others fail to achieve by reason, a mind quicker than those of his colleagues, supreme gifts as an orator—and Lloyd George made a redoubtable antagonist. He could blow hot and cold with the same breath, so cleverly that it was some time before his listeners had recovered sufficiently to discover what had happened.

As a member of the Conference he was well situated strategically, for Britain had already attained her main objectives: the destruction of German commerce, the crippling of German industry, and the capture of the German fleet and colonies. Unfortunately, in return for reelection he had promised to hang the Kaiser and make the Germans pay for the war (perhaps a politician should not be held too strictly to account for what he says in the heat of an election); but he had no desire for a peace of annihilation that would drive the Germans into the arms of the Bolsheviks, and on the whole was able to appear relatively disinterested. Of the British delegation in general it was said: "Mr. Balfour knows but does not care. Mr. Bonar Law cares but does not know. Mr. Lloyd George neither knows nor cares." This may be a somewhat uncalled-for slur on the fair name of Lloyd George, but it was not entirely unwarranted. Lloyd George himself is said to have remarked, "What am I to do between a man who thinks he is Jesus Christ and another who thinks he is Napoleon?"

Clemenceau was a fitting third for this triumvirate. Seventy-eight years old, a member of the generation that had lost the War of 1870, veteran of the Commune, patriot of patriots on the model of '93, he had won his nickname of the Tiger by a life which was one long unceasing battle against everything, because to him everything seemed wrong. Dominated by a profound cynicism, "he had one illusion—France; and one disillusion—mankind, including Frenchmen, and his colleagues not least." "This was the man whom the war had flung up to misrepresent the fine mind and the generous spirit of France." Clemenceau was no figurehead. "He possessed the essential qualities of great leadership. He knew when to be defiant and when to placate." He too could draw on a devastating wit. Of the Fourteen Points he remarked, "The Good Lord himself had only ten." Lansing declared that "he dominated the Peace Conference."

Though for the League he cared not a whit, he was willing to accept it as a supplement to guarantees for the security of France—provided that by so doing he could humor its sponsor into pledging such guarantees.

He wanted all the settlement of 1871 undone. He wanted Germany punished as though she was a uniquely sinful nation and France a sinless martyr land. He wanted Germany so crippled and devastated as never more to be able to stand up to France. He wanted to hurt and humiliate Germany more than France had been hurt and humiliated in 1871. He did not care if in breaking Germany Europe was broken; his mind did not go far enough beyond the Rhine to understand that possibility. . . . He wanted wider opportunities for the exploitation of Syria, North Africa, and so forth by Parisian financial groups. He wanted indemnities to recuperate France, loans, gifts, and tributes to France, glory and homage to France. France had suffered, and France had to be rewarded. Belgium, Russia, Serbia, Poland, Armenia, Britain, Germany, and Austria had all suffered too, all mankind had suffered, but what would you? That was not his affair. These were the supers of a drama in which France was for him the star.

The clash of raw nationalistic aspirations—voiced in the secret agreements that, although supposedly abandoned at the time of the armistice, had never been whole-heartedly resigned—became the chief theme of the Conference, whose sole preoccupation should have been the welfare of mankind; and these were the triumvirate—plus Orlando, guardian of Italy's "sacred egoism"—on whom, as they gathered in the intimate association of secret conclave, the fate of Europe ultimately depended.

BEHIND CLOSED DOORS

Clemenceau, alone of the Big Four, having taught in America and having married an American, understood both French and English. Wilson and Lloyd George had no command of French; Orlando knew no English. What with the necessity for interpreters and the normal differences of opinion, the sessions of the Council not infrequently degenerated into a welter of "sound and fury signifying nothing."

Two problems absorbed much time during the early days—Russia and the League. On May 27, 1916, Wilson had first definitely committed himself to creating a league; who originated the idea it is difficult to say. It was one of those concepts that evolve gradually in the public consciousness. In a way it may be said to go back to Sully's *Grand Plan* (published in 1662), and early in the war Asquith had spoken vaguely of the desirability of a league. Prior to the opening of the Conference a number of draft plans had been drawn up. The first of importance was the so-called Phillimore Plan, submitted to the British Government on March 20, 1918, by a committee of which Lord Phillimore was chairman. A copy of this plan was sent to Wilson. Another project was formulated by House, working from the Phillimore draft, and forwarded to Wilson on July 16, 1918. On the basis of these two plans Wilson formulated his own first draft. Smuts also made suggestions (dated December 16, 1918), and Lord Robert Cecil prepared a draft. After consideration of these and other propositions, Wilson prepared three more drafts. Finally, still another draft was evolved by Miller, of the American delegation, in company with Hurst of the British delegation and after consultation with Wilson, Cecil, House, and Smuts; and it was this Hurst-Miller draft that was presented by Wilson for considera-

tion and emendation by the Conference. It is impossible, therefore, to say how much of the final Covenant was due to its sponsor, but apparently rather little. Wilson was determined that the League should take precedence, and in this matter at least he had his way. The Council of Ten finally gave in, and on the twenty-fifth of January a plenary session adopted his resolution: "This League should be treated as an integral part of the general Treaty of Peace."

Bolshevik Russia presented a knotty problem. None of the Powers relished her repudiation of the tsarist debts (France, who was most vitally affected, least of all), all feared her, and although not technically at war with her they were helping to blockade her coasts, invade her territory, and support internal dissensions. The British and the Americans were beginning to realize that this anomalous policy was not only unjust but unwise; some of Wilson's pronouncements on the subject have been quoted. At the opening of the Conference Foch proposed a joint expedition, America to furnish the bulk of the troops, for the purpose of taking Moscow by way of Berlin and thus killing two birds with one stone. But even Clemenceau did not warm to this stillborn project.

As a result of a Christmas Eve telegram from Litvinov, Wilson proposed that "the various organized groups in Russia" be invited to send representatives to a conference with the Allies, and in a proclamation of January 22 suggested as a meeting-place the island of Prinkipo, in the Sea of Marmara (sufficiently remote to prevent contagion, Clemenceau having vetoed a suggestion that the meeting take place in Paris). The Bolsheviks accepted the invitation and agreed to recognize Russia's private debts in return for promises of nonintervention. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania concurred; but Denikin and Kolchak, the chiefs of the counter-revolution, spurned the suggestion with contempt. Bullitt of the American delegation was thereupon sent to Moscow under instructions from Lansing and House after a conference with Kerr, Lloyd George's private secretary. Lenin made a conciliatory offer, including recognition of the Allied debts. Upon his return Bullitt talked the matter over with Lloyd George, Wilson being "too busy" to see him. But when Lloyd George urged the publication of Bullitt's report, the suggestion was vetoed by Wilson! At no other time did the President so flatly repudiate his own principles, and by so doing he shouldered a heavy responsibility for one of the great failures of the Conference. Two weeks later, in the House of Commons Lloyd George made a declaration on the subject: "We have had no approaches of any sort or kind. I have only heard of reports . . . but these have never been put before the Conference by any member of the Conference at all. There was some suggestion that there was some young American who had come back. All I can say about that is that it is not for me to judge. . . ."! (Of course, it must be remembered that, as a politician and a diplomat, Lloyd George was accustomed to using a different language from the rest of us!) Thereafter France was free to pursue her policy of force, undisputed.

As an aid to an understanding of the workings of the Council and of the artificiality of much that went on, a momentary glance at one of the side shows may prove of value. The claims of Albania were presented to the Council by a decrepit Turk who had no interest in the subject, no following among the Albanians, and who got the job because he was willing to sacrifice Albanian


welfare to the ambitions of Italy. Evidently he was not even familiar with his manuscript. In the snug comfort of the council chamber he droned on interminably—while in Northern Albania the natives, massacred by the thousand by their worthy neighbors the Serbs, were engaged in a desperate hand-to-hand struggle for existence.

In order to avoid such loss of time, particularly over matters about which the great themselves knew nothing, most of the work was ultimately done in committee: eventually fifty-two commissions were functioning. The first of the territorial commissions, the Rumanian, was appointed on February 1. The most important of the commissions, perhaps, were those on Reparations, Financial Questions, and the League: the last certainly had the most distinguished membership. Among its nineteen members were Wilson (chairman), Cecil, Léon Bourgeois, House, Orlando, Smuts, Wellington Koo, Hymans, and Venizelos. Most of the articles in the treaty were taken verbatim from reports submitted by these commissions.

When a month had elapsed with little accomplished, the public began to get restless. More important by far, as the Council progressed from minor matters to questions of the first importance its incapacity became increasingly evident. Because twenty or thirty persons in all were usually in attendance, Wilson and his apologists maintained that it was too large to function effectively. Be that as it may, from February 14 to March 14 Wilson was absent on a trip to America, and on February 10 Clemenceau was wounded by a would-be assassin. When Wilson returned he and Lloyd George, together with Orlando, absented themselves from the Council of Ten and met privately with Clemenceau in his sick room. Thereafter the four kept on sitting apart, without any sanction, thus constituting themselves a separate body—known as the Council of Four or the Big Four. This close corporation acted with even greater secrecy than its predecessor. Meanwhile, shorn of its power if not its legal authority, the old Council, rechristened the Council of Five, continued to meet and paw the air!

One of the most difficult problems, over which a severe struggle ensued, was the Rhine frontier. The spokesmen for the extreme chauvinists were Poincaré and Foch ("If one is master of the Rhine, one is master of Germany"). These hotheads demanded that, if the entire Rhine from Basel to the Dutch border were not handed over to France outright, the Rhineland should at least be separated from the rest of Germany and erected into a buffer state. Though the British and the Americans had no desire to assist in the creation of a new Alsace-Lorraine or anything approaching it, and not even King Albert of Belgium supported the French, it was only after Wilson had ordered the *George Washington* to Brest that Clemenceau would listen to reason. To the annexation of the Saar Valley by France Wilson likewise remained adamant, even when the irascible French Premier taunted him with being pro-German and stormed out of the room like a spoiled child. As it was, Clemenceau yielded only after Wilson and Lloyd George had promised that the United States and Great Britain would guarantee French security.

The entire American delegation favored a predetermined reparations total,



XVIII. POSTWAR TREATY ADJUSTMENTS

but here Lloyd George stood with the other Allies. On the question of the basis for calculating reparation payments he did likewise; the decision to include pensions and separation allowances was a compromise between "the cost of the war" and the formula of November 5. Despite the note of November 5, also, the Italians were unwilling to forego the undue booty promised them under the Treaty of London. In particular, an even more acrimonious controversy developed on the subject of Fiume. Though the city proper was Italian, by a mere handful, the suburbs were Slav, and Fiume was the only good port available for the use of the new state of Yugoslavia. Again Wilson stood firm, allowing the Italian delegation to withdraw from the Conference rather than yield.) His attitude on the Fiume problem may have had something to do with the fact that he yielded Shantung to the Japanese; he was afraid to imperil the treaty by alienating too many of the powers. On these questions Wilson lacked the backing of the British; but it was Lloyd George who fought single-handed against the excessive demands put forward by Poland, supported by France. Possibly it was not sentiment alone that, when the proposal was made to award the great German port of Danzig to Poland, made him abandon "the rôle of irresponsible and playful plenipotentiary . . . changed [him] from a state of bored indifference to one of aggressive participation." Trade, however, could hardly have caused him to insist on a plebiscite in the Marienwerder district.

The sixth plenary session (May 6), which ended the Conference so far as the smaller nations were concerned, constituted a fitting dénouement to this tragedy of errors. The lesser powers obtained their first, and it might be said their last, glimpse of the treaty; the press were excluded and, together with the public, kept in not particularly blissful ignorance. (When they first ascertained the text, it was through German sources!) No formal vote was taken, but "assent" was obtained by the time-honored procedure of letting "the ayes have it."

The Germans, who had not even been informed of what was taking place, were now invited to sign on the dotted line. They received some intimation of what was in store for them when they were met at Duisburg by a special representative of President Wilson. During the conversation Brockdorff-Rantzau, the Foreign Minister and the head of the delegation, intimated that he would never sign anything that departed from the Fourteen Points; to which Colonel Conger replied, "I hope I shall not have to report in that sense!" On their arrival the Germans found themselves little better than prisoners.

On May 7, the anniversary of the *Lusitania* tragedy, the text of the treaty was presented to the German delegates; Wilson and Smuts wanted a discussion, but Clemenceau and Lloyd George insisted that any German comments should be in writing. The criticisms, when made, impressed Lloyd George so profoundly that he proposed drastic modifications; but by this time Wilson was in a hurry to see the treaty signed. He even refused to heed his own financial experts—a point confirmed by Tardieu. The most that Lloyd George could obtain was a plebiscite for Upper Silesia and slight modifications of the western frontier of Poland. The German delegates were unanimous in their inclination not to sign, but the Allies were holding a pistol at Germany's head and Erzberger was working to win over the Weimar Assembly. An eleventh-

hour plea for the omission of the clause relating to the surrender of the Kaiser and the notorious Article 231 on war responsibility was unavailing. On June 28, 1919, five years, to a day, after Francis Ferdinand was assassinated (Is this another sample of poetic justice?), the Treaty of Versailles was signed, in the palace where, not quite fifty years before, the German Empire had been proclaimed, and where once lived the Sun King who wrested Alsace from a feeble and disunited people beyond the Rhine.

THE PEACE OF PARIS: THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES

By way of supplement as well as preface to the following summary of the treaty, a few of the armistice terms will be given. November 11, 1918, Germany agreed to surrender 5,000 guns, 25,000 machine guns, 3,000 trench mortars, 1,700 fighting and bombing planes, 5,000 locomotives, 150,000 railroad cars, 5,000 motor trucks, all her submarines, 6 battle cruisers, 10 battleships, 8 light cruisers, and 50 destroyers. In addition, the Allies obtained the right to occupy the Rhineland. By an extension of the armistice on January 16 Germany promised 400 two-engined steam-plow outfits, 13,000 plows, 12,500 harrows, 2,500 steam rollers, 2,500 mowing machines, 3,000 reapers and binders, and so on.

The Treaty of Versailles began with the Covenant of the League.² From the list of states invited to belong, the name of Germany was significantly omitted. The German frontier was "rectified." Belgium gained Moresnet outright and, subject to plebiscites, the districts of Eupen and Malmédy. The Saar was made autonomous for fifteen years, under the nominal administration of the League, at the end of which time a plebiscite was to be held. In any case the coal mines were to go to France. "The wrong done by Germany in 1871" was righted, and no questions asked. A small corner of Upper Silesia was given to Czechoslovakia; the remainder, according to the results of a plebiscite, was to go to Germany or Poland or be divided between them. The eastern frontier of Germany was entirely altered, in order to make way for a resurrected Poland which was to include the Vistula corridor (thereby cutting East Prussia off from the rest of Germany). The great German port of Danzig was erected into a free city, nominally under the protection of the League, but in reality subject to a considerable measure of Polish domination. Germany surrendered the district of Memel to the Allies. Plebiscites, to be held in the southern districts of East Prussia and the northern districts of Schleswig, were to determine whether the former should go to Poland and the latter to Denmark.

The fortifications of the Rhineland and of a zone fifty kilometers east were to be destroyed, together with those of Helgoland. Germany surrendered all her colonies to the Allies, and renounced her rights in Shantung in favor of Japan. She agreed that the independence of Austria should be "inalienable, except with the consent of the Council of the League" (the text might just as well have read "except with the consent of France"). She likewise recognized the independence of Czechoslovakia and Poland, as well as of all territories formerly part of the Russian Empire. She agreed that Belgium and

² See Appendix VIII.

{Luxemburg should no longer be neutral, and renounced her rights in the latter.

The German army was restricted to 100,000, including not more than 4,000 officers. The general staff was to be dissolved, and Germany agreed not to reconstitute it in any form. The number of her police was limited, and they were not to be assembled for military training. Her army equipment was likewise limited; "after she has become a member of the League" it was to be regulated by that body. The manufacture of military equipment was to be approved, that of poison gas was forbidden. Importation of such articles was also forbidden. Enlisted men of the German army were to agree to serve for twelve years, officers for twenty-five. Any military schools not strictly essential were to be abolished. Associations of whatever description were forbidden to occupy themselves with military matters. The German navy was to consist of only 6 second-class battleships, 6 light cruisers, 12 destroyers, and 12 torpedo boats. It was to comprise no submarines. Eight battleships, 8 light cruisers, 42 destroyers, and 50 torpedo boats were to be delivered to the Allies. Battleships constructed for replacement purposes were not to exceed 10,000 tons displacement. The German military establishment was not to include any military or naval air-forces. "No dirigible shall be kept." All aeronautical material, military or naval, was to be surrendered to the Allies. Inter-Allied commissions were to superintend the execution of the military clauses; the League of Nations was likewise to have the right to investigate such matters.

The Kaiser was arraigned, and provisions were made for his trial. Germany furthermore agreed to surrender for trial "all persons accused of having committed an act in violation of the laws and customs of war."

Article 231. The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies. Article 232. The Allied and Associated Governments recognize that the resources of Germany are not adequate, after taking into account permanent diminutions . . . to make complete reparation. . . . The Allied and Associated Governments, however, require, and Germany undertakes, that she will make compensation for all the damage done to the civilian population. . . .³

Belgium was to be restored; everything she had borrowed of the Allies was to be repaid by Germany, with interest at 5 per cent. Article 233 provided for a Reparation Commission, which was to notify Germany of her total obligations on or before May 1, 1921. During 1919, 1920, and the first four months of 1921 Germany was to pay the equivalent of 20,000,000,000 gold marks. Out of this sum were to be taken the expenses of the occupation and the cost of such supplies as were necessary for Germany to exist. Germany was also to pay the entire cost of repatriating prisoners and interned civilians.

On questions involving the cancellation or postponement of any part of Germany's debt, or of interpreting the reparations clauses of the treaty, a unanimous vote of the Reparation Commission was to be necessary. All other questions were to be determined by a majority vote.

³ An annex specified that this was to include pensions and separation allowances.

In case of default . . . the Commission . . . may make . . . recommendations as to the action to be taken. . . . The measures which the Allied and Associated Powers shall have the right to take, in case of voluntary default by Germany, and which Germany agrees not to regard as acts of war, may include economic and financial prohibitions and reprisals and in general such other measures as the respective Governments may determine. . . .

Germany recognizes the right of the Allied and Associated Powers to the replacement, ton for ton . . . of all merchant ships and fishing boats lost or damaged owing to the war. . . . The right thus recognized will be enforced on German ships and boats under the following conditions: The German Government . . . cede [sic] . . . the property in all the German merchant ships which are of 1,600 tons gross and upwards; in one-half . . . of the ships which are between 1,000 and 1,600 tons gross; in one-quarter . . . of the steam trawlers; and in one-quarter . . . of the other fishing boats.

In addition, Germany agreed to build ships for the Allies for five years, not to exceed 200,000 tons per annum. She furthermore agreed to "devote her economic resources directly to the physical restoration of the invaded areas" and to furnish such materials as might be required, including (to the French and Belgians) 40,700 horses, 184,000 cattle, 121,200 sheep, 15,000 swine, and 10,000 goats. Coal (in excess of 19,500,000 tons during the first year, and varying amounts over a period of ten years), 50 per cent of her stocks of dyestuffs and chemicals, and various other goods were also to be delivered to the Allies, to be paid for by them. Germany surrendered her cables (those privately owned were to be credited to the reparations account).

The French flags captured in 1870-71 were to be returned. Germany was to deliver to Belgium an amount of books, manuscripts, incunabula, and so on, equal in value to those destroyed at Louvain; also the leaves of the "Adoration of the Lamb" by the Van Eycks and those of the "Last Supper" by Dierick (sic) Bouts.

" . . . A first charge upon all the assets and revenues of the German Empire and its constituent States shall be the cost of reparation. . . . Up to May 1, 1921, the German Government shall not export or dispose of, and shall forbid the export or disposal of, gold without the previous approval of . . . the Reparation Commission." All nonmilitary material handed over in accordance with the terms of the various armistice agreements was to be credited to reparation payments; but France was not to assume any part of the German public debt on account of Alsace-Lorraine, nor were any of the mandatory powers to do so on account of former German colonies.

Germany was not to erect any discriminatory tariffs against the Allies. The Elbe, the Oder, the Niemen, and the Danube were internationalized. Czechoslovakia was to be granted ninety-nine-year leases on free areas in the ports of Hamburg and Stettin. The League was to exercise supervision over such matters. The Kiel Canal was opened to all vessels of "all nations at peace with Germany."

A special section of the treaty was devoted to labor questions. It contained a prologue beginning with the words: "Whereas the League of Nations has for its object the establishment of universal peace, and such a peace can be estab-

lished only if it is based upon social justice; and whereas conditions of labour exist involving such injustice and privation to large numbers of people as to produce unrest so great that the peace and harmony of the world are imperilled . . ." This section provided for a general conference, to be composed of four representatives from each state in the League (two government representatives, one representative of employers, and one of employees), and an International Labor Office, to be controlled by a board of twenty-four (twelve representing governments, six elected by the employer representatives to the Conference, and six by the employee representatives). There was also a code of guiding principles: 1. The guiding principle . . . that labour should not be regarded merely as a commodity or article of commerce. 2. The right of association for all lawful purposes. . . . 3. . . . A wage adequate to maintain a reasonable standard of life. . . . 4. . . . A forty-eight hours week. . . . 5. The abolition of child labour and limitations on the labour of young persons. . . . 6. The principle that men and women should receive equal remuneration for work of equal value."

As guarantee for the execution of the treaty, the Rhineland, together with its bridgeheads, was to be occupied for fifteen years. If the treaty were faithfully observed, the area of occupation was to be contracted at the end of each five-year period (Article 429). If at the end of fifteen years "the guarantees against unprovoked aggression by Germany are not considered sufficient by the Allied and Associated Governments, the evacuation . . . may be delayed to the extent regarded as necessary. . . . Article 430. In case . . . the Reparation Commission finds that Germany refuses to observe the whole or part of her obligations under the present with regard to reparation," the Rhineland may be reoccupied.

Finally Germany agreed to respect the allied treaties with her own allies.

THE PEACE OF PARIS: SUPPLEMENTARY TREATIES

An evaluation of the Treaty of Versailles follows, but is preceded by a summary of the other treaties that together with it constituted the Peace of Paris of 1919-20. The treaties with Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria were very similar to that with Germany, in many parts copied word for word, and for that reason will be treated much less fully.

By the Treaty of St.-Germain, with Austria (September 10, 1919), the dismemberment of the Polyglot Empire was legalized. Recognizing the independence of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Yugoslavia (the new Greater Serbia), Austria proper was left to stand or fall alone, a little landlocked strip of mountains with a population of 6,500,000. Except with the consent of the League (that is, France), she was forbidden to unite with Germany, as she had done according to her new constitution of November 12. Furthermore, she was forced to recognize Italy's claims not only to Trieste and the Italian Trentino but to approximately 250,000 Germans in the Tyrol south of the Brenner. Her army was restricted to 30,000. (Economic and financial difficulties made it improbable that she would attempt to maintain a larger force in any case.) Her entire fleet, including submarines, was to be surrendered; but with no

seacoast left, it is unlikely that she felt this to be any special degradation. At best it would have been a "Swiss navy." In view of her painfully restricted resources—and although she was compelled to acknowledge liability for restitution as though she were still an empire of 50,000,000—the only specific reparation payments mentioned were a number of animals for Italy and Rumania.

Hungary, strange to relate, received the worst treatment of all. Following one line of specious reasoning after another, by the Treaty of Trianon (signed June 4, 1920, but never ratified) the Allies cut Hungary down on all sides; a third of the Magyars (3,000,000 out of 9,000,000) were placed under foreign domination. Hungary's unofficial motto became, and still is, "Nem, nem, soha!"—"No, no, never!"

By the Treaty of Neuilly (November 27, 1919) Bulgaria was accorded rather more lenient treatment than her erstwhile allies. Nevertheless, her remaining bit of seacoast on the Aegean was given to Greece, who certainly had no need of it, and four small districts peopled by Bulgars were awarded to Yugoslavia. In this way the Yugoslav frontier was brought within gunshot of the Bulgarian capital. In all, 1,200,000 Bulgars contiguous to the motherland were placed or left under foreign domination (800,000 in Macedonia, 200,000 in Thrace, and 200,000 in the Dobruja). The American delegation formally protested, but their protests passed unheeded. During the war Bulgaria had declared that Serbia no longer existed and had perpetrated horrible outrages on the Serbians. Many will therefore feel that the penalty fitted the crime, but that does not alter the fact that the Allies intensified an already dangerous situation and violated Wilson's Eleventh Point.

A fifth treaty, signed at Sèvres (August 10, 1920), which the Allies were unable to enforce,⁴ was framed with a view to securing Turkey treatment similar to that accorded Austria or, to be more exact, China. The Treaty of Sèvres, together with other agreements, sought to divide most of Asia Minor into spheres of influence for the powers; only the north center was to be left to the undisputed sovereignty of the new Turkish Government at Angora.

THEORY VS. REALITY

What had happened to the Wilsonian Peace? Look first at the Fourteen Points. (No attempt can be made in this volume to cover matters involving obvious contradiction or disputed interpretation.) Points Two and Ten, as has been seen, had been thrown into the discard before the Conference opened. The change of attitude on Point Ten was probably justified, but what about Point Two? Point One was repudiated, so far as the Conference itself was concerned, as soon as the delegates met. Point Three involves matters too complicated to consider in detail; some rather half-hearted attempts were made to embody it in the treaty. In regard to Point Four, except as applied to Germany, the Conference "passed the buck" to the League. Point Five went into the discard. The British Empire was allowed to retain the lion's share of the German colonies, disguised as mandates. Shantung was handed over to Japan,

⁴ See Chapter XX.

whereat China refused to sign the treaty. Japan also received a mandate over the German possessions in the Pacific north of the equator. Point Six was not only disregarded but openly flouted by Allies as well as by Bolsheviks. Point Seven: Belgium was restored—but not merely restored; in addition she was given territory to which her claims were at least contestable. Point Eight: "The wrong done . . . in 1871" was righted without benefit of plebiscite, though Alsace was German-speaking and most of Lorraine had been taken over by France only in 1766. Point Nine: Italy was allowed to possess herself of several non-Italian districts, notably the German Tyrol as far as the Brenner (in order that she might be afforded protection against 6,500,000 Austrians!)—to mention only one of the most flagrant examples. The disposition of the Tyrol was doubly inexcusable, since a perfectly defensible frontier could have been established that would have left only a few thousand minorities in this region under foreign domination. Point Eleven: Though legally and morally the Allies were bound to protect Montenegro, she was thrown to Serbia, along with the adjacent South Slavs—not to mention 500,000 Magyars—many of whom were none too happy with their new bedfellows. Rumania emerged with over 4,000,000 non-Rumans (1,500,000 Magyars, 1,000,000 Ukrainians, 750,000 Jews, 500,000 Germans, 250,000 Bulgars, and so on, and so on)—and at that, she felt aggrieved because she failed to get the whole Banat. Point Twelve: Turkey escaped the fate of Austria only because of her unexpected powers of resistance and revival—and because of one Mustafa Kemal. Though by the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres her subject nationalities were freed, most of them fell into new servitude. Wilson's handling of Turco-Greek relations, in particular, is an indelible blot on his record; behind the backs of his experts and against their advice he authorized Venizelos to fall on Smyrna, the outlet to Anatolia. Point Thirteen: The new Poland, as constituted at Paris, included 2,500,000 Germans (and eventually, thanks to Allied aid, 7,000,000 minority peoples of various nationalities). Why Poland should have been granted direct access to the sea, any more than Switzerland and Czechoslovakia, or why she should have been granted a different form of access from that granted Czechoslovakia, is not altogether clear.

Only two points (Eight and Fourteen) were carried out to the letter and, so far as can be judged, in spirit as well. Three (Seven, Twelve and Thirteen) were carried out according to the letter of the law, but the spirit was violated (whether on reasonable grounds or not is another question). Four (One, Three, Ten and Eleven) were partially fulfilled and partially violated (in the League Covenant an attempt was made to see that Point One should be effective in the future). Five (Two, Four, Five, Six, and Nine) were completely disregarded, though the violation of Point Two did not constitute a technical violation of the armistice agreement.

The famous restatement of the principle of nationalism known as the principle of self-determination—originated by Trotsky and popularized by Wilson—was obviously designed to be the cardinal principle of the settlement; and if a lasting settlement was to be achieved, it should have been the touchstone by which every provision of the treaty was tested. In many cases, of course, it was impossible to push this principle to its logical conclusion without arriving at a

reductio ad absurdum and producing a new Holy Roman Empire. On practical grounds it was possible to justify the inclusion in Czechoslovakia of *some* minorities situated within its geographical frontiers, and the inclusion of *some* minorities in the new Poland, Greater Rumania, and so on—but not the unreasonable numbers that these states were awarded or succeeded in grabbing. Where any doubt concerning contiguous areas existed, resort should have been had to a plebiscite, the logical corollary of the principle of self-determination. Some plebiscites were provided for; and in Schleswig, the Allenstein and Marienwerder districts, Upper Silesia, the Klagenfurt area, and Ödenburg plebiscites were held. Observe that, with the exception of Schleswig (and in part of Schleswig even, Germany polled a larger vote), the majority of voters elected to remain under their former “masters.” In the Allenstein district and the Marienwerder district, where the plebiscites were granted only at the insistence of Lloyd George, the German vote was overwhelming. Plebiscites were to have been held in Teschen, Orava, and Spisz, also; but the attempt was abandoned, and these districts were arbitrarily divided between Czechoslovakia and Poland. Poland succeeded in bluffing the powers out of a proposed plebiscite in Eastern Galicia. The conditions governing the so-called plebiscites in Eupen and Malmédy were such as to render the results highly illusory. A plebiscite is to be held in the Saar.

When doubtful cases arose, the principle of self-determination was more honored in the breach than in the observance. In the disposition of Memel (Lithuania's only good port) and of Fiume this arbitrary procedure was justified; but in others the principle of self-determination was violated cynically and unblushingly, or on the flimsiest of excuses. The most blatant example was the prohibition forbidding Austria to unite with Germany. Moresnet was handed over outright to Belgium, as was Alsace-Lorraine to France. In Hungary, only one small area (Ödenburg) was permitted to express its wishes—significantly enough, this area lay between Hungary and Austria—though of the 3,000,000 Magyars placed arbitrarily under foreign domination 1,800,000 lived in areas contiguous to the motherland.

Italy, which received the most favorable treatment, complained the loudest. The struggle she put up to fulfill her sacred aspirations has already been noted, as well as the refusal of Wilson to accede to her full demands. On April 14 he indicated a line representing what he considered the extreme concessions that should be made. In addition to the Italian Trentino and the Italian cities of Gorizia, Trieste, and Pola, Italy was to be given the Alto Adige (Upper Trentino, or Lower Tyrol), with nearly 250,000 Germans, most of the Istrian Peninsula (to the Arsa) and its hinterland, with 365,000 Yugoslavs, the Yugoslav island of Lissa, and the Albanian port of Valona. December 9, 1919, after he had gone home, Wilson weakened still further. In a despairing attempt to effect some sort of settlement he agreed with the Allies that, if Yugoslavia were willing, Italy should also have the remainder of the Istrian Peninsula, with 40,000 more Yugoslavs, the Yugoslav island of Lussin, and a mandate over Albania—in order to secure Italy's “absolute strategic control of the Adriatic”! (His note of April 14 had specifically called attention to the fact that “Austria-

Hungary no longer exists. This eastern frontier will touch countries henceforth destitute of the military and naval power of Austria.") Needless to say, Yugoslavia was *not* willing; but in the end her protests made no difference.

The Allies violated the principle of "no indemnities" by including pensions and separation allowances in the reparations account. *So far as the immediate future was concerned*,⁵ as proved by the Great Depression, the financial clauses of the treaty were its worst features. And by drawing themselves a blank check on Germany, the Allies more than balanced the blank check that Germany handed Austria on the eve of war.

Article 231 was not only futile but childish as well. Forcing Germany, at the point of a gun, to say that she was guilty did not make her so; she either was or was not, and *whether* she was or not could only be determined by unprejudiced and unmistakable historical evidence.

By excluding Germany from participation in the framing of the treaty, the Allies again violated the armistice terms (Wilson's September 27 speech) and adopted a course unprecedented in high-handedness. "The procedure by which peace was finally obtained was unique in diplomatic history. It does not remotely correspond to any previous example." Finally, by excluding Germany from the League and making the League custodian of the treaty, the Allies once more violated the armistice terms. Here again, in spite of the British and Americans, France got her way!

Such were the fruits of a war estimated to have cost \$186,000,000,000 in direct outlays and 10,000,000 lives.⁶ The direct and indirect costs, taken together, have been placed at \$337,000,000,000—exclusive of the value of human depreciation, but inclusive of the estimated money value of lives actually snuffed out and the cost to neutrals. Toward the end the war was costing in excess of \$10,000,000 an hour! The Paris Conference of 1919-20 unquestionably did good and reshaped the map of Europe more nearly in accord with the dictates of nationality. Of that there can be no doubt. But in all fairness the question may be raised whether, like the Congress of Vienna, it did not create more problems than it solved.

WITNESSES AND RESPONSIBILITIES: BROCKDORFF-RANTZAU AND LLOYD GEORGE

It is small wonder that Brockdorff-Rantzau, when confronted with the treaty, remarked: "This fat volume was quite unnecessary. They could have put the whole thing more simply in a single clause—*L'Allemagne renonce à son existence*"—"Germany renounces her existence." As an example of the German way of looking at the matter, Erzberger had figured that the damage to the devastated areas would cost not more than 9,000,000,000 marks and that the German colonies were worth approximately that sum—but the Germans

⁵ That is, the future down to and including the present, as opposed to the long run of history.

⁶ The figure as to casualties is extremely conservative. The number of deaths in battle alone was just short of 10,000,000 (9,998,771), the numbers of prisoners and missing about 6,000,000. Millions more died of starvation. The wounded numbered about 20,300,000. By contrast, all the wars waged between 1791 and 1913 cost less than 4,500,000 lives.

were given no credit for their colonies, to say nothing of other land and property that they likewise lost without credit.

May 7, in acknowledging receipt of the treaty, Brockdorff-Rantzau delivered a speech:

It is demanded of us that we shall confess ourselves to be the only ones guilty of the war. . . . We are far from declining any responsibility . . . but we energetically deny that Germany and its people, who were convinced that they were waging a war of defense, were alone guilty. . . . In the last fifty years the Imperialism of all the European States has chronically poisoned the international situation. . . . We have not come here to belittle the responsibility of the men who have waged the war. . . . But in the manner of making war also Germany is not the only guilty one. . . . Crimes in war may not be excusable, but . . . passions are aroused which make the conscience of peoples blunt. The hundreds of thousands of noncombatants who have perished since the eleventh of November by reason of the blockade were killed with cold deliberation. . . . Think of that when you speak of guilt and punishment. The measure of guilt . . . can only be stated by . . . a neutral commission . . . to whom all archives are open. We have demanded such an inquest. . . . The Allied and Associated Governments swore in the time between the fifth of October and the fifth of November, 1918, a peace of violence, and wrote "A Peace of Justice" on their banner. . . . The conscience of the world is behind it. There is no nation which might violate it without punishment. You will find us ready . . . with a firm intention . . . of repairing . . . any wrong that may have been committed—principally the wrong to Belgium, and to show to mankind new aims of political and social progress. . . . Only if the gates of the League of Nations are thrown open to all who are of goodwill can the aim be attained, and only then the dead of this war will not have died in vain. . . .

Partisans of Wilson, such as Baker, subsequently admitted that the German case was well founded.

On June 16 the Allies issued a reply: "The Allied and Associated Powers are in complete accord with the German Delegation in their insistence that the basis for the negotiation of the Treaty of Peace is to be found in the correspondence which immediately preceded the signing of the Armistice on November 11, 1918." Thus the existence of a *pactum de contrahendo* (binding agreement) was explicitly admitted—but the Allies contended that the Treaty of Versailles was founded on Wilsonian principles.

The Germans were not alone in criticizing the peace terms. March 25 Lloyd George had issued one of the most statesmanlike pronouncements of the Conference:

France itself has demonstrated that those who say you can make Germany so feeble that she will never be able to hit back are wrong. . . . You may strip Germany of her colonies, reduce her armaments to a mere police force and her navy to that of a fifth-rate power; all the same in the end if she feels that she has been unjustly treated in the peace of 1919 she will find means of exacting retribution from her conquerors. . . . Injustice, arrogance, displayed in the hour of triumph will never be forgotten or forgiven.

. . . I cannot conceive any greater cause of future war than that the German people, who have certainly proved themselves one of the most vigorous and powerful races in the world [,] should be surrounded by a number of small states, many of

them consisting of people who have never previously set up a stable government for themselves, but each of them containing large masses of Germans clamouring for reunion with their native land. The proposal of the Polish Commission that we should place 2,100,000 Germans under the control of a people which is of a different religion and which has never proved its capacity for stable self-government throughout its history must, in my judgement, lead sooner or later to a new war in the East of Europe. What I have said about the Germans is equally true of the Magyars. . . . As far as is humanly possible the different races should be allocated to their motherlands, and . . . this human criterion should have precedence over considerations of strategy or economics or communications [.] which can usually be adjusted by other means. Secondly, I would say that the duration for the payments of reparation ought to disappear if possible with the generation which made the war.

But there is a consideration . . . which influences me even more. . . . The whole existing order in its political, social and economic aspects is questioned by the masses of the population, from one end of Europe to the other. . . . Much of this unrest is healthy. We shall never make a lasting peace by attempting to restore the conditions of 1914. But there is the danger that we may throw the masses . . . into the arms of the extremists. . . . In another year Russia, inspired by a new enthusiasm, may have recovered from her passion for peace and have at her command the only army eager to fight, because it is the only army that believes that it has any cause to fight for.

. . . I would, therefore, put it in the forefront of the peace that once . . . [Germany] accepts our terms, especially reparation, we . . . will do everything possible to enable the German people to get upon their legs again. We cannot both cripple her and expect her to pay. . . . If the only difference between Germany and ourselves were between onerous terms and moderate terms, I very much doubt if public opinion would tolerate the deliberate condemnation of millions of women and children to death by starvation. If so the Allies would have incurred the moral defeat of having attempted to impose terms on Germany which Germany had successfully resisted.

. . . To my mind it is idle to endeavour to impose a permanent limitation of armaments upon Germany unless we are prepared similarly to impose a limitation upon ourselves. . . . Unless that is arrived at before the Covenant is signed the League of Nations will be a sham and a mockery. . . . If the small nations are permitted to organize and maintain conscript armies . . . boundary wars will be inevitable and all Europe will be drawn in. Unless we secure this universal limitation we shall achieve neither lasting peace, nor the permanent observance of the limitation of German armaments which we now seek to impose. . . . Germany, if she accepts the terms we consider just and fair, should . . . be admitted to the League of Nations, at any rate as soon as she has established a stable and democratic Government. . . . If, however, the Peace Conference is really to secure peace . . . it must deal with the Russian question.

WITNESSES AND RESPONSIBILITIES: SMUTS

Of all those gathered in Paris during that fateful spring of 1919 none exhibited greater statesmanship, none was more fair- and far-minded, than Smuts. The little Dutch-African-Britisher loomed like a great lighthouse in a night of inky black; almost alone he saw the problem clearly and saw it

whole. History is therefore fortunate in possessing four of his pronouncements. The first is a letter of May 22 to Lloyd George:

The most dangerous provision of the whole Treaty is *the occupation of the left bank of the Rhine* for 15 years—and even thereafter—at the option of the Allies. . . . It would be possible for France for the next 15 years to put most of her military expenditure on to German shoulders by keeping the bulk of her troops in the occupied area. In the second place . . . a system of martial law may and probably will be adopted. . . . Both this area and the Saar basin should remain in the German Customs system. . . . The special . . . administration of the Saar Basin . . . should automatically cease after fifteen years. . . . The actual scheme adopted in our Reparation Clauses is unworkable, and must kill the goose which is to lay the golden eggs. . . . In particular I think the coal demands we are making on Germany are too heavy, and must seriously cripple her industry. . . . I would scrap the schedules dealing with the future delivery of coal and coal products, and the future construction of ships. . . . I would certainly take away the power from the French and Belgian manufacturers to rove about German factories in order to despoil them of machinery. . . . In . . . Poland we are . . . committing a cardinal error in policy which history will yet avenge. The new Poland will include millions of Germans (and Russians). . . . I think the two cardinal errors in policy of this Treaty are the long occupation of the Rhine, and the enlargement of Poland beyond anything which we had contemplated during the war. . . . While I am all in favour of the policy laid down in the Punishment Clauses, I feel that for the German Government to agree to them as they stand must be almost, if not quite, impossible. . . . I think we are doing wrong in trying to bind down Germany to a maximum army of 100,000 men. For a population so large, and in such a state of internal ferment, and with frontiers and neighbours such as Germany has, I think such a force totally inadequate for necessary police and defense purposes. . . . Tanks and military aircraft . . . have become part of the equipment of a properly organized army. . . . Generally most of the provisions in respect of German rivers and railways are hopelessly one-sided, and seem intended merely to bring the whole principle of internationalization into disrepute. . . . The Treaty is full of small, comparatively unimportant provisions which serve no useful purpose, but must be unnecessarily galling. . . . I am very anxious, not only that the Germans should sign a fair and good Peace Treaty, but also that, for the sake of the future, they should not merely be made to sign at the point of the bayonet, so to speak. The Treaty should not be capable of moral repudiation by the German people hereafter. . . . The moral authority of the Treaty will be all the greater and more binding on that account. And not only the enemy, but the public opinion of the world will accept it more readily as an honorable ending of the most awful and most tragic dispute in history. The final sanction of this great instrument must be the approval of mankind.

On May 30 Smuts sent President Wilson the following commentary:

. . . The German answer to our draft Peace Terms seems to me to strike the fundamental note . . . which we are bound to consider most carefully. . . . If the Allies end the war by following the example of Germany at the beginning, and also confront the world with a "scrap of paper," the discredit on us will be so great that I shudder to think of its ultimate effect on public opinion. We would indeed have done a worse wrong than Germany because of all that has happened since August, 1914, and the fierce light which has been concentrated on this very point. . . . I

think we should all give the gravest consideration to the question whether our Peace Treaty is within the four corners of your speeches of 1918. Frankly I do not think this is so, and I think the Germans make out a good case. . . . All the one-sided provisions . . . and all the pin-pricks, with which the Treaty teems, seem to me to be both against the letter and the spirit of your Points.

On June 29, the day following that on which the treaty was signed, he delivered his third pronouncement:

I have signed the Peace Treaty . . . because the world needs peace above all, and nothing could be more fatal than the continuance of the state of suspense between war and peace. The six months since the Armistice was signed have, perhaps, been as upsetting, unsettling, and ruinous to Europe as the previous four years of war. I look upon the Peace Treaty as the close of those two chapters of war and armistice, and only on that ground do I agree to it.

. . . I feel that the real work of making peace will only begin after this Treaty has been signed. . . . The promise of new life, the victory of the great human ideals, for which the peoples have shed their blood and their treasure without stint, the fulfilment of their aspirations towards a new international order, and a fairer, better world, are not written in this Treaty. . . . A new heart must be given, not only to our enemies, but also to us. . . .

There are territorial settlements which will need revision. . . . There are indemnities stipulated which cannot be expected without grave injury to the industrial revival of Europe, and which it will be in the interests of all to render more tolerable and moderate. . . . *I am confident that the League of Nations will yet prove the path of escape for Europe out of the ruin brought about by this war.*

Smuts's fourth and final pronouncement was contained in his farewell message on leaving London in July. The following are a few sentences chosen at random:

My own case is a striking instance of how the enemy of to-day may be the friend and comrade of to-morrow. . . . On the Continent the seventy-odd million Germans represent the most important and formidable national factor. You cannot have a stable Europe without a stable, settled Germany. . . . Leave Russia alone, remove the blockade, adopt a policy of friendly neutrality and Gallio-like impartiality to all factions. . . . Vast changes are coming, and are already beginning to loom in sight. There is no formula or patent medicine that will see us through this crisis.

On whom rests the responsibility for the tragedy of the peace, a tragedy more sickening even than the war? Clearly the blame is not undivided, any more than was the blame for the war itself. Wilson laid it on the British, for at first countenancing a peace of revenge and, as he seemed to think, not changing until too late. Since they were in a position to be comparatively disinterested, there is much to be said in substantiation of this indictment. In so far as individuals were directly responsible, however, Clemenceau and his Italian colleagues must surely shoulder a heavier share of the blame. Yet their motives were not fundamentally base—rather they could see only their own side, and actually believed their countries entitled to the extravagant things demanded. They were the tools of the egocentric impulse that dominates all places and all peoples. (To that extent they proved themselves politicians, rather

than statesmen.) Indeed, it was not Clemenceau but Poincaré and Foch who made the most extreme demands in regard to the Rhine. And even Foch was less extreme than others of his fellow countrymen—and back of the spokesmen loomed the peoples. Each of the protagonists except Wilson acted with the foreknowledge that in all probability his career depended on his success at the Peace Conference, that if he were notably unsuccessful his public life would be snuffed out like a candle. In such circumstances it is difficult not to act with an eye to the gallery.

And Wilson? Did *he* do his utmost? In a crisis he had three alternatives: he could drag out the Conference indefinitely by sheer obstinacy, he could break it up and leave everything unsettled, or he could appeal over the heads of the Conference to the public opinion of the world. At one time he apparently considered the third alternative; on February 24 he declared, "The peoples who constitute the nations of the world are in the saddle and they are going to see to it that, if their present governments do not do their will, some other governments will." Certainly the wish was father to the thought, for it was the peoples themselves who disappointed him the most bitterly. When he actually tried to appeal to the people in Italy, the results were anything but encouraging. Each nation hailed him so long as he defended their interests—but only so long. Whenever he spoke a good word for the Central Powers, he was accused of being pro-German. It was the price he paid for having countenanced and encouraged the anti-German slanders of the war propagandists. Wilson's attitude at the last, after Lloyd George had suffered his change of heart, seems decidedly more reprehensible: but a change at that late hour would have involved public acknowledgment of error, and by then Wilson had allowed himself to be persuaded, by the specious arguments of his chauvinistic colleagues, that the settlement was in accord with his terms. In the end, therefore, his Puritan passion for righteousness, inherited from a line of Presbyterian divines, proved his undoing.

The final result was a peace of compromise, in which the interests of the Central Powers, with Wilson as their only professed champion, inevitably went to the wall. Thus did the Allies perform the unprecedented feat of eating their cake and having it too. By promises of just treatment they persuaded the Germans to get rid of the Kaiser and disarm, and then treated them as harshly as if they were dealing with the Imperial Government itself—so harshly that even Clemenceau was moved with compassion ("It is sad. . . . After all, there was something big about Germany!"). Can more be said? Is it any wonder that Germany cherishes bitterness against Wilson and the Allies?

As for Wilson's conscious motives at the last moment, it seems clear that they were similar to those of Smuts. He believed an imperfect peace better than no peace at all; or, as he himself put it (June 3), "The most fatal thing that could happen, I should say, in the world, would be that sharp lines of division should be drawn among the Allied and Associated Powers." Above all, *he too believed that the League would eventually right any wrongs committed by the treaty.*

Was it an error, as many believe, to make the League and the treaty inseparable? Without attempting to answer the question, one may first of all call

attention to Wilson's reason for so doing ("It is not likely that it [the League] could be formed after the settlement") and second, one may emphasize that, as they were excluded from the League, this twin birth was bound to make the defeated powers look upon the Geneva Assembly as merely another Holy Alliance, designed to perpetuate unjust and intolerable wrongs.

One cannot help wondering whether, homeward bound, Wilson ever thought of that day (January 22, 1917) when he had insisted:

It must be a peace without victory. . . . Victory would mean peace forced upon the loser, a victor's terms imposed upon the vanquished. It would be accepted in humiliation, under duress, at an intolerable sacrifice, and would leave a sting, a resentment, a bitter memory upon which terms of peace would rest, not permanently, but only as upon quicksand. Only a peace between equals can last. Only a peace the very principle of which is equality and a common participation in a common benefit. The right state of mind, the right feeling between nations, is as necessary for a lasting peace as is the just settlement of vexed questions of territory or of racial and national allegiance.

THE GREAT RENUNCIATION

For effective action the League required the participation of the United States, the one Great Power nonpartisan in European affairs. This Wilson came home to secure, confident that he could rely on the fundamental idealism and common sense of the American people for support; it was to be his final but not his first disillusionment of the kind. Though Europeans were opposed to the treaty proper, they were willing to accept the League; most Americans did not object to the treaty proper (except for the matter of Shantung), but they manifested strong opposition to the League—a curious anomaly, since Europeans were primarily responsible for the territorial and economic clauses and an American had championed the League Covenant.

It was Wilson's express desire that the treaty should be dealt with as a strictly nonpartisan issue, and officially the Republicans of course agreed. (Wilson's partisan choice of a peace delegation counted heavily against him in what was to follow.) Unfortunately—since the opposition to ratification contained both those willing to see the United States enter the League with reservations and those who were irreconcilably opposed—the issue was not clean-cut. When the Senate refused to ratify the treaty, owing to the bigoted and vindictive opposition headed by Lodge and Borah, Wilson made a personal appeal to the country. His speaking tour, which began on September 3, came to an abrupt close on the twenty-sixth, when his health gave out. How much effect the tour or its abrupt termination had on events it is obviously impossible to estimate; by the final vote of March 19, 1920, the Senate again refused to ratify the treaty.

During the presidential campaign of 1920 the Democratic candidate stood for ratification. His opponent did a straddle that left his stand on the matter completely obscured but enabled a number of hard-shelled Republicans who were not too enthusiastic about the League to vote for him and to assert at the same time that a vote for Harding was a vote for the League (with suitable reserva-

tions, of course). The anti-Democratic landslide was thereupon interpreted by Republicans as a repudiation of the League! This explanation was stoutly and correctly denied by the Democrats; but thenceforth the League became a dead issue in American politics, and the United States proceeded to make her own private peace with Germany (July 2, 1921).

Whatever the true interpretation as to the sentiments actuating the American electorate in 1920, the fact remains that the vote was *not* a referendum on the League—either for *or* against—simply because most of those voting against it were unaware how the League was constituted (not having troubled to read the Covenant) and so acted on incorrect premises. One of the main Republican arguments was that the British Empire would have six votes in the League to one for the United States. The statement had just enough truth in it to deceive those who were willing to be deceived or who had not read the Covenant. The British Empire *was* to have six votes in the League *Assembly*; *but* only one in the *Council*, where all current business must be passed, and by unanimous vote. Another such argument was that League activities would violate the Monroe Doctrine—whereas the Covenant specifically upheld that doctrine. Third, it was argued that the terms of membership deprived Congress of the right to declare war, another invalid argument, as can also be seen by careful reading of the Covenant. Much of the opposition was based on personal hostility to Wilson, whether admittedly or not, and on the inexorable determination of Republicans not to let the Democratic Party reap the credit of such a sensational coup (it has been plausibly maintained that it would have made no difference how many Republicans Wilson took to Paris). All these factors weighed in the balance—yet all were subsidiary to the main issue.

Just as Americans voted for Wilson because "he kept us out of war," so they voted against the League because they believed it would get us into war. They entirely failed to apprehend the inescapable *necessity* for such an organization. Arguing from Washington's dictum against "entangling alliances," delivered during the infancy of the Republic, many sincere persons said that the United States should not adhere to an agreement which, they asserted, would inevitably result in America's being dragged into European quarrels. Now the League is obviously not an entangling alliance in Washington's meaning of the term (whereas the European, prewar alignments were just that). Such shortsighted people failed to comprehend these fundamental facts: *so long as European quarrels continue to arise America is bound* to be dragged in, as she has always been in the past when any issue of basic importance is involved; and the *only* hope of avoiding such an eventuality lies in the erection of a strong international force that can prevent those quarrels from coming to a head—just as the police force in civilized countries prevents crime, or stamps it out before it can jeopardize the peace of the entire community.

From September of 1920 until his death in February of 1924, Wilson lived in retirement. To the realization that he had failed to secure a just peace was added the supreme bitterness of having failed to establish the League on the firm bases calculated to correct the evils of that peace. Instead, he had to watch France and Italy transform his dream child into an engine of repression and aggression. His next-to-last public words, uttered on Armistice Eve of 1923,

showed how bitter he felt. Speaking in the invisible presence of ten million soldier dead, he declared unreservedly, "France and Italy between them have made waste paper of the Treaty of Versailles." It was the deathbed statement of a broken man, broken in the service of the most exalted ideal known to history—the same ideal that had inspired his great predecessor of nearly two thousand years earlier.

Three months later Wilson had joined Lincoln as one of the great martyr presidents of America. In the larger sense, if the nations can but catch his vision, he did not fail. The flame he kindled burns on. Even yet it may prove the effective force in the regeneration of international relations, even yet bring to Europe and to mankind what they most need—Peace. This American, "this man whom Europe so often accused of lack of comprehension, whom she so long misunderstood, first flattering him, then calumniating, but never understanding him, was the only one who really divined Europe and her needs!"

In Washington Cathedral, in the capital of the nation that likewise misunderstood its great prophet, lies all that is mortal of Woodrow Wilson, twenty-eighth President of the United States—first American to belong even more to the world at large than to the land that gave him birth.

Sleep softly . . . eagle forgotten . . . under the stone.
 Time has its way with you there, and the clay has its own.
 "We have buried him now," thought your foes, and in secret rejoiced.
 They made a brave show of their mourning, their hatred unvoiced.
 They had snarled at you, barked at you, foamed at you, day after day.
 Now you are ended. They praised you . . . and laid you away.
 The others, that mourned you in silence and terror and truth,
 The widow bereft of her crust, and the boy without youth,
 The mocked and the scorned and the wounded, the lame and the poor,
 That should have remembered forever, . . . remember no more.
 Where are those lovers of yours, on what name do they call,
 The lost, that in armies wept over your funeral pall?
 They call on the names of a hundred high-valiant ones,
 A hundred white eagles have arisen, the sons of your sons,
 The zeal in their wings is a zeal that your dreaming began,
 The valor that wore out your soul in the service of man.
 Sleep softly . . . eagle forgotten . . . under the stone.
 Time has its way with you there, and the clay has its own.
 Sleep on, O brave-hearted, O wise man that kindled the flame—
 To live in mankind is far more than to live in a name,
 To live in mankind, far, far more than to live in a name!—⁷

⁷ The poet will forgive if these lines, written in honor of another, are here applied to one for whom, with equal appropriateness, they might well have been written.—Author



PART VIII
DEMOCRACY OR DICTATORSHIP?
WAR OR PEACE?

THE POSTWAR ERA

XVII. BOLSHEVIK RUSSIA

XVIII. FRANCE, ENGLAND, AND GERMANY

XIX. FASCIST ITALY; THE MIDDLE-SIZED POWERS

XX. IMPERIALISM KICKS BACK

XXI. INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

THE POSTWAR ERA

The cataclysm of 1914 and the Peace of 1919 ended the nineteenth century and ushered in the twentieth century proper. Even though the greatest war in history might have been expected to furnish some surprises, to many who grew up in the Prewar Era of "security" and modest plenty the Postwar Period—with its New Era, characterized by stenographers who dressed like millionairesses, with its Great Depression, characterized by millionaires and nobles who were reduced to penury or even beggary, and with its hundred and one other novelties—came as a startling and decidedly unpleasant surprise. Even the casual observer is struck by four postwar phenomena in the political sphere: the increase in number of the European states, the persistence of undemocratic government, the rise of a great anticapitalistic power, and the League of Nations.

To the prewar statesman, not less than to the man in the street, the Postwar Era was surprising and unsettling. Throughout the later Middle Ages and modern times an almost constant tendency toward political integration had been manifest. Of the three hundred and more practically independent states of the mid-eighteenth century worth mentioning, only about threescore of importance were left after the Congress of Vienna had completed its work. Between 1815 and 1914, all the intermediate powers but one (Spain) had disappeared—the Greater Netherlands, the Greater Sardinia, the Two Sicilies, the Ottoman Empire in Europe, Sweden-Norway and Bavaria—and most of the lesser powers had been absorbed. By 1914, accordingly, only a score of states worth considering remained; at that time a political romanticist might have concluded that Europe was ultimately to achieve unity by the process of "making large ones out of small ones," or that the Continent was at least to be partitioned between three great powers, one Slavic, a second Germanic, and the third Latin—with Great Britain, backed by its overseas empire, maintaining a precarious independence. As a result of the World War, however, the pendulum swung suddenly the other way and the number of sovereign states was increased by some 50 per cent. In addition, a complete realignment had taken place. Three of the six European powers of 1914 had undergone profound changes: Germany had become a cripple, Russia a pariah; and Austria-Hungary had completely disappeared. The eclipse of the Austrian Empire—analogous to, but surpassing in importance, that of Poland a century earlier—was the outstanding feature in the diplomatic realignment. Largely as a consequence of its disappearance, but also as a consequence of the losses suffered by Russia, four new, intermediate powers had appeared—Poland, Rumania, Czechoslo-

vakia, and Yugoslavia; and seven smaller states—Hungary, Austria, Finland, the Irish Free State, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. Finally, the League of Nations, a totally unprecedented *international* organization, had arisen.

Nor was this the end of the surprises; the "war to end wars" was succeeded by an unending string of small wars, official and unofficial; the war "to make the world safe for democracy" was hardly done when over half the inhabitants of Europe found themselves living under dictatorships, open or disguised. And many of the dictators were men of comparative or absolute obscurity in the Prewar Era.

In so far as these new phenomena resulted from the force of nationalism they were logical extensions of prewar developments; to the extent that they were antidemocratic they constituted a fundamental antithesis to prewar tendencies.

It could also be noted that with the exception of Russia social democracy, in the sense of social equality at least, was nearly as far off as in 1789 or 1815—nearly as far off as ever.

One additional observation of a general nature comes to mind. Prior to 1789 it was England that was the revolutionary country of Europe. From 1789 on, for the better part of a century France was the revolutionary country *par excellence*. During the twentieth century, while England and France have remained stable, the forces of revolution have raged elsewhere.

CHAPTER XVII

BOLSHEVIK RUSSIA

LAYING THE TRAIN

Because of the vast numbers affected and the extreme novelty of the experiment involved, the outstanding development of recent times in the realm of internal affairs is the Bolshevik Revolution¹ in Russia. How did the most autocratic country of Europe come to be the scene of such an experiment? The answer may be put in a nutshell: Precisely because it *was* the most autocratic. In order that this explanation may be intelligible, however, a detailed examination of the conditions in tsarist Russia, including a consideration of its history subsequent to 1855, is essential.²

Why did the tsarist régime collapse without striking an effective blow in self-defense? Here the explanation, in large measure, is to be found in the character of Nicholas II. A would-be autocrat in order to succeed must act the part; whereas Nicholas was the Louis XVI of Russia. (Throughout the history of the Bolshevik Revolution the student of the events of 1789 can find innumerable illuminating parallels.) Like Louis, Nicholas "*n'était pas de sa race*" ("didn't take after his family"). With the exception of Alexander I, who was at least imperial in bearing, the preceding Romanovs were autocrats both by temperament and to the manner born. Poor little "Nicky," to be sure, was equally determined to be an autocrat; but Nature had granted him less capacity than any of his predecessors. Not only was he totally unfitted to act in an emergency, but both he and the Tsaritsa were temperamentally unsuited to "play the game"—in the sense of discharging even the normal routine expected of them.

Russia was accustomed to tsars who conducted themselves as befitted a great empire and a great tradition, to a court that yielded to none in elegance and distinction, where official position counted for nothing and everything depended on the favor of the sovereign, where a lieutenant in the Guards outranked a general of the line, a court exceeding Versailles in license perhaps, frivolous and corrupt, but polished, fascinating, and imperious—surpassing in its Byzantine splendor. Nicholas and his consort, who were fundamentally rather timid souls, pious and strait-laced, withdrew to the privacy of Tsarskoe

¹ Using the term "revolution" in its broadest sense.

² See Chapter VIII.

Selo (Dyetskoe Selo) and appeared in public only two or three times a year. Court festivities, balls, masquerades, hunts, military reviews, receptions, and theatricals—all the former traditional functions—were given up; and St. Petersburg (now Leningrad) languished in neglect while the Tsar devoted himself to his wife and his wife devoted herself to her family and to an ignorant, superstitious, middle-class companion whom she preferred to the pompous, pushing ladies of her official retinue. One is reminded of Louis XVI and his activities as an amateur locksmith and of Marie Antoinette and her pastoral affectations. This mode of life alienated the imperial couple from their relatives, the grand dukes and duchesses, and rendered the Tsar and the Tsaritsa impervious to advice from those quarters when, at a later day, need for sound advice became imperative. The nobility as a whole, who cherished memories of the first Nicholas and the second and third Alexanders, were likewise alienated from this small, reserved man, who inspired neither liking nor fear, and from this sober, silent wife. The masses, who had to pay the fiddler, might hate the iron-fisted tsars of an earlier day; nevertheless, they too felt the decline in imperial prestige as a sort of national degradation. The earlier autocrats had at least known how to make themselves respected, whereas Nicholas was perpetually uncertain when to be firm and when to yield.

As the ruler of a state like England Nicholas would have done as well as another—as well as his cousin George V, whom he so greatly resembled. As the ruler of an autocracy in its death throes he was a round peg in a square hole. The very qualities that would have made him a model citizen were his undoing; when the crisis arrived, because of his devotion as a husband he allowed himself to be led by the nose, even as Louis had been dominated by Marie Antoinette. (The chief trouble with despotism is that it opens the way for such influences to get in their work.) Under the circumstances, any of his more full-blooded ancestors would have made a better ruler. In Russia's hour of direst need poor little "Nicky," though well enough intentioned in his way, was merely an ill-timed joke; lacking the virtues of an enlightened despot, he lacked even the virtues of the unenlightened despot who realizes that the first duty of a government is to govern.

Indirectly, the downfall of tsardom, like the French Revolution, can be traced to centuries of oppression, to the fact that the tsars in their belated attack on the institution of serfdom stopped with halfway measures, and to the fact that they constantly favored the nobility and bourgeoisie against the peasants and proletariat.

Directly, the downfall of the Romanovs went back to that fateful Sunday in 1905 when hundreds of unarmed workmen were shot down in cold blood while peaceably approaching the imperial palace to petition the Little Father. Next came the Rasputin affair, the history of which reads like a tale from the Arabian Nights. In the years preceding the World War the imperial family fell under the spell of a creature by the name of Rasputin, who posed as a "holy man." The little Tsarevich, the sole male heir to the throne, was a victim of haemophilia; and his distracted mother, who was normally of a nervous and mystical temperament and whose chief prepossession was an unreasoning determination that he should inherit the autocratic power unimpaired, lived

in hourly dread of losing him. Rasputin was reputed to possess the mysterious power of curing him when an attack occurred. Thus this most notorious of charlatans, obtaining an almost hypnotic control over the Empress and, through her, over the Emperor, became the power behind the power behind the throne, and made and unmade ministers at will.

Rasputin was an ignorant peasant belonging to a religious sect peculiar to Russia and incomprehensible to outsiders, which believed in sounding the depths of sin as a prelude to subsequent repentance, contrition, and abasement—the greater the sin, the more fervent the atonement. At the same time that he was acting as the Tsaritsa's confessor, therefore, he was leading a life of open and flagrant shame. Though filthy and though repulsive in the extreme, he possessed a curious animal magnetism; countless wives and daughters of the aristocracy and even the imperial nurse fell into his clutches. When the facts became generally known, repeated efforts were made by individuals from every quarter of high society to end the scandal. The Duma in its sessions discussed the affair; the papers published the minutest details of Rasputin's private life. Finally Rodzyanko, the president of the Duma, approached the Tsar, who empowered him to make an official investigation. Nicholas expressed himself as convinced by the evidence, and for a while Rasputin was exiled from court. His absence happened to coincide with the one time he might have been of service; he was unalterably opposed to war and it was while he was away that war was declared. The Tsaritsa, however, refused to lose faith in him; and soon he was back again, stronger than ever.

The effect of all this on public opinion and the endless amount of backstairs gossip to which it gave rise can readily be imagined. More especially, it led to strained relations between the Duma, subservient as that body was, and the Tsar. When a number of the newly elected members expressed a desire to be presented at court, Nicholas refused to receive them until some of the ministers threatened to resign, and when he finally yielded, heaped reproaches on them—never a word of praise. During the celebration of the Battle of the Borodino, no seats were reserved for the deputies; and similar slights were offered them on every occasion.

The Revolution of 1905 had failed and reaction had triumphed, but the country remained discontented. The proletariat had continued to increase in numbers, and together with the majority of the peasantry and factions from the other classes had grown more and more restless as time went on. It was evident at the time war broke out that Russia was trembling on the brink of a second revolution. In their fundamental attitude toward the World War there was a division of opinion among the conservatives, who should have been students of history but most of whom apparently were not. Though some saw clearly that the interests of the autocracy lay with the monarchical Central Powers, rather than with democratic England and France, the majority, particularly the bourgeoisie, were devoted to the powers who had provided the funds for industrial development and, in addition, they believed that a foreign war was what was needed to reunite the country. In this opinion they were partially correct. At the outbreak of hostilities, under the influence of drummed-up patriotism, Russia was united as it had not been in a century; the extreme

Left, under Kerensky, was the only faction in the Duma that failed to support the Government unreservedly. The assembly as a whole looked on with indifference while the authorities imprisoned defeatists by the hundred or shot them down like mad dogs. Even in November, when five of its members were arrested in defiance of their parliamentary immunity and exiled to Siberia "for membership in a secret society" (the Social Democratic party), the assembly remained quiescent. The defeatists were for the most part Bolsheviks, who asserted that since the triumph of Russia would strengthen the autocracy, which would be a calamity, the thing to be desired was rather the overthrow of tsarism—if necessary by Germany.

Eventually the war completed the work begun by Bloody Sunday. Only a few weeks after the outbreak of hostilities the disaster of Tannenberg began an almost unbroken series of calamities. It seems hardly necessary to seek further for a cause when one learns that the Tsar while visiting the front had difficulty in finding his way about because the troops did not even have maps of *their own* territory! They were also greatly hampered by shortage of ammunition; yet offers from manufacturers were repeatedly declined by the head of the service of supply on the ground that "there is no need of ammunition"! The real reason was the desire to augment the profits of certain favored firms. According to Rodzyanko, who until the day of his death remained a staunch royalist,

chaos reigned supreme. Freight trains arrived in Moscow packed with wounded, who lay on the bare floor of the cars without straw, often without clothes, with badly dressed wounds and having had no food for days. . . . The military first-aid organization was the worst of all. There were no vehicles, no horses, and no medical supplies. In spite of this, no other organizations were allowed at the front. . . . [At] the Warsaw-Vienna railway station . . . 17,000 wounded from the battles of Lodz and the Berezina were collected. . . . Countless numbers . . . lay in the cold rain and mud without so much as straw. The air was filled with their piteous cries: "For God's sake, have our wounds dressed. We've been without dressings for five days." . . . The only medical staff in attendance . . . were the Warsaw doctors, assisted by volunteer nurses. This was a Polish society-unit numbering about fifteen members. . . . The soldiers in the Carpathians were fighting barefoot. . . . The Grand Duke [Nicholas] . . . said that he had been compelled temporarily to suspend operations owing to lack of munitions and the shortage of boots.

In 1915 nearly a third of the soldiers at the front were at times unarmed. As a result of the Galician disasters of that year, the ineptitude and indifference of the bureaucracy became an open secret, for the shortcomings of the Government, paid for by the rank and file, were revealed in the casualty lists, which mounted inexorably and appallingly, million after million.

Behind the lines it was the same story of misery, oppression, and inefficiency. "The poor peasant loses his last cow, but the rich man is not touched." Of 15,000,000 Russians under arms early in 1917, millions who could not be used at the front because of the shortage in arms spent their time at the rear, carousing instead of producing, while the Government supported their families. Two million refugees, as well, were dependent on government aid, and three-quarters of the industrial workers were engaged in military production. The

cities were threatened with famine, yet at "the municipal cold storage plants [in Petrograd] ³ . . . mounds of rotting carcasses were piled up all around. This meat was intended for the use of the army. There was nowhere to store it . . . and it was not allowed to be placed on the market." "Cartloads of rotting carcasses being conveyed to soap factories could be met in the streets . . . at a time when no meat was to be found on the market." "It was the same with the meat supply from Siberia; but here thousands of tons instead of hundreds were lost, owing to the inadequacy and disorganization of the transport arrangements." For the same reasons millions of tons of grain in Siberia were also rotting away.

THE FALL OF THE ROMANOVS

The first to protest was Witte. Others took up the cry, and soon the ministers were subject to constant attack in the Duma and were being accused not only of inefficiency but of graft and even treason. Naturally these accusations had their effect on public opinion. In reply the Government would adjourn the Duma and thereby add fuel to the flames. When members of the Duma asked to assist in war work, they were at first refused; and even after the Government finally consented, they were hampered in every possible way. Gradually the thinking public came to the conclusion that it was a question of winning the war with democracy or losing it with autocracy. Guchkov, head of the War Industries Committee and an ardent supporter of the tsarist régime in the prewar period, voiced the sentiments of the overwhelming majority when he informed the Government: "We were not a revolutionary organization. . . . It was you who turned us into one because we came to the conclusion that Russia could only hope for victory if it was rid of you. And this is the process by which our peaceable organization was forced to include subversive measures, carried out, if necessary, by force of arms." But Nicholas would listen only to what he wanted to hear; some have assumed that his obstinacy was part of a premeditated attempt to discredit quasi-constitutionalism and to induce a demand for undiluted autocracy. In 1915 the Duma was asking for a ministry of confidence; in 1916 it was demanding a responsible ministry. Both were refused. Far from acceding, the Tsar inscribed a report from the Minister of the Interior with the following illuminating annotation: "It is indeed high time to reduce the powers of the Imperial Duma. It will be interesting to see how Messrs. Rodzyanko & Co. will take it."

Thus the stage was already set for revolution when Nicholas, unwilling to yield to popular opinion and urged on by the Tsaritsa, took what was to prove the fatal step. Prior to the war the Tsaritsa had remained in the background; now the moment had arrived when she was to step forward, seize the reins, and assume responsibility for the most appalling tragedy that ever overwhelmed a dynasty. Disregarding the united protests of every patriotic faction, from extreme liberals to extreme conservatives and including the members of his own family, the Tsar transferred the Grand Duke Nicholas to the Caucasus

³ As has been noted, during the World War the name of the capital was changed to Petrograd.

front and assumed personal command of the troops operating against Germany and Austria. The so-called exiling of the Grand Duke was particularly unfortunate, as he was the only living member of the dynasty who had proved either able, incorruptible, or popular. At the front the Tsar lost what little reputation he had left. Useless as a civil ruler, he proved worse than useless as a military leader. As he himself confessed in his letters to his wife, he was in a continual fog and had not the haziest notion what it was all about. His chief adviser was the Tsaritsa, who sent him instructions from Rasputin in every letter! (Incidentally Rasputin was reputed to be working as an agent of the Central Powers.) Already there were many who believed the Tsar indifferent; by refusing a national ministry and assuming military command he shouldered personal responsibility for everything that went wrong, at the front as well as behind the lines, and revealed his true character in all its pitiful weakness and obstinacy.

February 10, 1917, Rodzyanko had his last audience with the Tsar:

The Emperor's attitude was not merely indifferent, but positively harsh. During the reading of the passage which dealt with the shortage of food supplies in the army and the towns, the arming of the police with machine guns, and the general political situation, the Emperor seemed absent-minded and finally interrupted me:

"Couldn't you get through with it quicker?" he said sharply. "The Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovich is expecting me to tea."

When I mentioned the terrible conditions in which our prisoners of war were kept and the report on the subject . . . the Emperor said:

"This does not concern me at all. There is a special committee for this presided over by the Empress. . . ."

On my speaking of the menacing state of the country and the prospect of a revolution, the Emperor again interposed:

"My information is directly contrary to yours. As to the spirit prevailing in the Duma—if the Duma permits itself such harsh utterances as last time, it will be dissolved."

I was obliged to conclude my report.

"I consider it my duty, Sire, to express to you my profound foreboding and my conviction that this will be my last report to you."

"Why?" the Emperor asked.

"Because the Duma will be dissolved, and the course the Government is taking bodes no good. There is still time; and it is still possible to change everything and grant a responsible ministry. That, apparently, is not to be. You, your Majesty, disagree with me, and everything will remain as it is. The consequence of this, in my opinion, will be revolution and a state of anarchy which no one will be able to control."

The Emperor said nothing and curtly bade me farewell.

By this time all the imperial connections, as well as the rest of the country, were tired of Nicholas and even more of his wife, whom they had never liked. A plot was on foot to depose him in favor of the Tsarevich, with the Grand Duke Michael as Regent; but events moved too fast. The Romanovs had had three centuries and the stage was now set for another and different experiment.

During the last four months of 1914, Russia experienced only 19.75 economic strikes a month and only 1.25 political strikes. The former affected 9,169 men,



Courtesy of Brown Brothers

LENIN



TROTSKY

Courtesy of Keystone View Company

or less than 30,000 on a yearly basis; the latter 895, or only about 2,500 on a yearly basis. During 1915 the economic strikes averaged 68.25 a month, the political 18—affecting nearly 400,000 and over 150,000 men respectively. During 1916 there was an average of nearly 100 economic strikes a month and better than 20 of a political nature. Thus more than 775,000 and 300,000 men respectively—well over 1,000,000 in all—were affected.

March 3, 1917, a fresh strike broke out in one of the Petrograd factories. By the tenth of the month, nearly all the workers in the capital were on strike and disorders had developed. The disorders, which ultimately proved to be, the first of the revolution, were principally bread riots, occasioned in part by the food shortage; but apparently the bureaucracy were up to their old tricks. Able authorities say that the harebrained Minister of the Interior—who should surely rank high in the Bolshevik Valhalla—instigated the revolt, at the suggestion of the Tsaritsa, in order to have the credit of suppressing it. If so, the ruse was tried once too often, for he had started something he was unable to finish. When the situation got beyond control, he decamped, leaving the liberals and the socialists to clean up the mess.

News of the disturbances in Petrograd reached the Tsar on the tenth. The next day Rodzyanko telegraphed: "The capital is in a state of anarchy. The Government is paralyzed; the transport service has broken down; the food and fuel supplies are completely disorganized. Discontent is general and on the increase. There is wild shooting in the streets." Again he urged a responsible ministry. On the twelfth he added: "The situation is growing worse. Measures should be taken immediately, as tomorrow will be too late. The last hour has struck, when the fate of the country and dynasty is being decided." Though the Council of State also telegraphed in almost identical terms, though the Grand Duke Michael urged his brother to yield, and the Prime Minister added his plea, Nicholas remained obdurate. Not content with refusing to go forward, he indulged in a final exhibition of firmness and ordered the dissolution of the Duma—an order that proved the swan song of the autocracy.

The decisive factor that tipped the scale in favor of the revolutionists was the army. Because the army had remained loyal to the monarchy, the revolution of ten years earlier had been a failure; in 1917 the monarchy fell because even the Cossacks were on the side of the revolutionists. On the eleventh the Petrograd garrison refused to fire on the populace, and the next morning the capital was in the hands of the mob. Around the Duma, which had assembled in spite of the orders of the Tsar, civilians and soldiers gathered in an expectant mass, and soon were augmented by several regiments of the garrison.

For decades the revolution had been in the air, for months it had been hourly expected; yet at the moment when it arrived not a single faction was prepared to take advantage of it. The army, just shaking off its traditional habits of obedience, was unused to political action; the bourgeoisie wavered between its accustomed allegiance to the monarchy and its newly developed, theoretical devotion to the revolution; the proletariat was divided against itself; and the peasantry as a whole was still ill-organized and groping in the dark. The revolution was therefore the product of a variety of forces operating not exactly in combination, but at least in conjunction. The proletariat possessed the force and the

will, but lacked organization and prestige; the Duma, representing mainly the bourgeoisie, possessed the prestige and the organization, but had no force at its disposal and wavered at the crucial moment. It was by pooling their resources, so to speak, that these two factions, aided by the army, produced a movement of national proportions.

At this decisive moment Kerensky, the young leader of the Socialist deputies, stepped to the front of the stage and imparted a fleeting semblance of unity to the divergent groups. When the Duma, to which all were looking for leadership, inclined to disperse, it was he who rushed out hatless and coatless to greet the crowds, shouting: "We are on your side! We thank you for coming and promise to stand by the people." He it was who inspired the soldiers to proclaim their loyalty to the Duma; he it was who, in the name of that body, turned a local protest into a national uprising; and he it was who, by his oratory, galvanized the stupefied masses into consciousness of power.

The action of the masses proved the determining factor in a double sense: the members of the Duma acted both because they feared the mob and because they were conscious of its backing. Throughout the morning they debated, hesitating to grasp the scepter which had fallen from the nerveless hands of the sovereign. To obey the Tsar, with the ministers in hiding, meant to abandon Russia to the mob; to disobey was to side with the mob. Finally, about three o'clock, they proceeded to form an extraordinary Committee of Twelve, with Rodzyanko as chairman. Two Socialists were on the first slate; but only Kerensky, of the Social Revolutionaries, accepted. Yet for a few hours Russia manifested a sense of national unity such as occurs rarely in history—except when aroused by war—and of such potency that in the face of it no unsympathetic government could survive.

The reason Kerensky was the only extremist to accept a seat on the Duma committee became apparent that same evening when the Socialists formed a Soviet⁴ of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. Composed of some two thousand "elected" delegates—one for each thousand workers, each company of soldiers, and so on—the Soviet was a strictly class organization, from which all bourgeois elements were excluded. At the very outset, therefore, were sown those seeds of dissension which were to prove so fatal and, in the end, land Russia in the Bolshevik camp. Throughout the day, however, neither the Duma nor the Soviet could make up its mind to a break with the Old Régime and so merely followed the lead of the mob, which arrested the ministers and brought them to the assembly.

On March 13 a Provisional Government headed by Prince Lvov, a well-intentioned nonentity, was appointed by the Duma Committee. It included Milyukov and Guchkov, and was composed almost exclusively of Cadets (bourgeois liberals) and Octobrists (bourgeois Tories). Again Kerensky was the only extremist to collaborate. The Provisional Government decided to induce the Tsar to abdicate in favor of his son and to have the Grand Duke Michael appointed Regent; but at once the Soviet, by announcing its determination to have nothing to do with the Old Order, began to exercise its disintegrating influence.

⁴ The Russian word *COBET* is commonly translated "council." "Soviet," the usual form of transliteration, will be employed in this account. The pronunciation is sóv-yet.

On the fifteenth the Tsar appointed Prince Lvov Premier and abdicated in favor of his brother Michael. The Grand Duke, in turn, said that he would only accept if elected by the people, and thereupon turned over the power to the Provisional Government. How completely the country was converted to the idea of revolution is proved by the fact that for months there was no move in opposition. The March Revolution was over, and with next to no bloodshed, almost as soon as it had opened—but the revolution as a whole had just begun.

THE BOURGEOIS-SOCIALIST RÉGIME

The new régime was weak in that, since the ministry was almost exclusively bourgeois in composition and since the bourgeoisie constituted only some 7 per cent of the population, the Government rested on too narrow a base. Moreover, its program was exclusively bourgeois in complexion. The bourgeoisie wanted a purely political revolution, without any social changes, and devoted themselves almost entirely to destructive measures, content to leave the pressing problem of constructive accomplishment to a Constituent Assembly—to be called in the supposedly near, but nevertheless indeterminate, future. This program found little favor with the masses. So began a two-cornered struggle between the bourgeoisie and the Socialists which developed into a three-cornered fight, with the Socialists caught between the reactionaries and the Bolsheviks.

With the Soviet and the Provisional Government competing for power, revolutionary Russia had from the outset two governments. When Kerensky, who was vice president of the Soviet, had been asked to join the Provisional Government, he had requested permission of the Soviet Executive Committee. The committee refused, but Kerensky appealed to the Soviet as a whole and received enthusiastic support. At this time the Social Revolutionaries were the largest party in the Soviet, the Mensheviks the next largest. The Bolsheviks, under the leadership of Kamenev (Rosenfeld), were a small and unobtrusive minority; except that they advocated a peace-at-any price policy, a point they were not active in pressing, they did not differ radically from the Socialists. Their total membership throughout Russia was perhaps 10,000.

On the question of constitutional rights the Provisional Government was at a considerable disadvantage: if it claimed to inherit power from the Romanovs, it would antagonize the extremists; if it claimed power from the people, it would have some trouble in establishing its claim. The Soviet, though arbitrarily excluding all bourgeoisie, advanced just such a claim, and had a somewhat better case. Posing as a sort of parliament, on the basis of this claim it asserted that it had a right to oversee the Government. Though the contention was stoutly denied, the Government felt obliged to cooperate with the Soviet, as a power with which to reckon, unwillingly—unwittingly, one might almost say—giving the Soviet a sort of sanction.

Tactically, as well, the Government was at a disadvantage: its members were out of touch with the masses, while the Socialists and the Bolsheviks were able to carry on an intensive propaganda among the proletariat, the peasants, and the soldiery. Throughout, the Soviet played a rôle similar to that played by the

Paris Commune during the French Revolution; all over Russia local soviets were organized which looked to the Petrograd Soviet for leadership. Thus the local authority of the Government was undermined in the same way that the Petrograd Soviet undermined its central authority.

The members of the Government were men of intelligence, education, and patriotism, who would have made excellent routine administrators; but the emergency called for a strong man, and there was not a really strong man in the lot. Moreover they were constitutionalists, inclined to adhere strictly to their theories; while in a crisis such as this, Russia needed a man who was not afraid to be an opportunist.

On March 15 the Provisional Government issued a declaration of policy proclaiming:

1. An immediate general amnesty. . . . 2. Freedom of speech and the press; freedom to form labor unions and to strike. These political liberties should be extended to the army in so far as war conditions permit. 3. The abolition of all social, religious, and national restrictions. 4. Immediate preparation for the calling of a Constituent Assembly . . . which shall determine the form of government and draw up the Constitution. . . . 5. In place of the police, the organization of a national militia with elective officers, and subject to the local self-governing body. 6. Elections to be carried out on the basis of universal, direct, equal, and secret suffrage. 7. The troops that have taken part in the revolutionary movement shall not be disarmed or removed from Petrograd. 8. On duty and in war service, strict military discipline should be maintained, but when off duty, soldiers should have the same public rights as are enjoyed by other citizens.

Since all but Articles 4, 6, and 8 had been proposed by the Soviet, the program as issued was a compromise. The Soviet had demanded the following reading of Article 8: "The army should be organized on the basis of self-government." When the Government refused to adopt this wording, the Soviet took the extraordinary liberty of issuing on its own authority the famous Order No. 1, which has been blamed for much of the subsequent trouble in the army. According to terms of this order, the enlisted personnel of each military unit were to elect a committee which was to have charge of all arms. When off duty, soldiers were to revert to civilian status. Officers were no longer to be addressed as your Excellency, your Honor, and the like, but simply as Mr. General, Mr. Colonel, and so on. Most serious of all, orders from the Government were to be executed only if they did not conflict with orders from the Soviet. In that it issued this order, the Soviet has been charged with a conscious attempt to induce insubordination in the ranks, but since the Soviet was in favor of continuing the war and since the order specifically stated that "in the ranks and during their performance of the duties of service, soldiers must observe the strictest military discipline," further consideration does not seem to bear out this interpretation. Moreover, according to Order No. 2, "Order No. 1 . . . did not provide that these committees should elect the officers." Order No. 1 was in the main a reaction from previously existing conditions in the army; its primary objects were to make the army more democratic and to transfer control from the Provisional Government to the Soviet. The first of these objects was commendable,

even if the measures themselves were ill-advised and apt to be misunderstood by ignorant privates; the second was a dangerous and dubious innovation.

The question that pressed for immediate solution was the war; it was the war that caused the first serious difference of opinion between the Government and the Soviet; and the war remained the chief bone of contention for the next eight months. The actuating motive of the liberals in overthrowing the monarchy was the expectation that as a result Russia would become a more effective force in the war; and in the months immediately following nearly every leader of prominence lent his support to a war policy. Many such well-known defeatists as Prince Kropotkin rallied to the Government; and on his return from exile Plekhanov, the most noted of Russian Socialists with the possible exception of Trotsky and Kerensky, did likewise. The trouble arose from the fact that the Soviet, which was strongly opposed to imperialism, would only support a war of defense.

On March 18 the Government issued a declaration on foreign policy, promising the Allies to carry out the tsarist pledges. The Soviet objected, tried to induce the Government to modify this stand, and finally appealed to the workers of the Central Powers. April 10 the Government issued a new declaration stating that Russia was engaged in a war of defense only. A third declaration, of May 1, attempted to straddle the issue by yoking the declaration of April 10 with the statement that the Russian Government "will, in every way, observe the obligations assumed toward our Allies." This vacillation and double-dealing inevitably aroused distrust, and gave rise to street fighting which was only quelled with the help of the Soviet.

Finally, Prince Lvov proposed a coalition cabinet, and Kerensky persuaded the Soviet to accept on condition that its policies be adopted by the Government. The two strongest men in the existing Government—Milyukov, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Guchkov, Minister of War—resigned, Prince Lvov remained as Prime Minister, Kerensky became Minister of War, and four other Social Revolutionaries entered the cabinet. From this time on, Kerensky was the pivot in all the cabinets of the Provisional Government. The new ministry forthwith issued a declaration of policy "The Provisional Government . . . spurns the idea of a separate peace . . . We wish peace without annexations, without indemnities, and on the basis of the self-determination of peoples."

In one important respect the 1917 Revolution in Russia differed from the French Revolution of 1789. The danger from without at first produced no corresponding stiffening of the defense. Though Kerensky had the best of intentions, he took the dubious step of appointing civil commissioners with dictatorial powers, reminiscent of the French Representatives on Mission, to supervise the operations of the army. Checked from above by the commissioners and from below by the soldier committees, with general disintegration and war-weariness eating at the vitals of their forces, the army commanders were helpless. The news that the peasants were seizing the large estates led the soldiers to fear that they would be left out in the distribution of land; and on July 19 the war machine went completely to smash. In some cases the soldiers "did not even wait for the enemy to show himself. In some instances military units deserted in a body." Army commanders, civil commissioners, and soldier com-

mittees were united in their indignation, but to no avail. Some of the Soviet delegates, even, were roughly handled and narrowly escaped death at the hands of rebellious regiments. Many officers were beaten and killed.

THE RISE OF LENIN

In the heart of Russia lies the Volga, mightiest of European rivers; and on the banks of the Volga lay Simbirsk (now Ulyanovsk), the birthplace of Kerensky. Here his father was headmaster of the high school (Gymnasium). In Simbirsk, also, by another of those strange coincidences in which Destiny delights was born one who was to rise to far greater fame.

The history of Soviet Russia is the history of Lenin. Seldom has a single individual so influenced the course of events; seldom if ever has a leader overcome such obstacles. Lenin, as he is commonly known, by reason of his revolutionary pseudonym, or Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov, as he was baptized, was born in 1870. His father was an inspector of schools who came of the merchant class and who, by virtue of his rank as State Counsellor, was enrolled in the hereditary nobility. The father and mother were what we of today would call parlor Bolsheviks; they dabbled in socialistic theory, were ardent advocates of reform, even of revolution, but they never attempted to put their theories into practice. On Lenin's high-school certificate Headmaster Kerensky wrote: "Very gifted; consistently painstaking and regular in his attendance."

In 1887, when Lenin was seventeen, his elder brother was executed as leader of a group that had attempted to assassinate Alexander III. One might imagine the future dictator of Russia consecrating himself to the task of avenging his brother, but there is no evidence to this effect. The chief result of his brother's unhappy end, as a matter of fact, seems to have been that it convinced Lenin of the futility of old-fashioned terrorism. It is interesting to note that the family was not subject to persecution as a result of his brother's rash action, but that after the death of her husband his mother received a pension from the tsarist Government on which Lenin also lived. Moreover, the very year that his brother was executed—at a time when higher education was a privilege accorded to few—Lenin was admitted to the University of Kazan. Shortly after, however, he was expelled for participating in a student assembly.

Radicalism, springing from the contemplation of intolerable wrongs, is a tendency common to youthful idealists. In most, as maturity advances it fades into the light of common day. Not so with Lenin, for the flame once kindled burned with undiminished vigor to the end. Leaving the university, he plunged into the study and propagation of Marxism. In order to lay his homage at the feet of Plekhanov, the dean of Russian Socialists, he made a pilgrimage to Geneva. Plekhanov, on his side, recognized in the callow, dreamy youth the makings of the great realist he had long been seeking in vain. So Joshua received the blessing of Moses and with increased vigor went back to his labors.

During the strikes of the middle '90's, as recorded earlier,⁵ Lenin experienced his first and almost his only contact with the proletariat prior to the Revolution of 1917. He was arrested soon after and sent to Siberia for three years, and

⁵ See p. 216.

while there, was chosen by the Social Democrats, in their First Congress, as editor of the *Workers' Gazette*. In 1900, because the Government believed that his activities would serve as a counterirritant to those of the terrorists, of whom they stood in far greater dread, he was allowed to leave Russia. Thus, indirectly, the terrorists helped to advance the overthrow of tsardom. He spent most of the next five years in Germany and England editing the *Iskra* (*Spark*); through articles signed "Lenin" the fame of that pseudonym chiefly spread. One of Lenin's staff was another young refugee, also from Siberia, named Bronstein, but known today as Trotsky. Lenin's imperious spirit, which in after days would brook no opposition even in the party, was in constant rebellion against his superiors. Even with Plekhanov, who was also working on the *Iskra*, friction, partly doctrinal and partly temperamental, developed; and at once the hard, ruthless streak in the future dictator came to the surface. So began a conflict that was to outlast the years, until long after, unwept and unsung, the old warrior perished of neglect at the hands of his more successful follower.

The program adopted at the Second Congress of the Social Democrats in 1903 was a compromise between the views of Plekhanov and those of his aspiring disciple. Lenin did not hesitate to declare himself a "Jacobin"; whereupon Plekhanov, with another flash of insight, remarked, "Of such stuff Robespierres are made." The Plekhanov-Lenin faction within the *Iskra* group obtained a momentary triumph over the Martov-Trotsky faction on the question of restricting the party membership, but was outvoted in the congress as a whole. As a result of this defeat, in part, and in part as a result of his final split with Plekhanov (occurring soon after) Lenin resigned from the *Iskra*—which under the control of the Mensheviks became more conservative and was ready to consider cooperation with the bourgeoisie. From then on he devoted himself to building up a separate organization of his own faction, thenceforth known as Bolsheviks. During the Revolution of 1905 he returned to Russia, where he found the workers acting under the leadership of the Mensheviks and his former lieutenant, Bronstein. After the failure of the Moscow uprising, which he instigated but in which he did not participate, he went into hiding in Finland. He and Stalin laid plans for seizing bank funds in transit in order to replenish the party exchequer; during the execution of the plot several soldiers were killed.

In 1907 Lenin left Finland, spending several years in Paris. This was by far the most discouraging period of all; the wave of revolution had risen, had threatened for a moment to carry everything before it, had broken, and now was on the ebb. The party of revolt, including 50,000 Bolsheviks, had numbered 3,000,000 in 1905; from that time on, it shrank progressively until it could count only 46,000 adherents in 1910. Lenin never lost faith, however, and was constantly strengthening the Bolshevik organization and his hold over it. Two Jews, Zinoviev (Radomyslsky) and Kamenev (Rosenfeld), were his chief assistants. During this period, also, Stalin entered the Central Committee. Apparently with the connivance of the Austrian authorities, Lenin moved his headquarters from Paris to Cracow, close to the Russian frontier. The final rupture between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks, who up to this time had remained nominally associated within the Social Democratic party, took place late in 1913.

When hostilities broke out in 1914, Lenin was arrested as an enemy alien, but ten days later was released and assisted into Switzerland—one would be interested to know just why and how. The Bolsheviks were the only party which openly and uncompromisingly condemned every aspect of the war. Between Lenin and Trotsky, still a Menshevik and at this time living in Paris, long and bitter polemics on the subject ensued. Trotsky too condemned the war, but with a tinge of Russian nationalism that enabled Lenin to denounce him out of hand as a diplomat and a poseur. In this unobserved tempest in a teapot, it was Lenin the doctrinaire vs. Trotsky the opportunist; later the rôles were to be reversed. December 28, 1916, Lenin paid a long visit at the German Embassy in Berne; on April 8, 1917, he left Switzerland in a special "sealed" car. He reached Sweden by way of Germany—permission having been obtained from the general staff, which judged correctly that his presence in Russia would be more valuable than a dozen army corps—and on the sixteenth arrived in Petrograd.

The *Pravda*⁶ of April 19 contained his famous Theses: "1. War on the part of Russia under the new government of Lvov & Co. continues unconditionally to be an imperialistic war for plunder, in view of the capitalistic character of this government. . . . 3. No support to the Provisional Government. . . . 5. No parliamentary republic, but a republic of Soviets of Workers,' Farm Laborers,' and Peasants' Deputies. . . ." By the Mensheviks and the Social Revolutionaries and even by the majority of Bolshevik leaders these propositions were greeted with little but derision. "A man who talks such nonsense is not dangerous. It is a good thing that he has arrived[,] for now he is in full view." His German connections counted heavily against him at the moment—but the fact that he stood almost alone caused him no uneasiness. He was used to it; he had the right to address the Soviet; and he was able to publish his views without hindrance. Time would do the rest.

Shortly after reaching Russia, Lenin received an unexpected ally in the person of Trotsky, who, having been allowed to pass through England at the insistence of the Provisional Government, arrived from the United States. Trotsky too immediately began to preach the dictatorship of the Soviet. Here was a man untainted by any suspicion of pro-German sympathies, and distinguished as the hero of the 1905 Revolution.

Lenin did not long remain in the shade. The Bolshevik Conference of May 7, where he secured the adoption of most of his principles, marked his return to power in the party. The Provisional Government was denounced as "a government of landowners and capitalists." On the question of the war the Conference adopted an ambiguous declaration; the Bolsheviks refused to cooperate with the Socialists, but protested against "the base slander . . . that we sympathize with the idea of a separate peace." The First Congress of Soviets afforded a fresh opportunity to appraise the relative strength of the extremists (June 16). Of 882 delegates with full voting powers, 285 were Social Revolutionaries, about 250 Mensheviks, and only slightly over 100 were Bolsheviks.

⁶ *The Truth*, then the official organ of the Bolshevik party, now the leading Russian daily and still the official organ of the party.

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

In the midst of the army crisis of July the Ukrainian difficulty came to a head. The Ukrainians (also known as Little Russians or Ruthenians) were a cultural group that claimed the right of self-determination. They were bent on setting up a separate government. Kerensky made a bargain with them on the basis of certain concessions. On July 16 the Cadets, who denounced this bargain as a violation of the rights of the (future) Constituent Assembly, resigned from the ministry. A three weeks' cabinet crisis resulted. Prince Lvov also retired and was followed by other ministers. When Kerensky attempted to form a new coalition, the Cadets held out for such terms that he too resigned and thus left Russia without a government. Thoroughly frightened, the Cadets and the Socialists got together; and the Soviet, the Duma Committee, and the Cadets each gave him a vote of confidence. Kerensky thereupon formed a cabinet with a Socialist majority (August 6).

The new Government was the most representative Russia has ever had; but for the war and the Bolsheviks it might have survived. Even so it might have weathered the storm had it seen its way clear to summoning the Constituent Assembly without delay, had not the difficulties involved led Kerensky to postpone the elections from September 30 to November 25. In the meantime the only party on which the Government could depend for whole-hearted support was the Socialist; the liberals gave only lukewarm assistance, while the Bolsheviks were openly hostile.

As if the Government did not already have enough troubles, another rising took place in the capital in the middle of July. The picture is blurred. Whether Lenin instigated the movement is uncertain, though it is certain that he took part. The Bolshevik leaders limited their outward action, at least, to attempting to pacify the mob. That they may have been sincere in this attempt appears possible from the fact that although the mob was in control on the seventeenth, the Bolsheviks did not try to seize power. A strong force of cavalry arrived the next day, and the Government succeeded in restoring order. The Bolshevik headquarters were occupied, together with the offices of the *Pravda*; Lenin fled to Finland, where he remained in hiding most of the time until November.

Kerensky now had a golden opportunity to wipe out the Bolsheviks, with the sanction of public opinion, for he was able to publish incontrovertible evidence proving that Lenin had been subsidized by Germany (which Lenin did not scruple to deny). Instead, those who had been arrested were shortly released. Lenin would have made no such mistake; and in this case opportunity did not knock a second time.

The July uprising gave Trotsky, who was not yet a Bolshevik, an opportunity to align himself with Lenin. When the first order for the arrest of the opposition leaders failed to include his name, he issued a statement: "I agree with the main theses of Lenin, Zinoviev, and Kamenev. . . . My attitude toward the events of July 16-17 was the same as theirs. . . . The fact that I . . . am not a member of the Bolshevik party is not due to political differences, but to certain circumstances in our party history which have now lost all significance. . . . I

am just as uncompromising a political opponent of the Provisional Government as the above-named comrades."

By this time, Kerensky was convinced that drastic measures alone could save the country. The death penalty was restored in the army on July 25; on the thirty-first, Kornilov, who had proved the only leader with the will and the ability to restore discipline, was intrusted with the supreme command. Kornilov was also picked by Kerensky as the man to wipe out the Bolsheviks. Unfortunately for the Provisional Government he became the rallying-point for the reactionaries, and there were signs that he was not averse to serving as the "man on horseback" of the Revolution. Whether an actual plot existed or whether it was principally a misunderstanding is unknown and comparatively unimportant. At any rate, Kerensky was compelled—or believed himself compelled—to choose between the Bolsheviks and the monarchists. Duplicating the mistake so often made in the past by the tsarist bureaucracy, he chose what at the moment appeared the lesser evil.

September 9 Kerensky deprived Kornilov of his command. Kornilov replied by refusing to be deposed, and attempted to move against the capital. Kerensky thereupon liberated the Bolshevik leaders and legalized the formation of a Red Guard. The railroad workers refused to furnish Kornilov with transportation for his troops, and he was soon arrested.

Superficially Kerensky's position appeared stronger than ever, for the monarchists had failed and Lenin was in hiding; in reality it was a Pyrrhic victory, which, as Kerensky himself later pointed out, served as the true prelude to Bolshevism. Another cabinet crisis resulted. The Socialists were in favor of excluding the Cadets, and only with great difficulty did Kerensky succeed in reconstituting a coalition ministry, consisting of three Social Revolutionaries, four Mensheviks, four Cadets, three nonpartisan Socialists, and two independents (October 8). The reconstructed ministry was appreciably weaker: the Soviet-Bolshevik alliance had displaced the Government-Army alliance as the dominant factor, and Kerensky had lost most of his remaining supporters. The nationalistic minorities, absorbed in their own private affairs, had never given the Government any support; Finland, for example, even preferred to deal with the Soviet, which she believed to be more sympathetic. The reactionaries felt that the triumph of Lenin was actually to be desired, as leading inevitably—at least, so they hoped and believed—to a reaction. Many of the Liberals, who had been Kerensky's only supporters with the exception of the Socialists, but who had been getting more and more discouraged and disgruntled, came to the conclusion that he was no better than Lenin and in the hope of returning to power when their opponents were mutually exhausted, resigned themselves to letting the extremists fight it out among themselves. Most important of all, the moderates of the Left decided that Kerensky, as an associate of Kornilov and an advocate of war with Germany, was a reactionary. Since they were by far the largest faction, the net result was a decided swing to the Extreme Left.

Ever since the outbreak of the Revolution, the Bolsheviks had been gaining in power. Their April congress only claimed to represent 76,000 workers; and in June, as has been seen, they could muster only a little over 100 out of 882 votes in the First Congress of Soviets. In every local election, however, they

registered fresh gains September 19 an adverse vote in the Petrograd Soviet led to the resignation of the Menshevik-Social Revolutionary Presidium (presidential committee), and on October 8 a new Presidium was elected in which the Bolsheviks obtained four out of the seven places. Trotsky was elected chairman. Nevertheless, if the elections to the Constituent Assembly had been held on September 30, as planned, the day might yet have been saved for the moderates.

The slogan that carried the Bolsheviks to power was far different from the "Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity" of the French Revolution. "Land, Peace, and Bread" offered to each of the three great factions of the population the concrete aims it most desired—to the workers food, to the soldiers peace, to the peasants land. At this point it seems proper to introduce a few figures to emphasize anew the overwhelming importance of the agrarian problem. According to the census of 1905, 10,500,000 peasants owned just over 200,000,000 acres, which made less than 20 acres apiece on the average and which, with the large families prevalent in Russia, with the primitive conditions of culture, and with the not too fertile character of much of the soil, was far from sufficient (Of these holdings 2,850,000 averaged less than 8.5 acres apiece.) A million more peasants owned 40,500,000 acres, an average of a little better than 40 acres. A million and a half well-to-do farmers owned nearly 189,000,000 acres, or about 125 acres apiece on the average. And 30,000 landlords still owned nearly 189,000,000 acres, an average of almost 6,300 acres apiece. (At the end of the nineteenth century, over 5,000 landlords owned estates averaging better than 10,000 acres; while nearly 700 more owned estates averaging over 80,000 acres. These conditions changed somewhat between 1905 and 1917, but not enough to alter the picture substantially.) The Provisional Government, in contrast to the Bolsheviks, refused to deal with the land question until the Constituent Assembly met, proposed to continue the war until Germany was defeated, and was unable to cope with the food shortage.

In the Bolsheviks the Government faced that most dangerous of combinations, a rank and file with everything to win and nothing to lose, plus a leader combining consummate ability with the ethics of a Machiavelli. Lenin translated the Marxian formula "Proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains" into the trumpet call "Loot the looters!" The Government set itself a far-off goal, the Constituent Assembly, and would be content with nothing less. The Bolsheviks, as good strategists, advanced bit by bit, consolidating each position as it was gained and then advancing their objectives. It was this constant change in their avowed aims that confused and deceived their opponents.

October 9 and 10, Lenin published another detailed program: 1. No compromise with the bourgeoisie. 2. All authority to the Soviets. 3. Immediate conclusion of peace. 4. Confiscation of large estates without compensation. 5. Workers' control of production and consumption. 6. Convocation of the Constituent Assembly. Soon after he declared that the Soviets must seize all supplies—"Anyone who does not work should not eat." Food was to be distributed only to those possessing workers' certificate books.

FIVE DAYS THAT SHOOK THE WORLD

The approach of the whirlwind was heralded by one of the Guards regiments, which on October 22 demanded that all power be handed over to the Soviets. The same day, under the guise of protecting the capital from the Germans, the Executive Committee of the Soviet voted to form a War-Revolutionary Committee with authority to supervise the orders issued by the commander of the Petrograd area. Though this was a direct blow at the authority of the Government, the ministry made no reply. The possibility of an uprising was openly discussed in the Soviet on the twenty-ninth, and on November 1 the Factory Committees declared for the transfer of power to the Soviets. On the third the Petrograd regiments, through their committees, acknowledged the authority of the War-Revolutionary Committee; it was the final warning, yet Kerensky and his colleagues sat as if stricken with paralysis and continued their debates.

The November 6 issue of the *Izvestia*, the organ of the Socialists, contains an extraordinarily interesting and illuminating account of the situation on the eve of the Bolshevik Revolution:

On the night of November 4, members of this Committee [the War-Revolutionary Committee] presented themselves at headquarters and demanded the right to participate, with a deciding voice, in the command. Colonel Polkovnikov, the commander of the troops, emphatically refused to admit their claim. The Petrograd Soviet then called together at Smolny representatives of the regiments, who telephoned to all the units that the Staff refused to recognize the War-Revolutionary Committee and by so doing broke with the revolutionary garrison and the Petrograd Soviet and became a tool of the counter-revolution. "Soldiers of Petrograd," the telephone message goes on to say, "the safeguarding of the revolutionary order from counter-revolutionary attacks falls on you, under the direction of the War-Revolutionary Committee. Orders not countersigned by the Committee are void. . . ."

The Commander of the Petrograd Military District called a meeting which included representatives of the Central Committee [of the Soviet] and the Commissar attached to his staff. Members of the Petrograd garrison . . . came headed by Sergeant Dahkevich. He announced that he was authorized by the garrison to inform the Staff of the District that from now on all orders issued by the Staff must be countersigned by the War-Revolutionary Committee. . . .

This conflict brought General Cheremisov, the Commander of the Northern front, to Petrograd yesterday. He talked over with the Prime Minister both the situation at the front and the local conflict. Without commenting on the conflict, General Cheremisov insisted . . . that the Petrograd garrison should relieve some of the regiments at the front. "If," said the General, "the War-Revolutionary Committee should take the stand that the garrison troops should not be moved, then he [*sic*] would categorically protest in the name of the armies."

Kerensky had conferences with some of the Central Executive Committee, who told him that in this conflict the members of the Central Executive Committee were whole-heartedly with him, but asked him to withhold action temporarily, for they hoped to settle the trouble in a peaceful manner by discussions between the Central Executive Committee and the Petrograd Soviet.

Since the Bolsheviks were in control of the committee, it may be suspected that they were simply pulling the wool over Kerensky's eyes; but it is possible that the Government allowed itself to be lulled by the expression of these sentiments into a false sense of security, into hoping against hope for a peaceful solution to a well-nigh insoluble problem. Whatever the reason, the conclusion is inevitable that the ministers either failed to realize or refused to realize the seriousness of the situation, for they continued their policy of masterly inactivity—resigned to marking time in the hope that the Constituent Assembly would convene before the blow fell. Such is the disadvantageous position into which an honorable party that commits itself to a program and lacks the courage to face the charge of opportunism is maneuvered.

On the eve of the November Revolution, the Bolsheviks themselves were divided. For fear that the attempt to seize power would fail and so discredit the party hopelessly, Zinoviev and Kamenev were against it. Lenin wanted it to begin in Moscow. But Trotsky went his way. The news of the projected transfer of the Petrograd garrison very possibly determined his action. Certainly it influenced the garrison itself, which had no desire to exchange its soft job in the capital for an arduous post at the front.

The evening of the sixth (October 24, O.S.)⁷ the rallying-cry was a paraphrase of the French slogan of 1789: "The Kornilovists are mobilizing forces in order to annihilate the All-Russian Congress of Soviets and the Constituent Assembly." That night, as Lenin entered the city in disguise, the garrison, by order of the Soviet, occupied the public buildings. Kerensky escaped and attempted to arouse the near-by troops, but General Cheremisov and the officers who soon after were to lead the White revolutions⁸ failed to support him.

Lenin's handling of the situation was characteristic and illuminating. Kerensky's chances of success depended ultimately on whether he could obtain reinforcements from the front; and this, in turn, depended on the attitude of the railroad employees, who were demanding a government which should include all the Socialist parties. Lenin pretended to entertain these proposals, and the Railway Union prevented Kerensky from obtaining reinforcements. As soon as Kerensky had given up the struggle, Lenin declared that collaboration with the non-Bolsheviks was only possible on condition that they supported the Bolshevik program. In less than twenty-four hours the Bolsheviks were in possession of the capital, and in less than a week the entire country was at their feet.

With hardly a struggle, therefore, 100,000 Bolsheviks had obtained control of the central organization in a country of 175,000,000! What does all this prove? First and foremost, the power of a determined, highly disciplined minority with a positive program, as against a negative and disunited majority, however much greater. Whatever, under modern conditions, may be the truth or falsity of the Napoleonic dictum that the advantage (in warfare) lies with the attack, in politics this principle certainly holds true. The liberals and the Socialists were unwilling, and too scrupulous, to make the promises necessary to hold the loyalty of the masses; while the Bolsheviks obtained control of the key posi-

⁷ Old Style, the Julian Calendar then in vogue in Russia, as has been noted.

⁸ Of those opposed to the Reds (Bolsheviks).

tions—the central organs of the proletariat and, through them, the capital and the central organs of government—by a cleverly directed war of propaganda. The Bolsheviks were immeasurably aided by another factor: many, particularly among the Socialists, did not recognize the true import of the struggle until it was all over. *Caveat emptor!*⁹ Thus began a régime that no one except the Bolsheviks themselves expected to last more than a few weeks, or at most a few months—and many Bolsheviks entertained strong misgivings.

FIRST STEPS TOWARD UTOPIA

At 10 A.M. on November 7, 1917, Lenin issued a proclamation: "The Provisional Government has been overthrown." At 2 P.M. he outlined his policies to the Soviet:

We shall have a soviet government, without the participation of bourgeoisie of any kind. . . . One of our immediate tasks is to put an end to the war at once. But in order to end the war, which is closely bound up with the present capitalistic system, it is necessary to overthrow capitalism itself. In this work we shall have the aid of the world labor movement, which has already begun to develop in Italy, England, and Germany. . . . We shall secure the confidence of the peasants by one decree, which will wipe out the private property of the landowners. . . . We will establish a real labor control of production. . . . We should now occupy ourselves in Russia with building up a proletarian socialist state.

The Second Congress of Soviets met that evening. Of the 670 delegates 300 were Bolsheviks; nearly 200 were Social Revolutionaries; a little over 50 were Mensheviks. Though the Social Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks protested against the Revolution and most of them withdrew, the Social Revolutionaries of the Left wing remained and the congress proceeded to business.

The first decree, which concerned the war, called for an immediate, just, and democratic peace, "without waiting for a final confirmation of all the terms" and without indemnities or annexations, "regardless of the time when such forcible annexation took place; regardless of the cultural development or backwardness of the nation forcibly annexed or forcibly detained . . . regardless, finally, of the fact whether said nation is in Europe or far across the ocean." An armistice of three months, in which to conclude the necessary agreements, was proposed. "War cannot be ended by refusing to fight; war cannot be ended by one side"—this (differing in no essential from similar pronouncements by Kerensky) from Lenin the opportunist.

The land decree read in part as follows:

The final settlement of the land question belongs to the national Constituent Assembly. . . . 1. The right of private ownership of land is abolished forever. Land cannot be sold, bought, leased, mortgaged, or alienated in any manner whatsoever. All lands . . . pass to the nation without indemnification and are turned over for the use of those who till them. Persons who have suffered from the loss of property will be entitled to public aid only during the time necessary for their readjustment to the changed conditions of existence. 2. All the underground resources . . .

⁹ The old legal dictum meaning "Let the buyer beware!"

as well as forests and waters which have national importance, are transferred for the exclusive use of the State. . . . 3. . . . Small private estates, city and village land in fruit or truck gardens, are to be left in possession of their present owners. . . . 6. All Russian citizens (male and female) . . . are entitled to the use of the land as long as they are able to cultivate it. Hired labor is not permitted. . . . Farmers who are too old or physically unable to till the soil lose the right to it, but receive instead a state pension. 7. The land is to be divided equally among the toilers, according to needs or labor capacity, depending on local conditions. Each community is to decide for itself how its land is to be apportioned, whether it is to be held collectively or as homesteads or artels. 8. All the alienated land goes into one national fund . . . subject to periodical redistribution. . . . Should the supply of land in certain localities be inadequate . . . the surplus population shall be settled elsewhere at the expense of the State. . . . The lands of peasants and Cossacks of average means shall not be confiscated.

After these decrees had been passed the congress voted its approval of a provisional government, known as the Soviet of People's Commissars, which was to hold office until the Constituent Assembly convened. Lenin, who once more signed himself Ulyanov, was of course the head (President of the Soviet). Bronstein (Trotsky) was Commissar of Foreign Affairs; Dzhugashvili (Stalin), Commissar of Nationalities.

November 28 the Government issued a decree regulating the organization of industry:

In all industrial, labor, financial, agricultural, transportation, coöperative, and similar enterprises employing wage workers or contracting for work to be done at home there is introduced workers' control of production, of the purchase and sale of products and raw materials, of their storage, and also of the financial management of enterprises. The workers in any given enterprise shall establish workers' control through their elected agencies, such as the mill and factory committees, shop foremen's councils, and the like, with the condition that representatives of the employees [employers?] and the technical staff shall be included in . . . these agencies. The workers' control bodies shall have the right to supervise production, and to set a minimum output for each enterprise. The workers' control bodies have the right of controlling all the business correspondence of any enterprise.

As will be noted, this halfway measure did not include the abolition of private ownership of factories or other industrial plants. The hold of the bourgeoisie on the industrial, commercial, and financial life of Russia was still virtually intact when the Bolshevik Revolution began; and there is evidence to the effect that had they accepted the change and refrained from political activity, they might have retained this hold indefinitely. The Bolsheviks had the utmost need of their services, and wherever the bourgeoisie stuck to their posts they were protected from mob persecution.

Though the November Revolution¹⁰ was a success because organized resistance was lacking, it is one thing to overthrow a government, however tyrannical, and another to establish a new one in its place. Many revolutions have weathered the destructive phase only to fail miserably when they have come to

¹⁰ The Bolsheviks have now adopted the Gregorian calendar but often refer to their accession to power as the October Revolution.

the constructive. No longer could the Bolsheviks sit by and hurl the critic's ban; it was up to them, now that they were in power, to translate their ideology into cold, hard facts or perish in the attempt. In consolidating their régime, they had to build up a government and to defend it at the same time; and on every side they met determined opposition.

The elections to the Constituent Assembly, to begin with, were a staggering shock to the Government. The Bolsheviks obtained less than 200 out of over 700 seats, while the Social Revolutionaries, most of them belonging to the Right wing, had a clear majority of over 400. All in all, the Constituent Assembly was the most representative parliament ever elected in Russia, but it never had a chance to make itself felt. Two days before it met, Lenin, anticipating trouble and changing his tactics to suit the occasion, declared all power vested in the Soviets. When the Constituent Assembly opened on January 18, 1918, it refused to recognize the authority of the Soviets, but this purely constitutional opposition was disposed of with neatness and dispatch; the assembly was closed by force, and thereafter was heard of no more. So much for Bolshevik democracy.

During the peace negotiations the Bolsheviks were abandoned by the Social Revolutionaries of the Left wing. The night of April 11-12 the anarchists in Moscow were crushed; fourteen were killed and six hundred imprisoned. And on June 14, when the Central Executive Committee of the Bolshevik party voted to exclude even the Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries from further participation in party or governmental affairs, the ruling clique definitely and finally cut itself off from all other political factions. Thus, with only the uncertain support of the Russian proletariat and the still more uncertain support of the peasantry to rely on, the Bolsheviks faced a world united in opposition—Social Revolutionaries, Mensheviks, anarchists, liberals, tsarists, neutrals, the Entente, and Germany. Moreover the Bolsheviks were embarking upon hitherto uncharted waters; no attempt had ever been made before to inaugurate an anticapitalistic, proletarian régime on a large scale and, as Marx and Lenin had devoted most of their time to attacking the evils of capitalism, there was not even a matured, detailed, constructive plan for them to follow.

THE STRUGGLE FOR EXISTENCE

Like the Provisional Government, the Bolsheviks encountered their first serious difficulties in dealing with the war, and proved quite as unsuccessful in meeting them as their predecessors. It is interesting to note how their war policies, in general outline, paralleled those of Wilson point for point: peace without victory, anti-imperialism, self-determination, and the abolition of secret preferential treaties. Fearing that the army might prove a nucleus of disaffection, Lenin paralyzed the military machine by appointing a sublieutenant commander-in-chief. Since this action weakened his hand in dealing with the Germans, in so doing he made a choice of evils. Calling on the Allies to join him, he then approached Germany with a view to concluding a peace without victory *on either side*. He was vastly surprised, apparently, when neither the Allies nor the Central Powers warmed to his altruistic proposal. The German

general staff were only too ready to assist him so long as he confined his attention to his countrymen; but when their own interests were affected, it was a different matter, and they simply took advantage of the situation to raise their terms. Helpless in their clutches, the Bolsheviks next summoned the workers of Central Europe to rise—but without effect. Trotsky, who was in charge of negotiations, then advanced his “neither peace nor war” proposal (“We will not sign peace, but we will declare the war ended”); but the Germans, refusing to be put off in any such fashion, began a fresh offensive. Finally, in desperation, the Bolsheviks turned to the Allies and, in return for assistance against the Central Powers, offered them the control of the railroads, the Black Sea fleet, or practically anything else they wanted. This remarkable proposal, for reasons best known to themselves, the Allies chose to ignore. Since single-handed resistance was obviously impossible the Bolsheviks, in spite of a sharp division of opinion within the party, finally submitted (March 3, 1918). What they wanted most, after all, was peace, so as to have a free hand to deal with internal affairs; and that, and nothing more, was exactly what Lenin’s original peace-at-any-price policy got him.

In “disposing” of the German threat, the Bolsheviks had rid themselves of only one, and not necessarily the most formidable, of the dangers by which they were threatened. The Allies proved even more hostile. They resented the “traitorous” action of the Bolsheviks in withdrawing from the war, they were angered at the Bolshevik repudiation of the tsarist debts, they could not help sympathizing with the unfortunate Russian bourgeoisie, and above all, they were eager to see the Revolution stamped out before it spread to other countries. Better the Germans than the Bolsheviks!—though the Allies were far from admitting that they were confronted with any such alternative. It was the old story of the Revolutionary Era over again; only now, in place of Monarchism vs. Republicanism, it was Capitalism vs. Bolshevism. Such were the motives that actuated Allied policy toward Russia, but the workings of that policy were extraordinarily tortuous—so complex that a volume or volumes would be required to disentangle them.

At the outset Wilson welcomed the Bolshevik Revolution, Allied officers in Russia helped to organize the Red Army, Allied and Bolshevik troops coöperated on the Murmansk coast, and Czechs and Bolsheviks made common cause. Soon, though almost imperceptibly, Allied policy changed. Alleging that the stores of war material they had shipped into Russia might fall into the hands of the Germans, the Allies had landed expeditionary forces at Vladivostok (April 6), on the Murmansk coast, at Archangel, and in southern Russia. England, France, Japan, and the United States were the chief participants; but the Allies were assisted by a considerable number of Czechoslovaks who had been captured from the Central Powers. Though at first, as just noted, the Allies and the Bolsheviks acted in concert, it gradually became evident that the overthrow of the Soviets, disguised as a crusade in behalf of the Russian minorities, was the primary objective of those directing operations. The Allies maintained a blockade and did not even allow medical stores to enter Russia. Since a blockade is a war measure and the Allies were not technically at war with the Soviets, and since many of their own people were hostile to a policy

of intervention, the Allied Governments emphatically denied the existence of the blockade, referring to their action as "economic pressure." The United States, though it did not join in the blockade, refused to allow its ships to clear for Russia, in order to avoid "international complications." (One is inclined to ask why Wilson did not adopt an embargo policy three or four years earlier.)

The Allies coöperated with various subject peoples and White Russian leaders who were conducting revolts: the peoples of the Caucasus, the Ukrainians, General Kornilov, who began a campaign among the Don Cossacks early in 1918, General Denikin, who was Kornilov's successor, Admiral Kolchak in Siberia, and General Yudenich in Estonia. The Bolsheviks were also harassed by risings of Social Revolutionaries and by passive resistance on the part of the peasants.

The most serious difficulty faced by the Soviets was the problem of food supply. According to Lenin's original idea there was to be a mutually advantageous exchange of products between industrial and agricultural laborers. This policy might have proved tenable had there been an adequate supply of manufactures, but under the control of the workers the production of the factories dwindled rapidly. Since the peasants, needless to say, did not relish the idea of a one-sided exchange and hence became increasingly reluctant to part with their grain, the Government had no alternative but to force them to comply at the point of the bayonet.

Toward the Entente the Bolsheviks, on their side, were pursuing a tortuous policy. What they desired above all was a world revolution of the proletariat, but they had first to cope with the expeditionary forces operating on Russian soil. From August of 1918 on they made several proposals for peace. February 4, 1919, in reply to Wilson's Prinkipo invitation, they offered to repay the tsarist debts, and they made similar offers through Bullitt and Nansen; but since the Allies were confident that the Soviets would be overthrown, they were in no mood for compromise. It was at this very time that the formation of the Third International, with the avowed purpose of bringing about a world revolution, was announced (March 2).

The Bolsheviks were completely surrounded from the autumn of 1918 to the autumn of 1919; at one time they held only a small area corresponding roughly to that dominated by the principality of Moscow in the sixteenth century. Kolchak controlled all Siberia, had been recognized by Denikin, by the Archangel Government, and by the Allies, had advanced to within twenty miles of the Volga, and was therefore the nominal ruler of nine-tenths of the Russian Empire; the defeat and overthrow of the Soviets seemed only a matter of time. With lightning speed, the picture changed. Kolchak, instead of uniting with Denikin, made the mistake of striking toward Archangel; and thus the Whites, failing to coordinate their blows, were defeated one at a time. Yudenich came within sight of Petrograd in the fall of 1919, and Denikin advanced to Orel—nearer to Moscow than New York is to Washington, or London to Paris—but Kolchak was already in headlong flight. When the Supreme Council of the Allies decided to lift the blockade in January of 1920, the end was in sight. The

counter-revolutionary movements had at most prevented the Bolsheviks from taking the offensive in behalf of their comrades in Hungary.

Just as their troubles seemed over, with nothing but a remnant of Denikin's forces (under Wrangel) to be disposed of, the Bolsheviks were confronted with a fresh attack. The Poles, having regained their liberty, were dreaming of reconstituting their state with its extreme historical boundaries. This plan for a Greater Poland which should constitute a first-class power was fostered by France, intransigent, as usual, where the Bolsheviks were concerned and eager to create a *cordon sanitaire* against the Red Peril; Lloyd George lent his moral support out of fear of Bolshevik activities in the Caucasus and in Central Asia. Aid was also expected of Rumania, Finland, and Japan. The Soviets did their best to avoid a conflict, but when driven into a corner, they turned on the Poles in a magnificent exhibition of patriotism and chased them to the gates of Warsaw. Somewhat oversanguine, they were in turn disastrously routed when the French reinforced the Poles, and were forced to purchase peace by ceding a considerable strip of territory. Some 6,000,000 Russians, in consequence, went to increase Poland's already large element of minority peoples. The price was heavy, but the Bolsheviks were left free to finish off Wrangel in short order. By the end of 1920, counter-revolutionary activity in European Russia was over; in 1922, Japan evacuated eastern Siberia, where she had ruined her prospects (as the Entente had ruined theirs elsewhere) by insisting on a protectorate.

THE CONSOLIDATION OF POWER

What deep-seated bases of power enabled the Bolsheviks to surmount such apparently insuperable obstacles and to accomplish this dramatic and well-nigh incredible reversal of fortunes?

1. In a country like Russia, where the middle classes constituted a negligible fraction of the population, the Bolsheviks could afford to disregard the interests and the sentiments of the bourgeoisie; and by their legislative policy (see pages 502-503) they neutralized the peasantry to a considerable degree and obtained the enthusiastic support of a large part of the proletariat. By proclaiming a "dictatorship of the proletariat" they further strengthened their hold on the industrial classes.

2. The Red Army, the creation of Trotsky, was the weapon that enabled the Soviets to ward off attacks from without. The Bolsheviks, like their tsarist predecessors, knew the meaning of the adage *Divide et impera*; Lettish, Chinese, and Mongolian regiments, which had no compunctions against slaughtering Russians, constituted a considerable portion of their early army. Moreover, as Lloyd George had surmised, the Russian proletariat proved the only factor, in Europe with a cause for which they were willing to die; consequently they fought with a crusading zeal resembling that of the armies of the First French Republic. The extremely difficult and hazardous living-conditions and the privileged position in regard to rations occupied by soldiers helped with recruiting. Strange as it may seem, capable tsarist officers—among them Brusilov, ablest of the imperial commanders—helped to train the troops. The reasons are not far to seek. Service in the army was their profession—the only one for which they

were educated. Whereas they and their families ran better than an even chance of starving to death if they gave it up, in the service of the Soviets they occupied a position of privilege. Trained to unquestioning obedience, they were able to reason that by simply carrying out orders they were, after all, fulfilling their whole duty—that it was none of their business to debate political issues. The presence of armed foreigners on Russian soil made them feel they were performing a patriotic duty. Finally, the soldiers in the Red armies knew they were confronted with a literal, unescapable choice between victory and death. If captured they were almost sure to be executed; if they flinched Trotsky, who had no humanitarian qualms about capital punishment, was sure to get them.

Though one of the least ostentatious commanders known to history, Trotsky built up an iron discipline that would have been the envy of a Caesar or a Napoleon. Since none of the other leaders, in all probability, could have done it, this achievement constituted his unique contribution to the Bolshevik cause. History affords no stranger spectacle than that presented by this Jewish idealogue who in a country which was surfeited with war, where the masses were opposed to the ideals for which the army was fighting, developed a great military machine out of nothing. The career of Carnot is positively drab by comparison. Incidentally, the Red Army proved a potent force for educating the masses in the Bolshevik ideals.

3. The Bolsheviks formed a *corps d'élite* in every branch of the Soviet administration, a body with a spirit of devotion that could not fail to inspire the rank and file. During the Yudenich attack on Petrograd, for instance, Trotsky issued the following order: "The Communists must be at the most dangerous posts giving an example of bravery and indefatigability. Communists found guilty of saving themselves will be punished doubly."

4. The Allied forces were an addition of doubtful value to the counter-revolution: they were too few in themselves to constitute a serious menace, and the assistance they rendered the Whites was lamentably ineffective. Allied intervention before November 11, 1918, was ostensibly directed against Germany, though what the operations in Siberia had to do with such a matter it is hard to conceive; after November 11, since sentiment in Allied quarters was dead against war in any form, the privates lacked all enthusiasm for the anti-Bolshevik crusade. An actual mutiny developed in the French fleet at Odessa; and additional aid promised Kolchak never materialized. Most important of all, the Allies betrayed that they did not merely aim to free Russia from the Bolsheviks but that they intended to partition her into spheres of influence and thereby eliminate her from the ranks of the Great Powers. Thus the French forced the Ukraine to sign a treaty (February 4, 1919) whereby France obtained a fifty-year concession of the railroads, a guarantee of the tsarist debts backed by the revenue of the railroads, and a virtual protectorate. Similar treaties were concluded with the republics of the Caucasus. England was bent on carving out a sphere of influence in the north; and Japan, in the Far East. Since the whole affair partook of a gigantic plundering expedition, the Allies enabled the Bolsheviks, by contrast with the Whites, to pose as patriots.

5. The Whites were likewise too few to reconquer Russia unassisted, and in addition they proved no more efficient against the Bolsheviks than against the

Germans. An eyewitness of the Yudenich advance relates that "for five days of hard fighting . . . despite abundant stores on the road and adequate means of transport, practically no food or ammunition reached the front line." The White officers too often manifested a distinctly holiday spirit, and not infrequently they treated the privates and the civil population with anything but tact. Incidentally the Whites quarreled among themselves almost incessantly. Like their predecessors of the French Revolution, the Russian aristocracy knew how to die—but not how to live.

6. Though the Whites counted on the assistance of the peasantry, none of the White leaders, with the exception of the Omsk Government which was overthrown by Kolchak, betrayed any real interest in the welfare of the agriculturalists. The peasants were at first inclined to favor the counter-revolution; but when the Whites began to reinstate the landlords, they decided they could expect even less from the anti-Bolsheviks than from the Bolsheviks.

Born of centuries of oppression, the Russian Revolution, like the French, illustrated Newton's Third Law of Motion ("To every action there is an equal and opposite reaction"); for this reason and because they constituted the overwhelming mass of the population, it was appropriate that, in the last analysis, the peasants should be the ones to decide the issue.

7. The Bolshevik secret police, officially entitled Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-revolution and Usury but commonly known as the Cheka, furnished the weapon with which the Government combated internal dissension. The Cheka was simply the Tsarist Okhrana turned inside out. A still earlier predecessor was the Revolutionary Tribunal of the 1790's. Two years before their advent to power the Bolsheviks had demanded the abolition of the death penalty; but when the Cheka was instituted (December, 1917) they endowed it with dictatorial authority to execute all offenders against the Government. With the approval of Trotsky, no distinction was drawn between such former comrades as Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries, who merely opposed the tactics of the Bolsheviks, and the tsarists and liberals, who opposed the new régime on principle; and with most of the proletariat as well as a part of the peasantry on its side and with Dzerzhinsky as Director, the Cheka proved even more efficient than the Okhrana.

The most consistent opposition to the Soviets was for obvious reasons furnished by the bourgeoisie. The Bolsheviks had foreseen this contingency when they had proclaimed a dictatorship of the proletariat, had laid down the rule that no one who did not work should eat, and had announced their determination to exterminate the bourgeoisie. This intent did not necessarily mean literal extermination, as is frequently implied—merely that the bourgeoisie should cease to exist as parasites. The outstanding principle introduced by the Bolsheviks—a principle of revolutionary import, if there ever was one—was the equal obligation of all to work. The Bolsheviks were determined, first of all, that the bourgeoisie should get to work, and second, that they should indulge in no form of counter-revolutionary activity. As Bukharin put it: "Sheep must protect themselves against the wolves. It is absurd to suppose that you can secure a common sheep-wolves' will. There must be either a wolves' will or a sheep's will. In the same way, there cannot be a common capitalistic-labor will."

In enforcing their dictates the Bolsheviks had a number of effective weapons at their disposal. They had control of the food supply, and on September 1, 1918, they divided the urban population into four classes, which were to receive rations in the proportions 4, 3, 2, and 1. The bourgeoisie, needless to say, were relegated to the fourth class; and since the first class received barely enough for subsistence, those who refused to work died of starvation. In addition, the bourgeoisie were loaded with crushing surtaxes. These measures, quite sufficient in most cases, were the extent of the oppression exercised against those who offered merely passive resistance. Those who engaged in active counter-revolutionary operations were left to the tender mercies of the Cheka. At first merely harsh, the Cheka, in accordance with a decree of September 5, 1918, instituted a veritable reign of terror during the dark days of the civil war. The situation was exactly like that obtaining in Revolutionary France as a result of the Law of Suspects. Not merely active counter-revolutionary operations, including sabotage, but also "failure to report a known contemplated or committed counter-revolutionary crime" were included in the list of criminal offenses. No one could open his mouth to criticize or denounce the Bolsheviks, even to his best friends, without fear of detection. Since the Bolsheviks were fighting with their backs to the wall, this policy of organized terrorism, horrible as it was, is quite understandable. And in judging them the impartial student of human affairs should not forget the situation that existed in the United States, under very much less provocation, during the World War, and that even *in times of peace* it is a crime merely to *advocate* the overthrow of the Government by force. The wholesale execution of hostages, many of them quite innocent in thought and deed, was the most abominable feature of the whole sickening business; following an attempt to assassinate Lenin, five hundred of these unfortunates were massacred in Petrograd. Finally, it may be pointed out that the attitude of the Bolsheviks toward persecution was exactly that of the medieval Church: better a few hundreds or a few thousands should suffer rather than the whole people perish.

How many lost their lives as a result of the Red Terror is not known and never will be, and the estimates vary so widely as to be of little or no value. One authority says that at least 6,000 persons were shot in the concluding months of 1918 alone, another puts the total of "official" victims at nearly 13,000, a third estimates the number of official executions at about 70,000, while a fourth says the number executed was at least 700,000 to 800,000, if not 1,000,000. The Denikin Commission set the number of executions in southern Russia alone at 1,700,000. By way of contrast, take the following statement by Brailsford: "There has never been a 'terror' in Vladimir, though undoubtably life had been made harder at one time for the middle-class than it is now. . . . Hostile 'intellectuals' . . . guessed that about forty persons had been executed in the whole province since the Revolution, out of a population of 1,600,000." This account accords closely with the records of the Cheka, which show that, since the Revolution began, only 79 persons in Vladimir had been executed. Of these 18 had participated in mutinies; 12 were officials, most of them guilty of corruption; 12 were criminals; 12 were members of the former Okhrana; and 25 were deserters. From the lips of one who served with the A.E.F. in

Siberia, the author received the testimony that this officer had never witnessed any Bolshevik atrocities, but had seen the Whites line their prisoners up by the hundred, compel them to dig their own graves, and then mow them down with machine guns. Such testimony can be duplicated *ad lib.*¹¹ For instance, there is the statement of a third witness for the defense: "The White Terror met these mass murders with equal excesses. . . . The losses in battle and on campaign were far exceeded by the number of non-combatants exterminated." One wrong does not justify another, but it at least serves to make the other comprehensible. And this much is certain: in cold-blooded, inhuman, wanton ferocity the Whites were a match or more than a match for the Reds—nor was the Russian Revolution peculiar in this respect. If the Cheka executed innocent hostages who had done nothing worse than harbor unfriendly sentiments or, through no fault of theirs, were connected with those doing so, the Whites massacred innocent men, women, and children who were not even known to be connected with the hostile faction. Reduced to the lowest terms, the evidence amounts to this: the Whites are known to have massacred thousands and accused the Reds of massacring tens of thousands, the Bolsheviks admitted that they executed thousands and accused the Whites of massacring tens of thousands. When the kettle begins calling the pot black, it is time for the historian to suspend judgment.

After the civil war was over, the tsarist system of exile became the more common mode of punishment; in the two years from 1923 to 1925 72,000 were sent to Siberia. From 1922 to 1927, according to official figures, 1,500, or an average of 300 a year, were executed.

BOLSHEVIK FOREIGN POLICY ↙

In pursuit of their foreign policy the Soviets—under the guidance of Chicherin¹² and of his understudy and successor, Litvinov—found themselves caught between the horns of an insoluble dilemma: they were in dire need of economic assistance from abroad, but were theoretically committed to the cause of world revolution, for which Russia was to serve merely as the base of operations. The formation of the Third International in March, 1919, to further this cause has been noted; it was headed by Zinoviev; but although propaganda was spread broadcast and a temporarily successful revolution took place in Hungary, no permanent results were achieved.

When the Entente finally came to a realization that the Bolsheviks could not be conquered and when the Bolsheviks saw that the world revolution was not imminent, both sides were ready for a compromise and economic interests came to the fore. The Bolsheviks were experiencing the evils of underproduction, while the Entente had need of Russian markets; as should have been self-evident, in an era of world economy such as the present neither could get along satisfactorily without the other. Officially, therefore, the Bolsheviks abandoned their propaganda, in order to further the resumption of normal relations;

¹¹ Cf. Ross, *The Russian Soviet Republic*, p. 123, n. 3.

¹² Soon after the Soviet régime began, Chicherin succeeded Trotsky as Commissar of Foreign Affairs.

but as the capitalistic nations were still distrustful, their early efforts met with only moderate success.

In 1920, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Finland signed treaties of peace with the Soviets, according *de jure* recognition,¹³ and Sweden resumed unofficial commercial relations. In 1921, with a view to reestablishing trade relations, *de facto* recognition¹⁴ was accorded by Great Britain, Germany, Norway, Austria, and Italy; and *de jure* recognition by Persia, Afghanistan, Turkey, Poland, and Outer Mongolia. Although, with the exception of Outer Mongolia, the Bolsheviks did not succeed in Sovietizing any territory beyond the pre-war confines of the empire, their Asiatic treaties were a veritable triumph from a diplomatic point of view; the formation of an "Eastern Entente" may yet prove a milestone in the emancipation of Asia from European imperialism. The treaty with Persia was signed almost exactly a year and a half after one that Persia, acknowledging herself a virtual protectorate, had signed with Great Britain. Another piece of astute Bolshevik diplomacy was the Soviet renunciation of all special privileges in China; an attempt to bring about a proletarian revolution, however, resulted in a decline, rather than a rise, in Soviet influence. While it cannot perhaps be proved, the not inconsiderable success of Soviet diplomacy in Central Asia, notably in Afghanistan, probably had something to do with England's change of attitude. Thus in the Middle East the Soviets inherited the mantle of the tsars.

As will be observed, the countries according *de jure* recognition in 1920-21 were minor powers which, by reason of their situation as neighbors, were obliged to come to terms with the new régime. Czechoslovakia accorded *de facto* recognition in 1922, Denmark in 1923. The first notable triumph of Soviet diplomacy in the West was the Treaty of Rapallo of April, 1922, whereby Germany accorded *de jure* recognition and an understanding was consummated that enabled the two powers to present a united front to Entente imperialism. Among the Allies, after six years had elapsed Russia remained an outlaw.

In 1924, therefore, the Soviets centered their foreign policy on an attempt to secure universal *de jure* recognition. As an inducement, they promised to abstain from propaganda and offered special trade concessions to the first Great Power granting such recognition. Great Britain (February 1) beat Italy by six days. Other European powers—Norway, Austria, Greece, Sweden, Denmark, Hungary, and France last of all—followed suit during the year. (Great Britain and France, however, phrased their announcements in such terms as to preclude sanctioning the Soviet conquest of Georgia, a country they still regard as independent.) Here again economic and financial motives played a leading part. Great Britain, whose economic situation was the worst, took the lead; while France, the hardest hit by the repudiation of the tsarist debts, held off the longest. Early in 1925 the Soviets entered into diplomatic relations with Japan.

Not until July, 1921, did the United States remove its restrictions on Russian trade; and even then it decreed that no passports should be issued, no mail service reestablished, and that Americans trading with the Soviets should do

¹³ Recognizing the Soviets as the legal government.

¹⁴ Recognizing the Soviets as the government in power but *not* the legal government.

so at their own risk and without any protection from the Government. *De jure* recognition it consistently refused to accord—though by 1927 its trade with Russia was valued at \$100,000,000, twice the prewar total, and by 1929 at \$150,000,000. In 1931 the Soviets imported nearly \$38,000,000 worth of American goods, to \$4,800,000 worth from Canada, \$2,000,000 from France, and so on. Not until the fall of 1933, when America had been staggering along for three years under the effects of the Great Depression and when Russo-American trade had declined 95 per cent (leaving the United States in sixth place), did these vital economic interests produce their full effect. On November 15 President Roosevelt signed an agreement with Litvinov recognizing Russia and re-establishing diplomatic relations. Bullitt was appointed first American ambassador to the Soviets. Strange though it may seem—in reality it is by no means strange—Russia turned to America first of all for inspiration and advice. Russians are profoundly impressed by the vitality, force, and achievements of the United States; and the great new nation of the Eastern Hemisphere is correspondingly eager to learn industrial technique from the great new nation of the Western.

Beginning in 1925, the Soviets centered their attention on concluding treaties of nonaggression and neutrality. The first of these agreements, with Turkey, was concluded in December. Similar treaties were signed with Germany, Afghanistan, and Lithuania in 1926, with Persia in 1927, and in 1932 with Finland, Poland, Latvia, Estonia, and France. Off and on throughout the second half of 1932 negotiations were under way for the signing of a similar pact with Rumania, but each time they broke down over the question of Bessarabia. Invitations to Japan brought no favorable response, and on account of Japanese aggressions in Manchuria Russo-Japanese relations will bear watching.

During the first decade of its existence the Soviet Government was extremely suspicious and fearful of the League of Nations, which the Bolsheviks were fond of contrasting with the Third International and which they denounced as a Holy Alliance of capitalistic states. Later, however, the Soviets consented to participate "unofficially" in certain League activities. As they had a standing army of 562,000, second in size only to that of France, their presence was essential to the disarmament conferences; and Litvinov took the lead in advocating the reduction of armaments. In 1928 the Soviets adhered to the Kellogg-Briand Pact; but throughout their foreign policy was hampered by failure to observe their promises to refrain from propaganda.

What do the nonaggression pacts and the Russian attitude on disarmament signify? That the Bolsheviks have reformed and have abandoned the idea of a world revolution? Hardly. First of all, they are indicative of the belief entertained by the Soviets that for the moment more is to be obtained by coöperating with other governments than by antagonizing them. Second, the Bolsheviks have reached the conclusion that the world revolution is so remote that at present their assistance will not be needed by their colleagues abroad. More specifically, the nonaggression pacts are an attempt on the part of the Soviets to construct a *cordon sanitaire* of their own that will guarantee their frontier from bourgeois attacks. If the time comes when aggression appears likely to be of profit, is it reasonable to suppose that, as the belief that the end justifies

the means is one of the fundamental planks of the Bolshevik party, it will let a "scrap of paper" stand in its way? Fundamentally, the relations of Russia with the rest of Europe, though disguised and intensified, are the old struggle of East vs. West.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE U.S.S.R.

The Bolsheviks had meanwhile elaborated a system of government. Owing to the war, Russia lost her subject populations to the west and was thus cut off from the Baltic proper. A glance at the map of Europe conveys the impression that she suffered a heavy loss. As a matter of fact, this territory constituted only about 5 per cent of the prewar empire; and except for Bessarabia, seized by Rumania during the civil war, the Soviets appear outwardly resigned to the changes. Also the small Transcaucasian districts of Kars and Ardahan, east of the Black Sea, were retroceded to Turkey. Otherwise the boundary of the Russian Empire proper from the Black Sea to the Pacific is the same as that of prewar Russia. In addition, the Soviets exercise what is a virtual protectorate over Chinese Outer Mongolia, which contains an area of over 1,000,000 square miles. With a sixth of the land surface of the globe (8,144,282 square miles, or two and two-thirds times as many as are contained in the United States) and a population of over 160,000,000, Russia is still by far the largest agglomeration of contiguous territory and people under one flag. Seven-ninths of her territory is situated in Asia, and since over three-fourths of the inhabitants are located in European Russia, the limit of population is by no means attained.

Soviet Russia is far from unified as to nationality. According to official statistics the Russians proper, or Great Russians, constitute only a little over half the population. The largest minorities are the Ukrainians, with over 20 per cent; the White Russians, with over 3 per cent; the Kazaks, with 2.7 per cent; the Uzbeks, with 2.6 per cent; the Tatars, with 2 per cent; and the Jews, with 1.8 per cent. In European Russia alone, a third of the inhabitants are non-Slavic. Some say that in all there are more than 180 nationalities, speaking about 150 languages or dialects; others, that there are 577 races (*sic*) and tribes. This diversity and the imperial sweep of their territory the Soviets owe, indirectly at least, to those tsars who proclaimed themselves "By the grace of Almighty God, the Emperor and Autocrat of All the Russias, of Moscow, Kiev, Vladimir, Novgorod; the Tsar of Kazan, the Tsar of Astrakhan, the Tsar of Poland, the Tsar of Siberia, the Tsar of the Tauric Chersonese, the Tsar of Georgia; the Potentate of Pskov and the Grand Duke of Smolensk, Lithuania, Volhynia, Podolia, and Finland; Prince of Estonia, Livonia, Courland and Semigallia, Samogitia, Bielostok, Karelia, Tver, Iugor, Perm, Viatka, Bulgaria, and others; the Potentate and the Grand Duke of Novgorod on the lower lands, of Chernigov, Riazan, Polotsk, Rostov, Iaroslav, Bielosersk, Udor, Obdorsk, Kondiisk, Vitebsk, Mstislavl, and of all northern land the Ruler; and the Potentate of all lands of Iveria, Kartalinsk, and Kabarda, and of the regions of Armenia; of the Princes of Cherkassia and Gorsk, and others, the Heir-Potentate and the Possessor; the Potentate of Turkestan; the Heir of Norway, the Duke of Schleswig-Holstein, Stormarn, Ditmarsh, and Olden-

burg, etc., etc., etc." The density of population throughout the empire ranges from 165 to the square mile for the Ukraine as a whole (185 in parts) to 3 to the square mile for Siberia as a whole (most of Siberia has less than 1 per square mile). In the European portion of Russia proper (the R.S.F.S.R.) the density averages about 60; in the Soviet empire as a whole (the U.S.S.R.), about 18. There is one city of 3,000,000, Moscow; one of 1,500,000, Leningrad;¹⁵ four others with over 400,000 (Kiev, Baku, Odessa, and Kharkov) and 14 with over 100,000. The urban population is less than 20 per cent of the whole.

Government by soviets alone was, as has been seen, an accident. The Bolsheviks originally intended to utilize the Constituent Assembly as the center of their system, and it was only when that body proved hostile that they evolved the present form of government. In 1918 a constitution was promulgated for Russia proper, thenceforth known as the R.S.F.S.R. (Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic). At that moment, as has been pointed out, the Bolsheviks were in control of only the central portion of European Russia. During the next few years, according to their ability to enforce their will the extent of their control varied.

The original Soviet of People's Commissars included a Commissar of Nationalities, and on November 15, 1917, Stalin, as Commissar of Nationalities, issued a declaration proclaiming: "2. The right of the peoples of Russia to dispose of their own fate, even to separation and the establishment of an independent state. . . . 4. Free development of national minorities and ethnographic groups inhabiting Russian territory." These principles were simply a restatement of the original Bolshevik platform in regard to nationalities proposed by Lenin and adopted at the Social Democratic Congress of 1903: "the complete right of self-determination of all nations," a policy which had been repeatedly reaffirmed, as it was in a resolution adopted by the Social Democratic party in April, 1917 ("The question concerning the right of nations to their free separation cannot be confused with that of the expediency of such separation"), and in the Declaration of Rights of November 22, 1917.

The real key to Soviet policy, however, is to be found in a statement made by Stalin in 1913: "A nation has a right to autonomy. It has the right even of secession. But this does not mean that it may take this step under any [all] conditions or that autonomy or secession everywhere and always shall be a profit for the nation, that is, for its majority, its working masses." In practice the policy of the Bolsheviks was a compound of liberal principles and Machiavellian opportunism. They actually granted the freedom they preached—as in the case of Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland—when convinced that they had no alternative. They then made a virtue of necessity by pointing out how liberal and anti-imperialistic they were. And like other governments, they were very free with what was not theirs to give; for example, when Siberia was under the control of Kolchak, they recognized the Tatar-Bashkir Republic. But they had no intention of respecting the independence of that republic any longer than necessary—just as the Allies respected the principle of nationality only so far as seemed useful. To have

¹⁵ Petrograd was rechristened Leningrad after the death of Lenin. Moscow, the original capital, had meanwhile been restored to its former primacy.

pushed their theories to the logical conclusion would have meant to reduce Russia to a second- or third-rate power. So little by little, usually by means of "proletarian" revolutions, the secession states were forced or cajoled into submission. The excuse given in each case was that their governments did not represent the people—just as the French Jacobins, during the Revolution of 1789, undertook to assist their fellow revolutionists throughout Europe.

By 1922 the Bolsheviks were ready to propose a common government for the R.S.F.S.R. and its satellites; and in 1923 the constitution of the U.S.S.R. (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), in the form of a treaty, was duly "ratified." The U.S.S.R. contains seven main divisions (the first five, federative; the last two, unitary): the R.S.F.S.R., the Ukrainian S.S.R., the Transcaucasian S.F.S.R., the Uzbek S.S.R., the Tadzhik S.S.R., the White Russian S.S.R., and the Turcoman S.S.R. It comprises over 70,000 village soviets and 700 towns (about 320 with less than 10,000 inhabitants). The R.S.F.S.R. is made up of 11 "autonomous republics," 13 areas, and 13 autonomous areas; it comprises about 55,000 village soviets and over 500 towns; and as the oldest, largest, and most populous part of the Union—containing nine-tenths of the area and two-thirds of the inhabitants—it constitutes the pivot around which the system revolves. Each of the other republics has a government resembling that of the R.S.F.S.R.

THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT: BASIC PRINCIPLES

The Soviet system is to a unique degree the outgrowth of an ideal; and since this ideal has made the constitution a document peculiar unto itself, certain underlying, *unwritten* principles must *constantly* be kept in mind: 1. "Citizen" is synonymous with productive worker. 2. The dictatorship of the proletariat, in practice, means the dictatorship of the Bolshevik party.¹⁶ 3. The Bolsheviks regard the constitution, not as an act of self-limitation, but as no more than an explanation of the mechanism through which the party governs, "subject to change without notice," therefore, whenever and to any extent the party shall see fit. These principles account for the fact that theory and practice are not infrequently in exact antithesis according to Western standards, and that the democratic Soviet constitution is a caricature of most democratic constitutions.

The student of government, in order to interpret a constitution, must be familiar with constitutional practice as well as theory. The Soviet system illustrates this axiom to a surpassing degree. In the interests of harmony and efficiency and in accord with their well-known belief that the end justifies the means, the Bolsheviks have concealed the true bases of power so cleverly that they are almost indiscernible. For example, although in theory all power is vested in the people (the workers) in practice all power proceeds from above. Moreover, any attempt to explain the system resembles the proverbial attempt to describe a three-ring circus, for it involves an understanding of the organization and the mutual relations of (1) the constituent "states" of the Soviet federation, (2) the central government, (3) the Bolshevik party, and (4) the Third International.

¹⁶ The term "Bolshevik party" is used here to avoid confusion; the official name of the group governing Russia is of course "Communist party."

The Soviet government, according to constitutional theory, is the most liberal in the world in its treatment of minorities; not only are residual rights vested in the component parts of the Union—so that, beyond the powers delegated to the central government, “each union republic exercises its sovereign authority independently”—but the individual republics are even guaranteed “the right freely to leave the union.” The government of the U.S.S.R., however, is given extremely wide powers: jurisdiction over foreign and internal trade, economic matters, transportation, communications, the military establishment, taxation, finances, land, justice, labor, education, and foreign affairs, including the declaration of war. “25. Ratifications, modifications, and additions to the present treaty are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R.” What, then, remains, even in theory, for the allied “republics”? Certainly very little. In practice they have next to no say on political or economic matters—the more so since representatives of the central government exercise personal and direct supervision over local affairs. Local initiative is therefore restricted almost entirely to cultural activities. To be specific, the following are the principal concessions to minorities: (1) a certain degree of theoretical autonomy; (2) the right to be governed by native officials (supervised by representatives of the central government), provided these are acceptable to the Soviet authorities; and (3) the right to use the native language. In other words, since the minorities cannot be educated in Russian overnight, the Bolsheviks allow them to use their own language in expressing their ideas—provided the ideas themselves are acceptable. (In the case of the backward Asiatics, if the general tone of the local authorities is loyal the Bolsheviks occasionally permit a certain amount of deviation from orthodox Bolshevism.) Since the theoretical right of withdrawal can be exercised only with the concurrence of all the other republics, it is easy to see how much this right is worth (without having recourse to the history of the American Civil War). Obviously the allied and autonomous “republics” have considerably less authority than the united “states” of America. Why, then, is there not more discontent? The answer to such a problem has been given by Bryce: “The best way of strengthening . . . centripetal tendencies has been to give so much recognition and play to the centrifugal as may disarm them, and may allow the causes which made for unity to operate quietly without exciting antagonism.”

The Soviet constitution is based on Lenin’s interpretation of the *Communist Manifesto*. In contrast, therefore, to most democratic constitutions—since the Bolsheviks believe that the supremacy of the state should be absolute and that individuals are entitled to consideration solely as members of classes that are not prejudicial to the interests of the state—it contains no charter or declaration of human rights or liberties. (The supremacy of the State as an ideal is reminiscent of Plato’s *Republic*.) Similarly, although the constitution of the R.S.F.S.R. proclaims “the equality of all citizens,” it immediately adds that the R.S.F.S.R. “deprives all individuals and groups of individuals of rights which could be utilized by them to the detriment of the . . . Revolution.” The constitution of the R.S.F.S.R. guarantees the *workers* freedom of assembly, liberty of association, and universal, free education. In practice, however, the first

two are nonexistent; even scientific societies cannot meet without permission. "The Church is separated from the State and the school from the Church, and freedom of religious¹⁷ and antireligious propaganda is acknowledged to be the right of all citizens." Nothing is said about freedom of the press. As a matter of fact, there is strict censorship of all except official publications. "Work is the duty of all citizens. . . All land, forests, mineral wealth, waters, as well as factories and works, railways, fluvial and aerial transport and means of communication are the property of the workers' and peasants' state."

The Soviet constitution is the only document of the kind that is frankly propagandist and provisional. Its avowed object is 'the union of the workers of all countries in a World Socialist Soviet Republic,' and "entry into the Union is open to all socialist soviet republics, both now existing and which may arise in the future." In order that whenever the world revolution occurs, the constitution may serve without change for all countries, the word "Russian" was purposely omitted from the title of the Union. Similarly, the constitution of the R.S.F.S.R. declares itself "adapted to the present transition period . . . with the aim of securing . . . the establishment of socialism, under which there shall be neither class division nor state authority." And according to the Second Congress of the Third International, "federation is a transitory form toward the complete unification of the working masses of all nations." Thus the two fundamentals of all modern constitutional theory, national sovereignty and the territorial state, have been discarded by the Bolsheviks. From the foregoing it is evident how far the Bolsheviks have advanced beyond the Jacobin principles that outraged conservatives and set the world aflame at the end of the eighteenth century. More noteworthy still, the Soviet constitution violates almost every canon of the 1903 platform of the Social Democrats.

THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WORKING PRINCIPLES

All authority in the U.S.S.R. is theoretically vested in the Union Congress of Soviets. (In the R.S.F.S.R., according to its constitution, "all authority . . . is vested in the soviets of workers', peasants', Cossacks', and Red Army deputies.") In practice this means little. The Congress is in session only one week every two years. Furthermore, it approves but does not initiate measures, and approval is usually given in blanket form to general policies. Since the election of members is carefully controlled, the Congress as a body is never critical.

Having abolished all preexisting class distinctions, the Bolsheviks proceeded to create a new set of their own. Russian society, grouped according to fundamental rights and privileges or the lack of them, was to be made up of three main categories: (1) Bolsheviks, (2) "productive workers" (not including the professional classes) and members of the armed forces, and (3) the residue.¹⁸ Many nineteenth century constitutions established a property qualification for voting; the Bolsheviks reversed this rule and disfranchised the following classes: (1) those employing hired labor for profit, (2) those enjoying an income other

¹⁷ Altered by a law of April, 1929

¹⁸ Employees other than Bolsheviks are grouped with the second category, and each category is subdivided. Various modifications in this classification have been effected.

than that received as salary, (3) those engaging in private business, (4) ecclesiastics, (5) former members of the tsarist police and members of the Romanov family, (6) lunatics, and (7) criminals. These categories make up the pariahs of Russian society and their members are obliged to pay higher taxes. As a matter of fact, as Russian society at the time of the Revolution was constituted, the disfranchisement provisions affected less than 10 per cent of the population. All citizens of both sexes above the age of 18 who are "productive laborers," members of the military establishment, or their housekeepers (except those disfranchised by the preceding provision) are entitled to vote. In pursuance of their ideals of class solidarity, the Soviets even accorded the franchise to foreigners who were "productive workers." All these provisions are in accord with the Marxian theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat. To admit the bourgeoisie to a share in political power, argued Marx and Lenin, would be suicide for a proletarian state. Therefore, they concluded, the dictatorship of the proletariat must last so long—but only so long—as the bourgeoisie continues to exist as a class.

The Bolsheviks made one of their worst mistakes when they lumped those of the intellectual and the professional classes who did not join their ranks with the bourgeoisie and subjected them to similar disabilities, for a trained professional class was what the Soviets most needed. Forced in the course of time to recognize this fact, they have modified their attitude; August 1, 1931, a decree was issued placing engineers and technicians in the same privileged category as industrial workers with regard to living-conditions, food supplies, and educational opportunities.

Another extremely interesting extraconstitutional feature of the Soviet system is the attempt to base representation on professional rather than geographical groupings. The province (*gubernia*) has been abolished and its place taken by a larger division, known as the oblast. In theory each oblast, united by economic interests, is a geographic entity providing a logical basis for professional representation. Furthermore, the primary assemblies of voters are made up of those engaged in the same or like occupations. The Bolsheviks maintain, with a considerable degree of plausibility, that representatives chosen by and from a given professional group—business men, teachers, mechanics, and so on—are more truly representative than those who are chosen at random in political districts (which are "nothing but meaningless conglomerations" of individuals from all professions and classes) and who are therefore sure to belong to some profession or class alien to the majority of their constituents. Since the Soviets have adopted the recall, representatives can be retired at any time by vote of their constituents.

It is the system of election that betrays the real "catch" in the supposedly democratic Soviet system. Democratic states of the West have introduced the secret ballot in order to safeguard and reassure the voter; in order to intimidate the voter, the Bolsheviks have abolished the secret ballot. Needless to say, they are as well versed in political chicanery—"letting the ayes have it," and so on—as any party in democratic countries. Furthermore, the Government presents a list of official candidates, and no opposition party is permitted to exist. A

favorite method of disposing of unwelcome opposition is to declare an election invalid.

Though the members of the Union Congress are elected, the election system takes the form of a great pyramid, all elections above those for the local soviets being indirect (see the diagram). In addition, it is even more indirect for the rural soviets than for the urban, where the electors are apt to favor the Bolshevik cause. Finally, the urban soviets are given a larger proportion of representatives, though—since urban representation is based on the number of *voters*, while rural representation is based on the number of *inhabitants*—not so much larger as might at first appear. As a result, though less than 10 per cent of the local soviet members are Bolsheviks, 75 per cent of the members of the Union Congress belong to the party. All things considered, therefore, the Union Congress can hardly be compared with the United States Congress or the parliaments of Europe.

Supreme power during the hundred and three consecutive weeks when the Union Congress is not in session is constitutionally vested in the Central Executive Committee (C.E.C.). In some ways the C.E.C. corresponds to the United States Congress or, perhaps more nearly, to the Reichstag and Bundesrat of the former German Empire. It is a bicameral body, made up of the Union Soviet and the Soviet of Nationalities. The Union Soviet is composed of representatives of the component parts of the Union, elected by the Union Congress from among its members on the basis of population. The Soviet of Nationalities is likewise composed of representatives of the component parts of the Union, five for each autonomous republic and one for each autonomous area, but elected, subject to the approval of the Union Congress, by the local executive committees. The C.E.C. has the right to postpone meetings of the Union Congress, and the R.S.F.S.R. has a comfortable majority in both councils; but even the C.E.C. is in session only one week out of every four months.

The pyramid constituting the Soviet Government is topped by two smaller bodies, both of them elected by the C.E.C. and in theory responsible to it, the Presidium and the Sovnarkom. The Presidium, as its title implies, is a presidential committee; it numbers twenty-seven, consisting of the presidia of the Union Soviet and the Soviet of Nationalities (nine each) plus nine additional members elected by the two councils in joint session. It has the authority to suspend the decrees of all other governmental bodies and is vested with the powers of the Union Congress and of the C.E.C. when they are not in session. These prerogatives, however, are the least of the factors which account for its supreme importance. Notwithstanding its constitutional dependence on the C.E.C., it is at all times autonomous and it exercises a controlling influence over the entire machinery of government. All theories aside, therefore, the Government is a closed corporation. The Sovnarkom, or Soviet of People's Commissars (SOViet[Council]-NARod[People]-KOMmissar[Commissioner]), is the cabinet.¹⁹ Since both the Presidium and the Sovnarkom issue decrees having the force of law (there are no "laws" in our sense of the term), the line of

¹⁹ Until the creation of the Presidium, in the fall of 1919, the Sovnarkom was the head of the Government.

demarcation between their functions is not clearly drawn; but in practice the presidium is obviously predominant.

The Sovnarkom is made up of fifteen Commissariats. Nine (Union Commissariats) have exclusive jurisdiction throughout the Union; the other six (Unified Commissariats) correspond to similar organs in the autonomous republics, over which they have constitutional oversight. In point of fact, the local Commissariats, nonunified (those which are without corresponding organs in the Sovnarkom) as well as unified, are all under the control of the central Government. The most important division of the Sovnarkom is the Commissariat of Inspection, which acts as a general supervising body throughout the Union. This is no "paper" inspection, as is proved by the fact that in 1920-21 alone it discovered 5,662 offenses committed by officials and 18,886 cases of abuse of office. As a result, 1,048 officials were discharged outright, 4,478 tried, and 3,807 punished.

Two singular and peculiarly important organs attached to the Sovnarkom are the O.G.P.U. (sometimes called O.P.U.) and the Soviet of Labor and Defense. The O.G.P.U. is the Cheka—"abolished" in 1922—masquerading under a new name but possessing no other discoverable differences. Could the Bolsheviks govern without the aid of the O.G.P.U.? Who knows? Up to the present, certainly, it has been the mainstay of their strength. Although appointed by the Presidium and attached to the Sovnarkom, the O.G.P.U. is in reality irresponsible. Pervading and overshadowing every branch of the Soviet administration, political and economic, central, local, and foreign, it is the Inquisition of Bolshevism and as such the embodiment of naked, uncompromising, sinister Power—beside which all constitutional theorizing pales into insignificance. The Soviet of Labor and Defense was designed "to formulate the economic and financial plans of the U.S.S.R., to make proper changes therein in accordance with the economic and political situation, as well as for the purpose of immediate supervision over the people's commissariats of the U.S.S.R. in the field of economic measures and measures concerning defense." With jurisdiction over practically everything done by the individual commissariats, it is a sort of cabinet within a cabinet.

Attached to the Soviet of Labor and Defense and charged with the technical elaboration of plans for industrial, commercial, agricultural, and financial projects is the State Planning Commission (Gosplan), the Bolshevik substitute for *laissez-faire*. "Whereas European and American capitalism, which depends upon individual personalities . . . works for the day only . . . in the U.S.S.R. everything is done with a view to the future."

Thus the central government contains three departments or bureaus—the Commissariat of Inspection, the O.G.P.U., and the State Planning Commission—each charged with general oversight! If supervision can make a government efficient, surely the Soviet Government should be the *ne plus ultra* of efficiency.

THE BOLSHEVIK PARTY AND THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL

When all is said and done, the complicated and imposing structure that constitutes the Soviet Government is in reality nothing but a façade serving to

mask the real, though extraconstitutional, means of government—the organs of the Bolshevik party. To Lenin the dictatorship of the proletariat meant not simply the exclusion of the bourgeoisie and the rule of the workers. In particular it meant, first of all, the dictatorship of the dominant fraction of the proletariat that subscribed to his own views and made up the Bolshevik party; second, the dictatorship within the party of his own dominant group; and third, the dictatorship of the dominant individual—meaning, of course, Lenin himself. In other words, it meant a dictatorship in the most exact sense of the word. "The State means the workers, the most advanced progressive section of the workers, the advance-guard—that is, ourselves." Thus did Lenin paraphrase the "*L'état, c'est moi*" ("I am the state") of Louis XIV.

May 10, 1917, while the Bolsheviks were still nominally a faction of the Social Democrats, Lenin proposed that the party change its name. "The Social Democrat Plekhanov, as well as other social-chauvinists all over the world, have betrayed socialism. We must call ourselves the 'Communist Party.'" In 1919 this suggestion was officially adopted; but as has already been explained, in the interests of clarity it seems better to employ throughout this book the old term "Bolshevik."

Since none but strict Bolsheviks are admitted to party councils and no other party is permitted to organize, there is a fundamental cleavage between party and nonparty members within each unit of the Soviet administration. The growth of the party may be indicated by the following figures:

January, 1917	10,000	March, 1919	313,766
April	40,000	March, 1921	730,051
August	100,000	March, 1922	485,909

Part of this increase was due to sincere conversions; part, to the desire to side with the "ins." The drop between 1921 and 1922 was the result of a so-called cleansing or purgation effected by Lenin in order to rid the party of undesirable or insincere elements. Of those ejected, 38 per cent were condemned for "conduct unbecoming a Bolshevik" (over a third of them for ambition, over a fourth for drunkenness and brutality, nearly a tenth for observance of religious rites, others for middle-class ways of life, chauvinism, anti-Semitism, and so on); 33 per cent, for breaches of party discipline; 16 per cent, for criminal acts (half of them for abuse of official position or corruption). From time to time, in order to keep out the radishes (Red outside but White inside) and grafters, similar purgations have been carried out. In 1924 it was decreed that at least 51 per cent of the party members must belong to the proletariat. Actually, about 70 per cent come from that class, while less than 20 per cent are peasants. The membership in 1933, including candidates, was approximately 3,000,000—still a very small fraction of the population. One reason for this comparatively slow growth is made clear by the following regulation: "Those who propose new members are responsible for the members recommended. In case of an unworthy recommendation they are subject to party discipline, even to exclusion from the party."

How does this very small minority, lacking any constitutional status, manage to control the vast Soviet organization? First of all, because of the singular

nature of the Government. Second, because the existence of rival parties is effectually prevented. Third and most important of all, because party officials occupy key positions in the Government. And fourth, because of the nature of their organization.

The Bolshevik (Communist) party is very similar in organization to the Soviet Government. In general one may say that it is superimposed on the Soviet structure and that the two are linked throughout. The exact relationship, however, is difficult to describe. The *lowest* gradation in the party organization is made up of units known as cells;²⁰ but although the two hierarchies are parallel, with a gradation in the party structure corresponding to each gradation in the Soviet structure, the Bolsheviks consider their party cells superior to the *highest* organs of the Soviet state. Take a case in point. Kalinin, by virtue of his position as chairman of the Presidium, is often referred to as the President of the U.S.S.R.; his functions as chairman are much like those of the President of the French Republic. He is also chairman of the C.E.C. Finally, he is of course a member of various party organizations. This situation explains the following singular item from a newspaper: "The bureau of the cell has recently requested the Chairman of the C.E.C., Comrade Kalinin, to submit to a meeting of the Party a report on the work of the C.E.C."—just as if a Democratic ward committee should order President Roosevelt to submit a report on Congress.

Supreme authority in the Bolshevik hierarchy is theoretically vested in the Party Congress. When this Congress is not in session, it devolves on the Central Committee. The real power, however, resides in the Politbureau (Political Bureau), an autonomous subcommittee or supercommittee, at present containing ten members with an approximately equal number of alternates, which corresponds to the Soviet Presidium. Subsidiary to the Politbureau are the Orgbureau (Organization Bureau), which deals with matters of importance, and a Secretariat, which takes care of matters of detail and routine. There is also a Central Revision Committee, to supervise the functioning of party organizations, and a Central Control Commission, with jurisdiction over party discipline (expulsion, and the like), which acts in conjunction with the Commissariat of Inspection—the only definite, semiconstitutional link between the party and the Government proper. Theoretically elected by the Central Committee, the Politbureau, since its nominations are always accepted, is in reality self-perpetuating. In addition, it controls the appointments to subcommittees and to the various governmental organs. In 1928, over half the seventy-one members of the Central Committee held high office in the Soviet Government, including eight of the eleven Commissarships; and every decision of importance made by the Government is submitted to the Politbureau for approval. If concrete evidence be needed, there is the testimony of Lenin, who feared that this situation might result in paralyzing the machinery of government: "We have only one ruling party, and you cannot forbid members of the Party to make complaints. This is why the Soviet of People's Commissars has to forward almost everything to the Politbureau."

The Bolshevik party exhibits characteristics that can be paralleled only in

²⁰ Each cell has an executive known as a bureau.

the famous Jesuit order. Both have the same iron discipline. In the Bolshevik party, so long as a question is open for discussion, criticism is permitted; but once a decision is reached, all dissension must cease. Expulsion, with resultant loss of privileges, is the penalty for insubordination. In this way a body of dogma has developed which is as rigid as that of any church and which it is heresy to question. And since the Bolsheviks emphasize quality rather than quantity in their membership, they have by these means developed an organization that presents an unbroken front to all opposition. Bolsheviks are expected to set an example to the community, and in general they do so. Captain McCullagh, a British army officer and a Catholic, describes his experiences while in the hands of the Bolsheviks in the following terms: "The Ekaterinburg [Sverdlovsk] that met my eyes on [*sic*] Feb., 1920, was completely changed. Trying to describe that change to myself in one word, I meant to say 'Bolshevism' but found myself saying 'Puritanism.'" Like the Puritans, the Bolsheviks are terribly in earnest and have imparted their seriousness to society as a whole. Says Keynes: "A longing comes for the frivolous ease of London." Until recently the salaries of Bolsheviks were limited to 225 rubles (about \$115), which meant that their scale of living was frugal, if not penurious; yet like the famous Committee of Public Safety, the upper officials have never been convicted of peculation. Unlimited prestige and power, plus some preferment in regard to housing and food, are their only rewards—but apparently they are sufficient. It is a rule that Bolsheviks shall be punished double for offenses. Such a régime, even if it repels, cannot fail to inspire respect.

To return to the comparison with the Jesuits, it is no exaggeration to maintain, as has more than one authority, that Bolshevism is a religion. What is religion, broadly viewed, but the fundamental code of beliefs and ideals that inspires the actions of an individual or a group? Only spiritual exaltation, faith of the highest order, can explain the devotion that brought the Bolsheviks triumphantly through three years of almost unparalleled hardships and that enables them to carry on with undiminished ardor. That they are antireligious in the orthodox sense simply proves the point. The energy that if they were orthodox they would devote to worship they devote instead to the propagation of their own peculiar faith. Not only is Bolshevism a religion, but its devotees are religious fanatics. Otherwise they would never have succeeded. And so long as the flame of their faith continues to burn undiminished, it will be a strong force indeed that can overthrow them.

The greatest danger confronting Bolshevism is that it may go the way of many other religions, cease to be a living faith, and become nothing but a rigid body of formulas, administered by a petrified, place-seeking bureaucracy and divorced from the desires of the masses. Bolsheviks, as soon as they become party or government officials, inevitably and automatically cease to be active workers in industry or agriculture and lose touch with the workers. Already the Bolshevik bureaucracy numbers half a million. To put the matter more graphically, of Russia's "former proletariat . . . one-quarter fell in the civil war, another disappeared into the villages, and a third only ended its internecine struggles by mutual extermination, while the fourth rose to join the ranks

of the Soviet bureaucracy. Former proletarians are now ruling the new proletariat of today."

The Third International parallels the Bolshevik party and the U.S.S.R. in organization. Founded in 1919, the Third, like the First and the Second, is an international association of workers; but unlike the Second, which it aims to supersede, it excludes socialists and other moderates and admits only "communists" to membership. For this reason it is frequently known as the Communist International (*Komintern*). Its avowed object is a world revolution of the proletariat for the purpose of bolshevizing the entire globe. The First Congress, in 1919, comprised only 60 delegates; while the Sixth, in 1928, had over 500, of which 100 represented countries outside Europe. The Third International now has branches in 66 countries: 40 in Europe, 20 in the East, and the remainder in the Western Hemisphere. Theoretically it is an entirely independent organization (the Soviet Government, embarrassed by its activities, is fond of disclaiming responsibility for what the *Komintern* does). This may be true officially; but otherwise it is pure nonsense. Soviet Russia, as the only Bolshevik government in existence, is bound to exercise a preponderant influence. The similarity between the aims of the Third International and those of the U.S.S.R. is much too close to be accidental. The fact that the headquarters of the International are in Moscow is in itself sufficient indication of a definite connection; the Bolsheviks are the last to tolerate an institution with which they are not thoroughly in sympathy. Above all, the actual connection can be proved through the Bolshevik leaders who are active and prominent in the International. The First Congress was called by the Central Committee of the party. Zinoviev was made head and held the post until 1926, when he was superseded by Bukharin. In 1928 eight of the Central Committee of the party were also members of the Executive (I.K.K.I.) of the International.

DOMESTIC POLICY

Soviet domestic policy, in addition to the points already mentioned, stresses the following aims: (1) social welfare; (2) atheism; (3) universal education; (4) reading-matter for the masses; (5) a new code of family ethics. The Bolsheviks are making extensive efforts to further the welfare of the workers. They have established rest and recreation rooms in connection with their factories and endeavor to provide amusements, lectures, and hygienic supervision. The number of hospital beds per capita has been more than doubled. Large estates in the Caucasus and elsewhere have been turned into vacation centers, and each year the workers are granted a vacation of from twelve to thirty days with pay.

The Soviet program of propaganda embraces three cardinal points, one negative and two positive. The Bolsheviks, like Bakunin, believe that the first thing to be done in order to emancipate the masses is to free them from what are deemed superstitions. The keynote of their efforts in this direction is their policy of atheism. "The dominant classes in capitalistic states look upon religion

as a very useful means for deceiving and exploiting the people." "To maintain churches at the public charge is as absurd as it would be to maintain opium dens at the public charge." "Religion is a narcotic for the people"—one of their best-known slogans. Contrary to common belief, the Bolsheviks have been rather surprisingly canny and moderate in pushing their antireligious policy. As in France, the Church has been disestablished and deprived of its property (11,000 square miles and untold millions in treasure) and of its control over marriage and education. Organized religious instruction is forbidden; but religious congregations are allowed the use of church edifices free of charge, and there is no official interference with attendance at services. The clergy are a particular object of dislike to the authorities, especially since all who helped to secularize church property were threatened with excommunication by the patriarch. Many clergy perished during the civil war, along with the rest of the bourgeoisie, for aiding and abetting the counter-revolution—just as after the Caporetto disaster sixty-four priests were shot by the Italian Government for disseminating enemy propaganda—but up to the summer of 1920, according to church sources, only 320 of the clergy had been executed. If they engage in counter-revolutionary activities, they are apt to find it an unhealthful occupation; so long as they confine their efforts to the cure of souls, however, they are not molested. Much has been made of the secularization of ecclesiastical structures. As a matter of fact, Russia probably has more churches per capita than any other country in the world. The number of communicants, on the contrary, is constantly diminishing. Lacking sufficient schools, libraries, museums, hospitals, or funds to erect them, the Government has therefore taken over a certain number of religious edifices no longer needed for the purposes for which they were designed. There has been less vandalism on the whole than during the French Revolution. Believing as they do, the Bolsheviks have gone to the extreme in discarding and condemning the otherworldliness of the Church, in denouncing the medieval values of self-abasement and asceticism, and in promoting a belief in the value of positive, material happiness. As a result, the Russians are losing their proverbial mystic fatalism and becoming more happy and vital. Although not expressed in those terms, the credo of the Bolshevik ethics is "The greatest happiness of the greatest number."

Like all governments, the Soviets recognize that their best opportunity to obtain a hold on public opinion is through education. In Russia, where so little had been done before, they had a golden opportunity. The percentage attending school in 1897 was only one-eighth as great as in the United States; less than 50 per cent of those of school age were in attendance in 1905; in 1914, about 70 per cent; 60 per cent of males and 70 per cent of females were illiterate in 1920. The Bolsheviks included in their program a universal-education project, for adults as well as for children. At first they were terribly hampered by lack of funds; teachers were underpaid and underfed, and students had to work in unheated classrooms, without texts, pencils, or paper. Many could not be accommodated at all. In 1922 less than 40 per cent of the children of school age were receiving instruction. The following table gives some conception of what has been accomplished.

SCHOOL AND COLLEGE ATTENDANCE, SOVIET RUSSIA

	1914 15	1932
Elementary students	7,000,000	19,000,000
Secondary students	500,000	4,550,000
University students	125,000	500,000
Trade school students	267,000	850,000
Factory school students		1,100,000
Agricultural universities	5	152
Agricultural university students	3,300	84,000
Agricultural colleges	16	967
Agricultural college students	1,600	207,800
Agricultural high schools		321
Agricultural high school students		207,000

October 1, 1930, universal education for rural as well as urban districts was decreed. Millions were in attendance at adult schools for illiterates. In 1931-32 free universal compulsory education for children between eight and eleven was an accomplished fact. In 1932 less than 10 per cent of the Russian population was illiterate.

As an idealogue, Lenin realized fully the force of the idea, and demanded that reading matter be made accessible to the masses. This desideratum has been fulfilled with such amazing success that hundreds of thousands of books, including some 50,000 copies of *Das Kapital*, issue from the presses yearly, making Russia the greatest producer of literature in the world. The range is astonishingly wide and deep: 3,000 books on economics, 4,000 on science, and thousands more of a technical nature, in addition to a large amount of fiction and books for children that are admired by the rest of the world. Half of this tremendous production issues from the state press (formerly the Gozizdat, now the Ogiiz), and every factory, cooperative, party cell, and so on has its own library. As for the daily press, the journalist who can convince the authorities of his fundamental orthodoxy is permitted a range of criticism as wide as or wider than his colleagues are allowed in capitalistic countries. In 1927 alone the *Pravda* obtained the dismissal of 445 officials, the trial of 925, the discipline of 308, the expulsion of 59 from the party, and the punishment of 254.

Having disposed of the Church, with its supernatural sanction to marriage, the Bolsheviks were ready to inaugurate a new code of family ethics. When they first came into power, a cry of horror arose outside Russia over their alleged "nationalization of women." No such policy ever existed, and the belief that the condition was to be found even locally rests on two documents of the shadiest origin. Nevertheless, for purposes of propaganda the lie was assiduously spread in anti-Bolshevik circles—a particularly foul slander, even in a period unequalled in malicious and unfounded accusations. What the Bolsheviks actually did, though in this matter as well they have not gone as far as implied, was to promulgate a new code of divorce. They cut the red tape, to be sure, so that either member of a marriage can obtain his or her freedom without difficulty, thereby eliminating an enormous amount of misery, but at the same time they

insist that children must be provided for—a limiting principle that has prevented indiscriminate remarriage.

Perhaps the greatest contribution of the Bolsheviks to social ethics is the elimination of illegitimacy, that shameful stigma with which innocent children are branded in more “enlightened” countries. They have also undertaken to stamp out prostitution, and their economic system itself goes further toward attaining that goal than can any abstract legislation in capitalistic countries. One of the most interesting and novel of Bolshevik experiments is the collectivist education of children: large-scale attempts have been made at the public rearing of orphans, many of them left by the civil war, and children whose parents are unable to care for them properly or who are considered by the authorities unfit for the duties of parenthood. “A nursery [is] . . . as much a part of the plant for a new industrial enterprise as are engines. . . . Nearly ten million children are now embraced by nurseries and other pre-school institutions.” In Moscow half of the children cared for by nurseries remain there continuously night and day for five days of the six-day week. Again one is reminded of Plato.

WAR COMMUNISM ²¹

An able scholar, not pro-Bolshevik, says of the Russian leaders: “If we are to be just . . . we must see in them, not first and foremost the Terrorists and founders of the Cheka, not the initiators of bloody experiments and the destroyers of the intelligentsia, but the saviors of the country from anarchy.” After they had disposed of their open enemies, cowed their subterranean enemies, and erected a government, the Bolsheviks were still confronted with their most formidable task, the rehabilitation of industry and agriculture.

In an effort to solve the agrarian problem the Bolsheviks encouraged the poorer peasants, the “agricultural proletariat,” to despoil the “rich” and “middle-class” peasants. But so long as the industrial workers proved unable to supply sufficient manufactured goods, the peasants remained intractable and the Government was compelled to continue its policy of requisitioning grain by force—which only made matters worse. The peasants replied by hiding their surplus or raising only enough for their own needs, and in the theoretically classless society of Russia a fundamental cleavage between classes developed: on the one hand the peasants, with more grain than they could use; on the other, the proletariat, the officials, and the army, faced with the prospect of starvation.

The catastrophic slump in industrial production that attended the inauguration of the Bolshevik Régime was the consequence of a number of causes operating in conjunction. Russia suffered severely as a result of the World War. Subsequently, cut off from the rest of the world by the Allied blockade, she was unable to obtain necessary supplies of raw materials and of the manufactured goods that she had never produced and had been accustomed to import. Imagine the condition of the agricultural West in the United States if it were suddenly cut off from the industrial East! This blockade alone was sufficient to explain the industrial slump. Since many factory-owners boycotted the

²¹ The name given by the Russians to this period.

Revolution or were driven out by their unruly employees, and the laborers proved unequal to the task of management, workers' control of industry was not a success. A certain percentage of the laborers were lazy and took advantage of the situation to loaf. And since the Government was unable to furnish sufficient food, all were undernourished and physically unable to do a full day's work. When rations failed to arrive, they had to purchase food in the open market and so exhausted their wages in a few days. They then absented themselves from work, in an endeavor to earn enough on the side to keep from starving, or supported themselves by selling factory equipment. Most disastrous of all, thousands deserted industry altogether (although such action was punishable by a reduction of rations or, if repeated, by imprisonment) and went back to their villages. The number of workers in the region of the Don fell from 270,000 to 108,000, and in 1920 a third of those in the Urals left work. In 1921 30 to 50 per cent of the laborers in metallurgy failed to report. By 1920-21 the proletariat was reduced to about a third of its prewar dimensions. Such expedients as the organization of Labor Battalions, working under supposedly iron discipline, Communist Saturdays, when the workers were to donate their holidays for the good of the state, were tried—but all in vain.

In one respect at least the Bolsheviks demonstrated their realism. There was no question of abandoning modern technology and capitalistic methods of production—such as was to be encountered among the neo-medievalists, the Social Revolutionaries, and the followers of Gandhi—merely of whether to substitute state capitalism for individualistic capitalism, the control of the state for the control of the bourgeoisie. At the outset, as has been seen, the Soviets shrank from taking this dubious step. Whatever the ultimate fate of the bourgeoisie would have been had they behaved differently or under different circumstances, their politico-economic resistance, coinciding with the civil war, sealed their doom. The Government was in no mood to temporize and when they refused to cooperate in workers' control, punished their sabotage with the confiscation of their plants. Soon the authorities found themselves embarked perforce on a fairly thoroughgoing policy of nationalization.

In June of 1918, as a war measure large-scale industry was nationalized; and by February of 1920 over 4,000 establishments—nearly 50 per cent of the total—had been taken over. Employing over 1,000,000 workers, these plants represented practically all the large and average-sized undertakings. The remainder employed only some 300,000. In 1918 private trading was abolished, and the Government attempted to enforce this regulation by printing the ruble out of existence. Manufactured goods were to be distributed gratis; food, by means of ration cards. In January of 1920, a Decree on Universal Labor made work compulsory in the factories and on the farms. Those who wanted food were obliged to present duly attested workers' books. Whatever the effect on the industrial workers, for the peasants it meant a reversion to serfdom. In November a decree was issued nationalizing *all* industrial establishments of more than ten workers and those of more than five workers which utilized mechanical power. Smaller industries were to be under government supervision.

There is no need to turn to the anti-Bolsheviks for testimony as to the

desperate straits in which Russia found herself in 1920; the Soviet documents admit everything.

"By 1920-21 . . . industrial output was about 10-15 per cent of the pre-war figures." The mining of metals declined to less than 2 per cent. In the Bogoslavsk mines the output per worker sank from 3.7 tons in December of 1920 to 2.1 in March of 1921; in the Urals, from 2 to 1. The value of the per capita consumption of sugar and molasses fell from 4.87 rubles to .24; textile consumption, from 6.77 to .91. Under such circumstances receipts did not even cover expenses.

"In 1913 there were 20,030 locomotives. . . ." "In 1919 there were hardly 4,000 locomotives in good repair in the country and less than 25,000 kilometers [about 15,625 miles] of lines were in operation. . . ." "The railways carried in 1921 only 21 per cent of the pre-war volume of traffic. . . ." "The gross production of grain had decreased 50 per cent."

Many statisticians give a considerably lower figure for this last. The Ukraine, which in earlier days had furnished 29,500,000 metric tons, produced only 6,600,000. These conditions, the result in part of an unprecedented drought, produced the Great Famine of 1921—the worst in Russian history. Since the transport system had broken down, the authorities were virtually helpless. In December 99 per cent of the inhabitants in the government of Samara were without bread. In addition, pestilence stalked the land; millions died of relapsing fever, millions more of spotted typhus. In many villages a third of the population was unconscious from the effects of hunger and disease. Though America contributed \$15,000,000 in relief and other countries generous amounts, 35,000,000 were brought to the verge of starvation and 5,000,000 died.

THE NEP

The Bolsheviks were able to blame all the shortcomings of the Soviet régime on the Allies and the counter-revolutionists while the civil war was in progress; when production continued to decline after the return of peace, it was not so easy to explain matters. Peasant uprisings led by Social Revolutionaries and a mutiny in the fleet at Kronstadt in March of 1921 were the straws which convinced Lenin that a change of policy was imperative. Clearly the choice lay between victory without the undiluted Bolshevik ideals or defeat with them, between the interests of the State and the interests of the proletariat. The NEP (New Economic Policy), a partial reversion to and compromise with capitalism that was in the nature of a strategic retreat, was Lenin's answer to this problem and the final demonstration of his powers as an opportunist. "Everything," he admitted, "must be set aside to increase production." Thus Lenin the politician and statesman triumphed over Lenin the ideologue.

The NEP was foreshadowed by a decree of November 23, 1920, which for the purpose of attracting capital authorized the Government to grant economic concessions to foreigners. Lenin justified these concessions by the argument that they would further the ultimate triumph of Bolshevism. "We can and must learn a great deal from capitalism." The concessions were to run for a limited period only, at the end of which time the Soviets would find themselves in

possession of additional, well-equipped, and properly functioning plants.

The Tenth Congress of the Bolshevik Party was responsible for the two most important steps taken since the Bolsheviks came into power. Stalin was elected secretary, and on March 16, 1921, it was decided to substitute taxation for requisitioning of grain. The Government promised to take only a definite proportion of peasant produce, instead of the entire surplus, and to allow the remainder to be sold. The only socialistic provision in the new regulations was that the taxes be progressive. In July freedom of internal trade was restored. The following year, as a further concession, the severity of the progressive principle was modified. With only the army to feed, the Government was now in an infinitely stronger position economically.

Industrial establishments employing fifteen or less workers, though constituting two-thirds of the number nationalized, contained only 6 per cent. of the workers. The Government decided they were more trouble than they were worth and, with the twofold object of lessening its difficulties and stimulating industry, decreed that all establishments of less than twenty workers might be denationalized. In addition, it decreed that, irrespective of size, nationalized concerns that were idle or unprofitable might be restored to their owners or leased. Forced labor was abolished, and a new "gold-standard" currency was introduced.

Lenin refused to compromise, however, in three respects: the Government continued to control foreign trade, transportation, and large-scale industry. Moreover, government industries were producing two-thirds of the total output; and by 1926-27 less than 10 per cent of the goods manufactured was coming from privately owned industries. The NEP was therefore a hybrid—half individualistic capitalism, half state capitalism.

Lenin had stooped to conquer, and conquer he did; if not an unqualified success, the NEP was at least a success of sorts. By 1927 the volume of industrial production had attained prewar levels; but since population had increased some 10 per cent, per capita production was still backward. Prewar levels were likewise attained in the area sown to grain. The net result in agriculture, however, was still less satisfactory; due to the reduction in large-scale farms, the production per acre was not as great and the surplus available for the market was consequently less. In 1922-23 the Government was able to begin exporting grain and thereby improve its international position; yet so far as the peasants were concerned—since the prices of grain were low and the prices of industrial products high—the situation was as unsatisfactory as under the tsarist régime.

Lenin's great contribution to Marxism was his insistence on the necessity of reconciling the peasantry. In practice this meant favoring the poorer peasants at the expense of the landlords and the "rich" peasants (kulaks). During the first five years (1917-22), as a result of the Bolshevik land settlement the number of landless peasants was reduced almost 40 per cent (from 11.4 per cent to 6.7 per cent), the number holding more than four desiatins (10.8 acres) was cut in half and, correspondingly, the number with small holdings (less than four desiatins) was increased from 59.1 to 78.6 per cent.

The NEP was Lenin's last and greatest contribution to Bolshevism. In May

of 1922, despite his robust constitution, he suffered a stroke. He subsequently recovered his faculties, but not his strength. A second stroke followed in March, and thereafter he was unable to write or even to dictate. On January 21, 1924, he died.

In order to emphasize and explain his career as a whole, it is necessary to risk overemphasizing his importance in the earlier periods. If Lenin had died in the spring of 1917 he would have disappeared from the pages of history unwept, unhonored, and unsung. If he had died in 1920 he would be remembered, along with Attila and Genghis Khan, simply as one of the great destructive forces of history. A small portion of the proletariat might have mourned, but certainly no one else. The NEP crowned his work and made his fame secure. While his body lay in state, 750,000 mourners waited an average of five hours apiece, in a temperature 30° below zero, to tender him their homage.

The same reasons that make it difficult to appraise the Bolshevik Revolution as a whole make it impossible to arrive at a judgment of Lenin. It seems safe to assert that no character in history has evoked such varying estimates. To some he is Satan incarnate; to others, the Messiah. Giving the Devil his due, what were the outstanding characteristics of this great leader? Above all, idealism, idealism that did not die, as in the case of so many leaders, when he had tasted power, but persisted as the underlying force to the very end; moral courage, the willingness to stand alone in defense of his ideals; insight, an uncanny ability to divine what the people wanted and what tactics to pursue in order to adapt his theories to the conditions of life; opportunism, the willingness to compromise—just so far as was necessary—in order to reach his ultimate goal; constructive ability, the power not only to destroy but to build anew on the ruins of the old; and finally, ruthlessness, the willingness and determination to sacrifice everything and everybody to a cause. Robespierre slew his thousands; Lenin, his tens of thousands. Yet it was idealism, not desire for gain or glory, which carried him to victory. And although it was the will to power which chiefly distinguished him from his rivals, there is no doubt that had he been faced with a choice between being a figurehead or the power behind the throne, he would have chosen the latter.

Lenin is dead, but his soul goes marching on. After he had died the prewar capital was renamed in his honor, as has been noted; and today the great square in front of the Kremlin, in the present capital, is dominated by a mausoleum, one of the most impressive achievements of modernistic architecture, rising as a memorial to the leader whose forces brought down the Old Régime in Russia with a crash that shook the world. Greater still is the memorial built with his own hands—Soviet Russia. On that supreme achievement, in the last analysis, his immortality depends; and so long as it endures, Lenin can never die.

Whom shall the student of world history find to compare with him? Alexander and Caesar, by contrast, are puny figures; Louis XIV likewise. Beside Napoleon, commonly reputed the greatest of military leaders but who left comparatively little impress on the country where he wielded dictatorial powers, Lenin looms like a demigod. Frederick II, Frederick the Great, Cavour, and Mustafa Kemal, in their lesser spheres, may perhaps stand comparison. Jesus, Mohammed, Innocent III, Luther, Loyola, Washington, Bolivar, Lincoln, Bis-

marck, Sun Yat-sen, and Gandhi alone of the world figures, perhaps, can bear to stand beside this Titan. In the long run of history Lenin stands out as one of the few leaders who solely by force of ideals and personality stormed the heights of privilege and captured the citadel.

One man with a dream, at pleasure,
Shall go forth and conquer a crown;
And three with a new song's measure
Can trample an empire down.

THE ADVENT OF STALIN

ii

With the disappearance of Lenin two momentous questions arose: Would his work survive? Who would his successor be? Throughout the period of civil war and until his death, there had been little friction in the Bolshevik ranks; not that differences of opinion were lacking, but under the pressure of outward circumstances and his dominating personality these differences never became acute. The principal figures left on the stage were Trotsky and Stalin; and of the two, Trotsky was by far the more famous. Strange to say, neither was typical of the group that made the November Revolution. Stalin, to be sure, was an old-line Bolshevik; indeed he considered himself a Bolshevik of the Bolsheviks, for during the disheartening period from 1905 to 1917, while the émigré idealogues were cooling their heels in the cafés of Western Europe, he had borne the heat and burden of the day in Russia. Four times he made the weary journey to Siberia, and he had been associated with Lenin when Trotsky was still a Menshevik. Trotsky had never been an orthodox Bolshevik; but he was the hero of the Revolution of 1905, the man who had engineered the November Revolution, the creator of the Red Army, and the most brilliant orator in the party. While Trotsky was making a name for himself, Stalin had remained in comparative obscurity; inconspicuousness, in fact, was part of his policy. Conscious of his lack of magnetism, he made no attempt to play to the gallery, but worked instead in the innermost recesses of the party organization. The son of a peasant cobbler, by contrast with Trotsky, who was an idealogue *per excellence*, Stalin was a "savage from the Caucasus" (he is a Georgian, and his real name is Dzhughashvili), a fact that goes far to explain his character. In his elemental, brutal force, his *virtù*, he reminds one of the Renaissance tyrants; yet with this fundamental difference: he is not a man of culture or, primarily, of intellect. Rather he personifies the East, which from the days of the nomad invasions to the present has so profoundly affected Russia. It is amusing to reflect that if the tsars had not conquered Georgia there would probably be no Stalin. While Lenin and Trotsky were rushing around in the public eye, proclaiming great ideas in impassioned utterances, Stalin, almost unobserved, was quietly though no less passionately at work building up the party organization, and incidentally his own power, by means of personal contacts with local leaders. Everything passed through his hands. Nothing escaped his observation. And as a result, although he was looked down upon by the inner circle in the Kremlin, he knew Russia better than any of them. At the time Lenin died, he

occupied by far the most important post in the country, secretary of the party, a position that he used with astute, Oriental cunning to undermine his opponents.

Inevitably the question of succession was one that Lenin had considered. In December of 1922 he wrote a will in which he made it evident that he did not consider any of his colleagues fitted to fill his shoes. In a codicil, written in June of 1923, he likewise failed to indicate a successor; but he definitely decided against Stalin, possibly because he realized that Stalin had the best chance.

Comrade Stalin, having become general secretary, has concentrated an enormous power in his hands; and I am not sure that he always knows how to use that power with sufficient caution. On the other hand, Comrade Trotsky . . . is distinguished not only by his exceptional abilities—personally he is, to be sure, the most able man in the present Central Committee—but also by his too far-reaching self-confidence and a disposition to be too much attracted by the purely administrative side of affairs. These two qualities of the two most able leaders of the present Central Committee might, quite innocently, lead to a split. . . . Stalin is too rough, and this fault, entirely supportable in relations among us Communists, becomes insupportable in the office of general secretary. Therefore I propose to the comrades to find a way to remove Stalin from that position and appoint to it another man who differs from Stalin—more patient, more loyal, more polite, and more attentive to comrades, less capricious, etc.

Yet in the end it was Stalin who won. In the beginning, however, he evidently did not feel strong enough to act alone; and so there developed a triumvirate, composed of Stalin, Kamenev, and Zinoviev.

Between Stalin and Trotsky a rivalry that involved everyone of prominence inevitably and immediately arose, and a triple struggle ensued: a struggle of personalities, a struggle over party policies, and a struggle over national policies. Trotsky began by criticizing the actions of the party leaders, including Lenin, during the Bolshevik Revolution; and at once the cry of "Treason!" was heard. Stalin stood for the dictatorship of the inner clique, disguised as the dictatorship of the majority; Trotsky stood for party democracy. Stalin at first advocated concessions to the peasantry, to capitalism, and to foreign capital (the NEP); while Trotsky, as the champion of what he conceived to be the orthodox Bolshevism of Lenin as opposed to Stalin's "Leninism," advocated the world revolution, anticapitalism, and a strong-arm policy toward the peasants.

Stalin was content to watch quietly while Zinoviev and Kamenev pounced on Trotsky, discredited him, and forced him from office. Suddenly Zinoviev and Kamenev appeared in the opposition, along with Trotsky. Stalin thereupon joined forces with Rykov and Bukharin, and Zinoviev and Kamenev were in turn degraded. But Rykov and Bukharin, like their predecessors in the triumvirate, found Stalin an uncomfortable bedfellow, turned up in the opposition, suffered a like fate, and gave way to Molotov and Yaroslavsky as Stalin's particular henchmen. For several years the running fight continued, and in every fresh combination Stalin proved himself a past master of the policy of *Divide et impera*. He had an uncanny ability not only to outgeneral his opponents but to destroy their prestige and render them helpless. In the course of time every one

of Lenin's close associates was driven from power;²² and each time the opposition raised its head it was crushed, to sink lower in the hierarchy. Finally it was ejected from the party altogether. Nor was that the end. In January of 1928—so powerful had Stalin become—ninety-eight of the leaders were exiled from Moscow. Many of them subsequently recanted and were readmitted to the party; but Trotsky, as the ringleader, was deported to Turkey, and later forbidden ever to return (1932).

Today, as always, "the Union is ruled by a dictating minority which is dictated to by another minority to which a dictator dictates. These minorities are in constant change. Their only stable nucleus so far has been Stalin." All this in spite of the fact that the great majority of the time he has held no official post (in the Soviet Government) but has been content with his position as party secretary. What further demonstration is needed of the supremacy of the party?

THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN

The center of interest, in recent years, has been the Five-Year Plan. As defined in retrospect by Stalin, "the basic task of the Five-Year Plan was to change the backward and, in some respects, medieval technology of our country into a modern technology . . . to transform the U.S.S.R. from a weak, agrarian country, dependent upon the caprices of capitalistic countries, into a powerful industrial country quite able to stand on its own"—not only able to stand on its own but, as the plan was originally formulated, able to compete successfully with the great industrial nations of the West.

This grandiose project was to be fulfilled in the five years between the beginning of the third quarter of 1928 and the beginning of the corresponding quarter of 1933. As means toward this end, the Government again strengthened its hold over industry, restricted internal trading, introduced bread cards, made intensive efforts to stimulate collective agriculture, and levied forced loans on the peasantry. The Five-Year Plan therefore involved a reaction from the NEP and a reversion to War Communism. In fact, as Stalin says, "the basic task of the Five-Year Plan in transforming the U.S.S.R. into an industrial country was to eliminate all capitalistic elements"—in agriculture as well as in industry. In other words, Stalin was stealing Trotsky's thunder. The Five-Year Plan had the advantages of setting a definite, limited objective, of making production a sort of game; and it aroused such enthusiasm among the proletariat that it gave rise to the slogan: "The Five-Year Plan in Four Years." On December 31, 1932, accordingly, at the end of four and a quarter years, the campaign was officially terminated.

What were the results? On this subject, as on everything else connected with Russia, there is a vast diversity of opinion. Stalin, in his address of January 7, 1933, proclaimed the success of the plan

a new argument for revolution against the bourgeoisie of the entire world. . . . We had no basic metallurgical industry. We now have it. We had no tractor industry. We now have it. We had no automobile industry. We now have it. We had no

²² See Appendix.

machine [producing] industry. We now have it. We had no serious modern chemical industry. We now have it. We had no really serious industry for the production of agricultural machinery. We now have it. We had no aviation industry. We now have it.

In the production of electrical energy we occupied the very last place. We have moved forward now to the most advanced ranks. In the production of oil products and coal we occupied last place. We have now moved forward among the first. . . . Capitalistic elements have been expelled from industry finally and irrevocably. . . . The ratio of industrial production to agricultural production has risen from 48 per cent . . . (1928) to 70 per cent . . . (1932).

At the end of the fourth year of the Five-Year Plan we have succeeded in realizing 93.7 per cent of the program of general industrial production as conceived for the five years, having increased industrial production more than threefold in comparison with the prewar level and more than twofold in comparison with 1928. As regards the production program for heavy [basic] industry, we have carried out the Five-Year Plan 105 per cent. . . . We have built tens and hundreds of big new factories. . . . During the period of the . . . Five-Year Plan the average annual increase in industrial production was 22 per cent. . . .

In the course of some three years [the party] has managed to organize more than 200,000 collectives and about 5,000 state grain and live-stock farms, having attained also in four years an increase of 21,000,000 hectares [51,401,000 acres] in the cultivated area. The collectives now embrace more than 60 per cent of the peasant economy . . . or more than three times the program of the Five-Year Plan. . . . The party has destroyed, although it has not yet wiped out completely, the kulaks as a class. . . . We have thousands of collectives and scores of state farms which are already profitable. . . . It is quite understandable that the majority of them cannot as yet be profitable.

One of the fundamental achievements of the Five-Year-Plan-in-Four-Years has been the abolition of unemployment. . . . We have accomplished . . . 3. An average increase of 67 per cent in the annual wages of workers and employees in heavy industry, as compared with 1928. . . . Of course, we have not yet attained to the point at which we can supply fully the material requirements of the workers and peasants. And we can hardly hope to reach it within the next few years. . . . Regardless of shortcomings and mistakes, the existence of which no one of us denies, we have attained serious successes.

Stalin laid the failure to achieve the plan in full to the war scare with Japan. Though he recognized the difficulties involved in making the new plants, with their new technique, function, there are nevertheless obvious exaggerations and sidesteppings in his speech.

Certainly Soviet writers are naïvely lacking in self-criticism, since scholarship of that kind is strictly taboo. Their writings abound in such absurd statements as the following: "This progress was achieved without the aid of capital from abroad. All these, therefore,] are the obvious fruits of the reconstruction of the U.S.S.R. on socialist lines." Before detailed criticisms are taken up, however, some of the concrete claims advanced may be introduced. The production of electricity, for instance, was increased from 1,945 kilowatt hours in 1913 to 8,231 in 1930. Though only 26,700 automobiles out of a projected 75,000 were produced, 105,850 tractors instead of a projected 91,000 were turned out. The railroads, with an increase of 8,000 miles since the war, had a trackage of 50,600;

the 900-mile Turkestan-Siberian Railroad, completed in May, 1930, was the most notable feat of construction. The amount of freight had increased 80 per cent over prewar conditions; the passenger traffic, 200 per cent (1931?)—giving the Soviets the first place in the world, if not per capita, at least on a basis of gross figures.

The Soviets admit that, owing to the struggle of the kulaks against collective agriculture, the number of cattle has been considerably reduced; with this exception, they claim notable gains. "In 1927, 98.9 per cent of agricultural work was performed by animals. In 1931 the proportion performed by animals has been reduced to 74.4 per cent." The yield per acre, however, is still only about half that of the other leading producers. From 1928 to 1931 the kulaks declined from 5,400,000 to 1,600,000. In 1928 socialized enterprises produced only 4.4 per cent of the marketable output in agriculture; in 1931 they produced 55 per cent.

Three impartial critics of the Five-Year Plan who may be consulted differ from Stalin and his colleagues less in regard to facts than on the matter of interpretation. The first points to a serious shortage in consumers' goods—including the worst shortage in foodstuffs since the Great Famine—and the failure of basic industries (coal, iron, and steel) to achieve more than two-thirds of their expected 1932 production. But on the basis of Soviet figures he also points out five even more important facts: 1. Russia has acquired 1,500 new plants. ("In machine-building she is fast approaching second place, and in the manufacture of agricultural machinery she is rapidly moving toward first.") 2. Industry provided 70 per cent of the nation's output in 1932. 3. Russia could if necessary continue her internal development with her own mechanical resources alone. 4. Nearly all individual enterprise has been wiped out. 5. Eighty per cent of the cultivated land is comprised in the collective or state farms. This critic believes that collectivization of agriculture is essential to progress, that collectivization would endure even if the Soviets were to collapse, and that if properly directed, it can become the crowning achievement of the Soviets.

The second critic recognizes that phenomenal progress has been achieved (substantially as claimed), all the more phenomenal because it took place, prevented unemployment, and provided an opportunity for the youth of Russia at the very moment when most countries were in the throes of the Great Depression. But he maintains that progress in capital construction was achieved at the expense of the consumer. The Five-Year Plan was "conspicuously unsuccessful in giving the average Soviet citizen satisfactory food and housing or in supplying him with manufactured goods." Crops were left standing, and the rise in wages was more than balanced by the decline in the value of the ruble. The possibility that Soviet Russia will prove an industrial steam roller among nations he considers decidedly remote. Nevertheless, "the adoption of this gigantic blue print . . . was one of the three most important dates in the history of the Russian revolution."

The third critic, writing just as the Five-Year Plan campaign closed, is even more favorable. He calls attention to the fact that the important branches of industry—iron, steel, nonferrous metals, and coal—which had been behind schedule were showing marked improvement during the fall. The Soviet Union, he claims, is "unshaken by the food and consumers' goods shortages,

which are freely admitted in the newspapers and seem to be regarded as a normal consequence of the national concentration upon new industrial construction and the production of capital goods." In short, he believes that the plan "has justified itself beyond all save the most extravagant hopes."

Whether the Russian peasants can be trained to make intelligent use of the new machinery remains to be seen.

WHAT SHALL WE BELIEVE?

The reader in search of a clear-cut picture of Soviet Russia is bound to come away empty-handed. He has the cold comfort of knowing that he shares his plight with practically all non-Russians, for it is difficult if not impossible to learn the facts or to form valid conclusions. Just after the Revolution there was an unparalleled amount of propaganda, pro and con, concerning the Bolsheviks. Much of the anti-Bolshevik propaganda was so absurd that its true nature should have been patent to the most unsophisticated, but in those days the public appetite in capitalistic countries strained at nothing. Some of this propaganda was innocent; those responsible, dependent on faulty sources of information, simply did not know any better and believed it themselves. Much was deliberate—designed to deceive and welcomed by the governments that were striving to crush Bolshevism at its inception. Like the Bolsheviks themselves, these governments acted on the principle that the end justifies the means. But deliberate or innocent, it was swallowed by reputable organs of the press such as the London and the New York *Times*.²⁸ Systematic misrepresentation has of late died down; yet now and again supposedly reputable publications indulge in sporadic outbursts which the public welcomes, or is supposed to welcome—witness the classic that appeared as recently as April 16, 1932, describing Soviet Russia as a "country where murder and looting, debauchery and thieving, torture and rape, are a large part" of the regular occupations of the Government. Hence there is still need to weigh carefully what one reads.

Certainly no one would accept all Bolshevik statements at their face value, though so far the Bolsheviks have proved better historians than their would-be detractors. Certainly no unbiased observer would deny, however he might feel about their methods, that the Bolsheviks aim to bring about a utopian paradise. Certainly no one, least of all the Bolsheviks themselves, would maintain that they have already succeeded. Rome was not built in a day, and the Bolsheviks have had only fifteen years.

The most important results of the revolution as affecting agriculture, the most important results of the revolution as a whole perhaps, are the land settlement, whereby all land has been opened to the peasants, and the beginnings of modern agriculture. Prior to the World War, tractors were practically unknown; now they are in use by the thousand. And one outstanding fact is beyond dispute; the Soviet régime which was expected to collapse in a few weeks is still "going strong."

This much, too, is certain: If her potential strength can be brought to bear,

²⁸ The *Manchester Guardian*, that model of what a newspaper should be, had what was probably the best early news.

Russia's position as a Great Power is secure. Destiny has furnished materials for the building of a great state, a great empire—man power, resources, and land, each in lavish quantities. It only remains for the architect, the statesman, to weld them into place. With the exception of China Russia has the greatest supply of useful man power of any state. In the Donets basin alone she has the greatest supply of anthracite. Her timber supply is the greatest in the world. She has "two miles of asbestos mines" capable of yielding "double the whole production of the world." In Siberia there is boundless mineral wealth, and land enough for countless millions; and in Turkestan, where there is also mineral wealth, only 3 per cent of the land is under cultivation. As an example of the statesmanlike breadth of vision with which the Soviets have approached their task, communication by water has been established with the Kara Sea on the northern coast of Siberia—opening up 10,428 miles on the Ob, with access to 1,500,000 square miles of territory, and 3,300,000 square miles by way of the Yenisei—with the result that freight rates for a region half again as large as the United States have been cut to less than half. Soviet scientists have disclosed that Russia's iron resources are four times as great as was supposed in 1913, her coal reserves five times as great, her lead and zinc reserves seven times, and her reserves of copper fifteen times.

So far as the new social order is concerned, the exploitation of man by man has been eliminated: "Want is now due entirely to circumstances and is the burden laid upon men not by individuals, but by the State." Will the Soviets succeed in modifying circumstances, and so render their citizens truly free? Such is the fundamental question the future must answer. One hears it said that the majority of Russians would welcome a change. Much of course depends on education. It is as difficult for a teacher in Russia to advocate capitalism as for a teacher in America to advocate Bolshevism. In the near future the majority of Russians will be natural Bolsheviks, by birth and by education; just as Americans are natural capitalists, for the same reasons. As for the present, it seems improbable, even if the majority do want a change, that they will start a revolution in order to bring one about. Remembering what the Bolsheviks have survived, one is inclined to conclude that they may go on indefinitely.

The Russian nature has changed, or at least that of the younger generation appears to be different. Indifference is giving place to ambition, passivity to purposefulness, indolence to energy, quiescence to activity, sloth to vigor, inactivity to work, resignation to happiness. This transformation in human nature is in some ways the greatest accomplishment of Lenin, first and greatest of Russians of the new type. In any case it is the most substantial guarantee of the permanence of his work.

From the beginning of the Russian state until the outbreak of the Bolshevik Revolution Russia was under the domination of foreign cultures, Norse, Byzantine, Mongol, and Western. The Western culture, which the upper classes were content to ape during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, was as alien as the others; it lacked any roots in the history of the country. The masses had no share in shaping this culture, and were incapable of absorbing it. Today Russians are conscious of possessing a native culture which they themselves have created. In art—the ballet, the Moscow Art Theater, the Cossack choirs,

and the films—collectivism is achieving triumphs that promise to be a real contribution. Those who have seen Russian films can testify to this—and to the extraordinary impressiveness of the effects attained by subordinating the individual to the crowd, conveying the impression of a people on the march.

Dark spots exist, to be sure, but what culture would willingly be judged by them? To those in sympathy with Bolshevism, there is an ever present stimulus in living in the greatest laboratory for social experimentation known to history. Those who suffered at Valley Forge did not reckon their rewards in Continental specie alone. In their newly won freedom, or sense of freedom, the Russian masses find compensation for their sacrifices; and for that sense of freedom they will, if necessary, make greater sacrifices still. At any moment a new development may be in progress that will affect the destinies of mankind for centuries to come. Possibly, under the influence of an exalted collectivism, Russia may attain a *truly* unified culture such as Europe has not known since the Middle Ages.

The society toward which the Bolsheviks are working as an ultimate goal has been described by Stalin in the following terms:

(1) No power in private hands over the basic means of production and distribution—everything will be under the collective will. (2) No classes. The toilers of industry and agriculture will be united into one stratum of toilers. (3) No great state power but free associations of toilers with national planning so as to effect the greatest economies. (4) A development of the technique of industry to the highest point. (5) No contradiction between town and village. They will be united into one economic and cultural organization. (6) Distribution . . . to each according to his need, from each according to his ability. (7) The maximum development of culture and art. (8) Since there will be no economic need all talented individuals and scientists will have every opportunity to develop their abilities. (9) A world system of economics. When there are no longer capitalistic states then armed force will be done away with.

Knowing all this, and the doctrines of world revolution, one wonders at the capitalistic "statesmen" who from shortsighted imperialistic motives or for temporary trade advantages sold their birthright and enabled the Bolsheviks to keep their heads above water. If Russia becomes the greatest power in the world—and there is better than an even chance that she will—what then? Lenin declared that capitalism and Bolshevism cannot exist side by side. Can he, who was so often right, have been entirely mistaken in this respect?

CHAPTER XVIII

FRANCE, ENGLAND, AND GERMANY

POSTWAR POLITICS AND PROBLEMS IN FRANCE

During and just after the World War, the Entente world echoed to expressions of sympathy for France. As a matter of fact, although France suffered more than any of the other Allied Powers as a direct result of the war, the Peace of 1919 saw her ancient hegemony restored. Emerging as the foremost diplomatic and military power of the world, she was also within a decade the most prosperous and powerful country in Europe economically and financially.

In the period immediately following the war, reconstruction and security were the two questions that held the center of the stage in France. Their handling depended on the complex organization of the French Chamber and of French politics. The Chamber of Deputies presented the same broad outlines as before the war—an overwhelming preponderance of parties belonging in theory to the Left with only a handful of conservatives and reactionaries on the Right. Yet some of the parties belonging to the theoretical Left were so moderate by comparison with others that they tended to ally instead with the Right. Consequently, during the elections of November 1919, Clemenceau, the author of the Carthaginian peace, was supported by a conservative-moderate coalition known as the Bloc National (Nationalist Block)—a combination of all the other parties against the Socialists and Communists. And by raising the red specter and appealing to the war spirit, which was still strong, the Bloc National was able to win an outstanding victory. As a result the Chamber, from Right to Left, was constituted as follows: Conservatives, 31; Liberal Action Group, 73; Progressives, 12; Republican Left, 117; Radicals, 52; Socialistic Radicals, 71; Socialistic Republicans, 24; Dissident Socialists, 6; and Socialists, 54. To put the matter more simply, it consisted in the main of a Right, a Center (nominally Left) and a Left (the Socialistic Radicals) allied, and an Extreme Left (the Socialists). When the Radicals withdrew from the Bloc National, France was governed by the Center supported by the Right.

The first problem in the mind of every Frenchman was the reconstruction of the 13,000 square miles constituting the Devastated Regions. Here an eighth of her population had lived, and here had been concentrated the greater part of her mines and industries: 60 per cent of her cotton goods, 70 per cent of her sugar and coal, 80 per cent of her steel, 90 per cent of her linen thread and ore, and 94 per cent of her woollens. And here 2,000,000 people had been rendered

homeless, 300,000 private dwellings had been destroyed and 435,000 seriously damaged, 6,000 public buildings had been wrecked and 10,000 injured, 20,000 industrial plants had been damaged, 1,500 miles of railroad and 30,000 miles of road had been torn up, 30,000 wells had been destroyed, and 1,360,000 cattle and horses had disappeared. Hundreds of miles of barbed-wire entanglements and millions of tons of munitions had been left scattered about. Estimates of the cost of repairs ran from 95,000,000,000 to 123,000,000,000 francs, and by May 1, 1921, requests had been made for 34,000,000,000 francs in actual damages and 106,000,000,000 in indemnities. By the middle of 1922, France had spent \$7,500,000,000 on reconstruction and pensions—\$5,700 a minute! Since they were to be covered by the German reparations, these terrific expenditures over and above the normal cost of government did not disturb the French as much as they would have otherwise. They were accordingly kept in a Budget of Recoverable Expenditures, separate from the regular budget; and no attempt to balance the two was made.

Though Clemenceau retired in January, 1920, he was succeeded by Millerand, who had likewise become conservative in his old age. On January 16, 1921, however, Briand became Premier. Briand sought to temper justice toward the Germans with mercy and understanding; but this commendable attempt was blocked by the French Chamber and the French people, who persisted in demanding the impossible. In the first place they expected fantastic sums; in the second, they injured their case by padding their accounts. In place of a factory that was ten or twenty years old when destroyed, they demanded that the Germans pay what it had cost when new or even enough to replace it with a much better one. A regular scandal developed. Nevertheless, as the Germans continued to fall behind in their payments the French got more and more enraged. On July 12, 1922, Poincaré "*la Guerre*," as his French critics had christened him, took office with the intention of extracting the reparation payments by force, if necessary. How Poincaré put on the screws and hounded the Germans into bankruptcy by invading the Ruhr will be recounted later. Finally the French began to realize that in exchanging Briand for Poincaré they had merely jumped from the frying-pan into the fire. In the elections of May, 1924, the electorate administered a sharp reproof to the Bloc National by giving a substantial majority to the Cartel des Gauches (Coalition of the Left). The Socialistic Radicals increased their representation by better than 50 seats, the Socialists theirs by nearly 50, and a new extreme Left, the Communists (29 seats), appeared in the Chamber; the Center and the Right were correspondingly reduced. Herriot, the leader of the Socialistic Radicals, thereupon formed a ministry and governed with the support of the Socialists. Under his leadership France entered definitely on the path of reconciliation with Germany. In her pursuit of this new policy and in the conduct of her foreign affairs in general from April 11, 1925, until January of 1931 the outstanding figure—in many ways the outstanding figure in all French politics—was Briand, Foreign Minister under Painlevé, then Premier again himself, and subsequently Foreign Minister again.

Most French and Francophiles assumed that the Alsace-Lorraine Question, at least, had been consigned to oblivion with the signing of the Treaty of Ver-

sailles. Not so! A number of important changes, notably the abolition of the Concordat of 1801 and of religious instruction in the schools, had taken place in France since 1871. Alsace-Lorraine under German rule had enjoyed autonomy, together with the benefits of German efficiency and the advantages of the great material prosperity resulting therefrom; the children of Catholics were allowed to attend Catholic schools. France, the most centralized country of Western or Central Europe in the early postwar days, made no allowances for minorities. Frenchmen argued, quite logically, that if Alsace-Lorrainers wanted to be French they should be willing to pay the price. Consequently the Landtag was ignored, the Strassburg Municipal Council was suppressed, and officials who knew no German were sent to govern the district—almost as though it were a conquered province. The teaching of French in the schools was made detrimental to that of German (shades of Alphonse Daudet!). Herriot and his party were particularly incensed that there were no lay schools where freethinkers could send their children and when they came into power, set out to eradicate all remnants of particularism. In May of 1926, as a result, the Alsations organized a Home Rule League (*Heimattbund*). Complete autonomy, with priority for German in education, was demanded. In November of 1927 three local papers were suppressed for advocating autonomy, and on May 1, 1928, fifteen alleged conspirators were brought to trial in Colmar. Two of the defendants were newly elected Deputies, and four, including one of the Deputies, were convicted. Early in 1929 the French Chamber devoted over two weeks to the Alsace-Lorraine problem. The obvious solution would be to attach Alsace-Lorraine to Switzerland or, failing that, to erect it into a buffer state under the League; but politicians and diplomats are not inclined to obvious solutions.

Two more problems of the 1870 Era agitated France, though less violently than in the past. The royalists again became active in the years of financial semi-chaos following the war. Declaring that what France needed was a strong monarchy, in place of the "inefficient" Republic, they counted on the wave of antidemocratic sentiment at that time sweeping Europe to carry them into power; and under the leadership of Léon Daudet, son of the famous writer, they conducted an active campaign through an organization of young men known as *Camelots du Roi*. Clashes with the police were not infrequent. Their organ of propaganda, strongly nationalistic as well as monarchical, was *L'Action française*. Altogether the royalists managed to stir up an amount of excitement quite out of proportion to their numbers.

Strange as it seems, their activities led indirectly to a reconciliation between the Republicans and the Pope. France had again appointed an ambassador to the Vatican in 1921; in 1927, in return, *L'Action française* was placed on the Index and the monarchists were thrown to the wolves. (French Catholics who persisted in their royalist activities were practically excommunicated.)

"FRANCE HERSELF AGAIN"

Try as he would, Briand was unable during his premiership to bring order out of chaos; and as time passed, the financial system went from bad to worse. His failure was primarily due to inherited difficulties. During the five years

before the Cartel des Gauches came into power—because of the situation previously outlined—annual deficits had added 150,000,000,000 francs to the national debt. As the French were already contributing 16 per cent of their income to the state, the Socialists refused to allow any increase in taxes. By July of 1926 the debt was mounting at the rate of 7,500,000,000 francs a month, and the franc had fallen in value to about two cents (from its normal value of about twenty cents). It was obvious that unless something drastic were done the franc would vanish into thin air, as the mark had just done.¹

In this crisis, the gravest faced by the country since the war, France again turned to Poincaré. Herriot detached his Socialistic Radicals from the Cartel des Gauches; and on July 23 a National Union ministry from the parties of the Center was constituted, supported by the Right and by the Radicals. Briand was retained as Minister of Foreign Affairs, a guarantee that Poincaré had abandoned his intransigent attitude toward Germany. Effective financial measures were forthwith introduced: the Recoverable Budget was absorbed into the regular budget, expenditures were reduced, taxes were increased until the French were paying a fifth of their income, and the year closed with a surplus of 1,500,000,000 francs. Gradually the franc rose in value, until on December 20 it was stabilized *de facto* at 25.19 to the dollar (approximately four cents). As the costs of reconstruction decreased and reparation payments increased, France became the most prosperous country in Europe. The brand-new factories of the Devastated Regions, equipped with the latest machinery, in the end gave her a distinct advantage. Whereas the 1926 production of coal, pig iron, and steel was respectively 24 per cent, 22 per cent, and 5 per cent less in Europe as a whole than in 1913, production in France was 31 per cent, 78 per cent, and 80 per cent higher. French exports were nearly 50 per cent greater than before the war; and in contrast to her prewar situation France enjoyed a favorable balance of trade.

The elections of April, 1928, were a victory for the Poincaré conservatives; the Center, and to a lesser extent the Right, increased their representation; the Left, and still more the extreme Left, lost ground. In November, however, Herriot and the Socialistic Radicals withdrew from the coalition; and on July 27, 1929, Poincaré, the Savior of the Franc, handed in his resignation. From then until the end of January, 1931, Briand, as Premier and as Foreign Minister under Tardieu, Steeg, and Laval, was once more the undisputed pivot of French politics. When he finally retired from public life, he had directed the foreign affairs of France for nearly six consecutive years and had been Premier eleven times.² In the spring of 1932, Tardieu, Clemenceau's former lieutenant, became Premier for the second time (February 20).

The elections of May, 1932, were the occasion for another swing toward the Left. The composition of the new Chamber was as follows: Conservatives, 5; Republican-Democratic Union, 76; Independents of the Right, 28; Republicans of the Left, 72; Popular Democrats, 16; Radical Left, 62; Socialistic Radicals, 157; Socialistic Republicans and French Socialists (two parties that act as one), 37; Socialists, 129; Socialistic Communists, 11; and Communists, 12. Shortly after the Chamber met, a group of thirty Republicans of the Left withdrew

¹ See p. 564.

² Two of his ministries were consecutive.

from the party and under the leadership of Tardieu formed the Republican Center, which seated itself just to the right of its old position. On June 4 Herriot became Premier for the third time, again supported by the Socialists; but on December 14, when the Chamber voted to default on the debt payments to the United States, he resigned.

During the World War and the Postwar Period a considerable amount of social legislation was passed. By unanimous vote of the Chamber and Senate a Minimum Wage Law was enacted (July 10, 1915). As originally formulated, this act protected women engaged in the clothing trades (sweated industries). Subsequently protection was extended to other industries and to men as well as to women (December 14, 1928). Individual agreements between employees and employers that contravened a collective agreement were declared null and void (March 25, 1919). A general Eight-Hour Day Law was enacted (April 23, 1919); work in all industrial and commercial establishments was limited to eight hours a day or forty-eight a week; public as well as private employees and clerical as well as nonclerical were protected; and no reduction of wages on account of the reduction in time was permitted. The provisions of the law of April 9, 1898, concerning the responsibility of employers for accidents were extended to certain industrial diseases (October 25, 1919). The rights of trade unions were considerably increased (March 12, 1920). Protection against accidents was extended to agricultural laborers (December 15, 1922) and to domestic servants (August 2, 1923). Employers were forbidden to use children under eighteen and women in night work in factories, mines, and so on, or children under eighteen in any work connected with transportation (January 24, 1925). Work between 10 P.M. and 5 A.M. was to be considered night work, and women and children were to have at least eleven consecutive hours of rest. A national system of compulsory insurance against sickness, invalidism, old age, and death was enacted (April 5, 1928), which went into force on February 5, 1930. In cases of sickness the law called for medical care as well as cash payments. The provisions of the law apply to all salaried workers, male and female, whose annual earnings exclusive of family allowances are less than 18,000 francs (about \$700); farmers and other workers who do not receive a regular salary are entitled to participate voluntarily.

There was one problem in addition to reconstruction on which all Frenchmen could agree—security. The 1921 population of Catholic France, excluding the French colonies but including Alsace-Lorraine, was only 39,000,000—400,000 less than in 1911; without Alsace-Lorraine it would have been 2,000,000 lower. Moreover, it was 23,000,000 less than that of Protestant Germany. Consequently the French, who as a nation believed that they had been forced into the war, regarded the problem of security as the second, if not the first, of the major issues facing postwar France. During the Peace Conference, Wilson and Lloyd George had promised that the United States and Great Britain would guarantee France from attack by Germany (though not *vice versa*!), but the United States failed to honor Wilson's promise, and since Lloyd George had made his offer contingent on American action, France was left without her guarantees.

The French forthwith set about looking elsewhere for allies. These they soon found in the natural adversaries of Germany. A Franco-Belgian alliance was signed in 1920 (September 7). In accordance with Article 18 of the League of Nations Covenant, the League Secretariat was informed of its existence; but in defiance of that article, the terms were not published. In 1921 (February 19) France signed an alliance with Poland. "If . . . either or both of them should be attacked without giving provocation, the two governments shall take concerted measures for the defense of their territory and the protection of their legitimate interests." France and Poland further agreed "to consult each other on all questions of foreign policy which concern both states" and "before concluding new agreements which will affect their policy in Central and Eastern Europe."

Between February 15 and July 12, 1923, on the basis of a proposal put forward by Poincaré, the Chamber voted to advance 400,000,000 francs to Poland, 300,000,000 to Yugoslavia, and 100,000,000 to Rumania for the purchase of French munitions and military equipment. France and Czechoslovakia concluded an alliance in 1924 (January 25). The two powers agreed to act in concert, to decide on what measures they should adopt in case their interests were threatened, to cooperate against Austria and Hungary, to prevent the restoration of the Hohenzollerns, to settle all differences peacefully, and to consult on matters concerning Central Europe.

In 1925 (October 16), in accordance with the new orientation of French policy toward peace and reconciliation with Germany, Briand, Stresemann, and Chamberlain negotiated treaties of mutual guarantee and conciliation between France, Germany, Great Britain, and several other powers—the so-called Locarno Pacts.

France and Rumania signed a treaty of alliance (June 10, 1926). They agreed not to attack each other, to settle all differences by peaceful means, to consult each other with a view to maintaining the *status quo*, to consult each other if attacked, and "to concert their policy in the event of any modification or attempted modification of the political status of the countries of Europe." A similar treaty was signed between France and Yugoslavia (November 11, 1927). These alliances, together with the agreements negotiated between the various members of the so-called Little Entente (Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Rumania) and by the Little Entente with Poland, completed the system that France built up in order to surround Germany, Austria, and Hungary and preclude any possible threat from those quarters. Ostensibly defensive, it was bound to be viewed as offensive by Germany.

IS ENGLAND DONE?

The history of England since 1918 is primarily a matter of economics. Although England as a country emerged from the war with few visible scars, 9,000,000 tons of her shipping had been destroyed, the interest on the national debt rose from £24,500,000 (1914) to £349,500,000 (1921), and her postwar problem as a whole proved, in its essentials, more difficult than that faced by France or, with the possible exception of Austria, by any other postwar state.

For a century, thanks to her lead in the Industrial Revolution, she had been able to feed herself by exchanging her manufactured products for grain and other foodstuffs—not only to feed herself but to grow rich in addition. She had consequently neglected agriculture, and her population had grown until approximately 80 per cent was urban. Though Belgium, with the densest population in the world, had more inhabitants to the square mile, the United Kingdom had 27 per cent more inhabitants per acre of *arable* land—2,170 to 1,709—and in this respect stood second only to Japan. Only 6 per cent of the population were engaged in agriculture. Not only did England fail to grow anywhere near enough food to support herself but even had she made the effort to do so, she could not possibly have succeeded. Superficially, by eliminating her foremost trade rival in Europe, the war seemed to enhance England's favored position; actually, it did just the reverse.

During hostilities England was governed by an all-party coalition, under Liberal leadership, of which Lloyd George was Prime Minister when hostilities ended. In February of 1918 the English Parliament passed a Fourth Reform Bill. The Representation of the People Act, as it was called, conferred the suffrage on all males over twenty-one who could satisfy a six months' residence qualification or who were occupants of a £10 place of business. More surprising, by far, women over thirty who were occupants of property or wives of occupants were also enfranchised. Thus 8,500,000 women and 4,000,000 additional men—12,500,000 in all—received the vote, and the total electorate rose to 21,000,000. Plural voting was so restricted that a voter was prevented from casting his ballot in more than two constituencies—normally the one where he resided and the one where he worked; degree-holders of certain universities were still entitled to vote for the university representative, but in that case they surrendered their vote as business occupants. The Reform Act of 1918 also provided for a redistribution of seats: the standard ratio for representation was set at 1 to 70,000, and on this basis forty-four boroughs and five agricultural districts were disfranchised, other boroughs lost one of their representatives, and thirty-one boroughs were enfranchised.

In 1918 as head of a Liberal-Conservative coalition, Lloyd George held the first general election since 1910. His campaign slogan was "Hang the Kaiser and make the Germans pay for the war." The Independent Liberals under Asquith, as well as certain irreconcilable Conservatives and the Laborites, put up their own candidates. The election proved an overwhelming victory for the Lloyd George coalition, which captured 467 seats—as against 57 for the Laborites, 28 for the Independent Liberals, and only 23 for the irreconcilable Conservatives. Of the coalition candidates returned, however, the Conservatives had a majority of five to two over the Liberals, and in the cabinet they had a correspondingly high representation. Moreover, the Laborites had polled four times as many votes as in any previous election.

For a brief interval British trade revived, and in 1920, by the imposition of heavy taxes, England succeeded in balancing her budget; but by the end of that year her exports had declined 50 per cent. This disastrous situation was the result of a number of causes: general impoverishment and depreciated currency on the Continent, in particular in Germany, the Bolshevik Revolution in

Russia, tariff barriers, increase of exports from the United States and Japan, and increased production in the British Dominions. At the beginning of 1921 1,000,000 men in Great Britain were out of work; by the middle of the year the number had more than doubled; and from then on, unemployment was endemic. What was to be done? Obviously the laborers and their dependents could not be left to starve, so the Government solved the problem by handing out doles—a dangerous proceeding, for if the amount was sufficient to insure a reasonable living, many workers were apt to sit back and make no effort to obtain a job. Lloyd George also entered into a trade agreement with Russia. Finally, he passed an act providing that “key industries” should be fostered by a protective tariff of $33\frac{1}{3}$ per cent and that imports from countries with depreciated currencies should pay a special tax. Thus for the first time in a century England made a move away from free trade.

In October, 1922, the Conservatives withdrew from the coalition; whereat Lloyd George resigned and a new election was held. The Conservatives, under the leadership of Stanley Baldwin, won a decided victory, but the Laborites very nearly doubled their vote (2,244,945 to 4,236,733) and more than doubled their seats in the House (57 to 142); the Liberals were reduced to a handful. Unable to cope with the economic difficulties confronting him, Baldwin decided that if the country would support him, he would try out-and-out protection. Hence another general election was held in December, 1923. Although the Conservatives, with 258 seats, still had a plurality, they had lost 89, while the Laborites had gained 48, making 192 in all; the Liberals held 158. For the moment England had a three-party system. Baldwin resigned, and Ramsay MacDonald, with the Lloyd George Liberals in support, took office as England's first Labor Prime Minister. It was also the first time that an English Government had not only been without a majority but did not even have a plurality.

The alarm felt by many English over the Labor “victory” proved unwarranted. MacDonald, knowing well that under the circumstances he could not succeed in passing any radical legislation, did not attempt to introduce a capital levy or any such revolutionary measures; and he was firm in dealing with strikes. Though he lowered taxes and duties in the hope of reducing unemployment, he was not noticeably successful in coping with economic problems. He scored some noteworthy triumphs, however, in the field of foreign affairs. He abandoned the building of the great British naval base at Singapore, furthered the acceptance of the Young-Stamp Plan (popularly known as the Dawes Plan), and paved the way for Locarno. Finally, he accorded Russia *de jure* recognition. Two treaties with Russia regulating trade were negotiated. When these treaties were attacked by both Conservatives and Liberals, he appealed to the electorate—the third general election within two years. The publication of a letter purporting to show that Zinoviev had urged the British Communists to bring about a revolution in England had a considerable influence on the results. Though the Labor party increased its popular vote to 5,500,000, it won only 151 seats; the Liberals elected a mere 42 members. Consequently the Conservatives, with 418 seats in the House, had a majority of over 200, and Baldwin again became Prime Minister.

For five years, 1924-29, the Conservatives remained in power. In 1925 the pound returned to par—the only instance of such a recovery—but in their efforts to cope with the economic ills afflicting Great Britain the Conservatives were hardly more successful than their predecessors.

Five factors had contributed heavily to England's prewar economic supremacy: coal, textiles, carrying trade, brokerage services, and foreign investments. After the war coal and textiles were heavily hit. Coal furnished 10 per cent of the value of British exports in 1913; in 1925, only 6½ per cent. Germany consumed 6,000,000 tons less; Russia, 13,000,000 less. Italy was developing hydro-electric power and France was receiving coal in reparation payments. Hydro-electric power and the gasoline engine affected the coal industry adversely even in England. Textiles were injured by the spread of the Industrial Revolution to China, Japan, and India; during the first three decades of the twentieth century, while the cotton spindles of the world were increasing some 55 per cent, India, Japan, and China were increasing theirs some 75 per cent, 425 per cent, and 560 per cent respectively. Great Britain was exporting 3,000,000 yards of cotton goods to India in 1913; in 1927, only about half that amount. Exports to China and Japan fell from 773,000,000 yards to 128,000,000. Great Britain fell behind in the production of steel. The United States, France, and Germany each produced more, the United States alone five or six times as much—and when the Industrial Revolution began, the United States was not even in the running. More serious by far, the iron in England is rapidly approaching exhaustion; while France has a superabundance of iron, 5,000,000 tons are now imported annually into Great Britain. In shipbuilding, in the carrying trade, and in banking England still maintains her superiority; it is these factors which keep her going.

The situation in the coal industry, complicated by disagreements between owners and operatives, was in many ways the most serious of England's many troubles. Early in May, 1926, because of a proposed wage reduction, the unions struck; whereupon the transport workers declared a sympathetic strike. These events, widely heralded as a "general strike," caused great excitement, volunteers from all walks of life turning out to "keep England from starving." Though the "general strike" ended in nine days, the coal strike continued until November 19, when the miners surrendered at discretion. The direct costs—\$275,000,000 in wages and \$1,500,000,000 in production—were appalling, and in addition England lost her coal trade with Sweden and Norway to Poland, and even had to import coal herself. By taking advantage of the furore created by the strike to pass a new Trades Dispute Act, the Government was able to make a general strike illegal, forbid picketing, and once more render trade-union funds liable to legal action. It ignored the recommendations of the Samuel Commission, which pointed out that three-fourths of the coal mined was produced at a loss and advised that the mines be nationalized.

In 1928 the Government passed a Fifth Reform Bill enfranchising women on equal terms with men. The chief measure for solving the economic crisis was an act relieving industries of 75 per cent of their local taxes.

In foreign affairs Austen Chamberlain, who directed this department of activity for the Conservatives, continued most of MacDonald's policies; together

with Briand and Stresemann he brought about the Locarno understandings and made the Pact of Paris possible. Only in his dealings with Russia was there a notable difference of attitude; the treaties drawn up by MacDonald were not ratified, and in 1927, following a raid on the Arcos (Russian trading) offices in London, diplomatic relations were severed.

THE SECOND MACDONALD GOVERNMENT

In 1929 Great Britain once more faced a general election. Lloyd George came out in favor of an extensive program of public works, which he claimed would eliminate unemployment; MacDonald advocated steeply graduated taxes and the nationalization of basic industries; the Conservatives were content to stand on their record. The Laborites increased their popular vote to 8,330,000 and their representation to 289. The Conservatives polled even more votes (8,590,000), but their representation fell from 396 to 260. The Liberals, with 5,250,000 votes, captured only 58 seats but, unfortunately for the Laborites, they again held the balance of power. For the second time MacDonald became Prime Minister without a majority.

In foreign affairs he continued his own good work and that of Austen Chamberlain. He concluded a treaty for the limitation of naval armaments, helped to bring about the evacuation of the Rhineland, persuaded his countrymen to accept the Optional Clause of the World Court Statute, and recognized Russia, subject to the understanding that the Bolsheviks would refrain from propaganda in Great Britain. In the domestic sphere, however, his only outstanding accomplishment was a Coal Mines Act placing the entire industry on a co-ordinated basis and reducing the working day to seven and a half hours.

MacDonald's task was not made any easier when, shortly after he took office, the Great Depression descended on the world. Britons hardly knew whether to lament over conditions at home or to rejoice that they were not worse off. One authority writing at the opening of 1931 compared the conditions of the moment with those of the preceding year in the following terms: "The British key industries, coal, iron and steel, all relapsed." "Iron and steel trade declined to the lowest point in four years. Engineering industries and shipbuilding also lost ground. . . . Textile industries, both wool and cotton, are in a deplorable state." "Agriculture is as badly off as manufacturing, perhaps worse." According to the farmers, the state of agriculture was the worst that it had been since 1879. Between the end of 1929 and the end of 1930, unemployment had increased from 1,300,000 to 2,300,000. Exports had fallen off 20 per cent. "And yet," he continued, "England has no bread lines, no crime waves and no bank crashes. Nobody is hungry or roofless. Almshouses are rapidly vanishing." For the first quarter of 1931, trade returns showed that exports had declined 37 per cent. In the shipbuilding industry 52.5 per cent of the workers were unemployed, while unemployment as a whole increased to over 2,500,000.

Up to this point (1931), in spite of all her difficulties, England had managed to pay her way; but with \$5,000,000 a week now going to the unemployed, the fund available could meet only half the costs. Under these conditions Snowden, MacDonald's dynamic Chancellor of the Exchequer, proposed a budget includ-

ing a tax of .4 per cent on all land, with the exception of that used for agriculture. The gasoline tax was to be raised to 12 cents to the (imperial) gallon—an increase of 50 per cent. The Conservatives were violent in their opposition and eventually forced Snowden to exclude certain other categories of land, such as that used by educational institutions, from his special tax; but with these amendments the budget passed, thanks to the Liberals, by a vote of 289 to 230. It is worth noting that Snowden, though one of the oldest leaders of his party in point of service, had been so lukewarm toward the Laborite handling of unemployment that he had even held it up to ridicule, that he had accused his colleagues of being afraid to tell the people the truth about the matter, and that his previous pronouncements on British finances had been of a decidedly alarmist nature.

The history of the late summer and early autumn of 1931 is unique in British annals, and several points are still wrapped in a veil of impenetrable obscurity. Until the middle of July the Old Lady of Threadneedle Street (the Bank of England) had a comfortable reserve of gold. At that moment France began a heavy drain on these reserves, in order to put pressure on Great Britain to oppose the Austro-German customs union; by the thirty-first, when Parliament adjourned for the summer recess, \$160,000,000 had been drawn out of the country. The very day Parliament adjourned, but a few hours later, by curious coincidence, a report that was of more than ordinary interest was made public. This report, drawn up by a committee of financial experts under Sir George Ernest May, made out that \$600,000,000—three times as much as Snowden had estimated—would be needed to balance the budget. The May Committee recommended that in order to obtain this sum expenditures—unemployment benefits, and so forth—should be cut.

Hurried conferences were held—between the members of the cabinet, between the cabinet and a committee of bankers in the Treasury in Whitehall (there is an internal passage connecting Whitehall with Downing Street), and between the cabinet and the leaders of the Conservatives and the Liberals—at which fundamental differences of opinion developed. The Conservatives, the Liberals, and the bankers were for putting the recommendations of the May Report into effect; Henderson, one of MacDonald's oldest lieutenants, backed by the Trades Union Council, was dead against any reduction in the dole. MacDonald, who was on the fence, attempted to effect a compromise. On August 22 he was informed by Lombard Street (the British Wall Street) that unless something were done within three days, the Bank of England would be compelled to suspend gold payments. He was also given to understand that American bankers would aid the pound, but only if the dole were cut. (Subsequently it appeared that the Americans had made no such conditions.) When Henderson and his faction held out, MacDonald, rather than see England go off the gold standard, threw in his lot with the Conservatives; whereupon the cabinet resigned. Then came another singular occurrence. On August 23 the King called a conference in which MacDonald, the Conservatives, and the Liberals all participated (it would be interesting to know how much the King had to do with the outcome); and on the twenty-fourth, MacDonald, who by now commanded only a small fraction of the Laborites, became Prime Minister of a coalition

Government. The new cabinet, which was limited to ten members, consisted of four Laborites, including Snowden, four Conservatives, and two Liberals. MacDonald was read out of the Labor party; and on the twenty-eighth Henderson became its official leader.

Thus ended MacDonald's career as a Laborite. Superficially, at least, it was an astounding end, as unpredictable as it was astounding, for a man who had devoted his entire life to the cause, who had been the outstanding Socialist of British history, and who was deemed by Americans the greatest of all England's Prime Ministers—the only one to fulfill, in British terms, the American ideal of a career "from log cabin to the White House." It seems safe to hazard the opinion that it will be long before this episode is cleared up—if ever. Was his change of coat the consequence of apostasy, of a plot, or of self-sacrifice? So far, the student can only propound the question and wonder. There were those who, subsequent to the event, pointed out that in spite of his humble origin and his unrivaled record as a leader of labor Ramsay MacDonald had always been an intellectual rather than a laboring man, that he had never had any connection with the trade-union movement from which the Laborites drew their strength, that he had never proposed a single socialistic measure apart from the Snowden Budget, that he had never associated on terms of intimacy with his Laborite colleagues but had always preferred the society of the socially elect, and that with the passage of time he had become constantly more estranged from his colleagues and followers.

ENGLAND ABANDONS FREE TRADE

When Parliament met on September 8, MacDonald first asked for a vote of confidence; and this he received, 309 to 250—but from a very different backing from his old one. The government showing now represented the Conservatives and the Liberals, plus twelve Laborites—all that had followed their former leader into the enemy camp. The Opposition showing, correspondingly, was furnished by the Laborites, including Stanley Baldwin's son, who habitually sided with that party. Snowden then presented a supplementary budget, which was likewise voted. Unemployed laborers who had been receiving \$4.25 a week were cut to \$3.81; all persons in receipt of an income up to \$10,000 were (with a few exceptions) obliged to pay a 25 per cent income tax; those with a higher income had to pay 35 per cent; and all officials had their salaries cut—from the Prime Minister, who lost \$5,000, to the policeman, whose weekly wage of \$23 fell \$1.25. These cuts caused considerable discontent and some violence. A passive mutiny occurred on September 15 among the naval units stationed at Invergordon—the first that the British fleet had known since 1797.

Although the budget had been balanced, although the King contributed \$250,000 from his already straitened civil list, and although both France, which had caused the crisis, and the United States assisted in bolstering up the pound, the new Government failed to achieve any immediate success in stemming the financial debacle. Panics in Zurich and, more particularly, in Amsterdam, led to a continued drain of gold; by the twentieth over \$1,000,000,000 worth had been withdrawn from England. For two days the exchanges were closed;

and on the twenty-first the gold standard was abandoned after having been maintained, with the exception of a brief interval, for over a century. This second step backward from his former program and policies was only one of many that MacDonald was destined to take as time went on. By the twenty-eighth unemployment had risen to 2,825,000, and by December 7 the pound had fallen to \$3.25—a decline of 33 $\frac{1}{3}$ per cent from par.

The Conservatives, particularly that faction led by Neville Chamberlain, were meanwhile clamoring for an election. Whether MacDonald could have resisted the demand is open to question. It has been so asserted: "The Prime Minister was master of the situation in September; or he could have been if he had exerted the weight of his position, his strategic advantage and the widespread public belief in his indispensability." He had, indeed, been indispensable as the leader of the Laborites; as the leader of the forces of conservatism he was something of an anomaly, a general without an army—an army of his own, at least. In any case, he should have made use of that plain speaking and hard logic by which he had won to the heights of glory; and this he failed to do.

On October 27 the British again went to the polls. MacDonald, as spokesman for the coalition, refrained from putting forward any definite program and instead made a plea for personal support. By an "act of faith" the electorate was to give him *carte blanche* to do as he saw fit. He also argued that if the Laborites were returned the pound would vanish into thin air. This argument he drove home by holding up three 20,000-mark notes of 1923, nominally worth \$15,000, and pointing out that as four days' wages for a German miner they would not buy as much as ten English shillings. Stanley Baldwin, who made a separate statement for the Conservatives, pointed out that what was needed was a protective tariff. A detailed program of nationalization, such as MacDonald himself had advocated in the old days, was proposed by the Laborites. Though not made clear, at least by MacDonald, the real issue, as everyone knew, was Free Trade vs. Protection.

The Laborites polled some 7,000,000 votes, but lost 201 seats—the most drastic turnover in British history. The coalition as a whole, capturing 554 out of 615 seats, emerged with a majority of 493. But more important still, since 471 of the government seats fell to followers of Baldwin, the Conservatives, single-handed, had a majority of 327 over all other parties combined. The remainder of the seats won by the coalition were divided between the protectionist Liberals under Simon (35), the free-trade Liberals under Samuel (33), the National Laborites (13), and the Irish (2). The Opposition, a pitiful 56, was made up of 52 Laborites and 4 Lloyd George Liberals. In addition there were 5 independents. Among other things, the 1931 election marked the end of Lloyd George, who forthwith resigned as leader of the Liberals. The student of English politics also notes with interest that the Liberals as a whole, though they polled only about 3,000,000 votes, won over a third more seats than the Laborites. When all is said and done, there is no mystery about the main reason for the Laborite debacle: like Hoover in America, they had the misfortune to take office just before the beginning of the Great Depression.

A cabinet of twenty, on the basis of the seating in the Commons, should have

been made up of half a Laborite, two and a half Liberals, and seventeen Conservatives. Instead there were four "Laborites," including Snowden (Lord Privy Seal, however, instead of Chancellor of the Exchequer), five Liberals, and eleven Conservatives. Most astonishing of all, Stanley Baldwin insisted that MacDonald remain Prime Minister. Was this gallantry, or did Baldwin prefer that in such troublous times someone else should shoulder the responsibility? In any case MacDonald made an excellent stalking-horse for the Conservatives; and it was soon evident that owing to the overwhelming preponderance of Conservatives in the Commons, he was in effect their prisoner. Soon he was throwing his old principles overboard wholesale. The struggle in the cabinet was so violent that on January 22, abandoning the principle of cabinet unity, in force since 1784, he issued an official statement: "Ministers who find themselves unable to support the conclusions arrived at by the majority of their colleagues on the subject of import duties and cognate matters are to be at liberty to express their views by speech and vote."

It was a foregone conclusion, notwithstanding these differences of opinion, that England under the leadership of MacDonald's National Government would abandon her free-trade policy, which had stood for the better part of a century. November 25, 1931, a tariff of 1,500 items was put into operation; on the articles enumerated a duty of 50 per cent was levied, and the Board of Trade was empowered to raise this levy to 100 per cent if it thought best. As other categories were added soon after, by the end of December between a third and a half of the manufactured goods imported were subject to this tax. Contrariwise, goods from the British Dominions—and this was an all-important exception—were exempt. Thus, by appropriate coincidence, it was a cabinet in which the Chancellorship of the Exchequer was held by Neville Chamberlain that realized the dream of Imperial Preference conceived by his father, Joe Chamberlain, a generation earlier.

In less than six months, in place of "Ramsay Mac," Help of the Helpless, Defender of the Defenseless, Champion of Disarmament, Arbitration, and International Conciliation, there appeared Mr. MacDonald, the man who cut unemployment benefits, the man who failed to save the pound, the man who declared that the Singapore naval base should be completed.

One important point more may well be noted in considering the trials and tribulations of postwar England: in contrast to France, Germany, Italy, and Russia, England saved the creditor class at the expense of the masses by bolstering up the pound, and to that extent complicated her problem.

Today, as a decade ago, one fundamental question remains to be answered: "Is England done?" Will she henceforth be nothing but a second Spain, living on a glorious past—worse off than Spain, which petrified economically before the Industrial Revolution reached her? Or to use a more exact analogy, will she be merely another Austria—a huge head with a Lilliputian body?

THE GERMAN REVOLUTION

August 4, 1914, the Imperial German Reichstag unanimously voted the credits necessary for what was to be the World War. This striking manifestation of

unity was made possible when the Social Democrats (Socialists), who were the largest party, decided to concur. The decision was reached by a vote of 96 to 14 in the party caucus; even Liebknecht, the future leader of the extremists, approved, for he was convinced that Germany was fighting on the defensive. With comparatively few exceptions, this unanimity of feeling and expression continued until the last year of the war.

Rosa Luxemburg, a woman Socialist, was the only leader to protest from the first. In December, when additional credits came up for approval, Liebknecht voted in opposition; in March two votes were cast in opposition and thirty deputies left the chamber. Liebknecht entered into more or less open conflict with the Government and, among other things, published a series of derogatory letters signed "Spartacus." In April of 1917, Haase, the leader of the Social Democrats, and a number of other dissident Socialists formed the Independent Social Democratic party. The Left wing, under the leadership of Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, was made up of Spartacists. The Majority Socialists elected Ebert to fill the place of Haase. In January of 1918 a great political strike, engineered by the Independent Socialists, broke out in the munitions plants; but the Majority Socialists, by assuming leadership, were able to divert it into legal channels.

The causes of the German revolutions of 1918 are clear, though the events are somewhat obscure. The fundamental causes were hatred of the Imperial—and imperious—Government (though not of the monarchy) and of the high-handed governing classes, coupled with war-weariness. The upper classes were still able to live in luxury, but owing to the shortage of food the masses, including the middle classes, were suffering intensely. The Russian Revolution and the propaganda of Wilson also played a not inconsiderable part. By the middle of the summer, when it became evident that the war was lost, the people were loath to keep up the struggle.

These last two factors had a determining effect on the authorities as well. When the Kaiser and his advisers saw that their moral authority was gone, they turned with true patriotism to the Reichstag, as the only organ enjoying the confidence of the nation, and set up a parliamentary régime. The Chancellor was dismissed (September 30), and on October 3 Prince Max (imilian) of Baden, a South German liberal, was appointed in his stead. Prince Max included in his cabinet Scheidemann of the Social Democrats and Erzberger of the Center. The Kaiser made still further concessions to the principle of democracy on the twenty-eighth. Marking, as it did, the end of the quasi-autocratic régime and the beginning of a liberal empire, this series of events may be called the First German Revolution of 1918—indeed it has even been called the real German Revolution.

The new Government had the backing of the overwhelming majority of Germans, but it was merely a passive backing. In order to understand the Second German Revolution of 1918, it is necessary to follow several threads. The first signs of violence appeared late in October. On the twenty-eighth the Admiralty ordered Von Hipper to the Belgian coast in order to protect the right flank of the retreating army. Suspecting, as was true, that the order had been given without consulting the Government and fearing that a fleet move-

ment would jeopardize the peace negotiations, the sailors mutinied. There is some difference of opinion as to whether the mutiny was the beginning of the Second Revolution or just the prelude. In point of fact, it seems to have been both, depending on the point of view. In itself it was a mutiny pure and simple, for the participants were not acting against but in behalf of the Government. Nevertheless the movement rapidly communicated itself to the civilian population and to the army in the interior (though it did not reach the front before the armistice). A mass meeting to demand the abdication of the Kaiser was held in Munich on November 7. The demonstration turned into a revolution, a republic was established the next day, and on the thirteenth the Wittelsbach dynasty of Bavaria abdicated. Elsewhere Spartacists were in action, strikes were breaking out, other princely houses were abdicating, and councils (soviets) of soldiers and workers on the Russian model, though with little unity of program or action, were being formed. These events were singularly bloodless.

Meanwhile the abdication of the Kaiser had become an issue in Germany at large as a result of two occurrences: October 22 abdication had been mentioned for the first time in public, by Haase, during a debate in the Reichstag; and on the twenty-third, President Wilson had made it one of the conditions of peace. When the pronouncement of the twenty-eighth was issued, Scheidemann went to Prince Max and told him the Social Democrats considered that in addition to parliamentary government, the abdication of the Kaiser was necessary. But William, when the subject was broached, refused to comply and claimed that his presence was essential to save the country from Bolshevism.

Though Berlin was rather behind than in the lead in the revolutionary movement, a state of siege was proclaimed on November 5, and on the seventh the general in command issued a decree forbidding the formation of revolutionary councils "on the Russian model." At the same time, Scheidemann informed the Chancellor that if the Kaiser had not abdicated by noon of the next day the Socialists would withdraw from the cabinet; the demand did not entail the overthrow of the Hohenzollern dynasty or the erection of a republic. Prince Max, who had come to the conclusion that the Kaiser and the Crown Prince must abdicate *in order to save the dynasty*, associated himself with the demand and transmitted it to army headquarters. Again the Kaiser refused to comply. As the Socialists made good their threat, the Government was left without any supporters. When it became known that Prince Max had ordered the general in command in Berlin not to fire on the people and that the general had thereupon resigned, Scheidemann said, "Now we must place ourselves at the head of the movement or there will be chaos in the Reich."

The morning of November 9, a strike broke out in the power and industrial plants of Berlin, and one by one the most trusted regiments went over to the strikers; obviously it was the beginning of a revolution. Prince Max, telephoning frantically to army headquarters, was informed that the Kaiser's abdication was being drawn up. On the basis of this information he announced that the Kaiser had abdicated (as a matter of fact, the Emperor did not issue his abdication until the twenty-eighth), that he himself would remain in office until a Regent was installed, and that he was convoking a National

Assembly. Simultaneously Ebert and Scheidemann appeared and demanded to be given control of the government. In view of the fact that he was powerless and that the Socialists seemed best able to control the situation, Prince Max and his cabinet decided to comply and forthwith appointed Ebert Chancellor; the question of the regency was left in abeyance. The action taken by Prince Max was of course illegal, but for *de facto* purposes it sufficed.

Exactly what view did the Socialists take of their action, and just when did Germany cease to be an empire and become a republic? To the second question it is impossible to formulate a precise answer. Scheidemann appeared on the steps of the Reichstag a few minutes after Ebert was installed and made a pronouncement to the assembled multitude. Though there is considerable difference of opinion as to what he said, it was to the effect that a republic had been set up. Ebert's official declarations made no mention of the subject, and it was months before any legal action was taken. By way of answer to the first question there is more exact information. Just after the new Government took office it issued several decrees signed "Chancellor of the Empire, Ebert." Late in the day some fighting occurred, but only fifteen were killed. All theorizing aside, the Second Revolution of 1918 was an accomplished fact—and a saddler now ruled where the Hohenzollerns had formerly reigned.

What followed is doubly confusing, since the names of the governing bodies and the titles of the officials give little or no clue to their true identity. The principal factions involved were the Majority Socialists (Social Democrats), the Independent Socialists, and the Spartacists. The Majority Socialists, though, were evolutionists, not revolutionists. If a revolution were to prove inevitable, they wanted it to be political, with only a mild social tinge. Their moderation was a great tribute to the work of Bismarck; it would not be going too far to say that it was Bismarck who saved Germany from Bolshevism. The Spartacists wanted a revolution of the Bolshevik type. The Independents stood halfway between, though officially one with the Spartacists (this last factor furnished an added element of confusion). They were for the most part opposed to violence, by contrast with the Spartacists; but by contrast with the Majority Socialists, they wanted to go further along the path toward a socialized state.

The Majority Socialists realized fully that the Spartacists for the moment constituted the chief danger to the democratic state and, furthermore, that even though the Spartacists should gain power only to be subsequently overthrown, the net result would be autocracy, not democracy. They also realized that if they had the Independents on their side, they stood a much better chance of defeating the Spartacists. For this reason they had made overtures to the Independents even before they took over power, and had intended to include them in the cabinet. But the Independents agreed to enter the Government only on three conditions: the inclusion of none but Socialists, equal division of power in the Government, and official recognition of the sovereignty of the Workers' and Soldiers' Councils. So urgent was the crisis that on November 10 the Majority Socialists finally acceded, and a Council of People's Commissars, consisting of three Majority Socialists (Ebert, Scheidemann, and Landsberg) and three Independents (Haase, Dittmann, and Barth) was set up.

Throughout, the terminology and much of the machinery was Bolshevistic, but—and this is the important point—the main actors were not. The whole performance, in fact, was more or less the Bolshevik Revolution in reverse; it began with a theoretical dictatorship of the proletariat and ended in a parliamentary democracy.

That evening a plenary session of the Workers' and Soldiers' Councils (Soviets) of Berlin declared Germany "a Republic, a Socialistic Republic. The Workers' and Soldiers' Councils are now the holders of political power." An Executive Committee was appointed and the Council of Commissars approved. The Commissars made no attempt at a clean break with the Old Régime but chose a cabinet of old-line bureaucrats; furthermore, it was decided that for the time being at least the local functionaries should remain at their posts. Though the cabinet members were in theory subject to the control of socialistic "comrades," the latter were for the most part content to let well enough alone. Of the all but successful efforts of the local councils (soviets) to render the work of the local authorities futile, nothing can be said in this brief account.

GERMANY IN TRAVAIL

Although friction developed between the two groups in the Government and between the Government and the executive of the Berlin Council, and although sporadic outbreaks of violence occurred, the various factions at first adopted a policy of watchful waiting. On December 16 the First All-German Congress of Workers' and Soldiers' Councils met. Both the Independents, who had grown increasingly hostile to the Majority Socialists, and the Spartacists hoped great things of this assemblage, but they were bitterly disappointed. Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg were refused the right to participate, and the Congress voted that the elections to the National Assembly should be held on January 19. It also voted that a Central Committee should be set up to supervise the Commissars. The Independents proposed that this Central Committee should be in effect the governing body in the country and when the Congress declined this proposition, they foolishly refused to participate in the election of members. Consequently the entire committee was made up of Majority Socialists.

On December 23 a detachment of sailors who had occupied the royal palace and stables was ordered to evacuate. Instead, they seized the Chancellery and imprisoned Ebert, and were with difficulty dislodged by government troops. The Independents in the Government thereupon resigned—because their colleagues had caused the troops to fire on "the people." With the approval of the Central Committee, three Majority Socialists—Noske, Wissel, and Löbe—were elected to fill their places (Löbe declined to serve).

Since the Independents were in open opposition to the Government and since the National Assembly would meet in a short time, the Communists, as the Spartacists now called themselves, decided that the time had come to act. January 5, 1919, the *Rote Fahne* (the *Red Flag*, Communist) and *Die Freiheit* (*Freedom*, Independent Socialist) called for a mass demonstration against

the Government; that same evening, the Communists seized the offices of the *Vorwärts* (*Forward*, Majority Socialist). Up to this time, the Commissars had avoided using force so far as possible, partly because they were constitutionally opposed to its use and partly because the motley collection of irregulars that constituted their army had proved unreliable. Now it was clear that something drastic must be done, and without delay. But what? This question the perturbed Commissars debated at length, without arriving at any conclusion. The narrative is continued by Noske, who had quelled the Kiel Mutiny. "I demanded a decision. Thereupon someone replied: 'Then do the job yourself.' Whereupon I . . . answered: 'Very well, if you like. One of us must be the bloodthirsty tyrant; I won't shirk the responsibility.'" They had the right man—or at least the man who knew how to pick the right men. Retiring to the little town of Dahlem, Noske set about organizing a force. For this purpose he turned to some of the high officers of the former imperial army; however these militarists might feel about a socialized democracy, they were sure to look with even less favor on a Bolshevik dictatorship.

On the sixth a mob of between 100,000 and 200,000, led by the Communists, occupied the entire Unter den Linden³ and most of the public buildings. As the government forces could offer little resistance, the revolutionists were in virtual control for the better part of a week. On the eleventh, Noske entered the Wilhelmstrasse at the head of 3,000 veterans. The military were as harsh as they were efficient, and did not scruple to use the notorious Spanish *Ley de Fuga*;⁴ among the prisoners who fell by their hand were Rosa Luxemburg and Liebknecht.

The elections were held on the nineteenth, as scheduled. The suffrage was perhaps the most democratic ever known. All adult Germans, male or female, including soldiers and paupers, were entitled to vote; and 82 per cent of the electorate participated. Seats in the Assembly were distributed on the Hondt system of proportional representation, with the following results:

<i>Party</i>	<i>Votes</i>	<i>Seats</i>
Nationalists (German National People's party)	3,200,000	42
German People's party	1,240,000	21
Center (temporarily the Christian People's party) . . .	6,000,000	88
Democrats (German Democratic party)	5,600,000	75
Social Democrats	11,466,000	165 *
Independent Socialists	2,300,000	22
Miscellaneous	500,000	10

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* Including two deputies from the troops on the Western front.

Thirty-nine of the deputies were women. The Nationalists, former Conservatives, represented the agrarian Junkers and the great industrialists. Though they favored the monarchy, they admitted the necessity for a parliamentary form of government. The German People's party, an outgrowth of the National Liberals, represented the smaller business interests. They too were parliamentary

³ The chief street of Berlin.

⁴ The law authorizing the police to shoot prisoners who attempt to escape—notorious because used as a cloak for illegal executions.

monarchists and nationalists, but their main concern was to reestablish tranquillity and guarantee private property; in the sense that they favored legal equality they were democrats. Their leader was Stresemann. The Center remained, as before the war, devoted to Roman Catholic interests, and therefore advocated "freedom" of instruction and confessional schools, in addition, they stood for a federated republic and private property. Their most prominent leader was Erzberger, who had signed the armistice in behalf of Germany. The Democrats were former Progressives and National Liberals; in general they were advocates of classic, laissez-faire liberalism, and they attempted to rally all who were in favor of bourgeois democracy, as opposed to reaction and to socialism. The Social Democrats remained theoretically faithful to the Erfurt Program and a mild form of Marxian socialism, to be gained through parliamentary means; more exactly, they advocated the nationalization of "such industries as were ripe for it," but they never specified what that meant. The Independent Socialists, though more outspoken in their denunciations of capitalism, also stood by the parliamentary republic, by means of which they hoped to nationalize the means of production.

The National Assembly met in Weimar, the Athens of Germany, on February 6. The choice of a small town, remote from the Berlin mob, showed foresight; wisdom was likewise shown in the passing of a provisional constitution a few days after the Assembly convened (February 10). Thereupon the Provisional Government resigned, and the next day Ebert was elected President. Ebert appointed a ministry headed by Scheidemann and containing five other Majority Socialists, four Centrists, three Democrats, and a nonpartisan. Brockdorff-Rantzau was Minister of Foreign Affairs; Preuss, Minister of the Interior; Noske, Minister of Defense (War); Erzberger, minister without portfolio.

The chief work of the National Assembly was of course the drafting of the new constitution, adopted on July 31, promulgated, published, and effective on August 11. It was in the main the work of Preuss, and he and his colleagues effectively proved that the nonpolitical German of legend is a myth. Drawn up as the result of a careful study of all previously existing systems of government, it is by all odds the most interesting of democratic constitutions.

By the Weimar constitution of 1919, Germany became a highly federalized republic—almost, but not quite, a unitary state like France—rather than a loosely federalized country like the United States. (Black, red, and gold were declared the national colors.) All the normal essentials of parliamentary government were provided; and in addition, the Weimar constitution contained many novel and noteworthy features. The rules of international law were declared part of the constitution. The Reich⁵ was empowered to legislate on the distribution of population. Readjustment of the frontiers of the constituent lands (states) was provided for,⁶ in the hope of reducing the preponderance of

⁵For reasons of historical association those who framed the constitution preserved the term "Reich," which the reader is free to translate "realm," "commonwealth," or "empire," according to the dictates of his pleasure or judgment.

⁶In accordance with correct constitutional terminology, the term "land" is employed by the Weimar constitution when referring to the constituent "states." In this account the term "state" is used, as more comprehensible to the average American.

Prussia. Though nothing was accomplished in this last direction, the two "principalities" of Reuss united on December 21, 1918. Later they were joined by Saxe-Altenburg, and eventually eight "principalities," the three just mentioned and five others (Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach, Saxe-Gotha, Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt, Schwarzburg-Sondershausen, and Saxe-Meiningen), formed the state of Thuringia. At the same time (April 30, 1920) Coburg, which had detached itself from Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, joined Bavaria. The constitution contained several modern variations of the democratic principle—proportional representation, the initiative, the referendum, and the recall.

One of the most interesting features was the balance between the various organs of central government and between the central government and the sovereign people. The President of Germany is the most powerful head of any democratic state. He can coerce the constituent states, he can dissolve the Reichstag, he can order laws submitted to popular referendum, he has a pocket veto in case of dispute between the two houses of the legislature, he can use force to defend the public safety and restore order, and most important of all, by virtue of Article 48 he can suspend the civil rights guaranteed by Articles 114, 115, 117, 118, 123, 124, and 153 of the constitution. This last privilege was invalid, however, if the Reichstag objected—as it did in May, 1920—and war could be legally declared only through the enactment of a national law. Laws were ordinarily to be initiated by the cabinet, go to the Reichsrat (the successor to the Bundesrat), and if social or economic in nature to the National Economic Council, and finally to the Reichstag. Nevertheless, the Reichstag, the Reichsrat, the National Economic Council, and the people themselves were to have the privilege of initiating legislation likewise. The President and the Reichsrat were to exercise a suspensive veto over the acts of the Reichstag; in either case, the people were to have the final say. The Reichstag was given the right to appoint investigating committees, and standing committees with the privileges of investigating committees to oversee foreign relations and to protect its own rights. The Reichsrat, like its predecessor, was to be composed of representatives of the constituent states (no state might have more than two-fifths of the votes), but the powers granted it were vastly inferior. The National Economic Council, composed of representatives of the workers and employers, was to be a purely advisory body, and in this sense an extralegal body. It was the only concession in the sphere of government to the conciliar (soviet) system advocated by the Spartacists and Independent Socialists.

The constitution introduced a number of novelties in the realm of social affairs. Two features stand out: 1. Though the constitution was impregnated throughout with the democratic principle, though women were accorded equal rights with men, though the individual was promised either work or bread, though the state was obligated to assist the poor to obtain secondary and higher education, and though even non-German minorities were protected—yet individual rights were conditioned by corresponding duties. The citizen was bound to accept office and to employ his physical and mental powers and his material possessions for the benefit of society. Thus in the Weimar constitution the *laissez-faire* doctrine of individual rights as an end gave way to the socialistic concept of the public welfare as the ultimate goal of individual and collective

effort. In other words, it was the welfare of society rather than the welfare of the individual that was primarily considered. The rights of labor, of large families, of illegitimate children, and of the poor were stressed, but the rights of intellectual workers and of the middle class were not forgotten. Even the family was mentioned—for the first time in a modern constitution. Academic freedom was guaranteed. 2. Though private property was guaranteed, entailments were abolished and provision was made for the expropriation of land and natural resources, for the socialization or collectivization of industry, and for the voluntary formation of workers' councils—"the only really new idea that has appeared in the public law of modern states since the war." The councils were given no political power, however, and had therefore a very different status from those in Russia.

These last provisions took shape in the collectivization of the coal, potash, and iron industries (laws of March 23 and April 29, 1919). A law of December 31, 1919, provided that electrical plants of sufficient importance should become the property of the Reich, but owing to the chaotic conditions that ensued few were collectivized.

THE INFANCY OF THE GERMAN REPUBLIC

If ever an infant democracy was born to misfortune it was the German Republic that first opened its eyes on August 11, 1919. Even before it officially saw the light the Republic, or its godparent the Weimar Assembly, was called on to conclude peace with the triumphant Allies.

During the earlier part of the Paris Conference, while the Allies were deciding the terms of peace, Germany was sustained by faith in Wilson and by the belief that the armistice agreement assured a just settlement. Consequently the news of the terms, when it arrived in May, came as an overwhelming surprise and shock. Germans were particularly incensed at the War-Guilt clause and at the fact that the Allies, after setting up the doctrine of self-determination, should forbid the Anschluss—the union of German-Austria with Germany proper. From one end of the country to the other rose the cry that the terms were unjust, impossible of fulfillment, and therefore unacceptable. Some, it is true, argued for acceptance—notably the Independent Socialists—not because they considered the treaty just but because, with greater realism, they saw the futility of resistance. The majority, including all the other parties and their leaders, argued that Germany was lost whether she signed or not, and they therefore advocated honorable resistance rather than shameful acceptance. Scheidemann was of this number; on May 12, during the first meeting of the National Assembly in Berlin, he publicly announced it as his official policy. On June 20 he resigned, the Democrats likewise retired from the Government, and a new ministry, drawn from the Socialists and the Center, took office. Erzberger, who was thought to know more about the Allies than any other German, gave it as his opinion that they would not refuse *some* concessions; and the new Government accordingly persuaded the Assembly to accept the treaty "without nevertheless recognizing thereby that the German people were the authors of the the war and without assuming any responsibility according

to Articles 227 to 230." So convinced were the Deputies that the Allies would accept this compromise that they began to leave Weimar, but the reply was promptly rejected. On June 23, therefore, the Government was obliged to propose unconditional acceptance. "Only a period of four short hours separates us now from the recommencement of hostilities." By a rising vote the remaining deputies agreed that the previous decision should be interpreted as authorizing the Government to yield.

Since the Allies gave the German people as a whole—not simply the militarists—cause for feeling they had been unjustly treated, the worst troubles that have befallen Germany since the war, from the financial debacle of 1923 to the dictatorship of Hitler, are one and all the direct or indirect result of the Peace Treaty, and particularly of the refusal to accept the formula proposed by the Weimar Assembly. Had the Allies deliberately sought to strangle the German Republic they could not possibly have found a better way. Immediately after the conclusion of hostilities the nation had been ready to make the Kaiser a scapegoat; but—as the Germans pointed out—had the Kaiser remained or had the Allies been obliged to fight their way to Berlin, the terms could scarcely have been made more severe. Rightly or wrongly, therefore, the nation blamed the Republic for rendering the country incapable of resistance; and had the monarchists succeeded in finding a capable leader there is little doubt that the Republic would have disappeared in even shorter order than it did.

It is impossible to construct a clear, simple, and at the same time comprehensive picture of the events that took place in Germany during the four years following the signing of peace, interwoven as they were with foreign relations. On every side, both without and within, the Republic found itself facing enemies—several very real devils and any number of uninviting deep blue seas: on the right, the monarchists and the militarists, and on the left, the Communists and the Independent Socialists; the Allies in front, and behind, the Bolsheviks. The Government could have coped with all but the Allies, but the Allies as a whole continued their unremitting hostility. The conduct of the French occupying the Rhineland kept Germany at fever pitch, and the militarists in Germany and France played into each other's hands in such a way as to make the task of the Government almost impossible. In never-ending succession one crisis trod on the heels of another.

The Communists had been provoking strikes and risings throughout the session of the Weimar Assembly. Early in March they had instigated another revolt in Berlin, they set up a momentary dictatorship in Saxony, and for nearly a month had Munich in their power. No sooner was the Communist danger disposed of, momentarily, and the Peace Treaty signed, than the monarchists appeared on the scene. In March of 1920, in the face of an uprising led, officially, by a second-rate monarchist by the name of Kapp, the Government and the Assembly retreated to Stuttgart. Fortunately most monarchists, including those of importance, did not stir, Noske persuaded the trade unions to declare a strike, Kapp fled to Sweden, and within a week the movement collapsed. The trade unions thereupon demanded a reward; the Government quieted them by dismissing Noske, infamous for his order of March 9, 1919: "Any person encountered fighting with weapons in his hands against the gov-

ernment troops is to be shot at once." The Kapp rebellion was followed by an uprising of 70,000 to 80,000 Communists in the Ruhr. Meanwhile one ministry after another rose and fell; in most the Center constituted the nucleus.

The first Reichstag elections were held in June of 1920; the results, as might have been foreseen, favored both extremes: the Nationalists and the People's party both increased their representation, while the Independent Socialists gained 58 seats and the Communists won 2. At the Congress of Halle the Independents split; the Right wing thereupon rejoined the Majority Socialists (September, 1922) and the Left wing fused with the Communists.

And year in and year out there was the question of reparations, on which everything else hinged.⁷ The Allies began by demanding fantastic sums, and although the amount was from time to time reduced, it remained impossible. These demands reacted on Germany's already depleted finances—during the war the amount of currency in circulation had increased fivefold—and on her capacity to pay. Exact the impossible of a man and you make him a bankrupt, for no one will extend him credit—precisely what happened to Germany. At the same time Germany for a brief interval gave a false appearance of returning prosperity. Owing to the falling wages and exchange, manufacturers were able to produce and sell at a profit. In reality, a bonus in the form of a small portion of the national wealth went with each article sold; but the Allies got the impression from this seeming prosperity that their demands were justified. Whether the effort made by the Government to meet its obligations was wholly honest is a moot question; certainly there were elements in Germany that made no effort at all. This the French took to be typical of the whole nation and finally, inspired by Poincaré, they seized the Ruhr—Germany's greatest industrial region—in an attempt to force payment (1923). The chief result was a virtual state of war between France and Germany.

The Ruhr episode was all that was needed to finish off German finances. The mark had already dropped to 6,865 to the dollar (from approximately 4 to the dollar). In less than a year—with 30 paper factories, 133 printing establishments, and 1,783 machines at work—it was worth less than the paper it was printed on; and since wages received one day might depreciate 20 per cent, 40 per cent, or even 60 per cent by the next, all incentive to thrift was destroyed. The inevitable result was a stampede, known as the flight from the mark, to transform currency into commodities. ("See how much money the Germans have to spend!" was the comment of the Allies.) In the end merchants and farmers, caught in the catastrophic whirl of prices, refused to sell; the Reichsbank raised its rate of discount to 90 per cent. The most lasting effect was the destruction of the greater part of the middle class, which suffered hardly less than its counterpart in Russia. Savings, pensions, and insurance were wiped out; of what value was the interest on 100,000 marks (normally about \$25,000) in bonds when it took 1,000,000,000 marks to buy a box of matches? Chaos, infinitely more appalling in a highly organized industrial state than in a primitive agricultural society, was clearly in sight—the chaos threatening any nation that either voluntarily or involuntarily resorts to inflation.

⁷ See pp. 642-48.

STRESEMANN AND THE SPIRIT OF LOCARNO

August 13, 1923, when Stresemann became Chancellor, Germany entered a new era. Some consideration of his antecedents is therefore in order. Stresemann was an ardent nationalist, if not a chauvinist, a representative of Big Business, and the founder and leader of the People's party—which was essentially monarchistic. Moreover, he entered office at a moment when it seemed almost incredible that parliamentary government in Germany could survive. Yet he was to prove the real hero of German democracy and one of the outstanding heroes of postwar Europe. The apparent contradiction seems difficult to resolve. It is partially explained by his dependence on the Socialists, but still more by his realism. He knew that for Germany to turn monarchist would merely involve her in fresh trouble with the Allies—and, above all, Stresemann was a patriot.

The conditions with which he was confronted have been outlined; his task was threefold: the liquidation of the Ruhr affair and the resumption of normal relations with the Allies, the stabilization of the mark and the balancing of the budget, and the establishment of the authority of the Reich throughout Germany. His first step was to abandon the unequal contest in the Ruhr (September 26); his second, to stop the printing of paper money and to substitute for the old paper mark a rentenmark—exchangeable for the old mark at a ratio of 1 to 1,000,000,000,000 (October 15). These political and economic changes led to further economic and political upheaval; whereupon Stresemann declared a state of siege and gave the generals commanding the local districts dictatorial powers.

In order to understand what follows it is necessary to go back a few years. In 1921 the National Socialist party (Nazis), with the swastika as its symbol, was founded by a group of seven men; the last of the founders to join was Hitler, but in July he was chosen its president. Hitler was a middle-class Austrian, who began life as a Viennese sign-painter. He joined the German army when war broke out and became a corporal. After the war he decided to become the Mussolini and the Gambetta of Germany rolled into one. His stock in trade consisted of oratory—he has been pronounced "the most successful orator that Germany has ever possessed"—and a rather curious assortment of nebulous ideas. Discontent, especially discontent at the Treaty of Versailles, was his chief asset; his party was therefore a party of protest, at first made up of young men whom he gathered about him in Bavaria.

When Stresemann set up his dictators, the Bavarian Government simply ignored the Reich and appointed a dictator of its own. The Bavarian dictator, Von Kahr, and his associates had the overoptimistic notion that if they proclaimed the monarchy all Germany would follow their lead and that they could then overthrow the Republic by merely walking into Berlin. Hitler was equally determined to overthrow the Government, but officially he was bent on maintaining the Republic. To his way of thinking this was to be accomplished by a March on Berlin à la Mussolini, and he persuaded Ludendorff to join him. Hitler and Von Kahr were both heartened when the Socialists

quitted the Government and left Stresemann to carry on with a rump cabinet (October 3, 1923). A comic-opera revolution in Bavaria ensued. Hitler mobilized his "troops," captured Von Kahr, and proclaimed himself President of the Reich. His commanding officer then went over to Von Kahr, and Hitler in turn was captured. When the rival factions had worn themselves out, the Reich had no difficulty in stepping in and restoring order. The ease with which the affair was handled ultimately proved a bad thing for the Republic. The revolutionary Government of Saxony, composed of Communists and extreme Socialists, was snuffed out at the same time by a whiff of machine-gun fire. A new cabinet under Marx (Center) was constituted on November 23; Stresemann, the Briand of Germany, remained as Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Twice in 1924 Germany faced a general election, once before and once after the Young-Stamp (Dawes) Plan for determining the annual amount of German reparations was approved by the Reichstag. In May the parties on the wings won substantial victories: the Nationalists captured 106 seats (the largest block in the Reichstag); the Nazis, 32; and the Communists, 62. In December the Nazis polled less than 1,000,000 votes and lost 18 seats; the Communists lost 17. The Young-Stamp Plan was doubly important, for it provided that Germany should obtain a loan of 800,000,000 (gold) marks—the first aid she received from outside.

The second great figure in the history of the German Republic stepped on the stage early in 1925. Ebert died in February, and for the first time a popular election for the presidency was held. The republican candidates together polled a majority on the first ballot, but because the republican vote was split a Nationalist came out ahead. Ludendorff, the extreme Nationalist candidate, received only 285,000 votes, however, to 1,000,000 for his nearest competitor. On the second ballot the republicans, with the exception of the Communists, united. Thereupon the Nationalists put up Hindenburg, the idol of the German people. Though his two opponents together had 1,000,000 more votes, Hindenburg won by a plurality of 900,000. The Nationalists hoped—contrary to their election statements—and the republicans and the Allies feared, that his victory was the prelude to a monarchical restoration; but for eight years Hindenburg proved true to his campaign promise: "According to the fundamental principles of the constitution, without respect to parties, persons, classes, and callings, I shall not be found wanting." "Faithfully and loyally" he had served William I, "faithfully and loyally" he had served William II, "faithfully and loyally" he served the republican Reich.

Stresemann's greatest work—and as a nationalist, his most surprising—was accomplished at Locarno. Just what the origins of the Locarno negotiations were is not clear. Officially they began when Stresemann made France a proposal for a security and arbitration pact (February 9, 1925). Whether the British, as they afterward claimed, urged Stresemann to act is not certain. When the French proved unresponsive—for one reason because there was no suggestion of guaranteeing the Polish frontier—Chamberlain did his best to bring France and Germany together. The negotiations were long and at times somewhat painful, and Stresemann had great difficulty in persuading the Reichstag to back his policy of rapprochement; but eventually it was agreed

that representatives of Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy, Belgium, Poland, and Czechoslovakia should meet in conference. On October 5, accordingly, Luther and Stresemann, Briand, Chamberlain, and their colleagues foregathered in the little town of Locarno just inside the southern frontier of Switzerland.

There, in the sub-Mediterranean climate engendered by the sheltering Alps—the glittering white of eternal snow peaks above, the glittering blue of Lake Maggiore below—German delegates met Allied delegates on terms of cordiality for the first time since the war. Impromptu luncheons and boat rides added an element of informality and intimacy, and on October 16 nine documents were initialed: a Treaty of Mutual Guarantee (the Rhineland Pact) between Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain, and Italy; an Arbitration Convention between Germany and Belgium; an Arbitration Convention between Germany and France; an Arbitration Treaty between Germany and Poland; an Arbitration Treaty between Germany and Czechoslovakia; a Final Protocol, which pronounced the preceding agreements “mutually interdependent”; a Draft Collective Note to Germany regarding Article 16 of the League Covenant; a Treaty of Mutual Guarantee between France and Poland; and a Treaty of Mutual Guarantee between France and Czechoslovakia.

The most important of these documents was the Rhineland Pact, which guaranteed

the territorial *status quo* . . . between Germany and Belgium and between Germany and France . . . and also the observance of the stipulations of articles 42 and 43 of the said treaty [of Versailles] concerning the demilitarized zone. Article 2. Germany and Belgium, and also Germany and France, mutually undertake that they will in no case attack or invade each other or resort to war against each other. This stipulation shall not, however, apply in the case of—1. The exercise of the right of legitimate defense. . . . 2. Action in pursuance of Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. 3. Action as the result of a decision taken by the Assembly or by the Council of the League of Nations or in pursuance of Article 15, Paragraph 7, of the Covenant of the League of Nations, provided that in this last event the action is directed against a state which was the first to attack. Article 3. . . . Germany and Belgium and Germany and France undertake to settle by peaceful means and in the manner laid down herein all questions of every kind which may arise between them. . . . Article 5. The provisions of Article 3 . . . are placed under the guarantee of the high contracting parties. . . . Article 10. The present treaty . . . shall enter into force as soon as . . . Germany has become a member of the League of Nations.

By the treaties with Poland and Czechoslovakia Germany agreed that “all disputes of every kind . . . shall be submitted for decision either to an arbitral tribunal or to the Permanent Court of International Justice. . . . This provision does not apply to disputes arising out of events prior to the present treaty.”

That he was able to persuade his countrymen to go so far in furthering the cause of peace was a notable triumph for Stresemann, since France and her allies—having obtained all the territory in Europe they could reasonably expect to acquire—had much more to gain by these agreements than had Germany. Her reward was the evacuation of the Rhineland, which began the day the Locarno compacts were signed (December 1). Stresemann also persuaded the

Reichstag to sanction the participation of Germany in the League, in conformity with the terms of the Locarno Pacts, and on September 10, 1926, amid an unparalleled demonstration of enthusiasm on the part of the League Assembly, he took his seat as German representative.

By the fall of 1927, Germany seemed well on the way to economic recovery. Based on a 1913 index of 100, production at the beginning of 1924—in the midst of the Ruhr occupation and before the Young-Stamp Plan went into effect—had been 56.5 for raw-material producing industries, 58 for material-consuming industries, 57 for all industries combined. By October of 1927 these indices had risen to 118 for the first group, 92 for the second, and 108.5 for both together. In 1928 foreign trade reached prewar levels. In 1929 Germany was once more able to wrest the blue ribbon of the Atlantic from England through the performances of her new liner, the *Bremen*, which on her maiden voyage to America made the crossing in 4 days, 17 hours, 42 minutes, while the best the *Mauretania* could do was 5 days, 2 hours, 34 minutes.

Though the election of May, 1928, still left the nationalistic groups in the Reichstag stronger than in the Weimar Assembly, it marked a further swing toward the Left.

Party	Votes	Seats
National Socialists (Nazis)	777,000	12
Nationalists	4,444,000	73
People's party	3,094,000	45
Center (including Bavarian People's party)	4,554,000	78
Democrats	1,495,000	25
Social Democrats	9,000,000	152
Communists	3,080,000	54
Miscellaneous parties	4,156,000	51

THE ADVENT OF HITLER

In March of 1930, when a new cabinet under Brüning (Center) took office, Germany was already in difficulties. Ever since 1925 she had been running behind financially, and for the year 1928-29 the deficit was 1,075,000,000 marks; for 1929-30 it was 313,000,000. Brüning's program was economy, price and wage regulation, and the peaceful removal of treaty burdens. Though not a very inspiring program, one must admit, it was the only possible one—short of such revolutionary measures as were being advocated by Hitler. The first two points Brüning proposed to enforce by dictatorial decrees, executed by virtue of Article 48 of the constitution. When the Reichstag attempted to rebel it was dissolved by Hindenburg; but new elections in September of 1930 resulted in outstanding gains for the Communists, who obtained 76 seats, and for the Nazis, who captured 95. The People's party and the Nationalists suffered heavily. It was a warning of worse possibilities—but the Allies were still riding "high, wide, and handsome."

Whatever success Brüning might otherwise have achieved was effectually forestalled by the Great Depression and the actions of France. In May of 1931 came the collapse of the Creditanstalt, the largest commercial bank in Austria.

The repercussions were felt throughout Germany. In two weeks the Reichsbank lost 27.4 per cent of its reserves, and only the Hoover moratorium prevented a financial catastrophe. It could not and did not prevent an industrial slump—the worst in Europe—and an immense amount of suffering. The unemployment figures were soon hovering around 6,000,000 (approximately 10 per cent of the *total* population¹). September 28 the stock exchange closed, and in January of 1932 Germany's foreign trade reached the lowest point in thirty-one years. Brüning came under fire from both sides, and among those particularly active and effective in stirring up trouble were the Hitlerites. To add to his difficulties Brüning had the proposed Austro-German customs union on his hands. In the preceding March Austria, bereft of any resources worth mentioning and surrounded by tariff walls on all sides, had made known her intention of forming a customs union with Germany. Had the plan been allowed to go through, Brüning might have survived, even in the face of the Great Depression; it was not yet too late to save the Republic and all that it stood for in the way of peace and reconciliation. Instead, the cry had immediately arisen from the Allies that the proposed customs union was the prelude to a political union. France exerted diplomatic and financial pressure, and on September 3, 1931, Austria and Germany announced that the plan had been dropped.

Brüning's submission furnished the Hitlerites with welcome ammunition. Throughout the following year (1932), by their clashes with the Communists, which not infrequently resulted in fatalities, they kept Germany in continual turmoil. In the spring Hindenburg's term as President ran out. Through a monster petition he was urged to use his powers under Article 48 to extend his presidency, but this he refused to do. In the March balloting Hindenburg received 18,650,730 votes, to 11,339,285 for Hitler, 4083,107 for Thalmann (Communist), 2,557,500 for Dusterberg (Nationalist), and 111,432 for Winter. Several curious features characterized this vote. In the first place, prior to announcing his candidacy (February 22) Hitler was an Austrian citizen. In the second place, Hindenburg was supported by the Center and the Social Democrats and opposed by the Nationalists—the exact reverse of the line-up when he was first elected. In the third place, the news of the Hindenburg vote was cheered in Paris! The April balloting resulted in the election of Hindenburg by 19,359,642 votes, to 13,417,460 for Hitler and 3,706,388 for Thalmann. Nevertheless, the Hitler vote was a final warning to the Allies—which they likewise chose to disregard.

On May 30 the ministry resigned. The immediate issue was Hindenburg's refusal to sanction the proposal put forward by Brüning to divide the great estates of East Prussia into small holdings (for once, it seemed that Hindenburg was allowing his personal feelings to dictate). More important was the refusal or failure of France, Great Britain, and the United States to solve the German budget dilemma by deciding what was to be done when the Hoover moratorium expired. Acting by virtue of his authority under Article 48, Hindenburg appointed Von Papen, an extreme Nationalist, Chancellor. July 8, too late to save the Brüning cabinet, the Allies put an end to reparation payments.

Late in the month new elections were held. The general trend was foreseen, but its magnitude was nothing short of astounding. The Hitlerites all but

doubled their vote and more than doubled their seats; in other words, the elections of July, 1932, created "by far the largest single party delegation—the National Socialists with 230 seats—which has sat in the Reichstag since its creation by Bismarck in 1867." The Communists and the Center gained slightly, and the Social Democrats and the Nationalists lost slightly. The half-dozen or more minority parties—including the *People's party* and the *Democrats*—were virtually wiped out. Their total votes fell to less than 2,000,000, their seats from 122 to 21!

Hitler, the once insignificant and ludicrous, was, for the moment at least, the outstanding figure in German politics. What were the sources of his surprising strength? It was inevitable, since the Nazis began as a party of protest, that Hitler should appeal particularly to the "declassed" middle class created by the Treaty of Versailles, the occupation of the Ruhr, the inflation of 1923, and the Great Depression: engineers, retired tradesmen, former army officers, teachers, clerks, civil-service employees, and the like (all those elements the French would call *petty bourgeoisie*). Once possessed of a modest competence, still clean, neatly dressed and sober, they were now "visibly down at the heel, spiritually crushed in the struggle with everyday life, distraught under a perpetual worry about the indispensable necessities of life." At the end of 1931, 50 per cent of the men among the white-collar workers were receiving less than \$60 a month; 50 per cent of the women, less than \$35. Other political parties had taken care of the industrial workers, the agricultural laborers, the business men, and the landowners. Small wonder these forgotten "middle" men and women turned to Hitler and his promises of a better day—a place in the sun. Unscrupulous, opportunistic, ready to appeal to the baser motives, he may have been; but when the standard of living of his audiences, far below prewar levels in 1929, had sunk to unprecedented depths, appeals such as these were bound to be effective. Hitler's *bête noire* was Marxian socialism and communism, and here too his middle-class audiences—though financially part of the proletariat—were with him. Why should they uphold a republic governed in the interests of a class-conscious proletariat? And because Marx was an internationalist Hitler and his followers were nationalists. At the same time they, like the Socialists, were against the plutocrats. Hence "National Socialism." Hitler also attacked the intellectuals, who because of their superior education constituted in a sense a state within a state.

That Hitler, with his oratorical ability and the radio to assist him, was able to "overpersuade" the "average man" was not perhaps so strange; but it was not the average man alone to whom he appealed. The farmer swelled the Nazi vote. Unemployed university graduates of recent years flocked to join his "shock troops." From 10 to 15 per cent of the German Fascists were recruited from the ranks of labor, lured by the slogan "Every available job belongs to a Nazi." Though the "socialization of industry" was another of his slogans, many capitalists—notably Hugenberg, the leader of the Nationalists, and Schacht, ablest of German financiers—were numbered among his supporters. Evidently they preferred Fascism to Communism—as did their colleagues in Italy. Moreover the Nazis specifically exempted "the real creators of our heavy industry, Krupps, etc." from their socialization programs; and they favored cutting in-

dustrial wages. Finally, Hitlerism appealed to many monarchists; Prince August William, fourth son of the Kaiser, declared Hitler to be "God's gift to Germany." What united *all* Hitlerites was the feeling of injured self-respect fostered by the discriminations and the position of inferiority thrust upon Germany since the war and brought home to the people through economic duress.

In November another election was held. This time, on the basis of a smaller aggregate vote, the Nazis dropped 35 seats. The Nationalists and the Communists gained somewhat; the Social Democrats and the Center dropped somewhat. Toward the end of January, 1933, when Hindenburg refused to agree that the Reichstag should be dissolved if it did not back the ministry, General von Schleicher, who had succeeded Von Papen, resigned. His place was taken by Hitler, with Hugenberg and Von Papen as members of the cabinet.

FASCISM IN THE SADDLE IN GERMANY

With Hitler in the saddle, another election was announced and the Nazis began an intensive campaign of intimidation. Early in March, for the third time in a little over six months, the German electorate was summoned to make known its wishes; 88 per cent responded, with the following results:

Party	Votes	Seats
National Socialists (Nazis)	17,265,000	288
Nationalists	3,115,000	52
Center (including Bavarian People's party)	5,496,000	91
Social Democrats	7,103,000	118
Communists	4,748,000	81
Miscellaneous	1,344,000	17

The Nazis alone therefore constituted 44 per cent of the Deputies elected and together with their Nationalist allies they had a clear majority of 52 per cent. Moreover, if they could unseat the Communists, as they threatened to do, they would have a majority of ten in their own right. Meanwhile they achieved a similar victory in Prussia and seized power in Hamburg, Bremen, Lübeck, and Hesse.

Immediately after the election Hindenburg took his first illegal step against the Weimar constitution by decreeing that "until the definitive regulation of the national colors, the black-white-red [the imperial colors] and the swastika flags are to be displayed together." On March 23, in a session held at Potsdam, the Reichstag voted Hitler dictatorial powers and adjourned *sine die*. "The prerogatives of the President remain untouched [Article 2]. . . . This law . . . shall remain in effect until April 1, 1937. It shall expire when the present government is replaced by another [Article 5]."

Hitler had for the moment become the leading figure on the world stage. What did his advent portend? Some notion could be gained from a survey of the events surrounding the election. After the Nazi campaign of intimidation began, the Reichstag building burned. Claiming that the fire was part of a Communist plot to terrorize the Fatherland, Hitler persuaded Hindenburg to sign a decree suspending what remained of the civil liberties guaranteed by

the constitution. Communist and Socialist papers were suppressed, German and foreign correspondents were gagged, and even the *Tageblatt* was forced to abdicate as an organ of news and opinion. Three hundred and fifty Communists, including Thälmann and other deputies, were incarcerated, Jews and other opponents of the Nazis were systematically manhandled and browbeaten in true Fascist style, and even foreigners were not safe from molestation. Thirty faculty members at the universities of Berlin and Bonn were dismissed. On June 22 the Social Democratic party, the largest group in opposition, was dissolved and deprived of its seats in the Reichstag and in the state diets. Less than a week later Hugenberg resigned from the cabinet and his Nationalist party "voluntarily" dissolved. On July 5 party life in Germany came to an end with the "voluntary" dissolution of the Center. On October 14 the local diets were dissolved and Germany became in effect a unitary state.

Further light on Hitler's intentions could be gained from a perusal of the Nazi platform, formulated in 1920 by an obscure engineer by the name of Feder:

I. We demand the union of all Germans [that is, Austrians] by the right of self-determination into one great Germany. II. We demand the equality of the German people with all other nations and the abrogation of the Treaties of Versailles and St.-Germain. III. We demand land and colonies for the feeding of our people and for settlement by our surplus population. IV. Only a member of our own people may be a citizen. . . . No Jew may be a member of our people. VI. . . . We fight against the corrupting parliamentary system of filling offices with people chosen only for their party without reference to their character and ability. VII. We demand that the State assume the burden of providing working and living possibilities for its citizens. If it is not possible to feed the entire population of the state, noncitizens must be expelled from the Reich. VIII. All further immigration of non-Germans is to be stopped. We demand that all non-Germans who have immigrated to Germany since August 2, 1914, be forced to leave the Reich. X. It must be the duty of every citizen to produce, either in physical or in intellectual fields. . . . XI. We demand the abolition of all income acquired without work. . . . XII. . . . We demand . . . complete confiscation of all war profits. XIII. We demand the nationalization of all trusts. XIV. We demand distribution of the profits of large industries. XV. We demand a great development of the system of caring for the aged. XVI. We demand the building up of a healthy middle class . . . immediate communalization of department stores. . . . XVII. We demand agrarian reform consistent with our national needs; the passing of a law to expropriate without compensation land which is to be used for common purposes; the abolition of interest in land and the abolition of all speculation in land values. XVIII. . . . Criminals, usurers, profiteers, and so forth must be punished with death. . . . XIX. We demand a German common law as a substitute for the Roman law which serves the materialistic world order. XX. To make it possible for every hard-working and capable German to have a higher education . . . the State has the responsibility of providing for a fundamental extension of our common educational system. XXII. We demand the abolition of the mercenary army and the formation of a people's army. XXIII. . . . Newspapers which work against the common good are to be prohibited. . . . XXIV. . . . The party as such represents the point of view of a positive Christianity. . . . XXV. . . . We demand the creation of a strong central authority . . .

the creation of class and occupational chambers to carry out the laws promulgated by the Reich in the different Federal States.

Still further light on Hitler's plans for the "Third Reich" could perhaps be gained from the dictates that, prior to the election, emanated from the "Brown House" in Munich—though a consistent program was not to be expected of this newest idealogue. According to these pronouncements the Government was to consist of experts, while the party contented itself with the rôle of guardian. On the question of foreign policy Hitler was particularly self-contradictory. At times he declared that Germany must ally herself with England and Italy and fight France and Russia; at others, that he regarded "a rapprochement between France and Germany as absolutely essential." In his speech of March 23 Hitler affirmed: •

The Government . . . in the mere view of existing conditions, regards the question of monarchic restoration as undiscussable at present. . . . We need contact with the outside world and [that is, for] our foreign markets furnish a livelihood for millions of our fellow citizens. But . . . for years Germany has been forced to give value without receiving countervalue. . . . It is hoped, however, that . . . the outside world will not deny us that measure of understanding that will eventually make it possible for Germany to reënter the peaceful competition of the nations. . . . Germany has now been waiting for years for the fulfillment of the promise that the rest of the world was to follow us in disarming. It is the sincere desire of the National Government to be able to refrain from increasing the German army. . . . Germany wants nothing but equal liberty. . . . The German people . . . want to live in peace with the world. That is why the Government stands by all means for the definite abolition of the division of the nations into two categories. The National Government is willing to hold out its hand for honest reconciliation to every nation that is willing to draw the line under the sad past. . . . An adjustment in our relations with France will be possible if both Governments tackle the problems in a far-seeing manner.

Would Hitlerism prove a gas tank filled with power under control or one filled with incendiary explosives? With considerable apprehension the chancelleries and peoples of the world awaited the answer.

CHAPTER XIX

FASCIST ITALY AND THE MIDDLE-SIZED POWERS

POSTWAR ITALY AND THE EARLY LIFE OF MUSSOLINI

The triumph of democratic theory—whether or not of democratic practice—in the period immediately preceding the World War was sufficiently pronounced and sweeping, even though somewhat grudgingly conceded in Central and Eastern Europe, to indicate an almost universal and irresistible drift in the direction of parliamentary government. Yet even in the West criticism of democracy persisted among the extremists of the Right and of the Left. This opposition was based on two major contentions: the extreme Left criticized modern democracy as not being sufficiently democratic and urged the addition or substitution of professional representation (for example, the Sorelian Syndicalists), while the extreme Right taxed it with being inefficient. At times, no doubt, democracy laid itself open to this last charge. The war, fought in order “to make the world safe for democracy,” seemed both to confirm and to refute this contention. The Allies were singularly inefficient in their conduct of operations; yet after all, it was they who triumphed over the semiautocratic Central Powers, and the net result was the overthrow of the three great conservative dynasties of Europe: the Romanovs, the Austrian Hapsburgs, and the Hohenzollerns.

Owing to the unsettled conditions subsequently prevailing and to the need for strong governments to cope with these conditions, the issue remained open; indeed, criticism of democracy increased rather than abated. Moreover, even stanch democrats are today more realistic than of old. They no longer regard democracy as that royal road to an earthly paradise their predecessors of a generation or two ago conceived it to be; they recognize that (up to the present at least) it has in application been attended by many defects and ills. For the evils of democracy there are two remedies. One is more democracy, and this is the way that has been chosen by Western, Northwestern and Southwestern Europe, by the British Dominions, and by the Western Hemisphere. The other is the dictatorship of an individual, a group, or a class. Foremost among those states which have chosen this antidemocratic way are Russia and Italy—Russia in the interests of democracy itself, Italy in the interests of the “State.”

The development in Italy is known as Fascism, and the story of Fascism is the story of Benito Mussolini. His immediate family, according to his own testimony, belonged to the upper level of the lower class. They were “honest

people. They tilled the soil, and because of its fertility they earned the right to their share of comfort and ease." His father was by vocation a blacksmith; by avocation an internationalistic socialist, anticlerical, with some reputation as a man of ideas, who had "done time" for his beliefs. His mother, who had been a teacher, was a woman of deeply religious nature. "I was not a good boy, nor did I stir the family pride. . . . I cannot see my early childhood either as being praiseworthy or as being more than normal in every direction." In short, he was average—but "restless."

Mussolini managed to obtain an education and became a teacher. Subsequently he went to Switzerland for further study, but in the course of time was ejected for his socialistic activities. In 1908, on similar grounds, he was imprisoned by the Italian Government. His next adventure was as a journalist in the Tyrol; this time he was expelled by the Austrian Government. In 1910, when an anarchist bombed the Colón Theater in Buenos Aires, Mussolini wrote: "When a government—be it Republican, Imperial, or Bourbon—gags you and puts you beyond the pale . . . one cannot condemn violence in reply to violence, even if it makes some innocent victims." Following the assassination of Stolypin, he wrote: "Russia of the proletarians is now exultant, and waits for dynamite to shatter the bones of the Little Father, of the blood-stained hands. The tragic end of the minister of Nicholas II is perhaps the beginning of a new period of revolutionary action. We hope so." He was again imprisoned, for his opposition to the imperialistic war in Tripoli; and in 1912 he became editor of the *Avanti*, the official organ of the radical Socialists. When a group of Socialist deputies went to congratulate the King on his escape from an anarchist, Mussolini had them expelled from the party, and he was prominent in the Communistic disturbances of June, 1914. In general, he was gravitating from simon-pure, Marxian socialism toward the syndicalism of Sorel, an influence that was to show powerfully at a later date.

Mussolini came out against the Triple Alliance at the beginning of the World War, and in favor of "absolute neutrality" in this "bourgeois" conflict. Soon, however, he was advocating that Italy should enter the war on the side of the Allies; for this reason he was formally expelled from the Socialist party on November 25, 1914. (Indirectly, therefore, the war proved the turning-point in his career, as in the career of many another.) "Do not imagine," he nevertheless declared, "that by tearing up my membership card in the Socialist party you can forbid my socialist faith or prevent me from continuing to work for the cause of socialism and of the revolution." Next he founded the *Popolo d'Italia*, which he used to conduct a campaign in behalf of intervention—in behalf of a war that "must necessarily create an atmosphere more propitious to the realization of the demands of the working class." Imperialism and even irredentism he condemned; for the non-Italian population of Trieste, if annexed, he pleaded the widest liberty. His enemies charged that he had sold out to the bourgeoisie, since he was penniless when he left the *Avanti*, and there is considerable evidence that he was subsidized by the French. After Italy entered the war he was drafted for the army, served without distinction as a corporal and, wounded by the explosion of a trench mortar, was returned to civil life on the plea that his services as an editor were needed. Such was the war and prewar career

of Il Duce ("The Leader," *cf.* the Latin *duco*), who is credited by the Fascists with having accomplished the regeneration of Italy almost single-handed.

Prewar Italy—with five times the population of New England in about twice the area, lacking coal, iron, and petroleum, without sufficient forests, with as much land reclaimed as possible, obliged to import a third of her grain and most of her raw materials—had the greatest difficulty in making both ends meet, even though hundreds of thousands emigrated annually. Had it not been for "invisible imports"—funds sent by emigrants to relatives at home, tourist expenditures, and so forth—it is hard to see how she could have got along. As it was, the scale of living was deplorably low; unable to afford meat, the laborers lived on rice and greens and (when they could get it) macaroni. In short, the Italian nation, in proportion to its resources, was among the poorest in Europe.

After the war, although hydroelectric power was developed on a large scale, economic distress increased; and distress, the war debts, and certain psychological factors profoundly affected finances, the morale of the people, and the position of the Government. The rolling stock of the railroads had deteriorated. Deficits in the budget accumulated, despite financial reforms, at a rate that could only lead to bankruptcy. The value of the lira decreased 50 per cent in a year and a half; the cost of living rose proportionally. Great numbers of men drifting back from the armies rendered the position of the unionized laborers highly precarious, and the workers, in consequence, turned more strongly than ever to socialism. Almost doubling their vote in the elections of November, 1919, the Socialists, some of whom were really Communists, became the largest party in the Chamber. Another group that figured heavily in the situation was the 160,000 discharged officers. A considerable number had risen from the ranks, had grown accustomed to command, and when it came to going back to a subordinate desk job or when they found themselves without work, were ready for any sort of adventure. Not a few of them hated the workers who had remained in the munition factories while the war was being fought. Though when unemployed they were violent radicals, many of them as soon as they had obtained satisfactory employment turned into equally violent conservatives.

Topping all this and most important of all was the matter of war and post-war psychology. Italy as a nation had not entered the war in a burst of enthusiasm, but through the machinations of her politicians and against the will of the working classes. During the last year of hostilities the politicians had stimulated the masses by extravagant promises of reform; after the conflict was over they were unable or unwilling to fulfill these promises. Moreover, in order to bring pressure on the other powers at the Peace Conference, the authorities propagated the notion that Italy, who had "won the war," was being robbed of the fruits of her victory. Mussolini at first maintained that Italy *had* obtained her objectives but when he saw how public opinion was developing, he changed his tune. As a result of all this the masses, already class-conscious, came to believe that their sacrifices had been in vain; consequently they grew even more indignant at those in any way responsible for getting them into the war. Here were all the elements for a first-class social war.

THE RISE OF FASCISM IN ITALY

The term *fascio* as applied to semipolitical groupings in Italy was nothing new and was not confined to antisocialists. It is derived from the Latin *fasces*, the bundle of rods bound about the Roman lictor's ax; hence, indirectly, the *fasces* symbolized the authority of the Roman State and its power over life and limb. By derivation *fascio* means "bundle," "combination," "union," "group," "band," or "squad." In the '90's there had been revolutionary *fasci* among the Socialists of Sicily; and before Italy entered the war *fasci* of interventionists, more or less independent, had formed all over the country. Mussolini had been the leader of the group at Milan.

Fascism proper, as known today, is a postwar phenomenon that developed in spite of, rather than because of, Mussolini; even its more obvious symbols were originated by others. "There were many fascisms, each springing spontaneously from local causes and each local situation having its own peculiarities. The earliest symptoms of the movement were agrarian and arose out of the unique economic and political situation of the lower valley of the Po. . . . Great financial interests control vast areas and these are worked to a large extent by day laborers (*braccianti*) whose lot is little different from that of industrial workers." The unionized laborers would fall on the nonunionized and wipe them out. The region was a hotbed of socialism, where during wartime the Socialists controlled most of the municipal administrations. Soon after the war Northern and Central Italy beheld the rise of *fasci* of every sort and description: *arditi* (young former service men who had organized before the end of hostilities) in black shirts, blue-shirted Nationalists, gray-shirted Liberals, Red Guards, Whites (Catholics), and more. Engaging in a general free-for-all, these various groups changed sides so often that it is hopeless to try to disentangle the alignments.

The only undercurrent at all recognizable was the opposition of the laboring classes, industrial and agricultural, to the conservatives and reactionaries of the upper and middle classes. Economically oppressed and possessed of the ideas and the class interests previously outlined, the workers staged strike after strike for higher wages and turned on those responsible for Italy's part in the war or for their economic misfortunes. Ex-service men who approved of the war, as well as soldiers ("assassins of the bourgeoisie" according to the laborers), were insulted and beaten; industrialists, when they refused to raise wages and instituted lockouts, found their factories seized by the workers; landowners were deprived of their land; and nonunion laborers were killed. The situation was serious, but many of the accusations hurled against the workers were absolutely false.¹ When the Government proved unable or unwilling to cope with the situation, *fasci* of ex-service men and bourgeoisie took the matter in hand, after the manner of the old vigilance committees of the American West. Their methods, known as squadism, were anything but gentle. Castor oil, administered to their victims in huge doses, was a favorite weapon; a second, beating with a large club; a third, pulling teeth.

¹ Cf. Salvemini, *Fascist Dictatorship*, Vol. I, p. 31, n. 3.

Among the many groupings referred to there was the Milan *fascio*, organized by Mussolini on March 23, 1919. According to Mussolini it had an original membership of only fifty-four. Those participating were for the most part "white-collar" radicals—outcasts from the regular parties ranging from Left-wing Nationalists to Anarchists. Having proclaimed himself in favor of "political democracy and economic democracy" and having declared, "We have no formal principles" ("We have neither republican nor monarchist principles, neither Catholic nor anti-Catholic, socialist nor antisocialist"), Mussolini propounded a program of immediate aims: the annexation of Fiume and Dalmatia; universal suffrage; proportional representation; a national assembly for the purpose of determining a new form of government; abolition of the Senate; economic councils with legislative powers; management of industries by workers' councils; a capital levy; confiscation of Church property; a heavy inheritance tax; and the seizure of 85 per cent of all war profits. This program the Milanese Fascists approved, together with a demand for the acceptance of the League of Nations and for opposition to imperialism! Their general aim seems to have been a workers' republic; in one of his speeches Mussolini declared, "We, who have always had republican leanings, will . . . come forward and say: Republic." The blame for the "humiliation of Versailles" was placed on the old-line politicians. The Mussolini Fascists, as can be seen, were originally much nearer the Left than the Right; but Mussolini also called for opposition to the Socialists, whom he now hated with an undying hatred, and in mid-April the *Avanti* offices were wrecked. He received so little support, even among the Fascists, in the elections of the following November that he polled only 4,000 votes.

In May of the same year the metal-workers near Bergamo, in order to obtain an increase in wages and prevent a lockout, had conceived the bright idea of remaining in the factories night and day, instead of striking; Mussolini had applauded this "productive strike." By September of 1920 the laborers had seized practically all the metal works around Turin and Milan and hundreds of other plants throughout Italy; Mussolini persisted that this was not Bolshevism. When the workers had exhausted the raw materials on hand, the movement died a natural death; and not long after, the Fiat Company was able to force its employees to sign a statement affirming that they did not belong to a union. The chief result was that the employers were frightened and it consequently became easy for the conservative *fasci* to obtain funds.

This was not the only time Mussolini openly upheld the proletariat. At Ferrara, where the *fasci* were carrying out an agrarian revolution, he declared, "I am glad to applaud heartily the Fascists of Ferrara who . . . have begun that agrarian revolution which . . . ought to give the peasants the definite possession of the soil." Of the food riots in the Romagna he wrote: "The people have revolted vigorously against the greed of the speculators. . . . It is not the Socialist party which has provoked and directed these demonstrations. . . . For our part we explicitly affirm the fundamental justice of the popular protest." And again: "I hope that the masses in the exercise of their sacred right will strike at the criminals, not only in their goods, but in their persons. A few food-hogs hanging from the lamp posts would be a good example. The Fascist

Central Committee proclaims its absolute solidarity with the masses." In the *Popolo d'Italia* he urged the masses to overthrow the Government, help the proletarian nations (Russia, Germany) and make war on the capitalistic nations (France, Great Britain, and the United States). The authorities distributed copies of the paper to the soldiers; then, when the soldiers absorbed the revolutionary ideas but rejected the nationalistic, they blamed the Bolsheviks. So much for the Fascist myth that Mussolini saved Italy from Bolshevism. As for the majority of the Socialists and their leaders—Turati, and the others—they realized as well as Lenin the impossibility of a Communist revolution and did their best to restrain their followers. To a Russian, enthusiastic over the prospects of a revolution in Italy, Lenin remarked, "Comrade, has it ever struck you that Italy has no coal?"

"Rasism" evolved at Cremona under Farinacci, a Socialist who later became national secretary of the Fascist party and who enjoyed a prestige second only to that of Mussolini. The Farinacci Fascists destroyed the power of the Whites, who had dominated the valley, and Farinacci, in alliance with the Masons and the Socialists, set himself up as boss, or *ras* (Ethiopian for "chief").

Observation of children reveals that they are far more vigorous in attack than in defense. This trait, common to adults as well, is the key to the second period of postwar Italian history. When the workers realized the failure of their efforts and became discouraged, the bourgeoisie began a counter-revolution with the purpose of converting the Socialist defeat into a rout, recapturing the municipal offices, and clinching their economic supremacy. The event that transformed the Fascist escapades into a national crusade of this character was the Bologna Incident. On November 21, 1920, the Bologna Fascists posted threatening notices, and the next day both Fascists and Socialists appeared armed in the piazza (square). When shots were exchanged and grenades thrown, the Socialist Councilmen in the Town Hall inferred that an attack had begun; four or five of them began firing on the non-Socialist members, one of whom was killed. The Fascists thereupon began reprisals and ousted the Socialists from office. Florence was another important center of this sort of Fascist activity; from there, as a base of operations, Dumini, the most notorious of the squadrist leaders, kept the whole of Tuscany in a continual uproar. This street war raged unabated throughout Northern and Central Italy until midsummer of 1921, and it did not fully subside for another year.

The whole affair was reminiscent of the street brawls of the Renaissance; compared with the amount of excitement raised the casualties were light. The number of fatalities for the period of the "Bolshevik Revolution" (up to September, 1920) was 35 police and 30 others killed by the "Bolsheviks," 109 "Bolsheviks" killed by the police and 22 by other parties. For the period of the counter-revolution pro-Fascists who are indiscriminating tend to place the number of "Fascist martyrs" at from 1,000 to 4,000, though some go as high as 50,000. In reality the figures were apparently about 300 for the Fascists and double that number for their victims. The Milanese Fascists alone finished off twenty-one of their opponents in a single day (December 18, 1922). If the workers began the trouble, they suffered more heavily in both periods.

Mussolini was meanwhile seeking to formulate an acceptable program and,

unable to find one, fell back on the two principles, flexibility and national revival (the resurrection of the glories of ancient Rome). He and his chief henchmen, Rossi and Bianchi, were at the same time working to capture strategic points and to organize centers, so that Fascism became a veritable *imperium in imperio*. In the spring of 1921 the Fascists, in alliance with the Nationalists, captured 35 seats in Parliament. August 3 Mussolini signed a Pact of Pacification with the Socialists; but his followers continued the fight, and Farinacci officially repudiated the agreement. Consequently Mussolini and Rossi resigned! Their resignations were refused, and a few months later the Fascists declared the pact null and void.

The Congress of Rome in 1921 (November) marked the formation of the National Fascist party. The black-shirt uniform, the songs, the organization, and the symbols—including the Roman salute, the lictors' rods and *fascies*, and the military formations so attractive to the young—were taken over bodily from the D'Annunzian *arditi*. The platform adopted was intangible, and with few resistant Socialists left to keep them busy the Fascist cohorts were beginning to lack objects on which to vent their brutality.

During the fall of 1922, owing to the unwillingness of the parties in the Chamber to cooperate, the parliament was deadlocked. By September 20 Mussolini was talking of a Fascist Revolution. He now declared the only trouble with the King was that he was not sufficiently monarchical. Shortly afterwards, he demanded under threat of force that the Fascists be given "five portfolios [in the ministry] beside the Commissioner of Aviation"; he specified that he would not himself participate in the Government. No one in the parliament or in the Government took the matter seriously.

During October the Fascists began to spread their control for the first time to the cities of the South, and on the twenty-fourth they held a congress in Naples. Mussolini declared that if the Government did not capitulate he would seize the power. From Naples the Fascists migrated to Civitavecchia, less than fifty miles northwest of Rome. The ministry, informed that the army would stand aside, resigned; and on the twenty-eighth the Fascists invaded the capital. No opposition was encountered. On the twenty-ninth the King called on Mussolini to form a new ministry.

Just what lay back of the so-called Fascist Revolution is a problem that has not been solved and perhaps never will be. That it was not fear of Bolshevism is clear from a statement made by Mussolini on July 2, 1921: "To affirm that there still exists a Bolshevik peril in Italy is . . . to substitute fears for reality." It has been said that the King was opposed to the March on Rome, and that even Mussolini was unenthusiastic—that he was merely a tool in the hands of the military clique. However that may be, it seems evident that the maneuver was essentially a bid by the conservatives for power. The metaphysical problem of whether the Fascist *coup d'état* was achieved by force may be left for the student of human institutions to solve; on the *morning* of the twenty-eighth there were only some 8,000 Fascists in Rome, and it has been questioned whether they had more than that number of organized men in all at their disposal.

THE BEGINNINGS OF THE FASCIST RÉGIME IN ITALY

The Fascist ranks, when the March on Rome took place, included a more miscellaneous collection than ever before; and immediately afterwards there was a general rush for the bandwagon. Some of those joining—convinced Fascists or non-Fascists who were willing to cooperate—acted from patriotic motives. Many joined for what they hoped to get out of it; many more because they feared to remain aloof. The first Fascist ministry was therefore a great disappointment to the rank and file, for it contained only three straight Fascists (Mussolini held two portfolios), while the remainder was made up from other parties. The Socialists were the only large group excluded.

For some time, Mussolini had been dilating on the evils of democracy. The Chamber, informed that it had the alternative of granting the Government dictatorial powers or being dissolved, chose what seemed the lesser evil. (The Socialists, led by Turati, were the only party that ventured to dissent.) Even so Mussolini at first made a pretense of preserving constitutional forms and of governing in collaboration with the non-Fascists—so long as collaboration meant that the non-Fascists did exactly as the Fascists dictated.

The true nature of Fascist rule in the country at large was made clear by the following letter (written by Balbo in 1923) to the Fascist leaders in Bologna: "As for these Communists, you had better explain to them that a change of air would do their health good. . . . If they insist on remaining, you had better beat them up—without exaggeration, but systematically. . . . We do not want any lawsuits as a result of our beatings-up—which must be performed in regular style."

As time passed the pretense at collaboration in the parliament, even, became less and less satisfactory and successful. The Nationalists fused with the Fascists in February, ten Popularists (Catholics) withdrew into the opposition in April, and on July 21, 1923, the Government got through a new electoral law: The party obtaining the most votes in an election, provided its vote was 25 per cent of the total, was to receive two-thirds of the seats in the Chamber. In the faint hope that they might be the fortunate party, the Popularists had refrained from opposing the measure. In the elections of April, 1924, the government candidates received 4,800,000 votes to 1,000,000 for the Socialists, 650,000 for the Popularists, and 600,000 for the remaining parties. A million ballots were declared invalid, and a liberal amount of squadristism was another feature. Mussolini evidently believed that his troubles were over; but the minority, led by Matteotti (Socialist), refused to submit. When Matteotti threatened to expose some of the less creditable practices of the Fascists, he was murdered (June, 1924).

A wave of indignation swept the country and almost swept the Fascists from power. Mussolini threw his best friends temporarily overboard and reconstituted his ministry; the Opposition continued to clamor for him to resign and when he refused to comply, withdrew from the Chamber to the Aventine Hill. Putting on a bold front, Mussolini governed through his rump parliament, which still contained about a hundred non-Fascists; but he endeavored to placate the Aventine Opposition by preserving legal forms and by attempting to stop

squadristism. The secessionists remained adamant, the more so because Rossi published a *memorial* charging Mussolini with being responsible for the continued violence. That Il Duce had gone out of his way to declare that "in internal affairs whatever happens, happens through my precise and direct volition and on my express order, for which I naturally assume full and personal responsibility" gave color to the charge. The absurdly light sentences imposed on those directly implicated in the Matteotti murder and the subsequent return to the Fascist ranks of those indirectly implicated were further evidence in the same direction. How the country at large reacted may be gauged from the circulation of the *Corriere della Sera* (independent), of which 80,000 copies a day were sold in Milan and which was read by hundreds of thousands elsewhere, while the *Popolo d'Italia* had a sale of only 4,000 in Milan and practically none elsewhere. More disturbing than the attitude of the general public and that of the Aventine Opposition was that of the parliamentary minority. As the months passed, leader after leader and group after group became increasingly critical—former Premiers such as Salandra, Orlando, and Giolitti, former service men, and even a number of Fascists.

Mussolini finally gave up all pretense at coöperation and conciliation; January 3, 1925, admitting by implication that he was a despot rather than a dictator, he openly declared war on all non-Fascists. Farinacci, who was a notorious fire-eater, was appointed secretary-general of the party. The opposition press, already muzzled, was obliterated or reduced to complete subjection; even the *Corriere della Sera*, the New York *Times* of Italy, was compelled to abandon its rôle as an organ of news and opinion. The Masonic orders were suppressed. Hundreds of non-Fascist leaders were exiled to the Lipari Islands, a private Devil's Island conducted by the Fascists. Opponents of the Government who escaped this unhappy fate were little, if any, better off; subjected to the usual systematic beating, they were even forbidden to leave the country, and if they succeeded in doing so their property was confiscated and their families were persecuted. Attacks on the policies of the Prime Minister were made a crime, attacks on his person a capital offense. While the Aventine secessionists were formally deprived of their seats in the Chamber, the Senate was flattered and praised for its subservience.

The treatment accorded the university faculties was illuminating. Every professor or lecturer who wished to retain his position was obliged to subscribe to the following oath: "I promise loyally . . . to teach and to fulfill all other academic duties with the purpose of educating honest citizens, faithful to the country and to the Fascist régime."

The enforcement of these measures was effected by a liberal use of squadristism. Florence was particularly favored, and in Pisa there was such a vigorous "house-cleaning" that the Bishop was moved to exclaim, "So last night Pisa was normalized! As a bishop I wept; as an Italian I blushed." Even foreigners were not safe, but were on occasion incarcerated or roughly handled for daring to comment adversely on the Fascist régime. Employees on the international sleeping-cars were ordered to give the Fascist salute!

A general reconstruction of the state, from top to bottom, followed. The supreme court (Fourth Session of the Council of State) was suppressed, the

law codes were revised, and the Head of the Government (that is, Mussolini) was made responsible solely to the King, given control of the armed forces, and empowered to issue decrees having the force of law. In emergencies he could even make laws. Eventually Mussolini held eight portfolios in the ministry. Local administration was brought under the direct and complete control of the central Government by substituting *podestà* (January and September 3, 1926) and appointive councils in place of elective mayors and councils.

Before the Fascists attained power in October of 1922, a number of reforms had been effected—which of course required time to make themselves felt. The railroads transported the same amount of freight in 1919 as in 1918. The number of passengers rose from 65,000,000 in 1918 to 102,000,000 in 1919 and 110,000,000 in 1920. The tonnage handled by Genoa (the chief port in the kingdom) was as great in 1919 as in 1918. The index of motor-car exports rose from 100 in 1913 to 105 in 1919 and to 794 in 1920. The capital of industrial concerns and the deposits in banks rose, and in 1920 an 18,000,000,000 loan was floated—a sum far in excess of any war loan.

Under the Fascists—thanks to an indirect subsidy from the United States, which granted Italy most-favored-nation treatment in its debt settlement, and to the benevolent intervention of Mellon, Morgan, and other international financiers—finances improved and the lira was stabilized; but since the official figures were juggled, it was impossible to determine whether or not the budget had been balanced. Increased production in agriculture, featured as “the battle of the wheat,” was heavily stressed; if Italy could achieve independence in respect to foodstuffs, she would save half her unfavorable trade balance. In order to increase the efficiency of the railroads Fascists were stationed on the trains. The merchant marine, 1,430,000 tons in 1914, was by 1926 expanded to a tonnage of 3,650,000. One of the greatest achievements of the new régime was the suppression of the Mafia and the Camorra, notorious gangs that for a century had terrorized Southern Italy and Sicily, defying every effort of the Government to stamp them out.

The most dubious policy adopted by Mussolini was his encouragement of an unrestrained and indiscriminate increase in population by taxing bachelors and rewarding fathers of large families. His motive was clear—to increase Italy's man power—but at the same time he aggravated the most serious difficulty to which he fell heir. Sooner or later, unless solved by war at the expense of other countries, the problem of overpopulation was almost certain to cause him or his successors trouble.

THE ITALIAN CORPORATE STATE

The Fascist reorganization of Italy was completed by the creation of the so-called Corporate State, based on the following central idea: state supervision and planned control of every form of activity—something like the Bolshevik system—was to supersede both laissez-faire individualism and the class struggle of the Socialists. The creation of the Corporate State was a gradual affair. In the beginning, the Fascist Government was decidedly capitalistic in tinge. Later, Mussolini concluded that if he were to secure the favor of the masses, he must

do something to merit it; and he found an instrument ready at hand in Rossoni's Federal Italian Union of Corporations

Rossoni was a labor leader who during the war had returned in disgust from the United States after an attempt to organize the I.W.W.; already a syndicalist, his experiences abroad plus the effects of the war made him a nationalist. His early efforts at organizing Italian labor affected only a few of the small farmers of Central Italy, but after the failure of the so-called Bolshevik Revolution of 1920, when various "national" syndicates (unions) sprang up, Rossoni succeeded in getting them together and in forming the Federal Italian Union of Corporations (1921). After the March on Rome Rossoni and his followers went over to the Fascists; it was a marriage of convenience, but had far-reaching consequences and eventually led to what the Fascists and the Syndicalists both disliked—state socialism.

By a law of April 3, 1926, Rossoni's syndicates were accorded legal recognition, strikes and lockouts were prohibited, labor tribunals for the settlement of industrial disputes were established, and provision was made for establishing "central coordinating bodies." A decree of July 1, containing one hundred and eight articles, christened these coordinating bodies "corporations" and defined their organization and prerogatives. Superimposed on the local and regional syndicates there were to be thirteen national federations: six for employers in industry, agriculture, commerce, maritime and aerial transportation, land transportation and inland navigation, and banking respectively; six for the employees in these same fields of activity; the thirteenth for "independent artists, artisans, and professional men." In each category of production (for example, industry or agriculture) the related federations of syndicates were to be combined into the aforesaid corporations. Finally, the decree provided that two "general confederations, one for employers and another for employees and the workers in independent occupations, may also be recognized." As a matter of fact, neither the corporations nor the general confederations were organized. Another decree (July 2) created a Ministry of Corporations (trade unions) which was given general oversight over the syndicates, was empowered to annul any of their decisions the Government considered undesirable, and in the absence of the corporations was to act as a coordinating body. Only approved laborers were permitted to belong to the syndicates, but all were obliged to contribute funds and were protected and bound by whatever agreements the syndicates made. A law of March 20, 1930, provided for the organization of a National Council of Corporations—similar to the National Economic Council in Germany—which comprised the presidents of the national employer and employee federations and was presided over by the secretary-general of the Fascist party.

April 21, 1927, the Fascist Labor Charter was published. Widely heralded in Fascist quarters as a substitute for the "outworn" Declaration of the Rights of Man, the Labor Charter proved a conservative, if not reactionary, statement of the rights of Labor:

Article 1. The Italian nation is an organism whose aim, whose life, and whose means of action are superior to those of the single individuals occupying and forming it. It is a moral, political, and economic unity, which finds its complete expres-

sion in the Fascist State. Article 2. Labor in all its forms . . . is a social duty. In this sense, and only in this sense, is it under the guardianship of the State. . . . Article 7. The Corporate State considers private initiative . . . the most efficacious and most useful instrument in the interests of the nation. . . . Article 13. The consequences of crises in production and monetary crises should be equally divided among all the factors of production. [This is the sole respect in which the Fascists may claim a substantial advance over ordinary labor legislation theory.] . . . Article 14. . . . When labor is paid on a piecework basis, the rates must be so determined that the industrious worker . . . will be able to earn a minimum above his basic pay. Article 15. Employees have the right to a weekly rest on Sunday. Article 16. After a year of uninterrupted service in an undertaking requiring continuous labor, an employee has the right to an annual paid holiday. Article 17. In undertakings requiring continuous work a laborer has the right . . . in case his discharge is not due to his own fault, to an indemnity. . . . Article 18. . . . The illness of a worker not exceeding a determined length does not terminate a labor contract. . . . Article 19. Infractions of discipline and acts which disturb the normal functioning of a company . . . are punishable . . . by a fine, suspension of work, or immediate discharge without indemnity. . . . Article 21. The collective labor contract extends its benefices and its discipline to home workers. . . . Article 22. Only the State can investigate and control . . . unemployment. . . . Article 23. . . . Employers must look for laborers among the workers registered in those [employment] offices [controlled by the corporative organs] and they have the option of choosing workers who are members of the party or of the Fascist Syndicates, depending on the length of time they have been registered. Article 24. Professional associations of workers are obliged to carry out selective action among the workers, intended constantly to increase their technical capacity and moral value. [An interesting and *significant* provision.] Article 26. Prevention of accidents is another . . . principle . . . toward which employer and employee must proportionally contribute. . . . Article 27. The Fascist State proposes to accomplish . . . the improvement of accident insurance [etc.]. Article 30. Education and instruction, especially professional instruction of . . . members and nonmembers, is one of the principal duties of the professional associations. . . .

The most novel and interesting of the reforms instituted by the Fascists was that effected by the electoral law of May, 1928, prescribing the method of choosing future parliaments. The thirteen federations were to pick 800 nominees, and 200 more were to be chosen by a number of "moral bodies" (state employees, including teachers, war veterans' associations, the Academies, and so on). The thousand names were to be submitted to the Grand Council² of the Fascist party, which was to select 400, with the proviso that it could add names not on the list. The 400 candidates so assembled were then to be presented to the electorate *as a single ticket*, the electors to vote yes or no on the question: "Do you favor the list of Deputies nominated by the Grand Council of Fascism?" Incidentally, the ballots were so marked and folded that it was possible for the officials to tell at a glance how the elector had voted. The franchise was enjoyed by those males over twenty-one belonging to certain categories: (1) approximately 7,000,000 who were liable for payment of dues to a syndicate; (2) 1,650,000 who paid 100 lire in direct taxes or were in receipt of an income of 500 lire

² A body unknown to law at the time of the enactment.

from government bonds; (3) 830,000 who were drawing government pay; and (4) 55,000 clergy of admitted religions. The similarity of this scheme to Sorel's "industrial democracy" is evident.³ The Electoral Law of 1928 may be taken to mark the end of the 1848 constitution.

During the first elections under the new plan the Grand Council selected from the thousand candidates presented: 104 of those nominated by the "moral bodies," 82 of those nominated by the "independent artists, artisans, and professional men," 125 of those nominated by employers, and 89 of those nominated by the employees. In the parliament of the Corporate State, therefore, labor in the technical sense obtained only 22.25 per cent of the representatives—not that this mattered particularly, since the parliament was merely a rubber stamp.

September 20, 1928, the Grand Council of the Fascist party—which first appeared as such on January 13, 1923, but which prior to 1928 was unknown to law—approved a bill "legalizing" its own existence and defining its constitutional position. The bill provided that the Council was to be under the sole control of the Head of the Government. In addition to determining the candidates for the Chamber, it was to pass on all "constitutional" laws. But by far the most important of its prerogatives was that of preparing a list of candidates for the premiership, "on the proposal of the Head of the Government," to be presented in case of vacancy. The membership of the Council was established at fifty-two, and members were to enjoy parliamentary immunity. Not long after, in order to make the Council more "manageable," Mussolini reduced the membership.

The question of Church and State rose to plague Mussolini, as it had his democratic predecessors; in March of 1927 the Pope condemned the Fascist conception of the State. Mussolini was too clever a tactician not to realize that the Church was a force worth having on his side, and in 1929 he made his peace with the Pope. By the Lateran Accord of February 11 the Vatican gained more, outwardly at least, than did the Fascists. The temporal sovereignty of the Pope was restored, by the recognition of Vatican City as an independent state, and the Pope was accorded the same legal protection as the King. As indemnity for the events of 1870 the Italian Government paid the Papacy 750,000,000 lire outright and 1,000,000,000 lire in 5 per cent government bonds. Catholicism was recognized as the state religion, the State bound itself to enforce canon (Church) law throughout Italian territory, and religious instruction was made compulsory in the schools. Furthermore, it was to be taught by instructors selected by the Church and paid by the State. Italian bishops and archbishops were to be appointed by the Vatican, after consultation with the Italian Government. In return the Church promised that they should take an oath of loyalty to the State, and the "Holy See . . . recognizes the Kingdom of Italy under the Dynasty of the House of Savoy, with Rome as the capital of the Italian State." How the Fascist State—nationalistic and in the main anticlerical—and the Catholic (Universal) Church, each claiming the intellectual obedience of its followers, will in the ultimate issue get along together remains to be seen.

³ See p. 345.

THE THEORY OF FASCISM IN ITALY AND ELSEWHERE

Until the March on Rome, and even later, it was evident that Fascism was riding a runaway horse. When the Fascists had finally recovered their breath, they set about explaining how they had reached the point where they found themselves. The elaborate political theory that resulted was in large part pure rationalizing. As for Mussolini Fascism, pure and simple, it was obviously an agglomeration of doctrines borrowed from diverse sources or resulting from Il Duce's personal experiences and chosen with a view to wide appeal. Three main elements may be distinguished: hatred of the Socialists (but not of socialism), who had repudiated his leadership, antidemocracy as developed by Syndicalists of the type of Sorel and from a different angle by the Nationalists, and imperialism as developed by the Nationalists.

The Fascists found a ready-made theory in the doctrines of the Nationalists. Prior to the war the Nationalists denounced democracy as a French importation. Public opinion in a democratic community, they claimed, is merely an aggregation of party interests, and representative government is merely party government. For this pseudo-government they proposed to substitute an organic society, in which minorities and individuals, instead of being given more liberty and protection against the majority and the omnipotent State, should be completely subordinated to the State. The Nationalists grew even more vociferous as a result of the war and began to picture Italy's participation and her subsequent expansion as the essence of idealism, rather than "sacred egoism"—a demonstration that God, immanent in the creative processes of history, was manifesting Himself in Italy. It was the Nationalists who first gave imperialism a fresh impetus, denounced the democracy and internationalism of Versailles, and pronounced the war a struggle for empire. They accordingly maintained that class struggles in Italy should be eliminated in the interests of the national struggle with other countries which should enable Italy to recapture the political primacy once held by Imperial Rome.

The Fascists find, or claim to find, the *raison d'être* for their actions in the writings of the following theorists—to whom reference is made in the *reverse* of chronological order. Gentile, Minister of Education in Mussolini's first cabinet, is the philosopher-statesman of Fascism. As a teacher and exponent of philosophy he belongs to the "native" Italian school of "idealists," as contrasted with the rationalists and positivists of France and other countries. These he attacks for their individualism, their skepticism, and their materialism. Gentile asserts that the true Risorgimento was actuated by essentially Italian ideals—(egoistic) nationalism, liberty, and the necessity for sacrifice; that during the last half of the nineteenth century this true Risorgimento was lost sight of, through devotion to a false Risorgimento actuated by French ideals—international fraternity, rigid constitutionalism, and individualistic democracy; and finally that Fascism is merely a revival of the true Risorgimento. Gentile's central concept is the synthesis of liberty and law—the attainment of liberty through law. Individual liberty, he maintains, is merely license to undermine the constructive activities of the group; only by subordinating himself to the

law of the group can the individual attain, through cooperation, those constructive ends which constitute his (higher) liberty. "Liberty is, to be sure, the supreme end and aim of every human life; but in so far as personal and social education realize it by evoking this common will in the individual, it presents itself as law and hence as the State. And this is not superimposed on individual activity and initiative externally, subjecting them to restrictive compulsion, but is their own very essence. . . . The maximum of liberty always coincides with the maximum strength of the State."

Croce, greatest of contemporary Italian philosophers, one of the pioneers of the science of esthetics, and like Gentile an exponent of Italian idealism, is an ardent opponent of Fascism; but he is nevertheless claimed by the Fascists because he revolted against French and German philosophy and developed the idea that, contrary to the general notion abroad, Italy has a continuous, purer, and better philosophic tradition than the rest of Europe.

Crispi, prewar Premier and Father of Italian Imperialism, was likewise claimed by the Fascists—though he had been dead these many years. De Sanctis was the spiritual father of the war generation in Italy. In his famous *History of Italian Literature* (1871) De Sanctis propounded the concept that corruption in Italy prior to its unification had not been caused by foreign tyranny but rather that corruption had led to tyranny. He pictured the regenerative forces at work, from Machiavelli on, and as a politician of United Italy denounced parliamentary corruption. Spaventa laid down the thesis later expounded by Croce: "Italian philosophy is . . . in itself the whole of philosophy. . . . It recalls the universal character of ancient Rome. . . . This forceful, variegated, and complicated nature requires a long and difficult undertaking to complete itself. It must struggle not only with other people but with itself. To be, it must overcome itself." Spaventa upheld the idea of the omnipotent State and a "noble [Party of the] Right."

A reading of his *Moral and Civil Primacy of the Italians* makes it easy to see why Gioberti⁴ is claimed by the Fascists:

We were already cultured and depaganized when the rest of Europe was still dormant and toiling in barbarism. Providence chose the Italian land for this high destiny. . . . All the great intellects of Europe, who enhanced in any measure the glory of their countries, lit their lamps at the living flame of Italian genius. [One is reminded of the panegyrics of the Francophiles.] France and the whole of Europe proportionally are heading towards barbarism and are nearly at the doors of a second Middle Ages. . . . To repair these none too remote perils, European civilization must be reestablished a second time. . . . History teaches us that every civilization has its special seat in one country or city as its base. . . . Italy is the true head of civilization and Rome is the ideal metropolis of the world. . . . Rome morally speaking is not only the eternal city but the innate city, that is, born with the first of men.

Such megalomania could not fail to appeal to the Fascists who even tried to drag Mazzini from his grave into their ranks.

Cuoco, disillusioned by the Neapolitan Revolution of 1799, denounced French

⁴ See also p. 116.

Enlightenment⁵ and constitutional democracy. In common with Vico, earliest of Italian idealists, he held that "governments must be drawn in conformity with the nature of the men who are to be governed" and therefore that no single form of government can possibly suit all countries. Vico also held that society is not the result of an artificial "social contract" based on hedonistic interests, such as Rousseau had pictured, but that it is a natural outgrowth of the spirit of a people.

Machiavelli,⁶ back in the Renaissance, upheld the idea that what Italy needed was a unified, strong, and, if need be, despotic state that could free her from foreign domination. It is this great political realist, above all, whom Mussolini claims to follow; in his mind's eye, no doubt, Il Duce is pleased to picture himself as the Prince of Machiavelli's dreams. The concept of the strong ruler and the strong state the Fascists trace back of Machiavelli to Dante, and back of Dante to Imperial Rome—that grandiose creation that has dominated so much of the political thought of Europe as a whole.

All this is a far cry from what Mussolini was preaching as late as April 6, 1920: "I start from the individual and strike at the State. Down with the State in all its forms and incarnations. The State of yesterday, of today, and of tomorrow. The bourgeois State and the Socialist State. In the gloom of today and the darkness of tomorrow the only faith which remains to us individuals destined to die is the at present absurd but ever consoling religion of anarchy."

There is an interesting problem that might well be considered by the student of human institutions: Is Italy governed primarily by consent and only secondarily by force, as the Fascists contend? or, as the opponents of Fascism insist, almost entirely by force? Certainly there is a modicum of truth in the Fascist contention, for the most despotic of rulers owe their tenure of office in part at least to the consent of the governed. Were this not so their tyranny would not last. Nevertheless, it requires a broad consensus of opinion and men who are willing to die for their liberty to overthrow a minority possessed of all the legal sanctions and all the armed force.

The liberals of the world, already hard pressed by the Third International, may soon find themselves confronted with a Fourth, the Fascist International; Mussolini would no doubt be delighted to serve as its head. In Italy and elsewhere Fascism stands for two things above all: "efficiency" vs. liberty and "nationalism" (obviously not of the Mazzini type) vs. internationalism. The corollaries drawn from these premises are that class struggles must give place to "class coöperation," democracy to autocracy in the form of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, the interests of mankind as a whole to those of the particular state in question. Fascists lay stress on the notion of "hierarchy": every man in his appointed place—which is merely the good old class system in a new dress—with the Fascists at the top, to do the appointing. Some of the additional consequences are imperialism, militarism, economic nationalism in the form of tariff barriers, international competition in various other forms, economic individualism (disguised, perhaps, as in Italy), religious reaction, and a supreme disregard for the rights of social, economic, and national minorities where the authorities

⁵ See p. 21.

⁶ See p. 14.

consider that those rights conflict with "interests of state"—all the elements, in short, that helped precipitate the World War. The net result is intellectual standardization of the most extreme type.

According to admirers: "Fascism is the concrete way of considering any organization or relation in the light of the aim for which it was created. . . . What matters is the actual working of an organization towards its aim." This is a scientific and pragmatic way of viewing the problem, and today is an age when pragmatism is in favor. But the trouble with pragmatists is that if they happen to find themselves on the losing side, they have nothing left to stand on. Granted that there is much to be said for efficiency and for coöperation and that charity begins at home, are the Fascists using the best means for attaining their ends? Can a people be regimented, willynilly, into a strong state? Is not a state so constructed built on sand? If the neighbors of this egotistical state are weak, such methods may suffice for a time; but will it not sooner or later encounter other, still stronger states or combinations of states which, aroused by an aggressively nationalistic attitude, will reply in kind? Though the autocratic states of Central Europe wrought wonders during the World War, great was the fall thereof at the hands of the Western democracies.

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF FASCIST ITALY

After he took office Mussolini's central interest, in his pose as a new Napoleon, was foreign affairs; and it was as a new Napoleon or a Roman conqueror that he voiced his intentions. For this reason—whether or not the internal affairs of Italy as such are any concern of other states—the encouragement given the Fascist régime by officials and private citizens of democratic countries like the United States was naïve, if nothing worse.

Fascism triumphant at first directed its displeasure at British imperialism and the Wilsonian League of Nations. Mussolini warmly defended the League, in the fall of 1918 and again the next spring; but in this matter, as in others, his Trieste speech of a few months later marked a definite departure: "Fascism does not believe in . . . the so-called League of Nations." After the March on Rome he announced a policy of the "Mediterranean for the Mediterraneans." "It is not in Italy's interest to contribute to the maintenance of British imperialism; rather it is in her interest to help in its destruction." Mussolini had so many pet hates, however, that more recently, although the Fascists continued to agitate the question of Malta, they inclined to compromise with England.

The two consistent bases of later Fascist foreign policy—beyond the normal "nothing for nothing"—were distrust of the League and hatred of France. Fascist dislike of France arose from a number of causes, but most of all from the fact that neighbors, at least neighboring states, are rarely good neighbors. As a younger sister of the "Latin race," Italy was jealous. The Fascists were given to talking of "unredeemed" Nice and Savoy. They disliked France for harboring refugees from Fascism, for assimilating Italian emigrants, for her successes in Europe and in the colonial field, and above all, for her alliance with Yugoslavia, Italy's traditional enemy to the east.

The particular bone of contention with Yugoslavia was at first Fiume. No-

ember 19, 1918, Fiume was occupied by Serbs. Soon after, the Serbs were persuaded to withdraw in favor of the Italians, who were joined by French, Americans (withdrawn February 11), and British. The Italians occupied northern Dalmatia single-handed; the officer in charge described himself as "Governor of Dalmatia"—a province with only 18,000 Italians out of a population of 635,000. In Fiume—which Italy claimed although, including the suburb of Sušak, it had a Slav majority of perhaps 26,000 and although the surrounding country on all sides is solidly Slav—the Italians set up a "National Council"; in June native Italians began to raise an armed force of volunteers. The Slavs of course claimed the city—the more so since it was the only good port readily available to their hinterland. The cream of the jest was that not even the infamous Treaty of London⁷ gave the Italians any legal claim.

The night of July 2-3 the Croat Club was wrecked, and on the sixth and seventh nine French soldiers were killed and fifty-eight wounded by Fiume Italians and Italian soldiers. The Allied Supreme Council sent a Commission of Inquiry which decided that the British should take over control; but the very day the change was to be effected D'Annunzio, Italy's swashbuckling poet, occupied the city with a band of adventurers and proclaimed himself dictator (September 12). The Allies ignominiously withdrew, and D'Annunzio proceeded to send an expedition to Dalmatia—from which he was ejected without bloodshed by American bluejackets. The Italian Government thereupon set up a fake blockade of Fiume.

Between the Allies, Italy, and Yugoslavia a long and in the main fruitless discussion ensued. The most important point, as it turned out, was that the Allies, by their memorandum of December 9, gave Italy the Albanian "city of Valona, together with such hinterland as may be strictly necessary to its defense and economic development." The discussion was closed by a letter of March 6, 1920, from President Wilson, stating that he was willing "to leave the determination of the common frontier [between Italy and Yugoslavia] to Italy and Yugoslavia." A treaty was accordingly signed at Rapallo on November 12. In addition to the entire Istrian Peninsula, with 467,000 Yugoslavs, Italy obtained the Istrian islands of Cherso and Lussin, also Yugoslav, the Dalmatian islands of Lagosta and Pelagosa, and the Italo-Dalmatian city of Zara. Fiume was erected into a Free State, contiguous with Italian territory. Any further dispute over boundaries was to be settled by arbitration. Why Yugoslavia signed the treaty is not altogether clear. Apparently she felt that she had been abandoned by the Allies, she was discouraged by the defeat of the Democratic party in the American elections, and she realized that so far as *force majeure* was concerned, she would be on the losing side in any single-handed contest with Italy. Furthermore, the Serbs, the majority element in Yugoslavia, were less vitally concerned than were the Croats.

D'Annunzio refused to recognize the treaty, and on December 1 declared war on Italy! The Italians advanced to the attack—not very ardently—and on January 1, 1921, much to the relief of the inhabitants, terms of surrender were arranged. Great Britain and France subsequently signified their assent to the Treaty of Rapallo, which thereupon became valid subject to the tacit proviso

⁷ See p. 422.

that Austria and Hungary should be accorded free access to the sea through Fiume. Though the League of Nations did not attempt to intervene, the D'Annunzio episode was the first of many body blows that served to undermine its prestige.

Even the Treaty of Rapallo failed to settle the Fiume Question. The Fiume Fascists prevented the new state from functioning, and the Italians remained in possession of the Yugoslav town of Šušak, as well as of parts of Dalmatia; the economic life of Fiume, meanwhile, was in a state of complete stagnation. This was the situation inherited by Mussolini. January 27, 1924, he succeeded in concluding a new agreement whereby Italy obtained nearly all the Free State of Fiume; Yugoslavia received only Port Baroš, the eastern tip. From every point of view the settlement was a victory for the Strong and for the Wrong. Italy, with Trieste—not to mention its other harbors—in its possession, had not the slightest need for Fiume; and Yugoslavia and Fiume itself have both suffered. The seaborne trade of the city was 2,250,000 tons in 1913; in 1924 it was only 718,843.

While the Fiume controversy was still raging Mussolini indulged in one of his most spectacular exhibitions of force. Because an Italian general, while delimiting the Greco-Albanian frontier, was murdered by parties unknown, he bombarded and seized the Greek island of Corfu; and when the League attempted to intervene, he openly flouted its authority. Earlier in 1923, as part of the Lausanne settlement with Turkey but in defiance of the Treaty of 1920 with Greece, he had obtained the important Greek island of Rhodes and the Dodecanese, likewise Greek.

In 1926 Mussolini signed a neutrality treaty with Spain which was manifestly aimed at France, and in 1927 a treaty with Hungary—the first postwar political agreement concluded by the Magyars. Obviously he thereby hoped to fatten the impoverished trade of Fiume; still more obviously he obtained an outpost against the pro-French Little Entente. He also flirted with the Rumanians, a people who like to imagine themselves Latins. In October, 1927, he emulated the Kaiser by sending three warships to Tangier to emphasize his claims to recognition in that sphere.⁸ In 1928 Italy signed treaties with Turkey and Greece. The Crown Prince of Italy was married to a Belgian princess, and an Italian princess to the King of Bulgaria. The United States was courted with gratifying results from the Fascist point of view.

Although the Fiume settlement led to better relations between Italy and Yugoslavia and although in June of 1924 Italy and Yugoslavia published a self-denying ordinance in regard to Albania which was confirmed in October of the following year, Albania succeeded Fiume as a subject of serious contention. This backward and disorganized country across the Straits of Otranto was looked upon by Italians as a natural outlet, economic if not political, and as a means of rendering the Adriatic even more of an Italian lake (*Mare nostrum*). Italy's hand had been strengthened by a Declaration of the Powers of November 9, 1921, which recognized the preponderance of Italian interests.

Early in December of 1924, Ahmed Bey Zogu, an Albanian refugee in Yugoslavia, invaded his native country. He entered Tirana on the twenty-fourth;

⁸ See p. 612.

Bishop Fan Noli, the Prime Minister and a former Harvard student, fled. In January Zogu was elected President with practically dictatorial powers; as a reward for Slav assistance, perhaps, he made an agreement with Belgrade in accordance with which the Conference of Ambassadors awarded Sveti Naum and Vermosha to Yugoslavia in exchange for Piškopēja. The final act establishing the Albanian frontiers was signed by the powers on July 30, 1926.

The boundary settlement failed to settle the Albanian Question. For one thing, Italy embarked on a policy of economic penetration: in August of 1925 she obtained oil concessions; on September 2 the National Bank of Albania was organized in Rome; and a year later (September 1) the Albanian Government received an Italian loan of 50,000,000 lire. Even more important was the continued political friction. November 27, 1926, Italy and Albania signed a treaty at Tirana. "Article 1. Italy and Albania recognize that any disturbance threatening the political [internal as well as external?], legal, and territorial *status quo* of Albania is contrary to their common interests. Article 2. In order to safeguard the above-mentioned interests the High Contracting Parties undertake to afford each other mutual support and . . . not to conclude with other Powers any political or military agreements prejudicial to the interests of the other Party." A supplementary Italian note explained that "the occasion for such support . . . can only arise at the request of one of the parties." Though the supplementary note was published along with the treaty, the Tirana Pact was denounced in Belgrade and in Paris, where it was described in the semiofficial *Temps* as "establishing a sort of protectorate" and even as "amounting, in effect, to nothing less than an Italian hold on Albania." The supporters of Bishop Noli who had repaired to Italy were interned early in 1927.

March 19 the Italian Government called the attention of the powers to "certain military preparations stated to be proceeding in Yugoslavia." Hardly was this scare over when the Albanian Government arrested an employee of the Yugoslav legation on suspicion of espionage; diplomatic relations between Yugoslavia and Albania were severed and only renewed through the good offices of the powers. That autumn Italian officers were seconded for service with the Albanian army. On November 11 France and Yugoslavia signed a treaty; and on the twenty-second, Italy and Albania signed a second treaty at Tirana—this time a twenty-year defensive alliance. Once more Yugoslavia protested, and again the powers felt it necessary to intervene. When Zogu was proclaimed king in September, 1928, Albania had the distinction of being the only postwar republic to revert to monarchy.

Toward the 250,000 unoffending Germans in the Upper Adige the Fascists adopted a policy of denationalization and Italianization unequalled in brutality in modern times by any civilized government. No guarantees had been exacted in behalf of these unfortunates by the Peace Conference, because the Italian authorities had promised the Germans "the free enjoyment of their autonomous institutions." This promise was kept before the Fascists came into power, but Mussolini refused to be bound by the actions of his "weak-kneed" predecessors. That German names of towns, streets, and so on were changed is not particularly surprising—but that was merely the beginning. The German South Tyrol as a separate unit was wiped out, the whole annexed territory being erected into

one province (Venezia Tridentina), and local self-government was extinguished. The German officials were removed. Use of Italian in the courts and schools was made obligatory; even supplementary instruction in German was eventually forbidden. Since teachers who knew no German were introduced and since the Germans were forbidden to send their children to private schools, the German South Tyrol, which in 1926 headed the Italian provinces in order of literacy, was in danger of becoming almost totally illiterate. Cultural associations, such as the Alpine clubs, were dissolved, and German papers suppressed. Most absurd and outrageous of all, the Germans were forced to Italianize their family names; in order that the instructions to Italianize public inscriptions might be carried out and that even the dead might be forced to comply, the authorities refused to renew leases when graves fell in—although officially the instructions applied only to the tombstones of persons who neglected to die before the decree came into force.

When the Germans in Austria and in Germany expressed sympathy for their fellow nationals, Mussolini fell into one of his pious rages, registered forceful ferocity, and declared that if they persisted he would adopt a policy of *reprisals*! "We declare that people sometimes have to pay with two eyes for the destruction of one eye, and with all the teeth in their head for the destruction of one tooth. . . . 'Fascist Italy can, if necessary, carry her tricolor further: lower it, never!'" Fascist policy toward the Tyrolese was the more inexcusable in that even under Hapsburg rule the Italians of the Tyrol had never suffered similar persecution, and the land in question had not even been included in the boundaries assigned to Italy by Augustus.

Mussolini did not confine his bellicose remarks to the Tyrol. "Inebriated with the exuberance of his own verbosity," he spent much of his time assuming Napoleonic poses. A few choice samples of his rhetoric must suffice:

Humanity is still and always an abstraction . . . men are still not brothers, do not want to be and evidently cannot be. Peace is hence absurd, or rather it is a pause in war.

There is another Italy: one which causes foreigners to sit up and take notice, the Italy which is working, preparing itself, striving to live and to conquer, the Italy of tomorrow, which will populate the sky with swift aeroplanes and the sea with powerful ships, which will no longer have its generations of small employees and scribblers of useless paper [fond of enlarging on the force of Fascist ideals, Mussolini showed little appreciation of the force of other ideals], but generations of sailors, who will carry the tricolor of Italy over all the oceans and all the shores of the world.

The Mediterranean is destined to return to us. Rome is destined to become once more the city which directs the civilization of the whole of Western Europe. Let us raise the banner of the Empire, of our Imperialism. . . .

We must be ready at a given moment to mobilize five million men . . . we must strengthen our navy and also our aviation . . . which must be so numerous and so powerful that the roar of its motors can drown out every other noise on the peninsula and the surface of its wings hide the sun from our land. Then tomorrow, when, between 1935 and 1940, we shall be at a point which I would call crucial for European history, we shall be able to make our voice heard and see our rights finally recog-

nized. If Italy wants to count for something, it must appear on the threshold of the second half of the century with a population of not less than sixty million inhabitants.

We are forty millions, squeezed into our narrow but adorable peninsula, with its too many mountains and its soil which cannot nourish so many. There are around Italy countries that have a population smaller than ours and a territory double the size of ours. Hence it is obvious that the problem of Italian expansion is a problem of life and death for the Italian race.

Mussolini adopted and popularized the idea that "proletarian" Italy should struggle against the domination of the "oligarchical" nations of the West. All in all, Mussolini and Fascist Italy remind one not a little of the Kaiser and pre-war Germany.

Mussolini's speechifying may be merely what William James would call "equivalents for war," intended mainly for home consumption. But what if his hearers—quick-tempered, easily swayed Italians—take him seriously and get out of control? This brings up an interesting question, often propounded: Who is really in control in Fascist Italy? Is Fascism the mouthpiece of Mussolini? or is Mussolini the mouthpiece of Fascism? From the outside the Grand Council appears to be merely a rubber stamp: whenever dissent arises, as it has and does, or whenever any of the Fascist lieutenants get too prominent, the offenders are kicked into the gutter with truly Napoleonic gratitude⁹—yet one cannot help wondering. Whatever the answer, were there not so many danger spots in Europe and the world at large one would be inclined to pronounce Fascist Italy, with its expanding and explosive population, *the* danger spot of the world.

THE RESURRECTION OF POLAND

Prior to the World War Poland was the outstanding example in Continental Europe, if not in the entire world, of a nation that was not a state. Partitioned in 1795 between Russia, Austria, and Prussia, the Poles never ceased to protest; but when the war broke out, they were divided as to what policy to pursue. For the Russian people—fellow Slavs—they had a certain feeling of kinship, but they hated the tsarist Government; toward Austria, which had granted them a large measure of autonomy, they felt less resentment than toward Russia and Germany, but the sense of kinship was lacking; for the Germans they felt little but cordial dislike.

Some Poles, lured by the promises of autonomy held out by the Grand Duke Nicholas, sided with Russia; the leader of this faction was Dmowski. Others, who thereby hoped to obtain for Poland a status in Austria-Hungary similar to that of Hungary, volunteered for service against Russia. Their leader was Pilsudski, a man of princely extraction, who began life as a medical student and a revolutionist, who had been sentenced to five years in Siberia, and who in 1908, with Austrian approval, had founded the military organization he later commanded.

⁹ In September, 1923, Rocco was suspended. Farinacci was replaced as secretary-general of the party. De Vecchi was appointed Governor of Somaliland. In November, 1928, Rossoni was "promoted" from Minister of Corporations to the Grand Council; and when the membership of the Council was reduced, Gentile was among those dropped. These are only a few instances.

During the war, sentiment in favor of absolute independence revived. The Central Powers attempted to turn it to their advantage by proclaiming an "independent" Kingdom of Poland (November 5, 1916); later they established a Council of Regency. Since Russia was no longer to be feared, Pilsudski changed his attitude and refused to lend aid to the new Government, for which he was imprisoned. In August, 1917, Dmowski founded a National Committee, under Allied patronage, which established its headquarters in Paris; he also made Paderewski Polish Ambassador to the United States—if a nonexistent country can be said to have an ambassador—and created a Polish army on the Western front.

The Poles became increasingly dissatisfied with their sham independence as time went on. October 6, 1918, the Regency and the Premier published a manifesto summoning a diet for a "free and united Poland"; on the twenty-second a new cabinet, containing Austrian Poles, was formed; and on November 3 the Regency proclaimed a republic. Four days later, when a socialist government was set up at Lublin, a conflict broke out. At this point, luckily for Poland, Pilsudski was released from prison by German revolutionists, arriving in Warsaw on the tenth. The Regency and the Lublin Government surrendered their powers in his favor. Though a second conflict broke out, this time between the Pilsudski Government and the Dmowski committee in Paris, it was resolved after the arrival of Paderewski; Pilsudski made him the first Premier of the reconstituted state (January 16, 1919), and he and Dmowski were appointed to represent Poland at the Peace Conference.

The policy of the Polish extremists was the reconstitution of Poland within its historic frontiers, which would have meant the inclusion of more non-Poles than Poles; what they failed to obtain at the Peace Conference they subsequently set out to acquire by force of arms. The sight was anything but edifying; hardly had the Poles obtained their liberty, after a century and a quarter of piteous beseeching, when they gathered an army of 800,000 and attempted to deprive all their neighbors of *their* rights. Surely the world might have expected better at the hands of that Poland which had produced Copernicus, Chopin, Paderewski, and Mme. Curie, and which, when the Turk was pounding at the gate, had once saved even the proud Hapsburgs. In the *political* sense land means power—there is no blinking that obstinate fact; and "*tout comprendre, c'est tout pardonner*" ("to understand all is to forgive all"). Moreover, we owe you something, Poland—we citizens of the world. We owe you an independent existence, and gratitude for your accomplishments in our behalf. But that does not mean that we should be unjust to others for your sake. And if as a result of your arrogance, your selfishness, or your greed, the heritage of our children goes down to irretrievable ruin in the wrack of another world war, we shall find it very hard to forgive.

The Polish conflicts with the Lithuanians, the Germans, the Czechs, the Ukrainians, and the Russians cannot be detailed here. Because most of their opponents were too weak or too exhausted to resist, the Russian affair alone developed into a real war. The trouble arose from the fact that in regard to the eastern frontiers of Poland the Allies had adopted a *laissez-faire* policy and had contented themselves with laying down (December, 1919) a provisional mini-

mum, known as the Curzon Line (running somewhat east of north, from a point on the Carpathians slightly west of where they are intersected by the 23rd meridian to a point on the East Prussian frontier northwest of Suwalki).¹⁰ The Poles regarded the Curzon Line as a standing invitation to make way with all they could seize to the east. As it was, they barely escaped annihilation for their pains. Having finally beaten off the Russians, thanks to timely assistance from the French, they turned on little Lithuania and did her out of Vilna.

In area the Polish state that resulted is a fourth again as large as Italy. The greater part of the land is arable: there are valuable mineral deposits, particularly in Upper Silesia; and the industries are so well developed (Łódź is the second largest textile center in the world) that 25 per cent of the Poles live in cities of over 10,000.

In population Poland, with 32,000,000 inhabitants, holds a unique position, halfway between France (42,000,000) and Spain (22,000,000). The population is far from homogeneous, however, since Poland contains several million Ukrainians (Ruthenians), over two million Jews, over a million Russians and Germans, several hundred thousand Lithuanians, and a sprinkling of Czechs and Slovaks; according to a Polish scholar (Professor Dyboski), "one-third of her population is not Polish in race [*sic*] and speech." Because of the way they were acquired and have been treated these minorities entitle Poland to rival Yugoslavia as the Austria of the New Europe.

Additional factors making for disunion were the cleavage between Poles of varying social and economic status—aristocratic and capitalistic industrialists and landlords, socialistic peasants and industrial laborers—and the differences that had developed between the three parts of Poland during the years when it was partitioned. It is by no means surprising, therefore, that the internal history of the New Poland has been anything but tranquil; that the factional struggles, so evident and disastrous in the past, have blazed forth afresh.

Elections were held January 16, 1919. Shortly afterwards the Sejm (Assembly) convened; Pilsudski and Paderewski surrendered their powers but were requested to remain in office. November 27, because the Allies refused to award eastern Galicia to Poland outright, Paderewski again resigned—this time for good. A constitution was adopted March 17, 1921, which came into force June 1; but the Sejm was loath to surrender its powers. Not until November, 1922, were the elections for the first constitutional Sejm held. During the presidential elections Pilsudski was passed over because he had arbitrarily dismissed one of the cabinets.

Unstable ministries, which at times governed without a majority, resulted from the multiplicity of parties; during both preconstitutional and postconstitutional periods they were drawn from the moderates. The interests of the Socialists, though championed by Pilsudski, were systematically disregarded. Financial reform constituted the most imperative question. Prior to 1921 nothing was done to check the orgy of expenditure and inflation; not until 1924 was anything of importance accomplished; and not until 1926 was the problem

¹⁰ The Curzon Line ran to a point a little northeast of Przemysł, thence northeasterly to the Bug, down the Bug to Brest Litovsk, north to Grodno, and thence northwesterly.

finally solved. In 1925 an agrarian law was passed—but of an extremely moderate character.

By 1926 intense dissatisfaction with the existing state of affairs was evident in many quarters. In particular, the Sejm was denounced as unrepresentative; but as it could only be dissolved with the consent of three-fifths of the Senate and as the Senate refused to act, nothing could be done. In May Pilsudski began a march on Warsaw, à la Mussolini; when the Government refused to abdicate, he laid siege to the city. At the end of three days the President and the Premier resigned. As a result of this *coup d'état* a new ministry was set up, on the fifteenth, in which Pilsudski became Minister of Defense, but he refused to proclaim himself dictator and when he was elected President, dramatically declined the honor. October 2, however, he became Premier. From then on, although he resigned in the summer of 1927, he remained virtual dictator.

Immediately after the *coup d'état*, amendments to the constitution were adopted (August 26, 1926) with the consent of the cabinet the President was empowered to dissolve the Sejm and the Senate, within certain limits he was authorized to issue ordinances having the force of law, and the control of the executive over the budget was strengthened.

Poland made rapid advances after the economic slump of 1924. Between 1925 and 1927 her output of coal increased nearly a third and her output of pig iron and steel almost doubled, and in 1927 she established new records in the production of coal, pig iron, crude steel, and zinc. In the production of zinc ore she ranked first in Europe. In 1925 she began the construction of a new port at Gdynia, at the end of the Polish Corridor, which together with a railroad financed by France eventually made her independent of Danzig. In 1930 the sands formerly abandoned to fishermen were the site of a city of 30,000 and a port with accommodations for fifty vessels that was handling over 5,000,000 tons of imports and exports annually.

In foreign affairs Poland continued her immemorial association with France, whose object was to maintain a *cordon sanitaire* between Russia and the remainder of Europe—Germany in particular. Poland also entered into agreements with the Little Entente. Finally, she sought the friendship of some of the Baltic States—Latvia, Estonia, and Finland, from Lithuania she remained permanently estranged on account of the seizure of Vilna.

POSTWAR SPAIN

Next to Poland, Spain (the only second class power in 1914) is the largest of the lesser powers of the New Europe in population, and the fourth largest country of Europe in area.¹¹ For over a century, she had played an inconspicuous part in European affairs, indeed, since that fatal day in 1588 when the Spanish power, then the greatest in the world, received a staggering blow at the hands of little, parvenu England, her strength and prestige had steadily declined. The final chapter of the epoch that had known Spain as a colonial power of the first magnitude closed at the end of the nineteenth century when

¹¹ Excluding Turkey, which is mainly Asiatic.

the last vestiges of her New World and Asiatic empire were lost to an even more parvenu power, the United States.

The subsidiary rôle played by Spain throughout most of the modern period was in the main due to four factors: oppressive treatment of minorities, reliance on overseas resources, economic poverty, and the stifling and unwise policy of the monarchy. After 1492, when the "natives" had finally succeeded in reconquering the ground lost in the eighth century, they set about oppressing the Moors and the Jews, who formed the most enterprising and enlightened element in the population. The development of a great overseas empire that followed was a positive disadvantage in the end, for the Spaniards learned to rely on the wealth of their colonial possessions and consequently neglected to build up industries of their own.

Two main difficulties confronted them during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The first was the conditions of agriculture. Here they encountered a triple problem. First of all, only a narrow strip in the west and in the mountainous north is humid; the remainder of the country, arid or semiarid, necessitates irrigation if crops are to be raised (and irrigation declined with the Moors). Secondly, Spain was a land of great estates. Third and most important of all, the agricultural methods savored of the eighteenth century—that is to say, of the Middle Ages—rather than the twentieth. The other main difficulty was lack of natural resources. Nearly half the coal used is imported. Cotton, petroleum, lumber, and wheat also figure heavily in the list of imports. Industry has made some progress of recent years, but little compared with the rest of Western Europe. These factors go far to explain why Spain, with an area greater than that of Germany, has only about a third as many inhabitants.

The policy of the monarchy aggravated the situation. As in days of yore, it allowed itself to be lured by grandiose dreams of foreign conquest, instead of concentrating on internal development. The field chosen was northern Morocco, where shortly before the World War an attempt was made to introduce Spanish rule in fact as well as in theory. Vast sums were expended—5,000,000,000 pesetas (about \$1,000,000,000) in a few years—and worst of all, the Spaniards were decisively and ingloriously beaten. In September, 1923, in the midst of the Moroccan debacle, General Primo de Rivera issued a manifesto à la Mussolini, calling on the King to dismiss the cabinet; invited to take over the government, he set up a military dictatorship. Primo de Rivera was somewhat more successful than his predecessors in dealing with the situation in Morocco—thanks to the assistance of the French—but he did nothing to allay the discontent of the industrial and agricultural laborers, the liberals, or the advocates of Catalanian autonomy. "Fifty per cent of the Spanish people were illiterate. More than one million children had no schools. In Madrid alone 45,000 children were receiving no education." Yet the Government went gayly on spending three times as much on the army and navy as it did on education.

The long-expected revolution broke out April 14, 1931; the monarchy collapsed with hardly a show of resistance. The event was doubly and trebly significant: not only did it signify the triumph of democracy over dictatorship and monarchy in Spain, but it likewise marked the final downfall of the

Hapsburgs and the Bourbons, united in the person of Alfonso XIII, and deprived the Catholic Church of its last remaining stronghold.

The constitution of the Spanish Republic, approved by the Cortes on December 9, contained several interesting and some unique features. Article 7 incorporated the rules of international law into Spanish law, and by Article 6 "Spain renounces war as an instrument of national policy." Article 24 introduced the principle of double nationality: subject to reciprocity, citizens of Spanish-American countries and of Brazil and Portugal were granted Spanish citizenship. The Republic was to constitute "an integral state, admitting the autonomy of municipalities and regions" (Article 1); the term "integral" was used in apposition to "unitary" and "federal." Elaborate provisions defined the powers of the central and the local authorities.

The legislature is unicameral, the Senate having been abolished; in case the President fails to order new elections, the old Cortes has full legislative power. The President is ineligible for reelection until after the lapse of six years (the normal term of office). The military—until ten years after retirement—and the clergy are ineligible for the presidency. "The Spanish state has no official religion." (Article 3.)

In a country that was for centuries the most strongly Catholic in the world the religious issue was bound to cause friction. The Premier resigned as a result of the adoption of Article 26:

All religious denominations shall be . . . subject to special laws. The State . . . shall not favor or give economic assistance to any churches, associations, or religious institutions. . . . Those religious orders which in addition to the three canonical vows [of poverty, (religious) obedience, and chastity] require a special vow of obedience to an authority other than the State are dissolved. Their property shall be nationalized. . . . The remaining religious orders shall be subject to a special law . . . resting upon the following provisions . . . 3. Inability to acquire or hold . . . more property than is strictly necessary to their support. . . . 4. Prohibition to engage in industry, commerce, or teaching.

The famous order of Jesuits was expelled (January 24, 1932).

The accomplishments of the first two years were not inconsiderable, especially taking into account the difficulties confronted by the infant republic. During the first year the number of soldiers was reduced to slightly over 100,000 and the number of officers from 26,000 to 9,418 (1,756 in Africa); 70,000,000 pesetas in domestic military expenditures were saved, plus 40,000,000 in Morocco.

Much was done for education; in fact the Spanish Republic showed a solicitude for this all-important branch of democratic endeavor that is perhaps unparalleled in history and that might well be emulated by richer and more "advanced" countries. "Between 1908 and 1930 the monarchy built [only] 11,128 schools, making a total of [only] 35,716 schools in Spain. In one year the Republic has built 7,000 schools, and in the next four years will add 20,000 more." When the monarchy ended, 6,833 teachers were receiving 2,500 pesetas a year or less. All were raised to 3,000, and a total of 21,516 had their pay increased.

The ratification of the Washington Convention relating to the eight-hour day was proclaimed (April 22, 1931); the benefits of social legislation were extended to agricultural laborers; and the legal basis of an agrarian reform was laid (May 21). A divorce law was enacted. Last, but by no means least, an attempt was made to satisfy the autonomist aspirations of Catalonia.

Because she was not overindustrialized the Great Depression affected Spain the least of any country in Europe—an ironical commentary on her “backward” condition.

In the realm of culture, if not of international politics, a small nation can achieve greatness; and the republicans are determined to demonstrate that in this realm at least Spain is still capable of adding new laurels to her old.

GREATER RUMANIA

In return for her dubious wartime services Rumania was rewarded with the greatest increase of European territory of any participant—and at that, she left the Peace Conference dissatisfied! Rumania of postwar days—twice the size of the state bearing that name in 1914—is the eighth largest country of Europe in point of population and the ninth in area (including barren Sweden, Finland, and Norway, but excluding Turkey). More specifically, it is slightly larger than Italy. Though it is fortunate in possessing abundant resources—timber, iron, the richest deposits of petroleum in Europe, and bountiful grain fields—its population is decidedly heterogeneous.

Rumania teems with minority problems. A quarter of its inhabitants are non-Rumanian—1,500,000 Magyars, 1,000,000 Ukrainians, 750,000 Jews, 500,000 Germans, 250,000 Bulgars, and a liberal sprinkling of Turks, Serbs, Slovaks, Russians, and Tatars. With the exception of the Jews, scattered throughout the kingdom and hated and oppressed by the Rumanians, and a solid block of Magyars in the center of Transylvania, these minorities are mostly concentrated along the border—an evil omen for the peace of Eastern Europe. The Dobruja, wrested from Bulgaria in 1913, is almost solidly Bulgar and Turk in the south. The Magyars living in the Banat and the great province of Transylvania were acquired from Hungary as result of the war; many are located in almost solid strips contiguous to their motherland. In addition, western Rumania contains Ruthenians, Germans, Slovaks, and Serbs. Bukowina, most of which also fell to Rumania from Austria, is made up of Ukrainians (also known as Ruthenians), Rumanians, and Germans. Most remarkable of all, Rumania gained not only from Austria-Hungary but from her ally, Russia. Bessarabia, so acquired, is one of the foremost danger spots of Europe. Russia wrested it from Turkey in 1812; when the Bolshevik Revolution broke out an independent republic was set up. Early in January, 1918, Rumania sent in troops to keep out the Bolsheviks; while they were in occupation the Supreme Council of Bessarabia voted for annexation to Rumania. In 1920 the Allies signed a treaty with Rumania recognizing the *status quo*; it was to come into force when ratified by three of the signatories, and Great Britain ratified in 1922, France in 1924, Italy in 1927. The population of Bessarabia—nearly 3,000,000—is one-half Rumanian, one-quarter Ukrainian, and the remainder Jewish, Russian, Bulgarian, German,

Turk, and Tatar. In speaking of the minorities inhabiting Rumania mention may be made of the Rumanians in northern Bulgaria, northeastern Yugoslavia, and the Yugoslavian Banat. Finally, there are the Vlachs, nomadic offshoots of the Ruman stock who are scattered throughout northern Greece, Macedonia, southern Albania, southern Yugoslavia, and southwestern Bulgaria.

Most readers of newspapers in the early Postwar Era were aware that Rumania had a queen by the name of Marie who was one of the most beautiful and talented of royal ladies, also a prince named Carol. Some of these same readers, though a considerably lesser number, knew that the reigning house belonged to the Sigmaringen branch of the Hohenzollern dynasty. Fewer still realized that Rumania had another ruling family—uncrowned, to be sure—the Bratianus. Yet it was old John Bratianu Senior, a veteran of the Paris Revolution of '48, who was the architect of a united Rumania, who placed Charles of Hohenzollern on the throne, and who as leader of the Liberals remained the power behind that throne until his death. In a country where over 80 per cent of the population was illiterate, where the elections were held under a three-class system, and where consequently only 200,000 had the vote, it was not difficult to retain power. When John was no more, John the Younger took up and carried on the work of his father. He it was who, although King Ferdinand had made an alliance with the Central Powers, brought Rumania into the war on the side of the Allies, represented her at the Peace Conference, and shaped her destinies in the early years of the Postwar Era.

Immediately after the war, strange to relate, Bratianu was unpopular—because he had only succeeded in doubling the size of Rumania! An opportunity to retrieve his popularity came when Béla Kun set up a Bolshevik republic in Hungary; although the Allies said it couldn't be done Bratianu invaded Hungary and subdued the Bolsheviks. By way of repaying themselves for their unsolicited efforts the Rumanians sacked the country with a fine disregard of persons and parties. It was a spectacular triumph, but one the Magyars will long remember.

Two pieces of fundamental legislation were enacted during the war: Universal manhood suffrage was adopted, and the foundations were laid for a far-reaching agrarian reform. Though a beginning had been made toward the expropriation of the landlords as early as 1864, when war broke out Rumania was still a country of great estates to the extent of nearly half the arable land. The legislation of the War Era and the Postwar Era provided that, subject to compensation, all cultivable land held in large estates, whether private, the property of corporations, or owned by the Crown, was to be expropriated; only 14 per cent of the land was to be left the landlords, and at most not more than 200 acres apiece. Since compensation was paid in terms of prewar values, whereas the currency fell to one-fifty-fourth of its prewar value, the enforcement of these provisions in Transylvania created fresh friction with the Magyars; the League of Nations sustained the complainants.

In the first Greater Rumanian elections (October, 1919) the Conservatives were wiped out and the peasant parties won a large majority; but King Ferdinand, acting in accordance with his interpretation of Article 88 of the constitution, refused to heed the wishes of the parliament. For the next eight

years he maintained either Bratianu and the Liberals or General Averescu of the People's party in power. At the end of 1925, politics began to stir again. On December 28 Crown Prince Carol renounced his rights to the succession rather than give up his red-haired Jewish mistress. Queen Marie apparently had something to do with forcing his hand; during the minority of her grandson she would probably have considerable to say. Bratianu also had a finger in the pie, for Carol had been the mainstay of the Opposition. On January 4 the parliament passed a law recognizing Carol's little son Michael (Mihai) as Crown Prince and providing for a Council of Regency, should one be necessary. In March Bratianu, emulating Mussolini, forced a new electoral law through the parliament. The party obtaining the most votes in an election, provided its vote was 40 per cent of the total, was to receive a large majority of the seats; parties obtaining less than 2 per cent of the votes were not to receive any seats. The law gave the Liberals a new lease on life.

King Ferdinand died in July, and the Regency for the minority of King Michael was accordingly established. In November John Bratianu also died; his place was taken by a third member of the dynasty, his younger brother Vintila. The situation inherited by the new scion of the House of Bratianu was fraught with difficulties, for already the masses were impatient. Ominous demonstrations by discontented peasants took place, from March of 1928 on, and a republican movement developed in Transylvania. Early in November the Regency requested the Government to resign, chiefly because of the failure to negotiate a foreign loan; and on November 4 the long rule of the Bratianus came to an end. Two days later Maniu, the Transylvanian leader of the great National Peasant party and the representative of 14,000,000 small farmers of Rumania, succeeded to office. A period of truly liberal reforms, as contrasted with the bourgeois reforms of the so-called Liberals, thereupon opened.

Former Crown Prince Carol eventually concluded that if he must make a choice, a throne without love was preferable to love without a throne. That he was able to reconsider was owing to the peasant demand for his return and to the evident willingness of all except the Liberals and possibly the Dowager Queen. June 6, 1930, by way of a plane from Paris (less romantic perhaps but more expeditious than a prancing stallion or even a private car), Carol dropped out of the sky into Bucharest. No active opposition developed. There was some talk of his taking the place of his brother on the Council of Regency; but two days later the slate was wiped clean, King Michael went back to his nursery, and the prodigal prince was proclaimed Charles II. Even the Liberals were soon hastening to pay him homage.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA, THE CENTER OF CENTRAL EUROPE

Czechoslovakia, in area the smallest by far of the middle-sized powers (Yugoslavia is nearly twice as large), is the fourth largest in population. Its current history, like that of present-day Poland, began during the World War. As soon as hostilities broke out, the Czechs and the Slovaks began to agitate for autonomy or equal rights within the Austrian Empire; but the repressive activities of the Government quickly caused many of the leaders to take refuge

abroad—Masaryk in December, Beneš and others later. The committee they founded in Paris became the Czechoslovak National Council in January, 1916, and Czechoslovak units appeared in the Allied armies. The Council formed a Provisional Government October 14, 1918, a declaration of independence was issued four days later, and on the twenty eighth a bloodless revolution took place in Prague. On November 14 the Czechoslovak National Assembly proclaimed the republic and chose Masaryk, its philosopher statesman, President. Beneš, another professor, was chosen Minister of Foreign Affairs. No better choice could have been made, Beneš proved not only the foremost diplomat among his countrymen but one of the foremost in the world. It is worth noting that before the war Masaryk was at times so unpopular—because he opposed provincialism, Panslavism, and uncritical nationalism—that for months he was unable to deliver his lectures. "Among all the states newly created or enlarged as a result of the war, Czechoslovakia alone has had the privilege of possessing two statesmen really worthy of the name." A constitution was adopted February 29, 1920.

In addition to being of extraordinary shape—little over a hundred miles wide in the center although 600 miles long—Czechoslovakia, even more than its neighbors, is a hodgepodge of nationalities. Since the Czechs and Slovaks, although officially one, are characterized by marked differences, there is not a single group possessing a majority. And together the two predominant factions constitute less than 65 per cent of the population. The historic Kingdom of Bohemia, inhabited mainly by Czechs, is the nucleus of Czechoslovakia. The remainder is made up of Moravia, mainly Czech, Lower (Austrian) Silesia, and the northern portion of the former Kingdom of Hungary, in which the Slovaks constitute the largest faction. The 35.6 per cent constituting the official minority is made up of a variety of linguistic groups. In order that Czechoslovakia might retain the geographical and historic frontiers of Bohemia, 2,175,000 Germans were included, there are also many Germans (800,000) in Moravia and Silesia, and 150,000 more in Slovakia. From Bratislava (Pressburg) to the northeastern tip of Hungary, an almost solid strip of some 750,000 Magyars extends along the southern frontier, which includes the Grosse Schutt, an island in the Danube fifty miles long. Over a hundred miles of the eastern tip of Czechoslovakia is populated mainly by Ukrainians (460,000), the other elements are 180,000 Jews and 75,000 Poles. Only 10 per cent of the frontier coincides with the limits of the Czechs and Slovaks. These facts explain why the banknotes are printed in six languages. As for the differences between the two dominant factions, the Czechs are interested mainly in industry and are educated, socialistic, and inclined to be anticlerical, the Slovaks, agriculturalists for the most part, are illiterate, conservative, and strongly Catholic.¹²

Czechoslovakia is fortunate in being a fertile country, well supplied with timber, minerals, and railroads. It contains approximately four-fifths of the industries of the former Austrian Empire and a considerable proportion of the agricultural land. Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia alone produced 32 per cent of the potatoes, 35 per cent of the wheat, 75 per cent of the fruit, and 90 per

¹² The figures in this paragraph are taken from the 1921 census.

cent of the sugar of that empire. In 1919 Czechoslovakia was the only sugar-exporting country in Europe. The industries include the famous Bohemian glass, china, and textile works. In short, Czechoslovakia is in most essentials more than self-sufficing. These factors explain why her per capita foreign trade a few years ago (about 1925) was \$165 as compared with \$19.60 for Poland.

One of the most important acts of the new régime was a law providing for the expropriation of large estates. In Bohemia 2 per cent of the landlords owned a quarter of the land: in Moravia less than 1 per cent owned nearly a third; in Slovakia a thousand or so owned nearly half. In 1919 the maximum size of arable holdings was fixed at 150 hectares (375 acres); by 1926, although a third of the land subject to expropriation was untouched and 200,000 acres were still in the form of tenancy, 2,000,000 acres had been distributed in small holdings. Extensive social reform cut the ground from under the Communists.

Land reform, secularization of education, the existence of varying sects, and a strong nationalistic reaction against the Papacy raised the question of Church and State. The Czechs were the earliest Protestants; though the greater part were reconverted during the Catholic Reaction, some 10 per cent remained Protestant, and shortly after the war 1,500,000 more broke away from Roman Catholicism and formed a National Church of their own. Many of those who did not take this step were merely subscribing Catholics and inclined to be anti-clerical. In 1925, when the anniversary of the burning of Huss for heresy was declared a national holiday, the Papacy withdrew its nuncio (ambassador); the Government replied by withdrawing its minister to the Vatican, and the Socialists and other anticlericals agitated for the separation of Church and State. A *modus vivendi* was reached in 1928: all bishops were to be citizens and take an oath to the Republic, while the state was to continue to support the clergy.

Friction between the various language groups caused no little difficulty in the beginning. The Germans, because they were discriminated against, refused to coöperate. The Ukrainians, commonly known as Ruthenians, were disgruntled because they were not given their promised autonomy. The Magyars were the bitterest of all. Even the Slovaks complained that they were not granted the autonomy promised them, they claimed, by Masaryk in the so-called Pittsburgh [Pennsylvania] Pact. Gradually, thanks to the enlightened policy of the Government, the minorities became more reconciled. The German block in the parliament broke up, and in October, 1926, two Germans entered the cabinet. Shortly after they were joined by two representatives of the Slovak People's party (clerical). In 1925, 4,656 of the elementary schools—3,288 German, 806 Magyar, 475 Lithuanian, and 87 Polish—were run for the benefit of minorities. Local councils were instituted in Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia, and Slovakia (1929); and Ruthenia was given a local diet.

The celebrated combination known as the Little Entente, founded on treaties of alliance of Czechoslovakia with Yugoslavia (1920) and Rumania (1921) and between Yugoslavia and Rumania (1921), is the work of Beneš. Oriented toward France, the Little Entente with its population of 46,000,000—when it acts as a unit—is one of the Great Powers. Toward Poland Beneš pursued a policy of reconciliation, in spite of the Polish chauvinists; and he was one of the first to advocate a policy of friendship and nonintervention toward

Russia. The most serious difficulty raised by the disintegration of the Austrian Empire was the problem of economic nationalism; in place of an economically unified Danube basin there appeared a number of would-be self-sufficient states, each surrounded by towering tariff walls. Beneš succeeded in establishing friendly commercial relations with Austria (1920), and even brought about similar connections with Hungary. In addition, he was one of the foremost protagonists of the League and of a far-reaching system of nonaggression treaties.

It can hardly be gainsaid that the progress has been the most orderly and considerable achieved by any of the "succession" states; and one is inclined to believe that, despite its minorities, Czechoslovakia is the most stable country of Central or Eastern Europe.

YUGOSLAVIA, THE GREATER SERBIA

Officially known at the outset as the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, Yugoslavia, outranking Great Britain in area and four-fifths the size of Italy, is the smallest of the middle-sized powers in population.¹³ When the Austrian Empire disintegrated, the Republic of Austria inherited the capital, which was also the financial center; Hungary, the grain fields; Czechoslovakia, the industries; and Yugoslavia, the Austrian quarrel with Italy—in addition to the private quarrels of the South Slavs.

Yugoslavia is made up of two main areas: a narrow coastal strip known as Dalmatia, with a salubrious climate, beautiful scenery, and a rich history, but with no hinterland worth mentioning; and a back area, cut off by the Dinaric Alps, which drains into the Save and thence into the Danube. When Italy seized Fiume, the only first-class port, the bulk of Yugoslavia was left almost as landlocked as Serbia (or "Servia," as it was then called) had been before the war. The resources of Yugoslavia are limited and undeveloped, the means of communication are deficient, and the people are backward.

To an even greater extent than most of the newer states, Yugoslavia has its minority and religious problems. Of the total population of 14,000,000 the Serbs, in the east and center, constitute only a little over half; the Croats and Slovenes in the northwest, in a ratio of 2 to 1, make up less than a third. The Germans, the Magyars, and the Albanians each number approximately 500,000; for the first two it is even harder to be under the Serbs than for their brothers to be under the Czechoslovaks and the Rumanians. In addition, there are some 200,000 Rumans, 150,000 Turks, 75,000 Jews and 10,000 Italians. As for religious divisions, the Orthodox (Greek) Catholics number approximately 5,500,000, the Roman Catholics 4,500,000, the Mohammedans 1,350,000, and the Protestants 200,000. Since part of the Serbs and the Croats are Orthodox Catholic and part Roman Catholic, religious lines cut across linguistic lines. The Slovenes are Roman Catholic; and the Turks and most of the Albanians are Mohammedans.

It is said that neither King Peter nor Pašić was desirous of including the

¹³ Turkey, primarily Asiatic, has a slightly smaller population.

Croats and the Slovenes in the Greater Serbia—in any case the subsequent conduct of the Serbs bore out the assertion. Nevertheless, in July, 1917, during the period when the officials of the Serbian Government were refugees, the Pact of Corfu was concluded. Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes were declared, by implication, one nation, and were to be united in "a constitutional, democratic, and parliamentary monarchy." The constitution was to be drafted after the conclusion of peace by a Constituent Assembly elected by universal suffrage, and was to provide for local autonomy in so far as compatible with existing social and economic conditions. By the Pact of Rome (March 7, 1918) Yugoslavs and Italians agreed to settle any future differences amicably, on the basis of nationality and self-determination, and they guaranteed the rights of their respective minorities. Later in the year a Yugoslav National Council was formed which in the latter part of October took over power when the Austrian Empire disintegrated; although Pašić refused to form a coalition cabinet, the Council voted the union of Yugoslav territories under the regency of Prince Alexander. King Peter died in 1921.

On a variety of excuses Alexander postponed the summoning of the Constituent Assembly for two years, during which Radić, the leader of the Croatian peasants, agitated for a Croatian republic; another six months elapsed before the constitution was approved (June 28, 1921). Even then there was a considerable amount of opposition, but as Radić and his colleagues had refused to participate in the Constituent Assembly, Pašić was able to set up a centralized government. Though the Croatian Peasant Deputies again refused to sit when Parliament first met, Radić subsequently took his seat and overthrew the Pašić ministry. When attempts to form a stable ministry proved fruitless, Alexander dissolved the parliament and imprisoned Radić. Though the elections of February, 1925, resulted in little change, Radić announced that he would recognize the constitution; notwithstanding, friction continued. In December of 1926 Pašić died. On June 20, 1928, during a session of Parliament, Radić was mortally wounded by an opposing deputy. The Croatian and Dalmatian delegates thereupon withdrew and set up a separate parliament at Zagreb; when approached by the ministry, they declared that they would discuss the matter only with the King. Alexander accordingly dissolved the parliament (January 5, 1929), abrogated the constitution, and became his own Mussolini. As Seton-Watson, an ardent British champion of the Yugoslavs, put it: "Unfortunately, the statesmen who controlled Yugoslavia's destinies in the post-war period were less worthy of the occasion than the soldiers who had endured to victory or than the peasant masses who made victory possible."

Aside from her perpetual differences with Italy the main question for Yugoslavia was that of securing a port to replace Fiume. A partial solution was reached in March, 1925, when she obtained a free zone at Salonika from Greece, but neither in essence nor in the working was this solution entirely satisfactory. Great was the rejoicing, therefore, when in April, 1928, it was announced that a British-American consortium was arranging a loan of \$250,000,000 for the construction of a port at Cattaro and a railroad from there to Belgrade.

CHAPTER XX


IMPERIALISM KICKS BACK

The Postwar Era witnessed a tremendous seething of unrest among the subject nationalities as well, more particularly those of the East—Near, Middle, and Far. In these regions—where formerly peoples of alien race, language, and religion were wont to intermingle without undue friction—our old friend Nationalism, transported from the West, wrought havoc. The result was troublous times for the British, and even more for the French, the Spanish, and the Italians. Two outstanding characteristics, seemingly contradictory but everywhere present, marked the activities of the Eastern peoples under Western tutelage: a negative impulse toward revolt against Western control, and a positive impulse toward the adoption of Western culture (though reactionary tendencies were simultaneously apparent) Under these two impulses a general shaking-up took place such as the world had not seen since the rise of Mohammed.

THE RENAISSANCE OF TURKEY

The situation in Postwar Turkey affected all three of the great imperialistic powers in varying degrees. To a greater degree it affected the world of Islam. According to Mohammedan theory, as maintained for a thousand years prior to the World War, the World of Islam was a unit, more closely knit by far than medieval Christendom: the supreme ecclesiastical and the supreme temporal authority—not only inseparable but indistinguishable to Mohammedan modes of thought, temporal authority being strictly subsidiary to the ecclesiastical—was vested in the (Sultan-)Caliph. Though this office was at times claimed by more than one ruler, it had in the course of time accrued to the Sultan of Turkey by a process of elimination—by the extinction of the other Mohammedan rulers of importance, such as the Mogul Emperor. That most of the World of Islam was under the heel of non-Mohammedan conquerors did not affect the theoretical unity. Rather it aided the Sultan to enforce his claims; with his rivals out of the way their subjects turned to him for leadership.

On November 23, 1914, the Sultan-Caliph took advantage of the world conflict to proclaim a Holy War (Jihad). The Allies as a whole and the British most of all were considerably perturbed by the possibilities involved, but the Western principle of nationalism, strange to say, proved far more potent than the religious appeal. Consequently the war divided rather than united the world



XIX. THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

of Islam; the non-Turkish portions for the most part failed to rally to the Sultan's cause; throughout the more remote sections of the Turkish Empire independent states sprang into being; and the Treaty of Sèvres (August 10, 1920) left the Sultan's domains in fragments. Even Asia Minor, except for a fraction of the northwest, was to be divided into spheres of influence, while the Zone of the Straits was placed under the official control of the Powers. Italy was especially elated at the results; for the first time in history she seemed on the point of acquiring an overseas dominion of real value. But the Treaty of Sèvres was to prove the high-water mark of Western supremacy, for it marked the beginning of a reaction against that supremacy which soon deprived the powers of their ill-gotten gains.

Alone among the defeated powers Turkey refused to play the rôle assigned her. The drama began May 15, 1919, with the disembarkation of a Greek force at Smyrna, the center of a territory in Asia Minor assigned to Greece and the outlet for Anatolia ("homeland" of the Ottoman Turks). The decision authorizing Venizelos to act had been reached a few days earlier by the Big Three—Wilson, Lloyd George, and Clemenceau—and the landing was effected under the guns of British, French, and American warships; the excuse was the immemorial existence of large numbers of Greeks along the coast. (Allied officials subsequently admitted that the Greeks were in the minority.) Though the British had already occupied the Dardanelles unopposed and the Italians had effected a peaceful landing at Adalia, the incursion of the Greeks was to result in a very different situation. In the first place, no sooner had the Greeks arrived than they began a sickening series of massacres. Even more important, perhaps, the Turks hated the Greeks without fearing them and were therefore much less prepared to accept them as masters. Finally, the Turks found a redoubtable champion in Mustafa Kemal. In short order the Greek occupation had developed into a full-fledged war.

The career of Mustafa Kemal, the commoner who almost single-handedly lifted Turkey from the depths of degradation, is one of the great romances of history. This new Cromwell was a radical from his youth up; he first attained prominence as chief of staff of the Third Army which coerced Abdul-Hamid during the Young Turk Revolution of 1908. The Dardanelles campaign added to his laurels. After the armistice, perhaps to get him out of the way, he was sent to Anatolia as inspector-general. Since the Turkish forces were in full process of disintegration the post did not appear to offer any possibility of distinction. The Greek invasion, however, provided him with an opportunity, which he capitalized by organizing not only an effective military establishment but a Nationalist party as well. The first fruit of his political activities was the Erzurum Congress of July, 1919. At the Congress of Sivas a National Committee of which he was elected president was organized. This committee took up its residence at Angora. The Nationalists were opposed by both the Allies and the Sultan, who was even more afraid of his domestic than of his foreign enemies; Mustafa Kemal was outlawed for his part in convening the Congress of Erzurum. In the fall of 1919 a Nationalist Pact, declaring for full Turkish sovereignty over the Turkish portions of the former empire, was drawn up

and adopted. At the invitation of the Allies, the Nationalists then adjourned to Constantinople.

At this point, not content with having sanctioned the ill-advised occupation of Smyrna, the Allies made the second of their tactical errors; March 15, 1920, they occupied Constantinople and proceeded to arrest and deport as many of the Nationalists as they could lay hands on. The Sultan was "persuaded" to denounce the Nationalists as rebels. The incident had exactly the opposite effect from that anticipated by its authors. The Nationalists who escaped and those who had remained in Angora set up an independent régime, declared the Constantinople Government at an end (April 29), and elected Mustafa Kemal president of the Assembly and commander-in-chief; a Law of Fundamental Organization was passed which proclaimed the sovereignty of the people and transformed Turkey into a republic, in reality, if not in theory.

In the meantime the conflict with Greece had been smoldering. When the Greeks began to extend their holdings beyond the confines of their original mandate, a general flocking of Turks to the colors resulted; the recruits were a motley rabble, not unlike the soldiers of the American Revolution—and imbued with much the same spirit. The first Greek offensive in June, 1920, was successful: a Greek force captured Brusa and later entered Mudania on the Sea of Marmara, a second took Adrianople, and a third occupied Uşak, in the direction of Angora. By May of 1921, however, the Allies had decided that they had better proclaim their neutrality.

During the summer of 1921 the Greeks advanced on Angora in a determined effort to finish off Turkish nationalism at its source. In this attempt they reached the Sakaria, a comparatively few miles from their objective, but here their offensive broke down; September 16 a general retreat began. The relatively insignificant engagement on the Sakaria may therefore be classed with the decisive battles of modern history. That the tide had turned was recognized by the French, who, much to the indignation of the British, sent Franklin-Bouillon to Angora to negotiate a private understanding (October 20); in return for economic concessions France agreed to withdraw from Cilicia and 80,000 Turks were thereby released for duty against the Greeks. Even before the French acted the Italians had concluded an agreement (March) and had withdrawn from Adalia (June). The British as usual continued to put their money on the wrong horse.

For the better part of a year, while the Turks were strengthening their forces, there was comparative calm; but in mid-August of 1922, when the Greeks once more resumed the offensive, the curtain went up on the last act. Hardly had the invaders got fairly under way when the Turks attacked at Afyon Karahisar (August 26), and by September 2 Mustafa Kemal was at Uşak. The Greeks retreated a hundred and sixty miles in eight days, and on September 9 the Turks reentered Smyrna without striking a blow. (Whether or not the great fire that at this point wiped out the most prosperous city of Asia Minor was the work of Greeks, there is no doubt that the Turks thought so.) Mustafa Kemal thereupon turned his attention to Thrace; but as Lloyd George had not even yet seen the handwriting on the wall, he found his path barred by General Harington at Chanaq. At this juncture Poincaré, who had

just declared for the neutrality of the Straits, suffered another change of heart and the French and Italians withdrew, leaving the British in the uncomfortable position of having to face the Turks alone, if at all. Though Lloyd George and Curzon put up a bold front, the Mudania Armistice of October 11 was in effect an abject capitulation. October 19 Lloyd George resigned as Prime Minister, and less than a month later the Sultan left Constantinople on a British man-of-war (November 17).

The Conference of Lausanne, which opened November 20, 1922, lasted (with an interim) until July 24, 1923, when peace was finally signed. The Allies surrendered their hold on Constantinople. Turkey recovered her foothold in Europe as far as the Matisa, including Adrianople; to the eastward she remained in undisputed possession of Asia Minor. All privileges enjoyed by foreigners in Turkey, such as the Capitulations, were canceled. In addition, the Greeks of Constantinople as well as those resident in Asia Minor were forced to emigrate *en masse*, in exchange for the Moslems of western Thrace—a novel and highly interesting solution of the minority problem.

This totally unexpected resurrection of a third-rate power in the face of the triumphant Allies was certainly not the least significant of the many astonishing developments of the Postwar Period. To be sure, the powers were war-weary—but so were the defenders. The Turks, however, had what their opponents lacked—a cause.

If the negative achievements of the Turkish Nationalists were surprising, their positive accomplishments were even more so. Mustafa Kemal, an ardent student of the French Revolution, had early resolved that in so far as he could bring it to pass Turkey should become a full-fledged "Western" state. Consequently the little provincial town of Angora, dirty and primitive, forthwith became the center of a cultural transformation second in extent and rapidity only to that achieved by Japan a half-century before.

On November 1, 1922, the National Assembly legislated the Sultanate out of existence and a few days later it elected a cousin of the former Sultan as Caliph. Within a year (October 29, 1923) a republic was formally proclaimed—the President, needless to say, was Mustafa Kemal—and less than six months thereafter, on March 3, 1924, the Caliphate itself was abolished. From then on reforms came thick and fast. Most surprising of all were the far-reaching "social" changes—for as every historian knows, it is a small matter to introduce constitutional changes as compared with inducing a people to abandon its everyday customs. Islam was deprived of its privileged position as the religion of state, missionary activity was suppressed, ecclesiastical seminaries and religious orders were abolished; Sunday replaced Friday as the day of rest, and the other religious holidays, together with the calendar, were westernized. The Latin alphabet was introduced, and Persian and Arabic derivatives and even the word "Ottoman" were banished from Turkish literature. The veil for women and the fez for men were done away with, along with the salaam. The harem, the eunuch system, and polygamy likewise went into the discard. State monopolies and nationalized industries were introduced, and foreign concessions were reduced to a minimum. Elementary compulsory education was established, and an elaborate system of higher education devised. Most aston-

ishing of all were the beginnings of feminine education. For the first time in Turkish history women were encouraged to take part in public life and permitted to mingle with men in public gatherings; in 1929 woman suffrage was introduced.

Throughout, Mustafa Kemal played the historic rôle of the benevolent and enlightened despot. Though for the most part he preserved republican forms, he was able to exercise a decisive influence over the course of events by virtue of the extensive powers granted the President by the constitution of April 20, 1924, and above all by reason of his great personal ascendancy. Where criticism threatened to be embarrassing, however, he did not scruple to beat down his opponents by force rather than by weight of argument—as offending journalists discovered to their sorrow. Since the President appoints the president of the Council (Prime Minister) Mustafa Kemal is supreme so long as he retains the backing of the Assembly. Most of the opposition, be it noted, came from above; the lack of opposition among the masses (to which the Kurds offer an outstanding exception) leads one to believe that, strange as it may seem, his ideas are not unduly distasteful to the majority of his countrymen.

UNREST IN NORTHWEST AFRICA

The chief reason the powers could ill afford to spend too much time worrying about the revival of Turkey was that in a great band stretching the breadth of the Eastern Hemisphere, from the shores of the Atlantic to the far distant waters of the Pacific, the world of Mohammed and Confucius was everywhere in ferment. Moreover, when the powers were not busy trying to quiet their subject nationalities, they were disputing among themselves, which, as has been seen, had no little to do with the Turkish fiasco.

One of the localities that gave rise to perennial disputes was the small international territory at the extreme northwest of Africa known as Tangier. No spot has enjoyed a more complex history in modern times. Conquered by Portugal in 1437, Tangier passed to England in 1662, only to be abandoned in 1684 as worthless. Its present status is the result of a gradual evolution that began in 1630, when France compelled the Sultan of Morocco to grant her nationals capitulatory privileges. The Sultan handed over the control of public health to representatives of the Western Powers in 1844.

The status of the settlement was still a subject of negotiation when the World War broke out; and during the war France assumed practically sovereign powers—which she attempted to legalize, without success, at the Peace Conference. France, Spain, and Great Britain, without consulting any of the other interested powers, concluded an agreement on December 18, 1923; this new régime went into force June 1, 1925. Italy and the United States, however, refused to recognize the change, and on July 25, 1928, a fresh set of agreements was concluded. Today the principal power in Tangier is exercised by Spain and France, with Great Britain and Italy playing subsidiary rôles; the United States, which was not consulted, still refuses to sanction the solution.

In the sixteenth century, Spain held title to the largest empire ever known to man; in 1898 she was relieved of the last remnants of her overseas domain (with the exception of her islands and her presidios¹ in Africa); six years later she concluded a Moroccan agreement with France and set out afresh on the path to empire. From the day in 1909 when her modern conquistadores sallied forth from their presidios to the conquest of their portion of Morocco they found themselves in hot water; military inefficiency and their ineptitude in dealing with the natives were the main causes. In the Jibalah, to the west, they attempted to secure control by negotiating a humiliating compact with a high-born bandit named Raysuni; while to the east they repulsed the advances of Abdul-Karimul-Khattabi, the most influential tribesman among the Riffs. This was unfortunate for the Spaniards, since the Riffs were sturdy Berber (white) stock who had never been tamed. Roman, Vandal, Visigoth, and Arab had come and gone—leaving the Rif a little, untouched island in their great empires.

When Abdul-Karim refused to pay his respects to the Spanish high commissioner, his son, Mohammed Abdul-Karim, was thrown into prison. Eventually the younger Abdul-Karim was released, and on the death of his father in 1920 he succeeded to the chieftainship. June 1, 1921, the Spanish, though warned by Abdul-Karim against so doing, advanced into the tribal territory of the Riffs, occupying Mount Abaran. That same night the Riffs attacked, and by the twenty-fifth the invaders had been driven in ignominious rout to the sheltering walls of Melilla. It was Adowa all over—only worse. The Spanish admitted the loss of nearly 15,000, and as they were in such a hurry that they simply threw their arms away, the Riffs found themselves abundantly supplied with modern weapons. Moreover the tribesmen demanded and received large sums for the return of the prisoners they had captured (about \$700,000 on January 27, 1923). When an enterprising American correspondent made his way into this terra incognita to inquire of Abdul-Karim, "Who devised the plans of victory?" the chieftain replied simply, "God—but I was there."

Although the Spanish even refused to allow medical supplies to be taken into the Rif by the British Red Crescent Society and although by January of 1922 they had upwards of 150,000 troops on Moroccan soil, they were not only unable to recover their ground but were actually compelled to retire into their presidios; Abdul-Karim set up his capital at Ajdir, under their very noses—only three miles from the presidio of Alhucemas. Early in 1925 he captured Raysuni and extended his sway over the Jibalah. Had he known when to stop, or had his followers permitted him to, the Republic of the Rif might have been as much a reality today as it was at the height of his successes.

Before making a settlement with the Spanish, unluckily for him, he undertook to measure swords with the French—a very different undertaking. The origins of the struggle are relatively unimportant. That the Franco-Spanish border was ill-defined provided the French with an excuse for intervention. The underlying cause for their not avoiding a conflict, as they might conceiv-

¹ Military posts.

ably have done (Abdul-Karim twice made them overtures), was the presence of a large number of unsubjugated Berbers in the Atlas, just across the Taza corridor from the Rif. The Berbers might well have joined hands with their kinsmen, and had Abdul-Karim succeeded in effecting such a juncture, Europe might have lost all North Africa, or even more; it was these very stakes, high enough to warrant a gamble, that lured the Riffs to destruction.

The Riffs had the best of it for a good three months, as one French outpost after another fell before their onslaught; and for a few hours on the night of July 29 they actually succeeded in cutting the Taza-Garsif Railroad. This really alarming event brought Pétain scurrying over from France. Of the ultimate outcome there could hardly be a doubt, *provided the French were willing to pay the price*—and many were far from willing. Moreover, as Abdul-Karim might have anticipated, the Riff successes led to alliance between France and Spain, previously the bitterest of rivals in Morocco. The doughty chieftain therefore found himself faced with a war on two fronts. Throughout the remainder of 1925, however, the 60,000 Riffs fought a drawn battle with their 280,000 Franco-Spanish adversaries. In 1926 the pressure exerted by the two powers on their Lilliputian antagonist had its desired effect; May 27 Abdul-Karim rode into the French lines and surrendered. For France the price of victory included an expenditure of 950,000,000 francs in 1925 alone, plus 400,000,000 francs' worth of munitions borrowed from the home forces.

In the long centuries of their activity as imperial powers neither France nor Spain ever met foemen more worthy of their steel. The Riff rising did not affect the *status quo*; but since the Riffs were much less numerous than the Turks and the Spanish much more numerous than the Greeks, it was highly significant as the first occasion when an unimportant, semibarbarous, and comparatively unorganized people successfully challenged a European power and raised high hopes throughout Islam.

Less strongly Islamic than either Morocco or Tunisia, Algeria was an area of comparative quiet in the North African storm zone, one where no organized opposition of a political nature developed. A partial explanation was the introduction of reforms (1918) that equalized the burden of taxation between natives and colonists, gave the natives a share in the government of mixed municipalities, and instituted a measure of self-government in the purely native communities.

Tunisia, where the natives sympathized with their colinguists in Egypt and organized a similar Nationalist (Dusturi) party, presented a somewhat more difficult problem. In 1920 (March) the Dusturi formulated a program of nine points, including an elective assembly with control over the purse, and a responsible government. When the Bey undertook to champion his subjects in April, 1922, a crisis arose; but it was quickly ended by a military demonstration on the part of the French. Though the authorities subsequently introduced various moderate reforms (July 13 and 14), the Dusturi continued to agitate. November 10, 1926, a few more reforms of a minor nature were granted.

DISCONTENT IN TRIPOLI AND EGYPT

When the Italians invaded the barren wastes of Tripoli in October, 1911, they initiated a phase of their colonial activity very similar to the doings of Spain in Morocco. Though they succeeded in wresting the country from Turkey and converting it into the Italian colony of Libya (Tripolitania and Cyrenaica), they never completely overcame the more effective opposition of the native Arabs and Berbers. Resistance centered in the Sanusiyah religious fraternity, which in the summer of 1915 drove the invaders back to a half-dozen points on the coast; thereafter the fortunes of war ebbed and flowed almost continuously. Lack of success and the fundamental uselessness of their efforts alike failed to appease the land-hunger of the Italians. Pride in their "achievements" kept them active, and in accordance with the Treaty of London, whereby they had been promised an increase of territory in Africa, a Franco-Italian agreement was signed September 12, 1919. As France surrendered her claims to the two salients between Ghadames, Ghat, and Tummo, Italy gained the entire caravan route from the Mediterranean to Lake Chad. December 6, 1925, Italy recognized the sovereignty of Egypt (that is, Great Britain) over the Ramlah wells, northwest of Sallum, and in return gained the sovereignty of the Jaghbug Oasis, one of the religious centers of the Sanusiyah fraternity. (July 15, 1924, also in accordance with the Treaty of London, Great Britain ceded Italy Jubaland—most of that portion of British Africa east of the 41st meridian.)

Shortly after the World War began, England discarded the fiction of Turkish overlordship in regard to Egypt and instead proclaimed a British protectorate. (Legally Turkey's rights did not lapse until the Treaty of Lausanne was signed.) The Egyptians remained quiescent during the period of hostilities because Egypt was the base of British operations in the Near East and because prior to the war the feeling of nationalism was confined to the intelligentsia. The war nevertheless had an important effect; Egyptian officials used the extraordinary wartime regulations as an excuse to fleece the fellah, and the British got the blame. Propaganda likewise made a considerable impression—the Anglo-French pronouncement of 1918, which called for a "complete and definitive enfranchisement of the peoples liberated from Turkish oppression," and the speeches of Wilson.

The Peace Conference had a further disquieting effect. Sa'd Pasha Zaghlul organized the Wafd ("Delegation") for the purpose of presenting the Egyptian cause; but although Arabia, India, Mesopotamia, and Armenia received sympathetic consideration, no one had an ear for Egypt. On the contrary, Zaghlul was deported to Malta. Two days later, March 10, 1919, English control was momentarily shaken by a rising, and the wave of anti-British feeling to which it was due enabled the Wafd to establish a permanent and well-endowed organization. That England did not find herself with a full-grown revolution on her hands was probably owing to the appointment of Allenby as high commissioner; as a result of his recent triumphs, Allenby enjoyed immense prestige in the Near East, and he insisted that Zaghlul be liberated and allowed to enter

into negotiations. But when British offers of autonomy were refused and when fresh disturbances developed, Zaghlul and five of his colleagues of the Wafd were arrested and deported to the Seychelles.

On February 28, 1922, Great Britain cut the Gordian knot by proclaiming the independence of Egypt, reserving for future discussion four matters: security of imperial communications, the defense of Egypt against foreign interference, protection of foreigners and minorities, and the Sudan. Legally, since the Egyptian Government refused to commit itself, the status of Egypt remained indefinite; but the Sultan proclaimed himself king, a constitution was promulgated (April 21, 1923), and elections were held. The Wafd obtained 188 seats to 27 for all other parties combined, and Zaghlul Pasha, who had returned in September, became Prime Minister.

Relations between Egypt and Great Britain continued strained. There was almost constant violence to British nationals, and on such occasions the British acted with a high hand. Moreover, Zaghlul remained decidedly intransigent on the outstanding principles in dispute. When invited by Ramsay MacDonald to a conference, he twice refused outright; and when he did accept, he would make no concessions whatsoever. On top of this came the assassination of Sir Lee Stack, Sirdar and Governor-General of the Sudan, November 19, 1924. The King and the Prime Minister at once expressed the most profound regret and a firm intent to see that justice was done, but the British did not wait for the Egyptians to act, and immediately dispatched reinforcements. On the twenty-second Allenby, escorted by an entire regiment of British cavalry, presented an ultimatum: among other things, Egypt was required to pay a fine of approximately \$2,500,000, withdraw all her officers and units from the Sudan, revise the rules for the employment of foreign officials, and agree to certain specified measures for the protection of foreigners. The Egyptians were given until the next day to decide. When the demands, with the exception of the fine, were rejected, the British occupied the customs offices at Alexandria, and Zaghlul resigned. On the twenty-ninth, however, the Egyptian authorities accepted the modified formula that they should seriously and sympathetically consider any advice from their foreign financial and judicial advisers, and the British troops were withdrawn from the customs offices. Only the Sudan issue, of those raised by the murder of Sir Lee, remained outstanding. An Egyptian appeal to the League was ignored, as not being an *international* affair—an informing commentary on the matter of Egyptian independence.

The resignation of Zaghlul was far from displeasing to the King; during 1925 and the first half of 1926 he excluded the Wafd from power and endeavored, by ruling through a Prime Minister of his own choice, to erect a personal government behind the façade of constitutionalism. Between July 13, 1927, and March 1, 1928, another attempt was made to clear up the problems at issue between Egypt and Great Britain. Chamberlain agreed that at the end of ten years the League should decide how much of Egypt was to be occupied by British troops, but up to that time he would admit of no restrictions; the Egyptian Government thereupon refused to discuss the matter further. While negotiations were in progress Zaghlul Pasha died.

From time to time, despite Egypt's hypothetical independence, Great Britain

even intervened in the internal affairs of the Egyptians, and here also she did not hesitate to enforce her dictates by show of force. At the end of April, 1928, she demanded that three projected pieces of legislation concerning public meetings, the carrying of firearms, and the election of village headmen (previously appointed) be dropped; when the Egyptian Government hesitated to comply, five British warships left Malta for Alexandria. A couple of months later the King dismissed the Prime Minister and a second period of "personal rule" began.

Between June 18, 1929, and May 8, 1930, a still further attempt was made to settle Anglo-Egyptian accounts. This time it was agreed that British troops should be restricted to the canal zone, and all other issues, except the matter of the Sudan, were settled; but when Henderson refused to allow the unrestricted immigration of Egyptians into the Sudan, negotiations again broke down. Soon after, the King entered on a third period of "personal rule," and October 23, 1930, a new and less liberal constitution was proclaimed.

THE FRENCH MANDATE IN SYRIA

By the Treaty of Lausanne Turkey surrendered her rights over her subject peoples with the exception of the Kurds. This acquiescence merely legalized a series of *faits accomplis*; Egypt had passed under British rule long before, and during the war the Sultan's remaining non-Turkish possessions had broken away of themselves or had been wrested from him by the Allies.

Prior to the war the area at the eastern end of the Mediterranean was popularly known as Syria. This area is sharply delimited geographically from the surrounding regions; nevertheless, it is not a unit physically, and not since the dawn of history has "Syria" and nothing but Syria constituted a political unit. Moreover, the inhabitants ranged from the westernized business men of Lebanon to the Ruwala who lived the changeless life of the steppe, the wild highland Druses, and such strange, esoteric sectaries as the Ansarians and the Ismailians. The most numerous of the eighteen antagonistic sects were the Sunnite (orthodox) Moslems, the next most important were the Maronites (former Monothelete Christians), the largest Ottoman community paying allegiance to the Vatican. In many regions feudalism flourished and was condoned, unofficially if not officially, by the authorities.

As a result of the war northern Syria became a French mandate—though the majority of the Syrians at the Peace Conference clamored for independence. The inhabitants were particularly incensed that they, who were on the whole comparatively advanced, should be refused the liberty granted the backward province of Hejaz, and in all but a fraction of the region, consequently, the mandatory power had to take possession by force. These circumstances were a fitting prelude to what followed, for the administration of Syria in the earlier part of this period proved the least profitable and the most inglorious episode in the entire course of French imperialism.

The postwar history of Syria began with the erection of an Arab National State centering in Damascus; at its head was the Amir Faisal. When the French arrived, they overthrew the Arab Government. What were they to put

in its place? A centralized government? A large number of small states? These were the questions with which they were confronted, once they had determined not to leave well enough alone, and as they soon discovered, it was not an easy decision to make. In any case they did not appear to use any great degree of wisdom in solving the problem. On the plea of protecting the minorities, French Syria was split up into five (later four) states: Great Lebanon, the Alaouite,² the Jabal (Jabalud-Duruz or Djebel Druse), Damascus, and Aleppo; the last two were subsequently united as the State of Syria. The dispositions were not even stable; the French commissioners were forever rearranging or on the point of rearranging their dispositions, and then undoing what they had just done. And each decision was a little worse than its predecessor. Great Lebanon, which centered in Beirut and was designed to be a Christian state, included by annexation various territories containing only 109,866 Christians to 273,361 non-Christians (Sunnites, Matawilah, and Druses). It was officially independent—but a Frenchman was put in as governor. The Alaouites, who had a state in which they constituted 176,000 out of a total of 278,000, were the only element in Syria really satisfied.

Having imposed a questionable organization on their new "wards," the French proceeded to make themselves odious by unpopular administrative measures. First of all, they forced the people to give up the Egyptian pound as the basis of their circulating medium and to accept instead the franc. Since the franc fluctuated in value—while the pound remained stable—the Syrians suffered considerable losses. Second, they made the study of French compulsory in the schools. Third, they made serious inroads on the principle of civil liberties. Martial law, open or disguised, was maintained. Suspects were imprisoned without trial and deported to the Island of Arwad or to one of the French overseas possessions. Members of the Lebanese Administrative Council were banished for publishing a manifesto demanding independence. Espionage was employed to gain evidence against offenders. The press was muzzled, and public meetings were forbidden. Fourth, the French kept their own personnel in office. Fifth and worst of all, they were obviously biased, and favored their coreligionists at every turn. Thus General Gouraud sided with the Catholics, while General Sarrail carried on an anticlerical campaign. Unfortunately for him and for France, he also chose to antagonize the Druses.

This comparatively small but extremely able people were a nonproselytizing, esoteric sect, feudal and clannish in organization; they had refrained from resisting the French overlordship, and in return for a promise of autonomy under a native governor and permission to bear arms had signed a treaty agreeing to keep the peace. It is an ironical commentary on the difficulties and dangers inherent in assuming the white man's burden that the French officer on the spot, the man who laid the grounds for the Druse revolt, was *in a way* one of the ablest administrators in Syria. A fitting subdeputy for Poincaré, Captain Carbillet took his duties with the utmost seriousness—too seriously—and he had a veritable passion for accomplishment. He filled the treasury, reduced the number of officials, built a hundred and twenty-five miles of motor road for the single automobile in the district and an equal length of irrigation

² Eventually the Government of Lattaquié (Ladikiya, Ladhikiya)

canals, opened thirty-two schools, and reformed the land system in favor of the peasants to such good effect that a million vine stocks were planted. These improvements, however, were little appreciated by the upper-class Druses—and the means by which they were effected still less so. The public works cost nothing, for they were constructed by forced labor (*corvée*); but whereas, under the Turks, the *corvées* had been limited to four days a year per man, under Captain Carbillet they averaged twelve days. His imported teachers fleeced the natives. He instituted a system of passes and forbade the Druses to travel from village to village without permission. He compelled the villagers to receive him in state whenever he appeared; if they failed to do so they were fined and the nobles were imprisoned or put to breaking stone on the roads. Finally, by admitting the peasants to the vote, Captain Carbillet got himself elected governor. In short, he was "a perfect example, in French uniform, of the legendary type of Prussian officer" and "treated the Druses with a rigour which his most truculent predecessors among the Mamluk Sultans and the Ottoman Padishahs had hesitated to use in their dealings with that redoubtable people."

When General Sarrail appeared in Syria, he antagonized the Catholics by refusing to treat them with special honor, he stirred up the Lebanese by dissolving their Council and changing their form of government, and he adopted a course of action that drove the Druses to desperation. For three months he persistently and brusquely refused even to listen to their complaints and to their requests—many times repeated and backed by the French Resident—that Captain Carbillet should be replaced by a native governor. When he finally deigned to take notice, it was to send the following order to his Delegate at Damascus: "I request you to summon to Damascus the conspirators, more especially Hamad Bey, Nasif Bey, 'Abdul-Ghaffar, and Sultan Atrash, on the pretext [*sic*] of receiving their demands. You will inform them that I hold them responsible for any disorder which may occur in the Jabal, and that I shall keep them in forced residence at a place which you will choose for me." The Delegate protested as vigorously as possible but when the instructions were repeated did as he was ordered.

July 18, 1925, came the Druse Revolt—in many ways a repetition of the Rif affair. In less than a month the French had lost considerable matériel and had admitted to having suffered 800 casualties. When the Druses attempted to raid Damascus, the authorities, jumping to the conclusion that the raiders had been invited, attempted to arrest a number of prominent Damascans. Most of the would-be victims escaped, fled to the Jabal, and allied with the Druses—a phenomenon novel in Syrian history and an evil portent for the French. Throughout September and early October the latter were driven back on Damascus; on the eighteenth the Druses began penetrating the city; on the nineteenth, without warning, the French suddenly withdrew their garrison into the citadel and systematically shelled the city. Though the foreigners, protected by the insurgents, suffered no injury, the civilian deaths were estimated at from 150 to 1,200, the property damage at from 70,000,000 to 80,000,000 francs. These events gave an immense impetus to revolt among the Moslems in other parts of Syria; to meet the emergency the French took the dubious step of

arming the Christians. As the insurgents were experts in guerrilla warfare, the only result was the utter desolation of the battlefields; the oasis of Damascus, a garden paradise famed throughout the world, became a desert like the surrounding country, and the city itself an armed camp.

By this time, the French were beginning to wake up to the fact that they had better do something constructive, and Sarrail was replaced by Jouvenel. Two days after he arrived, Jouvenel announced (December 4, 1925) that the Lebanon Representative Council was to draft a constitution, and May 24, 1926, the Lebanese Republic was accordingly proclaimed—with appropriate guarantees for French control. From then on the policy of France in Syria was much like that of Britain in Egypt—an alternation of kicks and caresses.

Attempts to organize the districts still at peace were not noticeably successful, and the attempts to come to terms with the Druses and Sunnites were a flat failure. Jouvenel insisted that the insurgents (in spite of their treaty rights) must first lay down their arms, and he refused unconditional amnesty to their leaders; while the insurgents demanded that the destinies of the districts annexed to Lebanon should be settled by self-determination. In mid-February of 1926 hostilities broke out afresh; again the insurgents forced their way into Damascus, and again the city was bombarded (May 8-9). The street fighting in behalf of the French was carried on by irregulars who indulged in all manner of depredations. Twelve hundred dwellings and 400 shops, valued at \$3,500,000, were destroyed, and a thousand civilians perished.

In February an extraordinary meeting of the League of Nations Mandates Commission met to consider the situation. Since France was one of the most powerful members of the League, the commission was exceedingly diplomatic; but it at least made clear to anyone who could read between the lines that it did not approve of the French line of conduct.

By April, 1927, France had worn down the insurgents by sheer weight of numbers, and an amnesty of February 16, 1928—from which thirty-nine persons, however, were excluded—helped to put an end to the revolt. A number of the rebels nevertheless preferred to seek refuge in Palestine, Transjordan, and the Nejd. On February 16 also the French raised the state of siege in Damascus, released their political prisoners, and abolished the censorship. A Constituent Assembly was convened in June; but as the constitution that it drew up was unacceptable to the French, the Assembly was dissolved and the high commissioner promulgated a constitution of his own (May 22, 1930). Organic statutes were at the same time promulgated for the Jabal and for the Government of the Alaouites at Lattaquié. On the whole, admitted that France encountered or created a situation intrinsically difficult of solution, her administration of Syria does not bear out the popular impression that the French are peculiarly apt in dealing with natives.

THE BRITISH MANDATES IN SYRIA

While the French were bludgeoning their way toward a doubtful success in northern Syria, the army officers in the British mandate in southern Syria were making it a point of honor to go about armed with nothing more dan-

gerous than swagger sticks—one is reminded of the British officer in the war who dumfounded the Germans by leading his men to the attack dribbling a football. Did the difference in attitude between the two mandatories mean that Britain was faced with a less difficult task? Not at all. It was merely cumulative evidence that popular opinion concerning their relative ability to handle natives is false.

True, the British enjoyed a certain strategic advantage at the start, for Allenby's resounding victory had increased their prestige tremendously. But the British in Palestine were likewise confronted with a race problem, and in addition they found their hands tied—legally, morally, or psychologically—by a number of pledges and engagements. In the first place, there was the promise to establish a Jewish National Home in Palestine made by Balfour (November 2, 1917). The Balfour Declaration had been endorsed by the Allies in general and by the League of Nations; and by it the British stood pledged to a large number of Zionist Jews throughout the world who wielded no little power and influence. The Arabs in Palestine believed that England was committed to the cause of Arab independence by the McMahon correspondence (October 24, 1914, on), as a result of which the Allies had obtained invaluable assistance during the war, and by the Anglo-French Declaration of November 7, 1918: "The object aimed at by France and Great Britain . . . is the complete and definite emancipation of the peoples so long oppressed by the Turks, and the establishment of National Governments and administrations deriving their authority from the initiative and free choice of the indigenous populations. . . . Far from wishing to impose on the populations . . . any particular institutions, they are only concerned to ensure by their support and by adequate assistance the regular working of Governments and administrations freely chosen by the populations." As has been seen, the French did not let this declaration stand in their way—and neither did the British.

By the terms of their mandate from the League the British were also committed in four ways: they were to secure a Jewish National Home in Palestine, they were to safeguard the other peoples in Palestine (that is, the Arabs), they were to introduce self-governing institutions (though no date was set), and lastly, they had the duty "of preserving existing rights and of securing free access to the Holy Places." Together, these four obligations constituted a task well-nigh, if not quite, impossible of accomplishment.

The Arab population, which constituted nearly 90 per cent of the whole and which had seen independence achieved by Arabs of lesser advancement (for example, those of the Hejaz), were from the first strenuously opposed to the mandate. Their discontent increased when the British proposed to erect a governing Council with only ten Arabs to two Jews, and they rendered the attempt to establish self-government abortive by refusing to cooperate. In 1920 and 1921 there were riots in which over a hundred lives were lost. But although the British were if anything more autocratic than the French, they were less inclined to play favorites, and disorder in Palestine decreased at the very time French Syria was in the throes of revolt. In 1925 the high commissioner was able to report that the British forces had been reduced to a regiment of cavalry, a squadron of airplanes, an armored-car company (some of

the planes and cars were stationed in Transjordan), and 500 gendarmes. The gendarmerie was subsequently disbanded; and in 1926 the cavalry was withdrawn.

Though apparently allayed, the fundamental discontent of the Arabs persisted—and ultimately increased. The main issue was Jewish immigration, which Great Britain was pledged to facilitate. At the time of the armistice there were only 55,000 Jews in Palestine; but during the next eight years, although the British laid down fairly stringent regulations, 90,000 more were admitted—mostly from southeastern Europe. If this sort of thing went on—and for all the Arabs knew, it well might—only a comparatively few years would elapse before the Jews would be in the majority. That the British were bent on obtaining just such a result was a conclusion the Arabs not unnaturally drew from the utterances of certain Zionists with whom the Government at Westminster was in constant communication. "I say frankly we hope that one day . . . there will be a Jewish majority in this country [Palestine]," said Mr. Sacher, chairman of the Palestine Zionist Executive. Already the Jews had almost tripled their holdings of land—much of it the best in Palestine—and the Arabs were beginning to suffer economically. A factor that greatly complicated the situation was nationalism, which flourished apace under the stimulus of fear—the same sort of fear that helped to produce the World War.

This situation resulted in a recrudescence of violence just when the French had finally succeeded in battering down the opposition in northern Syria. It was an ominous sign that the conflict began in the religious sphere, where until the moment in question there had been little or no friction. By unfortunate coincidence certain of the Arab Holy Places were sacred to the Jews as well; in particular, the Jewish Wailing Wall (all that remained of their temple) was an integral part of a Moslem holy inclosure, and the Moslems owned the adjacent pavement. By immemorial usage the Jews had acquired the right to perform religious ceremonies on this spot.

The seeds of trouble were sown in 1928. On September 24, the Jewish Day of Atonement, a screen and various other novel implements of the Jews were discovered on the pavement. The Moslems concluded that the Jews were attempting to alter the *status quo*, and went out of their way to make themselves obnoxious by performing their own ceremonies as close to the inner side of the wall as possible. The Government attempted to effect a reconciliation, but without success. On August 15, 1929, a group of young Jews marched to the wall, raised the Jewish flag, and sang an anthem. The next day the Moslems staged a counter-demonstration by displacing various religious tokens belonging to the Jews. Violence flared up on the seventeenth. The way in which it began is an illuminating illustration of how under stress of religious fanaticism small events lead to greater. When a Jewish boy was seriously stabbed while attempting to recover a football from the garden of an Arab, an affray resulted in which eleven Jews and fifteen Arabs were wounded. Disorder spread rapidly, and on the twenty-third a full-fledged riot developed. Between the twenty-third and the twenty-ninth 133 Jews were killed and 198 taken to hospitals; 116 Arabs were killed and 232 received hospital treatment.

As the situation became threatening the British rushed reinforcements to

Palestine, and soon had matters under control. A thousand suspects (over 90 per cent of them Arabs) were brought to trial. Twenty-two Arabs were sentenced to life imprisonment, and three were executed: one Jew, sentenced to death, eventually received ten years. Many Arab villages were fined.

This time it was the turn of the British to undergo a League inquiry, and on October 20, 1930, the Government at Westminster issued a declaration. They stated that they had "always regarded as totally erroneous" the conception that "the principal feature of the Mandate" was "the passages regarding the Jewish National Home." They endorsed the League statement: that "the obligations laid down by the Mandate in regard to the two sections of the population are of equal weight." They affirmed that "the important question of the establishment of a measure of self-government in Palestine must, in the interests of the community as a whole, be taken in hand without further delay." They declared that transfers of land must be restricted, and that "account should be taken of Arab as well as Jewish unemployment in determining the rate at which immigration should be permitted."

The White Paper of October, 1930, raised a storm among the Jews; there was a crop of resignations among Zionist officials, and the Jewish National Council in Palestine declared that it would have nothing to do with the projected Legislative Council. Ramsay MacDonald thereupon wrote a public letter to Dr. Weizmann, the Zionist president, in which he indicated that the British were about to see what additional land could be made available for the Jews in Palestine, that they did not intend, unless in exceptional cases, to transfer Arabs from the hill country to the (fertile) plains, and that they were not going to stop Jewish immigration. The result of this second pronouncement was a storm in Arab quarters. As the net result of both, Arabs and Jews alike decided that British policy was entirely opportunistic, and Britain lost considerable prestige in Palestine at a moment when she needed it badly.

In Transjordan, the remaining portion of Syria, Great Britain erected another mandatory government, with a capital at Amman (August, 1920). Since there was no Jewish question, Britain agreed to recognize the "independence" of this Arab state as soon as practicable. Nevertheless, the treaty concluded on February 20, 1928, made no mention of independence, and instead provided for a considerable measure of British control. The reasons were that Transjordan was a highly artificial creation, with no natural frontiers, and that the British wanted to protect the inhabitants from their tyrannical ruler. The natives, however, failed to appreciate this parental solicitude, and on July 25, 1928, they entered into a National Pact.

FROM CHRYSALIS TO BUTTERFLY: IRAQ

Britain's third mandate in the Near East was Iraq (Mesopotamia)—of peculiar interest as the only mandate that has thus far attained statehood. In administering this ancient cultural area the British encountered opposition from four main sources. First of all, there was the dispute with the United States over the question of the Open Door. Iraq was vastly more important economically

than any other mandate, and throughout the entire course of its history the leitmotif has been Oil. In 1922 the Americans surrendered their claims in return for 50 per cent of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's share in the rights of the Turkish Petroleum Co.

With the natives—stirred by the Wilsonian principle of self-determination—the British experienced almost as much difficulty as the French experienced in Syria. By the end of 1919 disturbances had developed, and in the summer of 1920 a revolt of no mean proportions swept the country. Throughout the month of August the situation remained critical. Gradually the British regained the upper hand, though in 1921 they still had 100,000 troops in Iraq—as contrasted with the former Turkish garrison of only 16,000—and they had spent approximately \$500,000,000. After considerable hesitation as to what policy to follow, they decided to set up Faisal, ejected from Syria by the French, as king! The proposed monarch was a brother of the Amir of Transjordan and a son of King Husayn of the Hejaz. Though destitute, therefore, of any real national backing, he was elected by the Council of State July 11, 1921, and duly installed August 23. October 10, 1922, he signed a treaty with Great Britain whereby Iraq was proclaimed an “independent” but “protected” state; much to the disgust of many natives a not inconsiderable measure of British control was recognized. Should Iraq be admitted to the League, however, the mandate was to cease. A Constituent Assembly was summoned, which voted an Organic Law July 10, 1924.

The third controversy of importance in which Britain engaged with regard to Iraq was the argument with Turkey—centering on the status of the Mosul vilayet (province)—as to where the northern boundary of the mandate should be drawn. Here again oil was the question at issue, for as Mosul contained rich deposits of the precious fluid, the British wanted the frontier to run somewhat north of the vilayet. Geographically, the region was more clearly a part of Mesopotamia than of Turkey, though there were several ways in which it might have been divided. The population was Kurdish, Turkish, and Arabic, with a sprinkling of Satan-worshipping Yezidis, Nestorian Christians, and Chaldeans (Uniates owing allegiance to the Vatican). In the city of Mosul (population 100,000) the Arabs predominated. Some of the factions proved hostile to the Iraq Government, and they were encouraged to resist by the Angora authorities, who did not want any Kurds left outside their boundaries to stir up the Kurds within. After the British and Turks had argued and fought over the matter for several years, the Government at Westminster finally referred the controversy to the League (August 6, 1924).

A League Commission found “no national ‘Iraqi’ feeling . . . except among a section of the Arabs. . . . There can at the same time be no doubt that the Turkish Government’s assertions . . . are incorrect.” The positive sentiments of the inhabitants were found to be remarkably diverse, but the commission concluded that the area should be divided along the line of the Lesser Zab. Later, a committee reported that in their opinion either Mosul should be divided as the commission had recommended or Iraq should receive the whole district south of the so-called Brussels Line (which did not differ greatly from the administrative boundary of the vilayet). December 16, 1925, the League

Council decided in favor of the latter alternative. The Turks refused to recognize the award, and open war seemed inevitable; but by a treaty of January 5, 1926, with Great Britain, to which Iraq was also a party, they finally accepted the *fait accompli* (with one unimportant exception). In return Iraq agreed to pay the Turks 10 per cent of all royalties on oil.

Partly because Iraq has no geographical frontier to the south, the British and the natives came into almost continual conflict with the Nejd. The western frontier was settled with France without undue difficulty.

In September, 1929, the British informed the Iraq Government that Great Britain would unconditionally recommend the admission of Iraq to the League in 1932. On June 30, 1930, a treaty was accordingly negotiated establishing the relations that should obtain between the two countries after the termination of the mandate. October 3, 1932, Iraq was admitted to the League and the provisions of the Treaty of 1930 came into force. Iraq is to consult and cooperate with Great Britain on foreign affairs; if either becomes involved in war the other will come to its aid; and Great Britain is entitled to maintain air bases in and to transport troops across Iraq territory. As with these exceptions Iraq is free to shape her own destiny, she enjoys a considerably greater degree of freedom than Egypt—but Iraq has no Suez Canal.

REVOLT IN THE DESERT

Some of the natives of the Arabian Peninsula proper took a not unimportant part in the World War, for which they demanded and obtained substantial rewards. King Husayn of the Hejaz received a subsidy of nearly \$1,000,000 a month in gold from the British, and the subsidies to some of the other Arab princes kept up until March 31, 1924.

From Iraq to the Red Sea by way of the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean the situation in Arabia continued unchanged after the war. Koweit remained "an independent principality under British protection" (British declaration of November 3, 1914). Al Hasa remained under the control of the Sultan of the Nejd. Qatar, Trucial Oman, Oman proper (Masqat), the Hadhramaut, Aden, the Aden Protectorate, and the Aden Hinterland remained more or less directly under British rule. In the hinterland in general their authority reached the vanishing-point. In the case of Aden, for instance, the British did not exercise effective control more than ten miles from Aden itself; the chiefs of the Protectorate, though subsidized by the British, were in reality autonomous; the chiefs of the hinterland stood in even looser treaty relation to the British, who had nothing to do with the population at all. The hinterland of the Hadhramaut was not even entered by a foreigner before 1931.

In the Yemen the Zaydi Imam of San'a continued his part in the World War even after his Turkish overlords and supporters had capitulated. When he reinvaded the Aden Protectorate, the British handed over the ports of Luhayyah and Hudaydah, which they had occupied, to the Idrisites, thereby cutting the Zaydi off from the sea. Other Arab principalities in addition to San'a—Mecca (the Hejaz), Sabya, Riyad, and Ha'il³—asserted their independence following

³ As can be seen, most of these "principalities" were primarily fortresses.

the war. In imitation of their Western masters in the arts of civilization they thereupon staged a comic-opera struggle for supremacy (not always so comic). The principal contestants were the King of the Hejaz, custodian of the Holy Places of Mecca, and Ibn Sa'ud, the Wahabi Amir. Though both were rulers of theocracies and hence possessed the essential basis for political success in Arabia, Ibn Sa'ud was in addition the leader of a fraternity of Puritanical zealots.

Abdul 'Aziz ibn Sa'ud, scion of a long line of Wahabi conquerors, began life as a refugee in Koweit. At the opening of the twentieth century, with a band of only 200 followers, he seized Riyad. In 1913 he conquered Al Hasa, and in 1915 he accepted the protection of the British, by whom he was recognized as "independent" ruler of the Nejd and so on. Like a number of his fellow dictators of the East, he showed himself an advocate of westernization—in so far as his Wahabi followers would permit—and made a noteworthy attempt to persuade the desert dwellers to abandon their age-old, nomadic existence in favor of agriculture. In 1919 he successfully measured swords with the forces of King Husayn of the Hejaz at the Battle of Turabah. Both combatants had been supplied with arms by the British—Husayn through the Foreign Office and Ibn Sa'ud through the India Office.¹ In 1921 he conquered the Rachid of Ha'il, who had placed themselves under the protection of the Hejaz. After Husayn had alienated the British by refusing to sign the peace treaties, by declaring himself King of the Arabs, and by declining English protection, Ibn Sa'ud invaded the Hejaz (August 29, 1924). In little over a month King Husayn abdicated in favor of his son (October 3). The new ruler held on until December 18, 1925, whereupon the Sultan of the Nejd was "elected" King of the Hejaz. On January 8, 1926, he was installed, and a year later the Nejd was proclaimed a kingdom. May 20, 1927, a new treaty was signed between the King of Hejaz-Nejd and the British, unlike the Treaty of 1915, it was negotiated on a basis of complete equality. The successes of Ibn Sa'ud were a remarkable tribute to his ability, for they were based almost entirely on personal skill and in no way on a ready-made political machine.

By March of 1926 the Imam of San'a had made himself master of a considerable portion of the domains of the Indrisi Sayyid of Sabya. The Tihamah coast of the Asir to a point north of Midia, including Luhayyah and Hudaydah, had fallen into his power. By October 21, 1926, when the Sayyid, fearful of losing his entire holdings, solicited and obtained the protection of Ibn Sa'ud for the rest of Asir, there were only two independent states—Hejaz-Nejd and Yemen—left in Arabia. Though the Imam was incomparably the weaker of the two rulers, he had strengthened his position by a treaty with Italy (September 2, 1926), which had a foothold in Eritrea just across the Red Sea. In 1927 he was still in possession of a portion of the Aden Protectorate. When the Zaydi raided some of the protected chieftains in 1928, the British retaliated with air raids. The Imam evacuated the Protectorate and sued for peace, but continued to retain a foothold in the Aden Hinterland. In January, 1929, he signed a commercial treaty with the Soviets.

• THE MIDDLE EAST IN TURMOIL

In the first decade of the twentieth century the Anglo-Persian Oil Co. obtained concessions in the Karun Valley and the Baktiari area in southwestern Persia. The commitments involved were many times greater than all the other British and foreign capital invested in Persia and Turkey. Moreover, since the oil was in part destined for their fleet the British considered that they had vital interests at stake. For these reasons and because Persia flanked India and Mesopotamia (Iraq), England made strenuous efforts during and after the war to obtain control; British expeditionary forces appeared on the scene, and \$1,125,000 a month was expended in subsidies. In 1919 an agreement was signed that made Persia a virtual British protectorate. Britain's plans for domination fell through, however, when the Bolsheviks invaded Persia and negotiated a treaty and when Riza Khan induced the Cossack Division to overthrow the Government (February 21, 1921).

Riza Khan was an even more romantic figure than Mustafa Kemal—whom he greatly resembled as a historical figure—in that he began life in the ranks and rose to a throne. For a while after executing his *coup d'état* he was content to remain commander-in-chief and Minister of War. He created an effective military machine that he wielded to maintain the independence of Persia and put down insubordination with a vigor long foreign to Persian governments; Kurds, Turks, Alurs, Turcomans, and Arabs, who had previously enjoyed autonomy, alike felt his heavy hand, and the British thought best to withdraw their forces. Yet he too favored the introduction of Western ideas and engaged a corps of American financial experts under Dr. Millspaugh (1922), who rapidly put Persian finances on a sound footing. When the Shah left on an extended tour of Europe (1923), Riza Khan decided to bring about a revolution and get himself elected President. A council of notables declared for a republic, but because of the separation of Church and State by the Turkish Republic, the move was thwarted by the Persian divines. Riza Khan accommodated himself to this turn of events, forbade any mention of a republic, and on December 12, 1925, some weeks after the Shah had been deposed, was himself elected Shah by the Constituent Assembly. Three days later he took the oath of office and ascended the peacock throne.

On September 7, 1923, Persia concluded a treaty with Afghanistan, and on April 22, 1926, she concluded a similar treaty with Turkey. Not long after, she announced that the Capitulations—which entitled foreigners to judicial privileges—would be abolished May 10, 1928. France gave her consent, but England refused. The Persian Government thereupon intimated that it would decline to allow the British to establish their projected air line across southern Persia, and when the appointed day arrived, the British gave in. The abolition of the Capitulations was an event of more than internal interest, for it marked the *début* of the new Persia as a fully independent power—the second that had arisen outside Europe since the Peace of Paris. Early in 1933, the Riza Khan Government canceled the concessions of the Anglo-Persian Oil Co., but later still made a compromise.

The first fully independent extra-European state to arise in the Postwar Era was Afghanistan, which for forty years had submitted its foreign affairs to British supervision. This change in status came about as a sequel to the Third Afghan War. February 20, 1919, Amir Amanullah succeeded to the throne of his murdered father. Since the Russian menace, which had so long kept Afghanistan tied to Britain had been removed by the Bolsheviks he decided to attack India. On May 3 the Afghans accordingly advanced against the British post at the end of the Khyber Pass. In less than a month, despite heat and cholera, the British had put 340,000 men in the field, had established a battle front a thousand miles long, had routed the Afghans in a nine days' campaign, and had constrained the rash Amir to sue for peace. Negotiations were concluded on August 8; but strange to say, the treaty, though it canceled all previous engagements, made no mention of Afghan foreign affairs.

Amanullah, like Mustafa Kemal and Riza Khan, was an advocate of westernization, but in a country like Afghanistan he had an even more difficult task. Nevertheless, he went so far as to proclaim a constitution that provided for universal compulsory education and which emancipated his women subjects (1923). The intense hostility aroused by his acts came to a climax when he attempted to bring about the unveiling of (high-class) women and to force his highland chieftains to adopt Western dress. Early in 1929 he was driven from Kabul by revolutionists, and abdicated October 6, his uncle, Nadir Khan, recaptured the capital, and on November 15 was recognized by the British as Nadir Shah. Six months later the new ruler ordered the election of a National Assembly that was to consist of twenty-five men between the ages of twenty-five and fifty-five who could read and write; exceptions to these requirements were to be made in the case of individuals of outstanding reputation! When the Great Depression arrived in this far-distant corner of the globe, Nadir Shah began to find it difficult to make both ends meet.

THE BIRTH PANGS OF MOTHER INDIA

Final proof of the fundamentally quiescent state of India seemed to be furnished during the World War when England had less than 30,000 troops in the peninsula; surely if India had been seriously disaffected she would have grasped such a golden opportunity. Further and perhaps even better proof was furnished by a four years' revolt—a result of the Third Afghan War—in the highlands of the Northwest Frontier Province. As will be recalled, Curzon had "organized" this district by subsidizing a native militia. When the war broke out, the British withdrew their militia from Waziristan—whereupon the Mahsuds rose in insurrection. The revolt continued long after the Afghans had made peace. In 1919-20 alone, 298 British subjects were killed in raids into India proper, 392 were wounded, and 463 kidnapped. An expeditionary force of 29,256 combatants and 34,987 noncombatants was dispatched (although owing to the difficulties of communication the striking force was only 8,500 strong), and with great difficulty and at enormous expense the tribesmen were finally subdued. The significant thing was that the infantry was entirely Indian and that the interior of India made no attempt to revolt.

Indirectly the World War affected India to a not inconsiderable extent. The surrender of Townshend at Kut-el-Amara was a damaging blow to British prestige. The Moslems of India were inclined to sympathize with their coreligionists in Turkey and, to the consternation of the British, came to an understanding with the Hindus. Even the doctrines of Wilson exercised an influence. And above all the British feared the possible effects of Bolshevism.

In 1917 Mr. Montagu, Secretary of State for India, delivered what promised to be an epoch-making pronouncement: "The policy of his Majesty's Government . . . is that of increased association of Indians in every branch of the administration and the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realization of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire." An exhaustive report on conditions in India, the Montagu-Chelmsford Report, was accordingly followed by the Government of India Act of 1919. This measure was by many compared with the Reform Bill of 1832, and in so far as it ameliorated the lot of a majority of British subjects the analogy was correct. The government of British India was refashioned from top to bottom; in particular, local government, intended as a training-ground for Indians in self-government, and the central Government were further distinguished.

The majority in nearly all the provincial legislatures was to be elective (less than a third of the members were to be nominated), the elections were to be direct, and the constituencies mainly territorial. On the basis of a property qualification some 5,000,000 Indians were given the vote. This was very far from making India a democracy, but at least it was a step in that direction. Furthermore, provincial legislatures were given the control over the purse and that of certain "transferred" matters—education, sanitation, excise taxes, and so on; but by a new and curious practice, known as the diarchy, certain other matters—such as police and judicial matters—were "reserved" to the British authorities.

In the sphere of the central Government there was no diarchy. The legislature was to be bicameral. In the lower house, the Legislative Assembly, the majority was also to be elective; but the representatives were to be returned on the basis of a higher property qualification. The upper house, the Council of State, was to comprise sixty members, thirty elected by the natives (on the basis of a still higher property qualification), three elected by British interests, and the remainder nominated members.

Such was the normal machinery of government provided by the Act of 1919—but an extremely important reservation remains to be mentioned. The Viceroy and the provincial governors were authorized in an emergency to veto or enact any measure, subject to royal approval, if they considered such action essential to public security and tranquillity. The apparent concessions were therefore little more than a polite gesture; in the ultimate issue England remained in absolute control.

The Act of 1919 also provided that at the end of ten years a fresh study of conditions in India should be made, with a view to determining what further changes, if any, should be desirable. Simultaneously with the enactment of the new constitution a committee of which Mr. Rowlatt was chairman introduced

legislation into the English Parliament that accorded the Indian administration increased powers to put down lawlessness.

For a number of reasons, far from showing any gratitude, India was anything but contented and peaceful under her new system of government. The constitution of 1919 was denounced as a delusion and a snare; the attempt to couple concession with repression, as evidenced by the Rowlatt bills, was deeply resented; the Moslems of India were angered by the Treaty of Sèvres; and Indians as a whole felt indignant that they should be held in bondage while other countries of the East, many of them less civilized, were gaining their freedom. This growing discontent, which was evidenced in a variety of ways, centered in the Indian National Congress and in the person of the Mahatma Gandhi, who passed for a veritable saint and whose influence over his countrymen was therefore phenomenal.

The National Congress was an unofficial assemblage that had been founded under the influence of foreigners (Mme. Blavatsky, Colonel Olcott, A. O. Hume, Charles Bradlaugh, Mrs. Annie Besant, and others), which the Government had at first sanctioned as a means of "blowing off steam," and which for a long time had been a bourgeois institution. It had had little influence on the masses prior to the war and had been weakened by factional strife. A fresh split developed in 1907 over the question of Swaraj (Home Rule). The Congress of 1914 was fired with enthusiasm for aiding the Allies to "make the world safe for democracy"; Gandhi backed this idea, while Mrs. Besant entered the lists as the champion of Swaraj and achieved great success in organizing the movement. The 1915 Congress declared for Lincoln's "government of the people, by the people, and for the people."

The Congress of 1918 divided on the question of accepting the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms; the great majority were opposed. When the Rowlatt bills became law and Gandhi summoned India to civil disobedience (noncooperation) for the purpose of obtaining Swaraj, the world witnessed the greatest manifestation of passive resistance since the First Russian Revolution. Many of Gandhi's followers, exhibiting extraordinary fortitude, allowed themselves to be beaten insensible by the police rather than yield; but many of the more ignorant were unable to comprehend the subtle distinctions of his philosophy, and broke into armed revolt, mobs obtained possession of a number of towns. Martial law was thereupon proclaimed. The repression culminated in the Amritsar Massacre, when the civil authorities, powerless to cope with the situation, called in the military; some 400 natives were killed and many more wounded. Though the general in command was censured by the home Government, Anglo-Indian relations were permanently embittered. As a secondary consequence, Gandhi decided to abandon passive resistance.

When the Nationalists reversed their decision and the Swaraj party entered the elections, it was with the avowed purpose of "uniform, continuous and constant obstruction . . . to make government through the Assembly and the Councils impossible." To a considerable extent they were able to accomplish this aim, since they obtained control of the Legislative Assembly, with the result that the Viceroy had recourse to his extraordinary powers. Continuous ferment did not, however, prevent the Government from passing a number of social re-

forms—such as a factory act, a mines act, and a workman's compensation act.

The conflict in India was complicated by a struggle between the Swaraj party and the radicals, formally inaugurated at the National Congress of 1921 when the first resolution advocating independence was introduced; Gandhi used his influence to defeat the motion. The *mélée* was further complicated by bloody riots between Hindus and Moslems that broke out in 1926 and 1927. In the latter year a new element was injected into the situation by the appointment by the Government at Westminster of the Simon Commission to conduct a fresh investigation with a view to recommending further reforms, as envisaged by the Act of 1919. Since this commission did not include any Indians, the Congress of 1927 unanimously agreed to boycott its work and also unanimously adopted a resolution declaring "the goal of the Indian people to be complete national independence." A committee undertook to draft an Indian-made constitution that should forestall the recommendations of the Simon Commission. When the Liberal Federation and the Muslim League voted to coöperate in this task, a Committee of Ten, under the chairmanship of Nehru, was created.

When the Congress of 1928, under the presidency of Nehru, met (in late December), it was composed of between 5,220 and 5,600 delegates. The members assembled in a huge tent on the outskirts of Calcutta, with over 20,000 people in attendance. In addition, there were an almost countless number of "side shows"—the All Parties Convention, the Conference of the All-India Workers' and Peasants' Party (Communistic), the All-India Youth Congress, the All-India Socialist Youths' Conference, the annual session of the All-India Muslim League, and the Independence League—not to mention various committees.

The Nehru Report called for Dominion Status (Swaraj), but the Congress as a whole was badly split; a considerable number, led by Nehru's own son, stood for independence—to which others, like Mrs. Besant, were unalterably opposed on tactical grounds. In an attempt to effect a compromise Gandhi, though not a delegate, proposed a resolution pledging the Congress to adopt the Nehru Report provided "it is accepted by the British Parliament on or before the 31st of December, 1929," with the additional proviso that "consistently with the above, nothing in this resolution shall interfere with carrying on in the name of the Congress a propaganda for complete independence." After the struggle had continued several days, in one committee or another, an amendment in favor of "complete independence" was finally voted down, 1,358 to 973 with 48 abstentions, and the Gandhi resolution was carried. The Congress also passed an additional resolution offered by Gandhi that provided a program of action for the immediate future: the boycott of foreign goods, passive resistance to local injustices, the abolition of untouchability (caste), and so forth. Gandhi's rejection of the Machine Age and his attempt to revert to the old processes of hand production (the spinning-wheel) was probably the weakest point in his program.

When the English Parliament allowed the following twelvemonth to elapse without deigning to notice the summons served on it, the Indian Congress of 1929, with the concurrence of Gandhi, voted to strive for complete independence. The resolution was almost unanimous—1,994 to 6. Passive resistance, to

be declared at the discretion of the National Committee, was to be the means employed. Conditions in this India for which Indians are demanding independence were eloquently described by the chairman of the Reception Committee to the 1928 Congress in his address of welcome (though, needless to say, the chief blame for India's woes was laid at England's door):

Slavish worship of the past, communal dissensions, the caste, the purdah, polygamy, early marriage, and other cankers of the body politic are responsible for our failure. We live a life divided into compartments, our patriotism is communal; our unity amounts to mere juxtaposition. Steeped in the prejudices of a mediaeval age, with half the nation losing their vitality behind the purdah, and in its turn devitalizing the other half, disintegrated by warring castes and creeds which condemn a population more than that of the United Kingdom or Japan as untouchables, whose shadow even it is pollution to tread can we ever expect that we shall be able to bear upon Britain the necessary pressure? In order to assert ourselves in the modern world, we must be modernized. You cannot oppose howitzers, dreadnoughts and aeroplanes with the primitive bow and arrow. What is true of the instrument is also true of the agent. The man power of India has to be fully developed and equipped with up to date ideals. The women must be free. You cannot with impunity paralyze half the nation and by its dead weight handicap the other half. Is it not national *hankari* to impair the vitality of the race by screening half its number behind the purdah and accelerate the process by the horrible custom of immature parenthood? The thousand and one air-tight compartments of the social fabric should be knocked down without mercy. Caste must go. What purpose does it serve in the present-day economy of India? The original economic purpose behind it no longer exists. It is not based on division of labor. It . . . exists only to emphasize meaningless, nay, harmful social distinctions. . . . There should, therefore, be a social revolution which must go hand in hand with political revolution.

In addition, it may be noted that less than 1 per cent of the population is in any sense literate. It is an ironical commentary on the situation in India that in order to concoct their anti-British plans the Indians, lacking a common tongue of their own, were forced to have recourse to the English language. Under such conditions, it seems certain that it must be a long time before India can develop a true sense of nationality or true democracy.

CHINA STIRS IN HER SLEEP

Once aroused, China endeavored to outdo Japan and leap from absolutism to democracy at a single bound. The attempt soon led to anarchy. Yuan Shi-kai, the first President, found himself faced by a parliament dominated by the Kuomintang (Nationalist Democratic party), which was bent on reducing the presidency to a mere figurehead. Though he at first achieved rather marked success—at the price of outlawing the Kuomintang, abolishing the parliament, and abandoning republican forms in general—Yuan was eventually discredited because he proclaimed himself emperor. From then on the internal history of China was for several years characterized mainly by personal rivalries between the great war-lords.

The establishment of the Republic had given Russia a chance to extend her influence in Outer Mongolia, and although China regained temporary posses-

sion in 1919 and although her sovereignty was recognized by Russia in 1924 (May 31), she ceased to exercise any effective control early in February, 1921. The World War gave Japan an opportunity to attempt the greatest coup yet envisaged. Early in 1915, with nearly all Europe engaged in fratricidal strife, she concluded that there was no good reason why she should not go her tutors in Western manners one better and swallow China whole in the form of an unofficial protectorate! Her project appeared in the guise of Twenty-One Demands, divided into five groups: (I) increased and exclusive privileges in Shantung—in addition to those acquired at the expense of Germany; (II) increased and exclusive privileges in southern Manchuria and eastern Inner Mongolia; (III) control of China's greatest iron-producing company; (IV) a promise from China not to cede or lease any coastal territory to any third power; (V) a promise from China to employ Japanese advisers—political, financial, and military—in her central Government (Article 15), to share the police power of important cities with the Japanese (Article 17), and to purchase 50 per cent or more of her munitions of war from Japan or to establish a Sino-Japanese arsenal. Though Great Britain and the United States protested, Japan presented a forty-eight-hour ultimatum May 7, and May 25 China agreed to all of the demands with the exception of 11, 15-19 inclusive, and 21. The eleventh demand was yielded later. Japan's hold on China was further strengthened by the Lansing-Ishii Agreement (November 2, 1917): "The Government of the United States recognizes that Japan has special interests in China, particularly in the part to which her possessions are contiguous." Japan promised in return to adhere to the principle of the Open Door.

The events of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century produced an ever increasing dislike of foreigners in China. This feeling was accentuated by the Twenty-One Demands and by the action of the Peace Conference in handing over Shantung to Japan. The Chinese were partially mollified for a time by the proceedings of the Washington Conference, which was called by the United States in the latter part of 1921. Though officially Chinese affairs were a side show, they took a prominent place. Hughes and Balfour persuaded Japan to relinquish Shantung and to modify the Twenty-One Demands. The Japanese steadfastly held out against general cancellation, but the demands were whittled down until China was released from all but four (some had already been superseded): Group IV and Articles 5 and 11, which extended the Japanese lease on the Liaotung Peninsula and the South Manchuria Railway for ninety-nine years and gave Japan a ninety-nine-year lease on the Kirin-Changchun Railway. The Lansing-Ishii Agreement was formally canceled, and the Japanese endeavored to explain away all apprehension in this regard and in regard to their general attitude toward China:

To say that Japan has special interests in China is simply to state a plain and actual fact. It intimates no claim or pretension of any kind prejudicial to China. . . . We are vitally interested in a speedy establishment of peace and unity in China and in the economic development of her vast natural resources. It is, indeed, to the Asiatic mainland that we must look primarily for raw materials and for the markets where our manufactured articles may be sold. Neither raw materials nor the markets can be had unless order, happiness and prosperity reign in China, under good and

stable government. With hundreds of thousands of our nationals resident in China, with enormous amounts of our capital invested there, and with our national existence largely dependent on that of our neighbor, we are naturally interested in that country to a greater extent than any of the countries remotely situated.

At the Washington Conference also the powers promised to revise China's customs arrangements, to abolish their postal services in China, to withdraw their troops as soon as China was in a position to "assure the protection of the lives and property of foreigners," and to publish all treaties and agreements concerning Chinese affairs. Finally, they signed a treaty (February 6, 1922) setting forth their general policy in regard to China and agreeing: "1. To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China; 2. To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government; 3. To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China." A casual observer might have concluded that a new era in Chinese affairs had dawned.

Whatever effect these pronouncements and events had on the majority of the Chinese, one faction at least, the Kuomintang, was determined to be satisfied with nothing less than complete freedom and equality for China. When the parliament was dissolved a second time, in 1917, the Kuomintang withdrew to Canton and left the war lords to fight it out in the north; a Nationalist Government was established in 1921 and Sun Yat-sen was elected President.

Sun Yat-sen (also Sun Wen or Sun Chung-shan) was by profession a doctor. He had been the mainstay of the revolutionary movement from the beginning, had founded the Young China Society, and when that movement failed, had become an exile in the United States, England, and elsewhere. He had also founded the Tungmenghui, an amalgamation of various antidynastic societies that had been the motive force behind the Revolution of 1911 and the progenitor of the Kuomintang. As President of the Canton Government he achieved little; he was forced out by one of his generals shortly after his election, and although he returned in the spring of 1923 accompanied by a Bolshevik adviser by the name of Borodin, he controlled little beyond the city of Canton—and that little not very securely. He died in March, 1925. As the Mazzini of China, however, he played a rôle of incalculable importance.

Sun Yat-sen dead proved more powerful than Sun Yat-sen living, for he became the Confucius of the New China and was revered with a veneration that fell little short of deification, while his writings became the Bible of the Nationalists. His objectives were embodied in the "three principles of the people": Nationalism, Democracy, and Socialism. According to Sun Yat-sen, nationalism ("national emancipation and racial equality") was essential in order that China might escape from being "a colony of every Great Power"; China must go back to her old learning but "must also go out to learn what is best in the West." As for democracy, China has little to learn from the West; she must rather "sacrifice some . . . personal freedom, in order to gain . . . national freedom." The West, he maintained, has not solved the problem of combining

strong central government with freedom for the people. The people must possess the initiative, the referendum, and the recall. As for socialism, "We must center all our problems around the welfare of the people" and avoid the Western error of taking "material problems as the central point in human history"; "none of the forms of Socialism developed in the West are fitted for our own country." "Our great and immediate problem is . . . the prevention of the rise of capitalists. . . . Our method . . . is to develop state industry." In practice, democracy was for the moment shelved for the dictatorship of the Kuomintang à la Lenin; the party elected a Central Executive Committee, which in turn elected the Political Council (cabinet).

What Sun Yat-sen, the Kuomintang, the war lords, and the Bolsheviks did not do for the development of a nationalistic spirit in China the powers did, for soon they were up to their old tricks. At the Washington Conference the British had promised to return Weihaiwei, but when it came to acting, they backed out on the excuse that there was no stable government with which to negotiate. The same excuse—in these cases more legitimate—was given for breaking up the conference that was to result in restoring Chinese tariff autonomy and for neglecting to give effect to the recommendations of the Commission on Extraterritoriality.

The most potent cause of antiforeign hostility, however, was the Shanghai Incident—an indirect result of the more or less contemporaneous incidence of the Industrial Revolution. The rapid organization of trade unions following industrialization was a development that was all the more natural since from time immemorial the boycott had been recognized as a weapon by the Chinese masses. By 1923 practically every trade and calling in Shanghai had been organized, and an epidemic of strikes had begun. Foreigners professed to believe that these disturbances were the work of Bolshevik agents. Though doubtless there was some truth in the assertion, the working-conditions—similar to those prevalent in England a century earlier—were cause enough. The strikers were aggressive and the authorities high-handed (in some places agitators were decapitated and their heads displayed on pikes). One of the strikes resulted from the dismissal of forty employees from a Japanese mill (February 2, 1925) and the prosecution and imprisonment of six. Both sides indulged in violence, the strikers apparently first. Though this strike was settled (February 26), another clash followed (May 14) when, as a result of the dismissal of two Chinese foremen from a Japanese mill, another strike was declared. Antiforeign agitation increased, and on May 30 students paraded the streets in a demonstration against foreign capitalists. The ringleaders were carried off to a police station, the crowd followed, and the British inspector, fearing that they would get the upper hand, ordered fire; twelve Chinese were killed and seventeen wounded. News of the so-called Shanghai Massacre spread like wildfire throughout China and gave rise to violent demonstrations in which a number of foreigners of various nationalities were killed; British goods were extensively boycotted.

CHIANG KAI-SHEK THE VICTORIOUS

Between the Nationalists and the powers no love was lost at any time. The powers feared nationalism and especially the known affiliations of the Kuomintang with Moscow—to what extent and for what purposes is still uncertain. For this reason above all the powers had refused to accord the Nationalist Government any sort of recognition, and their refusal, in turn, was an added source of grievance to the Kuomintang.

In the summer of 1926 the powers were surprised and alarmed by the sudden appearance of a rejuvenated Kuomintang, astonishingly strengthened under the leadership of General Chiang Kai-shek, who was almost unknown before Sun Yat-sen died but on whose comparatively youthful shoulders the mantle of the great leader had fallen. After quelling the communistic wing of the Kuomintang, Chiang struck north in mid-May toward the Yangtze basin, the richest and most populous region in China. The war lords there—partly from mutual jealousy and partly because they disdained this unknown adventurer—at first paid no attention. Before they realized what was happening Chiang had reached the Yangtze (August 18). Ten days later, Feng Yu-hsiang, the powerful "Christian general" of the rich province of Shensi, announced that he had joined the Kuomintang. Hankow, the commercial capital of Central China, was captured (September 7), and one by one the war lords of the Yangtze were defeated. By mid-November the Nationalist Government began to arrive in Hankow, and January 1, 1927, Greater Hankow was transformed into Wuhan and proclaimed the national capital. With the fall of Hangchow (February 16), the stronghold of the last of the Yangtze war lords, only two main factions remained—the Kuomintang and the Fengtien war lords under Chang Tso-lin, a bandit who had risen to be imperial governor of Fengtien and the strong man of Manchuria.

The powers had not neglected to keep their eyes on this disquieting development; for the moment at least the Kuomintang was a force to be considered willynilly. On November 17, Chamberlain had announced to the House of Commons: "The advance of the Southern forces into Central China does not appear to have adversely affected the personal security of British residents, nor does it appear to have involved any serious danger to British property, although there has inevitably been some risk to, and disturbance of, British establishments lying directly in the army zone."

After the Nationalists reached Hankow, where England, France, and Japan held concessions (areas within which the Chinese Imperial Government had agreed that the foreign powers concerned should exercise absolute jurisdiction), anti-foreign and anti-Christian demonstrations of an alarming nature developed afresh. The situation was complicated by the fact that Germany and Russia had surrendered their concessions several years before; the Nationalists argued that the other powers should do likewise. A final complicating factor was the fact that the British had just arrested fourteen members of the Kuomintang in Tientsin and had handed them over to Chang Tso-lin, by whom, after a military "trial," they were summarily executed. Though the demonstrations at

Hankow, which many foreigners believed to be countenanced if not staged by the Kuomintang, did not result in any loss of life, some of the Marines guarding the British concession were wounded by stones. Confronted with this situation, the British endeavored to mollify the Nationalists by surrendering control over their concession. At the same time they evacuated their women and children to Shanghai and dispatched an expeditionary force up the Yangtze.

March 27, 1927, Chiang Kai-shek occupied the territory surrounding Shanghai up to the limits of the cordon established by the foreign contingents guarding the International Settlement. The foreigners set an unfortunate precedent when—because the boundaries of their settlement were not easily defensible—they established part of their lines in Chinese territory. No untoward events, however, took place. The occupation of Nanking by one of Chiang's subordinates (March 23) was a very different affair; three Britons, one American, one Frenchman, and one Italian were killed, and other fatalities would in all probability have followed had not foreign warships opened fire. In this case the Hankow situation was reversed. There the authorities had made some attempt to protect foreigners from the populace; at Nanking the outrages were perpetrated by uniformed soldiery in the presence of their officers, while the townspeople remained quiet or endeavored to assist the victims. The affair may have been an attempt of Chiang's enemies to cause him embarrassment.

Though Yen Hsi-shan, the "model" Governor of Shansi, joined the Kuomintang on June 5, and the Nationalists gained additional ground in 1927, their advances were punctuated with periods of retirement. The slowing-down of their progress was the result of two causes: the Nationalists met their first formidable opposition in the forces of Chang Tso-lin—June 16 Chang declared himself generalissimo of the Republic and, shortly after, took up his residence in Peking—and a split developed in the ranks of the Kuomintang. This cleavage was the consequence of fundamental differences and personal rivalries between the Communists, led by Borodin, and the moderates under Chiang. Since the Right and the Center had boycotted the meeting of the Central Executive Committee on March 10, the Left was able to depose Chiang. The former commander withdrew to Shanghai, suppressed the Communists there, and published a manifesto calling for another meeting of the Executive Committee. At this meeting (April 15) a separate Government was set up, with Nanking as its capital¹

Eventually the Communists lost control of the Hankow Government as a result of three occurrences. Chang carried out a raid on the Russians in Peking (April 6) which disclosed that they were bent on promoting a communistic, not a nationalistic, revolution in China—a form of foreign interference no more acceptable to the Chinese than any other. The civil authorities at Hankow discovered for themselves (June 1) that Borodin was trying to foment a communistic revolution. Feng, the new Hankow commander, sent a telegram demanding that the Communists be expelled (June 21).

July 18 the Chinese Communists at Hankow were arrested, and on the twenty-seventh Borodin left for Russia. This change did not have the immediate effect that might have been expected. Having ousted Borodin, Hankow expected the retort polite from Nanking in the form of Chiang's dismissal.

Chiang accordingly resigned (August 12) and retired to Japan; whereupon the Nanking and Hankow factions got together and united in establishing a new Government at Nanking (September 20). Apparently Chiang had only "retreated in order the better to advance"; a couple of months later he returned and married a sister of Sun Yat-sen's widow, and on December 10 he was requested to resume command of the Nationalist forces.

At the opening of 1928 the Kuomintang, under three leaders, controlled thirteen provinces—nine under Chiang, three under Feng, and one under Yen; theoretically Feng and Yen were subordinate to Chiang. Chang Tso-lin and his allies controlled two provinces south of the Great Wall (Chili and Shantung) and the three provinces of Manchuria. Chang opened hostilities in April, but he and his confederates were soon on the defensive. May 18 the Japanese informed him that if he did not withdraw into Manchuria at once, he would find it impossible to do so; why Japan made this apparently gratuitous contribution toward the cause of Chinese unification is not clear. In these circumstances Chang evacuated the northern capital on the night of June 2-3. Just outside Mukden his train was blown up, and he died of the injuries he received; the Japanese were strongly suspected of being privy to the act. On the eighth Yen entered Peking.

Chang Hsueh-liang, who succeeded his father as head of the Manchurian Government, was unofficially informed by the Japanese that they would look with disfavor on the reunion of Manchuria with the rest of China. Notwithstanding, Chang joined the Kuomintang and December 29 raised the nationalist standard. At the moment the Japanese did not attempt to interfere. With the exception of Shantung, which the Japanese had illegally occupied on the pretext of protecting their nationals, China proper was once more united (theoretically) under one flag. In point of fact, Japan also had a stranglehold on Manchuria, and the allegiance of many of the Kuomintang leaders was more nominal than real.

THE NEW DAY IN CHINA

On October 3, 1928, the "Five Power" constitution planned by Sun Yat-sen had been promulgated at Nanking. Instead of the threefold "division of powers" common in the West the new Chinese constitution established a fivefold division: executive, legislative, judiciary, examining (for public office), and censorship. Each was represented by a board (Yuan). The Executive Board was senior and had control of the ten ministries. Above these boards was a Council of State (twelve to sixteen members) from which the presidents and vice presidents of the boards were chosen; the president of the Council of State was *ex officio* President of the Government and commander-in-chief. All laws and all decrees of the Council were to be signed by the President and by the presidents of the five boards. The new Government, with Chiang as President, was installed October 10. Peking was degraded to the rank of a provincial capital and rechristened Peiping, but the powers nevertheless persisted in retaining their legations there and only sent subordinate representatives to Nanking.

By the end of 1930 a number of important events in the sphere of foreign

affairs had taken place. The Nanking Incident was settled—with the United States April 2, 1927, with the other powers shortly after. The United States negotiated a treaty giving its consent to the restoration of Chinese tariff autonomy (July 24, 1928); the other powers followed suit; and January 1, 1931, the new Chinese tariff went into effect. September 28, 1928, the United States announced that the Treaty of July 24 preceding constituted a formal recognition of the Nanking Government; shortly afterward the other powers signified their recognition. October 1, 1930, the British returned Weihaiwei—the second time within a hundred years that Britain had voluntarily relinquished any territory. At the close of 1930 the outstanding issue between China and the powers was the question of extraterritoriality (Russia, Germany, and some of the smaller powers had already relinquished their extraterritorial rights).

During 1929 the Nanking Government was confronted with a fresh crop of troubles. The so-called Kwangsi Group in the Southwest revolted, but were suppressed by Chiang in an energetic campaign (April-June). In May a conflict developed between Chiang and Feng, who was disgruntled at not receiving control of Shantung; owing to the intervention of Yen this trial of strength was indecisive. At the close of the year, when the Nanking authorities were threatened by mutinies which broke out among their own troops, their fortunes reached the lowest point since they first began their northern campaign in 1926.

April 3, 1930, Yen came out as the open ally of Feng, assumed the title of commander-in-chief, and denounced Chiang—only to meet decisive defeat on August 15. In September young Chang Hsueh-liang, who up to this time had remained neutral, joined Chiang in return for full control over the North. October 6 Feng in turn met defeat at the hands of Chiang, and December 22 Yen left Tientsin for Dairen. So passed from the stage—another victim of megalomania—one of the most picturesque characters in modern Chinese history. Only two outstanding figures were left—Chiang and young Chang.⁴

It is too early to prophesy as to the future of a country like China. October 10, 1930, Chiang laid down a five-point program: suppression of banditry, reorganization of finances, purification of the administration, development of natural resources, and the extension of local self-government—so that "true democracy" might be brought into existence "at an early date."

The suppression of banditry, endemic in the best of times and never more prevalent than in 1930, was well chosen as the first point. Moreover, banditry was one of the main excuses given by the powers when they interfered in internal affairs. In the South not only the countryside and the villages were a prey to human locusts but city after city was sacked or compelled to pay tribute. Chiang took the matter in hand in December with characteristic energy.

On the question of finances all else hinged, for with adequate funds there was almost no limit to what the Government could accomplish. In T. V. Soong, his brother-in-law, Chiang had an able and energetic Minister of Finances. Backed by the business interests, Soong set out to persuade the provinces to surrender control of their finances to the central Government, and effected a

* For later events involving Chiang and Chang, see pp. 675-78.

reduction in the standing army from 1,200,000 to 500,000. A Central Bank of China was opened (November 1, 1928), and Professor Kemmerer arrived with a staff of American financial advisers (February, 1929). Because China was still on a silver standard, she was greatly handicapped by a marked decline in the value of silver.

In a country as large and as disorganized as China, it was difficult for the central Government to keep its hand on local affairs; many officials developed into petty tyrants. This situation the authorities took steps to remedy as rapidly as possible.

The development of natural resources, with which China was amply provided, was another point well chosen. Famine relief might have been made a special point. In Shensi alone, out of a population of some 6,000,000, 2,000,000 died in 1929, and 2,000,000 more were expected to die in 1930 before the harvest—yet there was plenty of surplus food in China as a whole, not to mention that which might have been imported from the United States.

The Government of China as established by the constitution of 1928 was a thinly disguised dictatorship of the inner circle in the Kuomintang. In 1929 (March 27) this tendency toward centralization was further stressed by an amendment to Article 29: "The organization of the National Convention, the election of delegates, and the quota of delegates from each locality shall be determined by the Central Executive Committee [of the Kuomintang]." Whether in the near future a country with so large a proportion of illiterate and ignorant citizens can be transformed into a democracy seems doubtful.

Although the Chinese are determined not to be dominated by foreigners, they are eager for advice and assistance. Foreigners already in Chinese employ were for the most part retained, and a new staff of high advisers was engaged. Sir Frederick Whyte (E, March 15, 1929) and Mr. Millard (A) were appointed political counsellors to the central Government. Colonel Bauer, formerly of Ludendorff's staff, arrived in November, 1928, with a party of German officers. December 3, 1930, the British Admiralty announced that a Naval Mission would proceed to China in a short time. Mr. Maze (E) was appointed Inspector-General of the Maritime Customs (January 10, 1929). As previously noted, China also engaged the services of a staff of American financial experts.

Will China surmount the many obstacles in her path, regain full control over her territory, and become actually as well as potentially the most powerful nation in Asia—or perhaps in the world?

THE DISEASE AND THE CURE

The imperialist says of the "backward" peoples of the earth, "Give me control over these dirty, undisciplined, shiftless beggars and I will make them clean, orderly, and industrious—to the mutual benefit of all concerned. What is more, I will make them healthy and protect them from their tyrannical rulers." It is a glowing picture—but suppose these "backward" people prefer to remain "backward" and resent being shoved along the pathway to "civilization"? Suppose the imperialist merely substitutes the tyranny of the foreign capitalist for the tyranny of the local prince?

The detached observer of the events outlined in this chapter and in the chapters on prewar imperialism is inclined to conclude that if the would-be bearers of the white man's burden cannot get along with the natives, they had better get out altogether. To which the realistic advocate of imperialism will reply that trade is essential to the industrial nations, and that since backward nations refuse adequate protection to traders, imperialism is a matter of life or death to the powers involved. Granted the premises, the student begins to see why the Industrial *Revolution* merits its title.

CHAPTER XXI

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

International affairs in the Postwar Period may be treated under four main heads: Reparations and Interallied Debts; the League and European Peace; Naval Disarmament and the Peace Pacts; and the Japanese Imbroglio.

BRICKS WITHOUT STRAW

Of the many unwelcome legacies left by the World War, none was more important than the reparations problem, for none affected so many lives so intimately. Until this ugly dilemma was solved there could be no hope of economic or financial stability in Europe or in the world at large—in all likelihood no political stability.

The Allies were extraordinarily shortsighted in their attempt to collect reparation payments. Having deprived Germany of a large part of her capital goods, a considerable portion of her natural resources, and all her colonies (the last two without giving her any credit), and having kept her in a state of blockade, so that she was unable to obtain the materials essential to economic rehabilitation, they started out on the assumption that she had paid next to nothing. Then, on the basis of the premise that she could not possibly pay all she ought, they proceeded to draw themselves a blank check (not until May 1, 1921, was Germany to be notified of her obligations) and set out to make her pay every penny she conceivably could. With this object in view they sent an army of occupation into the Rhineland. As for their fundamental premise, no sooner had they made use of it to justify themselves than they promptly forgot it again; for the next few years, in practice if not in theory, the basic factor in the situation—Germany's capacity to pay—was ignored.

From beginning to end the whole affair was complicated by the primary and extremely intricate question of how Germany *could* pay, a difficulty known as the transfer problem. Aside from gold, of which the supply is comparatively limited, there is no such thing as international money. Paper marks as such are valuable only in Germany. In order to be of value to a Frenchman in France they must be converted into francs and this can be done only by obtaining francs in exchange for services or goods—including such things as income from foreign investments, shipping, and scenery (tourist trade). Even gold must ultimately be purchased with goods or services. Moreover, as the Allies were to

discover, the amount of exchange that can be bought without dislocating internal finances is limited to the value of the services and goods available after the imports necessary for home consumption have been paid for. (Temporarily it is possible to solve the dilemma by borrowing—provided loans can be obtained—but ultimately, unless defaulted, such loans must be repaid in the same way.)

The whole question of reparation payments therefore went back to the condition of German commerce and industry. German commerce was largely dependent on German industry; and German industry, conversely, could result in an international (as distinct from an intranational) profit only if Germany could market her goods abroad. This meant that German goods had to be able to compete successfully with foreign goods. In other words, the Allies were faced with a choice of evils: they could ruin Germany by demanding too much and so make it impossible for her to revive economically (but in that case they would have to abandon all hope of reparation payments and, since she would be unable to purchase foreign goods, their own trade would be correspondingly injured); or in the hope of obtaining reparation payments they could enable Germany to get on her feet and once more become a commercial rival. Such was the paradoxical situation confronting Germany's debtors, for if a man is obligated to pay more than he possibly can, bankruptcy is the inevitable result. They could not eat their cake and have it too.

Aside from these more fundamental difficulties, there were at the outset numerous other hardly less important obstacles which rendered Germany's efforts largely futile. 1. The Allies were unwilling to accept some of the proffered forms of payment. Because she wanted her own nationals to have the work and for reasons of sentiment, France declined to allow Germany to participate in the restoration of the devastated regions. Because British shipbuilders were being thrown out of work, Britain soon told Germany to discontinue her deliveries of ships. 2. So long as the total of reparation payments remained indeterminate the Germans lacked all incentive to meet their obligations; the harder they tried the more they would have to pay. 3. During the early period, since any loans would have been water poured into a sieve, foreign countries declined to extend Germany credit. 4. The costs of the army of occupation were a prior charge, and until May 1, 1921, absorbed practically everything the Germans paid.

Incidentally, owing to the difficulty of evaluating deliveries in kind, there was constant bickering over the question of how much Germany was actually paying. In January of 1921 Germany claimed that she had paid 21,000,000,000 marks—1,000,000,000 more than she was due to pay by the first of May following; the Allies, however, asserted that she had paid only 8,000,000,000. On May 3, the Reparations Commission insisted that Germany was still in default to the extent of 12,000,000,000. "The amount which Germany had paid up to the 1st May, 1921, proved to be not more than sufficient to pay for the costs of occupation, exclusive of the costs of the United States Army. At that date, then, Germany had paid no Reparation." Eventually the total deliveries up to April 30, after deducting the value of nonliquid assets, were evaluated at something over 7,500,000,000 marks. But since nearly 5,000,000,000 were either payments for

food and raw materials received by Germany or else direct contributions to the costs of occupation, the balance, according to the Commission, was only 2,596,000,000 marks—as against 2,131,904,000 paid out by France, Great Britain, and Belgium for the costs of occupation. In addition to the Reparations Commission there were various minor commissions and tribunals with independent authority; “some of the members of the Reparation Commission were not aware until the autumn of 1920 that Germany had already paid large sums . . . under the clearing operations.”

Relations between Germany and the Allies were further complicated by the conduct of the French in the Rhineland. The Germans complained bitterly of the presence of colored troops, and they were particularly incensed when the French ordered German municipalities to maintain houses of prostitution for the army of occupation. Moreover the French made no secret of the encouragement they were giving the separatist movement which aimed at the creation of a Rhenish Republic. The author knows from personal experience (while in civilian clothes) that the Germans in the Rhineland were well disposed toward the British and Americans but hated the French with extreme cordiality.

The business of fixing the total of reparation payments was meanwhile going forward—after a fashion. May 29, 1919, Germany offered to pay 100,000,000,000 marks (about \$25,000,000,000), but this offer was rejected with scorn. At the end of January, 1921, the Allied governments (not the Reparations Commission) demanded that Germany pay 226,000,000,000 marks over a period of forty-two years, plus 12 per cent of the value of her exports. This absurd demand Germany was successful in resisting, but the Germans not unreasonably concluded that France was naming this fantastic figure in order to have an excuse for seizing the Rhineland and the Ruhr.

April 27, 1921, the Reparations Commission presented Germany with a bill—the London Schedule—for 132,000,000,000 marks (about \$33,000,000,000), minus what had already been paid but plus the Belgian war debt (4,000,000,000 marks). Even this figure was three times as much as some of the Peace Conference experts had recommended! And it could hardly be called a step forward, for to demand that the Germans pay an impossible sum was no great improvement over asking them to honor a blank check. Germany protested vigorously, but when the Allies threatened to occupy the Ruhr, she gave in. Throughout, negotiations on both sides, so far as the public and the general run of politicians were concerned, were conducted with the utmost bitterness.

As an immediate and inevitable consequence of the London Schedule, the mark declined rapidly in value. In January, 1921, it stood at 45 to the dollar (normally a little under 4), a year later at 162, in September of 1922 at 1,303, and in December at 6,865. Germany was soon unable to meet her monetary payments. Under the circumstances, even the French realized she could not help defaulting; but when a conference of the Allies assembled in Paris January 2, 1923, and Great Britain proposed a further reduction in reparation payments to approximately half the total demanded in the London Schedule, Poincaré would not listen to such a suggestion. The Paris Conference thereupon broke up—leaving relations between France and Great Britain decidedly strained.

Because of her financial troubles and various other difficulties Germany also fell short in her deliveries of timber: of 55,000 cubic meters of sawn lumber she produced only 31,440, and of 200,000 telegraph poles only 58,352. This shortage was of small importance intrinsically, but Poincaré seized on it as an excuse to demand that the Reparations Commission declare Germany in *voluntary* default. This the Commission did, by a vote of three to one: France, Belgium, and Italy against Great Britain. The British delegate, in discussing the matter, alluded to the shortage as "almost microscopic" and characterized Poincaré's charge as a "trumpery accusation." January 9, by a similar vote, the Reparations Commission again declared Germany in voluntary default because her coal deliveries were likewise short, by about 10 per cent. Just before the vote was taken the unofficial American observer was asked to express his opinion and made a strong plea¹ against the contemplated action. January 11, nevertheless, Poincaré extended the French zone of occupation to include the Ruhr, the industrial nerve center of Germany. Certainly the move was illegal;¹ whether it was morally defensible was a question, and whether expedient still more debatable. Meanwhile the United States withdrew its army from Germany.

Poincaré's line of reasoning was clear; he argued that the Germans were doing their best to avoid payment, and he proposed to bring them to terms. A novel situation resulted—a veritable state of war. The Germans offered passive resistance, while the French proceeded by every means in their power. A number were killed on both sides, and not far from 150,000 Germans were imprisoned or expelled from the Ruhr. As Germany in her weakened condition was unable to keep up the struggle indefinitely, the final outcome was a "moral" victory for the French: at the end of about six months the Germans abandoned their policy of passive resistance. But deliveries of coal dropped 75 per cent, and the mark continued its disastrous decline. By the end of January it had reached 50,000 to the dollar; by the middle of June, 100,000; by August 8, 5,000,000; by the middle of September, 100,000,000. By October 9, a dollar was worth over 1,000,000,000 marks!

TOWARD A NEW DAY

Clemenceau and Poincaré, between them, had ruined Germany financially and had brought Europe to the brink of economic disaster. What was to be done? December 29, 1922, Hughes had suggested that Germany's capacity to pay be determined by an international committee of experts, and October 30, 1923, the British Government proposed to erect such a committee. But when Poincaré refused to permit anything except Germany's *present* capacity to pay to be considered, Hughes declared that America would not participate.

November 30 the Reparations Commission resolved to appoint two committees of experts: a main committee to consider means of balancing the German budget and stabilizing German currency, and a secondary committee to consider the matter of German capital in foreign countries. Poincaré offered no objection to this apparently innocuous proposition, and the unofficial participa-

¹ See p. 463.

tion of American experts was secured; the chairman of the budget committee was Dawes (A), but the report that it submitted was in the main the work of Owen Young (A) and Sir Josiah Stamp (E). Frequent conferences were held with German experts, notably Schacht of the Reichsbank. \

Taking the bit in its teeth, the committee decided—unofficially, for fear of offending Poincaré—that the scope of its task included an investigation of the proposition: What can Germany pay annually without endangering her budget and the stability of her currency? On this subject the Young-Stamp (Dawes) Report, submitted April 9, 1924, reached the following conclusions. After she had regained her economic and financial equilibrium, Germany was to pay at least 2,500,000,000 marks annually (this comparatively high estimate was a compromise between the Anglo-American and the French points of view), *but only* in case she were permitted complete economic autonomy, that is, she must be allowed to resume full control of all her railroads and so on. As a concession to the French, the Young-Stamp Report formulated a "prosperity index" which was to determine whether Germany should pay more than the minimum annuity. It was further specified that no levies beyond those mentioned in the report should be imposed, as had previously been done for the expenses of administration, the support of the occupation, and the costs of special commissions. Finally, the report provided that Germany should receive loans to assist her economic and financial recovery. One subject the experts dared not consider: How much Germany should pay in the aggregate (how long she should continue to pay).

The Young-Stamp Report was accepted by the Allied Governments (with the exception of France) on April 24. The next day Poincaré sent out a typical diplomatic note on the subject, full of compliments for the committee but committing himself to nothing. Fortunately his days of power were numbered, for even the French were tired of his stiff-necked policy. May 11 he was defeated in the elections to the Chamber. With Poincaré out, Herriot took office, and September 1, 1924, the Young-Stamp Plan went into effect. The customs line between the occupied and unoccupied portions of Germany was removed on the ninth, and July 31, 1925, the last French troops left the Ruhr. Even more important steps psychologically—and it was psychologically, above all, that European relations needed improving—were the Locarno Security Pacts and Germany's admission to the League.

The way was now open for the settlement of the next important question concerning reparations: How long should Germany continue to pay? Another committee of experts assembled in February, 1929, under the chairmanship of Owen Young, with the object of effecting "a complete and final settlement." According to the Young Plan, submitted June 7, Germany was to pay fifty-nine annuities—thirty-seven averaging \$512,500,000 and twenty-two averaging \$391,250,000; \$165,000,000 of these payments was to be unconditional (not subject to postponement). The plan was accepted August 28. It was further provided that the Allied occupation of Germany should terminate June 30, 1930, and in due course of time this last provision was fulfilled. Austria was definitely relieved of all reparations obligations January 20, 1930.

Although the Young Plan established a schedule substantially lower than

that contemplated by the Young-Stamp Plan, it left Germany obligated to make payments long after those who made and fought the war would be dead. When the Great Depression of 1929 arrived the reparations question was once more dragged into the arena. Germany's economic and financial position was slowly undermined for over a year—and then came the deluge. In May, 1931, came the collapse of the Creditanstalt, a bank that controlled approximately 70 per cent of Austria's industries. The effects of this disastrous event were felt throughout Germany, and during the first two weeks in June the reserves of the Reichsbank shrank from 613,000,000 to 445,000,000. Germany and the world at large were obviously trembling on the brink of a major catastrophe. On June 20, accordingly, President Hoover proposed a year's moratorium on all intergovernmental debts—a proposal that was promptly accepted. It soon became evident, however, that more than a year's relief would be needed. On October 25 Hoover and Laval issued a joint statement: "In so far as intergovernmental obligations are concerned, we recognize that prior to the expiration of the Hoover year of postponement some agreement regarding them may be necessary. . . . The initiative in this matter should be taken at an early date by the European powers principally concerned [Germany]." When Germany suggested that a Special Advisory Committee of experts be summoned to consider the situation, France at first stipulated that the unconditional annuities should not be discussed; later she gave tacit consent to a more searching inquiry. Assembling in Basel December 7, the committee, which was made up of seven different nationalities, summoned four additional members, of still different nationalities; it issued its report December 23. The findings were as follows:

Germany would be justified in declaring—in accordance with her rights under the Young Plan—that in spite of the steps she has taken to maintain the stability of her currency, she will not be able, in the year beginning in July next, to transfer the conditional part of the annuity. [After it had formulated this conclusion to its designated task, the committee went on to] draw the attention of the governments to the unprecedented gravity of the crisis. . . . The Young Plan . . . contemplated a steady expansion of world trade, not merely in volume but in value. . . . In fact the opposite has been the case. . . . In the circumstances, the German problem—which is largely responsible for the growing financial paralysis of the world—calls for concerted action which the governments alone can take. . . . We can recall no previous parallel in time of peace to the dislocation that is taking place and may well involve a profound change in the economic relations of nations to one another. . . . These complex problems . . . can only be solved in conformity with economic realities. . . . The adjustment of all inter-governmental debts (reparations and other war debts) to the existing troubled situation of the world—and this adjustment should take place without delay if new disasters are to be avoided—is the only lasting step capable of re-establishing confidence, which is the very condition of economic stability and real peace.

Great Britain thereupon issued an invitation to a governmental conference. The representatives of nineteen powers, not including the United States, assembled at Lausanne June 16, 1932; and July 9 an agreement between Germany and her creditors was signed terminating the financial arrangements instituted by the Young Plan. In their place the Lausanne Settlement set up a new series of

German obligations: government bonds, bearing interest at 5 per cent and redeemable by means of a 1 per cent sinking fund, to the amount of 3,000,000,000 marks (about \$715,000,000). All outstanding reparations obligations, with the exception of the 1924 loan and the mobilization loans of 1930, were superseded. Moreover, the bonds were to be placed on the market only at the expiration of a three-year period from the date of signing the agreement. Since all German payments ceased as of June 16, the date of the opening of the Conference, Germany's aggregate indebtedness was reduced from approximately \$25,000,000,000 (under the Young Plan) to less than \$2,000,000,000. Including the Hoover year she was granted a four-year moratorium, and her annual payments thereafter could not exceed \$43,000,000—possibly less, depending on the sale of the bonds.


The Lausanne Settlement proper was supplemented by a secret gentlemen's agreement: "Concerning the creditor governments . . . ratification will not be effected before a satisfactory settlement is obtained between them and their own creditors [the United States, Great Britain, and so on]. . . . In case the settlement in question cannot be obtained, the accord with Germany will not be ratified. . . . In this eventually the legal position of all the interested governments would become what it was before the Hoover moratorium." Despite the contingent nature of this agreement, the Lausanne Settlement apparently disposed of the reparations issue for good and all; certainly it put the issue squarely up to the United States.

INTER-ALLIED DEBTS

Hardly less fruitful of international ill-feeling than payments in reparations was the question of inter-Allied debts. As it is impossible and unprofitable to discuss the matter in all its ramifications, it will suffice to point out that with the exception of the United States all the nations actively engaged in the war contracted debts in order to obtain funds with which to "carry on" and that they also borrowed, after hostilities ceased, for purposes of reconstruction. The United States, as the only country with comparatively unlimited resources, was by far the heaviest creditor; though some of the other contestants, notably Great Britain and France, also loaned money to their weaker allies.

There was no question of the legal liability of the debtor nations to return what they had borrowed, but because of the heavy financial burdens under which they labored and the economic difficulties resulting from the war they found repayment extremely onerous. Soon after the conclusion of peace, therefore, they sought to obtain the cancellation or the reduction of their debts; especially those owed the United States. A powerful argument advanced by the French was that since France was counting on reparation payments to repay her borrowings, her debts should be reduced in proportion as reparation payments were reduced. The British were willing to accept less from France—if the United States in turn would accept less from them.

Though America objected to being left holding the bag and refused to admit the interrelation between reparation payments and inter-Allied debts, she was generously inclined, and between May 1, 1923, and May 3, 1926, she



signed a series of debt-funding agreements with most of her creditors. She also signed an agreement with Greece in 1929 and one with Austria in 1930. The debtor nations promised to repay their borrowings, but the interest rates were reduced from the original 5 per cent; the new rates varied from approximately 3.3 per cent—in the case of Great Britain and the majority of countries involved—to 1.8 for Belgium, 1.6 for France, 1 for Yugoslavia, .4 for Italy, .3 for Greece, and none at all in the case of Austria. In effect, therefore, a considerable proportion of the debts was wiped out. The approximate percentages canceled were as follows: Estonia, Finland, Great Britain, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, 30 per cent; Czechoslovakia and Rumania, 37 per cent; Belgium and France, 60 per cent; Greece, 72 per cent; Austria, 74 per cent; Yugoslavia, 76 per cent; and Italy, 80 per cent. Though the extent of reduction was theoretically based on capacity to pay, not all the results appeared to accord with the theory. Why, for instance, did Great Britain receive such harsh treatment? Why was Italy let off so easily? One is almost forced to conclude that the politicians of democratic America were bent on subsidizing the Mussolini dictatorship.

With the entire breakdown of the reparations scheme resulting from the Lausanne Conference of 1932, inter-Allied debts once more became an active issue. As the date approached for the renewal of payments following the expiration of the Hoover moratorium, the debtor nations signified their unwillingness to meet their obligations, but the United States refused to countenance any illegal change in the debt situation. December 15 witnessed a curious situation: Great Britain, foremost of the least-favored countries, paid; while France, the foremost of the favored countries, defaulted. Czechoslovakia, Finland, Italy, Lithuania, and Latvia lined up with Great Britain. Poland and Estonia took advantage of their optional clauses to postpone their payments. Belgium and Hungary, like France, defaulted.

Seldom have the arguments on two sides of a case been so evenly balanced—though in most cases the contention concerning inability to pay would not hold water; it was merely a matter of whether the money was to be spent for armaments or to meet just obligations. The question of capacity was, indeed, the fundamental distinction between reparation payments and inter-Allied debts. France was the most prosperous country in Europe. She had been maintaining the largest army in Europe since the war; she had been lending her allies large sums for purposes of armament; and a week before she defaulted the gold reserve in the Bank of France was the largest in history—one hundred and sixty-nine times the amount necessary to meet her payment.

The foremost argument in favor of cancellation was that it would promote the economic welfare of the world—creditor nations as well as debtor. The debtor nations added the further argument that since the obligations concerned were contracted in a common cause, the United States, in canceling the debts, would merely be assuming a fair share of the burdens of war.

To these arguments America replied: first, that she was no party to the original quarrel; second, that she did not care to encourage the belief that other countries could begin a war and rely on her to pay for it; and third, that any reduction or cancellation of war debts ought to serve some purpose of direct

value. If European nations were in such need of reduction, they should at least be willing to effect a proportional reduction in the huge amounts they were spending or lending for purposes of armament—unproductive expenditures that were doing no little toward keeping the world in the state of economic ill-health from which it was suffering. That America, though opposed to illegal defaulting, was not opposed to a reconsideration of the debt question was shown by the invitation to a discussion of the subject extended to the British January 20, 1933.

Whatever the correct answer to the inter-Allied debts dilemma, the question itself at least demonstrated that the United States would do well to think twice before allowing herself to be entangled in another European war.

THE ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONING OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

The Postwar Era witnessed the beginning of the greatest experiment on record in international government—the only experiment of world-wide scope and truly international character. January 16, 1920, the Council of the League of Nations, under the presidency of Léon Bourgeois, met for the first time. What a world of dreams, hopes, and aspirations the assembled statesmen bore on their shoulders!

By the terms of the League Covenant, they were met

✓ In order to promote international co-operation and to achieve international peace and security

✓ by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war,

✓ by the prescription of open, just and honourable relations between nations,

by the firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among Governments,

and by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organised peoples with one another.

For the purpose of furthering the attainment of these objectives the Covenant enumerated certain specific obligations which were assumed by League members (see Appendix VIII, in particular Articles X, XI, XII, XVI, XVII, and XX; also VIII, XIV, XVIII, XIX, XXII, XXIII, and XXIV).

The main organs through which the League functions are a Council, an Assembly, and a Secretariat. (There are also various commissions and committees, and an independent, though related, International Labor Organization.) According to the terms of the original Covenant the Council was to be made up of one representative each of five Great Powers and of four lesser powers. The seats of the Great Powers are permanent. Those of the smaller powers are temporary, subject to election "from time to time" by the Assembly, but the original incumbents were designated by the Treaty of Versailles. When the United States refused to join the League, the Council was left with representatives of Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Belgium, Brazil, Greece, and Spain. The Council meets as often as necessary ("at least once a year"), wherever convenient. Except in Geneva, the seat of the League, it is customary for the repre-

sentative of the power that is host to act as president. When the meeting is held in Geneva, the presidency rotates.

The Assembly is made up of the representatives of all member states (not more than three each), including those of "any fully self-governing Dominion or Colony." On this last basis the British Dominions obtained seats. The representatives of each state are entitled to only one vote among them. According to the Covenant, the Assembly is to "meet at stated intervals and from time to time as occasion may require," and the Council and the Assembly enjoy concurrent jurisdiction. From these statements and from a perusal of the Covenant it will be seen that the organization of the League is *sui generis* and likely to cause no little disagreement.

The functions of the Secretary-General are constitutionally obscure. Though distinctly inferior to the members of the Council, he exercises a considerable influence over the transaction of the many matters of routine. The first Secretary-General—appointed by the Peace Conference—was Sir Eric Drummond (E), who held office until June 30, 1933, when he was succeeded by M. Joseph Avenol (F).

The League was handicapped from the start in a number of ways. First and foremost, its membership was not all-embracing. The United States refused to join, and Germany and Russia were not even invited. Among the other states at first left out were Abyssinia (now Ethiopia), Afghanistan, Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Mexico, Turkey, and the yet unborn Irish Free State. This tendency toward exclusiveness and a "holier than thou" attitude, particularly in regard to former enemy states, led many to consider the League an engine of repression, such as the Holy Alliance had been conceived to be. The feeling was all the stronger in that the Covenant guaranteed the territorial possessions of its members—in other words, the settlement of 1919. By 1922 this situation had been partially remedied by the admission of Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Costa Rica, Finland, and Luxemburg (1920) and Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (1921)—making fifty-one members in all. Certain Lilliputian states, such as Monaco, were refused membership on account of their size. Since Japan took little part in European politics, the absence of three of the seven powers left the three remaining powers of Europe with much more influence than they should have had and made it possible for any two of them to get their way. The factor that contributed the most to undermine the effectiveness of the League was the attitude of the United States—the power that by reason of strength and disinterestedness could have exercised a greater influence than any other.

The League is also handicapped by its methods of procedure. Most matters of vital interest require a unanimous vote, and decisions on international quarrels require a unanimous vote of all the states that are not parties to the dispute (Article XV, 6 and 7, and Article XVI, 4). Yet if all but one of the members agree, the minority state would certainly think twice before holding out. These regulations explain why the Assembly, which represents more states (though not more people), is dominated by the Council, although the two enjoy concurrent jurisdiction. In the debates in the "lower house" the representatives of the

small and medium-sized powers frequently line up against the members of the Council, or at least against the representatives of the Great Powers—who naturally tend to maintain the same attitude in the Assembly that they take in the Council. A third source of weakness is that the League is dependent for support on small, voluntary contributions. A fourth is that the League has no armed forces (apart from those of the member states) with which to enforce its decisions.

The first session of the Assembly opened at Geneva November 15, 1920. Among the more prominent delegates were Balfour, H. A. L. Fisher (E), Léon Bourgeois (F), Ishii (J), Hymans (Bn), Wellington Koo (Ch)—all members of the Council—Lord Robert Cecil (E), Viviani (F), Paderewski (P), Beneš (Cz), and Branting (Sh). Hymans was chosen president. The first action taken by the Assembly was to order a wreath placed on the tomb of Rousseau, whose grave was near by.

THE RESHAPING OF THE LEAGUE

In the First Assembly the members were on their good behavior and the atmosphere was distinctly cordial. Yet some of the lesser powers felt that certain features of the League organization should be changed or modified and began to exert pressure in that direction, which in the course of time led to a not inconsiderable reshaping of the League. The following resolution, presented by Viviani of Balfour's Committee Number 1, was unanimously adopted: "(a) The Council and the Assembly are each invested with particular powers and duties. Neither body has jurisdiction to render a *decision* in a matter which by the Treaties or the Covenant has been expressly committed to the other organ of the League. Either body may *discuss* and *examine* any matter which is within the competence of the League. . . . (c) The Council will present each year to the Assembly a report on the work performed by it." (As a matter of fact, the Council had already instructed the Secretary-General to report its activities to the Assembly.) It was also decided that the Assembly should meet at least once a year. Finally, the First Assembly adopted a resolution calling on the Council to appoint a committee to study the question of the election of nonpermanent Council members.

In the Second Assembly, as was to be anticipated, the disputes between the smaller states and the greater came to the surface. The smaller states felt that the Great Powers were running affairs to suit themselves. Realizing that the members of the Council, as responsible statesmen, were acting more or less in accord with dictated policy, they failed to realize that these men often modified their views in the atmosphere of the council chamber. Another object of attack was the Secretariat (though not the Secretary-General), which they felt was taking too active a part in shaping policy. Branting, smarting under the recent humiliation of the Åland Islands controversy, took the lead in these attacks and openly accused the Council of insincerity. Cecil, Balfour, and Bourgeois rose to the defense. The smaller states particularly resented the fact that the Great Powers held half the seats in the Council, that Belgium, a satellite of France, held a seat, that Spain and Brazil seemed likely to be reelected indefinitely, and

that only one seat, therefore, remained for allotment. The report of the committee on Council membership resulted in an amendment to the Covenant adopted October 5, 1921: "The Assembly shall fix by a two-thirds majority the rules dealing with the election of the non-permanent members of the Council, and particularly such regulations as relate to their term of office and the conditions of re-eligibility." But this amendment could not become effective until ratified by all of the states holding seats on the Council. Since France and Spain refused to ratify for several years, the succeeding assemblies were unable to accomplish much in this matter.

The only change of importance was the addition of two nonpermanent members to the Council (making six in all) by the Third Assembly (1922). The indignation of the smaller powers increased as time went on, for by the spring of 1926 Greece and China were still the only states not members of the Council that had ever been members. Spain, Brazil, and Uruguay continued to receive the majority necessary for reelection, thanks to the Latin-American vote; Belgium and Czechoslovakia received the pro-French votes; Sweden received the votes of the smaller states of Europe. Apparently this situation might have gone on indefinitely had it not been for an unusual occurrence of the first magnitude.

The event that finally resulted in a radical change in the composition of the Council—and incidentally almost disrupted the League—was the quarrel over the admission of Germany. Aside from the abstract matter of doing her justice, her admittance was as inevitable as it was desirable, for the League needed Germany not less than Germany needed the League. September 29, 1924, she had signified her intention of applying for membership with a permanent seat on the Council. The members of the Council all pledged their support, though the Brazilian Government replied that "the concrete questions arising out of the desires expressed by Germany . . . should rather be . . . discussed . . . within the League. . . . The German Government may be sure, however, that we shall examine impartially and in a conciliatory spirit the desires it expresses . . . and that we are resolved to find satisfactory solutions for all questions and all just claims." This reply was not made public at the time. A few months later Germany made the proposal—so vital to the peace of Europe—that eventually resulted in the Locarno Security Pacts, and it will be recalled that the Locarno Pacts were to come into force as soon as Germany had been admitted to the League with a permanent seat on the Council. During the Locarno negotiations neither Germany nor the other powers raised the question of the simultaneous granting of permanent seats to any other states; apparently no one thought of such a question's arising.

Greatly to the surprise of Germany, no sooner had she made formal application for admission than a flock of other states likewise raised claims to permanent seats—Spain, Brazil, Poland, China, and eventually Persia. In the case of the first four and more particularly in the case of Spain, which had once ranked as the foremost power in the world, the main difficulty was that, although they had no title to rank with the Great Powers, they resented being ranked with the small powers. The small powers, for their part, were even more unwilling than the large to see the international oligarchy enlarged. The situation was complicated by the fact that Spain and Brazil, by virtue of their

membership on the Council, were able to exercise a veto over the admission of Germany. Moreover, France was pledged to support Poland, one of her protégés; and Austen Chamberlain had similarly pledged himself to support Spain. When this last fact became known, the English public and Parliament—Laborites, Liberals, and a portion of the Conservatives alike—demanded an explanation and strongly condemned a policy that would lead Germany to think she had been tricked and that might endanger the Locarno Pacts. Germany, meanwhile, declared categorically that unless she alone were given a permanent seat on the Council she would not enter the League.

On March 28, 1926, the League Assembly met in special session for the purpose of admitting Germany, and the German delegates were present pending the decision. In an endeavor to arrive at a solution, Chamberlain and Briand conducted conference after conference. Sweden announced her unalterable determination not to vote for the admission to the Council of any state except Germany. China agreed to withdraw her claim if the other claimants would do likewise. Spain gallantly agreed not to vote against Germany, but added that she would withdraw from the League if she too were not granted a permanent seat. Finally Sweden, to her eternal credit, agreed to surrender her seat on the Council in favor of Poland. The only remaining obstacle was Brazil. Twice the delegates of the other South American states besought her to yield, and she was even promised the seat vacated by the United States so long as that power should remain outside the League; but as nothing availed to shake her determination the Assembly broke up, leaving the German delegates standing out in the cold. Naturally they felt the whole affair keenly—the more so since they had experienced the greatest difficulty in persuading the Reichstag to sanction the Locarno Pacts and the proposed entrance of Germany into the League.

The feature of the session evoking the most criticism was the fact that the vital discussions, instead of being brought before the Assembly, were all conducted in private. Nansen (N) in particular was outspoken on the subject: "The League itself cannot be blamed for what has happened. The machinery of the League did not even begin to work; no use has been made of it. What has happened is that there have been private conversations. There has been no meeting of the Council and no meeting of the Assembly to discuss the question. No record at all has been kept for the future." No less severe were the strictures voiced by Lloyd George and Ramsay MacDonald in the House of Commons (March 23).

The crisis threw the whole question of Council membership and elections—so long under discussion in the Assembly—into the foreground; and a committee appointed by the Council to consider these matters met in Geneva May 10. Lord Cecil came out as the champion of publicity as "the only safe means for avoiding misconstruction and misunderstanding." On this issue he carried the day; he also proposed a draft plan for settling the main question which, after some modification, was adopted by the committee on June 10. The plan provided for an increase of the nonpermanent members from six to nine, three of whom were to be elected annually (all nine, for varying terms, at the following session of the Assembly). Ordinarily they were not to be eligible for reelection. The same day the Spanish delegate announced his Government's intention to

ratify the amendment to the Covenant adopted by the Second Assembly; since France had just ratified, it would therefore go into effect (as it did July 29). He simultaneously intimated that Spain would carry out her threat to withdraw from the League. The Brazilian delegate subsequently announced, "Brazil here and now vacates the nonpermanent seat that she has occupied for the past seven years"; and four days later Brazil gave formal notice of her withdrawal from the League.

When the Assembly met in annual session September 6, it was asked to vote first on the question of the admission of Germany, and, second, on a combined resolution assigning Germany a permanent seat on the Council and adding three nonpermanent members. The two resolutions were unanimously adopted and the German delegates, who had remained at home, were notified. On the tenth, they took their seats amid an unparalleled demonstration of enthusiasm. Stresemann and Briand both spoke, and both were applauded to the echo.

The next day Spain announced her withdrawal from the League, and on the fifteenth the new regulations for elections to the Council were adopted. The result was a fourfold division of League members: members with permanent seats on the Council; members with temporary seats on the Council eligible by vote of the Assembly for reelection; members with temporary seats on the Council not eligible for reelection; and ordinary members (with seats in the Assembly only). On September 16 Chile, Poland, and Rumania were elected to the Council for three years; Colombia, China, and Holland, for two; and Belgium, Czechoslovakia, and Salvador, for one. Poland received a vote making her eligible for reelection. Thus the League had weathered the worst storm in the first decade of its existence, but in the process had lost Spain (Spain subsequently returned) and Brazil—the price paid for the shortsightedness of the Peace Conference in debarring Germany from membership.

Of the desirable changes in League obligations and organization the following are the more obvious: the elimination of the territorial (but not the independence) guarantee in Article X of the Covenant; an improved method of financing; and a League army—such as might be created on a mercenary basis if the League had sufficient funds or such as has frequently been suggested by France. In the long centuries of her existence as an independent, organized state this suggestion is by all odds the most far-seeing and creditable advanced by France. Those of us who love France wish that she would let her better side appear more often. It is interesting to note how the attitude of France toward the League has changed from one of comparative indifference and suspicion, if not hostility, to one of distinct cordiality; of course France has usually managed to get her way in League affairs.

MISCELLANEOUS ACTIVITIES OF THE LEAGUE

Space will not permit of detailing the accomplishments of the League Secretariat and the subsidiary League organizations in dealing with the matters committed to their charge—labor conditions, international hygiene, economic, financial, and intellectual coöperation, and a host of humanitarian endeavors. Two instances may be cited. During the first year of its existence the Council

created an International Commission that succeeded in stamping out an epidemic of typhus in Poland before it spread to other countries. November 9, 1929, Dr. Rajchman, Director of the Health Organization of the League, arrived in Shanghai at the invitation of the Chinese Government for the purpose of studying the question of maritime quarantine; while in China he extended the scope of his investigation, and his findings made a profound impression on the authorities. As for other matters, suffice it to say that the accomplishments of the League are not inconsiderable, that they have contributed substantially to promote the growing spirit of internationalism (and so prevent war), and that they are their own ample justification. "If it were certain that another world war would come in 2014 and sweep away the greater part of the fruits of civilization it would nevertheless be worth while to stamp out contagious diseases, the traffic in opium and in women and children and the hindrances to economic interrelation in order that the world might live in this happier condition until the next disaster descends upon it."

The one big concession to the Germans during the Peace Conference was in the matter of Upper Silesia (the second most important industrial region in Germany). French and Italian troops were subsequently sent in, and a plebiscite was held which, in spite of the pro-Polish attitude of France, confirmed the contentions of Germany; 705,575 German votes were registered to 480,169 Polish. The French were determined—though Upper Silesia was a closely knit economic unit and any division would inevitably separate important interests—that Poland should get as much as there was any excuse for giving her; the British and the Italians were more favorable to Germany, and twice British troops were sent from the Rhine. When the Allies were unable to agree, they turned the matter over to the League (August 12, 1921); and at the suggestion of Ishii, seconded by Balfour, the representatives of the lesser states on the Council (Belgium, Brazil, China, and Spain) were appointed a Committee of Four to reach a decision.

The plebiscite, when analyzed, showed that the Germans had carried twelve districts by wide majorities and two more by a narrow margin; the Poles had carried six districts by a substantial number of votes and a seventh by an extremely small majority. On the basis of the returns, but taking into consideration various "strategic" considerations, the Committee of Four awarded Poland nearly half of Upper Silesia, in the form of two very nearly separate blocks on either side of Beuthen; the city itself constituted an acute salient projecting out of the territory left to Germany. From the apex of the salient the line of division ran northwesterly to a point little east of Zawadski, and thence northeasterly to the former Russo-German frontier. A larger block was delineated by a line that began at the apex of the Beuthen salient, ran southwesterly to a point a little east of Ratibor, and thence south to the Oder. Although Poland received less than half of Upper Silesia it was by far the more valuable portion, for it included all the iron fields, 53 of the 67 coal mines, 91.5 per cent of the pit-head stocks, and 11 of the 16 zinc and lead mines (70 per cent of Germany's total zinc output). In order that the settlement should not completely disrupt the economic life of the territories involved by an abrupt change, the League negotiated an agreement (May 15, 1922) whereby the two parties immediately

concerned agreed to a transitory régime that assured Germany freedom of access to the transferred regions.

The Treaty of Versailles provided that a "plebiscite" should be held in Malmédy and Eupen in order to determine whether or not they should go to Belgium. Registers were to be established on which those who wished could signify their desire to remain with Germany; those who failed to register would be assumed to favor Belgium! And the Belgian authorities were to administer the "plebiscite." The League was then to review the findings. Germany protested that the League ought to hold a regular plebiscite, but the Council took refuge behind the terms of the treaty. Only one register was opened in each district and pressure was exerted to prevent the inhabitants from registering; the Council refused to investigate and merely approved the results. As late as March 15, 1927, the representative of this new Alsace-Lorraine was demanding a fresh plebiscite.

Two European territories, the Free State of Danzig and the Saar basin, were intrusted to the care of the League by the Peace Conference. Over Danzig the League was to exercise a perpetual trusteeship; over the Saar its oversight was to last for fifteen years in the first instance, longer or not according to the results of a plebiscite. In the Saar, in accordance with the Treaty of Versailles, the Council set up a Governing Commission of five. The Chairman (M. Rault), who was French and who understood no German, was a man of administrative ability but an autocrat by temperament. A second member was a Belgian; a third, a Dane who had lived twenty years in Paris; a fourth, a Canadian; and the fifth, an inhabitant of the Saar. In September, 1920, the German resigned in disgust and was replaced by a man who was completely a tool of the pro-French majority in the Commission.

Although the Treaty of Versailles specified that only in consultation with elected representatives of the inhabitants were the Commissioners to modify the laws, regulations, and fiscal system in force November 11, 1918, and although all decisions were to be reached by majority vote, the Commission was practically sovereign with these exceptions. Needless to say, the inhabitants did not relish the new régime; and when they protested, Germany supported their complaints. In point of fact the Governing Commission as a body was guilty of a number of illegal and high-handed acts: it delayed two years in summoning the Representative Assembly, refused to heed the representatives when summoned, maintained French troops in the Saar (though the Treaty of Versailles had stipulated, "Only a local gendarmerie for the maintenance of order may be established"), and even called in additional troops, who broke a strike by courts-martial and expulsions. The chairman surrounded himself with French officials. The system of illegalities culminated after another strike was declared February 5, 1923, in protest against the occupation of the Ruhr. The Commission again called in additional troops and issued a decree restricting freedom of speech and of the press under heavy penalties.

When these events became known, the House of Commons passed a vote of censure, the British Government demanded an inquiry (June 21), and Lord Cecil, in the League Council, called for a public investigation by the members in person, rather than by a committee. Hanotaux (F) was firmly opposed, but

as Branting upheld Cecil, France eventually yielded and the Saar Commission was accordingly summoned to Geneva (July 6). Rault admitted that he thought it his duty to look after French interests, that he had corresponded with the French Government, that he had arbitrarily decided which letters to submit to the Commission, that he had called for reinforcements without consulting the Commission, and that he had issued the decree in question after conferring with the Belgian member alone. The Canadian, who was the only unbiased member, testified that although the financial report of the Saar had never been submitted to the League, it had immediately been turned over to the French Government. The resolutions of the Council, framed by Hymans, were as guarded as usual, relied mainly on the publicity involved, and did little more than remind the Commission of its obligations. A group of inhabitants of the Saar were refused an audience; and later, when a prominent resident, Herr Kossmann, wanted the World Court to investigate the educational policy of the Commission, his request was ignored. The Canadian Commissioner resigned August 2. The effects of the investigation became apparent later. In April, 1924, the Danish member "resigned" and was replaced by a Spaniard, and the Saar member gave way to Herr Kossmann. In 1926 Rault "resigned" and a Canadian took his place as chairman.² The most valuable work accomplished by the League in connection with the Saar was the appointment of a special commissioner to see that the records of those entitled to vote in the future plebiscite were preserved (September 26, 1922).

The Treaty of Versailles provided that Danzig, with its 200,000 inhabitants (97 per cent of whom were German), was to be set up as a Free City; the obvious and only reason was to provide Poland with a port. Sir Reginald Tower was sent in as Allied administrator and as high commissioner for the League. A Constituent Assembly was elected by universal suffrage in May, 1920; the constitution in its final form was approved two years later; a treaty between Danzig and Poland was signed November 9, 1920; and on November 15 the Free State came into being. Over the question of the administration of the port, in particular, innumerable disputes developed and were in due course referred to the high commissioner or to the League Council itself. Not always did the decisions seem to be equitable. For instance, the Westerplatte Peninsula, a popular swimming-resort, was turned over to Poland for a munitions dump and Danzig was required to pay half the cost of building the dump. In 1925 the Poles began the construction of a port of their own at Gdynia. The obvious solution to the Danzig Problem, now that Poland's new port is completed, would be to return Danzig to Germany.

Another complex of problems arose to confront the League in connection with the oversight of the mandates that were set up as a result of the war. By the terms of the Treaty of Versailles the mandatory powers were required to make periodical reports; and at times, as in the cases of Syria and Palestine, the League took special action. As the Mandates Commission, lacking any real power, trod with extreme caution, the only protection afforded the minorities

² As everyone acquainted with the functioning of political bodies knows, there are resignations (voluntary) and "resignations" (involuntary).

was the pressure of public opinion and the composition of the Commission, a body made up mainly of nonmandatories.

A third form of tutelage exercised by the League is the oversight and protection of upwards of 40,000,000 minority peoples in Europe. (The first treaty to deal explicitly with this matter was the Polish Treaty of June 28, 1919.)

Two further services performed by the League were the financial rehabilitation of Austria and that of Hungary. Soon after the conclusion of peace Austria, a pigmy body with the head of a giant, was in desperate straits. November 1, 1920, the Reparations Commission declared for "remedial action of the most urgent and drastic character. Unless this is taken, the dissolution of all social and economic life in Austria will be automatic." Though these conclusions were forwarded to the Allied governments November 13, no action was taken. In the succeeding August the crown had fallen to one fifteen-thousandth of its normal value, but not until after October 4, 1922, when the League presented a second plan, was anything accomplished. League delegates arrived in Vienna the seventeenth, followed December 15 by the commissioner-general, Dr. Zimmermann (D). March 14, 1924, a similar reconstruction of Hungarian finances was undertaken, with Jeremiah Smith, Jr. (A), who served without pay, as commissioner-general. The League also assisted in "repatriating" the Greek refugees who left Asia Minor as a result of the Greek defeat at the hands of Mustafa Kemal.

One of the primary functions intrusted to the League is the reduction of armaments. The subject appeared on League agenda with commendable regularity, but the results were nil. The standard reason alleged was that advanced by Hymans in his farewell address to the First Assembly: "There are still nations that—by reason of their political or geographical position and because the League of Nations has not acquired the effective authority it will one day have—are obliged to take indispensable measures to guarantee their safety." The real reasons for failure were mistrust, jealousy, and pride. France, for instance, pleaded her need for security as excuse for maintaining staggering land armaments. (To her credit, be it said, she suggested the reduction of offensive armaments.) Italy, which had comparatively little need of a great navy, demanded parity with France. And all the Allied Powers by keeping German armaments on a lower plane than their own insisted on unilateral disarmament. So long as the German army was only 100,000, what need had France for an army of over 500,000? When Germany left the League (October 14, 1933), after pleading in vain for equality for fourteen years, rather than submit any longer to being ranked as an outcast and a fourth-rate power, the armament issue became even more pressing than it already was. So far, also, the League has done nothing to modify inequitable treaties (Article XIX of the Covenant).

THE WORLD COURT

Although little or no progress has been made toward disarmament, considerable has been achieved toward persuading nations to abandon trial by combat and instead to carry their differences to court. The Covenant of the League provides for a Permanent Court of International Justice, and in its session of

February 12, 1920, the Council decided to create a committee of jurists to draw up a plan for such a court. To the members of the committee, when assembled, Léon Bourgeois intrusted their task in the following peroration: "We look to you, gentlemen, for laws that will assure the perpetuity of the only empire that can never decay, the empire of justice, which is the expression of eternal truth." In presenting the committee's plan to the League Assembly six months later Dr. Hagerup (N) concluded: "We are far from thinking that what we have accomplished is perfect. . . . If there are critics who despair of success I hope that those whose ears are keener will catch, as they look upon this scaffolding, the sound of the hammers of the workmen laboring to build a sublime edifice which cannot be finished in a day but the completion of which will be our final ambition and our highest hope. Then we shall find a spot where might shall have ceased to be right and where the great words of Mirabeau . . . will be realized: 'One day law will become the sovereign of the world.'" The plan was approved by the Assembly December 13, and by mid-September of 1921 it had been ratified by a majority of member states. This ratification by sovereign states was an important matter, for it gave the Court a status of its own, independent of the League. Moreover the seat of the Court is the Hague, and the official language is French (not French and English, as is the case with the League). By October 1, 1931, forty-five states, including France, Germany, Great Britain, and Italy, had adhered. Three more, including the United States, had signed the Statute but had not ratified.


In selecting the judges use was made of an expedient suggested by Root (A): They were chosen by the Council and the Assembly, voting separately, from a list nominated by three "national" groups. In this way, nonmember as well as member states were represented. The preliminary session of what is popularly known as the World Court began January 30, 1922, the first regular (ordinary) session on June 15, 1922.

The competence of the Court has been generally recognized in connection with four types of situations. 1. It exercises "voluntary" jurisdiction when the parties to a quarrel agree to submit that particular dispute for settlement. 2. It exercises "compulsory" jurisdiction in cases involving states that have previously agreed to submit such cases to its jurisdiction or (3) in cases involving states that have signed the Optional Clause of the Statute by which the Court was established. The Optional Clause binds a state signing it to

recognize as compulsory *ipso facto* and without special agreement, in relation to any other Member or state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all or any of the classes of legal disputes concerning:

- (a) The interpretation of a treaty;
- (b) Any question of international law;
- (c) The existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation;
- (d) The nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation.

Since subsequently (or previously) the states signing this clause obligated themselves by treaty to renounce war, the coverage of this clause is exceedingly broad. Moreover—a highly important point—by the terms of the Optional



XXI. DANGER SPOTS OF TODAY

Clause, "in the event of a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by the decision of the Court." Where "compulsory" jurisdiction is involved the Court may hear and decide a case on the application of a single state. 4. The Court delivers "advisory opinions," as distinct from decisions, on questions submitted by the League Council or Assembly. Individual states may obtain similar services by bringing a dispute before the Council (Article XI of the Covenant), arguing that the dispute or part of the dispute is justiciable (Article XIII), or requesting the Council to refer the matter to the Court (last sentence of Article XIV).

By October 1, 1931, thirty-seven states, including France, Germany, Great Britain, and Italy, had adhered to the Optional Clause; five others had signed but had not at that date ratified. Japan and the United States had done neither.

July 31, 1922, the Court delivered its first declaration—an advisory opinion. The right of the Workers' Delegate from the Netherlands to a seat at the third session of the International Labor Conference had been challenged. He had been appointed by the Dutch Government in agreement with three labor organizations totalling 282,455 members, of which the largest had a membership of 155,642, but without the concurrence of a fourth organization whose membership was 218,596. The Court gave as its opinion that the appointment was legal, that a Government affiliated with the International Labor Organization is not obligated to consult the largest organization of workers in its country provided the organizations consulted have a greater total membership. The second declaration of the Court, also an advisory opinion, was to the effect that the competence of the International Labor Organization extends to the regulation of the working-conditions of agricultural laborers. A fourth advisory opinion was delivered February 7, 1923, which is of interest as throwing light on the way that the functions of the Court have been extended. When certain nationality decrees had been promulgated in Tunisia and French Morocco November 8, 1921, by virtue of which the French called for (military) service various persons whom Great Britain claimed as subjects, Great Britain had proposed arbitration, and when France had refused, Britain had thereupon brought the matter before the League Council under Article XI of the Covenant, and the French had agreed that the Council should ask the World Court whether the matter was a purely domestic concern. If the Court should decide in the negative, the dispute was to be submitted to arbitration or judicial settlement. The opinion of the Court was in the negative.

The Court delivered its first decision August 17, 1923. The occasion was the refusal by Germany (March 21, 1921) to allow a British vessel laden with French munitions for Poland to pass through the Kiel Canal; Germany gave as reason that she was neutral in the war between Russia and Poland. The judges decided, nine to three, that in accordance with Article 380 of the Treaty of Versailles "the canal has ceased to be an internal . . . waterway . . . and . . . has become an international waterway. . . . The Kiel Canal must be open . . . to all vessels . . . but on one express condition, namely, that these vessels must belong to nations at peace with Germany." Judges Anzilotti and Huber held that the conditions envisaged by Article 380 were dependent on a state of peace; Professor Schücking that the article imposed a servitude, and that as

Russia was not a party to the Treaty of Versailles Germany remained under obligations to fulfill her duties as a neutral.

The sixth advisory opinion (September 10, 1923) upheld the rights of certain German minorities who were being deprived of their land by the Polish Government. The thirteenth opinion (July 23, 1926) laid down the principle that the International Labor Organization is "not excluded from proposing regulations for the protection of wage-earners because such regulation may have the effect of regulating at the same time and incidentally the work of the employer." The fifteenth opinion (March 3, 1928) established the jurisdiction of the Danzig Courts over the Polish Railway Administration operating within Danzig territory. December 16, 1927, the Court rendered a decision protecting the rights of certain German property-holders in Upper Silesia. April 26, 1928, a decision was delivered protecting the rights of German school minorities in Upper Silesia.

Although as has been pointed out the World Court is a separate entity from the League, that part of its work bearing more directly on the prevention of war will be treated in connection with the work of the League. Of the Court and its work as a whole an eminent authority has said: "It has more than justified the expectations of its founders. . . . In a brief decade it has become indispensable."

THE LEAGUE AS PEACEMAKER

After the war, in place of a "single" all-embracing conflict, Europe and the world at large were afflicted with a bumper crop of small wars, official or unofficial. Though the situation was profoundly discouraging and proved that the League, as constituted, was no *guarantee* of peace, valuable work was nevertheless accomplished in composing international differences and so preventing a still more extended plague of wars.

The first dispute the League undertook to settle was the question of the Åland Islands, an archipelago situated midway between Sweden and Finland. When Finland attained independence, after the war, the Åland Islanders also claimed the right of self-determination and although the Finnish Diet passed a law granting them autonomy, they signified their desire to be reunited with Sweden. The Finns thereupon landed troops and arrested two of the leading separatists. Great Britain drew the attention of the League to the situation (Article XI of the Covenant). July 12, 1920, with the consent of the two governments involved, the Council undertook to pass on the matter, and a commission of three jurists was appointed.

The facts in the case were these. The islands are inhabited by Swedes and had belonged to Sweden until, along with Finland, they were seized by Russia. After the war, 9,735 of the 10,196 voters in the islands signed a document in favor of reunion with Sweden. But Sweden had perforce signed a treaty in 1809 "legalizing" Russia's claim, and after the World War had unconditionally recognized the independence of Finland. The dispute arose before Finland was recognized by Russia. On the basis of this last fact the jurists decided that the matter did not fall within the recognized sovereignty of Finland. The Council then appointed a Commission of three (Bn, Ss, and A) nonjurists to make an

award. Incredible as it seems, the Commission disregarded all the evidence, including the jurists' findings, refused even to hold a plebiscite, and awarded the islands to Finland outright.

Although the arguments by which the Commission sought to justify its reactionary decision were based on a false premise, as the most authoritative and reasoned refutation of the doctrine of self-determination extant they are of more than passing interest.

To concede to minorities, either of language or religion, or to any fractions of a population the right of withdrawing from the community to which they belong, because it is their wish or their good pleasure, would be to destroy order and stability within states and to inaugurate anarchy in international life; it would be to uphold a theory incompatible with the very idea of the state as a territorial and political unity. . . . The separation of a minority from the state of which it forms a part . . . can only be considered as an altogether exceptional solution, a last resort when the state lacks either the will or the power to enact and apply just and effective guarantees.

The Commission would have strengthened its argument immeasurably if it had fortified the concluding sentence with a proviso such as this: "and particularly when other factors—such as geographical remoteness—outweigh the element of sentiment." With such a proviso attached the pronouncement would still have been reactionary in spirit—and in the case of the Åland Islands there was not even the necessity of delimiting a frontier.

It was unfortunate that the Council, already under suspicion of being an extremely conservative body, saw fit, as its first enactment of the kind, to sanction the decision. The only mitigating feature of the affair was that the Commission recommended and the Council specified five guarantees: (1) Education was to be in Swedish and there was to be no compulsory teaching of Finnish; (2) whenever real estate was about to be purchased by a nonresident, any resident or the local public authority was to be entitled to purchase it at a price to be fixed in the last resort by a Court of first instance; (3) nonresidents were not to acquire the suffrage until they had been domiciled in the islands five years; (4) the governor was to be appointed by the President of Finland in agreement with the Åland Assembly or, failing agreement, from three candidates nominated by the Assembly; (5) the guarantees were placed under the supervision of the League, to which the Finnish Government was to transmit any complaints made by the Assembly. The agreement that embodied these terms was consummated June 27, 1921. Aside from this only one gain was registered—a really serious dispute had been composed without recourse to arms. The credit for this gain, truly one of the greatest in history, goes to Sweden (not the League), who sacrificed her just claims to the welfare of mankind and to whose eternal honor it shall redound.

An even more important controversy was that between Lithuania and Poland over Vilna. In this city, the ancient capital of Lithuania, and the surrounding district together the Lithuanians outnumbered the Poles two to one. The Bolsheviks had taken possession shortly after the war and when they withdrew, had negotiated a treaty recognizing Lithuania's rights; whereupon Poland advanced her troops to the neighborhood, set up a counterclaim, and

appealed to the League. Paderewski and Voldemaras met in Geneva and agreed to withdraw their forces from the disputed area under League supervision; the agreement, signed October 7, 1920, was to take effect on the tenth. The ninth, General Zeligowski, a Polish irregular, drove the Lithuanians out of Vilna and took possession; the Polish Government disavowed the act but added that, pending the holding of a plebiscite, it would resist any attempt to drive Zeligowski out. When summoned to discuss the matter at Geneva, the Poles argued that it was a *fait accompli* with which they were unable to interfere and that in any case it was beyond the scope of the original dispute! Disinclined to try force, the Council decided on a plebiscite. Though the disputants again agreed in principle, practical difficulties developed from which both parties were in a measure to blame—and Zeligowski remained.

So far the League Council had merely been weak, morally and physically. But while Lithuania was only a pawn in the game of international politics, Poland was a power to be reckoned with, and in addition the protégé of France. Fully cognisant of these facts, Poland appealed to the Conference of Ambassadors (of the Allied Powers); and on March 15, 1923, the Ambassadors decided that Vilna should go to Poland! Lithuania naturally refused to recognize this decision and continued to regard herself as in "a state of war" with Poland; the border was closed, and there were no official relations between the two countries. Minor incidents served to keep the wound open. In September, 1926, a new treaty was negotiated by Russia in which the Soviets reaffirmed their recognition of Lithuania's rights. Late in 1927 a fresh crisis developed which brought the dispute once more into the headlines: alleging, incorrectly, that Polish teachers in Lithuania had been dismissed on political grounds, Poland arrested a number of Lithuanians in the Vilna district and closed twenty-nine schools; Lithuania lodged a complaint with the League (October 15) and refused to be hushed up. November 24 Russia presented a note at Warsaw saying that the preservation of peace depended "in much larger measure on Poland than on Lithuania." Premier Voldemaras of Lithuania and Marshal Pilsudski of Poland breathed fire on their respective sides of the frontier. Finally they went to Geneva, the Marshal clad in his military boots and clanking a sword, and December 10 met in conference. Voldemaras was browbeaten into declaring that Lithuania was no longer at war with Poland; the Council issued a statement designed to save the face of both disputants; and a further conference was arranged. The resolution formulated by the Council ended with this statement: "The Council declares that the present resolution in no way affects questions on which the two Governments have differences of opinion." And since the conference broke down, that was just where the matter stood—which left Lithuania free to claim that the League had annulled the 1923 decision of the Conference of Ambassadors and to proclaim a new constitution naming Vilna as her capital.

East of Finland lies East Karelia, a territory inhabited by Finns. East Karelia was never part of Finland politically—though two of its communes were under Finnish protection during the Bolshevik Revolution—and had had no separate status in the Russian Empire prior to 1917. In June, 1920, an autonomous Karelia was created by the Soviets, and by the Treaty of Dorpat with Finland

(October, 1920) Russia agreed that East Karelia should enjoy political, economic, and cultural autonomy. In the summer of 1921 Finland protested that these terms had not been carried out. When a rebellion took place in mid-November in East-Karelia some of the Finns attempted to aid the insurgents (though the Finnish Government remained strictly neutral); Finland appealed to the League November 26; and at the end of the year, Russia concentrated troops on the Finnish border. January 14, 1922, the Council agreed to consider the matter provided that both parties consented, but Russia categorically refused; whereat the Council asked the World Court (April 21, 1923): "Do Articles X and XI of the treaty of peace between Finland and Russia signed at Dorpat on October 14, 1920, and the annexed declaration of the Russian Delegation regarding the autonomy of Eastern Karelia, constitute engagements of an international character which place Russia under obligations to Finland as to the carrying out of the provisions contained therein?" July 23 the Court replied seven to four: "No state can, without its consent, be compelled to submit its disputes with other states either to mediation or to arbitration or any other kind of pacific settlement. . . . The Court therefore finds it impossible to give its opinion." This excess of caution was doubly surprising and doubly disappointing; surprising because of the failure to reply and because only an opinion was asked, disappointing because of the failure to reply and because of the reason given for the failure. If the Court was determined to refuse, the least it could do was to keep still and not advance a mere statement of fact as a legal excuse ("legal" though it might be); it is precisely this type of legality that the League was designed to break down. And as Bustamante observes, what right did the Court have to refuse?

The third international dispute of major importance with which the Council dealt was the most important that arose during the first decade of the League's existence. This was the Corfu Incident, which owed its prominence to the fact that this time a power of the first rank was involved. Whatever success the League might achieve in dealing with small states, in the ultimate analysis its success or failure would depend on its ability to keep the Great Powers in line. August 27, 1923, General Tellini of the Italian army, who was at the moment engaged on behalf of the Conference of Ambassadors in delimiting the Greco-Albanian frontier, was murdered on Greek soil *by persons unknown*; footprints indicated that the assassins had come from and had returned to Albania. Unfortunately for Greece this was in the early days of Mussolini's rise to power, when he felt it incumbent on him to be especially nationalistic (bellicose). The twenty-ninth he sent Greece a twenty-four-hour ultimatum—thus bettering Berchtold's record by 50 per cent—in which he made the following demands: (1) a full and formal apology; (2) a solemn funeral service in Athens; (3) a salute to the Italian flag on an Italian squadron off Phaleron by Greek warships flying the Italian flag, the salute to be returned only at the departure of the Italian vessels at sunset; (4 and 5) an inquiry by Greece within five days, "with the assistance of the Italian Military Attaché"; (6) the execution of all persons found guilty and a fine of 50,000,000 lire (about \$2,500,000), to be paid within five days; (7) military honors to the victims on embarkation. Under circumstances considerably less provocative Italy had made demands

harsher than those of Austria in 1914. The Greek reply, reminiscent of the Serbian, accepted points 1, 2, 3, and 7, but rejected 4, 5, and 6 as "outraging the honor and violating the sovereignty of the State." Compensation, however, was promised. August 31 an Italian squadron appeared in the harbor of Corfu, one of the most strategic islands in the Mediterranean and a point long coveted by Italy, and demanded that the Greeks display a white flag. When the Greeks delayed, the antique citadel, at that moment housing Anatolian refugees, was bombarded; fifteen of the unfortunate outcasts were killed and many wounded—after which the Italians landed and took possession. After appealing to the League Greece took a less wise but almost unavoidable step on September 2 in agreeing to accept any decision reached by the Conference of Ambassadors.

When the Council first discussed the situation (September 1), Italy questioned its competence, and Mussolini intimated that if the Conference of Ambassadors were left to handle the matter he would eventually evacuate Corfu, whereas if the League took a hand he would not. At the meeting on the fifth Lord Cecil declared, "I do not at present see any ground whatever on which the Council, without entirely forfeiting its right to the confidence of the world and entirely waiving its position as created by the Covenant, can refuse to entertain the appeal brought to it by the Government of Greece." Branting supported Cecil, but Italy announced her "irrevocable opinion that the Council . . . should not proceed to take action." Thereupon Cecil had Articles 10, 12, and 15 of the Treaty of Versailles (identical with the same articles of the League Covenant) read aloud and the Council adjourned. The next day, when a communication was received from Poincaré, President of the Conference of Ambassadors, containing the information that the affair was being taken care of, the Council dropped the matter like a hot cake. The plan formulated by the Conference of Ambassadors contained points 1, 2, 3, and 7 of the Italian ultimatum, the demand for the death penalty was omitted, the inquiry was to be supervised by representatives of all three European powers, with a representative of Japan acting as president, and subject to a decision regarding indemnity, Greece was to deposit 50,000,000 lire in a Swiss bank. This seemed fair enough, but the dénouement was not so creditable. A preliminary report was to be submitted by the Inter-Allied Commission not later than the twenty-second. The report, when made, contained the information that the Commissioners "could not yet formulate a firm, definitive and unanimous opinion. . . . The inquiry carried out by the Hellenic authorities . . . shows cases of negligence . . . but the observations made up to this date are not complete or decisive enough to allow the Commissioners to judge whether the Greek Government ought to be held responsible . . . or whether these negligences are the result . . . of imperfect means of criminal investigation. For the moment the Italian Commissioner, for reasons more particularly of a moral order, inclines rather to the first hypothesis, while the other three Commissioners incline rather to the second." France needed Italian support for her Ruhr policy; without publishing the report, Poincaré's ambassadors announced that negligences had been noted and ordered the Greek Government to pay Italy the 50,000,000 lire (September 26). The next day Italy's victorious squadron evacuated Corfu.

With a glance at Vilna, this triumph for the cause of peace was doubtless worth something—but at best the League could claim only a very negative credit.

The Assembly, which was in session but which had remained silent in response to an appeal by Viscount Ishii of Japan (president of the Council), was highly indignant at the way the affair had been handled. The reputation of the Conference of Ambassadors for impartiality was considerably impaired when the final report proved not only as inconclusive as the first but brought out that the Greeks had been unable to conduct an effective inquiry without the cooperation of the Albanian authorities. The twenty-eighth, Ishii announced to the Assembly

At its meeting of the 22nd September, 1923, the Council asked a Committee of Jurists to formulate questions with regard to certain points . . . The Committee submitted to the Council, on the 26th September, the following questions 1. Is the Council, when seized . . . of a dispute submitted in accordance with . . . Article XV of the Covenant . . . as "likely to lead to a rupture," bound . . . before inquiring into any point, to decide whether in fact such description is well founded? 2 Is the Council . . . bound . . . to suspend its inquiry . . . when, with the consent of the parties, the settlement . . . is being sought through some other channel? 3 Is an objection founded on Article XV, Paragraph 8, of the Covenant the only objection based on the merits of the dispute on which the competence of the Council . . . can be challenged? 4 Are measures of coercion which are not meant to constitute acts of war consistent with the terms of Articles XII and XV of the Covenant when they are taken . . . without prior recourse to the procedure laid down in those articles? 5 In what circumstances and to what extent is the responsibility of a State involved by the commission of a political crime in its territory?

Cecil, Hymans, and Branting had been instrumental in getting these questions formulated, and it had been their intention that the World Court should furnish the answers, but again Italy successfully demurred. As Italy was supported by Hanotaux (F), a Special Commission of Jurists was consulted instead. Their answers were approved by the Council on March 13, 1924. The reply to the first question was negative. To the second the Commission replied, "The Council must refuse to consider the application." The third reply was affirmative. In reply to the fourth question the Commission declared that such coercive measures might or might not be consistent with the articles in question and that "it is for the Council . . . to decide immediately . . . whether it should recommend the maintenance or the withdrawal of such measures." To the fifth question the Commission replied "The responsibility of the state is only involved . . . if the state has neglected to take all reasonable measures for the prevention of the crime and [for] the pursuit, arrest and bringing to justice of the criminal. The recognized public character of a foreigner and the circumstances in which he is present in its territory entail upon the state a corresponding duty of special vigilance." Italy's gracious approval of these replies was doubtless a great consolation to Greece!

During the Corfu Incident the League "passed the buck" to the Conference of Ambassadors; during the Javoržina Dispute the buck was passed in the reverse direction. The Javoržina district was a fraction of the County of Spisz (Zips) that ever since the war had been in dispute between Poland and Czecho-

slovakia. The Peace Conference had originally intended that a plebiscite should be held; but the Supreme Council of the Allies, with the concurrence of the interested parties, decided to let the Conference of Ambassadors handle the matter (July 11, 1920). Though the Ambassadors' decision giving Javoržina to Czechoslovakia was signed by the Allies and by Poland July 28, was confirmed by the Treaty of Sèvres, and was reaffirmed by the Conference of Ambassadors (December 6), Poland refused to abide by the terms. August 18, 1923, the dispute was referred to the League under Paragraph 2 of Article XI of the Covenant, and the Council accordingly asked the World Court for an opinion as to whether the question was still open. On the basis of a reply of December 6 the Conference of Ambassadors finally settled the affair (September 5, 1924).

Albania had not had time to assume definite shape prior to the war; after the war the Conference of Ambassadors, which was to delimit the Albanian frontiers, let two years go by without lifting a finger. August 2, 1920, the Italians agreed to evacuate their holdings on the mainland;³ but in the north, where the Yugoslavs were still in possession, a so-called Mirdite Republic was in course of formation, and the Greeks were strengthening their forces in the south. When Albania protested to the League, the Council merely urged the Conference of Ambassadors to bestir themselves (June 25, 1921), but when Albania served notice that she would appeal to the League Assembly, the Ambassadors woke up. Though the members of the Assembly, when they met, were strongly in favor of espousing the Albanian cause, Cecil, Balfour, and Fisher persuaded them to await the forthcoming decision of the Conference of Ambassadors and in the meantime to content themselves with sending a commission "to report fully on the execution of the decision . . . as soon as it was given, and on any disturbances which might occur." As the Greeks were opposed to this proposition, the method of adopting the resolution was an illuminating illustration of how to let "the ayes have it" in such a way as to obtain a "unanimous" vote. The president: "Unless any member desires a roll call taken I will assume that the resolutions are carried." Silence. "The resolutions are carried."

A week later an army of Yugoslav regulars, 12,000 strong and fully equipped, began an invasion of Albania; inside of another week Oboti had fallen. If the Yugoslavs kept on, Italy was certain to support Albania, Greece would in all probability join in—and where the affair would end no one could say. November 7 Lloyd George asked the Secretary-General of the League to call a special meeting of the Council "to agree upon measures to be taken under Article XVI [economic sanctions]," and two days later the Conference of Ambassadors awarded the Monastery of Sveti (St.) Naum to Albania—for in this matter France could not count on Italian support. When Pašić saw how things were going, the Yugoslav troops were withdrawn; but as Yugoslavia still continued to protest, the matter was referred back to the League, and the League, in turn, asked the World Court for its opinion as to whether the decision should stand. September 4, 1924, the Court replied in the affirmative, but it was the last of October before the Albanian authorities were able to take possession of fourteen

³ They retained the island of Saseno, off Avlona.

villages in the Koritsa district from which Greek troops had just been persuaded to retire.

By far the most effective and creditable piece of work accomplished by the League during the first decade of its existence was its handling of the Greco-Bulgarian Crisis, whereby European politics were enlivened and the machinery of the League was tested in 1925. With latent hostility on both sides and the civilians on both sides armed, the frontier between Greece and Bulgaria was a perpetual menace—the more so since incursions of armed bands were endemic in this portion of the globe. While no serious incident had occurred since 1923, a fresh conflict all but set the Balkans aflame on October 19. Although the frontier detachments involved had been on friendly terms, shots were exchanged by the sentries at Demir-Kapu (since the Greek sentry was found dead on Bulgarian soil it was impossible to prove who began the firing), and soon the two posts were engaged. The Greek officer in command, who had been absent, returned, ordered his men to cease firing, and was advancing under a flag of truce when he was killed—unintentionally, the Bulgars claimed. Exaggerated reports reached Athens, and although airplanes failed to reveal any concentration of Bulgarian troops a strong Greek force invaded the Struma Valley, some twelve miles east of Demir-Kapu (October 22). Bulgaria appealed to the League, and the Minister of War ordered that only slight resistance should be offered; at no time did the Bulgars use artillery. Soon some seventy square miles of foreign soil were under Greek occupation. The nearest town of importance was about to be attacked when Briand (president *pro tem.* of the League Council), acting on his own responsibility, ordered the suspension of hostilities; the Council gave the Greeks sixty hours to withdraw and sent the nearest military attachés of the Allies to see that its orders were carried out. A Commission of Inquiry reported (November 28) that the provocation was not sufficient to justify the action Greece had taken and recommended that since the Bulgars had lost 12 killed (7 civilians), 19 wounded (11 civilians), and considerable property, Greece should pay 30,000,000 levas reparation and indemnity. Briand later pointed out that the idea of aggressive self-defense ought not to be allowed to “take root in the minds of nations that were members of the League and become a kind of jurisprudence.” This sentiment was echoed by Austen Chamberlain and by all the other members of the Council—not excepting the Italian representative! Although only small nations were involved and although Bulgaria did not act with the vigor she might have exhibited had she not been aware that she was an object of suspicion to the Allies, the settlement of the crisis was a truly creditable affair and noteworthy in more ways than one. For the first time the League had succeeded in imposing its will, as distinct from compromising; and the award in favor of a recent enemy and against a recent ally—even though there were facts that might have been taken to justify a contrary verdict—was a sign that the Council could on occasion be impartial.

THE NAVAL CONFERENCES AND THE PACT OF PARIS

In mid-November of 1921 the Washington Disarmament Conference opened. So far as naval disarmament was concerned America—in the act of becoming the greatest naval power in the world—entered the discussions holding the trumps; her postwar financial position was so strong that she could outbuild any competitor with comparative ease. This situation the other participants of course realized; the end of England's two-power standard had already been foreshadowed by a resolution of the Imperial Conference of 1921 which by implication signified British acceptance of naval parity with the United States. The American program was expounded with telling effect by Hughes. In the words of Balfour, "I listened . . . without supposing that anything very dramatic lay behind. And suddenly I became aware, as I suppose all present became aware, that they were assisting not merely at an eloquent and admirable speech, but at a great historical event." And for the reason just mentioned America was able to enforce the acceptance of her main propositions as well as to make a magnificent gesture.

Offering to scrap 30 capital ships, commissioned or building, with an aggregate tonnage of 845,740, the United States proposed that the British Empire scrap 23, with a tonnage of 583,375, and Japan 17, aggregating 448,928 tons; these proposals were only slightly modified. February 6, 1922, the five assembled powers signed a treaty embodying the results of their negotiations concerning disarmament. After the ships specified had been scrapped the British Empire would retain 22 capital ships, with an aggregate tonnage of 580,450; the United States 18, aggregating 500,650 tons; and Japan 10, of 301,320. France had only 164,500, and Italy obtained theoretical parity with France. No capital ships were to be built by the three principal naval powers for a period of ten years. At the end of that time they were to be entitled to lay down replacements in a ratio of 5 to 5 to 3 (by the actual terms of the treaty 525,000 tons for Great Britain and the United States and 315,000 for Japan). For France and Italy the ratio was 1.75 (175,000 tons). New ships could be replaced at the end of twenty years. The total and individual tonnage of aircraft carriers was likewise limited. For the first time in history a step toward the voluntary reduction of armaments had been accomplished.

It remains to record the failures of the Washington Conference. The British wanted to forbid the use of submarines, but to this the other powers would not agree. The United States proposed to limit auxiliary craft and submarines, but to this France would not agree. The best that could be done was to limit the size of noncapital ships, with the exception of aircraft-carriers, to 10,000 tons. It was France likewise who blocked the attempts to limit land and air armaments. Finally, an attempt to humanize naval warfare by providing additional legal protection for neutrals and noncombatants was also blocked by France!

The cause of naval disarmament was further advanced at the London Conference of 1930. It was impossible to conclude a five-power treaty because Italy stood out for parity with France; and because of the opposition of France and

Japan it was impossible to abolish submarines. Between the British Empire, the United States, and Japan, however, a treaty was concluded. The three powers agreed to a naval holiday in the building of capital ships during the years 1931-36; in addition, Great Britain was to scrap three battleships and a battle cruiser, and the United States two battleships. Other fighting craft were to be "demoted" to training-ships. Thereafter the United States would be left with 15 capital ships, of 456,200 tons; Great Britain with 15, of 427,850 tons; and Japan with 9, of 273,820. The aggregate tonnage in the chief categories of auxiliaries was restricted—the British Empire was to have 541,700 tons; the United States, 526,200; Japan, 367,050—and the size of submarines was limited.

The London Conference partially fulfilled the attempt of the Washington Conference to "humanize" the conduct of submarine warfare. According to Article XX of the London Naval Treaty:

The following are accepted as established rules of International Law: (1) In their action with regard to merchant ships, submarines must conform to the rules of International Law to which surface vessels are subject. (2) In particular, except in the case of persistent refusal to stop on being duly summoned or of active resistance to visit or search, a warship, whether surface vessel or submarine, may not sink or render incapable of navigation a merchant vessel without having first placed passengers, crew, and ship's papers in a place of safety. For this purpose the ship's boats are not regarded as a place of safety unless the safety of the passengers and crew is assured, in the existing sea and weather conditions, by the proximity of land or the presence of another vessel which is in a position to take them on board.

On March 22, 1927, Briand had a conversation with Professor Shotwell of Columbia during which the latter suggested the desirability of an agreement among states to renounce war as an instrument of national policy. April 6, the tenth anniversary of America's entrance into the war, Briand gave the Associated Press a personal message to the American people containing the suggestion that France and the United States should celebrate the occasion by concluding an agreement "to outlaw war"; in other words, they were to agree to "the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy." President Butler of Columbia lent his influence to push the project; Professor Shotwell and Mr. Chamberlain drew up an unofficial draft treaty; Briand forwarded the State Department in Washington a draft of his own early in June; and in December Senator Capper and Senator Borah introduced resolutions in the United States Senate advocating the "outlawry of war."

December 28, Secretary Kellogg suggested that the proposed treaty should be multilateral, rather than merely bilateral, to which France agreed. April 13, 1928, Kellogg submitted a draft treaty, based on that of Briand, to all the powers with the exception of Russia. Germany was the first to assent (April 27). In England the House of Lords passed a unanimous resolution in favor of the Kellogg proposals, and the Government returned a favorable reply, though with reservations. Japan accepted without reservations (May 26). June 23 Kellogg addressed a slightly modified draft treaty to fourteen governments, including the British Dominions and India; favorable replies were received from all—from Germany first (July 11), and from Japan last (July 20).

The official signing of the Pact of Paris (often called the Kellogg-Briand Pact) took place August 27 at the Quai d'Orsay. "Article I. The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare, in the names of their respective peoples, that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another. Article II. The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts, of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means." No sanctions were provided, and Britain reserved the right to "police" certain outlying, undeveloped territories.

The same day the United States addressed a note to forty-eight governments inviting them to adhere; France invited Russia. Of the fifty-eight sovereign states then in existence (excluding the British Dominions), only Yemen and the Nejd-Hejaz failed to receive an invitation. Within a year all except Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Luxemburg, Mexico, Salvador, and Uruguay had ratified the Pact; and all except Argentina and Brazil had signified their intention to adhere. But what such a "pious wish" as the Pact of Paris could accomplish remained to be seen.

An ironical commentary on the effectiveness of the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the League was the signing of a Four-Power Peace Pact between France, Germany, Great Britain, and Italy (June 7, 1933). Since it was to remain in force for ten years, the object of the pact was commonly—and correctly—said to be the maintenance of peace *for ten years*, the implication being that the powers would then be free to "start something" if they so desired.

THE NEW WORLD OF THE PACIFIC

So far the field of history has been considered primarily from the European standpoint. Some especial consideration is due a world that is peripheral from the European point of view but whose influence on Europe has been not inconsiderable in the past and is bound to be even greater in the future—the World of the Pacific. Europeans and Americans have heretofore looked on the Pacific as a dividing line (*cf.* the International Date Line) between the extreme west of the Western World and its extreme east. Events since the war have emphasized the fact that the Pacific is a world in itself, a center of interest not only for Japan and China but also for the British Dominions—Australia, New Zealand, and to a lesser degree Canada and South Africa—and for the United States. For all the British Dominions, with the exception of the two that are somewhat peculiar (Newfoundland and the Irish Free State), the Pacific is a focal point and a link rather than a dividing-line.

Even before the World War Japan had demonstrated that she was by all odds the leading power belonging primarily to the World of the Pacific, and a number of events connected with the war—the Twenty-one Demands (January 11, 1915), the Treaty of Versailles, and the Japanese occupation of eastern Siberia—served to emphasize and heighten her position. That these events were peaks, rather than milestones, was shown by the decline in Japanese fortunes that followed the war. The Chinese and the Russians showed un-

expected powers of resistance, Japan herself betrayed certain structural weaknesses, and the powers, when relieved of the war, were able to curtail Japanese activities to a considerable degree. The story of this last phase of Japanese history is first of all the story of the Washington Conference, which likewise marked the increasing importance of Pacific affairs in world history.

Late in the summer of 1921 the United States issued an invitation to the four principal Allied Powers "to participate in a conference on the limitation of armaments, in connection with which Pacific and Far-Eastern questions would also be discussed," and the invitation was accepted; the leading delegates were Hughes (A), Balfour (E), Shidehara (J), Briand (F), and Schanzer (I). Although the question of Pacific relations was apparently intended to be subsidiary, it was in no way less important than the main issue in point of fact. How Japan surrendered some of her Chinese claims has been noted elsewhere.⁴ On May 31 the United States had notified the Japanese that "the Government of the United States can neither now nor hereafter recognize as valid any claims or titles arising out of the present occupation and control [of eastern Siberia] and it cannot acquiesce in any action taken by the Government of Japan which might impair existing treaty rights or the political or territorial integrity of Russia." January 23 and 24, 1922, a conference within a conference was held during which Hughes made public the contents of this note and the Japanese affirmed their intention to withdraw from the Russian mainland—though not from northern Sakhalin.

One of the foremost questions before the Conference concerned the relations between the United States, Great Britain, and Japan; here the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, originally concluded in 1902, was the point at issue. Though the United States was explicitly excluded from the scope of action, the alliance was viewed askance in the United States, and likewise in the British Dominions; Great Britain, though legally able to withdraw, did not wish to offend the Japanese by so doing. Japan was wise enough to see that a half-hearted alliance which, if maintained, was bound to terminate sooner or later in a humiliating manner was not desirable from her own standpoint. She therefore entered into a Four-Power Pact (December 13, 1921) whereby Great Britain, Japan, France, and the United States agreed to respect each other's "insular possessions and insular dominions" in the Pacific (Article I), to hold a conference if any differences of opinion should arise (Article I), and to communicate with one another if threatened by an outside power (Article II). "Questions which according to principles of international law lie exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of the respective powers" were excluded from the operation of Article I, as were the four main islands of Japan. Upon the ratification of this pact the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was to terminate.

Japan obtained substantial compensation for her sacrifices through Article XIX, which provided that the *status quo* with regard to fortifications and naval bases in their outlying possessions in the Pacific should be maintained by the three principal signatories (Great Britain, the United States, and Japan). These provisions, by securing Japan against the establishment of any first-class naval

⁴ See p. 633.

base by either of the other two within striking distance of her main islands, made her defensive position virtually impregnable. Moreover, Hong Kong and the Philippines were thereby placed at her mercy, and she secured uninterrupted communication with her continental possessions and with China.

When Chang Hsueh-liang, dictator of Manchuria, joined the Chinese Nationalists at the end of 1928, he did so in defiance of the advice and wishes of the Japanese. Japan offered no active opposition at the time, and during most of the next three years she pursued a policy of friendship. There can be no doubt, however, that many Japanese were in favor of something more vigorous than a disguised protectorate over Manchuria, for the population of Japan has doubled in sixty years (1872-1932) and as a result she has 437 inhabitants to the square mile, as compared with 670 for Belgium, 468 for the United Kingdom, and 330 for Germany. When the barren character of the Japanese soil is taken into consideration, the problem confronting Japan becomes even clearer. Per square mile of *arable* land she has a population density of 2,774 as compared with 2,170 for the United Kingdom, 1,709 for Belgium, 819 for Italy, 806 for Germany, 467 for France, and 229 for the United States—and her population is increasing at the rate of 900,000 per annum.

Japanese relations with China were complicated by an almost endless number of factors. Chief among these complications was the rise of Chinese nationalism, with its concomitant hostility to all foreigners and a revival of interest in Manchuria on the part of the Chinese. The prewar population of Manchuria had been less than 20,000,000, but in the twenty years since 1914, it had increased over 50 per cent—mainly by Chinese immigration. The number of foreigners in 1931 was about 1,200,000, of whom 800,000 were Koreans (unwilling subjects of Japan); of the remaining 400,000, 230,000 were Japanese. Japan, and later China, had invested large sums in railways, and so forth. As for the political situation under the rule of Chang, "whatever the shortcomings of the administration . . . efforts were made in some parts of the country to improve the administration, and certain achievements must be noted, particularly in the field of education, progress of municipal administration, and of public utility work." The progress achieved by the Chinese was resented rather than welcomed by Japan, for the Japanese were determined to get the credit for any advances. Japan considered that as a result of the War of 1894, the War of 1904, and the Twenty-One Demands—not to mention her investments—she had acquired inviolable "historic rights," and these she was determined should redound to her material credit.

The more immediate causes of friction were the six hundred miles of railways the Chinese had recently built and were operating—an injury to their own (leased) South Manchurian Railroad, the Japanese asserted—and the ports of Yingkow (Newchwang) and Hulutao, which the Japanese claimed were detrimental to Talien (Dairen). Disputes over these matters became unusually acute when the Chinese lines in Manchuria were connected with those in the rest of China (1930).

JAPAN RUNS AMUCK

The inauguration of the League, the accomplishments of the Washington Conference, and the signing of the Pact of Paris led to the hope that a new era, fundamentally different if not perfect, had dawned in international affairs. This hope was rudely shattered the morning of September 19, 1931, when the world awoke to find that Japan was on the rampage and that as a result of her imperialistic activities of the preceding evening Manchuria was again in the headlines.

On the evening in question the Japanese attacked and overpowered the Chinese garrison in Mukden; the Japanese claimed that they had been attacked, but as the Chinese were under orders to observe the strictest decorum ("No matter how they may challenge us, we must be extremely patient and never resort to force, so as to avoid any conflict whatever") and as the Japanese had delivered simultaneous attacks elsewhere, the excuse cannot be seriously entertained. Though China appealed to the League, by the end of the year the Chinese troops were forced out of Manchuria and Chang had taken refuge behind the Great Wall; the Japanese advance was marked by numerous atrocities perpetrated on unoffending and defenseless civilians. Apparently the military party in Japan, always strong, had gained the upper hand and was running affairs to suit itself.

The impression was confirmed by Japanese activities in another field. When events in Manchuria led to an outburst of violent anti-Japanese feeling in the rest of China, a boycott ensued as a result of which imports from Japan fell 36 per cent. The Japanese were determined to remedy this situation if an excuse could be found for taking action, and an opportunity similar to that utilized by Germany in 1897 soon presented itself. Five Japanese monks were mobbed in Shanghai in mid-January, and one subsequently died; whereupon the Japanese naval commander on the spot demanded that all anti-Japanese agitation should cease, landed bluejackets, and backed up his demands with a twenty-four-hour ultimatum (January 27, 1931). At midnight of January 28-29—the conciliatory reply returned by the Chinese having been pronounced unsatisfactory—the Japanese attempted to seize Chapei, a suburb of Shanghai located just outside the International Settlement. The standard excuses were given—the necessity for protecting Japanese nationals and the indefensible boundaries of the International Settlement. But much to their surprise the Japanese were decisively repulsed. In a few days foreign troops were rushing to the scene from every quarter.

When repeated attacks by bluejackets failed to dislodge the Chinese, Japanese regulars began to arrive (February 9). As they too were unable to advance, a full-fledged war was soon in progress—though never officially declared! The numbers engaged are uncertain, but as reinforcements continued to arrive from time to time throughout the engagement the total Japanese effectives were probably not far from 50,000. It is doubtful if the Chinese had more. Needless to say, the Japanese were superbly equipped, while the Chinese did not even

have aircraft. Yet week after week the Nineteenth Route Army under Tsai Ting-kai continued to hold the invaders at bay.

The Japanese were extremely obnoxious, to say the least, in their conduct of operations, and even violated the International Settlement. One of the picturesque incidents of the fighting elsewhere was the attempt of a young American airman, Robert Short, to drive off six Japanese planes that were bombing civilians in Soochow. For this bit of gallantry he paid with his life—but not until he had proved that China had at least one friend who was willing to do something more than talk about Japanese atrocities. One is reminded of his gallant brothers of the Lafayette Escadrille. Not until the Japanese landed a fresh contingent further north and outflanked the Chinese positions were the heroic defenders of Chapei compelled to retreat (March 2).

Though the Battle of Shanghai resulted in a Japanese victory it revealed one all-important fact—which until then no one would have believed—and blazoned it forth that all the world might know, to wit, that the Chinese are, on occasion at least, better fighters than the Japanese. Were this a popular magazine and not a serious history this paragraph would end: "We nominate for the Hall of Fame General Tsai, gallant leader of the gallant Nineteenth Route Army, because with troops inferior in numbers and equipment, he withstood the Japanese onslaught for over a month, because he is a scholar and a gentleman as well as a magnificent fighter, because he is able to hold his men in check as well as to lead them to victory, and because, more than all the politicians and diplomats, he merits the Nobel Peace Prize for 1932."

Meanwhile the Japanese were showing their hand in Manchuria. A puppet government had been set up, and Manchuria was proclaimed an independent state under the name of Manchukuo (February 18). March 4, Pu-yi (Hsuan Tung), the Boy Emperor who had been deposed at the time of the Chinese Revolution, accepted the post of President; on the ninth he was installed at Changchun, the new capital.

September 21, 1931, just after the storm broke in Manchuria, China had appealed to the League, and on the thirtieth had suggested the appointment of a commission of inquiry. Japan at first vetoed this suggestion; but on November 21, evidently feeling that they were quite secure and preferring to take the initiative, the Japanese had themselves proposed that such a commission be appointed. The proposal was adopted by the Council December 10. The Japanese agreed to withdraw their troops to the railroad zone, and both parties promised to do nothing to aggravate the conflict. Japan consistently denied that she had any territorial ambitions in Manchuria.

The Commission of Inquiry consisted of the Earl of Lytton (E), chairman, Count Aldrovandi (I), General Claudel (F), General McCoy (A), and Dr. Schnee (G); Wellington Koo was assessor for China, and Yoshida for Japan. There was also a sizable staff of international experts. The Lytton Commission arrived in Tokyo February 29, 1932, and was at work until September 4; besides visiting various points south of the Great Wall it traveled in Manchuria and received 1,550 letters in Chinese, 400 in Russian, and others in Japanese, English, and French. Its findings were: "We have come to the conclusion

that there is no general Chinese support for the 'Manchukuo Government,' which is regarded by the local Chinese as an instrument of the Japanese."

March 11, 1932, the League Assembly had decided to create a Committee of Nineteen with general oversight of the Manchurian Crisis. Despite repeated promises to the contrary the Japanese extended their military operations, and on September 15 they recognized the independence of "Manchukuo." December 15 the Committee of Nineteen submitted two draft resolutions to the disputants as a basis for further attempts at conciliation.

January 2, 1933, as if to begin the New Year right and show how much they cared for the Lytton Report and for the Committee of Nineteen, the Japanese attacked Shanhaikwan. This strategic town, situated just inside the eastern end of the Great Wall, controls the main pass from Manchuria to the rest of China. The troops of Chang Hsueh liang held out for three days, but as usual modern equipment won in the end. With Shanhaikwan in their hands the Japanese began to encroach on the province of Jehol, lying between Manchuria and the Great Wall.

January 21, after an animated and prolonged correspondence with Japan, the Committee of Nineteen decided that its efforts at conciliation were useless. It accordingly prepared a Draft Report, in conformity with Article XV (Paragraph 4) of the Covenant, which was broadcast to the world February 17. The broadcast was the first use of radio for the purpose of stimulating world opinion, and the report was the first of the kind and by far the strongest document thus far issued by the League. It recited that "in Manchuria, or other parts of the territory of a member of the League, military operations, which the report of the Commission of Inquiry has described as 'war in disguise,' continued and still continues." It outlined the origins and development of the issue in the following terms.

The dispute . . . originated in Manchuria, which China and foreign powers have always regarded as an integral part of China under Chinese sovereignty . . . To cut off these provinces from the rest of China cannot but create a serious irredentist problem likely to endanger peace . . . Before Sept. 18, 1931, each of the two parties had legitimate grievances against the other in Manchuria, Japan taking advantage of rights open to question and the Chinese authorities putting obstacles in the way of the exercise of rights which could not be contested. During the period immediately preceding the events of Sept. 18, various efforts were made to settle the questions outstanding . . . by the normal method of diplomatic negotiations and pacific means and these means had not been exhausted . . . The Assembly cannot regard as measures of self-defense the military operations carried out . . . by the Japanese troops . . . Moreover, the adoption of measures of self defense does not exempt a state from complying with the provisions of Article XII of the Covenant . . . A group of Japanese civil and military officials conceived, organized and carried through the Manchurian independence movement . . . It cannot be considered as a spontaneous and genuine independence movement. The main political and administrative power in the "government" of "Manchukuo" rests in the hands of Japanese officials and advisers . . . While at the origin of the state of tension that existed before Sept. 18, 1931, certain responsibilities would appear to lie on one side and the other, no question of Chinese responsibility can arise for the development of events since Sept. 18, 1931.

Finally, there were detailed recommendations: Manchuria was to be returned to China and granted autonomy, and Japanese rights in China were to be safeguarded. Although a strong condemnation of Japan, the report was in no sense a one-sided pronouncement, for Japanese rights in Manchuria were specifically safeguarded (despite the way those "rights" had been acquired).

From then on events followed thick and fast. Just after Japan had presented an ultimatum demanding that China withdraw from Jehol—which she now claimed to be part of "Manchukuo"—and had begun a fresh attack, the League Assembly adopted the report condemning Japan (February 24); the United States and Soviet Russia were invited to concert their action with a Committee of Twenty-one. Only Japan voted in the negative and on the adoption of the report her delegates withdrew from the Assembly. March 5 Cheng-tehfu (Jehol City) fell.

March 7 the Soviets declined a seat on the League committee because thirteen of the members had not recognized Russia but added: "The Soviet Government will always solidly support the actions and suggestions of international bodies and separate governments aiming to solve the conflict and to safeguard peace in the Far East." The United States agreed to participate unofficially (March 13).


March 10 the resignation of Chang Hsueh-liang as commander-in-chief in North China had been accepted, and Chiang, through his Minister of War, Ho Ying-ching, had assumed personal control; for the first time since the fall of the Manchu Empire, all of China under Chinese control answered the orders of one man. March 20, although she had previously declared that she would confine her operations to Jehol, Japan seized Sahochiao, nine miles south of the Great Wall; on the twenty-seventh she announced that she was withdrawing from the League. Soon the Japanese were talking of creating a "buffer state" in North China, and on April 1 they launched another general offensive. For some time their advance was comparatively slow, but by May 1 they were hammering at the gates of Peiping. At this juncture a truce was signed. The Chinese promised to withdraw their forces "to the districts south and west of a line connecting Yenchieng, Changping, Kaoling, Shunyi, Tungchow, Sanho, Paoti, Lintingchen, Ningho and Lutai," and, except for the civil jurisdiction, thereby surrendered control of practically everything northeast of Tientsin and Peiping (Peking). There is reason to believe that the Nanking Government submitted to these terms (sold out to the Japanese, its opponents would say) in order to be free to deal with the rising menace of communism.

The ultimate settlement of the Sino-Japanese conflict may well depend on the turn of Japanese politics. When the League presented its demands, the military clique under Araki, Minister of War, was still in the saddle. The pronouncements of this redoubtable fire-eater were singularly like those of some prewar Germans: "The spirit of the Japanese nation is, by its nature, a thing that must be propagated over the seven seas and extended over the five continents. Anything that may hinder it must be abolished, even by force." "The Japanese Army can hope to beat any other army." (Evidently Araki neglected to consider that Japan had never encountered a really efficient modern army.) It is not so certain that the nation itself will subscribe indefinitely to this dangerous

doctrine. With the yen falling at an alarming rate, Japan faced the largest deficit in history, and the forthcoming budget called for expenditures of 2,239,000,000 yen more (\$470,019,000, or \$1,119,500,000 at the normal rate of exchange); in order to meet this emergency the Government was compelled to levy what were in effect forced loans. Already murmurs were being heard in the Diet and in the country at large. Two days after Japan had refused the League offer of conciliation Ashida, a deputy of the majority (Seiyukai) party in the Diet, declared: "The public is growing fearful that we are being dragged, blindly by the Army into an uncharted, pitch-black abyss. I appeal to the War Minister to forsake the notion that the Japanese Army is almighty!"

Will the Japanese Imbroglio be the death of the League, or will the League emerge from this trial of strength stronger than ever—able in the end to assure that peace which is the supreme hope of the coolies of China, the woodcutters of Japan, the chemical workers of Germany, the waiters of Paris, the silk-workers of Italy, the seamen of England, the workmen on the coffee plantations of Brazil, the miners of South Africa, the peasants of Russia, and the automobile workers of America? With Germany likewise deserting the League the immediate prospects are unfortunately not too bright.

No better note can be found on which to end this chapter than the pronouncement delivered by Stanley Baldwin, as Prime Minister of the Conservative Government in England, on January 8, 1926: "Who in Europe does not know that one more [great] war in the West and the civilization of the ages will fall with as great a shock as that of Rome?"




AN EARLY "HORSELESS CARRIAGE"

(Courtesy of Keystone View Company)

• THE FIRST WRIGHT PLANE

(Courtesy of New York Museum of Science and Industry)



Courtesy of Keystone Press Company

EINSTEIN

Pyramids and pins, ants and airplanes, cabbages and kings, are all simply diverse combinations of these same electrical particles. Had Hamlet seen such ghosts walking and flying about, he might well have exclaimed:

There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio,
Than are dreamt of in your philosophy.

It is easy to comprehend, from a survey of these facts, why the Electron Theory is characterized as "one of the most important generalizations of all time." Here is a unifying concept undreamt of by the scholastics of the Middle Ages, a concept enabling the scientist of today to affirm that "it is clear that electricity is the fundamental constituent of matter."

It has been said that tentatively a hydrogen atom might be conceived as a microscopic Earth-Moon system; actually, scientists are still at odds over the characteristics of the atom. De Broglie (F) suggested (1925) that electrons might be accompanied by waves (vibrations propagated through space), and Schrodinger (G) thereupon formulated the Theory of Wave Mechanics, which postulates that "matter" is nothing but waves radiating out an infinite distance from a "nucleus" having "no properties left except the purely spatial one of being the central point in this infinitely extended field." According to this theory, then, each electron exists everywhere! If a point within a material body be selected at random, an electromagnetic field is all that is usually found; if the point selected happens to be inside an electron, the only observable difference is a certain density of electricity. Those who accept the Theory of Wave Mechanics are bound to think of the universe as nothing but waves of energy; in other words, "matter" or "substance" has been replaced by "energy" or "behavior." The present drift of opinion is indicated by the following quotations from Dampier-Whetham (E).

Protons and electrons . . . have now been dissolved into sources of radiation or into wave-groups: into a mere set of events which proceed outward from a center. About what exists at the center, or about the medium which carries the waves (if indeed wave-equations connote waves in a medium), we know nothing. . . . To the philosopher of old, matter was . . . something extended in space which persisted through time. . . . Physical reality is [now] reduced to a set of Hamiltonian equations. . . . Even the electrons . . . have become but disembodied ghosts, mere wave-forms. They are not even waves in our familiar space, or in Maxwell's aether, but in a four-dimensional space-time [*cf.* the Theory of Relativity, below], which our minds cannot picture in comprehensible terms. Moreover, even as disembodied ghosts, their careers are short. The only known cause which will explain the vast output of radiant energy from the Sun and other stars is the mutual annihilation of protons and electrons. . . . Thus matter . . . is vanishing into radiation . . . from our Sun alone at the rate of 250 million tons a minute.

Still others, mindful that (since only mathematically can man grapple with reality) these theories are based on mathematical formulae alone, have declared that the universe can best be pictured as something made up exclusively of thought or as a Great Thought. The most ardent advocates of this thought-world theory, however, hasten to explain that their mathematical pictures are merely symbols or fictions—less precise than the old mechanical picture so that

they may be closer to the truth, further from giving a comprehensible picture of the truth in that they are less precise—and that “the material universe remains as substantial as ever it was, and this statement must . . . remain true through all changes of scientific or philosophical thought.” No wonder scientists as well as laymen are somewhat bewildered by the net result of their efforts.

THE PHYSICIST AS PRESTIDIGITATOR: MATTER IN ACTION

The foregoing is a consideration of the *construction* of matter. Before leaving this all-embracing twentieth century physics the student of contemporary culture must consider what the scientist has to say on the *action* of matter, for it is here that twentieth century science exhibits its most startling departures. Newtonian mechanics stood unchallenged until the close of the nineteenth century; but even before X-rays and radioactivity added to the unsolved problems of the physicist the theoretical explanation of the optics of moving bodies was not all that could be desired. In particular, an experiment suggested by Maxwell and first performed (1881) by Michelson (G-A) and Morley (E) did not give the expected results. A huge block of granite, on which delicate mirrors were mounted, was floated on mercury. As the block was slowly rotated, light, reflected back and forth between the mirrors, had to travel first along the earth's orbit and then across it; the reflection of the light as observed in the mirrors was expected to shift slightly and thus give direct evidence of the motion of the Earth around the Sun. Physicists were disconcerted to learn that this did not happen.

In science theory must give way to carefully verified fact; and in 1905 Einstein (G-Jh), taking the necessary steps, advanced the Special Theory of Relativity. A dozen years later came his General Theory, which showed that Newton's law of gravitation could be explained on the basis of the laws of motion. And now (1931) he announces that his new Unitary Field Theory, founded on the possibility of five directions in four-dimensional space, includes electrodynamics as well as gravitation and holds promise of embracing quantum phenomena (see below) within a closely connected whole.

What is a four-dimensional world? The world as observed by the average man has but three dimensions. Yet, given these three, the scientist asks, “*When* did these conditions obtain?” Time is therefore the fourth dimension of the relativist. But as time is something quite apart from the ordinary dimensions, why call it a dimension at all? Because only by so doing is the relativist able to deal with the world in motion as a problem of purely geometrical relations. When the relativist speaks of space-time or says that he has eliminated Newtonian space (short for the dimensions that exist in space) and time, he means that in order to obtain a true picture of the world ordinary dimensions and time cannot be separated but must be taken into consideration *simultaneously*.

Relativity proves that, although the world of four dimensions is a mathematical fiction, time and space are somewhat more intimately connected than nineteenth century physicists guessed: that if a man could be shot from the earth in a rocket traveling with the speed of light he would never grow old; that man's weight increases with his speed until, if he could run fast enough,

he would weigh a ton. Although these paradoxical experiments can never be realized with human beings, electrons may be observed in the laboratory with speeds approaching that of light, and atomic physicists make frequent use of special relativity theory corrections. The relativist says that the astronomer's universe, though unbounded, is finite, that his space is curved, and that if his telescope were sufficiently powerful he could peer out into space and, following the light rays around the universe, see the back of his head, or rather the head of one of his antediluvian forbears in the animal kingdom.

Just as the same sun rose every morning for those who held to the theories of Ptolemy as it did for the disciples of Copernicus, so it matters little whether man drives his motor cars according to the dictates of Newton or those of Einstein. In practical affairs the two theories are indistinguishable; indeed Einstein averred that he was merely supplementing the work of his glorious predecessor. In the realm of thought, however, the difference is vast; the possibility of dealing with the very large by means of a fundamentally different geometry, and the possibility that time and space may be inseparably interrelated in dealing with the very fast, are quite novel. The Theory of Relativity has opened up these possibilities and has taught the scientist to scrutinize his fundamental postulates more closely. Herein lies its chief contribution to science.

Even though Einstein's expectation should prove unfounded and it should ultimately be found necessary to discard Newtonianism, what cause is there for concern provided a new cosmology be found that is self-consistent and based on the Principle of Causality? Newton, Einstein, De Sitter (D), or some other—what does it matter who furnishes the explanation so long as one exists?

The final test of validity, both of knowledge as a whole and of science as a department of knowledge, is self-consistency. Though Galileo and Newton destroyed the synthesis erected by Thomas Aquinas, their own systems were self-consistent; and even Relativity, with its threat to Newtonian physics, leaves the Principle of Causality unchallenged. In the closing year of the nineteenth century, however, Planck (G) threw a monkey wrench into the works with his Quantum Theory, as a corollary to which Heisenberg (G) enunciated his Principle of Uncertainty (1927). This unsettling hypothesis asserts that *in the realm of the ultramicroscopic* the Principle of Causality fails; not only are scientists at present unable to predict the behavior of *single* electrons, as Planck pointed out, but Heisenberg affirms that they never will be able to do so. Such phenomena can only be dealt with *en masse*, by the principle of probabilities—statistically, in other words, as the insurance agent deals with human beings. Today, therefore, the scientist is obliged to use classical (that is, standard) theory on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays and Quantum Theory on Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Saturdays, so to speak.

Scientists hasten to proclaim that this complication does not affect the problems of everyday existence and that the theory of probabilities as applied to electrons is sufficiently accurate for all practical purposes—more accurate, in fact, than ordinary measurements of large-scale objects. Quantum Theory is disquieting, notwithstanding, in that it disrupts the increasing effectiveness of the human mind that has been observed throughout recent history. Even if the implications of Quantum Theory and Heisenberg's Principle of Uncertainty

are of no practical importance, to cope with a problem by the statistical method is obviously not the same as to deal with it as a manifestation of the Law of Cause and Effect; and the change in method is a retrogression that upsets the Principle of Causality and leaves mankind headed for the Dark Ages *intellectually*, if not practically.

THE SCIENTIST AS PHILOSOPHER

What has the scientist to say of his work in its broader aspects, when he rests from his labors for a moment and turns philosopher? The nineteenth century scientist scorned philosophy and went his way (and let the philosopher go his) content with a common-sense realism and a naïve materialism. And it is the schism between science and philosophy—between science and knowledge as a whole—that leads some scientists to adopt a frankly pessimistic attitude. Whitehead (E) attributes the dilemma to the triumph of Newtonian mechanism, as a result of which “the world had got hold of a general idea which it could neither live with nor live without.” What he says of the position occupied by the mechanistic approach, though a handsome tribute, has a sting in the tail that renders it a decidedly left-handed compliment: “No alternative system of organising the pursuit of scientific truth has been suggested. It is not only reigning, but it is without a rival. And yet—it is quite unbelievable.” This modern Jeremiah therefore calls for a radical reorientation, and threatens mankind with direful penalties should they disregard his warning: “A civilization which cannot burst through its current abstractions is doomed to sterility after a very limited period of progress.”

The message delivered by the average philosopher-scientist does not *at first glance* appear radically different; moreover, it seems almost self-contradictory. This seeming contradiction is more apparent than real, however, for the philosopher-scientist accepts the divorce of science and philosophy with equanimity and his conclusions are imbued with a decided if quiet optimism.

First, on the basis of a critical analysis of the mathematical weapons that he wields and which are the necessary basis of all achievement in the physical sciences, the scientist is ready as a New Realist to affirm, against Kant, that the pictures he draws of the world do represent reality *so far as they go*. This in itself may seem strange, since in the ultimate analysis these pictures are to a greater or less extent based on probabilities. Indeed, the scientist is beginning to question whether there are such things as natural “laws”; all we can be sure of, he points out, is that natural laws are “routines of sensation,” based on probabilities. We believe in the Law of Cause and Effect because we have seen certain phenomena happening so invariably in conjunction that we infer they must be manifestations of a law; we *feel* certain, logically, that there is a law, but even more logically we cannot *be* certain. Thus inductive science can only draw conclusions that are more or less probable. “The odds in favour of much of it are very high, and, for the most part, rising rapidly.” And for the philosopher-scientist this is enough.

The foregoing partially explains why, secondly, the scientist at the same time admits that his picture is only an approximation which does not reveal *ultimate*

reality although it may approach it more closely year by year. The student of literature is reminded of Stevenson's "El Dorado" in reading Lewis's (A) evaluation of the aims and achievements of science:

The scientist . . . does not speak of the last analysis but rather of the next approximation. . . . If dissatisfied with any of his work, even if it be near the very foundations, he can replace that part without damage to the remainder. . . . While science may never be wholly right it certainly is never wholly wrong; and it seems to be improving from decade to decade. The theory that there is an ultimate truth, although very generally held by mankind, does not seem useful to science except in the sense of a horizon toward which we may proceed, rather than a point which may be reached.

And the scientist reminds us that, as evolutionists, we have no right to demand the (absolute) truth. The more concrete conclusions of science as seen through the eyes of Bertrand Russell (E) are as follows:

That man is the product of causes which had no prevision of the end they were achieving; that his origin, his growth, his hopes and fears, his loves and his beliefs, are but the outcome of accidental collations of atoms; that no fire, no heroism, no intensity of thought and feeling can preserve an individual life beyond the grave; that all the labours of all the ages, all the devotion, all the inspiration, all the noon-day brightness of human genius are destined to extinction in the vast death of the solar system, and that the whole temple of man's achievement must inevitably be buried beneath the debris of a universe in ruins—all these things, if not quite beyond dispute, are yet so nearly certain that no philosophy which rejects them can hope to stand.

Of twentieth century science as a whole the student of civilization may say that it is calling into question many of the axiomatic truths of the nineteenth century and that it is less dogmatic. Nineteenth century science abandoned the attempt to explain *why* things are so; twentieth century science has abandoned the attempt to explain *how* things are so. Its sole aim is to explain *what* things are so—in terms of mathematical formulae where it seeks to grapple with ultimate reality. And Quantum Theory means that to a certain extent science has abandoned even this modest undertaking.

To the average man, absorbed in making a living, the conclusions of pure science may seem decidedly remote and unimportant, except where they lead to inventions. What does it matter whether the universe is finite? whether it is made up of electromagnetic waves? or whether the earth will be uninhabitable in the course of some millions of millions of years? Doubtless the seeming remoteness of these conclusions from the business of everyday life goes far to account for the fact that we do not burn our scientists at the stake or shut them up in madhouses, as we would have done in the "good old days." We are also influenced by other factors: increasing recognition of the fact that we can burn men but not ideas, increase in tolerance, increase in indifference, and the triumph of the scientific attitude of mind.

It is interesting to reflect that to most of us the notions accepted by our ancestors of a few thousand or even a few hundred years ago and the notions of present-day scientists are equally unintelligible. The human mind is notoriously

averse to change, but change it does, though slowly and by such imperceptible degrees that until long after they are well established, we are unconscious of the more radical innovations. Our grandchildren of a few generations hence will perhaps accept electrons and their apparently abnormal behavior as calmly as we accept an earth that is round and moves, although both are contrary to common sense.

THE END OF THE GREAT PLAGUES

The history of medicine, above all, has demonstrated that "the truth shall make you free." Just as the invention of the voltaic pile a century earlier resulted in marvelous advances in electrical science, so the discoveries of Pasteur and Koch led to the crescendo of triumphs achieved by the preventive medicine of the twentieth century.

The distinctive work of Koch did not terminate with his discovery of the gelatin-plate method of making cultures. In the early '80's he discovered steam sterilization, an integral part of modern operating-room technique. In 1882 he made what is perhaps his most important contribution, the discovery of the germ of tuberculosis—for throughout the temperate zone the Great White Plague was at that time the most dreaded of all diseases. Though the disclosure did not result in an immediate or decisive victory, since no inoculation has yet been devised, he evolved a method of detecting the germ with certainty and thereby made it possible to reduce the mortality by nearly half, whereas up to that time the issue had been almost entirely in the hands of Fate. Koch also discovered the germ of cholera (1884)—in these last two accomplishments "far eclipsing all former discoveries, on account of the magnitude of the difficulties encountered and overcome."

Diphtheria was formerly the most dreaded of children's diseases, since a third of those afflicted died and a large percentage of the survivors were left with incurable aftereffects. The germ was identified (1883) by Klebs (G) and isolated (1884) by Löffler (G), and in 1894 Behring (G) introduced a serum which if used in time reduces the mortality to the vanishing-point. Thus Behring saved the lives of a thousand children a year in London alone and, even more than Pasteur, convinced the public of the value of inoculation. Later (1913) Schick (H-A) developed a test that shows whether a child is susceptible.

Particularly impressive have been the triumphs achieved over the great plagues, which once swept mankind away like flies. Until the mid-nineteenth century, typhus was one of the most persistent and worst; it is estimated that during 1914-15 at least 135,000 lost their lives in the Serbian epidemic. Nicolle's (F) discovery in 1913 that it is purely a filth disease, transmitted by lice, explains why it has virtually disappeared in civilized countries.

The most famous of the great epidemic diseases is the plague (bubonic plague or the Black Death); it carried off upwards of 25 per cent of the population of Europe in the fourteenth century, and in England 75 per cent of the inhabitants perished. It is particularly feared because recovery is so rare, the mortality running to 95 per cent or even higher. The germ was discovered (1894) by Kitasato (J) and Yersin (Ss) and three years later Koch demonstrated that

human beings acquire the disease through fleas from rats. From this point control became a matter of sanitation, which accounts for the fact that the plague is no longer a menace in most civilized countries, though even recently it has carried off nearly a million in a year in India (1904 and 1905).

In civilized countries cholera has been more virulent of late than the plague. It visited Europe and America from the East no less than seven times during the nineteenth century. In 1892 it spread overland from India to Russia and thence to Western Europe and America in less than five months. Fortunately, thanks to the development of sanitation and the discovery of the germ by Koch (1884), Europe was prepared to prevent such appalling tragedies as had occurred in earlier times. Water was known to be the main agent of propagation; and Altona, adjacent to it, had only 328 deaths (mostly refugees), while Hamburg, adjacent to it, had 8,605. Marked success has likewise been achieved in treating those afflicted, so that the mortality has been lowered from 60 to 40 per cent. Though cholera is no longer feared in Europe and America, a half-million still perished at times in a single year in India (1918 and 1919), where the natives still persist in such practices as drinking the sacred waters of the Ganges in which they bathe.

Similar triumphs have been achieved by the military authorities, though only since the Boer War. Some idea of the previous ravages of disease in armies may be gained from the following figures, giving the approximate ratios of death from disease to those from wounds: Russian campaign of 1828, 4 to 1; American campaign in Mexico, 7 to 1; French campaign in the Crimea, 4 to 1; Federal campaign against the Confederacy, 2 to 1; Prussian campaign of 1866, 4 to 3; American campaign against Spain, 5 to 1; British campaign against the Boers, 2 to 1. It is interesting to note that the first to reverse this situation were the Japanese, who lost only half as many from disease as from wounds in their campaign against Russia. Among the American forces in the World War the proportion was 4 to 11. (The mortality from wounds in the Union armies in the Civil War was nearly 15 per cent, whereas in the World War it was less than 5 per cent.)

Most of the deaths from disease during the Spanish-American and Boer wars were due to typhoid; Eberth (G) had discovered the germ in 1880, and in 1896 Wright (E) had introduced antityphoid inoculation, but this preventive had been neglected by army authorities. The incidence among uninoculated troops during the Avignon epidemic of 1911 was 225 per thousand, while the inoculated troops went absolutely unscathed. The incidence among the British troops in France during 1914-18 was only 1.1.

Tetanus (lockjaw) is dreaded not so much on account of the number afflicted, which is comparatively small, as because of the rarity of survival—tetanus bacteria being the most deadly of all—and because of the agonizing mode of death. It attacks through open wounds, and is therefore particularly dangerous to soldiers. The germ was discovered by Nicolaier (G) in 1884 and isolated by Kitasato in 1889, and an antitoxin was developed by Behring and Kitasato (1890). The administration of antitetanus serum during the war to all soldiers wounded, no matter how slightly, reduced the incidence to the vanishing-point.

Gunpowder enabled the white man to conquer his less "advanced" brother of the tropics, but for centuries a far more redoubtable antagonist rendered his hold on those regions precarious and miserable—disease. Almost overnight, knowledge of diseases and of sanitation revolutionized this situation.

The most potent of the enemies encountered by man in the tropics—or for that matter in the world at large—is malaria. This formidable disease carries off a million a year in India alone and is said to account for over half the deaths sustained by mankind as a whole! A new branch of medicine and sanitation was opened up in 1879 when Manson (S) proved that the mosquito is an essential link in the propagation of one of the tropical diseases; the following year Laveran (F) discovered the germ of malaria. Inspired by Manson, Ross (E) undertook to prove that the mosquito is also the agent of malarial infection. Though a doctor by profession, Ross was a poet and musician by inclination, with little knowledge of research and less of mosquitoes; his sole qualification for the task in hand was his unbounded enthusiasm. For three long years he labored in the sweltering tropic heat, jeered at by his colleagues. He discovered the germs in the stomachs of mosquitoes, but his experiments with human beings failed, and he only succeeded in proving that mosquitoes can transmit malaria to birds (1898)—a discovery that won him the Nobel Prize in Medicine. As frequently happens, the true discoverer was not the one to get the credit. Meanwhile Grassi (I), who had never heard of Ross, set to work. One of the points that had militated against the hypothesis advanced by Manson was the fact that mosquitoes are often present where there is no malaria. Grassi had observed this peculiar circumstance, but he had also observed that mosquitoes are always present along with malaria. He drew the logical deduction that malaria is due to mosquitoes, but also that only a special type or types are involved. After examining carefully many districts in Italy he decided that one, or possibly all, of three varieties must be the guilty insect. Dangerous laboratory experiments, in which he was assisted by loyal friends, narrowed the choice to the *Anopheles*. In the summer of 1900 Grassi chose one of the worst malarial sections of Italy for a decisive field experiment. He screened ten cottages in a little village and induced the 112 members of these ten households to remain indoors during the hours when the *Anopheles* was abroad. Though the 415 inhabitants of the neighboring dwellings succumbed almost to a man, only five of the 112 subjects selected by Grassi were ill (relapsed cases from the previous year, in all probability).

Next to malaria, yellow fever has done the most to render the tropics unfit for white habitation; there is a case on record of a 220-man British warship that lost 600 men in the course of a two years' cruise in the Caribbean; and the mortality among those afflicted in Rio in 1898 reached 94.5 per cent. In 1900 a United States Army commission, headed by Walter Reed, was sent to investigate the conditions under which the disease arises; all those engaged in the work risked their lives and some died. Though the germ has never been discovered, Reed proved that yellow fever also is transmitted by mosquitoes; preventive measures similar to those employed against malaria were instituted and wherever enforced have virtually eliminated the dread affliction.

The outstanding monument to man's conquest of the tropics—the outstand-

ing monument to preventive medicine as a whole—is the Panama Canal, a triumph of medical far more than of engineering skill. The plague-ridden isthmus that separated the Atlantic from the Pacific was shunned by white men until 1849, when the discovery of gold in California led to the construction of a railroad, every tie of which cost a human life. When the French undertook to build a canal, appalling losses among the workmen constituted the main factor that compelled them to abandon the attempt—but not until they had sacrificed a life for every cubic yard excavated. Whether Americans would succeed or whether they too would fail depended on their ability to cope with the same death-dealing obstacles; success crowned their efforts, thanks to Colonel Gorgas (A), who solved the problem confronting him by the strictest enforcement of sanitary regulations, which reduced the death rate from disease to 2.8 per thousand among whites (1912), and transformed a plague center into a health resort.

HORMONES AND VITAMINS

Preventive medicine aims at keeping us not only alive but well and happy while we live. The glands of the body discharge on the surface of the skin or the mucous membranes (for example, sweat glands), or into the blood stream, or both. The secretions discharged into the blood contain substances known as hormones, and the function of a hormone may be determined through removing the gland by which it is secreted or through administering extracts of the gland.

The history of hormonal therapy dates from the experiments of Schiff (G), who demonstrated (1856) that dogs deprived of the thyroid gland develop a condition known in the case of human beings as cretinism, a particularly repulsive form of idiocy. In 1884 Schiff further demonstrated that if fed with thyroid extract dogs can be cured of this malady. This treatment was successfully applied to the relief of human suffering (1891) by Murray and Howitz (E). Kendall (A) isolated the active principle of the thyroid hormone (1919), and Harington (E) succeeded in producing it synthetically (1926).

In 1894 Oliver and Schäfer (E) demonstrated that the suprarenal glands secrete adrenalin and that injections of adrenalin cause well-defined pathological symptoms. It was isolated in 1901 by Takamine (J), and has since been produced synthetically; the result is a drug valuable for checking the flow of blood and stimulating the heart. After it had been shown that failure of the parathyroid glands to function causes tetany—a nervous affection—Collip (C) obtained an extract by which tetany can be prevented (1925). Pathological effects resulting from disturbances of the pituitary gland have been similarly remedied.

The most beneficent consequences of hormone therapy are those connected with diabetes, a disease due to failure of the pancreas to secrete insulin. The many sufferers formerly dragged out a miserable existence on a highly restricted diet until they died. Banting and Best (C), with the assistance of Macleod (C), succeeded in extracting insulin from the pancreas (1921); and Collip originated a method for purifying the extract so that it can be administered without causing undue local irritation (1922).

Equally remarkable advances have been made in handling diseases of malnutrition. Rickets has brought death and suffering to numberless children; scurvy has done the same to countless adults as well as children, on land as well as on sea, in the years since the World War as well as long before; 500,000 cases of pellagra, 10 per cent of which were fatal, were recorded in the southern United States in the first two decades of this century; xerophthalmia is a dreaded disease of the eyes; beriberi is a form of polyneuritis endemic in tropical and semitropical areas.

As early as 1720 Kramer (An) prescribed "green vegetables . . . oranges, lemons, etc." for the prevention of scurvy; but when the scientific bases are unknown, such knowledge spreads slowly. Captain Cook was awarded the Copley Medal for a paper on the prevention of scurvy, an ever present menace on shipboard in the days of long sailing voyages; his remedy was variety in diet, including "sour kraute," lemon preserves, and fresh vegetables when procurable. British tars are known the world over as Limies because since 1795 the British navy has prescribed lime juice for its personnel in order to prevent scurvy. These were merely empirical cures; physicians of the late nineteenth and the early twentieth century attributed such diseases to bacteria, but failed to discover any.

In the early '80's, although the sanitary conditions on their ships were as good as on the European, a third of the sailors in the Japanese navy were sufferers from beriberi. Takaki evolved the theory that the disease was due to faulty diet, and in 1882 he was permitted to experiment with a training-ship. Polished rice was the staple food; Takaki substituted barley, meat, milk, and fresh vegetables, with the result that those who ate the modified ration escaped and that during the war with Russia not a case developed. The conclusion drawn, however, was that beriberi was due to deficiency in protein. Eijkmann (D), going a step further, demonstrated that the disease could be prevented by merely substituting unpolished for polished rice, but his explanation of the facts was vague.

A different and more fruitful line of investigation resulted from studies of normal nutrition. Lunin (G) inferred as an outcome of experiments on mice (1881) that "substances other than casein [protein], fat, milk, sugar [carbohydrate] and salts are indispensable" in the diet. Though this conclusion did not attract much attention at the time, it was abundantly confirmed through similar experiments conducted by Hopkins (E), 1906-12. Since milk contains all the elements mentioned, it is known as the perfect food; but Hopkins found that rats waste away if fed on a synthetic diet composed of the isolated (chemically pure) constituents of milk, even though provided in quantities amply sufficient to furnish energy. The addition of a minute quantity of cow's milk—two five-hundredths of a pint a day—kept the rats well. Such experiments led to the belief in the existence of infinitesimal and hitherto unknown "accessory food substances," which were named vitamins.

That butter will prevent rickets—a disease appearing when lard is substituted—but not beriberi raised a difficulty solved in 1915 when McCollum (A) demonstrated that there are at least two vitamins; further research has revealed at least six. Large amounts of Vitamin A, which prevents xerophthalmia, are to be had in certain special livers, more especially in salmon-liver oil and halibut-liver

oil, but also in cod-liver oil, and in green vegetables. Vitamin B₁, which prevents beriberi, is to be had in large quantities in yeast, eggs, and legumes; and in lesser quantities in liver, turnips, and green vegetables. The best sources of Vitamin B₂, which prevents pellagra, are yeast and lean meat. Large quantities of Vitamin C, which prevents scurvy, are to be had in green leaves and stems, citrous fruits, turnips, and tomato. Fish-liver oils are rich in Vitamin D, which prevents rickets. Vitamin E, which prevents sterility, is present in large amounts in lettuce and eggs. Until recently, knowledge of vitamins rested on empirical evidence, that is, their presence had never been detected but was merely inferred from the effects of certain foods. The isolation of Vitamin D has been announced (1932).

The greatest contribution of recent times to diagnosis was the discovery of the X-rays. Seldom if ever has a new development made itself felt so quickly; X-rays were used to locate a bullet in a patient's leg four days after news of the discovery reached America, and within three months the technique was in general use. Since they enable physicians to study the conditions of the stomach without operating—by simply "looking" inside the patient, as it were—X-rays are of special value in diagnosing internal maladies. They are also used in the treatment of certain malignant conditions.

As a result of these advances in medical science, during the first quarter of the twentieth century the death rate for children under five was cut in half in Western Europe and in America. The gain among those between the ages of twenty and twenty-five was almost as great; while for all ages taken together the death rate declined about one-third.

PRO HUMANITATE

A survey of modern culture should not neglect to emphasize that all our triumphs in invention, in engineering, and in conquering disease—all our material progress, in short—is based on researches conducted without thought of gain or even of utility. And in view of this fact, tribute should be paid to those—the few whose names have appeared and the many who for lack of space must remain nameless—whose devotion alone made these advances possible and who sacrificed youth, money, health, and not infrequently life itself (when they might have made fortunes) for the good of mankind. Their abnegation is the outstanding argument for the socialist contention that love of the truth, the joy of discovery, and the spirit of service should be and may be the foremost incentives to achievement.

FROM EDISON TO TELEVISION

Though the majority of the great inventions of today appeared in the nineteenth century, many of them came into general use only during the twentieth, and numberless extensions of the basic principles have been made and are constantly being made.

The two thousand candles required to light a Philadelphia ballroom in 1817 cost a hundred times as much as would be paid for the same amount of light

at the present time; little more than a century separates us from the day when Lincoln read by the light of an open fire; and a single electric-light socket of today furnishes more illumination than was available to the average household of a hundred years ago. This revolution is due to the incandescent electric bulb—the most important means of lighting, by far, in the average urban community—which resulted from parallel inventions by Edison (A) and Swan (E). After Davy had demonstrated the fundamental principle numerous attempts, beginning in 1820 with De la Rue (E), were made to construct incandescent electric lamps; some were actually in use, but prior to the invention of the Gramme generator all such attempts were doomed to commercial failure. One of the earliest experimenters was Swan.

For the vital element of his lamp, the filament, Edison used carbonized bamboo or bristol board, functioning in a vacuum made possible by Crookes's technique (1875) for employing Sprengel's (G) pump (1865). Swan's squirted filaments, which could be cut to any desired length, replaced bristol board. The first commercial installation of Edison lights was made in a private plant in 1880; but for incandescent electric lighting to be of wide use it was necessary to establish central power stations, and in 1882 such stations began operating in both hemispheres. In installing his stations, since arc lights worked in series and the failure or cutting-out of one broke the entire circuit, Edison had to construct his apparatus and evolve the technique from the ground up. Edison also developed a generator of a new type with an efficiency of 90 per cent; previous machines were only some 50 per cent efficient. Central stations, once installed, could furnish power for an infinite number of purposes beside lighting, though long-distance transmission did not appear until after Tesla (An-A) had invented his polyphase system (1888). Since it enabled factories to function as effectively in late winter afternoons, or even at night, as in the daytime, the incandescent electric light has been of enormous importance industrially. It is worth remembering that Edison had practically no schooling.

The last prime mover developed in the nineteenth century was the heavy-oil or crude-oil (internal-combustion) engine; the first of the type now in use was built in 1895 by Diesel (G). Though not very widely adopted as yet, it has been employed with outstanding success on ships, may save the railroad from going the way of the trolley, and has certain superlative advantages: it uses an extremely inexpensive fuel and very little of it (less than .4 pound per horse power per hour), and it is the most efficient of all heat engines.

Motion pictures, as everyone knows, are based on a deception of the senses made possible by "persistence of vision" for a fraction of a second; sixteen pictures a second, embodying the correct poses, give the illusion of motion. The history of motion pictures can therefore be traced to the first quarter of the nineteenth century when Roget (E) delivered a paper (1824) on "The Persistence of Vision with regard to Moving Objects"; he also wrote a paper on "Optical Deception in the Appearance of the Spokes of a Wheel Seen through Vertical Apertures." Such studies gave rise to the zoetrope, or wheel of life, and other familiar toys. From the wheel of life to modern motion pictures is a history too long and too complicated even to outline; the first attempt to combine the principles with photography was made (1860) by Sellers (A),

but success was virtually impossible prior to the invention of the celluloid film and the projector.

The transparent, flexible celluloid film, invented in 1887 by Goodwin (A), was of fundamental importance for both motion pictures and photography proper. Through it light could be projected, and as utilized by Edison it resulted in the kinetoscope (1889), a "peep-show" motion-picture machine playing to an audience of one. The exhibition of life-size pictures to regular audiences came with the invention of the projector. In 1895 Jenkins (A) invented a projector which he sold to Armat for \$5,700! The Paul machine made its appearance in England and the Lumière machine in France the same year. The projector is a device of almost unexampled ingenuity; it has to make at least sixteen pictures a second appear, stop, and proceed, and each picture must appear in *exactly* the same spot, must remain stationary longer than it is in motion, and must be magnified one hundred and twenty times or more. The Jenkins-Armat projector was taken over by Edison, was renamed for him, and was used to furnish an "act" in a vaudeville program in 1896. Motion pictures remained adjuncts to the stage until the opening of the twentieth century. A few tentative moving-picture theaters then opened; but it was not until 1905—simultaneously with the appearance of the first picture based on a plot—that the craze for nickelodeons struck the country. Full-length dramas arrived five years later. When the Strand opened on Broadway in 1914, the nickelodeon was superseded by a moving-picture theater aiming to compete with the legitimate stage.

Attempts were soon made to couple sound reproduction with "the pictures"; Edison, among others, achieved considerable technical but little commercial success. An enterprising and far-seeing entrepreneur, Sam Warner, threw the weight of his influence into the scheme in 1926; and in a few months the "talkies" had supplanted the silent pictures.

With the exception of radio the motion picture is today the world's greatest source of entertainment, the poor man's theater. Remote hamlets that could never have seen a legitimate performance can enjoy a grade of talent formerly available only on Broadway. Moreover, London and New York can see how Asia and Africa live (in reality as well as according to Hollywood). And throughout the length and breadth of the land "the man on the street," without leaving the town theater, can watch leaders in all walks of life as they make history, see how they look, hear them talk, and observe their mannerisms. In fact the talking pictures are the greatest "debunking" agency in existence.

"By taking thought" man has been extending his faculties far beyond their normal reach ever since the day when the invention of the bow enabled his cave-dwelling progenitor to "reach out" and hit a distant adversary. Already photography had improved the most faulty of his faculties, his memory—but only his visual memory; with the invention of the phonograph Edison removed the bar. Death had set to auditory memory. Paganini and Jenny Lind are gone, and their music with them, yet we can still recapture the magic of Caruso's "Celeste Aïda." Edison's invention dated from 1877, but a decade elapsed before it was put on the market, and another decade before the manufacture of records became a commercial success.

Though the phonograph was Edison's most original invention, nothing remains today but the basic idea. Edison made cylindrical records by the hill-and-dale method, that is, the tool that recorded the sounds cut up and down; Berliner (G-A) invented the disk record, which is lateral-cut, that is, the tool moves from side to side; and these were put on the market by the Victor Company in 1897. The greatest improvements in subsequent years were the "noiseless" record, electrical recording (1925), and the long-playing record (1931). Edison's invention has enabled everyone to enjoy the music of the world's greatest composers and artists when and where he will. For the owner of a phonograph Mengelberg, Toscanini, and Muck, Bach, Beethoven, and Wagner, stand ready to perform at a moment's notice.

The career of a genius of such versatility as Edison is an illuminating proof of the essentially cooperative nature of invention, on which such emphasis has been laid. Had Edison never lived, in all probability the only device of his we would be lacking is the phonograph!—and how little Edison contributed to that machine as it exists today has been seen.

. To the uninitiated these groups of three little dots, wafted through space, mean nothing; yet to straining ears on the shores of far-distant Newfoundland they meant the realization of man's latest dream. It was the opening year of the twentieth century, and the sounds were coming from two thousand miles away across the Atlantic. Not even the slender thread of a cable to convey them. Wireless!

What lay back of this new magic? A train of thought as long as those back of countless other inventions: Faraday with his hypothesis of the identity of electricity and light; Maxwell proving it mathematically and proclaiming that electricity travels through space with the speed of light; Hertz creating and demonstrating his electrical waves; and then Crookes in the *Fortnightly Review* (1892), "Here, then, is revealed the bewildering possibility of telegraphy without wires, posts, cables, or any of our present appliances," and giving an exact description of the steps to be accomplished.

Finally Marconi (I). Five years before bridging the Atlantic, when barely of age, he had begun experimenting and had succeeded in transmitting signals about a mile. Only five years! His apparatus included a Righi transmitter and a Lodge-Branly receiver. Less than a decade after he had spanned the Atlantic he was sending messages six thousand miles, and before the end of the World War England and Australia were in communication.

The most remarkable invention in the history of wireless since Marconi began his work is the De Forest (A) tube, which made long-distance transmission possible and revolutionized the telephone as well. By means of a number of these tubes currents can be magnified by successive steps 3,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 times. The stages in the development of long-distance telephony may be indicated thus: Boston to Cambridge (1876); Boston to New York (1884); New York to Chicago (1892); New York to San Francisco (1915). The De Forest tube also made it possible to transmit several conversations simultaneously over the same wire.

By comparison with the cable wireless has several advantages: it is quicker, cheaper, transmits to any number of listeners at the same time; and above all

it is the only means of reaching those whose location is unknown. During 1927 one wireless station, in competition with fourteen cables, transmitted 20 per cent of the messages between Great Britain and the United States. Last but by no means least, the wireless has saved thousands of voyagers; the passengers and crew of the *Republic* (1909), 900 survivors of the ill-fated *Titanic* (1912), 500 survivors of the *Volturno* (1913), and so on, and so on.

But signaling by wireless was not enough; men wanted to hear each other talk—to telephone—by wireless. When Fessenden (A) invented the wireless telephone or radio (1903), did he dream of the Metropolitan Opera's performing for audiences of many million? Probably not. Before the introduction of the De Forest tube Fessenden could telephone ten miles. In 1915 the human voice was transmitted through the air from Arlington to Honolulu—almost five thousand miles. Commercial broadcasting began in 1920, and in 1927 telephone service was begun between England and the United States. And now, topping all and enabling us to see as well as hear people on the other side of mountains and oceans, comes television.

As a means of education or propaganda the potentialities of radio and television for good or for evil are almost boundless. Politicians of today can reach a greater number of constituents in a single evening than their predecessors could in an entire campaign. Statesmen can expound their policies by word of mouth to an entire nation, and across the seas to other nations. As an illustration of the way in which radio has transformed the world, the author, who was in America at the time, first heard of the death of Edison through London. Finally, radio is the world's greatest source of entertainment—and exasperation.

FROM LENOIR TO FORD

The age-long evolution of vehicular transportation is marked by three outstanding steps: the pre-Christian invention of the wheel, the invention of the steam railroad, and the invention of the gasoline automobile. The sedan chair was in use in Glasgow as late as 1848; the rickshaw and the wheelbarrow are still the chief means of conveyance in China. The development of locomotion parallels that of motive power, and the evolution of the present-day automobile is inseparably linked with that of the internal-combustion engine; for this reason the Dutch wind carriage (about 1600) and the steam automobile need be mentioned only incidentally. Since the days of Cugnot's steam carriage men have been striving to perfect the automobile, but as Cugnot's machine was excessively slow and cumbersome the period of useful development began with Trevithick of locomotive fame; the rise of the steam engine and the steam railroad were bound to stimulate inventors of vehicles to run without rails. Considerable success was attained. One of Hancock's (E) steam coaches ran 4,200 miles and carried 12,761 passengers in a period of three months (1839), and a Bollée coach made 22 miles an hour between Paris and Vienna in 1878. A steam automobile won an easy first in an important race at the close of the century (1897), and steam was—and still is—considered by many the ideal power for motor vehicles.

Without the pneumatic tire the automobile would be little better than the


horseless carriage of the Victorian Era. The pneumatic inner-tube tire was invented about 1845 by Thompson (E), one of those inventors who are unlucky enough to be born before their time; in his day there were few automobiles and bicycles to create a demand. During the bicycle craze it was reinvented (1887) by Dunlop (S), who thus enabled automobiles to ride on air.

The first vehicle driven by an internal-combustion engine (1862) was constructed by Lenoir (F); but as it only attained a speed of about 3 miles an hour, the cumbersome steam engine was not seriously threatened by the cumbersome Lenoir motor. Not until Daimler (G) invented his (comparatively) light, high-speed engine in 1885 did the steam automobile become potentially obsolete. The process of evolving a suitable type of body and applying the motor to it was slow and was carried out by the trial-and-error method. Experiments were made with bicycles, tricycles, ordinary carriages; and some time elapsed before manufacturers realized that a fundamentally new and stronger system of construction was required. Prominent among the early inventor-manufacturers were Benz (G) and Panhard & Levassor (using a Daimler motor). To this Parisian firm is due the chief credit for evolving the existing type of automobile body. The float-feed carburetor, invented in 1893 by Maybach (G), marked an important step in the solving of the fuel problem.

The first road competition, designed to test reliability only, was held in 1894, the course being from Paris to Rouen, a distance of 78 miles; 102 cars entered, 77 took part, and 17 finished. The horse power of the winning car was 3.5 (its speed 12 miles an hour). The following year a race from Paris to Bordeaux and back was held; 46 cars entered, 22 competed, and 9 covered the entire 732 miles. The winner made 15 miles an hour. A speed of 23 miles an hour was attained in 1897, and in 1901 a 60-horse-power Panhard made 53 miles an hour.

The automobile was, so far, merely a toy for the rich and might have remained such had it not been for Ford, the Father of the Automobile Age, who did more than all of his predecessors combined to put the horse in the museum. "The single invention of the automobile has in the last fifteen years [1911-1926] altered rural life far more fundamentally than anything in the last thousand years." The son of an immigrant, Henry Ford (born 1863), began work at the age of sixteen as a mechanic, on a salary of \$2.50 a week. By assisting a jeweler in the evening he earned \$2 a week additional. Later (1887) he began experimenting with the making of automobiles at home, the first a steam car; and he formed two companies (1897-) prior to establishing the one that bears his name. He founded his own company in 1903, though the (two) Dodge brothers at first did the actual manufacturing, for which they received fifty shares of Ford stock apiece.

In Ford's opinion, cars could be produced so cheaply by mass production (Whitney's system of interchangeable parts) that it would be possible to sell large numbers on a small margin of profit and make more money than by selling an expensive product to a select few. Results amply justified his policy. The first year 1,153 Fords were sold—a very considerable number for that day, even though a mere nothing judged by present standards. Seven years elapsed after the introduction of the Model T (1908) before 1,000,000 had been sold; but the company was producing 2,000,000 a year in 1926, and at the peak of



Courtesy of Keystone Tractor Company

MECHANIZED AGRICULTURE

during the war and helped to keep 1,000,000 men on reserve in the British Isles; one of them made a nonstop flight of 4,225 miles to German East Africa and back (1917). By the end of the war Germany had constructed over a hundred Zeppelins, but the Treaty of Versailles forbade her to have any in her possession.

Consequently the first airship to cross the Atlantic—following immediately after the first airplane—was not a Zeppelin but the British R-34. As the result of a series of appalling fatalities, however, the British gave up the construction of this type of craft. The Germans subsequently constructed a new and greater ship, the *Graf Zeppelin* (770 feet long), which by its famous round-the-world flight of 1929 made an enviable record. The first trip around the world was that of the Magellan expedition, which took 37 months. By the end of the nineteenth century the time had been reduced to 67 days 12 hours. The *Graf Zeppelin* made the trip from Lakehurst to Lakehurst, 19,500 miles with only three stops, in 21 days 7 hours 26 minutes total elapsed time, 12 days actual flying time. From Friedrichshafen to Friedrichshafen the distance was well over 20,000 miles and the elapsed time less than three weeks.

In 1931 a new record for altitude was established by Piccard and Kipfer (Ss). In a balloon with a specially constructed, air-tight gondola they ascended into the stratosphere, attaining a height of 51,793 feet (almost 10 miles), made scientific observations on the cosmic rays, and demonstrated that it is possible for man to exist, for a time at least and with the aid of oxygen tanks, in that rarefied atmosphere. In 1932 Professor Piccard ascended a full ten miles above the surface of the earth.

PILOTLESS LINERS, ROBOTS, AND BRASS BRAINS

In recent years navigation has profited immeasurably from the work of scientists. The magnetic compass—one of the few inventions of medieval times—was a fairly dependable and satisfactory instrument in sailing ships made of wood, even though it never indicated true north and was constantly varying from magnetic north. With the advent of steam engines and iron ships it became unreliable and difficult to use on account of local disturbances. The first radical improvement was the gyro-compass, which acts on an entirely different principle by utilizing the gyroscope to harness the rotation of the Earth. In addition to being insensible to local magnetism it has the outstanding advantage of indicating true north. Sperry's (A) gyro-compass, the type most widely used, was the product (1911) of fifteen years' labor. Incidentally, it has other important uses. For instance, "every shot which the British fleet fired at Jutland was directed by a Sperry gyroscopic compass." For a decade ships have been able to proceed from port to port across our greatest oceans without the touch of a hand on the helm and, in so doing, to keep a more exact course than if guided by a helmsman; this astonishing development is due to the gyro-pilot, invented by Sperry (1922) as an outgrowth of his work on the gyro-compass.

Because of the difficulties formerly involved in taking soundings few charts are free from inaccuracies, and vessels are lost every year because of such inaccuracies or failure to take soundings. The age-old method of sounding with a

lead requires skill, consumes time, and necessitates the slowing-down of the vessel. These disadvantages have been eliminated by echo-sounding, invented by Fessenden (1914), who used an oscillator to produce sounds under water and timed the echo from the ocean bed with a stop watch. It merely remained to perfect a device that would perform this operation accurately and automatically, and several have been developed. When once started, they function until stopped, and it is only necessary for the navigator to look at the dial in order to know the depth of water. Since the soundings are taken at full speed—whereas in extreme depths it previously required five or six hours for a single sounding—the echo-sounder has revolutionized the making of charts. A decade ago (1922), on a trip from Newport, Rhode Island, to Gibraltar, the *U.S.S. Stewart*, equipped with an echo-sounder designed by Hayes (A), recorded 900 depths. Shortly afterward a German vessel took more soundings in the South Atlantic on a single expedition than had been made in that area by all earlier sounding expeditions. Wireless, also, has proved of great value not only in facilitating the rescue of vessels in distress but in preventing wrecks by providing ships with their bearings (D/F, or direction-finding).

Since the idea gained currency that free-flowing supplies of oil were unlimited, the drilling of a free-flowing well in 1859 was a misfortune for the petroleum industry from a technical standpoint. Distillation of coal and shale received a tremendous setback in the face of such competition; the Scottish industry continued to function, but the petroleum plants in America were able to survive only by turning to refining. In general, inefficiency and waste prevailed. Recently we have begun to realize that we were living in a fools' paradise, for the twentieth century has witnessed an appalling dissipation of the visible supplies of oil as a result of the tremendous increase in motor cars and motor-driven machinery, the invention of aircraft, and the introduction of oil-burning marine engines (about 1914). As fuel for ships oil has outstanding advantages over coal: it can be loaded more easily, more quickly, and more inexpensively; it occupies only about half the space, leaving more room for cargo; it can be kindled and extinguished instantly; finally, it does away with stoking and thereby saves both wages and human waste. The question of petroleum production and conservation became vital. Were the motor car and the airplane, to say nothing of the Machine Age as a whole, doomed to extinction?

In 1905 plants were established for the recovery of gasoline from natural gas, a product known as casing-head gasoline. Mounting rapidly, the output was 7,000,000 gallons in 1911, 100,000,000 in 1916, and 200,000,000 in 1917. A second solution to the problem of the petroleum supply was the invention by Burton (A) of a "cracking" process that greatly increased the percentage of gasoline obtained from crude oil; within two decades after its introduction in 1913 about half the gasoline in use was "cracked," at a saving of 1,000,000,000 barrels of crude oil a year. The United States at present produces about 70 per cent of the world's petroleum; with Mexico and Russia, over 90 per cent. These figures and the importance of this great natural resource explain the Struggle for Oil which has played a not unimportant part in the international politics of both prewar and postwar days.


When we read that Albertus Magnus, Roger Bacon, and Descartes built automats capable of opening doors and playing musical instruments, which is the stronger, admiration for our own accomplishments or the feeling that after all there is nothing new under the sun? The men of the Middle Ages dreamt of transmuting base metals into gold; we of today no longer spend our time in the pursuit of alchemy, but we transform the "base" metals into machines more valuable than all the gold in the world. Similarly, medievalists sought to create robots that would answer their beck and call; but serious inventors—realizing that no robot, however lifelike in appearance, can combine all the functions performed by a human being—now reserve their time for more fruitful endeavors. Their energies are devoted to the creation of more and more automatic machinery for the performance of a given number of predetermined functions—for example, processing machines, sensitive to temperature and humidity, which control an entire cycle of operations, starting and stopping materials in accordance with a time schedule and showing a green light at the conclusion or a red one if anything goes wrong.

Consider a plant for the manufacture of automobile frames. Production begins with an automatic inspection machine which receives strip steel—delivered from freight cars by cranes at the rate of 900 pieces an hour—checks each piece for length, breadth, thickness, and curvature, straightens any that are bent, rejects those which are not up to specification, and sorts the remainder in piles according to size. Production is continued by other automatic machines until the finished frames emerge a couple of hours later, one every ten seconds.

Cigarettes are made by machines that turn out 50,000 an hour, and even machine tools are produced automatically, 355 to 2,880 pieces an hour. Machine production, besides saving time and expense, is vastly more sanitary than hand production. Milking is done by machinery, and the milk and cream are segregated by separators, cooled by mechanical refrigerators, and machine-bottled at the rate of fifty bottles a minute. Bread likewise reaches the consumer without ever having been touched by human hands.

Some modern robots, though bearing no resemblance to human beings, are astonishingly human in their functioning; the most remarkable, perhaps, is the televox, which was invented by Wensley (A) in 1927. Three of these mechanical "men," named Adam, Cain, and Abel, are on duty in Washington supervising the water supply. They were designed for use in substations of public-service companies, to obviate the necessity for special wires to the central plant, and are therefore endowed with the ability to "answer" the phone. When the bell rings, recent models reply, "Televox speaking." Then, in buzzer code, they can report, "It's hot," or, "It's cold," answer questions in regard to meter readings, heights of water, and positions of valves or switches, and in execution of commands start and stop machines, open and close switches, and so on. When the "conversation" is completed, televox "hangs up." It can even initiate a call by lifting the receiver and saying, "This is the televox calling for Main 5000." Here is a slave that never sleeps or tires, that works 24 hours a day, 365 days in the year, and that is useful wherever and as far as the telephone reaches.

It is said that the automobile is depriving us of the use of our legs; this is serious if true, but what about the machines that are doing our thinking for



XXII. DENSITY AND GROWTH OF POPULATION

